In Sweden’s Preschools, Boys Learn to Dance and Girls Learn to Yell. Ellen Barry. The New York Times, Mar 24 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/world/europe/sweden-gender-neutral-preschools.html
STOCKHOLM — Something was wrong with the Penguins, the incoming class of toddlers at the Seafarer’s Preschool, in a wooded suburb south of Stockholm.
The boys were clamorous and physical. They shouted and hit. The girls held up their arms and whimpered to be picked up. The group of 1- and 2-year-olds had, in other words, split along traditional gender lines. And at this school, that is not O.K.
Their teachers cleared the room of cars and dolls. They put the boys in charge of the play kitchen. They made the girls practice shouting “No!” Then they decided to open a proper investigation, erecting video cameras in the classroom.
Science may still be divided over whether gender differences are rooted in biology or culture, but many of Sweden’s government-funded preschools are doing what they can to deconstruct them. State curriculum urges teachers and principals to embrace their role as social engineers, requiring them to “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns.”
It is normal, in many Swedish preschools, for teachers to avoid referring to their students’ gender — instead of “boys and girls,” they say “friends,” or call children by name. Play is organized to prevent children from sorting themselves by gender. A gender-neutral pronoun, “hen,” was introduced in 2012 and was swiftly absorbed into mainstream Swedish culture, something that, linguists say, has never happened in another country.
One of the few peer-reviewed efforts to examine the method’s effects, published last year in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, concluded that some behaviors do go away when students attend what the study called “gender-neutral” preschools.
For instance, the children at these schools do not show a strong preference for playmates of the same gender, and are less likely to make assumptions based on stereotypes. Yet, the scientists found no difference at all in the children’s tendency to notice gender, suggesting that may be under a genetic influence.
At the Seafarer’s Preschool, the effort sometimes has the feeling of a venture into uncharted territory.
On a recent Friday in Hammarbyhojden, south of Stockholm, Elis Storesund, the school’s in-house gender expert, sat bent over a work sheet with two teachers of the 4- and 5-year-old Seagulls, reviewing their progress on gender objectives.
“When we are drawing,” said Melisa Esteka, 31, one of the teachers, “we see that the girls — they draw a lot — they draw girls with lots of makeup and long eyelashes. It’s very clear that they are girls. We ask, ‘Don’t boys have eyelashes?’ And they say, ‘We know it is not like that in real life.’”
Ms. Storesund, 54, nodded thoughtfully. “They are trying to understand what it is to be a girl,” she said.
Ms. Esteka looked frustrated. She had set a goal for herself: To stop the children from identifying things as “for girls” or “for boys.” But lately, her students were absorbing stereotypes from billboards and cartoons, and sometimes it seemed like all the slow, systematic work of the Seafarer’s Preschool was flying away overnight.
“There is so much they bring with them,” she said. “They bring the whole world with them. We can’t stop that from happening.”
Sweden’s experiment in gender-neutral preschools began in 1996 in Trodje, a small town near the edge of the Baltic Sea. The man who started it, Ingemar Gens, was not an educator but a journalist who dabbled in anthropology and gender theory, having studied Swedish men seeking mail-order brides in Thailand. Newly appointed as a district “equal opportunity expert,” Mr. Gens wanted to break down the norm of stoic, unemotional Swedish masculinity.
Preschool struck him as the right place to do this. Swedish children spend much of their early life in government-funded preschools, which offer care at nominal cost for up to 12 hours a day starting at the age of 1.
Two schools rolled out what was called a compensatory gender strategy. Boys and girls at the preschools were separated for part of the day and coached in traits associated with the other gender. Boys massaged each other’s feet. Girls were led in barefoot walks in the snow, and told to throw open the window and scream.
“We tried to do that — to educate boys in what girls already knew, and vice versa,” said Mr. Gens, now 68. A wave of criticism broke over him, but that was expected.
“They said we were indoctrinating the kids,” he said. “I say we’re always indoctrinating kids. Bringing them up is indoctrination.”
Teachers were required to review videotapes of themselves with the children, to identify subtle differences in the way they interacted with boys and girls. Many found that they used more words, and more complex sentences, with girls.
Helena Baggstrom, who taught at one of the schools, recalled watching footage of herself in a cloakroom, attending to children as they bundled up to go outside. She saw, to her shock, that she had helped one boy after another get dressed and run out the door. The girls, she realized, were expected to dress themselves.
“It was hard at first to see patterns,” she said. “We saw more and more, and we were horrified at what we saw.”
The strategy of separating boys and girls was later set aside in favor of a “gender neutral” approach intent on muting differences. Still, the spirit of Mr. Gens’s experiment had percolated through the government. In 1998, Sweden added new language to its national curriculum requiring that all preschools “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns” and encourage children to explore “outside the limitations of stereotyped gender roles.”
Traditionalists have raised occasional protests, complaining of liberal brainwashing. The far-right Sweden Democrats party, which won about 13 percent of the vote in 2014, has promised to roll back teaching that “seeks to change all children and young people’s behavior and gender identity.”
But in a political environment deeply split over immigration, gender-equality policies enjoy the support of Sweden’s largest parties, the center-left Social Democrats and the center-right Moderates.
A columnist and mathematician named Tanja Bergkvist, one of the few figures who routinely attacks what she calls “Sweden’s gender madness,” says many Swedes are uncomfortable with the practice but are afraid to criticize it in public.
“They don’t want to be regarded as against equality,” she said. “Nobody wants to be against equality.”
In Trodje, the first wave of preschoolers to attend gender-neutral preschools are now 20-somethings.
Elin Gerdin, 26, part of that first wave, is studying to be a teacher. In appearance she is conventionally feminine, her long dark hair coaxed into spirals with a curling iron. This is something she points out — that in appearance she is conventionally feminine. It is the first sign that she views gender as something you could put on or take off, like a raincoat.
“This is a choice I have made because this is me,” she said of her appearance. “And this is me because I am a product of society.”
There are moments when her early education comes back to her in flashes.
Ms. Gerdin’s friends have begun to have babies, and they post pictures of them on Facebook, swathed in blue or pink, in society’s first act of sorting. Ms. Gerdin gets upset when this happens. She feels sorry for the children. She makes it a point to seek her friends out and tell them, earnestly, that they are making a mistake. This feels to her like a responsibility.
“We are a group of children who will grow up, and we will have children, and we will talk to them about this,” she said. “It is not easy to change a whole society.”
That process was just beginning at the Seafarer’s Preschool on a recent morning, when the children scrambled out of voluminous snowsuits. Underneath his, Otto, a sturdy 3-year-old, was wearing a dress.
Otto prefers to wear dresses because he likes the way they fan out when he spins around, and it does not make him unusual here. Up until now, no one in Otto’s life — not his grandparents, or babysitters, or fellow 3-year-olds — has told him that boys do not wear dresses, said his mother, Lena Christiansson, 36, matter-of-factly. She would like this to continue as long as possible.
This expectation has become increasingly common, said Ms. Storesund, the Seafarer’s gender specialist.
“Now, parents ask us, ‘What are you doing about gender?’” she said.
Ms. Storesund is on hand to confront classroom dilemmas: When boys in the group for 3-year-olds refused to paint, or dance, and the group threatened to split along gender lines, she was brought in to unpack the problem, tinkering with the activities until she coaxed the boys back to equal participation.
Preserving a gender-neutral environment is not simple. Carina Sevebjork Saur, 57, who has been teaching at the school for a year and a half, said she often catches herself saying the wrong thing, like an offhand compliment on a child’s appearance.
“You are on your way to saying something, as a reflex, but you have to hold it back,” she said. “You can comment on clothes in other ways: ‘Oh, my goodness, how many polka dots!’”
The effort is compensated, teachers said, by the impression that they are unraveling mysteries, and as spring approached, some changes could be observed among the Penguins.
One of the group’s teachers, Izabell Sandberg, 26, noticed a shift in a 2-year-old girl whose parents dropped her off wearing tights and pale-pink dresses. The girl focused intently on staying clean. If another child took her toys, she would whimper.
“She accepted everything,” Ms. Sandberg said. “And I thought this was very girlie. It was like she was apologizing for taking up space.”
Until, that is, a recent morning, when the girl had put a hat on and carefully arranged bags around herself, preparing to set off on an imaginary expedition. When a classmate tried to walk off with one of her bags, the girl held out the palm of her hand and shouted “No” at such a high volume that Ms. Sandberg’s head swiveled around.
It was something they had been practicing.
By the time March rolled round, the girl had gotten so loud that she drowned out the boys in the class, Ms. Sandberg said. At the end of the day, she was messy. The girl’s parents were less than delighted, she said, and reported that she had become cheeky and defiant at home.
But Ms. Sandberg has plenty of experience explaining the mission to parents.
“This is what we do here, and we are not going to stop it,” she said.
Christina Anderson contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on March 25, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: In Sweden, Preschools Teach Boys to Dance, and Girls to Yell.
Wednesday, September 26, 2018
Moral reasoning / In S Thompson-Schill (Ed.), Language & Thought. Volume 3 of Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Moral reasoning. Lily Tsoi and Liane Young. In S Thompson-Schill (Ed.), Language & Thought. Volume 3 of Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience (4th ed.). http://moralitylab.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Tsoi_2018_Stevens_moral_reasoning.pdf
Abstract: Understanding people’s minds is essential for effectively navigating our social world. This chapter focuses on the capacity to attribute and reason about minds (theory of mind; ToM) and its role in moral cognition. The section on moral judgment focuses on the circumstances in which people rely on mental states for moral judgments and how ToM may differ depending on the moral domain. We provide a functional explanation for these patterns of mental state reasoning that contrasts the need to regulate interpersonal relations with the need to protect the self. The section on moral behavior focuses on interactions with moral agents (e.g., friends, foes, ingroups, outgroups). We examine how ToM is deployed during two fundamental social contexts (i.e., cooperation and competition) and elaborate on the circumstances in which people fail to consider the minds of others. We end by providing some evidence that ToM can improve interpersonal and intergroup relations.
Key Terms: morality, theory of mind, mentalizing, cooperation, competition, dehumanization, social cognition
Check also: The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions. James A. Dungan, Alek Chakroff, and Liane Young. PLoS One. 2017; 12(3): e0173405. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5344389/
Abstract: Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.
Abstract: Understanding people’s minds is essential for effectively navigating our social world. This chapter focuses on the capacity to attribute and reason about minds (theory of mind; ToM) and its role in moral cognition. The section on moral judgment focuses on the circumstances in which people rely on mental states for moral judgments and how ToM may differ depending on the moral domain. We provide a functional explanation for these patterns of mental state reasoning that contrasts the need to regulate interpersonal relations with the need to protect the self. The section on moral behavior focuses on interactions with moral agents (e.g., friends, foes, ingroups, outgroups). We examine how ToM is deployed during two fundamental social contexts (i.e., cooperation and competition) and elaborate on the circumstances in which people fail to consider the minds of others. We end by providing some evidence that ToM can improve interpersonal and intergroup relations.
Key Terms: morality, theory of mind, mentalizing, cooperation, competition, dehumanization, social cognition
Check also: The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions. James A. Dungan, Alek Chakroff, and Liane Young. PLoS One. 2017; 12(3): e0173405. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5344389/
Abstract: Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.
In order to be loved, you also have to be feared; the idea that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism
Bruno Maçães on the Spirit of Adventure (Ep. 50). Tyler Cowen, Sep 2018, https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/bruno-ma%C3%A7%C3%A3es-tyler-cowen-eurasia-adventure-liberalism-81e4d51340d0
Bruno Maçães, senior advisor at Flint Global is author of The Dawn of Eurasia — On the Trail of the New World Order [https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/305712/the-dawn-of-eurasia/9780241309254.html]
MAÇÃES: This raises deep philosophical questions and political questions. If you want Turkey to become like Europe, then you have to project European power across Turkey. If Europe no longer has that ability, then you shouldn’t be surprised that Turkey looks elsewhere.
It’s very simple. I think I say in the book that in order to be loved, you also have to be feared. This idea that you find in Europe now, that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism. I just cannot see that happen.
COWEN: So Europe lacks the spirit of adventure.
MAÇÃES: That is certainly the case. I think you see that. One of the areas where the spirit of adventure today is more relevant and important is technology. You see in Europe the idea that technology’s against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit, which I think is a good example of how adventure has disappeared from the European psyche.
Bruno Maçães, senior advisor at Flint Global is author of The Dawn of Eurasia — On the Trail of the New World Order [https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/305712/the-dawn-of-eurasia/9780241309254.html]
MAÇÃES: This raises deep philosophical questions and political questions. If you want Turkey to become like Europe, then you have to project European power across Turkey. If Europe no longer has that ability, then you shouldn’t be surprised that Turkey looks elsewhere.
It’s very simple. I think I say in the book that in order to be loved, you also have to be feared. This idea that you find in Europe now, that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism. I just cannot see that happen.
COWEN: So Europe lacks the spirit of adventure.
MAÇÃES: That is certainly the case. I think you see that. One of the areas where the spirit of adventure today is more relevant and important is technology. You see in Europe the idea that technology’s against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit, which I think is a good example of how adventure has disappeared from the European psyche.
A higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk; this holds for both men & women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education
Higher divorce risk when mates are plentiful? Evidence from Denmark. Caroline Uggla, Gunnar Andersson. Royal Society Biology Letters, DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2018.0475
Abstract: Work from social and biological sciences has shown that adult sex ratios are associated with relationship behaviours. When partners are abundant, opportunities for mate switching may increase and relationship stability decrease. To date, most of the human literature has used regional areas at various levels of aggregation to define partner markets. But, in developed countries, many individuals of reproductive age spend a considerable amount of time outside their residential areas, and other measures may better capture the opportunities to meet a (new) partner. Here, we use Danish register data to test whether the sex ratio of the occupational sector is linked to divorce. Our data cover individuals in Denmark who married during 1981–2002 and we control for age at and duration of marriage, education and parity. Results support the prediction that a higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk. This holds for both men and women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education. Our results highlight the need to study demographic behaviours of men and women simultaneously, and to consider partner markets beyond geographical areas so that differing strategies for males and females may be examined.
Abstract: Work from social and biological sciences has shown that adult sex ratios are associated with relationship behaviours. When partners are abundant, opportunities for mate switching may increase and relationship stability decrease. To date, most of the human literature has used regional areas at various levels of aggregation to define partner markets. But, in developed countries, many individuals of reproductive age spend a considerable amount of time outside their residential areas, and other measures may better capture the opportunities to meet a (new) partner. Here, we use Danish register data to test whether the sex ratio of the occupational sector is linked to divorce. Our data cover individuals in Denmark who married during 1981–2002 and we control for age at and duration of marriage, education and parity. Results support the prediction that a higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk. This holds for both men and women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education. Our results highlight the need to study demographic behaviours of men and women simultaneously, and to consider partner markets beyond geographical areas so that differing strategies for males and females may be examined.
The environmental costs and benefits of high-yield farming
The environmental costs and benefits of high-yield farming. Andrew Balmford et al. Nature Sustainability, volume 1, pages477–485 (2018). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0138-5
Abstract: How we manage farming and food systems to meet rising demand is pivotal to the future of biodiversity. Extensive field data suggest that impacts on wild populations would be greatly reduced through boosting yields on existing farmland so as to spare remaining natural habitats. High-yield farming raises other concerns because expressed per unit area it can generate high levels of externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient losses. However, such metrics underestimate the overall impacts of lower-yield systems. Here we develop a framework that instead compares externality and land costs per unit production. We apply this framework to diverse data sets that describe the externalities of four major farm sectors and reveal that, rather than involving trade-offs, the externality and land costs of alternative production systems can covary positively: per unit production, land-efficient systems often produce lower externalities. For greenhouse gas emissions, these associations become more strongly positive once forgone sequestration is included. Our conclusions are limited: remarkably few studies report externalities alongside yields; many important externalities and farming systems are inadequately measured; and realizing the environmental benefits of high-yield systems typically requires additional measures to limit farmland expansion. Nevertheless, our results suggest that trade-offs among key cost metrics are not as ubiquitous as sometimes perceived.
