Participants experienced greater momentary happiness when not experiencing a desire compared to experiencing acute desire; & the greater the desire conflicted with important goals the lower the momentary happiness

Testing Buddha: Is Acute Desire Associated with Lower Momentary Happiness? Stephen L. Murphy, Yuka Ozaki, Malte Friese & Wilhelm Hofmann. Journal of Happiness Studies, Feb 12 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-021-00362-9

Abstract: A central Buddhist claim is that having desires causes suffering. While this tenet draws from the belief that an acute desire state is more momentarily aversive than a no-desire state, the efficacy of this belief has yet to be comprehensively examined. To empirically investigate this claim, we furnished data from two experience sampling studies across USA/Canadian (N = 101; 3224 observations) and Japanese cultures (N = 237; 8497 observations). We compared states of acute desire with states of no desire regarding momentary happiness. We then tested, in an additional step, whether acute desires at greater conflict with personal goals were associated with even lower levels of momentary happiness. Findings were consistent across studies, with participants experiencing greater momentary happiness when not experiencing a desire compared to experiencing acute desire. Also, the greater the desire conflicted with important goals the lower the momentary happiness. The present findings support a key basis of the Buddhist belief that having desires causes suffering, showing acute desire states on average to be more aversive than no desire states.

General Discussion

Buddhism claims that having desires is the root of all suffering (Burton 2010). Nonetheless, a key foundation of this popular tenet had yet to be comprehensively examined—that individuals are, on the whole, momentarily happier when not experiencing a desire compared to when they are experiencing an acute desire. Across two culturally-divergent experience-sampling studies, and in support of our ‘Buddha hypothesis’, findings aligned with Buddhist tenets in showing momentary happiness was indeed greater when individuals were without desire compared to when they were experiencing an acute desire. Fine-grained analyses revealed that acute desires in greater conflict with important personal goals were associated with lower momentary happiness.

The present study investigated whether acute desire states were associated with lower momentary happiness relative to desire states given this theorized effect had yet to be comprehensively tested (Cooney et al. 1987; Kavanagh et al. 2005). Finding support for this effect was also valuable given the notion that acute desire states are aversive relative to no desire states is a foundational Buddhist belief that underpins their more popular tenet that having desires causes suffering. The present study’s findings perfectly aligned with this ‘Buddha Hypothesis’ that acute desire states would be more aversive than no desire states. Importantly, these findings build upon the weaknesses of past research that generally show acute desire states can be aversive (e.g., Cooney et al. 1987; Kavanagh et al. 2005). The present study showed that acute desire states were on average more aversive than no desire states. While unknown whether having desires is associated with lower temporally-stable forms of happiness, the present findings add some weight by supporting the efficacy of key belief upon which this view is based (although it should be borne in mind that pleasure from satisfying desires may yet attenuate, extinguish, or even crowd out the affective consequences of acute desire states). The present findings also keep desire-related research in the spotlight (e.g., Hofmann et al. 2012), highlighting that greater consideration of desire states may be critical for better understanding important processes and outcomes.

This research has various strengths, not least that identified effects were replicated and found to be of a similar magnitude across studies (dStudy1 = 0.62, dStudy2 = 0.71). That our findings were based upon data drawn from American/Canadian as well as Japanese participants also reduces (although does not eliminate) concerns that the identified effects were culturally specific. For instance, clear cultural differences in mean momentary happiness existed between Study 1 and Study 2. This finding corresponds with divergence in World Happiness Rankings between these nations (Japan, America, and Canada are placed 58th, 19th, and 9th, respectively, where higher rankings reflect happier nations; Helliwell et al. 2019). Nonetheless, we found momentary happiness was similarly reduced across studies when desires were acute rather than absent. A further strength of the present findings is that they came from data gathered at random times seven times a day during all typical waking hours, on all weekdays, in a large participant group, and across a large (unrestricted) number of desire-related domains. Ecological validity in this study was thus high. Indeed, it was the ecologically valid nature of this data, and the need for any strong test of the ‘Buddha Hypothesis’ to be based upon ecologically valid data, that motivated the present research.

