The framing of zero has a substantial effect on judgment: In the context of a simple gamble a small loss is more attractive than gaining nothing, but the same small loss is less attractive than losing nothing

Framing Zero: When Losing Nothing is Better Than Gaining Nothing. Marcus Wardley, Max Alberhasky. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, November 9 2020, 101641. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101641

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1326095730495401984

Highlights

• The framing of zero has a substantial effect on judgment and decision-making

• A loss is more attractive than gain nothing but less attractive than lose nothing

• These effects are consistent with an affect and reference point explanation

Abstract: The framing of zero has a substantial effect on judgment and decision-making, a fact which is often ignored or unacknowledged by many authors. Although prior research has shown that zero carries a special meaning, no prior research has specifically examined the framing of zero. Across four studies, the current research demonstrates the effect the framing of zero has on judgment and decision-making and explores the underlying mechanisms. In the context of a simple gamble a small loss is more attractive than gaining nothing, but the same small loss is less attractive than losing nothing. The present studies test and support an explanation of these findings based on the concept of reference points and the affect heuristic. The framing of zero in these decision problems acts as a point of comparison, or reference point, affecting how evaluators feel about the bet. These results establish the importance of framing zero in judgment and decision-making and sheds light on the mediators of this effect.

Keywords: framingzerogamblesaffectreference points

Subjects in ambiguous cases used punishment for reputational gain, punishing at higher rates when their behavior was observable to their audience, even when personally were less supportive of punishment

Jordan, Jillian, and Nour Kteily. 2020. “People Punish Moral Transgressions for Reputational Gain, Even When They Personally Question Whether Punishment Is Merited.” PsyArXiv. March 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/97nhj

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1326061880314634240

Abstract: People punish wrongdoers in order to appear virtuous. But is this true even in ambiguous situations, where people may question whether punishment is merited? Across three studies (total n = 4863), we investigate the willingness of liberal subjects to enact costly punishment of a university professor facing sexual harassment allegations. In our ambiguous (vs. unambiguous) condition, the allegations were less severe and the evidence for them was weaker—creating a murkier moral case for the relevant punishment. And yet in Study 1, we created a context in which subjects in both conditions expected punishing to look equally good in the eyes of a salient audience. We achieved this by describing the audience as more ideological in the ambiguous condition, because people expected more ideological audiences to be more supportive of punishment. Next, using this context, Study 2 measured the power of (equally strong) reputational incentives to encourage ambiguously vs. unambiguously deserved punishment. Subjects in the ambiguous condition used punishment for reputational gain, punishing at higher rates when their behavior was observable to their audience. In fact, making punishment observable was as effective at increasing punishment in the ambiguous (vs. unambiguous) condition—even though subjects in the ambiguous condition were, on average, far less personally supportive of punishment. Finally, in Study 3, reputational incentives again encouraged ambiguously-deserved punishment—even among individuals who, before learning that punishment could enhance their reputation, reported reservations about its morality. We thus find that people punish for reputational gain, even when they personally question whether punishment is merited.

The herbivore’s dilemma in Japan: In 2015 around 1 in 4 women and 1 in 3 men in their thirties were unmarried and not in a heterosexual relationship; half of the singles reported no interest in romantic relationships

The herbivore’s dilemma: Trends in and factors associated with heterosexual relationship status and interest in romantic relationships among young adults in Japan—Analysis of national surveys, 1987–2015. Cyrus Ghaznavi, Haruka Sakamoto, Shuhei Nomura, Anna Kubota, Daisuke Yoneoka, Kenji Shibuya, Peter Ueda. PLOS One, November 9, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241571

Abstract

Background: It has been suggested that an increasing proportion of young adults in Japan have lost interest in romantic relationships, a phenomenon termed “herbivorization”. We assessed trends in heterosexual relationship status and self-reported interest in heterosexual romantic relationships in nationally representative data.

Methods: We used data from seven rounds of the National Fertility Survey (1987–2015) and included adults aged 18–39 years (18–34 years in the 1987 survey; sample size 11,683–17,675). Current heterosexual relationship status (married; unmarried but in a relationship; single) was estimated by sex, age group and survey year, with singles further categorized into those reporting interest vs. no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships. Information about same-sex relationships were not available.

Results: Between 1992 and 2015, the age-standardized proportion of 18-39-year-old Japanese adults who were single had increased steadily, from 27.4 to 40.7% among women and from 40.3 to 50.8% among men. This increase was largely driven by decreases in the proportion of married women aged 25–39 years and men aged 30–39 years, while those in a relationship had increased only slightly for women and remained stable for men. By 2015, the proportion of single women was 30.2% in those aged 30–34 years and 24.4% in those aged 35–39 years. The corresponding numbers for men were 39.3% and 32.4%. Around half of the singles (21.4% of all women and 25.1% of all men aged 18–39 years) reported that they had no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships. Single women and men who reported no interest in romantic relationships had lower income and educational levels and were less likely to have regular employment compared to those who reported such an interest.

Conclusions: In this analysis of heterosexual relationships in nationally representative data from Japan, singlehood among young adults had steadily increased over the last three decades. In 2015 around one in four women and one in three men in their thirties were unmarried and not in a heterosexual relationship. Half of the singles reported no interest in romantic relationships and these women and men had lower income and educational levels and were less likely to have regular employment.

Discussion

Intimate relationships constitute an important component of human fertility and life satisfaction and are associated with better health outcomes [6, 13–16]. As such, a purportedly decreasing interest in sex and romantic relationships has brought young Japanese adults under national scrutiny and fostered unease in light of the country’s rapidly ageing population, low birth rates, and large number of individuals living in social isolation [25, 26]. In this study, which is the first to investigate the phenomenon of so-called “herbivore” young adults in nationally representative data in Japan, we assessed changes in, and sociodemographic factors associated with, heterosexual relationship status and reporting of no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships.

