Laura Johnsen, Isaac Cormier, Maryanne L. Fisher (2019). An Ethological Study of Camgirls: Plentiful, Sexually Available Virtual Women for Hire. Human Ethology, 34(Suppl.), HES39, Aug 2019. https:// doi.org/10.22330/he/34/suppl
ABSTRACT: Camgirls are defined as “young women that operate their own webcams to communicate with a broad audience online, often engaging in explicit behaviour in real-time in return for financial compensation” (Bleakley, 2014, p. 893). The number of camgirls is staggering; LiveJasmin.com reported over 2000 models at any given moment, with 35-40 million daily visitors in 2017. The unfettered access to live-action explicit performances can be overwhelming for viewers, and given that there are numerous websites, and therefore tens of thousands of camgirls, there is competition amongst the performers to solicit interest from viewers. We examined the various behaviours camgirls use to obtain viewers and explore whether their appearance and behaviors reflect evolutionary themes regarding mate preferences. Data were collected from the models featured on the homepage of a popular live streaming adult webcam platform. Over seven days, we took screenshots of the first 15 camgirls on the homepage of the site twice a day. We coded their behaviors (ranging from clothed with no stimulation to fully nude with stimulation), facial appearance (e.g., full face shown, partial face shown, face not shown), and body type. Number of views per show were also recorded. Preliminary analysis suggests that camgirls that are clothed and have their face fully shown have a higher number of viewers than those with full nudity or partial face covering. This may indicate that an appealing aspect of camgirls is related to the viewer engaging in a slow-building ‘courtship’ that ends with a sexual interaction as opposed to viewing the camgirls in mid-performance for a brief sexual release.
Friday, August 9, 2019
Is the global prevalence rate of adult mental illness increasing? Systematic review and meta‐analysis says no.
Is the global prevalence rate of adult mental illness increasing? Systematic review and meta‐analysis. Dirk Richter, Abbie Wall, Ashley Bruen, Richard Whittington. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, August 8 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/acps.13083
Abstract
Objectives: The question whether mental illness prevalence rates are increasing is a controversially debated topic. Epidemiological articles and review publications that look into this research issue are often compromised by methodological problems. The present study aimed at using a meta‐analysis technique that is usually applied for the analysis of intervention studies to achieve more transparency and statistical precision.
Objectives: The question whether mental illness prevalence rates are increasing is a controversially debated topic. Epidemiological articles and review publications that look into this research issue are often compromised by methodological problems. The present study aimed at using a meta‐analysis technique that is usually applied for the analysis of intervention studies to achieve more transparency and statistical precision.
Methods: We searched Pubmed, PsycInfo, CINAHL, Google Scholar and reference lists for repeated cross‐sectional population studies on prevalence rates of adult mental illness based on ICD‐ or DSM‐based diagnoses, symptom scales and distress scales that used the same methodological approach at least twice in the same geographical region. The study is registered with PROSPERO (CRD42018090959).
Results: We included 44 samples from 42 publications, representing 1,035,697 primary observations for the first time point and 783,897 primary observations for the second and last time point. Studies were conducted between 1978 and 2015. Controlling for a hierarchical data structure, we found an overall global prevalence increase odds ratio of 1.179 (95%‐CI: 1.065 – 1.305). A multivariate meta‐regression suggested relevant associations with methodological characteristics of included studies.
Conclusions: We conclude that the prevalence increase of adult mental illness is small and we assume that this increase is mainly related to demographic changes.
Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology & fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology
The Mickey Mouse problem: Distinguishing religious and fictional counterintuitive agents. Thomas Swan, Jamin Halberstadt. PLOS, August 8, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220886
Abstract: The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a “religious” or a “fictional” agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous–violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge–and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.
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We suggest that these biases collectively provide a template for predicting which counterintuitive agents can become objects of religious devotion. In particular, the biases for more beneficial and less threatening abilities (the latter only for well-known agents) suggest that “successful” agents must also be motivationally compelling: minimally counterintuitive traits make agents memorable, but memorable agents must satisfy psychobiological needs to become gods. Such gods are not necessarily more “powerful” or “fitness relevant” overall; it is the beneficial traits that distinguish religious agents, while threatening traits may often be higher for nonreligious agents.
Religious agents’ tendency to violate folk psychology over other folk beliefs is also consistent with this motivational interpretation. In a previous study, we found that agents with abilities that violate folk psychology were rated more of a potential opportunity (i.e., more beneficial) than agents violating folk physics or biology [35]. We surmised that agents violating folk psychology represent an opportunity to gain access to socially strategic knowledge—an opportunity that is particularly salient given our recent evolutionary history in which social threats have become increasingly costly and ubiquitous [54]. Indeed, the fact that agents have greater scope to violate folk psychology expectations may account for why agents feature prolifically in religious narratives [55], and appear more than other ontological categories (e.g., objects) in statements rated religious [14].
Nevertheless, these data only provide partial support for the motivational hypothesis. A motivation to believe in agents with beneficial abilities would not necessarily culminate in the formation of religious beliefs via motivated reasoning (i.e., biased strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs [28]). Belief formation also likely depends on an individual’s personality, cultural environment, and/or developmental history, among other factors. For example, people with a strong or temporarily elevated “fear of death” might possess a stronger motivation to believe in immortal beings than people with less fear [37, 38]. We consider it likely that at least some people form religious beliefs via a motivational path [37–45], however, widespread belief would depend on the commonality and thresholds of these individual and cultural factors.
The ambiguous traits used to describe religious agents, while not necessarily motivationally compelling in and of themselves, may interact with other motivational states to facilitate belief. When traits are defined ambiguously, abstractly [56], or metaphorically [57, 58] it becomes easier to attribute them in motivationally attractive ways. For example, the “better than average effect,” in which people rate themselves above average on positive traits and below average on negative traits [28, 59], is smaller when traits are precisely defined (e.g., neat, athletic, sarcastic, clumsy) than when they are ambiguous (e.g., idealistic, sophisticated, impractical, insecure) [29, 60], suggesting that ambiguity allows people to reason their way toward favored conclusions more easily. Similarly, the ambiguous content attributed to religious agents may facilitate motivated reasoning, making it easier to reason toward a belief in these agents. Counterintuitive abilities that can be demonstrated in a variety of ways (violating nonspecific or multiple folk domains), might permit gods to influence manifold situations of motivational significance [24], without precluding or disconfirming their involvement in any [26]. A god’s omnipotence, control of nature, magical powers, or “mysterious ways”, for example, can be applied in whatever manner a believer deems necessary.
A common argument against motivation-based theories of religion is that some gods are not comforting–they’re scary–and why would anyone want to believe in a scary god? We suggest that, like ambiguity, ambivalence facilitates the motivated reasoning process. We think anxiety and uncertainty attributed to threat-capable gods [61] can motivate belief-reinforcing behaviors, such as rituals and other deferential practices [45, 46, 62, 63], and that these behaviors become more intuitively compelling if the agent to whom they are directed is ambivalent. For example, rituals and prayers often depict a transaction in which a god is requested to perform a counterintuitive act in return for worship, good behavior, or a tangible offering. An entirely malevolent god would have little interest in accepting requests, just as an entirely benevolent god would have little interest in refusing them. Thus, an ambivalent god is the only god for whom transactional prayers and rituals make sense. Furthermore, an ambivalent god with whom we can communicate and occasionally extract positive outcomes may be more appealing, and more plausible, than a valenced god, or a god that acts capriciously or randomly. Thus, ambivalence should help make rituals and prayers an intuitively compelling avenue through which gods can deliver benefits (see [64] for other intuitively compelling ritual content), facilitating motivated reasoning towards a belief in these gods.
One anomalous finding is that well-known fictional agents were rated more threatening than well-known religious agents, but this wasn’t the case for invented agents. Negative information, such as about threatening agents, is more cognitively attractive than positive information [65]. A cultural unfolding of this negativity bias, constrained by the motivation to disbelieve overly threatening agents, may explain why it was restricted to culturally popular fictional agents. Such agents might share or even surpass the cognitive attractiveness of religious agents, in being counterintuitive and threatening, but may lack motivational attractiveness, resulting in popular but unbelievable beings. In other cases, threat may be lacking while benefit is not, which might result in motivationally attractive beings that don’t demand our attention for long enough to become religiously established (e.g., Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny). The cognitive attractiveness of threat may therefore be an alternative or additional reason why ambivalence appears to be a key feature of religious beings.
Nevertheless, it is adaptive to pay attention to threats, and possibly also to believe the reality of those threats in some contexts. In evolutionary terms, the cost of falsely believing a threatening agent is absent should be greater than falsely believing it is present, and this negative credulity bias [66] may explain why (an apparent minority of) religious agents deviate from ambivalence into malevolence [67]. Some cultural environments may require and activate our agency detection device more than others [68], making malevolent deities more likely.
Although American participants, mostly Christian, provided our data, we would expect similar results in other cultural contexts to the extent that they afford and foster similar motivations that are natural to the human mind (e.g., to avoid negative affective states). Conversely, cultural differences in the characteristics of religious agents may reflect motivations that arise or are more salient as a consequence of particular environments. Similarly, individual differences within cultures may reflect idiosyncratic motivations (e.g., for more social contact) associated with particular traits (e.g., death anxiety). This essentially motivational account of the characteristics of religious agents has the advantage of catering to the existence of atheists: despite observing the same content and contexts as everyone else, they lack belief, presumably because they lack a motivation for which this content is relevant.
Although the current study contributes to the development of a “belief template” that could, eventually, predict which agents are most likely to inspire religious devotion, it is just a start, with several acknowledged limitations. For example, we did not measure levels of belief in the well-known agents cited by participants, which could provide a better understanding of the role of individual differences. In addition, our distinction between religious and fictional entities neglects some counterintuitive agents, such as ghosts and spirits, that many people believe exist, but that are not necessarily objects of religious devotion. Future work might present participants with specific beings, entities, and other paranormal phenomena with a diverse range of a-priori plausibility before measuring belief and their perceived features. Similarly, our request for supernatural abilities restricted the number of intuitive features that participants attributed to their invented agents. Although we found no difference in rated intuitiveness or the number of intuitive abilities listed, the trend was towards religious agents being more intuitive, as found in other work [16, 17]. Finally, our proposed template neglects some religious agents, such as Satan and Loki, that are apparently neither beneficent nor ambivalent. It could be argued that belief in such agents (and polytheism in general) is declining, in line with the template’s proposed optimum, however, in less optimal settings, the ambivalence criterion might also be applied to groupings or entire pantheons of agents. Thus, we acknowledge that cultural and environmental factors may affect the reliability of the template, which is more a measure of cultural evolutionary success than a strict set of exclusionary criteria.
These limitations notwithstanding, we suggest a religious agent template, tentatively comprising beneficent yet ambivalent agents with ambiguous and folk-psychology-violating abilities, goes some way to solving the Mickey Mouse problem. Mickey Mouse lacks the necessary beneficence, ambivalence, and ambiguity, and we therefore lack the motivation and latitude to believe he is real.
Abstract: The Mickey Mouse problem refers to the difficulty in predicting which supernatural agents are capable of eliciting belief and religious devotion. We approached the problem directly by asking participants to invent a “religious” or a “fictional” agent with five supernatural abilities. Compared to fictional agents, religious agents were ascribed a higher proportion of abilities that violated folk psychology or that were ambiguous–violating nonspecific or multiple domains of folk knowledge–and fewer abilities that violated folk physics and biology. Similarly, participants rated folk psychology violations provided by the experimenter as more characteristic of religious agents than were violations of folk physics or folk biology, while fictional agents showed no clear pattern. Religious agents were also judged as more potentially beneficial, and more ambivalent (i.e., similar ratings of benefit and harm), than fictional agents, regardless of whether the agents were invented or well-known to participants. Together, the results support a motivational account of religious belief formation that is facilitated by these biases.
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Discussion
Cognitive scientists of religion still don’t know why only some counterintuitive agents are believable and worthy of devotion. We examined the characteristics of religious and nonreligious supernatural agents directly and found four ways in which they differ. First, counterintuitive abilities that violate folk psychology were more salient for participant-invented religious agents than for nonreligious agents and were more closely associated with religious agents than other types of violations. Second, counterintuitive abilities that were ambiguous–violating nonspecific or multiple folk domains–were more salient for invented religious agents than for nonreligious agents. Third, both invented and well-known religious agents were rated more of a potential benefit than their nonreligious counterparts. Fourth, both invented and well-known religious agents were more ambivalent (i.e., the difference between a religious agent’s threat and benefit rating was relatively small) than nonreligious agents, which were more valenced towards extremes of heroism (high benefit, low threat) or villainy (low benefit, high threat).We suggest that these biases collectively provide a template for predicting which counterintuitive agents can become objects of religious devotion. In particular, the biases for more beneficial and less threatening abilities (the latter only for well-known agents) suggest that “successful” agents must also be motivationally compelling: minimally counterintuitive traits make agents memorable, but memorable agents must satisfy psychobiological needs to become gods. Such gods are not necessarily more “powerful” or “fitness relevant” overall; it is the beneficial traits that distinguish religious agents, while threatening traits may often be higher for nonreligious agents.