Abstract: How we manage farming and food systems to meet rising demand is pivotal to the future of biodiversity. Extensive field data suggest that impacts on wild populations would be greatly reduced through boosting yields on existing farmland so as to spare remaining natural habitats. High-yield farming raises other concerns because expressed per unit area it can generate high levels of externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient losses. However, such metrics underestimate the overall impacts of lower-yield systems. Here we develop a framework that instead compares externality and land costs per unit production. We apply this framework to diverse data sets that describe the externalities of four major farm sectors and reveal that, rather than involving trade-offs, the externality and land costs of alternative production systems can covary positively: per unit production, land-efficient systems often produce lower externalities. For greenhouse gas emissions, these associations become more strongly positive once forgone sequestration is included. Our conclusions are limited: remarkably few studies report externalities alongside yields; many important externalities and farming systems are inadequately measured; and realizing the environmental benefits of high-yield systems typically requires additional measures to limit farmland expansion. Nevertheless, our results suggest that trade-offs among key cost metrics are not as ubiquitous as sometimes perceived.
A Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor
Explaining Differing Tastes in the Humor of Liberals and Conservatives. Todd L. Belt, Hawaii Univ. https://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/papers/docs/belt2018.pdf
Abstract: This paper explains how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a theory that explains these differences by matching psychological theories of humor to political science theories that explain personality traits of liberalism and conservatism. The secondary contribution involves the empirical testing of hypotheses are then drawn from this theory using data from 400 humorous still images collected by the author and the Library of Congress during the 2016 election cycle. The results indicate that a Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of differing tastes in political humor for future political discourse and civility.
Abstract: This paper explains how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a theory that explains these differences by matching psychological theories of humor to political science theories that explain personality traits of liberalism and conservatism. The secondary contribution involves the empirical testing of hypotheses are then drawn from this theory using data from 400 humorous still images collected by the author and the Library of Congress during the 2016 election cycle. The results indicate that a Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of differing tastes in political humor for future political discourse and civility.
Sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter; sexism played a role in Clinton's electoral loss, & she correctly characterized sexism as endemic (especially on the left)
Why Pillory Hillary? Testing the endemic sexism hypothesis regarding the 2016 U.S. election. Valerie Rothwell, Gordon Hodson, Elvira Prusaczyk. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 138, 1 February 2019, Pages 106-108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.09.034
Abstract: The present study used nationally representative American National Election Studies (ANES) data to examine the potential role of sexism in the 2016 presidential election. We hypothesized not only that sexism would predict voting for Trump (vs. Clinton), but that its role would be stronger on the political left (vs. right). The sample consisted of 1916 Clinton or Trump voters (51.41% women; Mage = 51.78, SD = 17.16; 79.5% White) who completed measures of political ideology and hostile sexism. Greater conservatism or sexism significantly predicted voting for Trump (vs. Clinton). As expected, sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter. Not only was Clinton correct that sexism played a role in her electoral loss, but she correctly characterized sexism as endemic, an influence especially perceptible on the left.
Abstract: The present study used nationally representative American National Election Studies (ANES) data to examine the potential role of sexism in the 2016 presidential election. We hypothesized not only that sexism would predict voting for Trump (vs. Clinton), but that its role would be stronger on the political left (vs. right). The sample consisted of 1916 Clinton or Trump voters (51.41% women; Mage = 51.78, SD = 17.16; 79.5% White) who completed measures of political ideology and hostile sexism. Greater conservatism or sexism significantly predicted voting for Trump (vs. Clinton). As expected, sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter. Not only was Clinton correct that sexism played a role in her electoral loss, but she correctly characterized sexism as endemic, an influence especially perceptible on the left.
There is a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, & greater same-sex attraction (female–female) vs a negative effect of lower income levels & more offspring
Man, Woman, “Other”: Factors Associated with Nonbinary Gender Identification. Stephen Whyte, Robert C. Brooks, Benno Torgler. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1307-3
Abstract: Using a unique dataset of 7479 respondents to the online Australian Sex Survey (July–September 2016), we explored factors relevant for individuals who self-identify as one of the many possible nonbinary gender options (i.e., not man or woman). Our results identified significant sex differences in such factors; in particular, a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, and greater same-sex attraction (female–female) versus a negative effect of lower income levels and more offspring. With respect to sex similarities, older males and females, heterosexuals, those with lower educational levels, and those living outside capital cities were all more likely to identify as the historically dichotomous gender options. These factors associated with nonbinary gender identification were also more multifaceted for females than for males, although our interaction terms demonstrated that younger females (relative to younger males) and nonheterosexuals (relative to heterosexuals) were more likely to identify as nonbinary. These effects were reversed, however, in the older cohort. Because gender can have such significant lifetime impacts for both the individual and society as a whole, our findings strongly suggest the need for further research into factors that impact gender diversity.
Abstract: Using a unique dataset of 7479 respondents to the online Australian Sex Survey (July–September 2016), we explored factors relevant for individuals who self-identify as one of the many possible nonbinary gender options (i.e., not man or woman). Our results identified significant sex differences in such factors; in particular, a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, and greater same-sex attraction (female–female) versus a negative effect of lower income levels and more offspring. With respect to sex similarities, older males and females, heterosexuals, those with lower educational levels, and those living outside capital cities were all more likely to identify as the historically dichotomous gender options. These factors associated with nonbinary gender identification were also more multifaceted for females than for males, although our interaction terms demonstrated that younger females (relative to younger males) and nonheterosexuals (relative to heterosexuals) were more likely to identify as nonbinary. These effects were reversed, however, in the older cohort. Because gender can have such significant lifetime impacts for both the individual and society as a whole, our findings strongly suggest the need for further research into factors that impact gender diversity.
Tuesday, September 25, 2018
The threat of punishment lowered the average quality & quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no incentive at all; also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward
Ballard, Timothy, and Daniel Cosgrove. 2018. “Information processing in the face of reward versus punishment.” PsyArXiv. September 26. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zvpcr
Abstract: Much is known about the effects of reward and punishment on behavior, yet little research has considered how these incentives influence the information processing dynamics that underlie decision making. We fit the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to data from a perceptual judgment task to examine the impacts of reward- and punishment-based incentives on three distinct components of information processing: the quality of the information processed, the quantity of that information, and the decision threshold. The threat of punishment lowered the average quality and quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no performance incentive at all. The threat of punishment also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward. These findings suggest that information processing dynamics are not wholly determined by objective properties of the decision environment, but also by the higher order goals of the system.
Abstract: Much is known about the effects of reward and punishment on behavior, yet little research has considered how these incentives influence the information processing dynamics that underlie decision making. We fit the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to data from a perceptual judgment task to examine the impacts of reward- and punishment-based incentives on three distinct components of information processing: the quality of the information processed, the quantity of that information, and the decision threshold. The threat of punishment lowered the average quality and quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no performance incentive at all. The threat of punishment also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward. These findings suggest that information processing dynamics are not wholly determined by objective properties of the decision environment, but also by the higher order goals of the system.
People with a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent; there is a moderating effect of power & conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches
Powerful Pharma and Its Marginalized Alternatives? Effects of Individual Differences in Conspiracy Mentality on Attitudes Toward Medical Approaches. Pia Lamberty and Roland Imhoff. Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000347
Abstract: Only little is known about the underpinning psychological processes that determine medical choices. Across four studies, we establish that conspiracy mentality predicts a preference for alternative over biomedical therapies. Study 1a (N = 392) and 1b (N = 204) provide correlational support, Study 2 (N = 185) experimentally tested the role of power: People who endorsed a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent. Study 3 (N = 239) again showed a moderating effect of power and conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches. These findings point to the consequences of conspiracy mentality for health behavior and prevention programs.
Keywords: conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, health behavior, health-related cognitions, illness beliefs
Abstract: Only little is known about the underpinning psychological processes that determine medical choices. Across four studies, we establish that conspiracy mentality predicts a preference for alternative over biomedical therapies. Study 1a (N = 392) and 1b (N = 204) provide correlational support, Study 2 (N = 185) experimentally tested the role of power: People who endorsed a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent. Study 3 (N = 239) again showed a moderating effect of power and conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches. These findings point to the consequences of conspiracy mentality for health behavior and prevention programs.
Keywords: conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, health behavior, health-related cognitions, illness beliefs
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor, those with bonding difficulties did not; the degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties; the ones with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor
Mother-child bonding is associated with body odor perception. Ilona Croy et al. Physiology & Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2018.09.014
Highlights
• Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties did not
• The degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor.
Abstract: Mothers can recognize the odor of their baby and typically like this odor very much. In line with this observation, infant body odors activate reward-related brain areas in the mothers. In some mother-child-dyads however, the mutual bond is impaired and mothers have trouble engaging in interaction with their child. We aimed to examine how mothers with bonding difficulties perceive their child's body odor.
In total 75 mothers and their babies (aged 0–12 months) were examined: Twenty-five of those were recruited in a psychosomatic day hospital ward, which is specialized for mother-child bonding disorders. Fifty age-matched healthy women and their babies served as controls. Body odor samples of each baby were collected from bodysuits in a highly standardized procedure. Thereafter, each mother rated the samples of her own and of two stranger's infants in a blindfolded and randomized design. In addition, general olfactory function in terms of threshold and identification ability was tested and the mother reported the bonding to her baby in a standardized questionnaire.
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own compared to odors of strange infant's, while mothers with bonding difficulties did not. Furthermore, the degree of preference was negatively correlated to self-reported bonding difficulties. Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor above chance, while control mothers could (p = 0.02). Both groups did not differ in general olfactory function.
We assume that reduced close body contact and interaction time in bonding difficulties may lead to reduced olfactory stimulation and hinder the recognition of the infantile body odor. Within a vicious cycle, a reduced hedonic experience smelling the own baby may prevent women from deliberately approaching the baby. Thus the positive and bond-building consequences of bodily and sensory interaction cannot unfold. As the baby's odor is normally perceived as very pleasant and rewarding, the conscious perception of the infantile body odor may be an additive therapeutic approach for mothers with bonding difficulties.
Highlights
• Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties did not
• The degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor.
Abstract: Mothers can recognize the odor of their baby and typically like this odor very much. In line with this observation, infant body odors activate reward-related brain areas in the mothers. In some mother-child-dyads however, the mutual bond is impaired and mothers have trouble engaging in interaction with their child. We aimed to examine how mothers with bonding difficulties perceive their child's body odor.
In total 75 mothers and their babies (aged 0–12 months) were examined: Twenty-five of those were recruited in a psychosomatic day hospital ward, which is specialized for mother-child bonding disorders. Fifty age-matched healthy women and their babies served as controls. Body odor samples of each baby were collected from bodysuits in a highly standardized procedure. Thereafter, each mother rated the samples of her own and of two stranger's infants in a blindfolded and randomized design. In addition, general olfactory function in terms of threshold and identification ability was tested and the mother reported the bonding to her baby in a standardized questionnaire.
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own compared to odors of strange infant's, while mothers with bonding difficulties did not. Furthermore, the degree of preference was negatively correlated to self-reported bonding difficulties. Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor above chance, while control mothers could (p = 0.02). Both groups did not differ in general olfactory function.
We assume that reduced close body contact and interaction time in bonding difficulties may lead to reduced olfactory stimulation and hinder the recognition of the infantile body odor. Within a vicious cycle, a reduced hedonic experience smelling the own baby may prevent women from deliberately approaching the baby. Thus the positive and bond-building consequences of bodily and sensory interaction cannot unfold. As the baby's odor is normally perceived as very pleasant and rewarding, the conscious perception of the infantile body odor may be an additive therapeutic approach for mothers with bonding difficulties.
A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, & social attraction; appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity & social relatedness
Further Tests of Personality Similarity and Social Affiliation. Nancy L. Segal, Brittney A. Hernandez, Jamie L. Graham, Ulrich Ettinger. Human Nature, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12110-018-9326-2
Abstract: Relationships of physical resemblance to personality similarity and social affiliation have generated considerable discussion among behavioral science researchers. A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes, U-LAs) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, and social attraction within an evolutionary framework. The Personality for Professionals Inventory (PfPI), NEO/NEO-FFI-3, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and a Social Relationship Survey were variously completed by 45 U-LA pairs, identified from the “I’m Not a Look-Alike” project, Mentorn Media, and personal referrals. The mean U-LA intraclass correlations were negligible for all Big Five personality traits on the PfPI and NEO/NEO-FFI-3 (ri = −.02 and − .04, respectively). In contrast, mean ri values of .53 and .15 for monozygotic (MZA) and dizygotic (DZA) reared-apart twins, respectively, have been reported for these personality measures. The U-LA self-esteem correlation (ri = −.18) was also below the correlations reported for MZ and DZ reared-together twins (ri = .31 and .13, respectively). Finally, far fewer U-LAs expressed close social relationships (20%) than MZA (80%) and DZA (65%) twins. The present study extends earlier findings indicating that appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity and social relatedness. The criticism that MZ twins are alike in personality because their matched looks invite similar treatment by others is refuted. A more judicious interpretation is reactive genotype-environment correlation, namely that MZ twins’ similar personalities evoke similar reactions from others. MZ twins’ close social relations most likely derive from their perceptions of genetically based within-pair similarities that are lacking in U-LAs.
Keywords: Twins Look-alikes Monozygotic Dizygotic Personality Self-esteem
Abstract: Relationships of physical resemblance to personality similarity and social affiliation have generated considerable discussion among behavioral science researchers. A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes, U-LAs) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, and social attraction within an evolutionary framework. The Personality for Professionals Inventory (PfPI), NEO/NEO-FFI-3, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and a Social Relationship Survey were variously completed by 45 U-LA pairs, identified from the “I’m Not a Look-Alike” project, Mentorn Media, and personal referrals. The mean U-LA intraclass correlations were negligible for all Big Five personality traits on the PfPI and NEO/NEO-FFI-3 (ri = −.02 and − .04, respectively). In contrast, mean ri values of .53 and .15 for monozygotic (MZA) and dizygotic (DZA) reared-apart twins, respectively, have been reported for these personality measures. The U-LA self-esteem correlation (ri = −.18) was also below the correlations reported for MZ and DZ reared-together twins (ri = .31 and .13, respectively). Finally, far fewer U-LAs expressed close social relationships (20%) than MZA (80%) and DZA (65%) twins. The present study extends earlier findings indicating that appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity and social relatedness. The criticism that MZ twins are alike in personality because their matched looks invite similar treatment by others is refuted. A more judicious interpretation is reactive genotype-environment correlation, namely that MZ twins’ similar personalities evoke similar reactions from others. MZ twins’ close social relations most likely derive from their perceptions of genetically based within-pair similarities that are lacking in U-LAs.
Keywords: Twins Look-alikes Monozygotic Dizygotic Personality Self-esteem
An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist; we conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants; the effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data
The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist? Elif E. Demiral, Johanna Mollerstrom. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.022
Highlights
• We study the Ultimatum Game with proposers either earning their role or not.
• An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist.
• We conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants.
• The entitlement effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data.
Abstract: Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement effect is at the core of experimental Public Choice – not just because it concerns the topics of bargaining and negotiations, but also because it relates to the question about under which circumstances actors behave more rational. We conduct three experiments, two in the laboratory and one online, with more than 1,250 participants. Our original motivation was to study gender differences, but ultimately we could not replicate the entitlement effect in the Ultimatum Game in any of our three experiments. Potential reasons for why the replication attempts fail are discussed.
Highlights
• We study the Ultimatum Game with proposers either earning their role or not.
• An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist.
• We conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants.
• The entitlement effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data.
