People considered hypocrites (as opposed to non-hypocrites) as less moral persons, & appraised their identical transgressive behavior more negatively, when they were high rather than low on competence

Calculating Hypocrites Effect: Moral judgments of word-deed contradictory transgressions depend on targets' competence. Mengchen Dong, Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Paul A. M. van Lange. Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology, September 6 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/jts5.113

Abstract: People often say one thing while doing another, and are therefore criticized as hypocrites. Despite the widespread criticism of hypocrites, relatively less is known about factors that influence moral judgment of hypocrisy. In particular, why are some word-deed inconsistencies condemned more harshly than others? The current research focuses on word-deed inconsistency as a common manifestation of hypocrisy, and examines targets' competence as one important factor that influences moral judgment of hypocrisy. We propose and test a Calculating Hypocrites Effect that people perceive hypocrites as less moral than non-hypocrites (i.e., who transgress with vs. without inconsistent claims), particularly when the targets are high rather than low on competence. Across four studies where competence was either measured (Study 1) or manipulated as expertise (Study 2), occupational status (Study 3) and skills (Study 4), we found support for the presumed Calculating Hypocrites Effect. When the targets were high (vs. low) on competence, people interpreted their misaligned words with deeds as more intentional (Study 2) and self-interested (Study 4), which in turn accounted for their severity of moral judgment. Moreover, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect applied even when the targets were competent in domains unrelated to their hypocritical deeds (Study 3). We conclude that perception of competence is an important factor that determines when, and for whom, hypocrisy incurs moral outrage.

7 GENERAL DISCUSSION

Accusations of hypocrisy abound in daily gossip, social platforms, and news coverage; however, scientific evidence on how people understand hypocrisy is still limited. A basic consensus of previous studies is that word-deed inconsistency can be a strong signal that induces the perception of hypocrisy (Barden et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2021; Effron et al., 2018; Jordan et al., 2017; Laurent et al., 2014). Based on this conceptualization, the current research aims to add more insights into the question why people condemn manifestations of hypocrisy for some but not others. Four studies supported a Calculating Hypocrites Effect that higher competence intensified people's negative moral evaluations of hypocrites. With both perceptions (Study 1) and various manipulations (expertise in Study 2, occupational status in Study 3, and skills in Study 4) of competence, people considered hypocrites (as opposed to non-hypocrites) as less moral persons (Studies 1, 3, and 4), appraised their identical transgressive behavior more negatively (Study 2), and recommended harsher punishment for them (Study 4) when they were high rather than low on competence. People's negative moral judgments of hypocrites applied even when the targets were competent in domains irrelevant to their hypocritical deeds (Study 3), and were especially true when they were competent and intended to promote own rather than others' interest (Study 4).

7.1 Theoretical and practical implications

By examining the Calculating Hypocrites Effect, the present contribution shows (1) how judgments of misdeeds are contingent on previous moral claims and (2) how competence information serves as a cue to infer intentionality and ulterior motives of word-deed inconsistency. Below we elaborate on these two main theoretical contributions, in relation to previous theorizing.

First, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect expands the observer licensing theory (Effron & Monin, 2010; Kakkar et al., 2020; Polman et al., 2013), by illuminating when and why pre-existing good deeds do not excuse subsequent misdeeds, and instead induce more severe moral judgments. People do not judge moral transgressions in a vacuum; an important contextual factor is the transgressors' previous deeds. Observer licensing theory suggests that a preceding good deed can license a following transgression as if there is a “moral credit account” (Effron & Monin, 2010). This theory, however, does not elucidate judgment mechanisms where previous good and subsequent bad deeds take place in an identical behavioral domain. More specifically, people may evaluate good and bad deeds in an identical domain as a whole (e.g., hypocrisy), instead of respectively as addition or deduction to a “moral credit account”. And people may not evaluate combinations of good and bad deeds only by their face value, but also by inferred ulterior motives. Put differently, moral judgments are determined by how people interpret the relation between good and bad deeds (e.g., as happening in independent or related domains), and how people construe the intentions and motives of such combined behaviors (e.g., to conceal own bad deed and gain undeserved credit, or to prevent others from committing the same transgressions; Dong et al., 2021; Effron & Miller, 2015; Effron et al., 2018).