Religious agents’ tendency to violate folk psychology over other folk beliefs is also consistent with this motivational interpretation. In a previous study, we found that agents with abilities that violate folk psychology were rated more of a potential opportunity (i.e., more beneficial) than agents violating folk physics or biology [35]. We surmised that agents violating folk psychology represent an opportunity to gain access to socially strategic knowledge—an opportunity that is particularly salient given our recent evolutionary history in which social threats have become increasingly costly and ubiquitous [54]. Indeed, the fact that agents have greater scope to violate folk psychology expectations may account for why agents feature prolifically in religious narratives [55], and appear more than other ontological categories (e.g., objects) in statements rated religious [14].
Nevertheless, these data only provide partial support for the motivational hypothesis. A motivation to believe in agents with beneficial abilities would not necessarily culminate in the formation of religious beliefs via motivated reasoning (i.e., biased strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs [28]). Belief formation also likely depends on an individual’s personality, cultural environment, and/or developmental history, among other factors. For example, people with a strong or temporarily elevated “fear of death” might possess a stronger motivation to believe in immortal beings than people with less fear [37, 38]. We consider it likely that at least some people form religious beliefs via a motivational path [37–45], however, widespread belief would depend on the commonality and thresholds of these individual and cultural factors.
The ambiguous traits used to describe religious agents, while not necessarily motivationally compelling in and of themselves, may interact with other motivational states to facilitate belief. When traits are defined ambiguously, abstractly [56], or metaphorically [57, 58] it becomes easier to attribute them in motivationally attractive ways. For example, the “better than average effect,” in which people rate themselves above average on positive traits and below average on negative traits [28, 59], is smaller when traits are precisely defined (e.g., neat, athletic, sarcastic, clumsy) than when they are ambiguous (e.g., idealistic, sophisticated, impractical, insecure) [29, 60], suggesting that ambiguity allows people to reason their way toward favored conclusions more easily. Similarly, the ambiguous content attributed to religious agents may facilitate motivated reasoning, making it easier to reason toward a belief in these agents. Counterintuitive abilities that can be demonstrated in a variety of ways (violating nonspecific or multiple folk domains), might permit gods to influence manifold situations of motivational significance [24], without precluding or disconfirming their involvement in any [26]. A god’s omnipotence, control of nature, magical powers, or “mysterious ways”, for example, can be applied in whatever manner a believer deems necessary.
A common argument against motivation-based theories of religion is that some gods are not comforting–they’re scary–and why would anyone want to believe in a scary god? We suggest that, like ambiguity, ambivalence facilitates the motivated reasoning process. We think anxiety and uncertainty attributed to threat-capable gods [61] can motivate belief-reinforcing behaviors, such as rituals and other deferential practices [45, 46, 62, 63], and that these behaviors become more intuitively compelling if the agent to whom they are directed is ambivalent. For example, rituals and prayers often depict a transaction in which a god is requested to perform a counterintuitive act in return for worship, good behavior, or a tangible offering. An entirely malevolent god would have little interest in accepting requests, just as an entirely benevolent god would have little interest in refusing them. Thus, an ambivalent god is the only god for whom transactional prayers and rituals make sense. Furthermore, an ambivalent god with whom we can communicate and occasionally extract positive outcomes may be more appealing, and more plausible, than a valenced god, or a god that acts capriciously or randomly. Thus, ambivalence should help make rituals and prayers an intuitively compelling avenue through which gods can deliver benefits (see [64] for other intuitively compelling ritual content), facilitating motivated reasoning towards a belief in these gods.
One anomalous finding is that well-known fictional agents were rated more threatening than well-known religious agents, but this wasn’t the case for invented agents. Negative information, such as about threatening agents, is more cognitively attractive than positive information [65]. A cultural unfolding of this negativity bias, constrained by the motivation to disbelieve overly threatening agents, may explain why it was restricted to culturally popular fictional agents. Such agents might share or even surpass the cognitive attractiveness of religious agents, in being counterintuitive and threatening, but may lack motivational attractiveness, resulting in popular but unbelievable beings. In other cases, threat may be lacking while benefit is not, which might result in motivationally attractive beings that don’t demand our attention for long enough to become religiously established (e.g., Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny). The cognitive attractiveness of threat may therefore be an alternative or additional reason why ambivalence appears to be a key feature of religious beings.
Nevertheless, it is adaptive to pay attention to threats, and possibly also to believe the reality of those threats in some contexts. In evolutionary terms, the cost of falsely believing a threatening agent is absent should be greater than falsely believing it is present, and this negative credulity bias [66] may explain why (an apparent minority of) religious agents deviate from ambivalence into malevolence [67]. Some cultural environments may require and activate our agency detection device more than others [68], making malevolent deities more likely.
Although American participants, mostly Christian, provided our data, we would expect similar results in other cultural contexts to the extent that they afford and foster similar motivations that are natural to the human mind (e.g., to avoid negative affective states). Conversely, cultural differences in the characteristics of religious agents may reflect motivations that arise or are more salient as a consequence of particular environments. Similarly, individual differences within cultures may reflect idiosyncratic motivations (e.g., for more social contact) associated with particular traits (e.g., death anxiety). This essentially motivational account of the characteristics of religious agents has the advantage of catering to the existence of atheists: despite observing the same content and contexts as everyone else, they lack belief, presumably because they lack a motivation for which this content is relevant.
Although the current study contributes to the development of a “belief template” that could, eventually, predict which agents are most likely to inspire religious devotion, it is just a start, with several acknowledged limitations. For example, we did not measure levels of belief in the well-known agents cited by participants, which could provide a better understanding of the role of individual differences. In addition, our distinction between religious and fictional entities neglects some counterintuitive agents, such as ghosts and spirits, that many people believe exist, but that are not necessarily objects of religious devotion. Future work might present participants with specific beings, entities, and other paranormal phenomena with a diverse range of a-priori plausibility before measuring belief and their perceived features. Similarly, our request for supernatural abilities restricted the number of intuitive features that participants attributed to their invented agents. Although we found no difference in rated intuitiveness or the number of intuitive abilities listed, the trend was towards religious agents being more intuitive, as found in other work [16, 17]. Finally, our proposed template neglects some religious agents, such as Satan and Loki, that are apparently neither beneficent nor ambivalent. It could be argued that belief in such agents (and polytheism in general) is declining, in line with the template’s proposed optimum, however, in less optimal settings, the ambivalence criterion might also be applied to groupings or entire pantheons of agents. Thus, we acknowledge that cultural and environmental factors may affect the reliability of the template, which is more a measure of cultural evolutionary success than a strict set of exclusionary criteria.
These limitations notwithstanding, we suggest a religious agent template, tentatively comprising beneficent yet ambivalent agents with ambiguous and folk-psychology-violating abilities, goes some way to solving the Mickey Mouse problem. Mickey Mouse lacks the necessary beneficence, ambivalence, and ambiguity, and we therefore lack the motivation and latitude to believe he is real.
Do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo? Data on more than 870,000 municipal vote outcomes in Switzerland: Rain decreases the share of votes for political change
Rain, Emotions and Voting for the Status Quo. Armando N. Meier, Lukas Schmid, Alois Stutzer. European Economic Review, August 8 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.014
Abstract: Do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo? We exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870,000 municipal vote outcomes in Switzerland to address this question. The empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data. We find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change. Our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition. In addition, we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high-stake votes. We discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks, a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change.
Abstract: Do emotions affect the decision between change and the status quo? We exploit exogenous variation in emotions caused by rain and analyze data on more than 870,000 municipal vote outcomes in Switzerland to address this question. The empirical tests are based on administrative ballot outcomes and individual postvote survey data. We find that rain decreases the share of votes for political change. Our robustness checks suggest that this finding is not driven by changes in the composition of the electorate and changes in information acquisition. In addition, we provide evidence that rain might have altered the outcome of several high-stake votes. We discuss the psychological mechanism and document that rain reduces the willingness to take risks, a pattern that is consistent with the observed reduction in the support for change.
Thursday, August 8, 2019
Suicide by abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku: Case reports from Romania and an international literature review
Suicide by abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku: Case reports from Romania and an international literature review. Claudia Judea-Pusta, Alexandru Rusu, Andreea Camarasan. Aggression and Violent Behavior, Volume 47, July–August 2019, Pages 68-73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2019.03.006
Highlights
• In Romania this type of suicide is rarely practiced, commonly seen in older males.
• Frequently the victims suffer from a mental illness, or are alcohol users.
• The tool used is the knife; the lesions are located in the middle abdominal axis.
• The mortality rate is higher in cases of abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku.
• It is important to establish a differential diagnosis between suicide and homicide.
Abstract: Seppuku is a traditional suicide method practiced by honorable Japanese samurai. Today this method of suicide is rarely used in Japan or worldwide and may be exceptionally encountered in patients suffering from psychiatric disorders, the majority of them being older men. It is well known that clinical and cultural factors also play a role in practicing this method of suicide. The mortality rate is significantly higher in cases of abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku, compared to the mortality rate caused by simple stab wounds. Death can occur immediately through massive external or/and internal hemorrhage as well as later on through complications, often septic. In the Romanian forensic literature files, suicide by abdominal stabbing suggesting seppuku is rarely encountered and documented. When investigating violent deaths owing to sharp force, the role of the forensic pathologist is not only to establish the cause of death and the mechanism used for creating the lesions, but also to identify the object used for inflicting the injuries, the type of the injuries, allowing thus to formulate a conclusion from legal perspective upon the act itself: suicide or homicide? The present paper reviews the international literature and presents three cases of suicide by self- inflected abdominal stab wounds suggesting seppuku, autopsied at the Bihor County Forensic Service, Romania, during 2013–2017.
Highlights
• In Romania this type of suicide is rarely practiced, commonly seen in older males.
• Frequently the victims suffer from a mental illness, or are alcohol users.
• The tool used is the knife; the lesions are located in the middle abdominal axis.
• The mortality rate is higher in cases of abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku.
• It is important to establish a differential diagnosis between suicide and homicide.
Abstract: Seppuku is a traditional suicide method practiced by honorable Japanese samurai. Today this method of suicide is rarely used in Japan or worldwide and may be exceptionally encountered in patients suffering from psychiatric disorders, the majority of them being older men. It is well known that clinical and cultural factors also play a role in practicing this method of suicide. The mortality rate is significantly higher in cases of abdominal wounds suggesting seppuku, compared to the mortality rate caused by simple stab wounds. Death can occur immediately through massive external or/and internal hemorrhage as well as later on through complications, often septic. In the Romanian forensic literature files, suicide by abdominal stabbing suggesting seppuku is rarely encountered and documented. When investigating violent deaths owing to sharp force, the role of the forensic pathologist is not only to establish the cause of death and the mechanism used for creating the lesions, but also to identify the object used for inflicting the injuries, the type of the injuries, allowing thus to formulate a conclusion from legal perspective upon the act itself: suicide or homicide? The present paper reviews the international literature and presents three cases of suicide by self- inflected abdominal stab wounds suggesting seppuku, autopsied at the Bihor County Forensic Service, Romania, during 2013–2017.
The role of media exposure on relational aggression: Exposure to relational aggression has the strongest effect on subsequent relational aggression; these results support cross-over effect
The role of media exposure on relational aggression: A meta-analysis. Nicole Martins, Andrew Weaver. Aggression and Violent Behavior, Volume 47, July–August 2019, Pages 90-99. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2019.03.001
Highlights
• Exposure to relational aggression has the strongest effect on subsequent relational aggression
• Exposure to non-specific media content has the weakest effect on relational aggression
• Exposure to physical aggression fell in the middle of the two content types; supports cross-over effect
• Future research should study these issues among heterogeneous populations so moderating variables can be further examined.
Abstract: We conducted a meta-analysis of 33 studies that examined the effects of media exposure on relationally aggressive behaviors and cognitions (a total of 66 effect sizes, N = (20,990). Across all types of aggressive content, there was a small positive effect (r = 0.15) on relational aggression. However, a comparison of effects sizes demonstrate that exposure to relational aggression had the strongest effect (r = 0.21), whereas exposure to non-specific media content had the weakest effect (r = 0.08). Exposure to physical aggression fell in the middle of the two content types (r = 0.15). Potential explanations for these effects as well as moderators that could influence the results are considered, and the practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Highlights
• Exposure to relational aggression has the strongest effect on subsequent relational aggression
• Exposure to non-specific media content has the weakest effect on relational aggression
• Exposure to physical aggression fell in the middle of the two content types; supports cross-over effect
• Future research should study these issues among heterogeneous populations so moderating variables can be further examined.
Abstract: We conducted a meta-analysis of 33 studies that examined the effects of media exposure on relationally aggressive behaviors and cognitions (a total of 66 effect sizes, N = (20,990). Across all types of aggressive content, there was a small positive effect (r = 0.15) on relational aggression. However, a comparison of effects sizes demonstrate that exposure to relational aggression had the strongest effect (r = 0.21), whereas exposure to non-specific media content had the weakest effect (r = 0.08). Exposure to physical aggression fell in the middle of the two content types (r = 0.15). Potential explanations for these effects as well as moderators that could influence the results are considered, and the practical implications of these findings are discussed.
Homicide and suicide appear to be more prevalent in democracies
Government political structure and violent death rates: A longitudinal analysis of forty-three countries, 1960–2008. PhillipMarotta et al. Aggression and Violent Behavior, August 8 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2019.07.008
Abstract
Objectives: Currently, little is known regarding the effect of regime type on mortality on a global level. The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of regime type on the rates of violent deaths (homicide, suicide, and combined rates).