Between 1992 and 2015, the age-standardized proportion of 18-39-year-old Japanese adults who were single (unmarried and not in a heterosexual relationship) had increased steadily, from 27.4 to 40.7% among women and from 40.4 to 50.8% among men, with these numbers corresponding an increase of 2.2 million single women and 1.7 million single men in the investigated age range. The increase was largely driven by increases in singlehood among women aged 25–39 years and men aged 30–39 years. By 2015, around one in four women and one in three men in their thirties were single. Our findings show that the decline in marriage among young adults [9] indeed reflects an increase in singlehood as the proportion who were unmarried and in a relationship rose only slightly among women and remained stable among men. Notably, being in a relationship became increasingly uncommon with higher age and among adults in their thirties, this group was so small that the proportion who were unmarried largely equaled the proportion who were single.

Around one in five women and men aged 18–39 years in 2015 were single while reporting that they had no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships. It should be assumed that a proportion of these individuals have interest, or are currently in, non-heterosexual sexual or romantic relationships. Moreover, the term “kousai” which was used in the question about interest in romantic relationships was not defined in the National Fertility Survey. This term is commonly used to refer to the act of engaging in a relationship with a romantic/sexual partner, but as with the word “dating,” the level of commitment to such a relationship is uncertain; it is possible that a proportion of those who answered that they had no interest in a romantic relationship may have had interest in sexual or romantic pursuits but preferred not to be in a stable relationship at the time of survey participation. However, over half of women and men who reported no interest in heterosexual romantic relationships had no heterosexual experience, indicating that many of these individuals are indeed sexually inactive.

While interpretation of the results on income and employment status among women is made difficult by the relatively large proportion of married women who are housewives [27], we note that single women without interest in romantic relationship had lower educational levels and income than single women with such an interest. For men, there was a pronounced gradient in income and occupational status across categories of relationship status and interest in relationships. For example, the proportion with regular employment was highest among married men (85.8%) and decreased stepwise for those in a relationship (63.2%), single with interest in relationships (53.2%), and single with no interest (42.6%). In age-adjusted analyses, married men were twice as likely to have an annual income of JPY 5 million as compared to those in a relationship and those who were single with an interest in relationship and more than three times as likely to have such an income compared to those without interest in romantic relationships.

The herbivore stereotype has typically been portrayed as a timid individual (most of the time male), seemingly indifferent to sex and romance; in other words, “herbivore” is largely described as a type of personality or a set of behaviors secondary to sexual interests [7, 8, 28]. This notion is challenged by the association of lower education, low income, and a lack of regular employment with reporting no interest in relationships among single women and men. It is likely that aspirations and outcomes in the labor and partner market have common determinants such as personality, values, physical appearance and physical and mental health status, and the associations may not represent causality. Nonetheless, high and stable incomes are important predictors of appeal in the partner market, particularly for men [10, 29–31], indicating that individuals with lower income may have difficulties in finding romantic partners. In addition, one could speculate that precarious employment and financial insecurity may contribute to decreased resources, motivation, and opportunities for pursuing romantic relationships [18]. Indeed as shown in our study and in previous analyses [32], income is strongly associated with marriage among Japanese men. Notably, in a study using longitudinal data (2002–2006) from a nationally representative sample of women [33], those with higher earnings (before marriage) were more likely to marry at any age than those with lower earnings. Moreover, women with a university or junior college degree were more likely to be married at the age of 38 years as compared with those with a high school degree or less, indicating that, perhaps contrary to popular belief [34], high earning potential and education constitute advantages in the partner market also for Japanese women. As such, it could be hypothesized that for some women and men, the reporting of no interest in romantic relationships may represent an adjustment of their expectations, or resignation, given their current lack of access to romantic partners and inability to pursue them, while they would be otherwise interested if they were to meet suitable partners. In support of this hypothesis, we found that around two thirds of the women and men reporting no interest in romantic relationships answered that they wished to get married in their lifetime and that around one third reported that a major reason for not getting married was that they had not met a suitable partner. It should also be noted that the proportion who reported no interest in romantic relationships in 2015 decreased with age and the proportions were largely similar in 2010 vs. 2015, indicating that some individuals get married regardless of their reported interest in romantic relationships.

Although there are other types of social connections which may provide benefits to health and life satisfaction [35–39], and while some individuals may prefer to live without romantic relationships, the large proportion of young adults that has lost interest, given up, or find it hard to form romantic relationships may have important implications for public health and fertility. Our findings indicate a possibility that policy measures aimed at improving employment opportunities and addressing economic disadvantage may also lead to increased interest in romantic relationships and marriage. Moreover, income and employment status are considered as important spouse-selection criteria in Japan, especially for women who evaluate potential husbands [10]. Given that most unmarried individuals wish to get married and the most common reason for staying single is that no suitable partner is available [10], it could be speculated that some individuals are reluctant to form romantic relationships with partners who do not fulfill their partner-selection criteria for marriage (e.g. with respect to income and employment status) but who are otherwise of romantic and sexual interest. This hypothesis is supported by our finding that almost no individuals in their late thirties were unmarried and in a romantic relationship, implying that the promotion of marriage as the most socially acceptable form of relationship between adults and a necessary step for co-habitation and family formation could constitute a barrier to forming romantic relationships in Japan.

While the decline in marriage rates has been established in many high-income countries [40], data on relationship status among unmarried individuals is scarce. A situation similar to that in Japan may be ongoing in South Korea, where a national survey found that 68% of unmarried women and 74% of unmarried men aged 20–44 years were not in heterosexual relationships and that young adults listed lack of money as an important reason for giving up dating [41, 42]. In the US and Europe, higher earnings and education have been associated with a higher likelihood of marriage among both women and men [43–45], although it is not known how these factors influence interest in romantic relationships. We found that the proportion of Japanese women who were single was 65.6% (18–24 years), 41.9% (25–29 years), 30.2% (30–34 years), and 24.4% (35–39 years), and the proportion of men who were single was 75.9% (18–24 years), 55.1% (25–29 years), 39.3% (30–34 years), and 32.4% (35–39 years). Our analyses of nationally representative survey data from Britain (Natsal-3, 2010–2012) and the US (General Social Survey, 2012–2018) showed that singlehood tends to be less common in these countries. In Britain, the proportion of women who were single (not married/living together with partner and not in a stable relationship) was 41.5% (18–24 years), 23.6% (25–29 years), 16.3% (30–34 years), and 14.0% (35–39 years). The corresponding numbers for men were 52.6% (18–24 years), 32.5% (25–29 years), 14.7% (30–34 years), and 11.8% (35–39 years). In the US, the proportion of women who were single was 62.6% (18–24 years), 25.2% (25–29 years), 20.0% (30–34 years), and 16.6% (35–39 years). The corresponding numbers for men tended to be closer to those we observed in Japan: 81.4% (18–24 years), 55.8% (25–29 years), 35.9% (30–34 years), and 22.0% (35–39 years). Of note, however, are the slightly different definitions of single used (S1 File), and that the estimates for Britain and the US accounted for any stable relationship, regardless of the gender of the partner, while only heterosexual relationships were considered in Japan.