Abstract: Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement effect is at the core of experimental Public Choice – not just because it concerns the topics of bargaining and negotiations, but also because it relates to the question about under which circumstances actors behave more rational. We conduct three experiments, two in the laboratory and one online, with more than 1,250 participants. Our original motivation was to study gender differences, but ultimately we could not replicate the entitlement effect in the Ultimatum Game in any of our three experiments. Potential reasons for why the replication attempts fail are discussed.
Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy: Parenting, stigmatization, and children’s psychological adjustment
Carone, N., Lingiardi, V., Chirumbolo, A., & Baiocco, R. (2018). Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy: Parenting, stigmatization, and children’s psychological adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 54(10), 1904-1916. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000571
Abstract: Forty Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy were compared with 40 Italian lesbian mother families formed by donor insemination, all with a child aged 3 to 9 years. Standardized interview, observational, and questionnaire measures of parenting quality, parent–child relationships, stigmatization, and children’s adjustment were administered to parents, children, teachers, and a child psychiatrist. The only differences across family types indicated higher levels of stigmatization as reported by gay fathers. Externalizing and internalizing problems in both groups scored within the normal range. When family structure and processes were entered together as predictors of child adjustment, a hierarchical linear model analysis showed that factors associated with children’s externalizing problems were the child’s male gender, high stigmatization, and negative parenting; children’s internalizing problems were higher in lesbian mother families and were predicted by stigmatization. Of note, neither gay fathers nor lesbian mothers tended to underestimate their children’s adjustment problems relative to teachers. Finally, for children of gay fathers, comparison between teacher SDQ ratings and teacher SDQ normative data on Italian children in a similar age range showed that teachers reported children of gay fathers to show significantly fewer internalizing problems than the normative sample. No differences in children’s externalizing problems emerged. A bootstrapping simulation confirmed all results, except the effect of stigmatization on child internalizing problems. Findings suggest that the practice of surrogacy by gay men has no adverse effects on child health outcomes. Implications for our theoretical understanding of child socialization and development, and law and social policy, are discussed.
Abstract: Forty Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy were compared with 40 Italian lesbian mother families formed by donor insemination, all with a child aged 3 to 9 years. Standardized interview, observational, and questionnaire measures of parenting quality, parent–child relationships, stigmatization, and children’s adjustment were administered to parents, children, teachers, and a child psychiatrist. The only differences across family types indicated higher levels of stigmatization as reported by gay fathers. Externalizing and internalizing problems in both groups scored within the normal range. When family structure and processes were entered together as predictors of child adjustment, a hierarchical linear model analysis showed that factors associated with children’s externalizing problems were the child’s male gender, high stigmatization, and negative parenting; children’s internalizing problems were higher in lesbian mother families and were predicted by stigmatization. Of note, neither gay fathers nor lesbian mothers tended to underestimate their children’s adjustment problems relative to teachers. Finally, for children of gay fathers, comparison between teacher SDQ ratings and teacher SDQ normative data on Italian children in a similar age range showed that teachers reported children of gay fathers to show significantly fewer internalizing problems than the normative sample. No differences in children’s externalizing problems emerged. A bootstrapping simulation confirmed all results, except the effect of stigmatization on child internalizing problems. Findings suggest that the practice of surrogacy by gay men has no adverse effects on child health outcomes. Implications for our theoretical understanding of child socialization and development, and law and social policy, are discussed.
Are Whites and minorities more similar than different? Testing the cultural similarities hypothesis on psychopathology with a second-order meta-analysis // Seems that closely alike
Are Whites and minorities more similar than different? Testing the cultural similarities hypothesis on psychopathology with a second-order meta-analysis. José M. Causadias, Kevin M. Korous & Karina M. Cahill. Development and Psychopathology, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579418000895
Abstract: The cultural differences hypothesis is the assertion that there are large differences between Whites and racial/ethnic minorities in the United States, while there are small differences between- (e.g., African Americans and Latinos) and within- (e.g., Latinos: Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans) minority groups. Conversely, the cultural similarities hypothesis argues that there are small differences between Whites and minorities, and these differences are equal or smaller in magnitude than differences between and within minorities. In this study, we conducted a second-order meta-analysis focused on psychopathology, to (a) test these hypotheses by estimating the absolute average difference between Whites and minorities, as well as between and within minorities, on levels of psychopathology, and (b) determine if general and meta-analytic method moderators account for these differences. A systematic search in PsycINFO, Web of Science, and ProQuest Dissertations identified 16 meta-analyses (13% unpublished) on 493 primary studies (N = 3,036,749). Differences between Whites and minorities (d+ = 0.23, 95% confidence interval [0.18, 0.28]), and between minorities (d+ = 0.30, 95% confidence interval [0.12, 0.48]) were small in magnitude. White–minority differences remained small across moderators. These findings support the cultural similarities hypothesis. We discuss their implications and future research directions.
Abstract: The cultural differences hypothesis is the assertion that there are large differences between Whites and racial/ethnic minorities in the United States, while there are small differences between- (e.g., African Americans and Latinos) and within- (e.g., Latinos: Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans) minority groups. Conversely, the cultural similarities hypothesis argues that there are small differences between Whites and minorities, and these differences are equal or smaller in magnitude than differences between and within minorities. In this study, we conducted a second-order meta-analysis focused on psychopathology, to (a) test these hypotheses by estimating the absolute average difference between Whites and minorities, as well as between and within minorities, on levels of psychopathology, and (b) determine if general and meta-analytic method moderators account for these differences. A systematic search in PsycINFO, Web of Science, and ProQuest Dissertations identified 16 meta-analyses (13% unpublished) on 493 primary studies (N = 3,036,749). Differences between Whites and minorities (d+ = 0.23, 95% confidence interval [0.18, 0.28]), and between minorities (d+ = 0.30, 95% confidence interval [0.12, 0.48]) were small in magnitude. White–minority differences remained small across moderators. These findings support the cultural similarities hypothesis. We discuss their implications and future research directions.
Confirmed there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery; people with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts
Differences in Spatial Visualization Ability and Vividness of Spatial Imagery Between People With and Without Aphantasia. Anita Crowder. PhD dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6685&context=etd
Summary: Mathematics education researchers have examined the relation ship between visualization and mathematics for decades (e.g., Arcavi, 2003; Bishop, 1991; Duval, 1999; Fennema & Tartre, 1985; Presmeg, 1986; Rösken & Rolka, 2006). Studies have linked spatial visualization ability, such as measured in mental rotation tasks, directly to mathematics self-efficacy (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Weckbacher & Okamoto, 2014), which in turn influences mathematics achievement (Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 1997). With the important role that spatial visualization plays in learning math ematics, the recent identification of congenital aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), which is the lack of mental imagery ability, has raised new questions for mathematics education researchers. This study investigated the differences in mental rotation test performance and vividness of spatial imagery between people who have aphantasia and people who do not as a first step toward examining how aphantasia may affect mathematics learning and education. Results confirmed prior aphantasia research showing that there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance between people with aphantasia and those without aphantasia, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery. Results also showed that there was less difference in mental rotation test performance between the genders for people with aphantasia, while gender played a significant role in mental rotation test performance for people without aphantasia. People with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts than people without aphantasia. Implications of these results will be discussed within the context of current research, and possible directions for future research will be offered.
Keywords: mathematics, aphantasia, mental imagery, visualization, spatial imagery
Summary: Mathematics education researchers have examined the relation ship between visualization and mathematics for decades (e.g., Arcavi, 2003; Bishop, 1991; Duval, 1999; Fennema & Tartre, 1985; Presmeg, 1986; Rösken & Rolka, 2006). Studies have linked spatial visualization ability, such as measured in mental rotation tasks, directly to mathematics self-efficacy (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Weckbacher & Okamoto, 2014), which in turn influences mathematics achievement (Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 1997). With the important role that spatial visualization plays in learning math ematics, the recent identification of congenital aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), which is the lack of mental imagery ability, has raised new questions for mathematics education researchers. This study investigated the differences in mental rotation test performance and vividness of spatial imagery between people who have aphantasia and people who do not as a first step toward examining how aphantasia may affect mathematics learning and education. Results confirmed prior aphantasia research showing that there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance between people with aphantasia and those without aphantasia, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery. Results also showed that there was less difference in mental rotation test performance between the genders for people with aphantasia, while gender played a significant role in mental rotation test performance for people without aphantasia. People with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts than people without aphantasia. Implications of these results will be discussed within the context of current research, and possible directions for future research will be offered.
Keywords: mathematics, aphantasia, mental imagery, visualization, spatial imagery
Monday, September 24, 2018
Moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of erectile disfunction, whereas regular and high consumption did not
Alcohol intake and risk of erectile dysfunction: a dose–response meta-analysis of observational studies. Xiao-Ming Wang, Yun-Jin Bai, Yu-Bo Yang, Jin-Hong Li, Yin Tang & Ping Han. International Journal of Impotence Research, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41443-018-0022-x
Abstract: The purpose of the present study was to conduct a meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies assessing the relationship between alcohol consumption and the risk of erectile dysfunction (ED). To identify relevant studies, databases such as Pubmed, Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Library were searched from the inception of the present study to March 2016. Finally, 24 studies (154,295 patients) were included. We combined a study-specific odds ratio (OR) estimated by using a random effects meta-analysis. The results of our meta-analysis indicated that light to moderate alcohol consumption ( < 21 drinks/week) was correlated with a decreased risk of erectile dysfunction (OR = 0.71; 95% CI: 0.59–0.86; P = 0.000). However, regular (ever vs. never) and high alcohol consumption ( > 21 drinks/week) had no significant influence on the prevalence of ED (regular: OR = 0.87; 95% CI: 0.75–1.07; P = 0.062; high: OR = 0.99; 95% CI: 0.80–1.22; P = 0.893). In a dose–response meta-analysis, a non-linear relationship was observed between alcohol consumption and risk of ED (P for non-linearity = 0.0000). In conclusion, moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of ED, whereas regular and high consumption did not.
Abstract: The purpose of the present study was to conduct a meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies assessing the relationship between alcohol consumption and the risk of erectile dysfunction (ED). To identify relevant studies, databases such as Pubmed, Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Library were searched from the inception of the present study to March 2016. Finally, 24 studies (154,295 patients) were included. We combined a study-specific odds ratio (OR) estimated by using a random effects meta-analysis. The results of our meta-analysis indicated that light to moderate alcohol consumption ( < 21 drinks/week) was correlated with a decreased risk of erectile dysfunction (OR = 0.71; 95% CI: 0.59–0.86; P = 0.000). However, regular (ever vs. never) and high alcohol consumption ( > 21 drinks/week) had no significant influence on the prevalence of ED (regular: OR = 0.87; 95% CI: 0.75–1.07; P = 0.062; high: OR = 0.99; 95% CI: 0.80–1.22; P = 0.893). In a dose–response meta-analysis, a non-linear relationship was observed between alcohol consumption and risk of ED (P for non-linearity = 0.0000). In conclusion, moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of ED, whereas regular and high consumption did not.
Krugman: Trump’s tariffs really are a big, bad deal. Their direct economic impact ***will be modest*** (?!), although hardly trivial
Now, to put Krugman's words in perspective, see the first results of Google search "nytimes.com trump tariffs will damage," the very constructive way to report and pour opinions that most journalists have:
But he, one the high priests of the anti-Trumpian church, the man who on election night 2016 "gave in temporarily to a temptation" he warns others about, to let his "political feelings distort" his "economic judgment," although "quickly retracted the claim," and "issued a mea culpa" (because being "an old-fashioned guy," he tries "to admit and learn from" his mistakes), says what you see above as title.
See his article:
Companies Warn More China Tariffs Will Cripple Them and Hurt ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/china-tariffs-businesses.html
Aug 20, 2018 - The Trump administration, which will hold trade talks with the Chinese this week, began six days of hearings on its proposal to tax another $200 ...
Tariffs to Raise Cost of Rebuilding After Hurricane Florence - The New ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/.../tariffs-rebuilding-hurricane-florence.html
3 days ago - The Trump administration imposed a 20 percent tariff on Canadian softwood ... It will take months to repair the damage from the floods, he said.
Rebuffed by Trump on Tariffs, Businesses Mount Coordinated Pushback
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/.../trump-tariffs-businesses-pushback.html
Sep 12, 2018 - The Tariffs Hurt the Heartland campaign focuses heavily on the economic ... September for The New York Times by the online polling firm SurveyMonkey. ... have all publicly warned Mr. Trump that his tariffs will hurt the very ...
Opinion | How China Wins the Trade War - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/.../trump-tariffs-china-trade-war-who-will-win.ht...
Aug 8, 2018 - President Trump exhorts his supporters that tariffs “mean jobs and great ... Reduced American demand for Chinese products does hurt China.
If the Trade War Starts to Damage the Economy, Here's How You'll Be ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/.../trade-war-damage-to-us-economy-how-to-tell.html
Jul 24, 2018 - “Still, tariffs hurt, and we're starting to see some precursors of an impact already.” ... By the time there would be solid evidence that the trade war was doing damage, the damage would already ....
Opinion | Getting Hurt by Trump's Tariffs - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/opinion/trump-tariffs.html
Jul 15, 2018 - They will, we hope, understand that a man's conduct, knowledge, ... of the New York edition with the headline: Getting Hurt by Trump's Tariffs.
Opinion | Trump Has No Idea What His Tariffs Have Unleashed for ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/.../trump-tariffs-trade-war-rural-america.html
Jul 26, 2018 - His trade war will hurt business at a time when the rural population is aging, and it will probably hollow out farm communities.
But he, one the high priests of the anti-Trumpian church, the man who on election night 2016 "gave in temporarily to a temptation" he warns others about, to let his "political feelings distort" his "economic judgment," although "quickly retracted the claim," and "issued a mea culpa" (because being "an old-fashioned guy," he tries "to admit and learn from" his mistakes), says what you see above as title.
See his article:
Making Tariffs Corrupt Again. Paul Krugman. TNYT, Sept. 20, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/tariffs-trump-corrupt.html
Syverson on productivity mismeasurement and slowdown, plus effect of AI on the slowdown
Interview with Chad Syverson. Aaron Steelman. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, June 2018, https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=2852546339326384272#editor/target=post;postID=3293709683462798846
EF: Some have argued that the productivity slowdown since the mid-2000s is due to mismeasurement issues — that some productivity growth hasn't been or isn't being captured. What does your work tell us about that?
Syverson: It tells us that the mismeasurement story, while plausible on its face, falls apart when examined. If productivity growth had actually been 1.5 percent greater than it has been measured since the mid-2000s, U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) would be conservatively $4 trillion higher than it is, or about $12,000 more per capita. So if you go with the mismeasurement story, that's the sort of number you're talking about and there are several reasons to believe you can't account for it.
First, the productivity slowdown has happened all over world. When you look at the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries we have data for, there's no relationship between the size of the measured slowdown and how important IT-related goods — which most people think are the primary source of mismeasurement — are to a country's economy.
Second, people have tried to measure the value of IT-related goods. The largest estimate is about $900 billion in the United States. That doesn't get you even a quarter of the way toward that $4 trillion.
Third, the value added of the IT-related sector has grown by about $750 billion, adjusting for inflation, since the mid-2000s. The mismeasurement hypothesis says that there are $4 trillion missing on top of that. So the question is: Do we think we're only getting $1 out of every $6 of activity there? That's a lot of mismeasurement.
Finally, there's the difference between gross domestic income (GDI) and GDP. GDI has been higher than GDP on average since the slowdown started, which would suggest that there's income, about $1 trillion cumulatively, that is not showing up in expenditures. But the problem is that was also true before the slowdown started. GDI was higher than GDP from 1998 through 2004, a period of relatively high-productivity growth. Moreover, the growth in income is coming from capital income, not wage income. That doesn't comport with the story some people are trying to tell, which is that companies are making stuff, they're paying their workers to produce it, but then they're effectively giving it away for free instead of selling it. But we know that they're actually making profits. We might not pay directly for a lot of IT services every time we use them, but we are paying for them indirectly.