Methods: Three measures of democracy were used to quantify regime type, the independent variable. Homicide and suicide rates were obtained from the World Health Organization. Multivariate conditional fixed-effects models were run to examine associations between regime characteristics and logged rates of homicide, suicide, and violent deaths. Models were adjusted for unemployment and economic inequality.
Results: Nations that scored higher on democracy indices, especially emerging democracies, experienced increased mortality due to violence. Homicide and suicide were divergent, showing a different time course and decreasing statistical power as a combined variable. Unemployment and inequality were associated with higher violence-related mortality.
Conclusions: Homicide and suicide appear to be more prevalent in democracies. Future analyses should examine which aspects of democracies lead to higher rates of violent death and should seek to use independently collected mortality data.
Abstract
Objectives: Currently, little is known regarding the effect of regime type on mortality on a global level. The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of regime type on the rates of violent deaths (homicide, suicide, and combined rates).
Methods: Three measures of democracy were used to quantify regime type, the independent variable. Homicide and suicide rates were obtained from the World Health Organization. Multivariate conditional fixed-effects models were run to examine associations between regime characteristics and logged rates of homicide, suicide, and violent deaths. Models were adjusted for unemployment and economic inequality.
Results: Nations that scored higher on democracy indices, especially emerging democracies, experienced increased mortality due to violence. Homicide and suicide were divergent, showing a different time course and decreasing statistical power as a combined variable. Unemployment and inequality were associated with higher violence-related mortality.
Conclusions: Homicide and suicide appear to be more prevalent in democracies. Future analyses should examine which aspects of democracies lead to higher rates of violent death and should seek to use independently collected mortality data.
From the neuroimaging data, we conclude that we cannot define the content of our thoughts during "mind blanking" because our inner speech system does not work at that time
The neural correlates of “mind blanking”: When the mind goes away. Toshikazu Kawagoe Keiichi Onoda Shuhei Yamaguchi. Human Brain Mapping, August 7 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.24748
Abstract: Mind blanking (MB) is the state where our minds are seemingly “nowhere,” and attention calls no perceptual input into conscious awareness. It is little investigated, perhaps partly because it is difficult to detect the mysterious periods of blanking. In this study, we found that our participants could intentionally produce a state of MB whose neural correlates were deactivation of Broca's area and parts of the default mode network (namely, the hippocampus) which would be active during mind wandering (MW), in addition to activity in another region in the default mode network (namely, anterior cingulate cortex). Because the behavioral finding replicates a previous report of ours, we suggest that the simple instructions that we used to induce MB should be effective. From the neuroimaging data, we conclude that we cannot define the content of our thoughts during MB because our inner speech system does not work at that time. Another possibility is that we actually think of nothing in the MB state. Although more sophisticated studies would be needed to uncover the mechanism of such a phenomenon, the present study provides a methodology and clues for understanding MB and related concepts such as MW, awareness, and metacognitive ability.
Death anxiety and death acceptance in atheists and other nonbelievers: The more certainty of Atheism, the less fear of death
Death anxiety and death acceptance in atheists and other nonbelievers. Jacob S. Sawyer, Melanie E. Brewster & Melissa M. Ertl. Death Studies, Aug 7 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2019.1648339
Abstract: This study explores how age, certainty of belief, belief in science and gender is related to death anxiety and death acceptance. Results from a sample of atheists and other nonbelievers (N = 270) in the United States suggested that age and certainty of belief were significantly related to death anxiety and death acceptance, while belief in science was not a significant predictor. In addition, women reported higher levels of death anxiety compared to men. Implications and directions for future research in death perspectives for atheists and other nonbelievers are discussed.
Check also Menzies, Ross G and Menzies, Rachel E. Fear of death: Nature, development and moderating factors [online]. In: Menzies, RE (Editor); Menzies, RG (Editor); Iverach, L (Editor). Curing the Dread of Death Theory, Research and Practice. Samford Valley, QLD: Australian Academic Press, 2018: 21-39. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/fear-of-death-nature-development-and.html
Also Monastic Tibetan Buddhists showed significantly greater fear of death than any other group. The monastics were also less generous than other groups about the prospect of giving up a slightly longer life in order to extend the life of another:
Abstract: This study explores how age, certainty of belief, belief in science and gender is related to death anxiety and death acceptance. Results from a sample of atheists and other nonbelievers (N = 270) in the United States suggested that age and certainty of belief were significantly related to death anxiety and death acceptance, while belief in science was not a significant predictor. In addition, women reported higher levels of death anxiety compared to men. Implications and directions for future research in death perspectives for atheists and other nonbelievers are discussed.
Check also Menzies, Ross G and Menzies, Rachel E. Fear of death: Nature, development and moderating factors [online]. In: Menzies, RE (Editor); Menzies, RG (Editor); Iverach, L (Editor). Curing the Dread of Death Theory, Research and Practice. Samford Valley, QLD: Australian Academic Press, 2018: 21-39. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/fear-of-death-nature-development-and.html
Also Monastic Tibetan Buddhists showed significantly greater fear of death than any other group. The monastics were also less generous than other groups about the prospect of giving up a slightly longer life in order to extend the life of another:
Nichols, S., Strohminger, N., Rai, A. and Garfield, J. (2018), Death and the Self. Cogn Sci. doi:10.1111/cogs.12590. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/monastic-tibetan-buddhists-showed.html
Do Relatives With Greater Reproductive Potential Get Help First?: A Test of the Inclusive Fitness Explanation of Kin Altruism
Do Relatives With Greater Reproductive Potential Get Help First?: A Test of the Inclusive Fitness Explanation of Kin Altruism. Jordan Schriver et al. Evolutionary Psychology, August 8, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919867094
Abstract: According to inclusive fitness theory, people are more willing to help those they are genetically related to because relatives share a kin altruism gene and are able to pass it along. We tested this theory by examining the effect of reproductive potential on altruism. Participants read hypothetical scenarios and chose between cousins (Studies 1 and 2) and cousins and friends (Study 3) to help with mundane chores or a life-or-death rescue. In life-or-death situations, participants were more willing to help a cousin preparing to conceive rather than adopt a child (Study 1) and a cousin with high rather than low chance of reproducing (Studies 2 and 3). Patterns in the mundane condition were less consistent. Emotional closeness also contributed to helping intentions (Studies 1 and 2). By experimentally manipulating reproductive potential while controlling for genetic relatedness and emotional closeness, we provide a demonstration of the direct causal effects of reproductive potential on helping intentions, supporting the inclusive fitness explanation of kin altruism.
Keywords: altruism, inclusive fitness, reproduction, emotional closeness, family relationships
Abstract: According to inclusive fitness theory, people are more willing to help those they are genetically related to because relatives share a kin altruism gene and are able to pass it along. We tested this theory by examining the effect of reproductive potential on altruism. Participants read hypothetical scenarios and chose between cousins (Studies 1 and 2) and cousins and friends (Study 3) to help with mundane chores or a life-or-death rescue. In life-or-death situations, participants were more willing to help a cousin preparing to conceive rather than adopt a child (Study 1) and a cousin with high rather than low chance of reproducing (Studies 2 and 3). Patterns in the mundane condition were less consistent. Emotional closeness also contributed to helping intentions (Studies 1 and 2). By experimentally manipulating reproductive potential while controlling for genetic relatedness and emotional closeness, we provide a demonstration of the direct causal effects of reproductive potential on helping intentions, supporting the inclusive fitness explanation of kin altruism.
Keywords: altruism, inclusive fitness, reproduction, emotional closeness, family relationships
Aesthetic empowerment through music
Aesthetic empowerment through music. Elvira Brattico, Ulrika Varankaitė. Musicae Scientiae, July 20, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1029864919850606
Abstract: This article describes how aesthetic enjoyment accompanying musical activities can empower individuals in health and disease. First, we explain the biological determinants of music enjoyment and how they can be studied. In doing so, we distinguish between core sensory pleasure and conscious liking, and we illustrate their respective contributions to aesthetic appreciation and expressive interaction with music. Second, we review findings illustrating the long-term impact of listening to favourite music on the brains of healthy musicians as well as on the brains and behaviour of individuals with pathological symptoms. Based on these findings, we propose a set of putative neural mechanisms underlying aesthetic empowerment through music. We also emphasize the importance of considering individual differences in sensitivity to aesthetic experiences of music, as evidenced, for instance, by neuroimaging and imaging genetics studies, drawing the connections between dopamine neurotransmission and dopaminergic genes with the reactivity of music–brain functions.
Keywords: Aesthetics, neuroaesthetics, liking, pleasure, enjoyment, clinical applications
Abstract: This article describes how aesthetic enjoyment accompanying musical activities can empower individuals in health and disease. First, we explain the biological determinants of music enjoyment and how they can be studied. In doing so, we distinguish between core sensory pleasure and conscious liking, and we illustrate their respective contributions to aesthetic appreciation and expressive interaction with music. Second, we review findings illustrating the long-term impact of listening to favourite music on the brains of healthy musicians as well as on the brains and behaviour of individuals with pathological symptoms. Based on these findings, we propose a set of putative neural mechanisms underlying aesthetic empowerment through music. We also emphasize the importance of considering individual differences in sensitivity to aesthetic experiences of music, as evidenced, for instance, by neuroimaging and imaging genetics studies, drawing the connections between dopamine neurotransmission and dopaminergic genes with the reactivity of music–brain functions.
Keywords: Aesthetics, neuroaesthetics, liking, pleasure, enjoyment, clinical applications
You’re dead to me! Social estrangements and social transgressions: A high number of estrangements corresponded to high scores on depressive tendencies and anxious attachment as well as low scores on social support
You’re dead to me! The evolutionary psychology of social estrangements and social transgressions. Glenn Geher et al. Current Psychology, August 8 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-019-00381-z
Abstract: In our species, social connections with a broad array of individuals are foundational to success. On the flip side, we have evolved so as to not be exploited by others. This dynamic is the focus of the studies described here. Study 1 examined the psychology of social estrangements. The main prediction was that the number of estrangements one has would be predictive of various adverse psychological outcomes. Using a sample of 315 young adults, we found evidence for this prediction: A high number of estrangements corresponded to high scores on depressive tendencies and anxious attachment as well as low scores on social support. In Study 2, using a between-participants methodology, we manipulated transgression intensity, target of the transgression, and whether an apology was included. 288 young adults participated. Each participant was presented with a set of stimuli representing one level of each of the three independent variables and then provided ratings for several dependent variables, such as how angry and betrayed he or she would feel in the situation. Transgression intensity and target of the transgression had consistent significant effects on the dependent variables in the predicted directions. Presence of an apology generally had little effect. In both Studies 1 and 2, high scores on the Dark Triad predicted the outcomes as well: In Study 1, a high number of estrangements corresponded to high scores on the Dark Triad. In Study 2, high scores on the Dark Triad corresponded to strong negative responses to social transgressions. Implications for the evolutionary psychology of interpersonal relationships are discussed.
Keywords: Reciprocal altruism Estrangement Social transgression Apology Forgiveness Positive evolutionary psychology
Abstract: In our species, social connections with a broad array of individuals are foundational to success. On the flip side, we have evolved so as to not be exploited by others. This dynamic is the focus of the studies described here. Study 1 examined the psychology of social estrangements. The main prediction was that the number of estrangements one has would be predictive of various adverse psychological outcomes. Using a sample of 315 young adults, we found evidence for this prediction: A high number of estrangements corresponded to high scores on depressive tendencies and anxious attachment as well as low scores on social support. In Study 2, using a between-participants methodology, we manipulated transgression intensity, target of the transgression, and whether an apology was included. 288 young adults participated. Each participant was presented with a set of stimuli representing one level of each of the three independent variables and then provided ratings for several dependent variables, such as how angry and betrayed he or she would feel in the situation. Transgression intensity and target of the transgression had consistent significant effects on the dependent variables in the predicted directions. Presence of an apology generally had little effect. In both Studies 1 and 2, high scores on the Dark Triad predicted the outcomes as well: In Study 1, a high number of estrangements corresponded to high scores on the Dark Triad. In Study 2, high scores on the Dark Triad corresponded to strong negative responses to social transgressions. Implications for the evolutionary psychology of interpersonal relationships are discussed.
Keywords: Reciprocal altruism Estrangement Social transgression Apology Forgiveness Positive evolutionary psychology
Abstract information alone is capable of changing a majority of clinicians’ care decisions; when unadjusted analyses or secondary outcomes are given undue attention in abstracts, the overall appraisal of a paper's contents is altered
Jellison S, Roberts W, Bowers A, et al. Evaluation of spin in abstracts of papers in psychiatry and psychology journals. BMJ Evidence-Based Medicine, August 5 2019, DOI: 10.1136/bmjebm-2019-111176
Introduction
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) serve as the gold standard in psychiatry. Given the importance of such trials to clinical practice, it is imperative that results be reported objectively.