Our study has limitations. First, as data on relationship status and interest in romantic relationships was self-reported, findings may have been affected by social desirability bias [46]; the risk of such a bias, however, may have been mitigated by the survey’s use of self-administered questionnaires [47]. Second, although the response rate in the National Fertility Survey was high (70.0–83.8% among unmarried individuals and 85.7–92.5% among married couples) and the sample was weighted so that it was representative of the Japanese population in terms of sex, age, and marital status, non-response might have introduced bias in our results. Third, the large sample size may have resulted in small differences in the investigated variables being statistically significant and interpretation of the findings should consider the absolute differences. Fourth, because the data were cross-sectional, we could not assess temporality of the associations of sociodemographic variables with relationship status and interest in romantic relationships. Finally, as the questions asked in the National Fertility Survey were limited to heterosexual relationships, we could not assess other types of relationships. Data on gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender groups in Japan is scarce [48], and questions targeted to the experiences of these groups should be included in future surveys.

From 2019... Some apes don't seem to have a sense of procedural (un)fairness, not getting upset when they have to spend greater effort for the same reward than their peers

From 2019... The Biology of Fairness. Sarah F. Brosnan. Chapter 2 in Social Psychology and Justice. Edited By E. Allan Lind. November 2019. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781003002291/chapters/10.4324/9781003002291-2

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1325861779474354182

Abstract: Humans are not the only species that is sensitive to outcome inequality. Other species, too, respond negatively to getting less than a social partner, and this breadth suggests a common biological foundation. Across species, negative responses to inequity are linked to the degree to which those species cooperate, and within cooperative tasks, subjects are sensitive to inequity, refusing to work with partners who do not equitably share rewards. Together, these results suggest that inequity aversion evolved because it provides a mechanism by which individuals can judge the relative value of their cooperative partners. In addition, humans and chimpanzees respond negatively to getting more than a partner, suggesting that they can inhibit this short term benefit for the long term gain of maintaining cooperative relationships. The comparative approach has been extremely useful in highlighting the roots of inequity responses and, thereby, helping us to better understand our own sense of fairness.

We did not find any evidence of influence of alcohol consumption on changes in brain volume over a 2-year period in 40–60-year-olds

Midlife alcohol consumption and longitudinal brain atrophy: the PREVENT-Dementia study. Michael J. Firbank, John T. O’Brien, Karen Ritchie, Katie Wells, Guy Williams, Li Su & Craig W. Ritchie. Journal of Neurology volume 267, pages3282–3286. June 20 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00415-020-10000-8

Abstract

Background and aims: Consensus is lacking on whether light to moderate consumption of alcohol compared to abstinence is neuroprotective. In this study, we investigated the relationship between self-reported alcohol use and brain volume change over 2 years in middle-aged subjects.

Methods: A sample of 162 subjects (aged 40–59 at baseline) from the PREVENT-Dementia programme underwent MRI scans on two separate occasions (mean interval 734 days; SD 42 days). We measured longitudinal rates of brain atrophy using the FSL Siena toolbox, and change in hippocampal volume from segmentation in SPM.

Results: Controlling for age and sex, there were no significant associations of either total brain, ventricular, or hippocampal volume change with alcohol consumption. Adjusting for lifestyle, demographic and vascular risk factors did not alter this.

Conclusions: We did not find any evidence of influence of alcohol consumption on changes in brain volume over a 2-year period in 40–60-year-olds.

Discussion

Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not observe any significant association between alcohol consumption and longitudinal brain volume changes. Rather, we saw a non-significant trend of 14–21 units of alcohol (vs. abstinence) associated with preserved total brain volume.

Studies of alcohol on cognition or brain structure have confounds due to social and demographic factors, with age, years of education, and social class all being linked to both alcohol consumption and brain volume. Our study, looking at brain volume change over 2 years within individuals overcomes to some extent these confounds, and including the lifestyle, demographic and vascular health factors in our analysis did not change our findings.

Combined with the previous conflicting reports on the benefit or otherwise of mild to moderate alcohol consumption, our data suggest at least that consumption of 7–21 units per week is not associated with marked brain atrophy over a 2-year period in midlife.

Limitations of the study include that alcohol consumption was estimated from subject report, and the relatively short follow-up of 2 years. The participants were mostly female, limiting the extrapolation to the general population.

In summary, we did not find any evidence of influence of alcohol consumption on changes in brain volume over a 2-year period in 40–60-year-olds.

