After more than 70 years of research efforts, the question of where memory information is stored in the brain remains unresolved

Where is Memory Information Stored in the Brain? James Tee, Desmond P. Taylor. arXiv Dec 10 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/2112.05362

Within the scientific research community, memory information in the brain is commonly believed to be stored in the synapse - a hypothesis famously attributed to psychologist Donald Hebb. However, there is a growing minority who postulate that memory is stored inside the neuron at the molecular (RNA or DNA) level - an alternative postulation known as the cell-intrinsic hypothesis, coined by psychologist Randy Gallistel. In this paper, we review a selection of key experimental evidence from both sides of the argument. We begin with Eric Kandel's studies on sea slugs, which provided the first evidence in support of the synaptic hypothesis. Next, we touch on experiments in mice by John O'Keefe (declarative memory and the hippocampus) and Joseph LeDoux (procedural fear memory and the amygdala). Then, we introduce the synapse as the basic building block of today's artificial intelligence neural networks. After that, we describe David Glanzman's study on dissociating memory storage and synaptic change in sea slugs, and Susumu Tonegawa's experiment on reactivating retrograde amnesia in mice using laser. From there, we highlight Germund Hesslow's experiment on conditioned pauses in ferrets, and Beatrice Gelber's experiment on conditioning in single-celled organisms without synapses (Paramecium aurelia). This is followed by a description of David Glanzman's experiment on transplanting memory between sea slugs using RNA. Finally, we provide an overview of Brian Dias and Kerry Ressler's experiment on DNA transfer of fear in mice from parents to offspring. We conclude with some potential implications for the wider field of psychology.

Subjects: Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Information Theory (cs.IT)

The most compelling evidence for something approaching human-like visual self-recognition is seen only in great apes, despite an impressive range of sometimes highly original procedures employed to study many monkey species

Mirror Self-Recognition. James R. Anderson and David L. Butler. In The Cambridge Handbook of Animal Cognition, Allison B. Kaufman, Josep Call and James C. Kaufman, eds. Jul 2021. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-handbook-of-animal-cognition/mirror-selfrecognition/E00B36F6CE100695BDF781881067D3B0

Summary: This chapter reviews five decades of research on reactions to mirrors and self-recognition in nonhuman primates, starting with Gallup’s (1970) pioneering experimental demonstration of self-recognition in chimpanzees and its apparent absence in monkeys. Taking a decade-by-decade approach, developments in the field are presented separately for great apes on the one hand, and all other primates on the other (prosimians, monkeys, and so-called lesser apes), considering both empirical studies and theoretical issues. The literature clearly shows that among nonhuman primates the most compelling evidence for something approaching human-like visual self-recognition is seen only in great apes, despite an impressive range of sometimes highly original procedures employed to study many monkey species. In the past decade, research has been shifting from simple questions about whether great apes can self-recognize (now considered beyond doubt), to addressing possible biological bases for individual and species differences in the strength of self-recognition, analysis of possible adaptive functions of the capacity for self-visualization, and searching for evidence of self-recognition in a range of nonprimate species.

"Dark participation" (malicious online participation including offensive speech, hate speech, fake news, and conspiracy theories) harms the well-being of victims, but for the perpetrators it might provide unique gratifications including experiences of pleasure

Dark Social Media Participation and Well-being. Thorsten Quandt, Johanna Klapproth, Lena Frischlich. Current Opinion in Psychology, December 11 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.11.004

Highlights

• Dark participation describes various forms of malicious online participation including offensive speech, hate speech, fake news, and conspiracy theories.

• Dark participation entails the participation of, at least, the perpetrators and victims—often also observers.

• Dark participation can severely harm the well-being of victims and can have noxious effects on intergroup relationships and society at large.

• For the perpetrators, dark participation might provide unique gratifications including experiences of pleasure that are yet to be fully explored by research.

Abstract: In recent years, there have been increasing global concerns about the abuse of digital technologies for malicious “dark participation,” the spreading of digital offenses, hate speech, fake news, and conspiracy theories. Clearly, dark participation can have severe effects on the victims and on society at large. However, less is known about the impact of dark participation on the perpetrators’ well-being. Preliminary research on the perpetrators indicates positive emotions and specific gratifications resulting from their behavior, in particular when it is fully consistent with their ideologies. Uncovering these gratifications—and the positive effects dark participation may have on perpetrators’ well-being—could be the key to a better understanding of the dark side of social media.

Keywords: conspiracy theoriesdark participationfake newshate speechincivilityoffensive speechperpetratorsvictimswell-being