How Do Partisans Consume News on Social Media? A Comparison of Self-Reports With Digital Trace Measures Among Twitter Users. Jieun Shin. Social Media + Society, December 18, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120981039
Abstract: There are growing concerns that social media exacerbates the selective exposure of audience members to content that supports their political views. However, despite the hype, the existing literature does not fully address the extent to which social media users selectively consume like-minded news stories, in part due to different methodologies. In an attempt to move toward a common framework, this study examined the partisan selective exposure of a representative sample of Twitter users by combining survey data with digital trace data. Specifically, the study linked survey responses (n = 558) from Twitter users with their media following and exposure to news via their friends. The study found that selectivity bias was present in all types of data, including self-reported media consumption (survey), media following (Twitter), and indirect exposure to media (Twitter). However, the study found some differences between self-reports and digital measures such that the overlaps in media diets between partisan groups were much larger based on the digital trace data than the self-reported data. In addition, the study observed an asymmetric pattern of selective exposure between conservatives and liberals in the digital trace data, but not in the self-reported data. The implications of these findings are discussed with reference to the contemporary news environment, hostile media effects, and normative assumptions of selective exposure.
Keywords selective exposure, social media, asymmetric politics, news diets, partisanship
This study investigated whether Twitter users selectively consumed ideological news media by linking survey responses from US Twitter users with their behavioral data. First, the study found that an individual’s political ideology was significantly associated with ideological bias in news consumption in all types of data, which included self-reported media consumption on Twitter (survey), media following (digital trace), and indirect exposure to media via friends (digital trace). Conservatives were significantly more likely to use right-wing media sources, whereas liberals were more likely to use left-wing media sources. In fact, of all variables that were included in the three tested models, an individual’s political identity was by far the strongest predictor of ideological media use. A partisan’s preference for congenial media consumption has been extensively shown in previous studies (Garrett, 2009; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Peterson et al., 2019; Stroud, 2008). However, this study demonstrated that this pattern holds for various types of media measures when drawing on a representative sample of Twitter users.
However, despite the significant association between political ideology and media diet at the individual level, the distribution of media slants between two partisan groups overlapped much more in the digital trace data than in the self-reported data. The OVL coefficients in the trace data, which included both following and exposure through friends, were almost two times larger than those of the self-reported data. This finding may be due to the possibility that self-reported media consumption is biased in a direction that mirrors the political identity of the individual (Brenner & DeLamater, 2016). On the contrary, actual media following and exposure via friends on Twitter may be influenced by other factors (e.g., media popularity, reputation, and trending topics) that deviate from the partisan motivation of the individual. Such a finding is consistent with previous studies that observed a moderate level of cross-cutting media exposure on social media (Bakshy et al., 2015; Eady et al., 2019). Similarly, a line of research using a network approach to audience overlap (Mukerjee et al., 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017) showed a strong common set of media repertoires among individuals across the spectrum.
Focusing on the overall convergence or divergence in media diets between partisans can shed additional light on the selective exposure phenomenon. Traditionally, studies investigating selective exposure (e.g., Iyengar & Hahn, 2009) primarily focused on the directional relationship between partisanship and ideological media choices. That is, Democrats are more likely to select liberal media, whereas Republicans are more likely to select conservative media. However, as Guess (2020) pointed out, “the literature on partisan selective exposure is largely silent on the question of how much of a preference for congenial content is acceptable or desirable” (p. 15). Although there is currently no consensus on this issue, accumulating references over time and across different platforms may be a starting point for more discussion around this topic.
Furthermore, this study observed an asymmetric pattern of selective exposure between conservatives and liberals in actual media consumption. Based on the self-reported data, both groups of partisan respondents similarly indicated their congenial media bias. However, comparing the levels of pro-attitudinal media exposure between partisan groups revealed that liberals’ selective exposure was statistically higher than that of conservatives’ selective exposure. That is, whereas the self-reported data showed a mirroring pattern between partisan groups departing from the neutral point, conservatives’ actual media following and exposure were shifted toward the liberal side of the spectrum. In addition, the study found that for conservatives, although the most influential media outlet was Fox News both in terms of following and indirect exposure, the top 10 most-followed and most-encountered news sources included liberal-leaning outlets such as CNN, the NYT, and the Washington Post. By contrast, the top 10 news sources for liberals did not include any conservative sources, even Fox News.
