Rolf Degen summarizing... Atheism is as much a part of the original state of the human mind as is belief in god

New Cognitive and Cultural Evolutionary Perspectives on Atheism. Thomas J. Coleman III, Kyle Messick, Valerie van Mulukom. In The Routledge Handbook of Evolutionary Approaches to Religion, January 2021. https://psyarxiv.com/ze5mv

Rolf Degen's take: Atheism is as much a part of the original state of the human mind as is belief in god

1. Introduction 

Atheism is a topic that has only recently attracted the attention of evolutionarily minded scholars. In this chapter, we will present the current issues with the study of atheism from an evolutionary perspective. 

Attempts to place atheism into an evolutionary framework have followed a methodological direction that, we argue, may have stymied inquiry thus far: the idea that the best starting place to develop an explanation of atheism is by building on explanations of theism (e.g., Barrett, 2004, 2010; Bering, 2002, 2010; Johnson, 2012; Kalkman, 2013; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Mercier, Krammer, & Shariff, 2018). Under this view, atheism is situated at the low end of a psychological continuum of religiosity and/or is a result of malfunctioning cognitive capacities that, if working normally, would produce religious belief (cf. Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Weekes-Shackleford & Shackleford, 2012). Thus, this stance assumes a priori that humans evolved to become homo religiosus (the idea that humans are inherently god believing creatures) and implies that atheists are either psychological deviants or closet believers (Coleman & Messick, 2019; Shook, 2017). Moreover, this view entails the idea that atheism is an empty signifier and individual atheists are therefore defined by the beliefs or psychological processes that they lack, rather than the ones they have. The problem for this perspective is: How can the absence of something(s) be linked to our evolved psychological endowment? Under this view, the possibility that atheism might be produced, in-part, by its own set of mechanisms (and not just a reversal of “theistic cognition”), or be evolutionary adaptive, would remain unexplored. 

In this chapter, we explore atheism—in its broadest sense—as a product of our evolved species-typical psychology. We build on past scholarship and research, whilst also taking this in several new directions. First, we argue that atheism can be defined in “positive” terms, and then we link this definition to evolved psychological mechanisms. This allows us to explore the phylogeny of atheism, including the possibility that our ancestors exhibited atheistic beliefs. Second, informed by evolutionary psychology, we review the ontogeny of atheism, as well as discussing the development of theistic cognition. Third, we review several adaptive and nonadaptive evolutionary hypotheses for atheism developed by Johnson (2012) and use new evidence to argue in favor of atheism as an adaptive worldview. Fourth, we reflect on the limited ability of existing biophysiological studies to inform current understandings of atheism. In closing, we further extrapolate advantages of this approach, as well as some potential limitations, and discuss future directions for research. Our overall aim is to spark renewed discussion for possible evolutionary perspectives on atheism.

6. The functionally adaptive explanation for atheism

In traditional evolutionary arguments, functional and adaptive traits are carried down to future generations through natural selection (or analogous processes operating at the cultural level; Laland & Brown, 2011). Adaptive traits help with the survival and success of a species. Citing numerous studies suggesting religiosity confers multiple beneficial outcomes, ranging from coping with stress, increasing social relatedness and facilitating social coordination, reducing death anxiety, and increasing psychological well-being and meaning in life, a group of researchers has consistently argued that religion should be considered an adaptive trait (Johnson, 2012, 2016; Laurin, 2017; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003; Wilson, 2002; Wood & Shaver, 2018)4. Far less attention however has been given to the possibility that atheism might be similarly adaptive (although see Szocik & Messick, 2020; Messick, Szocik, & Langston, 2019; Shults, 2018), and it was not until recently that evidence has accumulated in support of this position however, through a broader set of mechanisms than what is found with religion.

Dominic Johnson (2012) has proposed ten evolutionary hypotheses for the emergence of atheism. There are three non-adaptive hypotheses (no variation, natural variation, unnatural variation), that posit that there either are no real atheists (because everyone has some level of implicit or explicit belief in supernatural agency), or that atheists are a result of a natural distribution of belief, or that a variety of life circumstances could result in the emergence of atheism. The latter two hypotheses essentially outline atheism as being a byproduct, and thus, not as adaptive. The remaining seven explanations proposed by Johnson (2012), he suggests, are adaptive at either the individual or group level.

note 4 There are several reasons to be skeptical of religion as an adaptation, ranging from religion’s incoherence as a trait that could be selected (Richerson & Newson, 2008) to an overestimation of “the degree to which ostensive benefits would be sufficient to permit natural selection to systematically favor religious variants over nonreligious ones” (Kirkpatrick, 2006, p. 167).

One of the adaptive hypotheses is the exploitation hypothesis. This hypothesis claims that atheism is adaptive for the individuals only when they are in a position of power. This hypothesis builds off Karl Marx’s claim that religion functions as a tool for the elite to control “the masses,” as the figureheads of a society can exploit religious belief among their denizens to increase their own power, wealth, and status. In its strongest form, this hypothesis assumes that the majority of atheists were or are socio-political elites and have made a “Machiavellian calculation” (p. 59) that their own level of belief only matters to the extent that they can exercise control over their lower status religious adherents. The ecological contingency hypothesis also posits that atheism, like theism, can be adaptive at the individual level, but only in certain settings, as some traits are environment-and context-dependent. For example, this hypothesis assumes that atheists are disposed to a type of rationalist thinking that is more likely to flourish in times of abundance and peace, and that the adaptive components of religious beliefs are costly and more likely to flourish in times of scarcity and warfare. The atheism is a religion hypothesis views atheism as being functionally equivalent to religion. This hypothesis assumes that atheism, as a shared belief and collection of values, can confer the functional benefits associated with religion. This hypothesis will be expanded upon further in the next section. The final individually adaptive hypothesis is the frequency dependency hypothesis. This hypothesis builds off evolutionary game theory, which in turn posits that coexisting traits, such as belief and nonbelief, can be beneficial for one another through competition. In other words, this hypothesis assumes that atheists can receive the benefits of religion without believing, as long as atheism is not overly common.

Finally, Johnson proposes three theories that he claims can explain how atheism can be adaptive at the group level: 1) as a catalyst for the facilitation of the adaptive advantages of belief, 2) through serving to bolster religious belief as a reaction to skepticism, and 3) through atheists being skeptical of religious doctrine which results in the religious ‘toning down’ their doctrine to make it seemingly more credible. As Johnson (see 2012, p. 65) himself notes, these explanations outline atheism as being beneficial for believers, but without clear benefits to the atheists themselves. In other words, the existence of individual atheists is a non-adaptive (but not maladaptive) by-product of religion having been selected at the group level. It is not clear why Johnson labels these as adaptive hypotheses for the group-level selection of atheists, as the position seems to confuse what he argues is selected at the group-level (i.e., religion) for what he argues is the adaptive benefits of atheism at the individual level (i.e., rationality).

Of the ten theories offered by Johnson (2012), we argue that explanations of atheism as a fluke, byproduct of, or bolster for religious adaptations do not sufficiently account for why atheism persists and how it functions. The next section will further outline two perspectives to support this idea: We will argue first that atheism can be adaptive in ways similar to religious belief, and secondly that atheism becomes more prominent when the adaptiveness of religious belief becomes obsolete or redundant through secular societal mechanisms. Both explanations give credence to the functional/adaptive explanation for why atheism exists while recognizing atheism as a phenomenon that is comparable to religion, rather than a side-effect of it.