GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; large language models have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems

Emergent Analogical Reasoning in Large Language Models. Taylor Webb, Keith J. Holyoak, Hongjing Lu. Dec 19 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2212.09196v1

Abstract: The recent advent of large language models - large neural networks trained on a simple predictive objective over a massive corpus of natural language - has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training on those problems. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a novel text-based matrix reasoning task closely modeled on Raven's Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

---

GPT-3 “has been forced to develop mechanisms similar to those thought to underlie human analogical reasoning — despite not being explicitly trained to do so […] through a radically different route than that taken by biological intelligence.”

Use time of social media and streaming services was associated with reduced sexist attitudes

Can hedonic technology use drive sexism in youth? Reconsidering the cultivation and objectification perspectives. Ofir Turel. Behaviour & Information Technology, Dec 29 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2022.2159874

 Abstract: The information systems (IS) literature has examined sexism and gender inequality issues primarily in the context of the IS workforce. I suggest that we should extend this perspective by emphasising the role of technologies in promoting sexist attitudes in youth. A review of the literature suggests that hedonic technologies, such as videogames, video streaming and social media sites, have been often portrayed as delivering sexist content, and through cultivation, producing sexist attitudes and behaviours. Here, I build on cultivation, objectification, and ambivalent sexism theories, and hypothesise that (1) such effects exist in teenage users of videogames, video streaming services and social media, and that (2) such effects are more pronounced in males. Findings based on two secondary, large nationally representative datasets (n1 = 3,300, n2 = 3,946) of high school seniors do not, for the most part, support the hypotheses. The persistent non-significant and sometimes opposite to expectation findings are very informative, because they demonstrate that the overall role of modern hedonic technologies in driving sexism in teenagers may be limited or even positive, despite claims in popular media and findings of prior lab-based research. This is because the use time of videogames was only weakly associated with sexist attitudes and use time of social media and streaming services was associated with reduced sexist attitudes. The findings make first strides toward understanding the topic of IS content delivery and sexism and pave the way for more IS research on this important topic.

Keywords: Hedonic technologiessexismcultivation theorygender-based differencesvideogamessocial media

People with social anxiety disorder fear not only negative but also positive evaluation by others, because they are afraid that it will turn against them

A mixed methods investigation of reasons underlying fear of positive evaluation. Gillian A. Wilson, Bailee L. Malivoire, Stephanie E. Cassin, Martin M. Antony. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, December 15 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/cpp.2818

Abstract: Fear of negative evaluation (FNE) is a hallmark feature of social anxiety disorder (SAD). There is also evidence that people with SAD fear receiving positive evaluation and that fear of positive evaluation (FPE) is distinct from FNE. However, researchers have speculated that concerns related to negative evaluation may actually underlie FPE. This study sought to advance our understanding of FPE by employing both quantitative and qualitative methods to assess the reasons underlying participants' endorsement of FPE on the Fear of Positive Evaluation Scale and the extent to which these reasons reflect FNE versus FPE in a sample of individuals with SAD (n = 47) and a nonclinical comparison group (n = 49). Results indicated that responses to the FPES items primarily reflected an underlying FNE. Consistent with contemporary cognitive–behavioural theories of SAD, fear of proximal or eventual negative judgement emerged as the most common reason for participants' responses on the FPES. However, participants reported other reasons that did not reflect FNE, such as fear of hurting people's feelings and uncertainty associated with positive evaluation. All of the reasons underlying participants' ratings on the FPES were reported by both the SAD group and the nonclinical comparison group; however, individuals with SAD endorsed each of the reasons to a greater extent. These findings suggest that the FPES does not exclusively assess FPE as intended; however, the emergence and endorsement of reasons other than FNE suggest that FPE exists as a distinct construct.

Are Progressives in Denial About Progress? Yes, but So Is Almost Everyone Else

Are Progressives in Denial About Progress? Yes, but So Is Almost Everyone Else. Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock. Clinical Psychological Science, December 22, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/21677026221114315

Abstract: Scott Lilienfeld warned that psychology’s ideological uniformity would lead to premature closure on sensitive topics. He encouraged psychologists to question politically convenient results and did so himself in numerous areas. We follow Lilienfeld’s example and examine the empirical foundation beneath claims that positive illusions about societal change sustain inequalities by inducing apathy and opposition to reform. Drawing on data from a large-scale survey, we find almost the opposite: a pervasive tendency, across ideological and demographic categories, to see things as getting worse than they really are. These results cast doubt on functionalist claims that people mobilize beliefs about societal trends to support political positions and suggest a simpler explanation: Most laypeople do not organize information in ways that provide reliable monitoring of social change over time, which makes their views on progress susceptible to memory distortions and high-profile current events and political rhetoric.