Christianization with social mobility but without economic development: Evidence from missions in Ghana

Christianization without economic development: Evidence from missions in Ghana. Remi Jedwab, Felix Meier zu Selhausen, Alexander Moradic. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 190, October 2021, Pages 573-596. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.015

Abstract: One of the most powerful cultural transformations of the 20th century has been the dramatic expansion of Christianity outside of Europe. This unique historical process was facilitated by vast Christian missionary efforts. In this paper, we study the economic effects of Christian missions in Ghana. We rely on six distinct identification strategies that exploit exogenous variations in Christian missionary expansion from 1828 to 1932. We find no association between Christian missions, whether Protestant, Catholic, Presbyterian or Methodist, and local economic development, whether during contemporary or colonial times. However, some results suggest that Christian missions might have had a positive effect on human capital formation. There might thus be contexts in which missions promoted human capital accumulation without this necessarily translating into local economic development.

Keywords: Economics of religionReligious diffusionPath dependenceLong-term economic developmentChristian missionsChristianityAfrica

7. Concluding remarks

One century of Christianization has transformed Ghana’s religious landscape. In 2017, about 80% of the Ghanaian population were Christians. Conversion came at the expense of traditional religious beliefs. In this paper, we established that spatial historical patterns of Christianity persist to the present-day. We then found a positive correlation between Christianity today and measures of economic development today, even after controlling for an extensive set of factors that might help account for endogeneity in mission placement.

Using six distinct identification strategies that exploit possibly exogenous variations (natural experiments) in Christian missionary expansion, we then did not find much evidence for a positive effect of Christianity on economic development in Ghana. These results are broadly consistent across Christian denominations (i.e. Protestantism, Catholicism, Presbyterianism, Methodism), which reinforces our main takeaways and addresses external validity concerns.

It could well be that Christians in Africa are among the most skilled and wealthiest members of society when compared to other individuals within their communities (Alesina et al., 2020, Meier zu Selhausen, van Leeuwen, Weisdorf, 2018, Wantchekon, Novta, Klašnja, 2015). But the fact that Christianization might have increased social mobility does not automatically generate economic activity. The private returns of being a Christian – which may include increased human capital – might have been larger than its actual social returns. Indeed, in a seminal study, Pritchett (2001) pointed out that rapidly rising educational attainment rates in post-independence Africa have failed to translate into learning and sustained economic growth at the macro level. Some aspects of Christianization might have also hampered economic development, for example by promoting social upheaval, and thus lowering interpersonal trust, in missionized communities (Okoye, 2021). Likewise, religiosity can increase religious participation at the expense of labor supply and economic production (Barro, McCleary, 2003, Campante, Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015).

Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming the new global center of Christianity (Pew Research Center, 2015). Our analysis for Ghana suggests that continued Christian conversion might not necessarily promote economic development on the continent.

Positive indirect effect of masculinity stress on red meat consumption through beliefs that meat consumption can augment masculinity; attenuation of the effect when a red meat product is associated with an out-group (i.e., women)

The impact of masculinity stress on preferences and willingness-to-pay for red meat. Rhiannon MacDonnell Mesler, R. Bret Leary, William J. Montford. Appetite, October 5 2021, 105729. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2021.105729

Abstract: This work explores the effects of masculinity stress—distress arising from a perceived discrepancy with male gender norms—on red meat consumption, which has potentially substantial individual, collective, and ecological consequences. Across three studies, we demonstrate a positive indirect effect of masculinity stress on red meat consumption through beliefs that meat consumption can augment masculinity, an effect which is moderated by one's self-assessed traditional masculinity (study 1). We further demonstrate attenuation of the effect of masculinity stress on red meat preference when a red meat product is associated with an out-group (i.e., women; study 2) and show that this effect does not extend to women. In study 3, we show that the effect of masculinity stress on choice of red meat is attenuated following a masculinity affirmation. We finish with a detailed discussion of implications and directions for future research. Taken together, we provide convergent evidence that masculinity stress is associated with red meat preference, and that this preference can be discouraged by leveraging out-group reference information and masculinity affirmation. In so doing, this research provides a series of contributions to the literatures on meat eating and vegetarianism specifically, as well as gender identity maintenance more broadly.