Moreover, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect illuminates the role of competence and its implications on intentionality and motive inferences in moral judgments. While previous studies on competence and morality suggest that people form more negative impressions of immoral (vs. moral) others and resent them more strongly in social interactions when they are competent rather than incompetent (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy et al., 2016), the underlying mechanisms are still not clear. Our work suggests that when the targets are high (vs. low) on competence, self-claimed morals or ethics prompt a stronger perception of intentionality and self-interest in followed transgressions, and induce harsher moral judgments than open transgressions without conflicting claims. Considering word-deed inconsistency as a unique but prevalent moral phenomenon, competence can be one important criterion for its normative judgments. More broadly, perceived competence may explain why people judge identical (im)moral deeds differently, depending on, for example, the targets' skill level (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010), leadership position (Karelaia & Keck, 2013;), social prestige (Dong et al., 2021; Polman et al., 2013), and socioeconomic status (Yuan et al., 2018).

The Calculating Hypocrites Effect has practical implications on various social contexts where moral judgments play a central role. For example, in first social encounters, competence impression may influence moral impressions of inconsistent actors (Studies 1, 3, and 4), and further affect interaction dynamics like decisions of recruitment or cooperation (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy et al., 2016). In legal contexts, identical transgressions can induce different juror judgments depending on the availability of evidence suggesting expertise and previous commitment in the behavioral domain (Study 2). The “right” legal decisions may be better made by fully communicating these influential factors in juror deliberations. Also, in organizational settings, it may not be enough to establish punitive mechanisms based on the severity of unethical behavior. To maintain a just system, employees may deem that higher-status transgressors of organizational values deserve more penalties, especially when they transgress the very norms that they are trying to enforce on others (Study 4).

7.2 Limitations and future directions

The current research examined and replicated the Calculating Hypocrites Effect with various manipulations of competence and diverse manifestations of moral hypocrisy. However, some limitations should be noted, which merit future research.

First, although the current research examined moral hypocrisy in various behavioral domains, it did not cover the whole spectrum of morally relevant behaviors, especially the extremely severe or criminal ones (e.g., crimes against a person). Preaching against crimes (e.g., “we should not harm others physically”) is usually widely acknowledged and may not help actors gain much approval. People's harsher moral judgments of hypocrites and especially competent hypocrites may be more salient for proscriptive (characterizing what is good to do) than prescriptive (characterizing what should not be done) moral violations (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). These ideas are speculative, however, and deserve future empirical tests.

Second, despite a consistent pattern across some key societal domains, the evidence in support of the Calculating Hypocrites Effect was small in magnitude (see the internal meta-analysis). Though the present research conceptualized hypocrisy as objective word-deed inconsistency and examined hypocrisy as a discrete variable (i.e., hypocritical as compared to open transgressions), people's subjective understanding can vary on a spectrum depending on, for example, what kind of inconsistency (e.g., between saying and doing; between organizational value and individual behavior) in what domains (e.g., environmentalism, organizational values) they deem as hypocritical. For instance, liberals rather than conservatives may condemn environmental word-deed inconsistency of competent targets more harshly, given that liberals are more likely to moralize environmental topics (Feinberg & Willer, 2013) and deem environmental inconsistency as hypocritical (Kreps et al., 2017). This subjective perspective on hypocrisy can also help synthesize discrepant findings in our studies. The presumed Calculating Hypocrites Effect did not emerge when high- (vs. low-) status targets transgressed their affiliated organization's ethical values (Study 3). In this case, people may have attributed strong hypocrisy regardless of the transgressors' status or personal claims (Effron et al., 2015). Likewise, people condemned identical word-deed inconsistency more harshly when such inconsistency was introduced as self-oriented rather than other-oriented (Study 4). This finding may also relate to the fact that people perceived self- (vs. other-) oriented word-deed inconsistency as more hypocritical. Future research may integrate this subjective perspective on hypocrisy and investigate the influence of competence attributes on moral judgments through perceived hypocrisy.