The Oath Keepers' national organization is unusual among groups conducting political violence in that they seem to behave as a business

Klinenberg, Danny, Selling Violent Extremism (October 5, 2022). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4239242

Abstract: The Oath Keepers' national organization is unusual among groups conducting political violence in that they seem to behave as a business. Using leaked membership data, internal chat forums and publicly available articles posted to their website, I show that, unlike other far-right organizations, such as the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers do not organize as a club. Rather, its behavior is better explained as a firm that adjusts the price of membership over time to maximize profit. I then estimate the Oath Keepers' price elasticity of demand for new membership using five membership sales between 2014 and 2018. I find the organization's demand is highly sensitive to changes in price. These results imply that political violence can be motivated by nonideological entrepreneurs maximizing profits under current legal institutions -- a chilling conclusion.

Keywords: Extremism, Applied microeconomics

JEL A10