People tend spontaneously to think about the evidence that supports their beliefs, which leads them to judge their beliefs as outside their control, but they apparently fail to generalize this sense of constraint to others

Cusimano, C., & Goodwin, G. P. (2020). People judge others to have more voluntary control over beliefs than they themselves do. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 119(5), 999–1029. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000198

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319660071383597056

Abstract: People think other individuals have considerable control over what they believe. However, no work to date has investigated how people judge their own belief control, nor whether such judgments diverge from their judgments of others. We addressed this gap in 7 studies and found that people judge others to be more able to voluntarily change what they believe than they themselves are. This occurs when people judge others who disagree with them (Study 1) as well as others who agree with them (Studies 2–5, 7), and it occurs when people judge strangers (Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5) as well as close others (Studies 3 and 7). It appears not to be explained by impression management or self-enhancement motives (Study 3). Rather, there is a discrepancy between the evidentiary constraints on belief change that people access via introspection, and their default assumptions about the ease of voluntary belief revision. That is, people tend spontaneously to think about the evidence that supports their beliefs, which leads them to judge their beliefs as outside their control. But they apparently fail to generalize this sense of constraint to others, and similarly fail to incorporate it into their generic model of beliefs (Studies 4–7). We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of ideology-based conflict, actor–observer biases, naïve realism, and ongoing debates regarding people’s actual capacity to voluntarily change what they believe. 

Watson and Rayner’s (1920) attempt to condition a fear of furry animals and objects in an 11-month-old infant is one of the most widely cited studies in psychology (the Little Albert study)

Powell, R. A., & Schmaltz, R. M. (2020). Did Little Albert actually acquire a conditioned fear of furry animals? What the film evidence tells us. History of Psychology, OCt 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/hop0000176

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319655372257447937

Abstract: Watson and Rayner’s (1920) attempt to condition a fear of furry animals and objects in an 11-month-old infant is one of the most widely cited studies in psychology. Known as the Little Albert study, it is typically presented as evidence for the role of classical conditioning in fear development. Some critics, however, have noted deficiencies in the study that suggest that little or no fear conditioning actually occurred. These criticisms were primarily based on the published reports of the study. In this article, we present a detailed analysis of Watson’s (1923) film record of the study to determine the extent to which it provides evidence of conditioning. Our findings concur with the view that Watson and Rayner’s conditioning procedure was largely ineffective, and that the relatively weak signs of distress that Albert does display in the film can be readily accounted for by such factors as sensitization and maturational influences. We suggest that the tendency for viewers to perceive the film as a valid demonstration of fear conditioning is likely the result of expectancy effects as well as, in some cases, an ongoing mistrust of behaviorism as dehumanizing and manipulative. Our analysis also revealed certain anomalies in the film which indicate that Watson engaged in some “literary license” when editing it, most likely with a view toward using the film mainly as a promotional device to attract financial support for his research program.

The severest depressive symptoms lower the probability of voting by 0.05–0.25 points, an effect that is exceeded only by education and age; negatively affect most strongly affect physically demanding acts

Democracy and Depression: A Cross-National Study of Depressive Symptoms and Nonparticipation. CLAUDIA LANDWEHR (a1) and CHRISTOPHER OJEDA. American Political Science Review, October 19 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000830

Abstract: Depression is the most common mental health disorder. It has consequences not only on individuals but also on social and political levels. We argue that depressive symptoms impair political participation by reducing the motivation and physical energy of sufferers. We test our hypotheses by conducting regression analyses of four nationally representative cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys that collectively span many democracies. Our results are threefold. First, we find that the severest depressive symptoms lower the probability of voting by 0.05–0.25 points, an effect that is exceeded only by education and age. Second, we show that depressive symptoms negatively affect political interest and internal efficacy, thereby confirming that they diminish political motivation. Third, we find that depressive symptoms most strongly affect physically demanding acts, thereby confirming that they reduce the physical energy required for participation. We conclude by urging scholars to take depressive symptoms seriously in the study of political behavior.

Believing in Neuromyths Makes Neither a Bad Nor Good Student‐Teacher: The Relationship between Neuromyths and Academic Achievement in Teacher Education

Believing in Neuromyths Makes Neither a Bad Nor Good Student‐Teacher: The Relationship between Neuromyths and Academic Achievement in Teacher Education. Georg Krammer  Stephan E. Vogel  Roland H. Grabner. Mind, Brain, and Education, October 23 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/mbe.12266

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319554214780174336

Abstract: Neuromyths have been discussed to detrimentally affect educational practice, but the evidence for this assumption is still very scarce. We investigated whether 255 student‐teacher' beliefs in neuromyths are related to their academic achievement (overall grade point averages and first‐year practical courses). Believing or rejecting neuromyths that make no direct assumptions about learners' educability was not related to academic achievement. Believing in neuromyths that explicitly deny the educability of learners was only marginally related to academic achievement. We conclude that self‐reported beliefs in neuromyths do not differentiate between high‐ and low‐achieving initial teacher education students.

Check also Neuromyths are prevalent and independent of the knowledge of the human brain at the beginning of teacher education. Georg Krammer, Stephan E. Vogel, Tugba Yardimci, Roland H. Grabner. Zeitschrift für Bildungsforschung, Apr 8 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/05/neuromyths-are-prevalent-and.html

Retrograde amnesia: Would patients accept to go to a new home home if they were falsely told it was their home? Or accept affection from people to whom they were introduced as close relatives but were actors?

Cubelli R, Beschin N, Della Sala S, Retrograde amnesia: A Selective Deficit Of Explicit Autobiographical Memory. CORTEX, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2020.10.003

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319526944925487104

In patients with retrograde amnesia (RA), declarative memory is severely impaired for events that occurred prior to onset of the disorder. Implicit memory might be preserved (Kopelman, 2002), but it is usually tested with priming or procedural learning tasks (Kopelman and Kapur, 2001) that reveal sparing of memory for anterograde events. That is, these tasks assess memory for episodes which happened after the onset of RA. As such, they are appropriate to investigate implicit memory in anterograde amnesia (Schacter, 2019), not in RA.

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LZ acknowledged his lack of empathy towards his wife and his lack of paternal feelings towards his children, aged 15, 13 and 9. Yet he eagerly accepted that they were his family and behaved accordingly. This is a common trait of several RA patients. Researchers and clinicians accept this as a fact. Yet, to other observers this is astounding. Would RA patients eagerly accept to go home, if shown a completely different house, and were falsely told it was their home? Would they accept affection from people to whom they were introduced as close relatives but who were played by actors? Obviously, these thought experiments would be highly unethical...

RA does not entail loss of previously acquired skills, including syntax, and semantic knowledge, including lexicons, nor it is characterized by overt change in habits or emotions. True RA cases should present not only with preserved procedural memory but also with spared access to the entire gamut of implicit memories, quite independently of their verbal reporting. RA patients should not face overt feelings of estrangement when returning home or when mingling with relatives and friends. Therefore, the lack of access to the vast array of implicit memories, procedural, semantic or behavioural, would suggest malingering (e.g., Kurth, 1983; Zago et al. 2004).

In non-scientific parlance, RA is often depicted as sparing procedural memories (Della Sala and Brazzelli, 1998; Baxendale S. BMJ. 2004 Dec 18; 329(7480): 1480–1483). Rarely though other aspects of implicit memory, as above defined, are contemplated. A telling exception is portrayed in Figure 2 taken from a comic crime story of a RA patient who does not recognize his fiancée, yet feels for her and finds solace in her company (see Fig.2).