As sensible as the mismeasurement hypothesis might sound on its face, when you add up everything, it just doesn't pass the stricter test you would want it to survive.
EF: Would you consider artificial intelligence (AI) a general-purpose technology? If so, how do you assess the view that the returns on investment in AI have been disappointing?
Syverson: It's way too early. There are two things creating this lag for AI. First, aggregate AI capital right now is essentially zero. This stuff is really just starting to be used in production. A lot of it is simply experimental at this point. Second, a lot of it has to do with complementarity. People have to figure out what sorts of things AI can augment, and we're not anywhere down that road yet.
Erik, Daniel, and I are going out on a limb a little bit by saying this, but we think AI checks the boxes for a general-purpose technology. And it seems that with some fairly modest applications of AI, the productivity slowdown goes away. Two applications that we look at in our paper are autonomous vehicles and call centers.
About 3.5 million people in the United States make their living as motor vehicle operators. We think maybe 2 million of those could be replaced by autonomous vehicles. There are 122 million people in private employment now, so just a quick calculation says that's an additional boost of 1.7 percent in labor productivity. But that's not going to happen overnight. If it happens over a decade, that's 0.17 percent per year.
About 2 million people work in call centers. Plausibly, 60 percent of those jobs could be replaced by AI. So when you do the same kind of calculation, that's an additional 1 percent increase in labor productivity; spread out over a decade, it's 0.1 percent per year. So, from those two applications alone, that's about a quarter of a percent annual acceleration for a decade. So you only need maybe six to eight more applications of that size and the slowdown is gone.
EF: Some have argued that the productivity slowdown since the mid-2000s is due to mismeasurement issues — that some productivity growth hasn't been or isn't being captured. What does your work tell us about that?
Syverson: It tells us that the mismeasurement story, while plausible on its face, falls apart when examined. If productivity growth had actually been 1.5 percent greater than it has been measured since the mid-2000s, U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) would be conservatively $4 trillion higher than it is, or about $12,000 more per capita. So if you go with the mismeasurement story, that's the sort of number you're talking about and there are several reasons to believe you can't account for it.
First, the productivity slowdown has happened all over world. When you look at the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries we have data for, there's no relationship between the size of the measured slowdown and how important IT-related goods — which most people think are the primary source of mismeasurement — are to a country's economy.
Second, people have tried to measure the value of IT-related goods. The largest estimate is about $900 billion in the United States. That doesn't get you even a quarter of the way toward that $4 trillion.
Third, the value added of the IT-related sector has grown by about $750 billion, adjusting for inflation, since the mid-2000s. The mismeasurement hypothesis says that there are $4 trillion missing on top of that. So the question is: Do we think we're only getting $1 out of every $6 of activity there? That's a lot of mismeasurement.
Finally, there's the difference between gross domestic income (GDI) and GDP. GDI has been higher than GDP on average since the slowdown started, which would suggest that there's income, about $1 trillion cumulatively, that is not showing up in expenditures. But the problem is that was also true before the slowdown started. GDI was higher than GDP from 1998 through 2004, a period of relatively high-productivity growth. Moreover, the growth in income is coming from capital income, not wage income. That doesn't comport with the story some people are trying to tell, which is that companies are making stuff, they're paying their workers to produce it, but then they're effectively giving it away for free instead of selling it. But we know that they're actually making profits. We might not pay directly for a lot of IT services every time we use them, but we are paying for them indirectly.
As sensible as the mismeasurement hypothesis might sound on its face, when you add up everything, it just doesn't pass the stricter test you would want it to survive.
EF: Would you consider artificial intelligence (AI) a general-purpose technology? If so, how do you assess the view that the returns on investment in AI have been disappointing?
Syverson: It's way too early. There are two things creating this lag for AI. First, aggregate AI capital right now is essentially zero. This stuff is really just starting to be used in production. A lot of it is simply experimental at this point. Second, a lot of it has to do with complementarity. People have to figure out what sorts of things AI can augment, and we're not anywhere down that road yet.
Erik, Daniel, and I are going out on a limb a little bit by saying this, but we think AI checks the boxes for a general-purpose technology. And it seems that with some fairly modest applications of AI, the productivity slowdown goes away. Two applications that we look at in our paper are autonomous vehicles and call centers.
About 3.5 million people in the United States make their living as motor vehicle operators. We think maybe 2 million of those could be replaced by autonomous vehicles. There are 122 million people in private employment now, so just a quick calculation says that's an additional boost of 1.7 percent in labor productivity. But that's not going to happen overnight. If it happens over a decade, that's 0.17 percent per year.
About 2 million people work in call centers. Plausibly, 60 percent of those jobs could be replaced by AI. So when you do the same kind of calculation, that's an additional 1 percent increase in labor productivity; spread out over a decade, it's 0.1 percent per year. So, from those two applications alone, that's about a quarter of a percent annual acceleration for a decade. So you only need maybe six to eight more applications of that size and the slowdown is gone.
The unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII
World War II and African American Socioeconomic Progress. Andreas Ferrara. Warwick Univ, Sept 2018, Working Paper No. 387. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/387a-2018_ferrara.pdf
Abstract: This paper argues that the unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII. Results from combining novel military and Census data in a difference-in-differences setting show that counties with an average casualty rate among semi-skilled whites experienced a 13 to 16% increase in the share of blacks in semi-skilled jobs. The casualty rate also has a significant reduced form effect on cross-state migration, wages, home ownership, house value, and education for blacks. Using survey data from 1961, IV regression results indicate that the economic upgrade, which is instrumented with the semi-skilled white casualty rate, is also associated with an increase in social status. Both black and white individuals living in treated counties are more likely to have an interracial friendship, live in mixed-race neighborhoods, and to have reduced preferences for segregation.
JEL codes: J15, J24, N42
Keywords: African-Americans; Inequality; Race-Relations; World War II
Abstract: This paper argues that the unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII. Results from combining novel military and Census data in a difference-in-differences setting show that counties with an average casualty rate among semi-skilled whites experienced a 13 to 16% increase in the share of blacks in semi-skilled jobs. The casualty rate also has a significant reduced form effect on cross-state migration, wages, home ownership, house value, and education for blacks. Using survey data from 1961, IV regression results indicate that the economic upgrade, which is instrumented with the semi-skilled white casualty rate, is also associated with an increase in social status. Both black and white individuals living in treated counties are more likely to have an interracial friendship, live in mixed-race neighborhoods, and to have reduced preferences for segregation.
JEL codes: J15, J24, N42
Keywords: African-Americans; Inequality; Race-Relations; World War II
Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks”
Treatment of phantom shocks: A case report. Danielle R Hairston et al. The International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1177/0091217418802153
Abstract: Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators have become standard preventive treatment for patients with ventricular arrhythmias and other life-threatening cardiac conditions. The advantages and efficiency of the device are supported by multiple clinical trials and outcome studies, leading to its popularity among cardiologists. Implantation of the device is not without adverse outcomes. Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to negative psychological and psychosocial sequelae such as apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks.” Defined as patient-reported shocks in the absence of evidence that the implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device has discharged, phantom shocks could impact the mental health of those affected. This article reviews the case of Mr. L, a 47-year-old man with ischemic cardiomyopathy who was seen by the psychiatry consultation team while under cardiologic care because he reported that his implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device had been shocking him despite no objective evidence after interrogating the device. A literature review of phantom shocks, their associated symptomatology, and psychological consequences are outlined and discussed.
Keywords: implantable cardioverter-defibrillators, shock, phantom shocks, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
Abstract: Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators have become standard preventive treatment for patients with ventricular arrhythmias and other life-threatening cardiac conditions. The advantages and efficiency of the device are supported by multiple clinical trials and outcome studies, leading to its popularity among cardiologists. Implantation of the device is not without adverse outcomes. Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to negative psychological and psychosocial sequelae such as apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks.” Defined as patient-reported shocks in the absence of evidence that the implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device has discharged, phantom shocks could impact the mental health of those affected. This article reviews the case of Mr. L, a 47-year-old man with ischemic cardiomyopathy who was seen by the psychiatry consultation team while under cardiologic care because he reported that his implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device had been shocking him despite no objective evidence after interrogating the device. A literature review of phantom shocks, their associated symptomatology, and psychological consequences are outlined and discussed.
Keywords: implantable cardioverter-defibrillators, shock, phantom shocks, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
Sexism, Rape Myths and Feminist Identification Explain Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward the #metoo Social Media Campaign in Two Countries
Kunst, Jonas R., April Bailey, Claire Prendergast, and Aleksander Gundersen. 2018. “Sexism, Rape Myths and Feminist Identification Explain Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward the #metoo Social Media Campaign in Two Countries.” PsyArXiv. September 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jysw8
Abstract: On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano popularized the #metoo campaign, which sought to expose the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in public domains by encouraging victims to share their experiences on social media using the hashtag ‘metoo.’ The online campaign rapidly grew to a global phenomenon, which was generally well supported. However, some criticized the campaign online as a “battle of the sexes,” which pits men against women. The present cross-cultural research investigated whether gender differences in attitudes and feelings toward #metoo are due to underlying differences in ideologies and experiences that only partly overlap with gender. We surveyed respondents in the United States, where the campaign began, and in Norway, a highly gender-egalitarian country. In both countries, men expressed less positivity toward #metoo than women and perceived it as substantially more harmful and less beneficial. These gender differences were largely accounted for by men being higher than women in hostile sexism, higher in rape myth acceptance, and lower in feminist identification. The results, hence, suggest that gender differences in attitudes to social media campaigns such as #metoo might be best characterized as dimensional ideological differences rather than fundamental group differences.
Abstract: On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano popularized the #metoo campaign, which sought to expose the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in public domains by encouraging victims to share their experiences on social media using the hashtag ‘metoo.’ The online campaign rapidly grew to a global phenomenon, which was generally well supported. However, some criticized the campaign online as a “battle of the sexes,” which pits men against women. The present cross-cultural research investigated whether gender differences in attitudes and feelings toward #metoo are due to underlying differences in ideologies and experiences that only partly overlap with gender. We surveyed respondents in the United States, where the campaign began, and in Norway, a highly gender-egalitarian country. In both countries, men expressed less positivity toward #metoo than women and perceived it as substantially more harmful and less beneficial. These gender differences were largely accounted for by men being higher than women in hostile sexism, higher in rape myth acceptance, and lower in feminist identification. The results, hence, suggest that gender differences in attitudes to social media campaigns such as #metoo might be best characterized as dimensional ideological differences rather than fundamental group differences.
Do People Have Reproductive Goals? Constructive Preferences and the Discovery of Desired Family Size: Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal
Do People Have Reproductive Goals? Constructive Preferences and the Discovery of Desired Family Size. Máire Ní Bhrolcháin, Éva Beaujouan. In: Schoen R. (eds) Analytical Family Demography. The Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis, vol 47, pp 27-56
Abstract
The frequency of uncertainty in response to survey questions on fertility expectations is relatively high. This is inconsistent with the classical rational choice model implicit in much demographic research. Whether for this or other reasons, the phenomenon is by and large overlooked. Uncertainty in relation to fertility is, we suggest, genuine rather than the result of faulty measurement or poorly motivated responses. Its relatively high frequency requires that it is accounted for in any theory of fertility decision making.
Adapting ideas from behavioral economics, psychology, and political science we propose an alternative theoretical approach in which fertility intentions and preferences are thought of as constructed. Preferences are constructed when they are not drawn from a stored memory but assembled on the spot from information accessible at the time; reports of such preferences can be very sensitive to context. In this approach, uncertainty is not anomalous and some enduring apparent contradictions in survey findings on fertility intentions, expectations and preferences are explicable. Ideas in political science have the potential to enhance our understanding of responses to survey questions on preferences and intentions. Preference construction theory could provide an avenue to a better understanding of fertility preferences. Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Establishing the nature, origin and operation of fertility preferences is essential to answering the question whether fertility differentials and trends reflect choice or constraint or some mixture of the two.
Abstract
The frequency of uncertainty in response to survey questions on fertility expectations is relatively high. This is inconsistent with the classical rational choice model implicit in much demographic research. Whether for this or other reasons, the phenomenon is by and large overlooked. Uncertainty in relation to fertility is, we suggest, genuine rather than the result of faulty measurement or poorly motivated responses. Its relatively high frequency requires that it is accounted for in any theory of fertility decision making.
Adapting ideas from behavioral economics, psychology, and political science we propose an alternative theoretical approach in which fertility intentions and preferences are thought of as constructed. Preferences are constructed when they are not drawn from a stored memory but assembled on the spot from information accessible at the time; reports of such preferences can be very sensitive to context. In this approach, uncertainty is not anomalous and some enduring apparent contradictions in survey findings on fertility intentions, expectations and preferences are explicable. Ideas in political science have the potential to enhance our understanding of responses to survey questions on preferences and intentions. Preference construction theory could provide an avenue to a better understanding of fertility preferences. Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Establishing the nature, origin and operation of fertility preferences is essential to answering the question whether fertility differentials and trends reflect choice or constraint or some mixture of the two.
They played a task to be probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay; during this, they could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately; and did
Cabrero, Jose A. M. R., Jian-Qiao Zhu, and Elliot A. Ludvig. 2018. “Costly Curiosity: People Pay a Price to Resolve an Uncertain Gamble Early.” PsyArXiv. September 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/9hws7
Abstract: Humans are inherently curious creatures, continuously seeking out information about future outcomes. Such advance information is often valuable, potentially allowing people to select better courses of action. In non-human animals, this drive for information can be so strong that they forego food or water to find out a few seconds earlier whether an uncertain option will provide a reward. Here, we assess whether people will exhibit a similar sub-optimal preference for advance information. Participants played a card-flipping task where they were probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay. During this delay, participants could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately. This choice to find out early did not influence the eventual outcome. Participants preferred to find out early about 80% of the time when the information was free; they were even willing to incur an expense to get advance information about the eventual outcome. The expected magnitude of the outcome, however, did not impact the likelihood of finding out early. These results suggest that humans, like animals, value non-instrumental information and will pay a price for such information, independent of its utility.
Abstract: Humans are inherently curious creatures, continuously seeking out information about future outcomes. Such advance information is often valuable, potentially allowing people to select better courses of action. In non-human animals, this drive for information can be so strong that they forego food or water to find out a few seconds earlier whether an uncertain option will provide a reward. Here, we assess whether people will exhibit a similar sub-optimal preference for advance information. Participants played a card-flipping task where they were probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay. During this delay, participants could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately. This choice to find out early did not influence the eventual outcome. Participants preferred to find out early about 80% of the time when the information was free; they were even willing to incur an expense to get advance information about the eventual outcome. The expected magnitude of the outcome, however, did not impact the likelihood of finding out early. These results suggest that humans, like animals, value non-instrumental information and will pay a price for such information, independent of its utility.
Intergenerational Mobility at the Top of the Educational Distribution: A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins
Intergenerational Mobility at the Top of the Educational Distribution. Florencia Torche. Sociology of Education, https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040718801812
Abstract: Research has shown that intergenerational mobility is higher among individuals with a college degree than those with lower levels of schooling. However, mobility declines among graduate degree holders. This finding questions the meritocratic power of higher education. Prior research has been hampered, however, by the small samples of advanced degree holders in representative surveys. Drawing on a large longitudinal data set of PhD holders—the Survey of Doctorate Recipients—this study examines intergenerational mobility among the American educational elite, separately for men and women and different racial/ethnic groups. Results show substantial mobility among PhD holders. The association between parents’ education and adult children’s earnings is moderate among men and nonexistent among women with doctoral degrees. However, women’s earnings converge to an average level that is much lower than men’s, signaling ‘‘perverse openness’’ for women even at the top of the educational distribution. Among men, there is variation in mobility by race and ethnicity. The intergenerational socioeconomic association is null for Asian men, small for white and black men, and more pronounced for Hispanics. Educational and occupational mediators account for intergenerational association among blacks and whites but not Hispanic men. A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins in the United States, but it does not eliminate all sources of inequality.
