Clark et al. (2014) proposed a theory of motivated free will beliefs, that at least part of free will beliefs & attributions are caused by a desire to hold moral transgressors responsible; recently, this theory has been challenged

Clark, C. J., Winegard, B. M., & Shariff, A. F. (2021). Motivated free will belief: The theory, new (preregistered) studies, and three meta-analyses. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(7), e22–e47, Oct 2021. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000993

Abstract: Clark et al. (2014) proposed a theory of motivated free will beliefs, according to which at least part of free will beliefs and attributions are caused by a desire to hold moral transgressors responsible. Recently, this theory has been challenged. In the following article, we examine the evidence and conclude that, although not dispositive, much of the evidence seems to support the motivated account. For example, in 14 new (seven preregistered) studies (n = 4,014), results consistently supported the motivated theory; and these findings consistently replicated in studies (k = 8) that tested an alternative (counternormative) hypothesis. In addition, three meta-analyses of the existing data (including eight vignette types and eight free will judgment types) found support for motivated free will attributions (k = 22; n = 7,619; r = .25, p < .001) and beliefs (k = 27; n = 8,100; r = .13, p < .001), which remained robust after removing all potential confounds (k = 26; n = 7,953; r = .12, p < .001). However, the size of these effects varied by vignette type and free will belief measurement. We discuss these variations and the implications for different theories of free will beliefs and attributions. And we end by discussing the relevance of these findings for past and future research and the significance of these findings for human responsibility.