In 1500 reports of positive tears, 13124 participants, 40 diverse countries, 24 languages they found 4 qualitatively different types of positive tears, achievement, beauty, affection, and amusement tears

Zickfeld, Janis, Beate Seibt, Ljiljana B. Lazarevic, Iris Zezelj, and Ad Vingerhoets. 2020. “A Model of Positive Tears.” PsyArXiv. November 8. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sf7pe

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1325665261928804353

Abstract: Although several scholars acknowledge the existence of tears of joy, there is little systematic theoretical or empirical evidence on how positive tears are experienced, what elicits them, what actions or impulses they motivate in the crier, how they differ from tears of sadness or distress and whether there are different types. We systematically investigated these issues and drafted a first taxonomic model of positive tears. Drawing on more than 1500 reports of positive tears and including 13124 participants from 40 diverse countries and 24 languages, the studies employed a strong mixture of quantitative and qualitative techniques. The final results showed evidence of the occurrence of positive tears and found four qualitatively different types and profiles that we termed achievement, beauty, affection, and amusement tears. Achievement tears are often shed in contexts of extraordinary performance or when someone overcomes an obstacle and often include feelings of pride. Beauty tears occur commonly in situations of overwhelming elegance or beauty, including nature, music or visual arts, and feature feelings of awe or experiencing chills. Affectionate tears are often experienced in situations including unexpected kindness or exceptional love such as wedding ceremonies or reunions and often feature feelings of warmth, increased communality, and feeling touched or compassionate. Finally, amusement tears are shed when something especially funny occurs and include feelings of amusement or lightness and the inclination to laugh or giggle. We also investigated cross-cultural and inter-individual differences with regard to these categories and discuss limitations and implications of our taxonomy of positive tears.

 

COVID-19: Narcissism & Machiavellianism predicted greater negative affect & perceptions of threat during the pandemic, while psychopathy predicted positive affect; conversely, sadism predicted greater positive affect

Is the COVID-19 pandemic even darker for some? Examining dark personality and affective, cognitive, and behavioral responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Benjamin S. Hardin, C. Veronica Smith, Lauren N. Jordan. Personality and Individual Differences, November 7 2020, 110504. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110504

Abstract: As the COVID-19 pandemic and interventions intended to minimize its spread continue to impact daily life, personality research may help to address the different ways in which people respond to a major global health crisis. The present study assessed the role of dark personality traits in predicting different responses to the pandemic. A nationally representative sample of 412 Americans completed measures of the Dark Tetrad as well as perceptions of COVID-19 threat, emergency beliefs, and positive and negative affect in response to COVID-19. Narcissism and Machiavellianism predicted greater negative affect and perceptions of threat during the pandemic, while psychopathy predicted positive affect. Conversely, sadism predicted greater positive affect. Dark personality also showed some predictive ability in explaining pandemic-related behaviors (e.g., more frequent cleaning) but not others (e.g., social distancing). Our findings provide evidence for differences in how dark personality traits predict individual responses to global crises.

Keywords: Dark personalityDark TetradCOVID-19Pandemic

High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy)

The Possession of High Status Strengthens the Status Motive. Cameron Anderson, John Angus D. Hildreth, Daron L. Sharps. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, July 13, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220937544

Abstract: The current research tested whether the possession of high status, compared with the possession of low status, makes individuals desire having high status even more. Five studies (total N = 6,426), four of which were preregistered, supported this hypothesis. Individuals with higher status in their social groups or who were randomly assigned to a high-status condition were more motivated to have high status than were individuals with low status. Furthermore, upper-class individuals had a stronger status motive than working-class individuals, in part, due to their high status. High-status individuals had a stronger status motive, in part, because they were more confident in their ability to achieve (or retain) high status, but not because of other possible mechanisms (e.g., task self-efficacy). These findings provide a possible explanation for why status hierarchies are so stable and why inequality rises in social collectives over time.

Keywords: status, social class, rank, desire, motive

Rats: Even under conditions of low food motivation, food sharing occurred on only 1% of the sharing opportunities, inconsistent with claims in the literature that rats are altruistically motivated to share with other rats

Wan, Haoran, Cyrus Kirkman, Greg Jensen, and Timothy D. Hackenberg. 2020. “Failure to Find Altruistic Food Sharing in Rats.” PsyArXiv. November 7. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pmbnh

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1325308739650527232

Abstract: Prior research has found that one rat will release a second rat from restraint in the presence of food, thereby allowing that second rat access to food. Such behavior, clearly beneficial to the second rat and costly to the first, has been interpreted as altruistic. Because clear demonstrations of altruism in rats are rare, such findings deserve a careful look. The present study aimed to replicate this finding, but with more systematic methods to examine whether, and under what conditions, a rat might share food with its cagemate partner. Rats were given repeated choices between high-valued food (sucrose pellets) and 30-s social access to a familiar rat, with the (a) food size (number of food pellets per response), and (b) food motivation (extra-session access to food) varied across conditions. Rats responded consistently for both food and social interaction, but at different levels and with different sensitivity to the food-access manipulations. Food production and consumption was high when food motivation was also high (food restriction) but substantially lower when food motivation was low (unlimited food access). Social release occurred at moderate levels, unaffected by the food-based manipulations. When food was abundant and food motivation low, the rats chose food and social options about equally often, but sharing (food left unconsumed prior to social release) occurred at low levels across sessions and conditions. Even under conditions of low food motivation, sharing occurred on only 1% of the sharing opportunities. The results are therefore inconsistent with claims in the literature that rats are altruistically motivated to share food with other rats.

Evidence from a Panel of Transition Economies: The flat tax reforms increase annual GDP growth by 1.36 percentage points for a transitionary period of approximately one decade

The Macroeconomic Effects of Flat Taxation: Evidence from a Panel of Transition Economies. Brian Wheaton. Harvard Univ., October 24, 2020. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/wheaton/files/flat_tax.pdf

Abstract: Flat taxes have been the subject of policy discussion for decades, and such discussions have often come with bold macroeconomic claims. Yet the macroeconomic effects of flat taxation remains a mostly overlooked topic in the economics literature. To guide my analysis, I construct a simple model of investment decisions under varying income tax progressivity, and I show that decreased tax progressivity increases investment, which – under standard models of economic growth – should induce a transitionary increase in GDP growth. To test these implications, I turn to a natural experiment: between 1994 and 2011, twenty post-Communist countries introduced flat taxation on personal income. Since 2011, five of these countries have reverted to progressive income taxation. Using static and dynamic difference-in-differences approaches, I find that the flat tax reforms increase annual GDP growth by 1.36 percentage points for a transitionary period of approximately one decade. These findings are robust to multiple alternative specifications designed to deal with various identification challenges, including electoral endogeneity and correlated reforms. Entirely consistent with the model, this growth effect is operationalized through increases in investment (and labor supply), and it is driven both by the decreases in the average marginal tax rate and the reductions in progressivity resulting from the tax reforms. In short, tax progressivity can have important implications for macroeconomic outcomes.

