The positive correlation between contradictory conspiracy beliefs mostly reflects that disbelieving one conspiracy theory predicts an increased likelihood of disbelieving a contradictory one

Just Dead, Not Alive: Reconsidering Belief in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al. Psychological Science, April 11, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976231158570

Abstract: A well-established finding is that beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered vs. faked her own death) are positively correlated. This is commonly interpreted as evidence that people systematically believe blatant inconsistencies. Here, we propose that the field has insufficiently acknowledged a compelling alternative explanation: Disbelieving both conspiracy theories also yields a positive correlation. In four preregistered studies (total N = 7,641 adults), online participants evaluated 28 sets of contradictory conspiracy theories. Although the positive correlation was replicated in all cases, this was mostly due to participants who believed the official versions of these events (e.g., Princess Diana died in a car accident). Among participants who disbelieved these official stories, the correlation was inconsistent at best. A mini meta-analysis revealed a negative correlation among these participants, which was particularly due to the dead-or-alive cases. Apparently, researchers should reconsider the notion of systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories.

General Discussion

The results of four preregistered studies in three countries, along with a meta-analysis, yielded the following conclusions. First, beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories are positively correlated, replicating the basic finding of Wood and colleagues (2012). Second, this correlation is mostly attributable to the participants in the sample who believe the official version of events (Studies 1–4) and to a lesser extent those who feel unsure what happened (Study 2). Among participants who disbelieve the official version of events, the positive correlation emerges sporadically but inconsistently. In a meta-analysis, the correlation among these participants was negative, particularly for dead-or-alive cases. Altogether, the positive correlation between contradictory conspiracy beliefs mostly reflects that disbelieving one conspiracy theory predicts an increased likelihood of disbelieving a contradictory one.

Some of the correlations among participants who disbelieved the official version of these events were underpowered (e.g., the Osama bin Laden case; Studies 3 and 4); moreover, some of the conspiracy theories yielded very low levels of belief (e.g., the theory that Princess Diana faked her own death; Studies 1 and 4). Note that both of these issues speak against (and not in favor of) systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories. An underpowered correlation implies that only a small proportion of the sample disbelieved the official version of a particular case to begin with (Imhoff et al., 2022; Sutton & Douglas, 2022). Likewise, extremely low levels of belief on one of the items implies that few participants actually believe both contradictory conspiracy theories. And yet a positive overall correlation between contradictory conspiracy theories consistently emerged.

The current findings are limited to the populations and specific conspiracy theories investigated here, and future research may expand to different cultures and contradictory conspiracy theories. Moreover, our findings do not imply that people who believe contradictory conspiracy theories do not exist (see also Lukic et al., 2019; Miller, 2020; Petrović & Žeželj, 2022). Our data also contained participants who believed contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as other inconsistencies (i.e., believed the official version plus a conspiracy theory), although in low proportions (see Tables S1–S4 in the Supplemental Material). Instead, our findings suggest that researchers have overestimated the predictability and prevalence of such inconsistencies in a conspiratorial mindset.

This insight raises important new questions. For instance, to what extent is the correlation between conspiracy beliefs that are not mutually incompatible (often seen as reflecting a conspiratorial mindset) actually due to people who disbelieve both conspiracy theories? It is quite plausible that, among conspiracy theorists, the strength of this association is weaker than commonly assumed. More generally, the current studies underscore the methodological point that taking correlations at face value—without carefully examining underlying response distributions—can yield misguided conclusions.

This research domain hence should reconsider the notion of systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories. Certainly, many conspiracy theories are epistemically irrational in that they are based on weak evidence, pseudoscience, motivated reasoning, and unreliable sources. Moreover, most conspiracy theories do more harm than good for society (e.g., Douglas et al., 2019; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Jolley et al., 2019; van der Linden, 2015; van Prooijen et al., 2022). That does not mean, however, that believing a person was murdered increases the likelihood of believing that same person faked their own death. It is time for the research field of conspiracy theories to accept the obvious: When people believe a person is dead, they are not more likely to believe that same person is still alive.