Keywords: class inequality, higher education, meritocracy, intergenerational mobility, graduate education
Abstract: Research has shown that intergenerational mobility is higher among individuals with a college degree than those with lower levels of schooling. However, mobility declines among graduate degree holders. This finding questions the meritocratic power of higher education. Prior research has been hampered, however, by the small samples of advanced degree holders in representative surveys. Drawing on a large longitudinal data set of PhD holders—the Survey of Doctorate Recipients—this study examines intergenerational mobility among the American educational elite, separately for men and women and different racial/ethnic groups. Results show substantial mobility among PhD holders. The association between parents’ education and adult children’s earnings is moderate among men and nonexistent among women with doctoral degrees. However, women’s earnings converge to an average level that is much lower than men’s, signaling ‘‘perverse openness’’ for women even at the top of the educational distribution. Among men, there is variation in mobility by race and ethnicity. The intergenerational socioeconomic association is null for Asian men, small for white and black men, and more pronounced for Hispanics. Educational and occupational mediators account for intergenerational association among blacks and whites but not Hispanic men. A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins in the United States, but it does not eliminate all sources of inequality.
Keywords: class inequality, higher education, meritocracy, intergenerational mobility, graduate education
Sunday, September 23, 2018
What Fantasies Can Do to Your Relationship & The Effects of Sexual Fantasies on Couple Interactions: Dyadic fantasizing was associated with heightened desire & increased engagement in relationship-promoting behaviors
What Fantasies Can Do to Your Relationship: The Effects of Sexual Fantasies on Couple Interactions. Gurit E. Birnbaum et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218789611
Abstract: Research addressing the underlying functions of sexual fantasies has mainly focused on variables associated with frequency and content of fantasies. Relatively less is known about how sexual fantasizing affects the relationship. Four studies examined the contribution of fantasizing about one’s partner (“dyadic fantasies”) to relationship outcomes. In Studies 1 and 2, participants fantasized either about their partner or about someone else and rated their desire to engage in sex and other nonsexual relationship-promoting activities with their partner. In Studies 3 and 4, romantic partners recorded their fantasies and relationship interactions each evening for a period of 21 and 42 days, respectively. In Study 4, partners also provided daily reports on relationship perceptions. Overall, dyadic fantasizing was associated with heightened desire and increased engagement in relationship-promoting behaviors. Relationship perceptions explained the link between dyadic fantasies and relationship-promoting behaviors, suggesting that such fantasies benefit the relationship by enhancing partner and relationship appeal.
Keywords: extradyadic, fantasies, relationship quality, sexual desire, sexuality
Abstract: Research addressing the underlying functions of sexual fantasies has mainly focused on variables associated with frequency and content of fantasies. Relatively less is known about how sexual fantasizing affects the relationship. Four studies examined the contribution of fantasizing about one’s partner (“dyadic fantasies”) to relationship outcomes. In Studies 1 and 2, participants fantasized either about their partner or about someone else and rated their desire to engage in sex and other nonsexual relationship-promoting activities with their partner. In Studies 3 and 4, romantic partners recorded their fantasies and relationship interactions each evening for a period of 21 and 42 days, respectively. In Study 4, partners also provided daily reports on relationship perceptions. Overall, dyadic fantasizing was associated with heightened desire and increased engagement in relationship-promoting behaviors. Relationship perceptions explained the link between dyadic fantasies and relationship-promoting behaviors, suggesting that such fantasies benefit the relationship by enhancing partner and relationship appeal.
Keywords: extradyadic, fantasies, relationship quality, sexual desire, sexuality
Why are some societies more religious than others? One answer is religious coping: Individuals turn to religion to deal with unpredictable life events, like natural disasters, even though the effect decreases after a while
Acts of God? Religiosity and Natural Disasters Across Subnational World Districts. Jeanet Sinding Bentzen. University of Copenhagen. http://web.econ.ku.dk/bentzen/BentzenReligiosityDisasters.pdf
Abstract: Religious beliefs influence individual behavior in many settings. But why are some societies more religious than others? One answer is religious coping: Individuals turn to religion to deal with unbearable and unpredictable life events. To investigate whether coping can explain global differences in religiosity, I combine a global dataset on individual-level religiosity with spatial data on natural disasters. Individuals become more religious if an earthquake recently hit close by. Even though the effect decreases after a while, data on children of immigrants reveal a persistent e§ect across generations. The results point to religious coping as the main mediating channel, but alternative explanations such as mutual insurance or migration cannot be ruled out entirely. The findings may help explain why religiosity has not vanished as some scholars once predicted.
Abstract: Religious beliefs influence individual behavior in many settings. But why are some societies more religious than others? One answer is religious coping: Individuals turn to religion to deal with unbearable and unpredictable life events. To investigate whether coping can explain global differences in religiosity, I combine a global dataset on individual-level religiosity with spatial data on natural disasters. Individuals become more religious if an earthquake recently hit close by. Even though the effect decreases after a while, data on children of immigrants reveal a persistent e§ect across generations. The results point to religious coping as the main mediating channel, but alternative explanations such as mutual insurance or migration cannot be ruled out entirely. The findings may help explain why religiosity has not vanished as some scholars once predicted.
Hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. Two causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk & are more likely to view those hawks as moderates
Hawks, Doves, and Peace: An Experimental Approach. Michaela Mattes, Jessica L. P. Weeks. American Journal of Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12392
Abstract: An old adage holds that “only Nixon could go to China”; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.
Abstract: An old adage holds that “only Nixon could go to China”; that is, hawkish leaders face fewer domestic barriers than doves when it comes to pursuing reconciliation with foreign enemies. However, empirical evidence for this proposition is mixed. In this article, we clarify competing theories, elucidate their implications for public opinion, and describe the results of a series of survey experiments designed to evaluate whether and why there is a hawk's advantage. We find that hawks are indeed better positioned domestically to initiate rapprochement than doves. We also find support for two key causal mechanisms: Voters are more confident in rapprochement when it is pursued by a hawk and are more likely to view hawks who initiate conciliation as moderates. Further, the hawk's advantage persists whether conciliatory efforts end in success or failure. Our microfoundational evidence thus suggests a pronounced domestic advantage for hawks who deliver the olive branch.
Our results are the opposite of the good genes hypothesis prediction and suggest that in western, healthy populations, human mate preferences for more symmetric bodies are not related to immune competence
Human body symmetry and immune efficacy in healthy adults. Boguslaw Pawlowski et al. American Journal of Physical Anthropology, https://doi.org/10.1002/ajpa.23617
Abstract
Objectives: More symmetric organisms are perceived as more attractive. Fluctuating asymmetry (FA) i.e. small, random deviations from perfect bilateral symmetry, is supposed to inform about developmental instability. According to the good genes hypothesis, a low level of FA is a putative cue to an organism's biological quality. An important aspect of this quality is the immune system functioning. The aim of this study was to evaluate the relationship between immune system functioning and body symmetry in healthy people.
Materials and Methods: The composite body FA (cFA) was assessed on the basis of six bilateral traits (on hands and feet). The ISF was determined by many innate (total complement and lysozyme activity, neutrophils function) and adaptive immune parameters (T CD3 and B CD19 lymphocytes, total IgA and IgG and response to flu vaccine). A total of 98 men and 92 women were subjected to flu (among them 37 men and 30 women also to tetanus) vaccination. The blood samples were collected before and 4 weeks after the antigens exposure. Immunomodulatory factors: participant's age, body fat, and free testosterone level, were controlled.
Results: Apart from the weak positive association between CD3 or CD19 and cFA in men, we found no association between the level of body symmetry and the rest of the analyzed immune parameters for both sexes.
Discussion: Our results are the opposite of the good genes hypothesis prediction and suggest that in western, healthy populations, human mate preferences for more symmetric bodies are not related to immune competence.
Abstract
Objectives: More symmetric organisms are perceived as more attractive. Fluctuating asymmetry (FA) i.e. small, random deviations from perfect bilateral symmetry, is supposed to inform about developmental instability. According to the good genes hypothesis, a low level of FA is a putative cue to an organism's biological quality. An important aspect of this quality is the immune system functioning. The aim of this study was to evaluate the relationship between immune system functioning and body symmetry in healthy people.
Materials and Methods: The composite body FA (cFA) was assessed on the basis of six bilateral traits (on hands and feet). The ISF was determined by many innate (total complement and lysozyme activity, neutrophils function) and adaptive immune parameters (T CD3 and B CD19 lymphocytes, total IgA and IgG and response to flu vaccine). A total of 98 men and 92 women were subjected to flu (among them 37 men and 30 women also to tetanus) vaccination. The blood samples were collected before and 4 weeks after the antigens exposure. Immunomodulatory factors: participant's age, body fat, and free testosterone level, were controlled.
Results: Apart from the weak positive association between CD3 or CD19 and cFA in men, we found no association between the level of body symmetry and the rest of the analyzed immune parameters for both sexes.
Discussion: Our results are the opposite of the good genes hypothesis prediction and suggest that in western, healthy populations, human mate preferences for more symmetric bodies are not related to immune competence.
Driving near-accidents: People evaluated the consequences of an unexpected turn of events to be more extreme when it was presented as a counterfactual possibility rather than an actual occurrence
Learning from what might have been – judgments and evaluations of counterfactual outcomes. Jens Andreas Terum. PhD dissertation. The Artic University of Norway. November 2017. https://munin.uit.no/bitstream/handle/10037/12468/thesis.pdf
Summary
The aim of the present thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how people construct hypothetical alternatives to past events, and further explore the role of such counterfactual thinking in learning from accidents and near-accidents. In Paper 1 we introduced the notion that counterfactual thinking is a form of mental simulation that relies on abstract, gist based representations of the world, and therefore promote s a focus on schematic and prototypical outcomes. For events with a clear valence, this should lead counterfactual speculations to be more extreme, or unambiguously good or bad, compared to ordinary predictions. In line with our expectation, people evaluated the consequences of an unexpected turn of events to be more extreme, when it was presented as a counterfactual possibility rather than an actual occurrence.
Paper 2 replicated the main finding in Paper 1, and extended the investigation to include affective evaluations. Consistent with the previous finding, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than the same events presented as counterfactual, for both positive and negative outcomes. These apparently contradictory findings were discussed within the framework of Construal Level Theory, and it is suggested that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high – level account of counterfactual thinking.
In Paper 3 we investigate d learning from accidents and near-accidents. By asking people about their thoughts and feelings following accidents and near-accidents, we examined the degree to which these experiences had inspired caution. The results indicated that accidents inspired more caution than near-accidents. Furthermore, repeated experience with Judgments and evaluations of counterfactual outcomes near accidents app eared to have inspired caution, but we observed no change in caution following repeated experience with near-accidents. Learned carefulness did not seem to be associated with reported emotional intensity of the counterfactual outcomes imagined. However, learned carefulness was strongly associated with self-focused upward counterfactuals and the specific emotions of unpleasantness and regret, implicating the role of deliberate reflection .
In sum, the thesis contributes to research on counterfactual thinking by showing that counterfactuals promote a focus on extreme consequences, but attenuated affective reactions, consistent with the idea that counterfactual thinking is more abstract and schematic than future oriented thinking. One implication may be that learning from near-misses and close escapes is more contingent on deliberate reflection rather than affective assimilation.
Summary
The aim of the present thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how people construct hypothetical alternatives to past events, and further explore the role of such counterfactual thinking in learning from accidents and near-accidents. In Paper 1 we introduced the notion that counterfactual thinking is a form of mental simulation that relies on abstract, gist based representations of the world, and therefore promote s a focus on schematic and prototypical outcomes. For events with a clear valence, this should lead counterfactual speculations to be more extreme, or unambiguously good or bad, compared to ordinary predictions. In line with our expectation, people evaluated the consequences of an unexpected turn of events to be more extreme, when it was presented as a counterfactual possibility rather than an actual occurrence.
Paper 2 replicated the main finding in Paper 1, and extended the investigation to include affective evaluations. Consistent with the previous finding, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than the same events presented as counterfactual, for both positive and negative outcomes. These apparently contradictory findings were discussed within the framework of Construal Level Theory, and it is suggested that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high – level account of counterfactual thinking.
In Paper 3 we investigate d learning from accidents and near-accidents. By asking people about their thoughts and feelings following accidents and near-accidents, we examined the degree to which these experiences had inspired caution. The results indicated that accidents inspired more caution than near-accidents. Furthermore, repeated experience with Judgments and evaluations of counterfactual outcomes near accidents app eared to have inspired caution, but we observed no change in caution following repeated experience with near-accidents. Learned carefulness did not seem to be associated with reported emotional intensity of the counterfactual outcomes imagined. However, learned carefulness was strongly associated with self-focused upward counterfactuals and the specific emotions of unpleasantness and regret, implicating the role of deliberate reflection .
In sum, the thesis contributes to research on counterfactual thinking by showing that counterfactuals promote a focus on extreme consequences, but attenuated affective reactions, consistent with the idea that counterfactual thinking is more abstract and schematic than future oriented thinking. One implication may be that learning from near-misses and close escapes is more contingent on deliberate reflection rather than affective assimilation.
Oil Sanctions Against Iran Prove Potent: “The president is doing the opposite of what the experts said, and it seems to be working out”
Oil Sanctions Against Iran Prove Potent. Clifford Krauss. TNYT, Sep 19 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/19/business/energy-environment/iran-oil-sanctions.html
HOUSTON — When President Trump announced in May that he was going to withdraw the United States from the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration and five other countries negotiated with Iran in 2015 and reimpose sanctions on the country, the decision was fraught with potential disaster.
If Mr. Trump’s approach worked too well, oil prices would spike and hurt the American economy. If it failed, international companies would continue trading with Iran, leaving the Islamic Republic unscathed, defiant and free to restart its nuclear program.
But the policy has been effective without either of those nasty consequences, at least so far.
Nearly two months before American oil sanctions go into effect, Iran’s crude exports are plummeting. International oil companies, including those from countries that are still committed to the nuclear agreement, are bailing out of deals with Tehran.
And remarkably, the price of oil in the United States has risen only modestly while gasoline prices have essentially remained flat. The current global oil price hovers around $80 a barrel, $60 below the highs of a decade ago.
“The president is doing the opposite of what the experts said, and it seems to be working out,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a research and consulting firm.
Initial signs of a foreign-policy success could benefit Mr. Trump politically as Republicans try to hold on to control of Congress. The president and lawmakers allied with him could point to the administration’s aggressive stand toward Iran as evidence that his unconventional approach to diplomacy has been much more fruitful and far less costly than Democrats have been willing to acknowledge.
The administration’s tactical advantage could be fleeting, of course, if Iran retaliates with cyberattacks or militarily, incites more militia violence in Iraq, or revives its nuclear program.
The most important reason that predictions of higher oil prices have been wrong is that there is plenty of oil sloshing around the world. The United States has become a huge exporter of oil in the last several years and is now shipping roughly the same amount — more than two million barrels a day — that Iran did earlier this year.
Trade tensions and economic problems in developing countries like Turkey and Argentina might also be slowing the growth of energy demand.
Another thing in Mr. Trump’s favor is that while governments in Europe and Asia have publicly opposed his decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement, many businesses in those places have made a different calculation. They have concluded that it makes little financial sense to risk investments in and trade with the United States by doing business with Iran.
Until Mr. Trump’s May announcement, Western allies considered the nuclear deal with Iran a success. In exchange for agreeing to strict limits on its nuclear program and international monitoring, Iran was allowed to re-enter the global oil market. The deal lifted restrictions on foreign companies doing business in Iran and gave the country access to frozen assets overseas.