Corporal punishment in schools increases educational attainment, increases later-life social trust & trust in institutions, leads to less authoritarian attitudes toward child-rearing, to greater tolerance of free speech, & decreases later-life crime

Petrova, Maria, Gautam Rao, and Brian Wheaton. “The Long-Run Effects of Corporal Punishment in Schools,” Harvard Working Paper, Nov 2020. https://scholar.harvard.edu/wheaton/publications/poppies-protest-and-demand-economic-and-political-effects-legalizations-and

Abstract: Corporal punishment is used in schools in about 70 countries, including in 19 states in the United States. Despite its prevalence as a tool to discipline students, it remains remarkably understudied. We leverage the staggered state-level bans of school corporal punishment in the United States over the past several decades in conjunction with data on social and economic outcomes from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the General Social Survey (GSS), using a difference-in-differences design to measure the causal effects of school corporal punishment.  We find that the presence of corporal punishment in schools increases educational attainment, increases later-life social trust and trust in institutions, and leads to less authoritarian attitudes toward child-rearing, and greater tolerance of free speech.  Additionally, exposure to corporal punishment in school decreases later-life crime.  We find no effects on mental or physical health.  These results hold up to dynamic difference-in-differences specifications – which reveal non-existence of pre- trends – and a wide variety of other robustness checks.  Observing that only a small share of students are exposed to corporal punishment, we argue that the effects primarily represent spillovers resulting from restraining the behavior of disruptive students.

Masculinity & femininity affect disgust by gender; reframing disgust in terms of caregiving eliminates the gender gap in disgust; & the caregiving frame unexpectedly strengthens the relationship between disgust & political ideology

Slimy worms or sticky kids: How caregiving tasks and gender identity attenuate disgust response. Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz (a1) and Amanda Friesen. Politics and the Life Sciences, Volume 39, Special Issue 2, Fall 2020, pp. 167-186, November 3 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/pls.2020.21

Abstract: Disgust is derived from evolutionary processes to avoid pathogen contamination. Theories of gender differences in pathogen disgust utilize both evolutionary psychological and sociocultural perspectives. Drawing on research that suggests that masculine and feminine gender identities are somewhat orthogonal, we examine how gender identity intersects with pathogen disgust. In addition, building on evolutionary psychological and sociocultural accounts of how caregiving and parental investment affect pathogen disgust, we present a new measure of caregiving disgust and compare its properties across gender, parental status, and political ideology with those of a conventional pathogen disgust measure. This registered report finds that how masculinity and femininity affect disgust varies by gender, disgust domain, and their intersection; that parental status effects vary by disgust domain but not gender; that reframing disgust in terms of caregiving eliminates the gender gap in disgust; and that the caregiving frame unexpectedly strengthens the relationship between disgust and political ideology.

Age trends in malevolent personality conform to established patterns of normative change, indicating temporary disruption in adolescence and social maturation across adulthood

Age differences in Machiavellianism across the life span: Evidence from a large‐scale cross‐sectional study. Friedrich M. Götz  Wiebke Bleidorn  Peter J. Rentfrow. Journal of Personality, March 7 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12545

Abstract

Objective: Lifespan perspectives on personality development have gained much momentum in recent years, mostly focusing on benevolent and neutral traits such as the Big Five. Despite their strong associations with critical personal outcomes, surprisingly little research has investigated the development of malevolent traits. Addressing this gap, we examined age trends in Machiavellianism across the lifespan.

Methods: Using data from a large‐scale cross‐sectional sample (n = 1,118,643), we analyzed mean‐level changes from age 10 to 67.

Results: Age differences in Machiavellianism were most pronounced as a strong upward trend during the transition from late childhood to adolescence, when it peaked. Throughout adulthood it exhibited a steady downward trend, reaching an overall minimum at age 65. Across the lifespan, Machiavellianism tended to be higher in men and high‐income participants. Compared to Machiavellianism, the age trends in Agreeableness and—to a lesser extent—Conscientiousness showed almost perfectly polar opposite patterns.

Conclusions: Age trends in malevolent personality conform to established patterns of normative change, indicating temporary disruption in adolescence and social maturation across adulthood. The results advance theory and research on personality trait development across the lifespan and highlight crucial developmental windows that can inform targeted interventions to keep socially aversive traits in check.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Across the world, the number of people who were “very” or “extremely” concerned about fake news was far higher than the number of people who had actually seen any

Fletcher R. (2021) How News Audiences Think About Misinformation Across the World. In: Jayakumar S., Ang B., Anwar N.D. (eds) Disinformation and Fake News. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. Nov 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5876-4_4

Abstract: In this chapter, Richard Fletcher examines some of the key findings from the 2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Report. This report analysed online data dealing with news consumption from approximately 74,000 respondents internationally, with particular focus on their “level of concern over and exposure to specific types of misinformation and disinformation associated with the news”. One of its main findings was that just over half of the respondents were either “very” or “extremely” concerned about bias, poor journalism, and completely made-up news. However, Fletcher explains that the level and areas of concern varies from country to country. For example, in Eastern Europe, the questionnaire showed that “misleading advertising was more of a concern than in many other parts of the world”. Fletcher analyses each key finding of the report, including the public perception of “fake news” as a term, and who news audiences think should do more to fix problems associated with misinformation. He concludes by emphasising the importance of monitoring public concern over misinformation, in order to properly address the problems it poses.