Researchers are encouraged to conduct studies and report findings according to the highest ethical standards.1 2 This standard means reporting results completely, in accordance with a protocol that outlines primary and secondary endpoints and prespecified subgroups and statistical analyses. However, authors are free to choose how to report or interpret study results. In an abstract, authors may include only the results they want to highlight or the conclusions they wish to draw. These results and conclusions, however, may not accurately summarise the findings of the study. When such a misrepresentation of study results occurs, there is said to be spin. Spin has been defined as, ‘the use of specific reporting strategies, from whatever motive, to highlight that the experimental treatment is beneficial, despite a statistically nonsignificant difference for the primary outcome, or to distract the reader from statistically nonsignificant results’.3 Many practices contribute to spin, including the selective reporting of outcomes,4 5 p-hacking,6 7 inappropriate application of statistical measures like relative risk8 and manipulation of figures or graphs.9 10
Spin in abstracts has recently been discussed in a systematic review.11 Evidence suggests that abstract information alone is capable of changing a majority of clinicians’ care decisions.12 For example, when unadjusted analyses or secondary outcomes are given undue attention in abstracts, readers’ overall appraisal of the contents of a manuscript is altered.13 Additionally, a previous systematic review showed there to be a higher rate of favourable conclusions in industry-funded studies compared with other sponsorships.14
We have evaluated the prevalence of spin in abstracts of RCTs with nonsignificant primary endpoints in the psychology and psychiatry literature and have explored the association between spin and industry funding.
Introduction
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) serve as the gold standard in psychiatry. Given the importance of such trials to clinical practice, it is imperative that results be reported objectively.
Researchers are encouraged to conduct studies and report findings according to the highest ethical standards.1 2 This standard means reporting results completely, in accordance with a protocol that outlines primary and secondary endpoints and prespecified subgroups and statistical analyses. However, authors are free to choose how to report or interpret study results. In an abstract, authors may include only the results they want to highlight or the conclusions they wish to draw. These results and conclusions, however, may not accurately summarise the findings of the study. When such a misrepresentation of study results occurs, there is said to be spin. Spin has been defined as, ‘the use of specific reporting strategies, from whatever motive, to highlight that the experimental treatment is beneficial, despite a statistically nonsignificant difference for the primary outcome, or to distract the reader from statistically nonsignificant results’.3 Many practices contribute to spin, including the selective reporting of outcomes,4 5 p-hacking,6 7 inappropriate application of statistical measures like relative risk8 and manipulation of figures or graphs.9 10
Spin in abstracts has recently been discussed in a systematic review.11 Evidence suggests that abstract information alone is capable of changing a majority of clinicians’ care decisions.12 For example, when unadjusted analyses or secondary outcomes are given undue attention in abstracts, readers’ overall appraisal of the contents of a manuscript is altered.13 Additionally, a previous systematic review showed there to be a higher rate of favourable conclusions in industry-funded studies compared with other sponsorships.14
We have evaluated the prevalence of spin in abstracts of RCTs with nonsignificant primary endpoints in the psychology and psychiatry literature and have explored the association between spin and industry funding.
Wednesday, August 7, 2019
Recreational marijuana laws reduce annual opioid mortality in the range of 20%–35%, with particularly pronounced effects for synthetic opioids
The Effects of Recreational Marijuana Legalization and Dispensing on Opioid Mortality. Nathan W. Chan, Jesse Burkhardt, Matthew Flyr. Economic Enquiry, August 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12819
Abstract: This study documents how the changing legal status of marijuana has impacted mortality in the United States over the past two decades. We use a difference‐in‐difference approach to estimate the effect of medical marijuana laws (MML) and recreational marijuana laws (RML) on fatalities from opioid overdoses, and we find that marijuana access induces sharp reductions in opioid mortality rates. Our research corroborates prior findings on MMLs and offers the first causal estimates of RML impacts on opioid mortality to date, the latter of which is particularly important given that RMLs are far more expansive in scope and reach than MMLs. In our preferred econometric specification, we estimate that RMLs reduce annual opioid mortality in the range of 20%–35%, with particularly pronounced effects for synthetic opioids. In further analysis, we demonstrate how RML impacts vary among demographic groups, shedding light on the distributional consequences of these laws. Our findings are especially important and timely given the scale of the opioid crisis in the United States and simultaneously evolving attitudes and regulations on marijuana use. (JEL I18, K32, H75)
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Why "the scale of the opioid crisis in the" US? Why are you working in this area and know not of other places with similar issues? Less passion and more data, it is happening also in parts of the UK (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/world/europe/scotland-heroin-deaths.html).
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Why "the scale of the opioid crisis in the" US? Why are you working in this area and know not of other places with similar issues? Less passion and more data, it is happening also in parts of the UK (https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/07/world/europe/scotland-heroin-deaths.html).
Though we are not yet capable of fully determining who conspiracy theorists are, conspiratorial thinking, paranormal beliefs, & political orientations are good predictors of conspiracy beliefs
Who Are Conspiracy Theorists? A Comprehensive Approach to Explaining Conspiracy Beliefs. Adam M. Enders, Steven M. Smallpage. Social Science Quarterly, August 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12711
Abstract
Objective: This study disentangles the known correlates of conspiracy beliefs—such as the general predisposition toward conspiratorial thinking, authoritarianism, and partisan and ideological predispositions—in order to better understand the psychological antecedents of such beliefs and answer the question: Who are conspiracy theorists?
Methods: We use classification and regression tree models to explain individual beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, employing a large set of known correlates of conspiratorial thinking.
Results: Depending on the characteristics of the conspiracy theory employed on the survey, we find that political orientations and conspiratorial thinking provide the most analytical leverage in predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, paranormal beliefs were more predictive than previous literature suggests, while psychological biases demonstrated very limited predictive utility.
Conclusions: The psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs used to explain those beliefs vary considerably by the stimuli or events at the center of a given conspiracy theory. Therefore, disproportionately favoring one type of conspiracy theory on one's survey may result in inferences about conspiracy theorists that do not translate across studies. Furthermore, though we are not yet capable of fully determining who conspiracy theorists are, conspiratorial thinking, paranormal beliefs, and political orientations are more predictive of particular conspiracy beliefs than other attitudes, predispositions, and orientations.
---
A great deal of recent research has demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs are a central component of modern culture and politics (e.g., Brotherton, 2015; Oliver and Wood, 2014; Uscinski and Parent, 2014), rather than indicators of radical alienation or psychopathology. More commonplace than once thought, belief in conspiracy theories can have negative effects on individuals and democratic society. For example, mere exposure to conspiracy theories has been found to reduce individual intention to vote and make political donations (Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo, 1995), participate in politics more generally (Jolley and Douglas, 2014), and place trust in government services and institutions (Einstein and Glick, 2015). Thus, understanding conspiracy theories and those who believe them has positive implications not only for “conspiracy theorists,” but also for those around them, as well as normative implications for theories of culture and government. The rapidly expanding, albeit nascent, literature on conspiracy theories has identified a substantial set of attitudes, predispositions, orientations, and psychological mechanisms that are related to conspiracy beliefs. One characteristic shared by many of these studies is a focus on one, or a small subset of, correlate(s) of conspiracy beliefs. It is perfectly reasonable and expected that a young literature may move forward in such a piecemeal fashion as researchers strive to build a theoretical foundation for the subfield. However, such an erratic procession is not without consequential limitations. While we have learned a great deal about the correlates of conspiracy beliefs in a vacuum, we have little empirical foundation for understanding how those correlate work together. Indeed, we have only a tenuous grasp of who conspiracy theorists are.
In this article, we offer information about which factors related to conspiracy beliefs provide the most analytical leverage in correctly predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Such information is useful for both identifying the relevant characteristics of conspiracy theorists more precisely, and in further developing our theories about the psychological antecedents of specific conspiracy beliefs (Wood, 2017). Ultimately, a firmer understanding of the characteristics of conspiracy theorists can help us understand what about the conspiratorial frame of mind gives rise to the negative effects of conspiracism, and possibly help combat such effects.
To be more specific, this study offers three important developments of recent work on the correlates of conspiracy beliefs. First, we decipher which correlates seem to analytically matter most when a substantial set of previously identified factors are accounted for. In doing this, we find that the most predictive correlates of nine specific and commonly employed conspiracy beliefs are conspiratorial thinking, political orientations, and paranormal beliefs, while measures of several psychological biases and sociodemographic characteristics offer little utility in correctly classifying conspiracy beliefs. Second, we identify the characteristics of specific conspiracy theories that seem to affect which correlates are most predictive of related beliefs. More specifically, we find that the previously identified correlates differentially affect different “types” of conspiracy theories—namely, those with and without partisan political content. Finally, we discuss our general ability to answer the question “who are conspiracy theorists?” and provide practical recommendations for scholars interested in explaining conspiracy theories and those who believe them.
Background
A conspiracy theory is a “proposed explanation of events that cites as a main causal factor a small group of persons (the conspirators) acting in secret for their own benefit, against the common good” (Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson, 2016:2). A conspiracy belief, then, is a belief in a specific conspiracy theory. Perhaps the most obvious theoretical cause of specific conspiracy beliefs is “conspiratorial thinking,” a psychological state that is the amalgamation of “stable individual differences in the general tendency to engage with conspiracist explanations for events” (Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013:1). Conspiratorial thinking is a general tendency to view the world a certain way (Brotherton, 2015) rather than any specific trait, predisposition, or set of attitudes. A great deal of recent work on conspiratorial thinking has turned its attention away from specific conspiracy beliefs and toward the goal of identifying this mindset in individuals (e.g., Imhoff and Bruder, 2014; Lantian et al., 2016; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Wood, 2017). Most of the unique measurement strategies utilized to identify conspiracy theorists ask survey respondents to what extent they agree with claims such as “I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities” (Bruder et al., 2013), or “Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret places” (Uscinski and Parent, 2014).
Conceptually related to conspiratorial thinking are specific psychological biases that may cause—individually or cumulatively—one to view the world through the lens of conspiracism. Patternicity, the predisposition to delineate patterns from what are truly random events, is an obvious hallmark of conspiratorial thinking (Brotherton, 2015). Those individuals who are particularly susceptible to patternicity are more likely to “see” the connections between disparate events. Brotherton and French (2014, 2015) have also identified susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and intentionality bias as characteristics of individuals with conspiracy beliefs. Indeed, conspiracy theorists are likely to believe in several conspiracy theories that are logically at odds with each other and ascribe intention to perceived actions that are truly accidental or coincidental in nature.
Political scientists focusing on the role of political identities and orientations have found that partisanship and ideological self‐identifications are significantly related to many American conspiracy theories. For instance, Hartman and Newmark (2012) and Pasek et al. (2015) identify partisanship as a key predictor of conspiracy beliefs about the birthplace of Barack Obama. Miller, Saunders, and Farhart (2016) find that left–right political orientations serve as the latent structure that underlies a host of American beliefs in conspiracy theories about climate change, the birthplace of Barack Obama, the 9/11 terror attacks, and electoral fraud. The effects of partisan and ideological orientations also appear to translate in nature, though not exact character, across political context. van Prooijen, Andre, and Pollet (2015) find politically extreme individuals—those who reside on the edges of scales of ideological orientations, regardless of political context—tend to be more conspiratorial than their moderate counterparts.
A host of other individual differences have also been identified as correlates of conspiracy beliefs. Authoritarianism, for example, has long been a fixture in the literature on conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina‐Paap et al., 1999; McHoskey, 1995). Since authoritarian individuals are more likely to blame others for their problems, they are also more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that tend to posit that some unknown force is guiding events. More recent work has also identified paranormal thinking—the tendency to believe in the role of supernatural forces in everyday life, and individuals' ability to engage such forces—as an important correlate of conspiracy beliefs (Darwin, Neave, and Homes, 2011; Oliver and Wood, 2014). Lastly, personality characteristics (Swami, Chamorro‐Premuzic, and Furnham, 2010), anomia (Goertzel, 1994), and self‐uncertainty and belongingness (van Prooijen, 2016) have been found to correlate with conspiratorial thinking.
Finally, some have asserted the role of nonpsychological characteristics, such as age, race, gender, socioeconomic status, and educational attainment, in promoting conspiratorial thinking. Much of this work comes from a more historical, sociological tradition that emphasized “fringe” status in society as a major cause of conspiratorial worldview (e.g., Hofstadter, 1964). Although we are more interested in the psychological correlates of conspiracy beliefs, we nevertheless consider whether sociodemographic characteristics affect conspiratorial thinking in addition to other psychological variables.
We do not purport to have included every known correlate of conspiracy beliefs in the above lists, but we do believe that our review of the literature conveys the simple point that there are a great many of such correlates. And, even though none of the correlates of conspiracy beliefs we have outlined above strikes us as unreasonable or improbable, we are left wondering which of these correlates actually matters for classifying conspiracy beliefs. Very little of the research outlined above considers simultaneously the effects of several of the identified constructs on conspiracy beliefs. Gaining some grasp on this question is important for two reasons. First, it will help us better understand which predispositions, orientations, and attitudes best characterize conspiracy theorists. An understanding of the characteristics of conspiracy theorists will aid us in deciphering the best candidates for causal first‐movers of conspiracy beliefs. This has implications for our theories of the psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, and the measurement strategies we employ to capture and explain such beliefs. Second, this work will help us more fully answer perhaps the most illusive question faced by the literature: Who are conspiracy theorists?
Abstract
Objective: This study disentangles the known correlates of conspiracy beliefs—such as the general predisposition toward conspiratorial thinking, authoritarianism, and partisan and ideological predispositions—in order to better understand the psychological antecedents of such beliefs and answer the question: Who are conspiracy theorists?
Methods: We use classification and regression tree models to explain individual beliefs in specific conspiracy theories, employing a large set of known correlates of conspiratorial thinking.
Results: Depending on the characteristics of the conspiracy theory employed on the survey, we find that political orientations and conspiratorial thinking provide the most analytical leverage in predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Furthermore, paranormal beliefs were more predictive than previous literature suggests, while psychological biases demonstrated very limited predictive utility.