Keywords: MasculinityMasculinity stressMeat consumptionGender identity maintenance

Clark et al. (2014) proposed a theory of motivated free will beliefs, that at least part of free will beliefs & attributions are caused by a desire to hold moral transgressors responsible; recently, this theory has been challenged

Clark, C. J., Winegard, B. M., & Shariff, A. F. (2021). Motivated free will belief: The theory, new (preregistered) studies, and three meta-analyses. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150(7), e22–e47, Oct 2021. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000993

Abstract: Clark et al. (2014) proposed a theory of motivated free will beliefs, according to which at least part of free will beliefs and attributions are caused by a desire to hold moral transgressors responsible. Recently, this theory has been challenged. In the following article, we examine the evidence and conclude that, although not dispositive, much of the evidence seems to support the motivated account. For example, in 14 new (seven preregistered) studies (n = 4,014), results consistently supported the motivated theory; and these findings consistently replicated in studies (k = 8) that tested an alternative (counternormative) hypothesis. In addition, three meta-analyses of the existing data (including eight vignette types and eight free will judgment types) found support for motivated free will attributions (k = 22; n = 7,619; r = .25, p < .001) and beliefs (k = 27; n = 8,100; r = .13, p < .001), which remained robust after removing all potential confounds (k = 26; n = 7,953; r = .12, p < .001). However, the size of these effects varied by vignette type and free will belief measurement. We discuss these variations and the implications for different theories of free will beliefs and attributions. And we end by discussing the relevance of these findings for past and future research and the significance of these findings for human responsibility.

Rolf Degen summarizing... People behaved less helpfully toward a person who had laughed at a joke that was at the expense of a political peer

Are You Laughing at Them or with Them? Laughter as a Signal of In-Group Affiliation. Lawrence Ian Reed & Evelyn Castro. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, Oct 5 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10919-021-00384-0

Abstract: Despite the wide range of theoretical explanations for human laughter, it is generally agreed to function, at least in part, as a social signal. We tested the hypothesis that laughter serves as a signal of group affiliation. Participants viewed a video clip depicting a confederate partner of unknown group affiliation displaying either a neutral expression, a smile, or laughter in response to a joke told at the expense of a member of the in-group or the out-group. Participants then decided whether to help the confederate in a fictional and incentivized economic game. When viewed in response to a joke told at the expense of the in-group member, participants were less likely to help after viewing the laughter clip in comparison to the neutral and smiling clips. However, when viewed in response to a joke told at the expense of the out-group member, participants were more likely to help after viewing the smiling clip in comparison to the neutral and laughter clips. Taken together, these findings suggest that laughter may serve to signal affiliation, albeit only among out-group members.

Most high-income earners support progressive taxation when they identify themselves with a lower group; additionally, individuals who overestimate the earnings of the rich are more likely to support progressive taxation

Who Is High Income, Anyway? Social Comparison, Subjective Group Identification, and Preferences over Progressive Taxation. Asli Cansunar. The Journal of PoliticsVolume 83, Number 4, Oct 2021. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/711627

Abstract: Why are high-income and low-income earners not significantly polarized in their support for progressive income taxation? This article posits that the affluent fail to recognize that they belong to the high-income income group and this misperception affects their preferences over progressive taxation. To explain this mechanism theoretically, I introduce a formal model of subjective income-group identification through self-comparison to an endogenous reference group. In making decisions about optimal tax rates, individuals then use these subjective evaluations of their own income group and earnings of other groups. Relying on ISSP data, I find strong evidence for the model’s empirical implications: most high-income earners support progressive taxation when they identify themselves with a lower group. Additionally, individuals who overestimate the earnings of the rich are more likely to support progressive taxation.