Keywords: Misinformation Disinformation Bias Fake news Social media 

Parenting Styles in Gay Families: The homosexual parents reported a warmer parenting style, more cooperation, and less irritation with the temperament of the firstborn child

Parenting Styles in Gay Families. Christine Neresheimer. PhD Thesis, Zurich Univ, 2020.  https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-191334

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1324959453326831616

Abstract: There is less research on parenting styles in Europe currently than, for example, in the 1970s, when many researchers were working on the subject, developing instruments, and designing models for parenting styles. Parenting styles are influenced by many factors, such as the temperament of the child, the personality of the parents, or the cooperation between parents. Since the 1970s, ever more homosexual parents in Western cultures are open to their sexual orientation, live it, and use the opportunity to raise children, whether through surrogacy, adoption, or living with a second homosexual couple of another gender. Thus, in recent decades, in addition to a number of forms that replace the traditional family (e.g. patchwork families), ‘new’ or ‘modern’ family forms have correspondingly been discussed in literature (e.g. rainbow families, queer families). Most research in this area has focused on the immediate development of children in these family forms, such as the perennial question of whether children whose parents are homosexual more likely to display this sexual orientation in adulthood. In this work, the focus was on the parents. In this thesis project, we investigated the extent to which the parents’ parenting style is related to or independent of their sexual orientation. From this starting point, two studies were derived that investigated the parenting styles and related factors of homosexual and heterosexual couples. Study 1 showed correlations between parenting style, sexual orientation, and the temperament of the firstborn child. The homosexual parents reported a warmer parenting style, more cooperation, and less irritation with the temperament of the firstborn child. Study 2 investigated personality and the cooperation between the two parents. Here, both family forms showed many similarities, but they still differed slightly in personality and cooperation. In summary, the results of this doctoral thesis show that there are slight differences in parenting styles between homosexual and heterosexual parents and that these differences are partly significant but should also be considered with caution due to the parents' self-assessment.

Rising Ethnic Diversity in the United States Accompanies Shifts Toward an Individualistic Culture

Rising Ethnic Diversity in the United States Accompanies Shifts Toward an Individualistic Culture. Alex C. Huynh, Igor Grossmann. Social Psychological and Personality Science, October 29, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620967230

Abstract: We investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and the rise of individualism in the United States during the 20th and 21st centuries. Tests of the historical rates of ethnic diversity alongside individualistic relational structures (e.g., adults living alone, single-/multi-child families) from the years 1950 to 2018 reveal that societal and regional rates of ethnic diversity accompanied individualistic relational structures. These effects hold above and beyond time-series trends in each variable. Further evidence from experimental studies (N = 707) suggests that the presence of, and contact with, ethnically diverse others contributes to greater individualistic values (e.g., the importance of uniqueness and personal achievement). Converging evidence across societal-, regional-, and individual-level analyses suggests a systematic link between ethnic diversity and individualism. We discuss the implications of these findings for sociocultural livelihood in light of the rising rates of ethnic diversity across the globe.

Keywords: ethnic diversity, cultural change, cultural cognition, individualism

Moral foundations and political orientation: The basic differences about conservatives and liberals are supported; results may be less generalizable across samples and political cultures than previously thought

Kivikangas, J. M., Fernández-Castilla, B., Järvelä, S., Ravaja, N., & Lönnqvist, J.-E. (2020). Moral foundations and political orientation: Systematic review and meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, Nov 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000308

Abstract: We investigate the relationship of morality and political orientation by focusing on the influential results showing that liberals and conservatives rely on different moral foundations. We conducted a comprehensive literature search from major databases and other sources for primary studies that used the Moral Foundations Questionnaire and a typical measure of political orientation, a political self-placement item. We used a predefined process for independent extraction of effect sizes by two authors and ran both study-level and individual-level analyses. With 89 samples, 605 effect sizes, and 33,804 independent participants, in addition to 192,870 participants from the widely used YourMorals.org website, the basic differences about conservatives and liberals are supported. Yet, heterogeneity is moderate, and the results may be less generalizable across samples and political cultures than previously thought. The effect sizes obtained from the YourMorals.org data appear inflated compared with independent samples, which is partly related to political interest and may be because of self-selection. The association of moral foundations to political orientation varies culturally (between regions and countries) and subculturally (between White and Black respondents and in response to political interest). The associations also differ depending on the choice of the social or economic dimension and its labeling, supporting both the bidimensional model of political orientation and the findings that the dimensions are often strongly correlated. Our findings have implications for interpreting published studies, as well as designing new ones where the political aspect of morality is relevant. The results are primarily limited by the validity of the measures and the homogeneity of the included studies in terms of sample origins. 

Within-person grade variability was largely unstable across subjects & ages & not associated with any of 15 variables that typically explain between-person differences in school performance (e.g. IQ, socioeconomic status, personality traits)

Wright, Megan, and Sophie von Stumm. 2020. “Within-person Variability in School Performance.” PsyArXiv. November 6. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5ne37

Abstract: Although thought to be substantial, within-person variability in school grades has not been systematically studied. Here we analysed data from the Twins Early Development Study (TEDS; Nmax = 11,132) to describe within-person variability across grades in English, maths, and science from age 7 to 16 years. We found that within-person grade variability was largely unstable across subjects and ages. Within-person grade variability at age 16 was not associated with any of 15 variables that typically explain between-person differences in school performance (e.g. IQ, socioeconomic status, and personality traits). Also, within-person grade variability did not predict later educational outcomes at ages 18 and 21. Our findings suggest that within-person grade variability is an observable, but not meaningful psychological construct. We conclude that understanding the causes and consequences of within-person grade variability is of limited epistemological value.

Fukushima Daiichi: Each standard deviation increase in the influx of temporarily relocated survivors within 100 m of a resident’s home address was associated with a decrease in their trust in both people from their community and outside of it

Evaluation of Trust Within a Community After Survivor Relocation Following the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. Krisztina Gero et al. JAMA Netw Open. 2020;3(11):e2021166. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.21166

Key Points

Question  How is the movement of internally displaced survivors in the aftermath of a disaster associated with perceived trust towards others within a host community?

Findings  In this cohort study that included 3250 adults aged 65 years or older, each standard deviation increase in the influx of temporarily relocated survivors within 100 m of a resident’s home address was associated with a decrease in their trust in both people from their community and outside of it.

Meaning  The findings of this study suggest that opportunities for social interaction between old and new residents of host communities may be crucial for maintaining social trust.

Abstract

Importance  Trust is a core component of social cohesion, facilitating cooperation and collective action in the face of adversity and enabling survivors to remain resilient. Residential stability is an important prerequisite of developing trusting relations among community members. However, little is known about whether the movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) after a disaster might change community relations.

