Healy, A., & Malhotra, N. (2009). Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy. American Political Science Review, 103(3), 387-406, Aug 2009. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990104
Abstract: Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? Using data on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward the incumbent presidential party for delivering disaster relief spending, but not for investing in disaster preparedness spending. These inconsistencies distort the incentives of public officials, leading the government to underinvest in disaster preparedness, thereby causing substantial public welfare losses. We estimate that $1 spent on preparedness is worth about $15 in terms of the future damage it mitigates. By estimating both the determinants of policy decisions and the consequences of those policies, we provide more complete evidence about citizen competence and government accountability.
DISCUSSION
A government responding to the incentives implied
by our results will underinvest in natural disaster preparedness. The inability of voters to effectively hold
government accountable thus appears to contribute to
significant inefficiencies in government spending because the results show that preparedness spending substantially reduces future disaster damage. Voters are,
in a word, myopic. They are not, as we have shown,
myopic in the sense that they respond more to spending
just before an election than to spending a year or two
earlier; rather, they are myopic in the sense that they
are unwilling to spend on natural disasters before the
disasters have occurred. An ounce of prevention would
be far more efficient than a pound of cure, but voters
seem interested only in the cure. The resulting inconsistencies in democratic accountability reduce public
welfare by discouraging reelection-minded politicians
from investing in protection, while encouraging them
to provide assistance after harm has already occurred.
Although we consider our findings to be relevant to
potential underinvestments in preparedness in areas
beyond natural disasters such as preventive medicine,
the government almost certainly does not underinvest
in all kinds of preparedness. For example, after the attacks on September 11, large investments were made in
preventing future attacks on passenger jets. One clear
difference between airport security and most natural
disaster preparedness measures is that airport security
is highly observable and salient. Moreover, this example may be the exception that proves the rule we have
demonstrated in this article. When voters provide their
elected officials with incentives to make mistakes—
ranging from insufficient investment in natural disaster
preparedness to perhaps excessive attention to airline
security—elected officials are likely to provide the inefficient policies that voters implicitly reward.
Moreover, it is possible that major events such as
Hurricane Katrina can heighten the value of natural
disaster preparedness, but this effect may be temporary. For example, California passed Proposition 1E
in 2006, a measure that provided bond financing for
$4.1 billion in flood control measures, with $3 billion
for upgrades to levees in the Central Valley, an area
considered by experts to be exposed to catastrophic
flooding due to insufficient protection from the existing levee network. Experts characterized the situation
as a “ticking time bomb” in January 2005 (California ceeds were to be used to obtain federal matching funds
for the projects, in addition to financial and technical assistance from federal agencies such as the Army
Corps of Engineers.
Despite repeated warnings about the risk of severe
flooding in the Central Valley, large-scale action was
implemented only after Hurricane Katrina made the
danger salient. The importance of Hurricane Katrina
in ensuring support for Proposition 1E is suggested
by the short argument that supporters of the measure
included on the ballot. The argument read, “Our nation learned a tragic lesson from Hurricane Katrina—
we cannot continue to neglect our unsafe levees and
flood control systems” (California Attorney General
2006). The measure passed easily, winning 64% of the
vote, including 67% of the vote in Los Angeles County
and 56% of the vote in relatively conservative Orange
County, despite the fact that neither would be affected
directly by the bulk of the proposed spending. For
voters in these areas, it appears to be the case that
levee repair became a public good that voters were
willing to support after Hurricane Katrina made clear
the potential costs of inaction.27
A similar phenomenon appears to have occurred
at the federal level. Following Hurricane Katrina,
Congress passed and President Bush signed the PostKatrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006, which reorganized FEMA and appropriated $3.6 billion for
levees and other flood control measures.28 In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, voters in New Orleans
also appear to have placed greater value on these
preparedness projects. In late 2006, 30% of New Orleans residents said that “repairing the levees, pumps,
and floodwalls” should be one of the top two priorities in the rebuilding efforts, ranking this item and
crime control as their top two concerns (Kaiser Family
Foundation 2007, 55). The increased voter concern for
disaster protection appears to have faded significantly
since then. By mid-2008, only 2% of New Orleans
voters ranked “hurricane protection/rebuilding floodwalls, levees” as the top rebuilding concern (Kaiser
Family Foundation 2008, 52). This apparent change in
priorities for New Orleans residents suggests that even
an event like Hurricane Katrina is likely to increase the
salience of preparedness issues only temporarily.