Conclusions: The psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs used to explain those beliefs vary considerably by the stimuli or events at the center of a given conspiracy theory. Therefore, disproportionately favoring one type of conspiracy theory on one's survey may result in inferences about conspiracy theorists that do not translate across studies. Furthermore, though we are not yet capable of fully determining who conspiracy theorists are, conspiratorial thinking, paranormal beliefs, and political orientations are more predictive of particular conspiracy beliefs than other attitudes, predispositions, and orientations.
---
A great deal of recent research has demonstrated that conspiracy beliefs are a central component of modern culture and politics (e.g., Brotherton, 2015; Oliver and Wood, 2014; Uscinski and Parent, 2014), rather than indicators of radical alienation or psychopathology. More commonplace than once thought, belief in conspiracy theories can have negative effects on individuals and democratic society. For example, mere exposure to conspiracy theories has been found to reduce individual intention to vote and make political donations (Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo, 1995), participate in politics more generally (Jolley and Douglas, 2014), and place trust in government services and institutions (Einstein and Glick, 2015). Thus, understanding conspiracy theories and those who believe them has positive implications not only for “conspiracy theorists,” but also for those around them, as well as normative implications for theories of culture and government. The rapidly expanding, albeit nascent, literature on conspiracy theories has identified a substantial set of attitudes, predispositions, orientations, and psychological mechanisms that are related to conspiracy beliefs. One characteristic shared by many of these studies is a focus on one, or a small subset of, correlate(s) of conspiracy beliefs. It is perfectly reasonable and expected that a young literature may move forward in such a piecemeal fashion as researchers strive to build a theoretical foundation for the subfield. However, such an erratic procession is not without consequential limitations. While we have learned a great deal about the correlates of conspiracy beliefs in a vacuum, we have little empirical foundation for understanding how those correlate work together. Indeed, we have only a tenuous grasp of who conspiracy theorists are.
In this article, we offer information about which factors related to conspiracy beliefs provide the most analytical leverage in correctly predicting individual conspiracy beliefs. Such information is useful for both identifying the relevant characteristics of conspiracy theorists more precisely, and in further developing our theories about the psychological antecedents of specific conspiracy beliefs (Wood, 2017). Ultimately, a firmer understanding of the characteristics of conspiracy theorists can help us understand what about the conspiratorial frame of mind gives rise to the negative effects of conspiracism, and possibly help combat such effects.
To be more specific, this study offers three important developments of recent work on the correlates of conspiracy beliefs. First, we decipher which correlates seem to analytically matter most when a substantial set of previously identified factors are accounted for. In doing this, we find that the most predictive correlates of nine specific and commonly employed conspiracy beliefs are conspiratorial thinking, political orientations, and paranormal beliefs, while measures of several psychological biases and sociodemographic characteristics offer little utility in correctly classifying conspiracy beliefs. Second, we identify the characteristics of specific conspiracy theories that seem to affect which correlates are most predictive of related beliefs. More specifically, we find that the previously identified correlates differentially affect different “types” of conspiracy theories—namely, those with and without partisan political content. Finally, we discuss our general ability to answer the question “who are conspiracy theorists?” and provide practical recommendations for scholars interested in explaining conspiracy theories and those who believe them.
Background
A conspiracy theory is a “proposed explanation of events that cites as a main causal factor a small group of persons (the conspirators) acting in secret for their own benefit, against the common good” (Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson, 2016:2). A conspiracy belief, then, is a belief in a specific conspiracy theory. Perhaps the most obvious theoretical cause of specific conspiracy beliefs is “conspiratorial thinking,” a psychological state that is the amalgamation of “stable individual differences in the general tendency to engage with conspiracist explanations for events” (Brotherton, French, and Pickering, 2013:1). Conspiratorial thinking is a general tendency to view the world a certain way (Brotherton, 2015) rather than any specific trait, predisposition, or set of attitudes. A great deal of recent work on conspiratorial thinking has turned its attention away from specific conspiracy beliefs and toward the goal of identifying this mindset in individuals (e.g., Imhoff and Bruder, 2014; Lantian et al., 2016; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Wood, 2017). Most of the unique measurement strategies utilized to identify conspiracy theorists ask survey respondents to what extent they agree with claims such as “I think that events which superficially seem to lack a connection are often the result of secret activities” (Bruder et al., 2013), or “Much of our lives are being controlled by plots hatched in secret places” (Uscinski and Parent, 2014).
Conceptually related to conspiratorial thinking are specific psychological biases that may cause—individually or cumulatively—one to view the world through the lens of conspiracism. Patternicity, the predisposition to delineate patterns from what are truly random events, is an obvious hallmark of conspiratorial thinking (Brotherton, 2015). Those individuals who are particularly susceptible to patternicity are more likely to “see” the connections between disparate events. Brotherton and French (2014, 2015) have also identified susceptibility to the conjunction fallacy and intentionality bias as characteristics of individuals with conspiracy beliefs. Indeed, conspiracy theorists are likely to believe in several conspiracy theories that are logically at odds with each other and ascribe intention to perceived actions that are truly accidental or coincidental in nature.
Political scientists focusing on the role of political identities and orientations have found that partisanship and ideological self‐identifications are significantly related to many American conspiracy theories. For instance, Hartman and Newmark (2012) and Pasek et al. (2015) identify partisanship as a key predictor of conspiracy beliefs about the birthplace of Barack Obama. Miller, Saunders, and Farhart (2016) find that left–right political orientations serve as the latent structure that underlies a host of American beliefs in conspiracy theories about climate change, the birthplace of Barack Obama, the 9/11 terror attacks, and electoral fraud. The effects of partisan and ideological orientations also appear to translate in nature, though not exact character, across political context. van Prooijen, Andre, and Pollet (2015) find politically extreme individuals—those who reside on the edges of scales of ideological orientations, regardless of political context—tend to be more conspiratorial than their moderate counterparts.
A host of other individual differences have also been identified as correlates of conspiracy beliefs. Authoritarianism, for example, has long been a fixture in the literature on conspiracy beliefs (Abalakina‐Paap et al., 1999; McHoskey, 1995). Since authoritarian individuals are more likely to blame others for their problems, they are also more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that tend to posit that some unknown force is guiding events. More recent work has also identified paranormal thinking—the tendency to believe in the role of supernatural forces in everyday life, and individuals' ability to engage such forces—as an important correlate of conspiracy beliefs (Darwin, Neave, and Homes, 2011; Oliver and Wood, 2014). Lastly, personality characteristics (Swami, Chamorro‐Premuzic, and Furnham, 2010), anomia (Goertzel, 1994), and self‐uncertainty and belongingness (van Prooijen, 2016) have been found to correlate with conspiratorial thinking.
Finally, some have asserted the role of nonpsychological characteristics, such as age, race, gender, socioeconomic status, and educational attainment, in promoting conspiratorial thinking. Much of this work comes from a more historical, sociological tradition that emphasized “fringe” status in society as a major cause of conspiratorial worldview (e.g., Hofstadter, 1964). Although we are more interested in the psychological correlates of conspiracy beliefs, we nevertheless consider whether sociodemographic characteristics affect conspiratorial thinking in addition to other psychological variables.
We do not purport to have included every known correlate of conspiracy beliefs in the above lists, but we do believe that our review of the literature conveys the simple point that there are a great many of such correlates. And, even though none of the correlates of conspiracy beliefs we have outlined above strikes us as unreasonable or improbable, we are left wondering which of these correlates actually matters for classifying conspiracy beliefs. Very little of the research outlined above considers simultaneously the effects of several of the identified constructs on conspiracy beliefs. Gaining some grasp on this question is important for two reasons. First, it will help us better understand which predispositions, orientations, and attitudes best characterize conspiracy theorists. An understanding of the characteristics of conspiracy theorists will aid us in deciphering the best candidates for causal first‐movers of conspiracy beliefs. This has implications for our theories of the psychological antecedents of conspiracy beliefs, and the measurement strategies we employ to capture and explain such beliefs. Second, this work will help us more fully answer perhaps the most illusive question faced by the literature: Who are conspiracy theorists?
Does Exposure to Gender Role Models Increase Women’s Political Ambition? It seems not.
Does Exposure to Gender Role Models Increase Women’s Political Ambition? A Field Experiment with Politicians. Florian Foos and Fabrizio Gilardi. Journal of Experimental Political Science, August 7 2019. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2019.21
Abstract: There is a persistent gender gap in motivations to run for political office. While exposure to role models is widely believed to increase women’s political ambition, there is little field experimental evidence on whether exposure to female politicians in realistic settings can increase political ambition. We conducted a field experiment in which a sample of 612 female students was randomly assigned to receive emails inviting them to an event that included career workshops with female politicians, or no email. The treatment increased interest in the ongoing national election campaign, but, against expectations, did not have any positive effect on political ambition. Our results suggest that female politicians who discuss their experience bluntly, instead of following a motivational script, may fail to motivate other women to pursue a political career. These results highlight the need for more research into the type of events and messages that bring more women into politics.
We identify evolutionary advantages that may incentivize tolerance toward extra‐group individuals in humans & nonhuman primates, including enhanced benefits in the domains of transfer, mating, & food acquisition
The evolution of intergroup tolerance in nonhuman primates and humans. Anne C. Pisor, Martin Surbeck. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, August 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.21793
Abstract: Primate individuals use a variety of strategies in intergroup encounters, from aggression to tolerance; however, recent focus on the evolution of either warfare or peace has come at the cost of characterizing this variability. We identify evolutionary advantages that may incentivize tolerance toward extra‐group individuals in humans and nonhuman primates, including enhanced benefits in the domains of transfer, mating, and food acquisition. We highlight the role these factors play in the flexibility of gorilla, chimpanzee, bonobo, and human behavior. Given humans have an especially broad range of intergroup behavior, we explore how the human foraging ecology, especially large spatial and temporal fluctuations in resource availability, may have selected for a greater reliance on tolerant between‐community relationships—relationships reinforced by status acquisition and cultural institutions. We conclude by urging careful, theoretically motivated study of behavioral flexibility in intergroup encounters in humans and the nonhuman great apes.
1 INTRODUCTION
Attempting to explain the prevalence of intergroup aggression in primates, especially in humans (Homo sapiens sapiens), evolutionary anthropologists have focused extensively on intergroup contest and warfare. In response, other evolutionary anthropologists have focused extensively on peace systems in primates, especially in humans. Focusing on these two ends of the spectrum—war or peacefulness—has come at the cost of fully characterizing within‐species variation in individuals' behavioral strategies in intergroup encounters (e.g., Refs. 1-4; see also, Ref. 5: table 22‐1). Furthermore, both of these approaches emphasize selection pressures that favor or disfavor intergroup aggression; less researched are the selection pressures that, given disincentives for intergroup aggression, favor tolerant encounters and the prolongment of tolerant encounters in intergroup association.
In the present review, our goal is to call for explicit theorization about the individual‐level selection pressures that favored flexible behavior in intergroup encounters in humans and nonhuman primates, especially the often‐overlooked pressures that may favor tolerant encounters and association given disincentives for aggression. We review how tolerant behavior toward extra‐group conspecifics in specific domains—such as food access, mating, and reconnaissance before transfer—may have been favored by natural selection in nonhuman primates. In the course of this review, we pay special attention to the group‐living, nonhuman great apes, but not because these species are necessarily the best analogies for intergroup behavior in humans. We focus on these species for two reasons: first, due to our common ancestry, humans and the extant nonhuman great apes share a number of traits derived within the Primate order, suggesting that there is (at least some) insight to be gained by drawing comparisons between these species; and second, to highlight how little we still know about intergroup encounters in the nonhuman great apes, especially in gorillas and bonobos.
Given what has been observed of intergroup behavior in nonhuman primates, we assess whether consideration of the potential selective benefits favoring intergroup encounter and association in these species provides insight into human behavior. Our review of the literature suggests that the particularly high prevalence of intergroup tolerant encounter and association in humans may be derived, even within the great apes; we hypothesize that this high prevalence reflects human reliance on resources that vary extensively in their availability across space and time. Given that our field has invested much energy into studying the selection pressures favoring or disfavoring intergroup aggression, we conclude by urging evolutionary anthropologists to explicitly theorize about individual‐level selection pressures that may favor intergroup tolerant encounters, and even prolonged intergroup association, so that we can better understand the variation in intergroup behavior within and between species.
4 DISCUSSION
In evolutionary anthropology and in disciplines influenced by it, a common current assumption made by researchers is a “strong human universal toward parochial altruism”—in‐group favoritism at out‐group cost.86 Research focus on chimpanzees as a referential model for human behavior34 tends to promote this perspective. However, evidence suggests that individual behavior in intergroup encounters is actually quite flexible, both in humans (e.g., per the study from which the preceding quote was drawn86) and in the group‐living great apes generally. Disincentives for intergroup aggression have been thoroughly discussed by other reviews; however, these disincentives provide insight only into when selection could favor individual tolerance toward extra‐group members, but not why it does under these circumstances. Here, drawing on existing observations of nonhuman primates, we assembled potential fitness benefits that may favor intergroup tolerant encounter and association (Table 1). Though scientists know comparatively little about intergroup encounters in bonobos and gorillas relative to chimpanzees—a situation that should be remedied—the fitness benefits we identified seem to account for at least some of the observed variability in intergroup behavior in bonobos and gorillas.