Objective  We explored perceived changes in trust within 1 community directly impacted by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.

Design, Setting, and Participants  This prospective cohort study examined survey data from 3594 residents of Iwanuma City, Japan, aged 65 years or older. Data were obtained from the Iwanuma Study—part of the Japan Gerontological Evaluation Study, a nationwide cohort study established in 2010—approximately 7 months before the disaster. All Iwanuma City residents age 65 years or older (8576 residents) were eligible to participate in 2010. The response rate was 59.0% (5058 residents). A follow-up survey was conducted in 2013, approximately 2.5 years after the disaster. Of the 4380 remaining participants who answered the baseline survey, 3594 were recontacted (follow-up rate, 82.1%). Data analysis was performed from July 1, 2019, to January 9, 2020.

Exposures  The number of temporarily relocated Iwanuma City survivors within 100 m and 250 m of a nonrelocated resident’s home address.

Main Outcomes and Measures  Perceived changes in particularized trust (ie, trusting people from the same community) and generalized trust (trusting people from other communities) measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

Results  Among 3250 nonrelocated residents (1808 [55.6%] women; mean [SD] age, 76.5 [6.2] years) of Iwanuma City included in the analytic sample, multivariable-adjusted multinomial logistic regression analyses found that each standard deviation increase in the influx of internally displaced persons (1 SD = 11 IDPs) within 250 m of a resident’s home address was associated with higher odds of a decrease in the resident’s particularized and generalized trust (odds ratio, 1.17; 95% CI, 1.04-1.32).

Conclusions and Relevance  The influx of IDPs in the host community appeared to be associated with an erosion of trust among locals. To avoid the erosion of social cohesion after a disaster, it may be crucial to provide opportunities for social interaction between old and new residents of communities.

Discussion

Our study found that after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, the influx of IDPs to another community was associated with weakening of both generalized and local trust, suggesting that the concentration of IDPs within a temporary shelter village (as happened in Iwanuma) may have a particularly detrimental effect on social cohesion.

Building trust between residents of a community depends on repeated social interactions over an extended period of time, whereas exposure to outsiders or out-groups can trigger conflict and mistrust.²⁰ In a 2007 study, Putnam²⁶ found that the influx of immigrants in communities can spur perceived competition over scarce resources (eg, housing, schools), ultimately resulting in reduced community cooperation and altruism, as well as lower trust not only in people perceived as different, but also in those who are perceived as similar. This study found that internal forced migration after a disaster, even within the same city from 1 district to another, might also lead to the erosion of the trust of nonrelocated residents in people from other communities as well as in people from the same community.

Previously, we reported that relocating IDPs together as a group, as opposed to randomly housing them throughout the community, can be an effective means of preserving social connections and strengthening the resilience of disaster survivors.¹⁰ However, the same policy may also inadvertently promote erosion of trust between older residents of the host community and newcomers.

We have therefore identified a potential dilemma in postdisaster resettlement. Our previous studies^10,27,28 have reported that the resettlement of survivors needs to take into account the preexisting social ties within a disaster-effected community in order to prevent the loss of communality associated with widespread housing destruction. In Iwanuma, the city offered 2 different means of relocation to temporary housing to survivors. People could choose between individual relocation—moving to public housing by a random lottery or seeking housing in the open rental market—or group relocation, in which whole communities would be moved together as a group into prefabricated temporary housing villages (resembling FEMA-style trailer parks in the US). Families who wanted to escape the emergency shelters as soon as possible selected the individual option, so they could leave the shelters as soon as their number came up on the lottery. However, this mode of resettlement had the unintended consequence of disrupting existing social connections in the community and scattering the residents randomly throughout the trailer settlement. We previously found that people selecting the lottery option reported lower levels of social participation and social support.^10,28 By contrast, people selecting group resettlement were even more likely to be engaged in informal social participation 3 years after the disaster compared with before the disaster.¹⁰ However, as the result of our present analysis suggests, the option of moving large numbers of IDPs together and concentrating them into 1 location may lead to greater friction with established residents of host communities.

Limitations

Several limitations need to be considered while interpreting the findings of this study. First, although we controlled for socioeconomic status, depressive symptoms, and personal disaster experiences, there may be residual confounders that we failed to take into account. Second, the number of nonrelocated participants reporting much weaker trust after the earthquake is quite small (12 participants), resulting in relatively wide 95% CIs around the point estimates. Therefore, the results have to be interpreted with caution. Third, because of the uneven distribution of displaced survivors in the community, we were unable to determine the precise threshold between 8 and 21 IDPs when the erosion of trust began to occur. The results suggest that the resettlement of a few scattered individuals in a community was not associated with changes in on local trust. The erosion of trust seemed to appear when larger numbers of people moved in. Fourth, we do not have information on the residential movements of people younger than 65 years, which might not be correlated with the movement of people aged 65 years or older. On the other hand, two-thirds of the population of the city of Iwanuma were aged 65 years or older before the disaster, and the age structure of IDPs was similar. Fifth, it is not clear how participants define people from their community and people from other communities. By 2013, when the question was asked, IDPs had spent approximately 2.5 years in their new environment. Thus, the respondents may have perceived the displaced population as either people from their own community or as outsiders. Hence, the 2 questions about trust might not have distinguished between particularized and generalized trust, which would also explain the similarity of the corresponding OR estimates. Also, perceived change in trust was measured based on 1 question instead of a multi-item scale, which hindered a more precise assessment of trust levels among the respondents. Sixth, the question of the generalizability of our results needs to be considered due to the relatively low response rate (59%) on the baseline survey. However, previous reports based on the JAGES study confirmed that the demographic profile of the participants is similar to the rest of the residents aged 65 years or more in Iwanuma City.^7,10 Moreover, a 59% response rate is comparable with other studies on community-dwelling respondents.²⁹

Confidence is sexy and it can be trained: Examining male social confidence in initial, opposite‐sex interactions

Confidence is sexy and it can be trained: Examining male social confidence in initial, opposite‐sex interactions. Norman P. Li  Jose C. Yong  Ming‐Hong Tsai  Mark H. C. Lai  Amy J. Y. Lim  Joshua M. Ackerman. Journal of Personality, June 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12568

Abstract

Objective: We investigated whether men's social confidence in an initial, opposite‐sex chatting context can be improved through a video tutorial and the extent to which being perceived as socially confident results in being seen as more romantically desirable and worthy of future contact.