However, this finding does not necessarily suggest that conservatives have a higher tolerance toward a different point of view. A large body of literature has generally found that conservatives tend to be less tolerant of ideological outgroups (Ganzach & Schul, 2020) and ambiguity than liberals (Jost, 2017). Then, how can we explain this seemingly inconsistent finding? Several possible explanations exist. First, the current media echo-system is characterized by few prominent conservative news sources, with the exception of Fox News (Faris et al., 2017; Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016). Previous studies (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2014) have shown that whereas liberals trust a wide array of news sources, such as CNN, MSNBC, NYT, and WP, which are relatively long-standing and mainstream media sources, conservatives name only a single news source (Fox News) as their trusted media outlet. Due to such limited options, conservatives may consume news media that seems to be ideologically inconsistent. Alternatively, the Twitter environment itself may be a contributing factor. As this study and a Pew Research study (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019) have found, more Twitter users seem to be liberals (i.e., Democrats) than conservatives (i.e., Republicans). This imbalance may promote the visibility of liberal-leaning media through user media sharing compared with conservative-leaning media.
The findings of this study have implications for the effects of media on partisans and offer an opportunity to debate whether selective exposure to diverse opinion is normatively positive. Using field experiments, Bail et al. (2018) observed that when social media users are exposed to opposing political views, they become even more extreme in their views. This backfire effect was stronger for Republicans. Such a finding seems to be related to a stronger hostile media effect among Republicans than Democrats (Lin et al., 2016; Shin & Thorson, 2017). Similarly, numerous surveys have shown that conservatives place less trust in mainstream news media than liberals (Gallup, 2018; Jurkowitz et al., 2020). This stronger hostile media perception among conservatives could potentially result in them resorting to unsubstantiated information sources such as disinformation campaigns (Hjorth, Adler-Nissen, 2019).
Methodologically, this study advances our understanding of selective exposure on social media by linking self-reported estimates of media consumption with digital trace data. Media scholars (Garrett, 2013; Prior, 2013) have called for objective measures of selective exposure via tracking data due to biases observed in self-reported responses. For this reason, digital trace data are increasingly being used as an alternative to surveys. However, tracking data alone have drawbacks, such as a lack of accurate demographic information (e.g., even a simple task as to whether the account is a bot or a human). In addition, there are ethical challenges associated with the use of digital trace data such as obtaining consent from the users (Williams et al., 2017). Therefore, a combination of both approaches can make an important contribution to the literature. Consistency or inconsistencies arising from different measures are real opportunities to enhance our understanding of selective exposure, rather than rejecting one form in favor of another (Garrett, 2013).
In this study, some incongruencies between self-reports and digital trace were documented. In particular, conservatives’ shift toward the left in their news consumption in the digital trace data compared with the self-reported data deserves more attention. This suggests a gap between what survey respondents report and what they actually do on social media. Ascertaining a source of the gap could help us better understand ideological selective exposure.
This study has several limitations. First, the study used a predefined set of news outlets to measure the slant in media diets for news following and exposure via friends, whereas respondents were asked to self-report their ideological news consumption using approximate proportions. When answering this survey question, respondents may have considered other outlets that were not included in the predefined set. In particular, a retrospective assessment of ideological media consumption can be susceptible to biased responses. Future research is needed to compare other self-reported measures of media consumption, such as name listing or open-ended survey prompts, to improve the accuracy of the results. In addition, the findings were drawn from a relatively small sample of Twitter users (maximum 558 users in the full sample, 255 users in the overlapping sample) who opted to provide their account information. Future studies are needed to expand the sample size to more accurately assess the demographics and media behaviors of Twitter users.
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the literature of selective exposure by examining various measures of media consumption among social media users. The findings of this study provide overall support for the principle of selective exposure at the individual level. However, it was also found that the average media diets of the left and the right overlap considerably. This finding offers important implications for current debates about the prevalence of selective exposure on social media. These findings warrant more research on the various factors (e.g., Messing & Westwood, 2014) influencing the news choices of social media users in conjunction with political motivation.
Furthermore, this study provided some evidence of asymmetric media behavior between the left and the right. This suggests that the extent of cross-cutting media exposure could be different between conservatives and liberals. Selective exposure and partisan polarization have traditionally been treated as symmetrical concepts. This asymmetric pattern requires further investigation regarding the causes as well as the consequences. In particular, the consequences of frequently consuming challenging information deserve more attention, including a hostile perception of the media and lack of trust in journalism.
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