We find, across a range of transgressions, that people frequently see victims of wrongdoing as more moral than nonvictims who have behaved identically

Virtuous victims. Jillian J Jordan, Maryam Kouchaki. Science Advances, Oct 13 2021. Vol 7, Issue 42. DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.abg5902

Abstract: How do people perceive the moral character of victims? We find, across a range of transgressions, that people frequently see victims of wrongdoing as more moral than nonvictims who have behaved identically. Across 17 experiments (total n = 9676), we document this Virtuous Victim effect and explore the mechanisms underlying it. We also find support for the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, which proposes that people see victims as moral because this perception serves to motivate punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims, and people frequently face incentives to enact or encourage these “justice-restorative” actions. Our results validate predictions of this hypothesis and suggest that the Virtuous Victim effect does not merely reflect (i) that victims look good in contrast to perpetrators, (ii) that people are generally inclined to positively evaluate those who have suffered, or (iii) that people hold a genuine belief that victims tend to be people who behave morally.

Check also Ok, E., Qian, Y., Strejcek, B., & Aquino, K. (2020). Signaling virtuous victimhood as indicators of Dark Triad personalities. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Jul 2020. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/07/a-specific-dimension-of.html

DISCUSSION

Across 17 experiments (total n = 9676), we have documented and explored the Virtuous Victim effect. We find that victims are frequently seen as more virtuous than nonvictims—not because of their own behavior, but because others have mistreated them. We observe this effect across a range of moral transgressions and find evidence that it is not moderated by the victim’s (white versus black) race or gender. Humans ubiquitously—and perhaps increasingly (1, 2)—encounter narratives about immoral acts and their victims. By demonstrating that these narratives have the power to confer moral status, our results shed new light on the ways that victims are perceived by society.

We have also explored the boundaries of the Virtuous Victim effect and illuminated the mechanisms that underlie it. For example, we find that the Virtuous Victim effect may be especially likely to flow from victim narratives that describe a transgression’s perpetrator and are presented by a third-person narrator (or perhaps, more generally, a narrator who is unlikely to be doubted). We also find that the effect is specific to victims of immorality (i.e., it does not extend to accident victims) and to moral virtue (i.e., it does not extend equally to positive but nonmoral traits). Furthermore, the effect shapes perceptions of moral character but not predictions about moral behavior.

We have also evaluated several potential explanations for the Virtuous Victim effect. Ultimately, our results provide evidence for the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, which proposes that people see victims as virtuous because this perception serves to motivate punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims, and people frequently face incentives to enact or encourage these justice-restorative actions. We find empirical support for the assumption that seeing victims as virtuous motivates justice-restorative action. We also find, critically, that introducing disincentives for justice-restorative action causes the Virtuous Victim effect to disappear. Moreover, our results provide direct evidence that the Virtuous Victim effect does not merely reflect (i) that victims look good in contrast to perpetrators, (ii) that people are generally inclined to positively evaluate those who have suffered, or (iii) that people hold a genuine belief that victims tend to behave morally.

By supporting the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, our work advances our understanding of how people evaluate the moral character of others. Previous research has established that moral character evaluations are shaped by the direct personal attributes of evaluated individuals, such as their moral or immoral behaviors (12–15), social group affiliations (16–20), or physical attractiveness (21, 22). Our results suggest that, because people frequently face incentives to respond to wrongdoing with justice-restorative action, moral character evaluations can also be influenced by whether an individual was the recipient of immoral treatment. In this way, our results contribute to a growing body of evidence from psychology that moral judgements can be colored by self-interested incentives (43, 52–54).

By proposing a link between perceptions of victim virtue and justice-restorative action, the Justice Restoration Hypothesis also aligns with theories of “indirect reciprocity.” Such theories posit that people track the reputation status of individuals in their community, and the normative value of a particular action (e.g., helping or stealing from somebody) can depend on the recipient’s reputation standing (57, 58). For example, in some cultures, stealing from somebody in good reputational standing is considered a norm violation, but stealing from somebody in bad reputational standing (e.g., somebody who himself is a thief) is not (59). According to this framework, a harmful act is more likely to be viewed by society as a transgression that merits justice-restorative action if the victim is morally virtuous. Thus, it stands to reason that seeing a victim as virtuous would boost motivation for justice-restorative action and that, when we face incentives to enact or encourage justice-restorative action, we would therefore benefit from elevating the victim’s character.

An interesting question for future research is whether incentives for justice-restorative action influence our perceptions of victims in other ways. We find that the Virtuous Victim effect does not extend equally to certain positive nonmoral traits (e.g., intelligence and athleticism). Providing a potential explanation for this pattern, we find some suggestive evidence that describing victims as competent may be less effective at motivating justice-restorative action than describing victims as moral. However, insofar as other traits beyond morality (e.g., helplessness or innocence) are particularly effective at motivating justice-restorative action, we might expect people to elevate victims on those traits.

This proposal may also relate to evidence that people typecast moral patients (i.e., the recipients of moral action), including victims, as less agentic and more passive (7–9). This phenomenon is distinct from the Virtuous Victim effect (being passive is not the same thing as being moral) and is unlikely to account for our results. If the Virtuous Victim effect simply reflected that victims are seen as passive patients who are incapable of wrongdoing, we would have expected the effect to extend to predicted immoral behavior, but subjects did not rate victims as any less likely to commit immoral acts (e.g., spreading mean gossip). However, future research should investigate whether there may be a psychological link between seeing victims as moral and as passive, insofar as both perceptions could plausibly motivate justice-restorative action.