Interestingly, the case of Hurricane Katrina may be
anomalous with respect to the electoral benefits of rethan $94.8 billion in relief payments to the Gulf Coast
following Katrina (Congressional Budget Office 2007),
and the Republican Party suffered heavy losses in the
2006 and 2008 elections. Unlike most disaster events,
Hurricane Katrina was highly unique in the substantial
amount of media coverage it received. In an Associated Press poll of U.S. news editors and in the Pew
Research Center U.S. News Interest Index, Hurricane
Katrina was the top world story of 2005 (Kohut, Allen,
and Keeter 2005), and most of this coverage focused
on the mishandled immediate logistical response to the
disaster as opposed to the generous financial response
that came later. Hence, voters may have been substantially affected by the early negative media coverage
and carried those initially formed attitudes about the
administration’s competence with them into the voting
booth. Nevertheless, the case of Katrina offers two potential extensions to this research. Subsequent studies
can explore how the salience of a disaster changes the
political effectiveness of relief spending, in addition to
more closely examining how logistical response differs
from financial response.
Due to the transience of the effect that disasters have
on the visibility of preparedness, it is important to note
that there is some suggestive evidence that governments may be able to take action to make preparedness
salient to voters in a more permanent fashion. In the
late 1990s, FEMA introduced Project Impact, a grassroots disaster preparedness initiative that emphasized collaboration between government, businesses,
and local community leaders, bypassing state governments (Birkland andWaterman 2008;Wachtendorf and
Tierney 2001; Witt 1998). Under Project Impact,
FEMA selected a group of 57 communities from all
50 states (as well as Puerto Rico and the District of
Columbia) to receive either $500,000 or $1-million
grants to pursue disaster preparedness and mitigation
initiatives (Government Accounting Office 2002). The
program targeted areas of varying size and disaster risk.
Interviews with participants in the program indicate
that people valued the program. It was also credited
with helping limit damage from the February 2001
Nisqually earthquake in the Puget Sound, ironically
on the very day that the program was cancelled by the
Bush Administration (Holdeman 2005). Compared to
other counties, the change in the Democrats’ vote share
from 1996 to 2000 was 1.9% higher in Project Impact
counties, a significant difference (p = .006) (Healy and
Malhotra 2009). This estimate is only suggestive of the
possibility that voters may have responded to Project
Impact because it is not possible to control for the omitted variables that could be driving this difference.29
Future scholarship could use surveys, as well as lab and
field experiments, to determine the extent to which
voter decisions can be influenced by government efforts at increasing the salience of issues and policies in
areas such as disaster preparedness.
Although our results indicate that the incumbent
presidential party has not been rewarded for investing
in disaster preparedness, it is possible that voters could
credit members of Congress for those initiatives. A
natural extension to this analysis is to explore whether
similar effects are observed in House and Senate elections. We conducted a preliminary exploration of this
question by estimating analogous models predicting
the vote share for the incumbent Senate party in the
county as the dependent variable. For a variety of potential reasons, we did not obtain precise coefficient estimates from which to draw firm conclusions.30 Across
all specifications that we considered, though, preparedness spending entered with a near-zero coefficient. We
anticipate that future research more closely examining Congressional elections will find that members of
Congress, like presidents, are not rewarded for preparedness spending.
Subsequent research could also apply our empirical
strategy of simultaneously examining voting decisions,
government policy, and associated outcomes to issues
such as education or health care, as well as explore
potential ingredients for improved retrospection. A
more complete understanding of how citizens value
preparedness and relief across a variety of domains
could both advance our theoretical understanding of
retrospective voting and help inform policy making.
Through an analysis of voter responses to disaster relief
and preparedness spending, we have addressed outstanding questions in the long-standing and extensive
literature on citizen competence in democratic societies. Examining actual decisions by the electorate, we
found heterogeneity with respect to the public’s responsiveness to various government policies. However,
we have also shown that the mere presence of responsiveness does not necessarily indicate citizen competence and that failures in accountability can lead to
substantial welfare losses.