Our review of the literature suggests that the benefits favoring intergroup tolerant encounter and association in nonhuman primates can account for some, but not all, of the flexibility of intergroup tolerance in humans. In both humans and nonhuman primates, mating and transfer, as facilitated by visitation, and opportunities for social learning are potential benefits to be gained from intergroup tolerant encounter and association. Likewise, across the Primate order, kinship and partner preferences can further amplify the benefits and minimize the costs of encounter. However, humans have a much higher prevalence of intergroup tolerant encounter and association than do nonhuman primates—at least, as observed to date. Evidence from anthropology and across the social sciences suggests that humans' reliance on resources with extensive spatial and temporal variability has necessitated flexible interest in between‐community relationships as a means of managing the risks of resource shortfalls and ensuring access to nonlocally available resources. When and where the benefits of between‐community resource access have been high, cultural institutions and social status have also enhanced and reinforced these benefits. This is not to say that humans do not engage in intergroup aggression—the ethnographic, archaeological, and contemporary records provide ample evidence of parochialism and warfare—but rather that human intergroup behavior can be both more tolerant and more aggressive than what we have observed in our closest relatives and that this flexibility in intergroup behavior is functional.
We advance the hypotheses outlined in this review for testing by the evolutionary anthropological community. Similar ideas with respect to the importance of between‐community resource access have been outlined by functionalist anthropologists, archaeologists, and human behavioral ecologists previously—although usually without treatment of why between‐community resource access is of particular importance in humans. We hope that by amalgamating these perspectives and building upon them, the present paper inspires newfound interest in the flexibility of human and nonhuman great ape intergroup behavior, moving our discipline beyond its current focus on parochialism. In addition to our larger hypothesis with respect to the human foraging ecology, we wish to highlight other related questions to be addressed by future work. (1) The higher the frequency of shortfalls, the more likely that individuals will recall these shortfalls (whether via their own memories or even via oral traditions) and maintain between‐community relationships accordingly50, 51—but how frequent must they be? Is once every several generations enough? (2) Will the connections we drew between status acquisition, cultural institutions, and the relative importance of between‐community resource access be supported by additional data? To date, the connection between status and between‐community relationships has been more theoretical than empirical. (3) Which poses stronger selection pressure in humans: benefits gained via intergroup tolerant encounters and association in the currency of between‐community resource access, or the cost of mortality risk from aggression and warfare,37 potentially reduced by intergroup tolerant encounters and association?
To answer the above questions and improve the accuracy of our characterizations of sociality in both humans and nonhuman great apes, researchers will need to collect targeted data assessing the predictors of intergroup behavior. For field researchers studying humans, we urge caution with respect to reliance on observational data and “complete” social networks. Asking participants about their social strategies for mitigating shortfalls,49 their preferences for same‐community vs between‐community relationships,41, 42 and their extra‐community ties85 may provide a more accurate picture of the flexibility of human sociality. Furthermore, the dedication of increased research effort to intergroup encounters and association in gorillas and bonobos, as well as habituation of neighboring groups, will improve our understanding of sociality in the group‐living nonhuman great apes.
In the present review, we opted not to unpack the nature of human “groups” nor human group psychology. Humans are adept at cognizing groups of various kinds—from groups formed in experimental contexts to interest‐based groups to ethnic or religious groups—and at recognizing their boundaries. A number of the papers and book chapters we reviewed here discuss potential derived functions of group living in humans (see Refs. 53, 54, 56, 69). Our larger point is that human reliance on resources that vary in their spatial and temporal availability often necessitates relationships spanning distance; in general, the group‐living great apes evidence flexible interest in intergroup encounters and association (Box 1), and it is likely that this flexible interest became even more important in the human lineage (Section 3.2). While relationships spanning distance sometimes span ethnolinguistic boundaries, for example, or religious boundaries, they do not necessarily. As such, questions of the proliferation of different types of human groups, and how ethnic groups may have been built on the scaffolding of social relationships through which nonlocal resources could be accessed (e.g.,83), we leave to other papers.
Given the lack of attention the benefits of intergroup tolerant encounter and association have received in evolutionary anthropology, the present review reflects initial theorizing about these incentives; as such, we have not explored the roles of constraints, including phylogeny and life history constraints, nor the affordances of a comparative approach with non‐primate species. Phylogeny and life history constraints likely affect the prevalence and flexibility of intergroup tolerance in different species of primates. For example, the relationship between intergroup tolerance and the ecological and social factors discussed here may partially reflect a third variable, phylogenetic signal. Whether such constraints explain existing observational data is a question to be answered by future work. Furthermore, we chose not to pursue a comparative approach with non‐primate species. Though the high incentives for intergroup tolerant encounter and association observed in humans may have better analogies among non‐primate vertebrates or even insects,2 our goal here was to explore intergroup tolerance in humans in the context of nonhuman primates rather than to find the closest‐match analogy for human behavior.
5 CONCLUSION
Intergroup behavior in primates is flexible, and the prevalence of intergroup tolerant encounters and association varies across species. To be sure, incentives for aggression vary, as discussed extensively in existing work; however, when incentives for aggression are low or absent, why would natural selection favor tolerant behavior toward extra‐group members—or even increased rates of intergroup tolerant encounter and association? Drawing inferences from the existing primatological literature, we highlighted benefits favoring intergroup tolerant encounter and association in the Primate order, including in group‐living nonhuman apes and humans, such as transfer, mating, and food acquisition. Humans are unique among primates in our high prevalence of intergroup tolerance, however, and data from across the social sciences suggest the relevance of the human foraging ecology—especially the spatial and temporal availability of resources on which we depend—in explaining the human pattern. Future research should work to better document the variability in intergroup behavior in the group‐living apes, especially in gorillas, bonobos, and humans, using methods of data collection designed specifically for this endeavor.
Childhood intelligence, much more than adult personality, is a predictor of saving 40 years later; how intelligence affected education and also occupation explains adult financial success
Factors influencing adult savings and investment: Findings from a
nationally representative sample. Adrian Furnham, Helen Cheng.
Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 151, 1 December 2019,
109510. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109510
Abstract: This study explored a longitudinal data set of over 5766 adults examining factors that influence adult savings and investment. Data were collected at birth, in childhood (at age 11) and adulthood (at ages 33 and 50 yrs) to examine the effects of family social status, childhood intelligence, adult personality traits, education and occupation, and personal financial assessment on adult savings and investment. Results from structural equation modelling showed that parental social status, educational qualifications and occupational prestige, trait Conscientiousness, personal financial assessment and gender all had significant and direct effects on adult savings and investment, accounting for 26% of the total variance. The strongest predictor of adult savings and investment was their personal subjective financial assessment followed by educational qualifications and current occupational prestige. Limitations and implications are considered.
Abstract: This study explored a longitudinal data set of over 5766 adults examining factors that influence adult savings and investment. Data were collected at birth, in childhood (at age 11) and adulthood (at ages 33 and 50 yrs) to examine the effects of family social status, childhood intelligence, adult personality traits, education and occupation, and personal financial assessment on adult savings and investment. Results from structural equation modelling showed that parental social status, educational qualifications and occupational prestige, trait Conscientiousness, personal financial assessment and gender all had significant and direct effects on adult savings and investment, accounting for 26% of the total variance. The strongest predictor of adult savings and investment was their personal subjective financial assessment followed by educational qualifications and current occupational prestige. Limitations and implications are considered.
Political skill and outcomes in social life: Political skill was related to self-rated social life quality, perceiver-rated likeability, and friend-rated positive sociality
Political skill and outcomes in social life. Michael Z. Wang, Judith A. Hall. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 149, 15 October 2019, Pages 192-199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.05.010
Abstract: The concept of political skill has been extensively studied in work and professional life but not yet in social life. To study how political skill relates to social life outcomes, participants engaged in a videotaped interaction in the laboratory that was rated for likeability and intelligence by naïve perceivers and coded for behavior by trained coders. Participants also took the Political Skill Scale (PSI; Ferris et al., 2005) (with workplace references removed) and other personality questionnaires. Finally, ratings from participants' friends were gathered. Political skill was related to self-rated social life quality, perceiver-rated likeability, and friend-rated positive sociality. When controlling for extraversion, self-monitoring, and social self-efficacy, all relations stayed significant except ones with self-rated social life quality. Results were strongest for the PSI's subscales for networking ability and interpersonal influence. Sounding confident and initiating topics mediated relations between political skill and perceiver ratings.
Abstract: The concept of political skill has been extensively studied in work and professional life but not yet in social life. To study how political skill relates to social life outcomes, participants engaged in a videotaped interaction in the laboratory that was rated for likeability and intelligence by naïve perceivers and coded for behavior by trained coders. Participants also took the Political Skill Scale (PSI; Ferris et al., 2005) (with workplace references removed) and other personality questionnaires. Finally, ratings from participants' friends were gathered. Political skill was related to self-rated social life quality, perceiver-rated likeability, and friend-rated positive sociality. When controlling for extraversion, self-monitoring, and social self-efficacy, all relations stayed significant except ones with self-rated social life quality. Results were strongest for the PSI's subscales for networking ability and interpersonal influence. Sounding confident and initiating topics mediated relations between political skill and perceiver ratings.
Tuesday, August 6, 2019
Efforts to improve therapy models' general quality do not appear to have translated into improved outcomes; our results suggest that even with a therapy of perfect quality, achieved effect sizes may be modest
An Upper Limit to Youth Psychotherapy Benefit? A Meta-Analytic Copula Approach to Psychotherapy Outcomes. Payton J. Jones et al. Clinical Psychological Science, August 6, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702619858424
Abstract: Across 50 years of research, extensive efforts have been made to improve the effectiveness of psychotherapies for children and adolescents. Yet recent evidence shows no significant improvement in youth psychotherapy outcomes. In other words, efforts to improve the general quality of therapy models do not appear to have translated directly into improved outcomes. We used multilevel meta-analytic data from 502 randomized controlled trials to generate a bivariate copula model predicting effect size as therapy quality approaches infinity. Our results suggest that even with a therapy of perfect quality, achieved effect sizes may be modest. If therapy quality and therapy outcome share a correlation of .20 (a somewhat optimistic assumption given the evidence we review), a therapy of perfect quality would produce an effect size of Hedges’s g = 0.83. We suggest that youth psychotherapy researchers complement their efforts to improve psychotherapy quality by investigating additional strategies for improving outcomes.
Keywords: meta-analysis, psychotherapy, youth psychotherapy, psychotherapy research, copula, open data, open materials
Abstract: Across 50 years of research, extensive efforts have been made to improve the effectiveness of psychotherapies for children and adolescents. Yet recent evidence shows no significant improvement in youth psychotherapy outcomes. In other words, efforts to improve the general quality of therapy models do not appear to have translated directly into improved outcomes. We used multilevel meta-analytic data from 502 randomized controlled trials to generate a bivariate copula model predicting effect size as therapy quality approaches infinity. Our results suggest that even with a therapy of perfect quality, achieved effect sizes may be modest. If therapy quality and therapy outcome share a correlation of .20 (a somewhat optimistic assumption given the evidence we review), a therapy of perfect quality would produce an effect size of Hedges’s g = 0.83. We suggest that youth psychotherapy researchers complement their efforts to improve psychotherapy quality by investigating additional strategies for improving outcomes.
Keywords: meta-analysis, psychotherapy, youth psychotherapy, psychotherapy research, copula, open data, open materials
The present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts
What is ‘mental action’? Yair Levy. Philosophical Psychology , Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 969-991. Jul 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427
ABSTRACT: There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.
KEYWORDS: Mental action, embodied cognition, extended mind, covert action, overt action
ABSTRACT: There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.
KEYWORDS: Mental action, embodied cognition, extended mind, covert action, overt action
Partisan extremity was related to lower levels of cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation, across 3 independent cognitive assessments of cognitive flexibility
Zmigrod, L., Rentfrow, P. J., & Robbins, T. W. (2019). The partisan mind: Is extreme political partisanship related to cognitive inflexibility? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000661
Abstract: The rise of partisan animosity, ideological polarization, and political dogmatism has reignited important questions about the relationship between psychological rigidity and political partisanship. Two competing hypotheses have been proposed: 1 hypothesis argues that mental rigidity is related to a conservative political orientation, and the other suggests that it reflects partisan extremity across the political spectrum. In a sample of over 700 U.S. citizens, partisan extremity was related to lower levels of cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation, across 3 independent cognitive assessments of cognitive flexibility. This was evident across multiple statistical analyses, including quadratic regressions, Bayes factor analysis, and interrupted regressions. These findings suggest that the rigidity with which individuals process and respond to nonpolitical information may be related to the extremity of their partisan identities.
In experiments with university students and low‐educated adults all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work in numerical topics
Poor peer work does not boost student confidence. Heather Barry Kappes, Barbara Fasolo, Wenjie Han, Jessica Barnes, Janna Ter Meer. Journal of Behaviroal Decision Making, August 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2148
Abstract: Students' low confidence, particularly in numerical topics, is thought to be a barrier to keeping them engaged with education. We studied the effects on confidence of exposure to a peer's work of varying quality (very good or bad) and neatness (messy or neat). Previous research underpinned our hypothesis that a peer's bad‐quality work—which students rarely see—might boost student confidence more than very good work. We also predicted that a peer's very good work—which students are often shown—might be less discouraging if it were messy, suggesting it required effort and struggle. However, in experiments with university students and low‐educated adults, these hypotheses were not supported, and all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work. The failure to find support for these hypotheses can inform future research into social comparison effects on self‐confidence in numerical topics. These results also have practical implications for teachers and managers who are expected to provide examples of peer work.
Abstract: Students' low confidence, particularly in numerical topics, is thought to be a barrier to keeping them engaged with education. We studied the effects on confidence of exposure to a peer's work of varying quality (very good or bad) and neatness (messy or neat). Previous research underpinned our hypothesis that a peer's bad‐quality work—which students rarely see—might boost student confidence more than very good work. We also predicted that a peer's very good work—which students are often shown—might be less discouraging if it were messy, suggesting it required effort and struggle. However, in experiments with university students and low‐educated adults, these hypotheses were not supported, and all participants decreased in confidence after seeing any peer work. The failure to find support for these hypotheses can inform future research into social comparison effects on self‐confidence in numerical topics. These results also have practical implications for teachers and managers who are expected to provide examples of peer work.
Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive; seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation; seems a type of mental state which is not up to us
Active desire. Uku Tooming. Philosophical Psychology, Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 945-968, Jun 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1629406
ABSTRACT: Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.
KEYWORDS: Desire, agency, imagination, affect, reasons
ABSTRACT: Desire is commonly understood as a mental state in relation to which we are passive. Since it seems to arise in us spontaneously, without antecedent deliberation, it also seems to constitute a paradigmatic type of mental state which is not up to us. In this paper, I will contest this idea. I will defend a view according to which we can actively shape our desires by controlling the way in which we imagine their contents. This view is supported both by behavioral and neural data which indicate that imagining can either strengthen or weaken our existing desires. Arguably, this influence is made possible by our capacity to imaginatively elaborate on the content of our desires. This gives a reason to think that what we desire is partially under our control. It is under our control only partially because we can influence our desires insofar as their content appears appealing to us in imagination.
KEYWORDS: Desire, agency, imagination, affect, reasons
Negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS, as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration; mood was linked negatively with total usage time & call duration
Insights: Future Implications of Passive Smartphone Sensing in the Therapeutic Context. E.-M. Messner et al. Verhaltenstherapie 2019, https://doi.org/10.1159/000501735
Abstract
Background: Due to the ubiquitous use of smartphones in daily life, they offer unique opportunities to study human behaviour. This study sheds light on associations between self-reported stress, drive and mood levels and smartphone usage behaviour.
Methods: A total of 157 students installed the Insights app on their personal smartphone and tracked smartphone usage behaviour. Furthermore, students assessed self-reported levels of stress, drive and mood for 8 weeks.
Results: Three multi-level models were used to associate smartphone usage behaviour and self-reported mood, drive and stress levels. Results indicate a negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS (–3.539, SE = 0.937) as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration (0.018, SE = 0.937). Mood was linked negatively with total usage time (–0.019, SE = 0.004) and call duration (–0.016, SE = 0.007). Moreover, drive was negatively associated with Facebook usage time (–0.127, SE = 0.041).
Discussion: Overall smartphone usage behaviour is negatively associated with measurements of well-being.
Conclusion: Passive smartphone tracking could assist in the standardized assessment of behavioural data in real life in the future. Due to the risk of data misuse, ethical, legal and clinical guidelines have to be developed.
Keywords: Drive · Smartphone-tracking · Psychotherapy · Mood · Stress ·
Abstract
Background: Due to the ubiquitous use of smartphones in daily life, they offer unique opportunities to study human behaviour. This study sheds light on associations between self-reported stress, drive and mood levels and smartphone usage behaviour.
Methods: A total of 157 students installed the Insights app on their personal smartphone and tracked smartphone usage behaviour. Furthermore, students assessed self-reported levels of stress, drive and mood for 8 weeks.
Results: Three multi-level models were used to associate smartphone usage behaviour and self-reported mood, drive and stress levels. Results indicate a negative association of self-reported stress and number of SMS (–3.539, SE = 0.937) as well as a positive relation of stress and call duration (0.018, SE = 0.937). Mood was linked negatively with total usage time (–0.019, SE = 0.004) and call duration (–0.016, SE = 0.007). Moreover, drive was negatively associated with Facebook usage time (–0.127, SE = 0.041).
Discussion: Overall smartphone usage behaviour is negatively associated with measurements of well-being.
Conclusion: Passive smartphone tracking could assist in the standardized assessment of behavioural data in real life in the future. Due to the risk of data misuse, ethical, legal and clinical guidelines have to be developed.
Keywords: Drive · Smartphone-tracking · Psychotherapy · Mood · Stress ·
In philosophy of mind, the difference between perception & misperception is seen in terms of accuracy (perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate); but perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy
Perceptual precision. Adrienne Prettyman. Philosophical Psychology, Volume 32, 2019 - Issue 6, Pages 923-944. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1598765
ABSTRACT: The standard view in philosophy of mind is that the way to understand the difference between perception and misperception is in terms of accuracy. On this view, perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate. However, there is some evidence (albeit controversial evidence) that perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy. I add to that evidence in the paper. Then I point toward a way of understanding the difference between perception and misperception, not in terms of accuracy alone, but in terms of precision. That is, I argue that perceptual experience is designed to enable more fine-grained discrimination among the properties that are most useful for action, even if that involves inaccuracy. The view in this paper motivates a new account of illusion, on which illusions are imprecise as well as inaccurate. I call this the Precision Account of Illusion.
KEYWORDS: Perception, illusion, psychology, philosophy of mind
ABSTRACT: The standard view in philosophy of mind is that the way to understand the difference between perception and misperception is in terms of accuracy. On this view, perception is accurate while misperception is inaccurate. However, there is some evidence (albeit controversial evidence) that perceptual experience actually involves widespread inaccuracy. I add to that evidence in the paper. Then I point toward a way of understanding the difference between perception and misperception, not in terms of accuracy alone, but in terms of precision. That is, I argue that perceptual experience is designed to enable more fine-grained discrimination among the properties that are most useful for action, even if that involves inaccuracy. The view in this paper motivates a new account of illusion, on which illusions are imprecise as well as inaccurate. I call this the Precision Account of Illusion.
KEYWORDS: Perception, illusion, psychology, philosophy of mind
An empirical investigation of guilty pleasure (trash TV, kitsch)
An empirical investigation of guilty pleasures. Kris Goffin & Florian Cova. Philosophical Psychology, Aug 5 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1646897
ABSTRACT: In everyday language, the expression ‘guilty pleasure’ refers to instances where one feels bad about enjoying a particular artwork. Thus, one’s experience of guilty pleasure seems to involve the feeling that one should not enjoy this particular artwork and, by implication, the belief that there are norms according to which some aesthetic responses are more appropriate than others. One natural assumption would be that these norms are first and foremost aesthetic norms. However, this suggestion runs directly against recent findings in experimental philosophy, according to which most people deny the existence of aesthetic norms. Through three studies, we investigated people’s experiences of guilty pleasures and the norms that underlay these experiences. We tentatively conclude that guilty pleasures are more often connected to one’s personal norms and social expectations than to properly aesthetic norms.
KEYWORDS: Experimental philosophy, aesthetic normativity, emotions, guilty pleasures
ABSTRACT: In everyday language, the expression ‘guilty pleasure’ refers to instances where one feels bad about enjoying a particular artwork. Thus, one’s experience of guilty pleasure seems to involve the feeling that one should not enjoy this particular artwork and, by implication, the belief that there are norms according to which some aesthetic responses are more appropriate than others. One natural assumption would be that these norms are first and foremost aesthetic norms. However, this suggestion runs directly against recent findings in experimental philosophy, according to which most people deny the existence of aesthetic norms. Through three studies, we investigated people’s experiences of guilty pleasures and the norms that underlay these experiences. We tentatively conclude that guilty pleasures are more often connected to one’s personal norms and social expectations than to properly aesthetic norms.
KEYWORDS: Experimental philosophy, aesthetic normativity, emotions, guilty pleasures
Psychological reactions to human versus robotic job replacement
Psychological reactions to human versus robotic job replacement. Armin Granulo, Christoph Fuchs & Stefano Puntoni. Nature Human Behaviour (2019), August 5 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0670-y
Abstract: Advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are increasingly enabling organizations to replace humans with intelligent machines and algorithms1. Forecasts predict that, in the coming years, these new technologies will affect millions of workers in a wide range of occupations, replacing human workers in numerous tasks2,3, but potentially also in whole occupations1,4,5. Despite the intense debate about these developments in economics, sociology and other social sciences, research has not examined how people react to the technological replacement of human labour. We begin to address this gap by examining the psychology of technological replacement. Our investigation reveals that people tend to prefer workers to be replaced by other human workers (versus robots); however, paradoxically, this preference reverses when people consider the prospect of their own job loss. We further demonstrate that this preference reversal occurs because being replaced by machines, robots or software (versus other humans) is associated with reduced self-threat. In contrast, being replaced by robots is associated with a greater perceived threat to one’s economic future. These findings suggest that technological replacement of human labour has unique psychological consequences that should be taken into account by policy measures (for example, appropriately tailoring support programmes for the unemployed).
Abstract: Advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are increasingly enabling organizations to replace humans with intelligent machines and algorithms1. Forecasts predict that, in the coming years, these new technologies will affect millions of workers in a wide range of occupations, replacing human workers in numerous tasks2,3, but potentially also in whole occupations1,4,5. Despite the intense debate about these developments in economics, sociology and other social sciences, research has not examined how people react to the technological replacement of human labour. We begin to address this gap by examining the psychology of technological replacement. Our investigation reveals that people tend to prefer workers to be replaced by other human workers (versus robots); however, paradoxically, this preference reverses when people consider the prospect of their own job loss. We further demonstrate that this preference reversal occurs because being replaced by machines, robots or software (versus other humans) is associated with reduced self-threat. In contrast, being replaced by robots is associated with a greater perceived threat to one’s economic future. These findings suggest that technological replacement of human labour has unique psychological consequences that should be taken into account by policy measures (for example, appropriately tailoring support programmes for the unemployed).
Cognition in the fast lane: Ravens’ gaze duration are half as short as humans’ when choosing objects; their vision picks up more information per time unit
Bobrowicz, K., & Osvath, M. (2019). Cognition in the fast lane: Ravens’ gazes are half as short as humans’ when choosing objects. Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6(2), 81–97. https://doi.org/10.26451/abc.06.02.01.2019
Abstract: Time cannot be directly perceived; instead, its flow is inferred from the influx of sensory information. To prevent sensory overload, attentional mechanisms split up information into processable units. This portioning remains imperceptible to the individual. However, the length of these units still influences the speed of perception and the speed at which behaviors are performed. Previous studies have focused on establishing the length of these units in various mammalian species – mainly humans – by measuring different types of behaviors, including gaze. However, no such studies have been conducted on birds. We measured duration of ravens’ (Corvus corax) single gazes towards selectable objects before a choice was made, and compared it with that of humans in a similar set up. The raven gaze durations were approximately half those of humans (which fell slightly short of previously established ranges). We hypothesize that these differences are mainly due to the much higher so-called flicker-fusion-frequency in birds, which makes their vision faster in the sense that it picks up more information per time unit than mammalian vision does. We further discuss that the speed of perception might influence the general speed of cognitive processing in more complex tasks as well, and suggest that the addition of a temporal component in comparative cognitive studies might be informative.
KeywordsTime constant, Raven, Moment, Temporal processing, Cognition, Visual perception
Abstract: Time cannot be directly perceived; instead, its flow is inferred from the influx of sensory information. To prevent sensory overload, attentional mechanisms split up information into processable units. This portioning remains imperceptible to the individual. However, the length of these units still influences the speed of perception and the speed at which behaviors are performed. Previous studies have focused on establishing the length of these units in various mammalian species – mainly humans – by measuring different types of behaviors, including gaze. However, no such studies have been conducted on birds. We measured duration of ravens’ (Corvus corax) single gazes towards selectable objects before a choice was made, and compared it with that of humans in a similar set up. The raven gaze durations were approximately half those of humans (which fell slightly short of previously established ranges). We hypothesize that these differences are mainly due to the much higher so-called flicker-fusion-frequency in birds, which makes their vision faster in the sense that it picks up more information per time unit than mammalian vision does. We further discuss that the speed of perception might influence the general speed of cognitive processing in more complex tasks as well, and suggest that the addition of a temporal component in comparative cognitive studies might be informative.
KeywordsTime constant, Raven, Moment, Temporal processing, Cognition, Visual perception
A partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness; however, female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner
Show Me Your Partner and I’ll Let You Know if You are a Leader. Ipek Kocoglu and Murad A. Mithani. Academy of Management ProceedingsVol. 2019, No. 1, Aug 1 2019. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2019.13175abstract
Abstract: We integrate the research on evolutionary leadership with the evolutionary psychology of mate choice to investigate if the perception of an individual’s leadership capability is affected by the attractiveness of their partner. We argue that attractive partners signal unobservable leadership qualities, and accordingly, individuals are likely to be viewed more leader-like in the presence of an attractive partner than when seen alone. Study 1 found that a partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness. However, the benefits were limited to male CEOs. Female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner. In study 2, we found that while the penalty for female CEOs increased when they were synthetically coupled with an attractive male, the spillover of partner’s attractiveness was positive for females that were perceived to be significantly more attractive than their partners. Our findings suggest that indirect cues that emanate from the partner are critical for leadership assessment. They invoke attributions that enhance the perceived leadership of males but largely disapprove of females as leaders.