After Nov. 4, companies that buy, ship or insure shipments of Iranian oil can be excluded from the American market and banking system unless they obtain waivers from the administration.
Trump administration officials say its sanctions are designed to punish Iran for its interventions in Syria, Yemen and other countries.
For Iran, the timing could not be worse. The country has lost influence over oil prices as other producers have eclipsed its energy industry, which has not kept up with technological advances.
At the beginning of the century, Iranian officials could shake the oil markets by staging military maneuvers or merely hinting that they would reduce supplies. Back then, American oil production was falling and global demand for crude was surging.
But those days are long gone. Like the United States, countries including Canada and Brazil are also exporting more oil. Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have also increased production, helping to keep oil prices in check. Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies are only too happy to support the sanctions against their chief rival, Iran, by expanding exports.
[chart] Sources: Thomson Retuers; Energy Information Administration
That has provided a buffer for the global oil market as Iranian exports dropped by more than 25 percent, or around 600,000 barrels a day, between June and the start of September. Exports are expected to drop by an additional half-million barrels when American sanctions go into effect. All told, exports could drop from a high of 2.7 million barrels this year to fewer than a million in 2019 — lowering the country’s exports to less than 1 percent of the global market, from about 3 percent earlier this year.
That would further squeeze the Iranian government, which had $50 billion in oil revenue last year; oil and petroleum products make up about 70 percent of the country’s exports by value.
“For Iran, it shows the leverage that they have had through oil has not only diminished but may never return,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, a senior fellow specializing in energy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “People just don’t care if they are going to lose business in Iran. People don’t feel desperate for supply.’’
The sanctions are so onerous that even companies from countries opposed to Mr. Trump’s approach are withdrawing from Iran.
South Korea, Iran’s third-biggest oil market last year, halted purchases in August after buying 194,000 barrels a day in July. Shipments to France and Japan, two other major markets, are also dropping.
OMV, the Austrian oil company, recently backed out of an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company to evaluate oil fields. Hellenic Petroleum of Greece, Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s Eni are winding down oil purchases.
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a conservative Washington think tank, found that 71 foreign companies planned to withdraw from Iran, 19 intended to stay and 142 were undecided or hadn’t said as of early September.
“Big international companies have to ask themselves what risks are they willing to take on,” said David Adesnik, the foundation’s director of research. “Even if you don’t have a business in the U.S. you can be cut off from our financial system, and that’s not something a truly global firm can afford.”
The next big shoe to drop appears to be India, Iran’s second-biggest oil market after China. Reliance Industries, the nation’s leading refiner, has said it will stop buying Iranian crude when American sanctions kick in. And the State Bank of India, the country’s largest lender, has told refiners that it will block payments for Iranian crude.
American officials are waging a public and private campaign to persuade foreign leaders to cut economic ties with Iran — and to buy more American oil.
During a visit to India this month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the administration was seeking a total halt to Iranian oil exports, although countries will be given time to switch suppliers.
“Purchases of Iranian crude will go to zero from every country or sanctions will be imposed,” Mr. Pompeo said.
The sanctions could allow Russian and Chinese companies to replace Western businesses in Iran. After Washington denied it a waiver, the French oil giant Total pulled out of a contract to develop the South Pars gas field, leaving a potential opening to China’s CNPC to increase its investment in the field.
China, which imports a half-million barrels of Iranian crude a day, can more easily resist American policy than other countries. That’s because its smallest refiners and domestic banks have little or no exposure to the United States.
Russia is another obstacle.
Gazprom and Rosneft, two state-controlled Russian oil and gas giants, are negotiating oil development deals worth roughly $10 billion with the Iranian oil ministry.
For its part, Iran is not sitting still. The state-run Iranian tanker company is storing oil on its fleet of supertankers rather than shut down production, which can damage wells. Iran could smuggle oil over land through Pakistan and Afghanistan, and barter with trading companies to get around sanctions.
International transactions are largely denominated in dollars, which strengthens American sanctions. Over time, Iran’s oil trade could shift to other currencies, particularly the Chinese renminbi.
“We will continue by all means to both produce and export,” President Hassan Rouhani of Iran said recently on state TV. “Oil is in the front line of confrontation and resistance.”
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 20, 2018, on Page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Oil Sanctions Against Iran Prove Potent
HOUSTON — When President Trump announced in May that he was going to withdraw the United States from the nuclear agreement that the Obama administration and five other countries negotiated with Iran in 2015 and reimpose sanctions on the country, the decision was fraught with potential disaster.
If Mr. Trump’s approach worked too well, oil prices would spike and hurt the American economy. If it failed, international companies would continue trading with Iran, leaving the Islamic Republic unscathed, defiant and free to restart its nuclear program.
But the policy has been effective without either of those nasty consequences, at least so far.
Nearly two months before American oil sanctions go into effect, Iran’s crude exports are plummeting. International oil companies, including those from countries that are still committed to the nuclear agreement, are bailing out of deals with Tehran.
And remarkably, the price of oil in the United States has risen only modestly while gasoline prices have essentially remained flat. The current global oil price hovers around $80 a barrel, $60 below the highs of a decade ago.
“The president is doing the opposite of what the experts said, and it seems to be working out,” said Michael Lynch, president of Strategic Energy and Economic Research, a research and consulting firm.
Initial signs of a foreign-policy success could benefit Mr. Trump politically as Republicans try to hold on to control of Congress. The president and lawmakers allied with him could point to the administration’s aggressive stand toward Iran as evidence that his unconventional approach to diplomacy has been much more fruitful and far less costly than Democrats have been willing to acknowledge.
The administration’s tactical advantage could be fleeting, of course, if Iran retaliates with cyberattacks or militarily, incites more militia violence in Iraq, or revives its nuclear program.
The most important reason that predictions of higher oil prices have been wrong is that there is plenty of oil sloshing around the world. The United States has become a huge exporter of oil in the last several years and is now shipping roughly the same amount — more than two million barrels a day — that Iran did earlier this year.
Trade tensions and economic problems in developing countries like Turkey and Argentina might also be slowing the growth of energy demand.
Another thing in Mr. Trump’s favor is that while governments in Europe and Asia have publicly opposed his decision to withdraw from the nuclear agreement, many businesses in those places have made a different calculation. They have concluded that it makes little financial sense to risk investments in and trade with the United States by doing business with Iran.
Until Mr. Trump’s May announcement, Western allies considered the nuclear deal with Iran a success. In exchange for agreeing to strict limits on its nuclear program and international monitoring, Iran was allowed to re-enter the global oil market. The deal lifted restrictions on foreign companies doing business in Iran and gave the country access to frozen assets overseas.
After Nov. 4, companies that buy, ship or insure shipments of Iranian oil can be excluded from the American market and banking system unless they obtain waivers from the administration.
Trump administration officials say its sanctions are designed to punish Iran for its interventions in Syria, Yemen and other countries.
For Iran, the timing could not be worse. The country has lost influence over oil prices as other producers have eclipsed its energy industry, which has not kept up with technological advances.
At the beginning of the century, Iranian officials could shake the oil markets by staging military maneuvers or merely hinting that they would reduce supplies. Back then, American oil production was falling and global demand for crude was surging.
But those days are long gone. Like the United States, countries including Canada and Brazil are also exporting more oil. Russia, Saudi Arabia and Iraq have also increased production, helping to keep oil prices in check. Saudi Arabia and its Persian Gulf allies are only too happy to support the sanctions against their chief rival, Iran, by expanding exports.
[chart] Sources: Thomson Retuers; Energy Information Administration
That has provided a buffer for the global oil market as Iranian exports dropped by more than 25 percent, or around 600,000 barrels a day, between June and the start of September. Exports are expected to drop by an additional half-million barrels when American sanctions go into effect. All told, exports could drop from a high of 2.7 million barrels this year to fewer than a million in 2019 — lowering the country’s exports to less than 1 percent of the global market, from about 3 percent earlier this year.
That would further squeeze the Iranian government, which had $50 billion in oil revenue last year; oil and petroleum products make up about 70 percent of the country’s exports by value.
“For Iran, it shows the leverage that they have had through oil has not only diminished but may never return,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, a senior fellow specializing in energy at the Council on Foreign Relations. “People just don’t care if they are going to lose business in Iran. People don’t feel desperate for supply.’’
The sanctions are so onerous that even companies from countries opposed to Mr. Trump’s approach are withdrawing from Iran.
South Korea, Iran’s third-biggest oil market last year, halted purchases in August after buying 194,000 barrels a day in July. Shipments to France and Japan, two other major markets, are also dropping.
OMV, the Austrian oil company, recently backed out of an agreement with the National Iranian Oil Company to evaluate oil fields. Hellenic Petroleum of Greece, Spain’s Repsol and Italy’s Eni are winding down oil purchases.
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a conservative Washington think tank, found that 71 foreign companies planned to withdraw from Iran, 19 intended to stay and 142 were undecided or hadn’t said as of early September.
“Big international companies have to ask themselves what risks are they willing to take on,” said David Adesnik, the foundation’s director of research. “Even if you don’t have a business in the U.S. you can be cut off from our financial system, and that’s not something a truly global firm can afford.”
The next big shoe to drop appears to be India, Iran’s second-biggest oil market after China. Reliance Industries, the nation’s leading refiner, has said it will stop buying Iranian crude when American sanctions kick in. And the State Bank of India, the country’s largest lender, has told refiners that it will block payments for Iranian crude.
American officials are waging a public and private campaign to persuade foreign leaders to cut economic ties with Iran — and to buy more American oil.
During a visit to India this month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the administration was seeking a total halt to Iranian oil exports, although countries will be given time to switch suppliers.
“Purchases of Iranian crude will go to zero from every country or sanctions will be imposed,” Mr. Pompeo said.
The sanctions could allow Russian and Chinese companies to replace Western businesses in Iran. After Washington denied it a waiver, the French oil giant Total pulled out of a contract to develop the South Pars gas field, leaving a potential opening to China’s CNPC to increase its investment in the field.
China, which imports a half-million barrels of Iranian crude a day, can more easily resist American policy than other countries. That’s because its smallest refiners and domestic banks have little or no exposure to the United States.
Russia is another obstacle.
Gazprom and Rosneft, two state-controlled Russian oil and gas giants, are negotiating oil development deals worth roughly $10 billion with the Iranian oil ministry.
For its part, Iran is not sitting still. The state-run Iranian tanker company is storing oil on its fleet of supertankers rather than shut down production, which can damage wells. Iran could smuggle oil over land through Pakistan and Afghanistan, and barter with trading companies to get around sanctions.
International transactions are largely denominated in dollars, which strengthens American sanctions. Over time, Iran’s oil trade could shift to other currencies, particularly the Chinese renminbi.
“We will continue by all means to both produce and export,” President Hassan Rouhani of Iran said recently on state TV. “Oil is in the front line of confrontation and resistance.”
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 20, 2018, on Page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Oil Sanctions Against Iran Prove Potent
Luxury goods are beneficial signals that bestow social benefits like positive evaluations & compliance, but there can be high costs when it comes to warmth; costs appear to be driven by impression management concerns rather than envy
The Dark Side of Luxury: Social Costs of Luxury Consumption. Christopher Cannon, Derek D. Rucker. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218796790
Abstract: Extant research demonstrates that luxury goods are beneficial signals that bestow upon individuals social benefits that range from positive evaluations to compliance. In contrast to this perspective, the current work explores the idea that luxury goods can carry significant negative social costs for actors. Across four experiments, the social cost of luxury is examined. Although individuals who display luxury goods are ascribed higher status, they can pay a hefty tax when it comes to warmth. The social costs of luxury consumption appear to be driven by impression management concerns rather than envy. Consequently, whether the consumption of luxury goods yields positive or negative social consequences for an actor critically depends both on whether status or warmth is relevant for a decision and observers’ own lay beliefs about luxury consumption. Overall, this work reveals the more complex psychology of individuals’ interpretation and response to actors’ use of luxury goods.
Keywords: luxury consumption, social influence, status, warmth, impression management
Abstract: Extant research demonstrates that luxury goods are beneficial signals that bestow upon individuals social benefits that range from positive evaluations to compliance. In contrast to this perspective, the current work explores the idea that luxury goods can carry significant negative social costs for actors. Across four experiments, the social cost of luxury is examined. Although individuals who display luxury goods are ascribed higher status, they can pay a hefty tax when it comes to warmth. The social costs of luxury consumption appear to be driven by impression management concerns rather than envy. Consequently, whether the consumption of luxury goods yields positive or negative social consequences for an actor critically depends both on whether status or warmth is relevant for a decision and observers’ own lay beliefs about luxury consumption. Overall, this work reveals the more complex psychology of individuals’ interpretation and response to actors’ use of luxury goods.
Keywords: luxury consumption, social influence, status, warmth, impression management
Saturday, September 22, 2018
Machiavellianism & psychopathy predicted narrow AI risk perception above what other traits/characteristics do; in individuals with self-reported knowledge of AI, the Dark Triad traits were associated with risk perception
Individual Differences in Risk Perception of Artificial Intelligence. Benno G. Wissing and Marc-André Reinhard. Swiss Journal of Psychology, Volume 77, Issue 4, pp. 149-157. https://doi.org/10.1024/1421-0185/a000214
Abstract: This cross-sectional study (N = 325) investigated the relationship between the Dark Triad personality traits and the perception of artificial intelligence (AI) risk. Narrow AI risk perception was measured based on recently identified perceived risks in the public. Artificial general intelligence (AGI) risk perception was operationalized in terms of plausibility ratings and subjective probability estimates on deceptive AI scenarios developed by Bostrom (2014), in which AI-sided deception is described as a function of intelligence. Machiavellianism and psychopathy predicted narrow AI risk perception above the shared variance of the Dark Triad and above the Big Five. In individuals with self-reported knowledge of machine learning, the Dark Triad traits were associated with AGI risk perception. This study provides evidence for the existence of substantial individual differences in the risk perception of AI.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, Big Five, Dark Triad, Machiavellian intelligence, machine intelligence, risk perception
Abstract: This cross-sectional study (N = 325) investigated the relationship between the Dark Triad personality traits and the perception of artificial intelligence (AI) risk. Narrow AI risk perception was measured based on recently identified perceived risks in the public. Artificial general intelligence (AGI) risk perception was operationalized in terms of plausibility ratings and subjective probability estimates on deceptive AI scenarios developed by Bostrom (2014), in which AI-sided deception is described as a function of intelligence. Machiavellianism and psychopathy predicted narrow AI risk perception above the shared variance of the Dark Triad and above the Big Five. In individuals with self-reported knowledge of machine learning, the Dark Triad traits were associated with AGI risk perception. This study provides evidence for the existence of substantial individual differences in the risk perception of AI.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, Big Five, Dark Triad, Machiavellian intelligence, machine intelligence, risk perception
Oxytocin administration increased men's attraction to unfaithful women & wanting short-term relationships, whereas women became more averse to unfaithful men & exhibited an even greater preference for having long-term relationships with faithful ones
Oxytocin amplifies sex differences in human mate choice. Lei Xu, Benjamin Becker, Ruixue Luo, Xiaoxiao Zheng, Weihua Zhao, Qiong Zhang, Keith Kendrick. bioRxiv, doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/416198
Abstract: Infidelity is the major cause of partnership breakups across cultures and individuals with a history of infidelity are more likely to repeat it, although they may also present a greater opportunity for short-term sexual relationships. Here we have firstly investigated sex-differences in the attractiveness and perceived relationship potential of individuals who have exhibited fidelity or infidelity in a previous relationship. We also examined whether these sex differences are amplified by the neuropeptide oxytocin which promotes partner bonds but may also enhance sex-differences in social priorities. While both sexes valued faithful individuals most for long-term relationships, men were more interested in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful individuals than women, irrespective of current relationship status. Oxytocin administration increased mens attraction to unfaithful women and wanting short-term relationships with them, whereas women became more averse to unfaithful men and instead exhibited an even greater preference for having long-term relationships with faithful ones. The oxytocin effect on relationship-choice was only found in single individuals in line with their higher priority for finding a prospective partner. Thus, oxytocin release during courtship may first act to amplify sex-dependent priorities in attraction and mate choice before subsequently promoting romantic bonds with preferred individuals.
