Rolf Degen summarizing... Changes in a person's morality are perceived as a greater disruption of their self than changes in other aspects of personhood—except by psychopaths

Everett, Jim A. C., Joshua A. Skorburg, and Jordan Livingston. 2021. “Me, My (moral) Self, and I.” PsyArXiv. August 4. doi:10.31234/osf.io/af7u5

Abstract: In this chapter we critically review interdisciplinary work from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to shed light on perceptions of personal identity and selfhood. We review recent research that has addressed traditional philosophical questions about personal identity using empirical methods, focusing on the “moral self effect”: the finding that morality, more so than memory, is perceived to be at the core of personal identity. We raise and respond to a number of key questions and criticisms about this work. We begin by considering the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature, before turning to explore the boundary conditions of “moral self effect” and how generalizable it is, and then reflecting on how this work might be connected more deeply with other neuroscience research shedding light on the self. Throughout, we highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration.