Saturday, January 23, 2021

East German unhappiness: Churchliness and satisfaction with democracy are important explanations of the unhappiness rooted in the mentality gap between West Germans and East Germans

An anatomy of East German unhappiness: The role of circumstances and mentality, 1990–2018. Philipp Biermann, Heinz Welsch. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 181, January 2021, Pages 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.027

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1352962608777846784

Highlights

• We decompose the satisfaction gap between East and West Germany into objective circumstances and subjective mentality.

• We use about 419,000 observations from the German socio-economic Panel, 1990–2018.

• Circumstances and mentality contribute in the proportion 55: 45%.

• The mentality gap is driven by birth cohorts socialized under different political regimes.

• Churchliness and satisfaction with democracy mediate the mentality-related gap.

• Within-person preference/mentality changes occur as individuals adjust to politico-economic shocks.

Abstract: We decompose the satisfaction gap between East and West Germany into objective circumstances and subjective mentality, the latter capturing the way circumstances are being evaluated. Using the methodology proposed by Senik (2014) we find circumstances and mentality to contribute in the proportion 55: 45%. The mentality-related gap is driven by birth cohorts socialized under different political regimes – communist and liberal-capitalist – and disappears for the youngest cohort group. Results point towards churchliness and satisfaction with democracy being important explanations of the mentality gap. Within-person changes of the mentality gap occurred as aspirations or worries concerning politico-economic shocks were adjusted.

Keywords: GermanyHappinessLife satisfactionReunificationMentalityCommunism


US Data: There is little evidence that psychological distress is worsening over time; yet, treatment seeking has increased over the past 20 years

Changes in Mental Health and Treatment, 1997–2017. Amy L. Johnson. Journal of Health and Social Behavior, January 22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022146520984136

Abstract: Mental health outcomes have shown dramatic changes over the past half-century, yet these trends are still underexplored. I utilize an age-period-cohort analysis of the National Health Interview Survey from 1997 to 2017 (N = 627,058) to disentangle trends in mental health outcomes in the United States over time. Specifically, I leverage the contrast between reported psychological distress and rates of mental health treatment to isolate which has changed, how, and for whom. There is little evidence that psychological distress is worsening over time. Yet, treatment seeking has increased over the past 20 years. The increase in treatment seeking is best modeled as a period effect, providing initial evidence that the historical context has influenced responses to mental health over time for Americans of all ages and birth cohorts. I conclude with potential mechanisms and implications for future mental health research.

Keywords: APC analysis, medicalization, mental health treatment, psychological distress, sociology of mental health


Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders

Gender and cooperative preferences. Nadja C. Furtner et al. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 181, January 2021, Pages 39-48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.030

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1352945444024946690

Abstract: Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks of our original data from Germany, based on data from six countries around the world, confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, supporting the view that these are more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues in women than in men.

Keywords: Public goodsConditional cooperationGenderExperiment

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Men are more likely to be either perfectly selfish or perfectly selfless, whereas women are more likely to be in-between.

Those who experience schadenfreude about politics are more likely to express an intention to vote for candidates who promise to pass policies that “disproportionately harm” supporters of the opposing political party

Partisan Schadenfreude and the Demand for Candidate Cruelty. Steven W. Webster Adam N. Glynn Matthew P. Motta. January 6, 2021. http://stevenwwebster.com/research/schad.pdf

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1352862610534912003

Abstract: Americans are increasingly and durably divided along partisan lines. Yet, little is known about how partisan conflict influences extreme attitudes and behaviors. In this study, we examine whether Americans experience partisan schadenfreude—that is, taking “joy in the suffering” of partisan others—when bad things happen to those with whom they disagree politically. Analyzing attitudes on climate change, health care, taxation, and the coronavirus pandemic, we find that a sizable portion of the mass public engages in partisan schadenfreude and that these attitudes are most likely to be expressed by the most ideologically extreme Americans. Finally, we demonstrate that partisan schadenfreude is predictive of the demand for candidate cruelty: those who experience schadenfreude about politics are more likely to express an intention to vote for candidates who promise to pass policies that “disproportionately harm” supporters of the opposing political party. In sum, our results suggest that partisan schadenfreude is both widespread and consequential for American political behavior.