Abstract: Infidelity is the major cause of partnership breakups across cultures and individuals with a history of infidelity are more likely to repeat it, although they may also present a greater opportunity for short-term sexual relationships. Here we have firstly investigated sex-differences in the attractiveness and perceived relationship potential of individuals who have exhibited fidelity or infidelity in a previous relationship. We also examined whether these sex differences are amplified by the neuropeptide oxytocin which promotes partner bonds but may also enhance sex-differences in social priorities. While both sexes valued faithful individuals most for long-term relationships, men were more interested in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful individuals than women, irrespective of current relationship status. Oxytocin administration increased mens attraction to unfaithful women and wanting short-term relationships with them, whereas women became more averse to unfaithful men and instead exhibited an even greater preference for having long-term relationships with faithful ones. The oxytocin effect on relationship-choice was only found in single individuals in line with their higher priority for finding a prospective partner. Thus, oxytocin release during courtship may first act to amplify sex-dependent priorities in attraction and mate choice before subsequently promoting romantic bonds with preferred individuals.
Liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues; the divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely
Peltzman, Sam, Polarizing Currents within Purple America (August 20, 2018). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3235867
Abstract: The ideology of average Americans has changed little since the 1970s. Then as now around 30 percent identify liberal or conservative and 40 percent are moderates. In contrast to this stable “purple” distribution political parties have become more polarized into “red” and “blue” ideological camps with much less overlap than in the past. This paper contributes to the literature that seeks to reconcile these divergent trends by examining changes in the policy preferences within ideological categories. I analyze answers to a stable set of questions in the General Social Survey. The key finding is that liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues. The divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely.
Keywords: political polarization, political ideology, economic policy, social policy
JEL Classification: D72, D78
Abstract: The ideology of average Americans has changed little since the 1970s. Then as now around 30 percent identify liberal or conservative and 40 percent are moderates. In contrast to this stable “purple” distribution political parties have become more polarized into “red” and “blue” ideological camps with much less overlap than in the past. This paper contributes to the literature that seeks to reconcile these divergent trends by examining changes in the policy preferences within ideological categories. I analyze answers to a stable set of questions in the General Social Survey. The key finding is that liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues. The divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely.
Keywords: political polarization, political ideology, economic policy, social policy
JEL Classification: D72, D78
Friday, September 21, 2018
Genital Piercing: Childhood and Adolescent Behaviors That Serve as Predictors and Scores on Scales Measuring Hypersexuality and Risky Sexual Behavior, Sexual Orientation, Depression, Conflict, Intimacy, & Sexual Satisfaction
Genital Piercing: Childhood and Adolescent Behaviors That Serve as Predictors and Scores on Scales Measuring Hypersexuality and Risky Sexual Behavior, Sexual Orientation, Depression, Conflict, Intimacy, and Sexual Satisfaction. Karen Griffee et al. Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, Volume 24, 2017 - Issue 1-2, Pages 58-78.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10720162.2017.1290563
ABSTRACT: Groups of 62 women and 25 men with genital piercings were compared to same-sex controls without genital piercing (2,549 women and 1,427 men, respectively) on measures of sexual orientation, intimacy, conflict, sexual satisfaction, depression, numbers of sexual partners, and numbers of times they engaged in sexual behaviors with female and male partners as adults. As adults, both women and men with genital piercings scored higher on the measures of same-sex orientation, hypersexuality, and risky sexual behavior and had more adult male partners and same-sex partners than controls. Women with genital piercings were more likely than controls to endorse being sexually addicted.
https://doi.org/10.1080/10720162.2017.1290563
ABSTRACT: Groups of 62 women and 25 men with genital piercings were compared to same-sex controls without genital piercing (2,549 women and 1,427 men, respectively) on measures of sexual orientation, intimacy, conflict, sexual satisfaction, depression, numbers of sexual partners, and numbers of times they engaged in sexual behaviors with female and male partners as adults. As adults, both women and men with genital piercings scored higher on the measures of same-sex orientation, hypersexuality, and risky sexual behavior and had more adult male partners and same-sex partners than controls. Women with genital piercings were more likely than controls to endorse being sexually addicted.
Sister-brother Incest: Findings were consistent with other reports of early and persistent hyper-eroticization of incest victims
Sister-brother Incest: Data from Anonymous Computer Assisted Self Interviews. Stephen L. O'Keefe, Keith W. Beard, Sam Swindell, Sandra S. Stroebel, Karen Griffee & Debra H. Young. Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, Volume 21, 2014 - Issue 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/10720162.2013.877410
Abstract: Retrospective data were entered anonymously by 1,178 adult men using computer-assisted self-interview. Twenty-seven were victims of sister-brother incest (SBI), 119 were victims of child sexual abuse by an adult female (CSA-AF) before 18 years of age, 1,032 were controls. SBI was often the first sexual experience for the victim. Our findings were consistent with other reports of early and persistent hyper-eroticization of incest victims. SBI increased the likelihood of engaging in behaviors as an adult consistent with a co-existing or primary male-male sexual orientation, and SBI and CSA-AF had deleterious impacts on adult men's sexual adjustment with their adult partners.
Abstract: Retrospective data were entered anonymously by 1,178 adult men using computer-assisted self-interview. Twenty-seven were victims of sister-brother incest (SBI), 119 were victims of child sexual abuse by an adult female (CSA-AF) before 18 years of age, 1,032 were controls. SBI was often the first sexual experience for the victim. Our findings were consistent with other reports of early and persistent hyper-eroticization of incest victims. SBI increased the likelihood of engaging in behaviors as an adult consistent with a co-existing or primary male-male sexual orientation, and SBI and CSA-AF had deleterious impacts on adult men's sexual adjustment with their adult partners.
Adult Women: 10.6% had exposed themselves in public, 5.1% reported having urges to expose themselves in public, 5.9% had engaged in some sort of sex with underage males, & 2.4% reported they had sexual intercourse with underage males
Exhibitionism and Sex with Underage Males in Adult Women. Sandra S. Stroebel et al. Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, https://doi.org/10.1080/10720162.2018.1476944
Abstract: Data from 2,607 female participants in an anonymous computerized study were entered by the participants themselves: 276 (10.6%) had exposed themselves in public, 134 (5.1%) reported having urges to expose themselves in public, 153 (5.9%) had engaged in some sort of sex with underage males, and 100 (2.4%) reported they had sexual intercourse with underage males. As predicted by conditioning, modeling, and critical period learning theories, exposure to nudity within the nuclear family and partnered early sexual experimentation involving breast or genital exposure significantly increased the likelihood of participants exposing themselves in public and having such urges.
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Women are less frequently apprehended by police for genital exposure than are men and, as a result, exhibitionism has been less studied in women (Fedoroff, Fishell, & Fedoroff, 1999). For example, Fedoroff, Fishell, and Fedoroff (1999) reported that 6 of 118 men (5%) referred for paraphilia assessment met criteria for exhibitionism. In contrast only 14 women had been referred for assessment; yet 4 (29%) were diagnosed with exhibitionism. Similarly, there are fewer studies of the origins of exhibitionism in women than in men. There are several extensive reports of individual female patients in psychoanalysis that describe direct genital exhibitionism of women that resulted in their sexual arousal (e.g., Balsam, 2008; Grob, 1985).
Swindell et al. (2011) explored the early antecedents that predicted adult male exhibition-like behavior using epidemiological techniques and extensive information on the study participant’s experiences within and outside their nuclear families during childhood and adolescence. Exhibition-like experiences that had occurred prior to the age of 18 were statistically significant predictors of exhibitionistic behavior in the adult men studied. Swindell et al. (2011) explained the relationship between the early exhibition- like events in leading to the adult male exhibitionism as mediated by Pavlovian (classical) and operant conditioning as well as modeling of exhibitionism by the children’s parents and their giving tacit approval through modeling (Bandura, 1986).
In her Master’s thesis on the early antecedents of female exhibition-like behavior, Fouch (2015) reported similar findings in preliminary data and attributed the influence of the early experiences to critical period learning, a phenomenon that has also been shown to have a very powerful influence on adult sexual behavior (Griffee et al., 2014a, 2014b). For reviews of conditioning studies in humans and animals see Hoffman (2012) and Pfaus et al. (2012), respectively. Conditioning to visual cues not available in partnered sex may explain the high level of sexual dysfunction during partnered sex found in those using internet pornography (Park et al., 2016), a conclusion also supported by results of Blais-Lecours, Vaillancourt-Morel, Sabourin, and Godbour (2016) and van Oosten and Vandenbosch (2017).
Serendipitously, the camera phones capable of taking pictures and transmitting them wirelessly were just becoming available the same year data collection for the present study began (2002) and their quality improved steadily during the entire interval of data collection (2002–2014, Hill, 2013). The internet (Corley & Hook, 2012, p. 59), web-cams, and smartphones (Drouin & Landgraff, 2012; Nielsen, Paasonen, & Spisak, 2015; Sevcikova, 2016; van Oosten & Vandenbosch, 2017) provided new ways for people to remotely expose their bodies and/or genitals to others digitally and electronically (Corley & Hook, 2012, p. 59). Sexting (transmitting cell-phone textual messages with sexual content with or without sexual photos) was the word coined to describe this new phenomenon. Female sex-offenders use the internet to groom victims, find supportive others, find co-offenders, and download and upload child pornography (Elliot & Ashfield, 2011).
These new electronic technologies also opened new routes that researchers could use to study the exhibitionists and that police could use to catch or entrap perpetrators of exhibitionism. For example, Hugh-Jones, Gough, and Littlewood (2005) reported on exhibitionists who agreed to provide interviews over the internet, and Elliot and Ashfield (2011) used the internet to find and evaluate websites catering to pedophilic sex-offenders. Furthermore, a Google search by the present authors on November 22, 2017 found four news reports of unrelated events in four different U.S. states between September 2, 2017 and November 22, 2017, in which adult female teachers between the ages of 22 and 27 years admitted to sending photos of their nude or scantily clad bodies to one or more underage male teenage student’s smartphones. Three of the four electronically exhibitionistic- perpetrator-teachers went on to have sex with their underage male students before being arrested (e.g., Farberov, 2017; Haxel & Palmer, 2017; McBride, 2017; Silverman, 2017). The arrest in the fourth case occurred shortly after the perpetrator-teacher sent her pictures to five different male students because a parent found the picture on a student’s phone (McBride, 2017). These four perpetrator teachers would have been 15 years younger when cell phones capable of taking and sending pictures first became available in the United States (approximately 7–12 years of age, Hill, 2013).
This set of four cases was not exhaustive. The 4-month interval that included the four cases indicates the high frequency of such cases. To illustrate that such behavior of female teachers with underage male students has been frequently reported in prior recent news sources and that they were titillating to a male audience, we cite a Caveman Circus (Caveman Circus, 2015) internet website post entitled “The 18 hottest teachers caught having sex with their students” which provided descriptions of the sexual behaviors of 18 female teachers who had been caught having sex with underage students—complete with pictures of the teachers (often taken on the courthouse steps) when accessed on November 25, 2017. However, by November 27, 2017 the pictures had been taken down. Given the laws against such activities, the frequent news reports detailing the arrests of teacher-perpetrators, and the length of their jail sentences, why would school teachers send inappropriate pictures to—or engage in sex with— underage students?
There is growing awareness that like men, women can also become sexually addicted, although there has been far less research on female sexual addiction than on sexual addiction in males (for review, see McKeague, 2014 and Rosenberg, Carnes, & O’Connor, 2014). Female sex addicts differ from male sex addicts in that acting-out in women tends to involve relationships (McKeague, 2014). Sexual addiction frequently develops in the teenage years or in the early twenties, and 6.7% of 209 female college students’ scores on the PATHOS screening questionnaire (a self-administered questionnaire for detecting sexual addiction) were consistent with sexual addiction (Cashwell, Giordano, Lewis, Wachtel, & Bartley, 2015). In the research and treatment literature, female sex addicts are framed as victims whose behaviors are passive (e.g., McKeague, 2014; Opitz, Tsytsarev & Froh, 2009), however exhibitionism is aggressive, not passive.
Additionally, there are fewer studies of female sexual predators who have male victims than studies of male sexual predators who have female victims. Untested assumptions have been that minor males are not harmed when they believe that they participated voluntarily and that males are protected by impotence when they are coerced into sex (Sarrel & Masters, 1982; see Deering & Mellor, 2010; and Grayston & De Luca, 1999 for reviews). O’Keefe et al. (2014) found 27 victims of sister-brother incest (2.3%) and 119 victims of child sexual abuse (CSA, 10.1%) by adult women among 1,178 men who had provided data anonymously. The present study expands on Fouch (2015) by using a more recent database containing additional cases and by exploring the co-occurrence between female exhibitionism and adult women becoming sexual perpetrators by having sex with underage male victims.
Abstract: Data from 2,607 female participants in an anonymous computerized study were entered by the participants themselves: 276 (10.6%) had exposed themselves in public, 134 (5.1%) reported having urges to expose themselves in public, 153 (5.9%) had engaged in some sort of sex with underage males, and 100 (2.4%) reported they had sexual intercourse with underage males. As predicted by conditioning, modeling, and critical period learning theories, exposure to nudity within the nuclear family and partnered early sexual experimentation involving breast or genital exposure significantly increased the likelihood of participants exposing themselves in public and having such urges.
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Women are less frequently apprehended by police for genital exposure than are men and, as a result, exhibitionism has been less studied in women (Fedoroff, Fishell, & Fedoroff, 1999). For example, Fedoroff, Fishell, and Fedoroff (1999) reported that 6 of 118 men (5%) referred for paraphilia assessment met criteria for exhibitionism. In contrast only 14 women had been referred for assessment; yet 4 (29%) were diagnosed with exhibitionism. Similarly, there are fewer studies of the origins of exhibitionism in women than in men. There are several extensive reports of individual female patients in psychoanalysis that describe direct genital exhibitionism of women that resulted in their sexual arousal (e.g., Balsam, 2008; Grob, 1985).
Swindell et al. (2011) explored the early antecedents that predicted adult male exhibition-like behavior using epidemiological techniques and extensive information on the study participant’s experiences within and outside their nuclear families during childhood and adolescence. Exhibition-like experiences that had occurred prior to the age of 18 were statistically significant predictors of exhibitionistic behavior in the adult men studied. Swindell et al. (2011) explained the relationship between the early exhibition- like events in leading to the adult male exhibitionism as mediated by Pavlovian (classical) and operant conditioning as well as modeling of exhibitionism by the children’s parents and their giving tacit approval through modeling (Bandura, 1986).
In her Master’s thesis on the early antecedents of female exhibition-like behavior, Fouch (2015) reported similar findings in preliminary data and attributed the influence of the early experiences to critical period learning, a phenomenon that has also been shown to have a very powerful influence on adult sexual behavior (Griffee et al., 2014a, 2014b). For reviews of conditioning studies in humans and animals see Hoffman (2012) and Pfaus et al. (2012), respectively. Conditioning to visual cues not available in partnered sex may explain the high level of sexual dysfunction during partnered sex found in those using internet pornography (Park et al., 2016), a conclusion also supported by results of Blais-Lecours, Vaillancourt-Morel, Sabourin, and Godbour (2016) and van Oosten and Vandenbosch (2017).