Another strength of the present research was evidence highlighting differences in momentary happiness did not manifest due to a relatively high prevalence of acute desires in high- rather than low-conflict with important personal goals (i.e., across studies low-conflict acute desires were more frequently experienced). This potential explanation for reported differences inexplicably arises given that theory and literature suggest that conflicting (rather than unconflicting) desires require more effort and are generally more aversive (Dreisbach and Fischer 2012; Saunders et al. 2017). Nonetheless, in both studies, low-conflict (acute) desires were more prevalent than medium- or high-conflict desires, and low-conflict desires were also associated with less momentary happiness relative to having no desire. Finally, we did not hypothesize a magnitude for the proposed effects. Irrespective, our findings were consistent with both religious and psychological accounts that effects between desire and no desire are unlikely to be minor (e.g., Kavanagh et al. 2005). Specifically, the identified medium effect across Study 1 and Study 2 in unstandardized metric equated to a nearly 1-point difference on a 7-point scale.

Nonetheless, it is also important to bring attention to a key alternative explanation for our findings. That is, although conceived, in line with Buddhist tenets, that an acute desire state would reduce momentary happiness relative to a no desire state, it yet remains possible this identified effect reflected (at least in part) the reverse causal sequence—that lower (higher) momentary happiness gave rise to an acute (no) desire state. Indeed, this causal direction is equally conducive as it’s opposite with the present findings. Furthermore, this reverse causal sequence has theoretical and empirical support—aversive states like stress, fatigue, and emotional distress are well acknowledged to orient individuals towards more immediately gratifying opportunities (Tice et al. 2001). Accordingly, although considerable support exists to suggest acute desire promotes an aversive state (Kavanagh et al. 2005), that the present study was methodologically constrained in its ability to make strong causal claims demands the veracity of the reverse causal sequence should not be overlooked.

A secondary aim of the present study was to examine whether (acute) desires in greater conflict with important personal goals would, overall, be associated with lower levels of momentary happiness relative to having no desire. We hypothesized that momentary happiness would be lower, relative to the no desire state, when the degree of conflict with important goals was higher. Parts of this effect were established previously in a different sample, but without a more fine-grained analysis of degree of conflict, and without the crucial no desire baseline (Hofmann et al. 2013). Findings across both studies reported here provided a more generalizable basis for this claim, showing greater momentary happiness when conflict with personal goals was low or medium rather than high, and that even low conflict states were still experienced as lower in momentary happiness than no desire states.

Limitations

A first limitation of the present findings has been highlighted—that causality cannot be inferred in the present correlational research. Therefore, caution is warranted in concluding that desire-related variables (e.g., acute vs. no desire; low vs. high conflict) may have caused differences in momentary happiness. For instance, it is possible participants, in moments they were less (more) momentarily happy, were more likely to have (no) desires. This limitation can be remedied in future laboratory-based settings or in research using ecological momentary interventions (e.g., Heron and Smyth 2010).

A second limitation is given by the relatively low number of acute desire experiences utilized for the present purpose. These relatively low numbers prevented exploratory analyses of interest—e.g., to examine whether the domain in which acute desires arose moderated the extent to which level of conflict with other personal goals associated with momentary happiness. However, the decision to not include satisfied desire experiences in our analyses was an important one to prevent confounding effects. Despite the low number of cases, results across the two studies appeared quite robust and replicated well in the two different cultural settings. This provides some confidence in the robustness and generality of findings.

A third limitation is that, although our sample was heterogenous, approximately 78% of our sample in Study 1 was Caucasion. This renders it unknown whether our results would replicate in a more diverse sample. This argument can be extended to other characteristics. For instance, a high percentage of participants in both samples were college/university educated; much fewer participants exhibited lower educational attainment. Future research should aim to remedy this issue by testing this Buddha Hypothesis using a more diverse sample.

A final limitation is that the data furnished for this study precluded the possibility of examining whether desire-related variables (e.g., acute vs. no desire; low vs. high conflict) associated with more temporally-stable representations of happiness (momentary representations of happiness were available only). While the high frequency in which acute desires are experienced in typical daily life suggests momentary decrements in happiness may hinder broader representations of happiness (e.g., life satisfaction, wellbeing), this transfer effect was not examined and thus is not supported. Buddhist tenets primarily concern the chronic rather than acute effects of desire-related instances (i.e., how desire influences happiness in general rather than in momentary instances). Future research should therefore aim to explicitly measure more temporally-stable representations of happiness to ensure a more robust test of Buddhist arguments.