Another open question is whether the Virtuous Victim effect may ever extend to victims of accidental misfortune. In our experiments, subjects did not see accident victims as more morally virtuous than neutral targets. When viewed through the lens of the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, this pattern makes sense: When accidents occur, there are no perpetrators (and thus no incentives for punishment). In addition, while accidents do create victims who may need help, our subjects did not perceive strong incentives to help them. Notably, our subjects did not expect helping accident victims to look any better than helping neutral targets. However, the accident victims in our experiments suffered relatively minor consequences (the loss of an iPad). When more serious accidents occur (e.g., natural disasters in poor countries), people might plausibly perceive stronger reputational incentives to help, in which case we would expect people to elevate the character of accident victims. Nevertheless, our theory and results also suggest that, holding constant the harm suffered, moral transgressions will create stronger incentives for justice-restorative action than accidents, and victims of immorality will therefore reliably be seen as more virtuous than accident victims.

Future research should also investigate how our results relate to victim blaming. There is ample evidence that people sometimes blame victims for causing their own victimization (3–6). This observation is not incompatible with our findings: One could conceivably see a victim as morally good and as having contributed, causally, to their victimization. However, moral evaluations of victims may nonetheless correlate interestingly with attributions of causal blame. For example, in some contexts, people face disincentives for justice-restorative action (and thus face pressure not to punish perpetrators and help victims, but rather to excuse wrongdoing and dismiss victims). Our theorizing predicts that in these contexts, people are unlikely to morally elevate victims (and may even derogate their moral character). Indeed, in the disincentives condition of experiment 11a, it was relatively easy to evoke such a context—and consequently eliminate the Virtuous Victim effect—by encouraging subjects to imagine some hypothetical drawbacks of justice-restorative action. Moreover, it seems plausible that in contexts where people perceive disincentives for justice-restorative action, they may also be more likely to attribute causal blame to victims. Future research should test this hypothesis, which is broadly consistent with evidence that motivation (60) and ideology (5) can influence empathy for victims.

Relatedly, it is interesting to consider why our sexual aggression vignette did not produce a significant Virtuous Victim effect, while our rape vignette produced a strong effect. In the victim condition of our sexual aggression vignette, the target initially participated in a consensual sexual encounter with the perpetrator (who then continued making advances after she asked him to stop). The vignette was also vague: The nature of the continued advances was unclear, and it was thus unclear whether a sexual assault occurred. In contrast, in the victim condition of our rape vignette, the target did not consent to any kind of a sexual encounter, and the vignette described an unambiguous assault. We thus speculate that subjects may have perceived the rape vignette as describing a context that would create greater social consensus that a moral transgression occurred, giving rise to stronger incentives for justice-restorative action and thus a stronger Virtuous Victim effect. Future research should directly test this proposal and more generally investigate when victims of sexual coercion are judged to be morally virtuous.

It is also interesting that, in our experiments, the Virtuous Victim effect was not significantly moderated by target gender or (white versus black) race and extended to female and black victims. When viewed through the lens of the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, these findings suggest that subjects in our experiments perceived incentives to help victims and punish the perpetrators who wronged them, including when the victims in question were female and/or black. However, this perception may not always hold, at least for all subsets of the population. Furthermore, in contexts where people do not perceive incentives to engage in justice-restorative action on behalf of female and/or black victims (or victims from other historically or currently marginalized groups), our theoretical framework suggests that the Virtuous Victim effect may not extend to members of these groups. For example, individuals who perceive incentives to excuse (rather than punish) police violence against black Americans may fail to elevate (and, as described above, perhaps even derogate) the character of such victims. Further research should investigate this important possibility.

Another open question is whether the Virtuous Victim effect occurs across cultures, including in populations that are not “WEIRD” (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) (61). As just articulated, our theorizing predicts that the generalizability of the Virtuous Victim effect across cultures is likely to depend on the universality of incentives for punishing perpetrators and helping victims. For example, in cultures and contexts where victims are seen as contaminated (5) and helping them is not socially rewarded, we predict that the Virtuous Victim effect may disappear (or even reverse).

Further research should also investigate the Virtuous Victim effect outside of the laboratory. A limitation of our work is that we relied on hypothetical vignettes, most of which were presented in third person by a presumptively objective narrator. Thus, future work should explore perceptions of real-world victims, both in contexts where victim narratives are presented by third parties (e.g., news coverage of or gossip about immoral acts and their victims) and victims themselves.

Relatedly, future work should attempt to shed further light on our finding that the Virtuous Victim effect can, but does not always, extend from third- to first-person narratives. We have speculated that this finding may reflect that narrator credibility is crucial for the Virtuous Victim effect. Moreover, while people may be especially likely to question first-person narrators, perceived credibility might also play an important role in shaping evaluations of third-person victim narratives, especially in contexts where narrators seem less objective than they did in our vignettes.

Future research should also investigate the broader societal implications of the Virtuous Victim effect. How does the perception that victims are morally virtuous shape the treatment of victims by society (both in daily life and in domains like policy and law) and the roles that victim narratives play in social debates? Furthermore, what are the implications of the Virtuous Victim effect for the behavior and psychology of victims? For example, when victims are bestowed with moral status, what are the downstream consequences for their moral self-concepts and behavior (62, 63)? In addition, are people aware that being seen as a victim can make them appear moral? Recent research has documented a correlation between the tendency to signal one’s victim status and the tendency to signal one’s moral character (56), and our work shows that victim status can itself serve to boost an individual’s perceived moral character. These results raise the question of whether people are motivated to share their victimization to appear virtuous. On the other hand, however, do victims anticipate the pitfalls that may come with personally sharing their first-person narratives? Future work should investigate how these considerations shape the ways that victims choose to come forward with their stories.

In conclusion, we have shown that people frequently see victims of wrongdoing as morally good and provided evidence that this Virtuous Victim effect flows from incentives for justice-restorative action. This work has important implications for the role of victim narratives in society and raises many interesting directions for future research.