Serendipitously, the camera phones capable of taking pictures and transmitting them wirelessly were just becoming available the same year data collection for the present study began (2002) and their quality improved steadily during the entire interval of data collection (2002–2014, Hill, 2013). The internet (Corley & Hook, 2012, p. 59), web-cams, and smartphones (Drouin & Landgraff, 2012; Nielsen, Paasonen, & Spisak, 2015; Sevcikova, 2016; van Oosten & Vandenbosch, 2017) provided new ways for people to remotely expose their bodies and/or genitals to others digitally and electronically (Corley & Hook, 2012, p. 59). Sexting (transmitting cell-phone textual messages with sexual content with or without sexual photos) was the word coined to describe this new phenomenon. Female sex-offenders use the internet to groom victims, find supportive others, find co-offenders, and download and upload child pornography (Elliot & Ashfield, 2011).
These new electronic technologies also opened new routes that researchers could use to study the exhibitionists and that police could use to catch or entrap perpetrators of exhibitionism. For example, Hugh-Jones, Gough, and Littlewood (2005) reported on exhibitionists who agreed to provide interviews over the internet, and Elliot and Ashfield (2011) used the internet to find and evaluate websites catering to pedophilic sex-offenders. Furthermore, a Google search by the present authors on November 22, 2017 found four news reports of unrelated events in four different U.S. states between September 2, 2017 and November 22, 2017, in which adult female teachers between the ages of 22 and 27 years admitted to sending photos of their nude or scantily clad bodies to one or more underage male teenage student’s smartphones. Three of the four electronically exhibitionistic- perpetrator-teachers went on to have sex with their underage male students before being arrested (e.g., Farberov, 2017; Haxel & Palmer, 2017; McBride, 2017; Silverman, 2017). The arrest in the fourth case occurred shortly after the perpetrator-teacher sent her pictures to five different male students because a parent found the picture on a student’s phone (McBride, 2017). These four perpetrator teachers would have been 15 years younger when cell phones capable of taking and sending pictures first became available in the United States (approximately 7–12 years of age, Hill, 2013).
This set of four cases was not exhaustive. The 4-month interval that included the four cases indicates the high frequency of such cases. To illustrate that such behavior of female teachers with underage male students has been frequently reported in prior recent news sources and that they were titillating to a male audience, we cite a Caveman Circus (Caveman Circus, 2015) internet website post entitled “The 18 hottest teachers caught having sex with their students” which provided descriptions of the sexual behaviors of 18 female teachers who had been caught having sex with underage students—complete with pictures of the teachers (often taken on the courthouse steps) when accessed on November 25, 2017. However, by November 27, 2017 the pictures had been taken down. Given the laws against such activities, the frequent news reports detailing the arrests of teacher-perpetrators, and the length of their jail sentences, why would school teachers send inappropriate pictures to—or engage in sex with— underage students?
There is growing awareness that like men, women can also become sexually addicted, although there has been far less research on female sexual addiction than on sexual addiction in males (for review, see McKeague, 2014 and Rosenberg, Carnes, & O’Connor, 2014). Female sex addicts differ from male sex addicts in that acting-out in women tends to involve relationships (McKeague, 2014). Sexual addiction frequently develops in the teenage years or in the early twenties, and 6.7% of 209 female college students’ scores on the PATHOS screening questionnaire (a self-administered questionnaire for detecting sexual addiction) were consistent with sexual addiction (Cashwell, Giordano, Lewis, Wachtel, & Bartley, 2015). In the research and treatment literature, female sex addicts are framed as victims whose behaviors are passive (e.g., McKeague, 2014; Opitz, Tsytsarev & Froh, 2009), however exhibitionism is aggressive, not passive.
Additionally, there are fewer studies of female sexual predators who have male victims than studies of male sexual predators who have female victims. Untested assumptions have been that minor males are not harmed when they believe that they participated voluntarily and that males are protected by impotence when they are coerced into sex (Sarrel & Masters, 1982; see Deering & Mellor, 2010; and Grayston & De Luca, 1999 for reviews). O’Keefe et al. (2014) found 27 victims of sister-brother incest (2.3%) and 119 victims of child sexual abuse (CSA, 10.1%) by adult women among 1,178 men who had provided data anonymously. The present study expands on Fouch (2015) by using a more recent database containing additional cases and by exploring the co-occurrence between female exhibitionism and adult women becoming sexual perpetrators by having sex with underage male victims.
Smartphones reduce smiles between strangers
Smartphones reduce smiles between strangers. Kostadin Kushlev et al. Computers in Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.09.023
Highlights
• Strangers smiled less to one another when they had their phones in a waiting room.
• Participants were randomly assigned in pairs to have or not have their phones.
• Smiling behavior was coded by trained researchers blind to hypotheses.
• The effects applied to frequency of Duchenne smiles and to total smiling time.
• This preregistered study shows that phones are altering the fabric of social life.
Abstract: New developments in technology—from the printing press to television—have long facilitated our capacity for “absent presence,” enabling us to escape the limits of our immediate environment. Does being constantly connected to other people and activities through our smartphones diminish the need to engage with others in the immediate social world, reducing the likelihood of approach behavior such as smiling? In a preregistered experiment, strangers waited together with or without their smartphones; their smiling was later coded by trained assistants. Compared to participants without smartphones, participants with smartphones exhibited significantly fewer smiles of any kind and fewer genuine (Duchenne) smiles. These findings are based on objective behavioral coding rather than self-report and provide clear evidence that being constantly connected to the digital world may undermine important approach behavior.
Highlights
• Strangers smiled less to one another when they had their phones in a waiting room.
• Participants were randomly assigned in pairs to have or not have their phones.
• Smiling behavior was coded by trained researchers blind to hypotheses.
• The effects applied to frequency of Duchenne smiles and to total smiling time.
• This preregistered study shows that phones are altering the fabric of social life.
Abstract: New developments in technology—from the printing press to television—have long facilitated our capacity for “absent presence,” enabling us to escape the limits of our immediate environment. Does being constantly connected to other people and activities through our smartphones diminish the need to engage with others in the immediate social world, reducing the likelihood of approach behavior such as smiling? In a preregistered experiment, strangers waited together with or without their smartphones; their smiling was later coded by trained assistants. Compared to participants without smartphones, participants with smartphones exhibited significantly fewer smiles of any kind and fewer genuine (Duchenne) smiles. These findings are based on objective behavioral coding rather than self-report and provide clear evidence that being constantly connected to the digital world may undermine important approach behavior.
World-class athletes are perceived as more facially attractive than amateur athletes, with women athletes perceived as more facially attractive than men, & these findings generally occur to a greater extent for female than male respondents
Facial Attractiveness as a Function of Athletic Prowess. Richard P. Bagozzi et al. Evolutionary Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704918801369
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between facial attractiveness and athletic prowess. We study the connection between subjective facial attractiveness (measured on a 5-point scale of judged facial attractiveness) and athletes by gender and age of respondents. Five age classes were investigated in Studies 1–5: preadolescents (average age: 8.85 years: n = 92), adolescents (average age: 15.8 years; n = 82), young adults (average age: 21.6 years; n = 181), middle-aged adults (average age: 47.5 years; n = 189), and older adults (65 years old; n = 183). The findings show that world-class athletes are perceived as more facially attractive than amateur athletes, with women athletes perceived as more facially attractive than men, and these findings generally occur to a greater extent for female than male respondents. These findings hold for preadolescents, adolescents, young adults, and older adults. However, results were mixed for middle-aged adults where generally amateur athletes were evaluated more attractive than world-class and men athletes more attractive than women.
Keywords: facial attractiveness, athletic prowess, age and gender differences
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between facial attractiveness and athletic prowess. We study the connection between subjective facial attractiveness (measured on a 5-point scale of judged facial attractiveness) and athletes by gender and age of respondents. Five age classes were investigated in Studies 1–5: preadolescents (average age: 8.85 years: n = 92), adolescents (average age: 15.8 years; n = 82), young adults (average age: 21.6 years; n = 181), middle-aged adults (average age: 47.5 years; n = 189), and older adults (65 years old; n = 183). The findings show that world-class athletes are perceived as more facially attractive than amateur athletes, with women athletes perceived as more facially attractive than men, and these findings generally occur to a greater extent for female than male respondents. These findings hold for preadolescents, adolescents, young adults, and older adults. However, results were mixed for middle-aged adults where generally amateur athletes were evaluated more attractive than world-class and men athletes more attractive than women.
Keywords: facial attractiveness, athletic prowess, age and gender differences
Marital satisfaction and mortality in the United States adult population: Reducing marital dissatisfaction may increase longevity
Whisman, M. A., Gilmour, A. L., & Salinger, J. M. (2018). Marital satisfaction and mortality in the United States adult population. Health Psychology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000677
Abstract
Objective: The present study examined the association between marital satisfaction and all-cause mortality in a large, representative sample of American adults. Gender was evaluated as a potential moderator of this association.
Method: Ratings of marital satisfaction from married adults < 90 years of age (N = 19,246) were extracted from the 1978 – 2010 waves of the General Social Survey and linked to mortality data from the National Death Index. Discrete-time survival analysis was used to evaluate the association between marital satisfaction and mortality.
Results: After statistically adjusting for demographic variables, the odds of dying for married individuals who described their marriage as very happy or pretty happy were significantly lower than the odds of dying for married individuals who described their marriage as not too happy. The association between marital satisfaction and mortality was not moderated by gender.
Conclusions: The significant prospective association between marital satisfaction and mortality suggests that reducing marital dissatisfaction may increase longevity. Further longitudinal research is warranted to (a) replicate the current findings, and (b) evaluate whether increasing marital satisfaction through clinical intervention increases longevity
Abstract
Objective: The present study examined the association between marital satisfaction and all-cause mortality in a large, representative sample of American adults. Gender was evaluated as a potential moderator of this association.
Method: Ratings of marital satisfaction from married adults < 90 years of age (N = 19,246) were extracted from the 1978 – 2010 waves of the General Social Survey and linked to mortality data from the National Death Index. Discrete-time survival analysis was used to evaluate the association between marital satisfaction and mortality.
Results: After statistically adjusting for demographic variables, the odds of dying for married individuals who described their marriage as very happy or pretty happy were significantly lower than the odds of dying for married individuals who described their marriage as not too happy. The association between marital satisfaction and mortality was not moderated by gender.
Conclusions: The significant prospective association between marital satisfaction and mortality suggests that reducing marital dissatisfaction may increase longevity. Further longitudinal research is warranted to (a) replicate the current findings, and (b) evaluate whether increasing marital satisfaction through clinical intervention increases longevity
Contagion theory, including the nature of essence & its relation to conceptions of the soul and self, backward contagion, the process of transmission & whether contact is necessary or sufficient for it to occur, relation between positive & negative contagion
Carol Nemeroff and Paul Rozin, "Back in Touch with Contagion: Some Essential Issues," Journal of the Association for Consumer Research 0, no. 0 (-Not available-): 000. https://doi.org/10.1086/699971
Abstract: Since the introduction of contagion theory to the psychological literature in the 1980s and 1990s, research and interest in the topic have proliferated, especially as related to consumer perceptions and preferences. In this article we review current conceptual issues in contagion theory, including the nature of essence and its relation to conceptions of the soul and self, backward contagion, the process of transmission and whether contact is necessary or sufficient for it to occur, the relation between positive and negative contagion, the status of the eight originally proposed defining features of psychological contagion, and the companion “law of similarity.” We conclude with a discussion of sustainability-relevant applications of contagion theory in the public interest, such as food and water supply and safety, ownership and the sharing economy, and health care. Future research should devote increased attention to cultural differences in psychological contagion and begin to explore emerging impacts of virtual environments on the extended sense of self, reality, and attendant contagion-based thinking
Abstract: Since the introduction of contagion theory to the psychological literature in the 1980s and 1990s, research and interest in the topic have proliferated, especially as related to consumer perceptions and preferences. In this article we review current conceptual issues in contagion theory, including the nature of essence and its relation to conceptions of the soul and self, backward contagion, the process of transmission and whether contact is necessary or sufficient for it to occur, the relation between positive and negative contagion, the status of the eight originally proposed defining features of psychological contagion, and the companion “law of similarity.” We conclude with a discussion of sustainability-relevant applications of contagion theory in the public interest, such as food and water supply and safety, ownership and the sharing economy, and health care. Future research should devote increased attention to cultural differences in psychological contagion and begin to explore emerging impacts of virtual environments on the extended sense of self, reality, and attendant contagion-based thinking
Thursday, September 20, 2018
Public Health in a Cross-National Lens: The Surprising Strength of the American System Compared to France and the UK
Public Health in a Cross-National Lens: The Surprising Strength of the American System. Michael S. Sparer, Anne-Laure Beaussier. J Health Polit Policy Law (2018) 43 (5): 825-846. https://doi.org/10.1215/03616878-6951175
Abstract: Critics of the US health system argue that a higher proportion of the health dollar should be spent on public health, both to improve outcomes and to contain costs. Attempts to explain the subordinate status of public health in America highlight such factors as distrust in government, federalism, and a bias toward acute care. This article considers these assumptions by comparing public health in the United States, England, and France. It finds that one common variable is the bias toward acute care. That the United States has such a bias is not surprising, but the similar pattern cross-nationally is less expected. Three additional findings are more unexpected. First, the United States outperforms its European peers on several public health metrics. Second, the United States spends a comparable proportion of its health dollar on prevention. Third, these results are due partly to a federalism twist (while all three nations delegate significant responsibility for public health to local governments, federal officials are more engaged in the United States) and partly to the American version of public health moralism. We also consider the renewed interest in population health, noting why, against expectations, this trend might grow more quickly in the United States than in its European counterparts.
Abstract: Critics of the US health system argue that a higher proportion of the health dollar should be spent on public health, both to improve outcomes and to contain costs. Attempts to explain the subordinate status of public health in America highlight such factors as distrust in government, federalism, and a bias toward acute care. This article considers these assumptions by comparing public health in the United States, England, and France. It finds that one common variable is the bias toward acute care. That the United States has such a bias is not surprising, but the similar pattern cross-nationally is less expected. Three additional findings are more unexpected. First, the United States outperforms its European peers on several public health metrics. Second, the United States spends a comparable proportion of its health dollar on prevention. Third, these results are due partly to a federalism twist (while all three nations delegate significant responsibility for public health to local governments, federal officials are more engaged in the United States) and partly to the American version of public health moralism. We also consider the renewed interest in population health, noting why, against expectations, this trend might grow more quickly in the United States than in its European counterparts.
Costly female appearance-enhancement provides cues of short-term mating effort: The case of cosmetic surgery
Costly female appearance-enhancement provides cues of short-term mating effort: The case of cosmetic surgery. Hannah K. Bradshaw et al. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 138, 1 February 2019, Pages 48-55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.09.019
Abstract: Across three studies, we explore the relationship between cosmetic surgery, which functions as a costly appearance-enhancement tactic, and women's short-term mating effort. Study 1 demonstrates that women who exert increased short-term mating effort are more accepting of costly appearance-enhancement techniques (i.e., cosmetic surgery), but not relatively low-cost appearance-enhancement techniques (i.e., facial cosmetics). Study 2 and 3 further show that both men and women use information regarding a female targets' cosmetic surgery usage to infer increased short-term mating effort. Moreover, Study 3 demonstrates that inferences of short-term mating effort do not differ as a function of whether the target received facial or body cosmetic surgery. The findings of the current research demonstrate that women's engagement in extreme beautification procedures can influence others' perceptions of their short-term mating effort.
Abstract: Across three studies, we explore the relationship between cosmetic surgery, which functions as a costly appearance-enhancement tactic, and women's short-term mating effort. Study 1 demonstrates that women who exert increased short-term mating effort are more accepting of costly appearance-enhancement techniques (i.e., cosmetic surgery), but not relatively low-cost appearance-enhancement techniques (i.e., facial cosmetics). Study 2 and 3 further show that both men and women use information regarding a female targets' cosmetic surgery usage to infer increased short-term mating effort. Moreover, Study 3 demonstrates that inferences of short-term mating effort do not differ as a function of whether the target received facial or body cosmetic surgery. The findings of the current research demonstrate that women's engagement in extreme beautification procedures can influence others' perceptions of their short-term mating effort.
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