Rolf Degen summarizing... Even inaccurate gossip can discipline people to behave prosocially, by fueling worries about reputation

Direct and Indirect Reciprocity among Individuals and Groups. Angelo Romano, Ali Seyhun Saral, Junhui Wu. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 13 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.08.003

• Behavioral experiments support the predictive power of direct and indirect reciprocity.

• Reciprocity helps explain the effects of group membership, gossip, and third-party punishment on prosocial behavior.

• Group membership serves as a heuristic for expected partner’s prosocial behavior and anticipated future interactions.

• Gossip promotes prosocial behavior via an increased concern for reputation and expected partner’s prosocial behavior.

• Costly third-party punishment serves to deter potential defectors and maintain a positive reputation.

Abstract: Direct and indirect reciprocity are two fundamental mechanisms that promote prosocial behavior within groups and across societies. Here, we review recent work that illustrates how a (direct and indirect) reciprocity framework can illuminate our understanding of several factors related to prosocial behavior—namely group membership, gossip, and third-party punishment. We propose that each of these factors can promote prosocial behavior via proximate psychological mechanisms related to direct and indirect reciprocity: reputational concern, expectations, and anticipation of future interaction. Finally, we discuss the implications of adopting such a framework and highlight a number of avenues for future research.

Keywords: Direct reciprocityIndirect reciprocityCooperationProsocial behaviorReview

4. Third-party punishment

Another factor promoting prosocial behavior in social interactions is third-party punishment (Figure 1B). While second-party punishment can be considered a clear instance of negative reciprocity under the anticipation of future interaction [37], third-party punishment represents a more interesting case as the importance for a direct and indirect reciprocity framework may not be clear at first glance. In fact, prominent studies have found that uninterested third parties often punish defectors by incurring a personal cost, and this in turn promotes prosocial behavior among defectors [38]. Thus, third-party punishment can also be conceptualized as a form of prosocial behavior that promotes prosocial behavior in others. However, whether third-party punishment is always prosocial in nature is still debated [39]. Theoretical accounts in line with a reciprocity framework hypothesize that third-party punishment is used as (a) a tool to manage reputation even in one-shot interactions (e.g., to signal trustworthiness to potential future partners) [40,41], and (b) a way to avoid the mistreatment by the defector whom the third party may encounter in the future [19].

Recent research supports the potential role of psychological mechanisms related to a reciprocity framework in explaining why people engage in third-party punishment. For example, previous research found robust evidence that participants who witness a distant stranger being insulted by another person only punish the insulter when observed by other bystanders and when they are concerned about their reputation [42]. By contrast, in anonymous situations people intervene less when a stranger is insulted, compared to a friend or a close other [42]. Moreover, in support of a reciprocity framework, recent research found that people report more moral outrage in response to defection when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality, again suggesting that third-party punishment can be used as a tool to upregulate the punisher’s own reputation [40]. In line with this, across 24 studies, researchers found that the opportunity to gain reputational and partner choice benefits explain why third-parties may prefer compensation over punishment [43]. Reciprocal interactions also seem to be important in the evolution of parochial third-party punishment (i.e., the tendency to punish more harshly outgroup members, compared to ingroup members) [44]. A recent longitudinal study documenting punishment responses to norm violations in daily life also suggests that people upregulate their punishment in situations where their reputation is at stake [45].