Abstract: We integrate the research on evolutionary leadership with the evolutionary psychology of mate choice to investigate if the perception of an individual’s leadership capability is affected by the attractiveness of their partner. We argue that attractive partners signal unobservable leadership qualities, and accordingly, individuals are likely to be viewed more leader-like in the presence of an attractive partner than when seen alone. Study 1 found that a partner’s attractiveness enhances the perceived leadership of CEOs and this effect is mediated by CEO’s attractiveness. However, the benefits were limited to male CEOs. Female CEOs’ leadership was downgraded in the presence of an attractive partner. In study 2, we found that while the penalty for female CEOs increased when they were synthetically coupled with an attractive male, the spillover of partner’s attractiveness was positive for females that were perceived to be significantly more attractive than their partners. Our findings suggest that indirect cues that emanate from the partner are critical for leadership assessment. They invoke attributions that enhance the perceived leadership of males but largely disapprove of females as leaders.
Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development
Paying Back People Who Harmed Us but Not People Who Helped Us: Direct Negative Reciprocity Precedes Direct Positive Reciprocity in Early Development. Nadia Chernyak et al. Psychological Science, August 5, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619854975
Abstract: The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments (N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.
Keywords: direct reciprocity, altruism, social groups, cognitive development, social norms, open data, open materials
Abstract: The principle of direct reciprocity, or paying back specific individuals, is assumed to be a critical component of everyday social exchange and a key mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Young children know the norm of reciprocity, but it is unclear whether they follow the norm for both positive and negative direct reciprocity or whether reciprocity is initially generalized. Across five experiments (N = 330), we showed that children between 4 and 8 years of age engaged in negative direct reciprocity but generalized positive reciprocity, despite recalling benefactors. Children did not endorse the norm of positive direct reciprocity as applying to them until about 7 years of age (Study 4), but a short social-norm training enhanced this behavior in younger children (Study 5). Results suggest that negative direct reciprocity develops early, whereas positive reciprocity becomes targeted to other specific individuals only as children learn and adopt social norms.
Keywords: direct reciprocity, altruism, social groups, cognitive development, social norms, open data, open materials
Monday, August 5, 2019
Over the last 15 years, households have increasingly concentrated its spending on a few preferred products; not “superstar” products of large market shares; households increasingly focus spending on different products from each other
The Rise of Niche Consumption. Brent Neiman, Joseph Vavra. University of Chicago, July 2019. https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/brent.neiman/research/NV.pdf
Abstract: We show that over the last 15 years, the typical household has increasingly concentrated its spending on a few preferred products. However, this is not driven by “superstar” products capturing larger market shares. Instead, households increasingly focus spending on different products from each other. As a result, aggregate spending concentration has in fact decreased over this same period. We use a novel heterogeneous agent model to conclude that increasing product variety is a key driver of these divergent trends. When more products are available, households can select a subset better matched to their particular tastes, and this generates welfare gains not reflected in government statistics. Our model features heterogeneous markups because producers of popular products care more about maximizing profits from existing customers, while producers of less popular niche products care more about expanding their customer base. Surprisingly, however,our model can match the observed trends in household and aggregate concentration without any resulting change in aggregate market power.
Keywords: Product Concentration, Niche Products, Market Power, Markups, Long-tail
Abstract: We show that over the last 15 years, the typical household has increasingly concentrated its spending on a few preferred products. However, this is not driven by “superstar” products capturing larger market shares. Instead, households increasingly focus spending on different products from each other. As a result, aggregate spending concentration has in fact decreased over this same period. We use a novel heterogeneous agent model to conclude that increasing product variety is a key driver of these divergent trends. When more products are available, households can select a subset better matched to their particular tastes, and this generates welfare gains not reflected in government statistics. Our model features heterogeneous markups because producers of popular products care more about maximizing profits from existing customers, while producers of less popular niche products care more about expanding their customer base. Surprisingly, however,our model can match the observed trends in household and aggregate concentration without any resulting change in aggregate market power.
Keywords: Product Concentration, Niche Products, Market Power, Markups, Long-tail
On the potential distortions of highly cited papers in emerging research fields: A critical appraisal
On the potential distortions of highly cited papers in emerging research fields: A critical appraisal. Edoardo G. Ostinelli, Orsola Gambini and Armando D'Agostino. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Volume 42, 2019, e77. July 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002807
Abstract: Citation-based metrics are increasingly used as a proxy to define representative, considerable, or significant papers. We challenge this belief by taking into account factors that may play a role in providing citations to a manuscript and whether/how those highly cited studies could shape a scientific field. A different approach to summarisation of relevant core publications within a topic is proposed.
Abstract: Citation-based metrics are increasingly used as a proxy to define representative, considerable, or significant papers. We challenge this belief by taking into account factors that may play a role in providing citations to a manuscript and whether/how those highly cited studies could shape a scientific field. A different approach to summarisation of relevant core publications within a topic is proposed.
One reason for the high usage of sexually explicit material might be the rewarding property demonstrated in many studies showing an activation of the reward system during the presentation; no sex differences
No Sex Difference Found: Cues of Sexual Stimuli Activate the Reward System in both Sexes. Rudolf Stark et al. Neuroscience, August 5 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2019.07.049
Highlights
• SEM cues resulted in similar neural activations as the presentation of SEM
• The neural responses towards cues did not differ between men and women
• There were some sex differences in the neural responses towards SEM
• The nucleus accumbens response was unaffected by person characteristics
Abstract: Sexually explicit material (SEM) is increasingly used in western societies. One reason for this high usage might be the rewarding property of SEM demonstrated in many brain imaging studies showing an activation of the reward system during the presentation of SEM. It is not yet well understood why women use SEM to a remarkably lesser extent than men. Maybe men react stronger to stimuli – so called SEM cues –, which signal the presentation of SEM and are therefore more vulnerable to use SEM than women. Therefore, the present study aimed at investigating the sex specific neural correlates towards SEM and SEM cues. We were further interested in whether person characteristics as trait sexual motivation, extent of SEM use in the last month, and age at onset of goal-oriented SEM use affect the neural responses to SEM and SEM cues. The trials of the fMRI experiment consisted of an expectation phase with SEM or neutral cues and a presentation phase with SEM or neutral stimuli, respectively. Analyses showed that the reward circuitry was activated by SEM, but also by SEM cues. There were some sex differences in hemodynamic responses to SEM during the presentation phase, but not during the expectation phase to SEM cues in any of the regions of interest. The influence of the investigated person characteristics was only small if existent. The results suggest that sex specific cue processing cannot explain sex differences in the use of SEM.
Highlights
• SEM cues resulted in similar neural activations as the presentation of SEM
• The neural responses towards cues did not differ between men and women
• There were some sex differences in the neural responses towards SEM
• The nucleus accumbens response was unaffected by person characteristics
Abstract: Sexually explicit material (SEM) is increasingly used in western societies. One reason for this high usage might be the rewarding property of SEM demonstrated in many brain imaging studies showing an activation of the reward system during the presentation of SEM. It is not yet well understood why women use SEM to a remarkably lesser extent than men. Maybe men react stronger to stimuli – so called SEM cues –, which signal the presentation of SEM and are therefore more vulnerable to use SEM than women. Therefore, the present study aimed at investigating the sex specific neural correlates towards SEM and SEM cues. We were further interested in whether person characteristics as trait sexual motivation, extent of SEM use in the last month, and age at onset of goal-oriented SEM use affect the neural responses to SEM and SEM cues. The trials of the fMRI experiment consisted of an expectation phase with SEM or neutral cues and a presentation phase with SEM or neutral stimuli, respectively. Analyses showed that the reward circuitry was activated by SEM, but also by SEM cues. There were some sex differences in hemodynamic responses to SEM during the presentation phase, but not during the expectation phase to SEM cues in any of the regions of interest. The influence of the investigated person characteristics was only small if existent. The results suggest that sex specific cue processing cannot explain sex differences in the use of SEM.
Urban China: Tenure change from renter to owner significantly increased subjective well-being; the effect was unaffected by the financial burdens of new homeowners
Does happiness dwell in an owner-occupied house? Homeownership and subjective well-being in urban China. Xian Zheng, Zi-qing Yuan, XiaolingZhang. Cities, Volume 96, January 2020, 102404. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.102404
Highlights
• We investigated the causal effect of homeownership on subjective well-being.
• The causal relationship was estimated using the difference-in-differences approach.
• Tenure change from renter to owner significantly increased subjective well-being.
• The causal effect was unaffected by the financial burdens of new homeowners.
• We investigated the causal effect of homeownership on subjective well-being.
• The causal relationship was estimated using the difference-in-differences approach.
• Tenure change from renter to owner significantly increased subjective well-being.
• The causal effect was unaffected by the financial burdens of new homeowners.
Abstract: This study investigates the causal relationship between homeownership and subjective well-being based on household-level panel data collected from the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) in 2011 and 2013. The extent to which homeownership contributes to the changes in subjective well-being is estimated, focusing on the heterogeneous effects across socioeconomic and demographic groups. Evidence from the identification strategies indicates that homeownership has a positive impact on subjective well-being. Moreover, the results are robust to different specifications and unaffected by the financial constraints faced by new homeowners. Our findings have useful implications for policymakers to stimulate homeownership rates to promote subjective well-being.
Keywords: Subjective well-beingHomeownershipDifference-in-DifferencesUrban China
The analysis of well-being is the cornerstone of neoclassical welfare
economics, with abundant empirical literature concerning the determinants
of self-reported happiness, life satisfaction, or subjective
well-being (SWB) (Dolan, Peasgood, & White, 2008).1 As a representative
and multidimensional indicator of individual utility or
welfare, SWB is determined by the fundamental aspects of life from a
macroscopic perspective (Benjamin, Heffetz, Kimball, & Szembrot,
2014).
Housing satisfaction is one of the most decisive domains accounting
for life cycle satisfaction (Van Praag, Frijters, & Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2003); in the words of John Howard Payne (1781–1852), “Be it ever so
humble, there is no place like home”. Intuitively, homeownership exerts
an indirect influence on overall life satisfaction through housing
satisfaction. Previous studies mainly investigate the determinants of
housing satisfaction, including housing tenure, hedonic characteristics,
individual and household attributes, neighborhood conditions, and
social interactions. In particular, homeownership has gained increasing
attention due to its potential implications for both individuals and societies.
An extensive literature provides empirical evidence supporting
a positive relationship between homeownership and SWB (Diaz-
Serrano, 2009; Dietz & Haurin, 2003; Guven & Sørensen, 2012; Ruprah,
2010; Stillman & Liang, 2010; Zumbro, 2014), whereas other studies
report a contradictory negative or insignificant relationship
(Bucchianeri, 2011; Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005a; Parker, Watson, &
Webb, 2011).
Theoretical disputes and welfare concerns motivate our investigation
of the relationship between homeownership and SWB. For decades,
it was taken for granted that homeownership is related to welfare improvement
due to its private and social benefits. However, homeownership
is assumed to decrease SWB when the heavy financial
burden of mortgages, constraints on mobility, and uncertainty of
housing prices are considered. Many question whether homeownership
can ultimately increase SWB in consideration of housing affordability.
Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of homeownership on
SWB in consideration of both benefits and potential drawbacks.
In light of this debate, we evaluate whether homeownership increases,
decreases, or has no effect on SWB. An increased understanding
of the relationship between homeownership and SWB will be beneficial
for policymakers to develop sustainable housing policies. Furthermore,
discovering the factors through which homeownership affects SWB is
crucial. In this way, policymakers can advance policies and take initiatives
to facilitate SWB according to an appropriate micro-mechanism.
Consequently, the relationship between homeownership and
SWB is an important issue in need of further research.
China's housing market provides an appealing testing ground for
analyzing the homeownership-happiness puzzle for several reasons. On
the one hand, from the standpoint of housing systems, China is usually
considered as a home-owning society rather than a cost-rental society.
In such a setting, renting is not regarded as a good alternative to
homeownership. Renting usually involves residential uncertainty or
instability of individual life conditions. In particular, renters are unable
to fulfill widely-accepted family values and practices (Elsinga &
Hoekstra, 2005b). By contrast, the homeowners reap the benefits of
social identity in marriage markets and other aspects. Accordingly, an
enthusiastic preference for homeownership has been deeply rooted in
Chinese tradition since ancient times. On the other hand, market-oriented
reform of the welfare housing system in 1998 dramatically
fueled the willingness of households to gain privatized homeownership
and increased the homeownership rate (Chen & Wen, 2017). Additionally,
China's housing market is substantially influenced by local
governments' profit-oriented land financing activities. Along with a
series of socioeconomic reforms and acceleration in urbanization,
housing prices have been soaring in recent years, especially in first-tier
cities. Given the high housing prices and price-to-rent ratios, unaffordability
poses one of the biggest challenge in the so-called superstar
cities (Chen, Hu, & Lin, 2019; Gyourko, Mayer, & Sinai, 2013). The
literature concerning the homeownership-happiness puzzle in China
continues to grow, and some studies question whether the overwhelming
financial burden can offset the positive effects of homeownership
(J. Chen & Deng, 2014; R. Chen, 2010; Cheng, King, Smyth,
& Wang, 2016; Cheng & Smyth, 2015a; Hu, 2013).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents a literature review. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework
regarding the relationship between homeownership and SWB. The data
sources and descriptive statistical analysis used are presented in Section
4, followed by the empirical strategy in Section 5. Section 6 reports the
empirical results and robustness checks, while Section 7 summarizes
and concludes the paper.
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