More adolescents with browsing-induced envy experienced negative effects on well-being than adolescents with no browsing-induced envy

Valkenburg, Patti M., Ine Beyens, J. Loes Pouwels, Irene I. van Driel, and Loes Keijsers. 2021. “Social Media Browsing and Adolescent Well-being: Challenging the “passive Social Media Use Hypothesis”” PsyArXiv. January 8. doi:10.31234/osf.io/gzu3y

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1352852621418233856

Abstract: A recurring hypothesis in the literature is that “passive” social media use (browsing) leads to negative effects on well-being. This preregistered study investigated a rival hypothesis, which states that the effects of browsing on well-being depend on person-specific susceptibilities to envy, inspiration, and enjoyment. We conducted a three-week experience sampling study among 353 adolescents (13-15 years, 126 assessments per adolescent). Using a novel, N=1 method of analysis, we found sizeable heterogeneity in the associations of browsing with envy, inspiration, and enjoyment (e.g., for envy ranging from β = -.44 to β = +.71). The passivity hypothesis was confirmed for 20% of adolescents and rejected for 80%. More adolescents with browsing-induced envy experienced negative effects on well-being (25%) than adolescents with no browsing-induced envy (13%). Conversely, more adolescents with browsing-induced enjoyment experienced positive effects on well-being (47%) than adolescents with no browsing-induced enjoyment (9%).




Experienced well-being rises with income, even above $75,000 per year

Experienced well-being rises with income, even above $75,000 per year. Matthew A. Killingsworth. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 26, 2021 118 (4) e2016976118; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2016976118

Significance: Past research has found that experienced well-being does not increase above incomes of $75,000/y. This finding has been the focus of substantial attention from researchers and the general public, yet is based on a dataset with a measure of experienced well-being that may or may not be indicative of actual emotional experience (retrospective, dichotomous reports). Here, over one million real-time reports of experienced well-being from a large US sample show evidence that experienced well-being rises linearly with log income, with an equally steep slope above $80,000 as below it. This suggests that higher incomes may still have potential to improve people’s day-to-day well-being, rather than having already reached a plateau for many people in wealthy countries.

Abstract: What is the relationship between money and well-being? Research distinguishes between two forms of well-being: people’s feelings during the moments of life (experienced well-being) and people’s evaluation of their lives when they pause and reflect (evaluative well-being). Drawing on 1,725,994 experience-sampling reports from 33,391 employed US adults, the present results show that both experienced and evaluative well-being increased linearly with log(income), with an equally steep slope for higher earners as for lower earners. There was no evidence for an experienced well-being plateau above $75,000/y, contrary to some influential past research. There was also no evidence of an income threshold at which experienced and evaluative well-being diverged, suggesting that higher incomes are associated with both feeling better day-to-day and being more satisfied with life overall.

Keywords: well-beinghappinessincomesatiationexperience sampling


One way to assess the extent to which results from the current sample are generalizable is to assess the degree to which the current sample of people “behave like” a representative sample in terms of key variables that are shared across the current study and previous studies of representative samples. One such variable is evaluative well-being, which can be effectively measured without experience sampling and whose relationship with income has been widely studied in representative samples. Results from representative samples in the United States and around the world generally find that evaluative well-being rises approximately linearly with log(income), without a plateau (10). The 2010 study finding a plateau in experienced well-being likewise found that evaluative well-being rose linearly with log(income), without a plateau (11). In the current study, evaluative well-being rose linearly with log(income), without a plateau (Fig. 1 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1), following the same trajectory that has been repeatedly observed in representative samples [although see one recent exception (12)]. This suggests that the general form of the relationship between well-being and income found here matches the population as a whole, and offers a reason to expect results for experienced well-being to generalize as well. Additionally, while the sample was not recruited with the intent of being representative, the actual distribution of incomes values is a close match to the US census distribution (SI Appendix, Table S8). Finally, after controlling for other demographic variables, including age, gender, marriage, and education level, the relationship between income and experienced well-being remains statistically significant and with a majority of the effect intact, including when analyzed across all income levels, below and up to $80,000, and above $80,000 (all values of P < 0.00001; SI Appendix, Table S9). A concern that sample bias might explain the current results seems even less plausible after a close inspection of the relationship between well-being and income. If the sample just happened to include some unusually happy people with large incomes, there are many possible patterns of results that this could generate, most of which would be noisy patterns even if they did trend upward overall. The actual results from this study, however, show an almost perfectly linear relationship between well-being and log(income), as shown in Fig. 1 and SI Appendix, Fig. S1. Accordingly, if sample bias were the explanation for this study’s results, the sample would have to be biased in exactly the way necessary to produce the linear relationship that is observed between well-being and log(income). This is not strictly impossible, but it seems highly improbable.

Do the present data offer any insight into why income is correlated with well-being? The answer to this question is necessarily speculative, since the factors linking well-being to income are likely numerous, complex, and interrelated. One possibility is that people spend money to reduce suffering and increase enjoyment, and that marginal dollars are differentially deployed against these aims depending on one’s income. The difference between positive and negative feelings described above provides some evidence in favor of this: Compared to variation in incomes above $80,000, larger incomes below $80,000 had a stronger association with reduced negative feelings, consistent with the possibility that moving from low to moderate income might be especially useful in avoiding (or mitigating) causes of suffering. Perhaps low earners have many avoidable sources of suffering, but as one earns more, there are fewer sources of suffering whose avoidance can be purchased. In contrast, positive feelings rose more evenly across the entire income range, and even had a directionally steeper association with income above $80,000. Another possibility, not incompatible with the first, is that larger incomes give people more control over their lives. People’s sense of control, measured with the question “To what extent do you feel in control of your life?,” was able to account for 74% of the association between income and experienced well-being (b = 0.105 with no covariates vs. b = 0.027 with sense of control over one’s life as a covariate, in the same participants, Pmediation < 0.00001). Financial insecurity, measured with the question “Did you have trouble coping with regular bills during the last 15 days?,” also played a role and was able to account for 38% of the association between income and experienced well-being (Pmediation < 0.00001). Although higher incomes could hypothetically allow a person to “buy” more time and feel less rushed (22), time poverty, measured with the question, “Do you have too little time to do what you’re currently doing?,” actually increased with income (P < 0.00001). It was a small but significantly negative mediator of the association between income and experienced well-being (Pmediation < 0.00001), such that the association between income and experienced well-being was significantly steeper when time poverty was held constant.

There was also evidence that the strength of the association between income and experienced well-being was systematically larger for some people and smaller for others. The importance of money, measured with the question “To what extent is money important to you?,” was only modestly related to income (r = 0.12, P < 0.00001) yet had a sizable statistical interaction with income in predicting experienced well-being (P < 0.00001). Based on the size of the interaction term, results estimate that the association between income and experienced well-being was over four times as steep when comparing people 1 SD above vs. 1 SD below the mean in money importance (b+1SD = 0.149 vs. b−1SD = 0.035). Whether people who rate money as relatively unimportant simply do not care about money, have found that “the best things in life are free,” or have tried and failed to spend money to improve their lives is unclear, but this result shows that there is something systematic causing income to matter more for some people’s well-being than for others. The importance of money on its own was virtually unrelated to experienced well-being (r = 0.02, P = 0.06), so it was not better or worse overall to think money was important; instead, low earners were happier if they thought money was unimportant and high earners were happier if they thought money was important. A question that asked participants “To what extent do you think money is indicative of success in life?” similarly showed that the association between income and well-being was steeper for people who equated money and success (P < 0.00001). Unlike money importance, however, the more people equated money and success, the lower their experienced well-being was on average (P < 0.00001), and there did not appear to be any income level at which equating money and success was associated with greater experienced well-being. Detailed results for these and other mediators and moderators are available in SI Appendix, including SI Appendix, Tables S5 and S6.

When interpreting these results, it bears repeating that well-being rose approximately linearly with log(income), not raw income. This means that two households earning $20,000 and $60,000, respectively, would be expected to exhibit the same difference in well-being as two households earning $60,000 and $180,000, respectively. The logarithmic relationship implies that marginal dollars do matter less the more one earns, while proportional differences in income have a constant association with well-being regardless of income.

Taken together, the current results show that larger incomes were robustly associated with greater well-being. Contrary to past research, there was no evidence for a plateau around $75,000, with experienced well-being instead continuing to climb across the income range. There was also no income threshold at which experienced and evaluative well-being diverged; instead, higher incomes were associated with both feeling better moment-to-moment and being more satisfied with life overall. While there may be some point beyond which money loses its power to improve well-being, the current results suggest that point may lie higher than previously thought.

Having Children Speeds up the Subjective Passage of Lifetime in Parents

Having Children Speeds up the Subjective Passage of Lifetime in Parents. Marc Wittmann and Nathalie Mella. Timing & Time Perception, Jan 13 2021. https://doi.org/10.1163/22134468-bja10023

Abstract: A widely reproduced finding across numerous studies of different cultures is that adults perceive the most recent 10 years of their lives to have passed particularly fast, and that this perceived speed increases as they grow older. Potential explanatory factors for this effect are believed to be more routines in life as we age as well as an increase in time pressure during middle adult age, both factors that would lead to a reduced autobiographical memory load. Fewer contextual changes in life are known to cause the passage of time to be perceived as faster. Taking advantage of the database created for the study that first captured this age effect on subjective time (), we investigated the role that having children plays in the subjective speeding of time. Adults aged between 20 and 59 who had children reported that time over the last 10 years passed subjectively more quickly than adults of the same age group without children. Factors such as education or gender did not influence subjective time. A small correlation effect could be seen in the fact that parents with more children reported that time passed more quickly. Experienced time pressure was not a differentiating factor between the two groups, as time pressure was associated with a faster passage of time in all adults. Future systematic studies will have to reveal what factors on autobiographical memory and time might be accountable for this clear effect that raising children has on perceived time.

Keywords: Passage of time judgement (PTJ); ageing; routine; time pressure; retrospective time


I will defend your right to free speech, provided I agree with you: Users protest against a social network ban only when this affects an in‐group user; the effect is smaller when an in‐group aggressor targets a high warmth out‐group user

“I will defend your right to free speech, provided I agree with you”: How social media users react (or not) to online out‐group aggression. Paolo Antonetti  Benedetta Crisafulli. Psychology & Marketing, January 22 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.21447

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1352661538621022212

Abstract: Social networking sites (SNS) routinely ban aggressive users. Such bans are sometimes perceived as a limitation to the right to free speech. While research has examined SNS users' perceptions of online aggression, little is known about how observers make trade‐offs between free speech and the desire to punish aggression. By focusing on reactions to an SNS ban, this study explores under what circumstances users consider the protection of the right to free speech as more important than the suppression of aggression. We propose a model of moderated mediation that explains under what circumstances online aggression increases the acceptance of a ban. When posts display aggression, the ban is less likely to be perceived as violating free speech and as unfair. Consequently, aggression reduces the likelihood that users will protest through negative word of mouth. Moreover, users protest against an SNS ban only when this affects an in‐group user (rather than an out‐group user). This in‐group bias, however, diminishes when an in‐group aggressor targets a high warmth out‐group user. The study raises managerial implications for the effective management of aggressive interactions on SNS and for the persuasive communication of a decision to ban a user engaging in aggressive behavior.