Method: Women chatted with men who had received or not received a tutorial on how to handle speed‐dating chats (Study 1: N = 129; Study 2: N = 60) or with male targets selected for having high versus moderate confidence in handling initial, opposite‐sex encounters (Study 3: N = 46).

Results: Tutorial‐trained men felt more confident going into the chats and they, as well as male targets selected for their confidence, were perceived by female chat partners to be higher in social confidence, status, and dominance. However, only perceptions of social confidence were further associated with being perceived as more romantically desirable (as a short‐term mate) and worthy of future contact.

Conclusions: Findings indicate that social confidence is trainable and that other‐perceived social confidence can impact the outcomes of social interactions.

That humans are the rational animal may be overstated; we're not so much rational animals but rather the rationalizing animal

Yong, J. C., Li, N. P., & Kanazawa, S. (2020). Not so much rational but rationalizing: Humans evolved as coherence-seeking, fiction-making animals. American Psychologist, Nov 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000674

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1324712219335184384

Abstract: The evidence for biased perceptions and judgments in humans coupled with evidence for ecological rationality in nonhuman animals suggest that the claim that humans are the rational animal may be overstated. We instead propose that discussions of human psychology may benefit from viewing ourselves not so much as rational animals but rather as the rationalizing animal. The current article provides evidence that rationalization is unique to humans and argues that rationalization processes (e.g., cognitive dissonance reduction, post hoc justification of choices, confabulation of reasons for moral positions) are aimed at creating the fictions we prefer to believe and maintaining the impression that we are psychologically coherent and rational. Coherence appears to be prioritized at the expense of veridicality, suggesting that distorted perceptions and appraisals can be adaptive for humans—under certain circumstances, we are better off understanding ourselves and reality not so accurately. Rationalization also underlies the various shared beliefs, religions, norms, and ideologies that have enabled humans to organize and coordinate their actions on a grand scale, for better or worse. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this unique human psychological trait.

Human neonates prefer colostrum to mature milk; there is evidence for an olfactory bias toward the “initial milk”

Human neonates prefer colostrum to mature milk: Evidence for an olfactory bias toward the “initial milk”? Magali Klaey‐Tassone  Karine Durand  Fabrice Damon  Katrin Heyers  Nawel Mezrai  Bruno Patris  Paul Sagot  Robert Soussignan  Benoist Schaal  the MILKODOR Consortium. American Journal of Human Biology, November 5 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajhb.23521

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1324661491593826306

Abstract

Objectives: Colostrum is the initial milk secretion which ingestion by neonates warrants their adaptive start in life. Colostrum is accordingly expected to be attractive to newborns. The present study aims to assess whether colostrum is olfactorily attractive for 2‐day‐old newborns when presented against mature milk or a control.

Methods: The head‐orientation of waking newborns was videotaped in three experiments pairing the odors of: (a) colostrum (sampled on postpartum day 2, not from own mother) and mature milk (sampled on average on postpartum day 32, not from own mother) (n tested newborns = 15); (b) Colostrum and control (water; n = 9); and (c) Mature milk and control (n = 13).

Results: When facing the odors of colostrum and mature milk, the infants turned their nose significantly longer toward former (32.8 vs 17.7% of a 120‐s test). When exposed to colostrum against the control, they responded in favor of colostrum (32.9 vs 16.6%). Finally, when the odor of mature milk was presented against the control, their response appeared undifferentiated (26.7 vs 28.6%).

Conclusions: These results indicate that human newborns can olfactorily differentiate conspecific lacteal fluids sampled at different lactation stages. They prefer the odor of the mammary secretion ‐ colostrum ‐ collected at the lactation stage that best matches the postpartum age of their own mother. These results are discussed in the context of the earliest mother‐infant chemo‐communication. Coinciding maternal emission and offspring reception of chemosignals conveyed in colostrum may be part of the sensory precursors of attunement between mothers and infants.

Expanding the Measurement of Culture with a Sample of Two Billion Humans: Facebook users across 225 jurisdictions, data on 60,000 topics

Obradovich, Nick, Ömer Özak, Ignacio Martín, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín, Edmond Awad, Manuel Cebrián, Rubén Cuevas, et al. 2020. “Expanding the Measurement of Culture with a Sample of Two Billion Humans.” SocArXiv. September 9. doi:10.31235/osf.io/qkf42

Abstract: Culture has played a pivotal role in human evolution. Yet, the ability of social scientists to study culture is limited by currently available measurement instruments. Scholars of culture must regularly choose between scalable but sparse survey-based methods or restricted but rich ethnographic methods. Here, we demonstrate that massive online social networks can advance the study of human culture by providing quantitative, scalable, and high-resolution measurement of behaviorally revealed cultural values and preferences. We employ publicly available data across nearly 60,000 topic dimensions drawn from two billion Facebook users across 225 countries and territories. The data capture preferences inferred by Facebook from online behaviours on the platform, behaviors on external websites and apps, and offline behaviours captured by smartphones and other devices. We first validate that cultural distances calculated from this measurement instrument correspond to survey-based and objective measures of cultural differences. We then demonstrate that this measure enables insight into the cultural landscape globally at previously impossible resolution. We analyze the importance of national borders in shaping culture and explore unique cultural markers that identify subnational population groups. The global collection of massive data on human behavior provides a high-dimensional complement to traditional cultural metrics, potentially enabling novel insight into fundamental questions in the social sciences. The measure enables detailed investigation into the countries’ geopolitical stability, social cleavages within both small and large-scale human groups, the integration of migrant populations, and the disaffection of certain population groups from the political process, among myriad other potential future applications.

US: Females are now more likely to report drinking and getting drunk in the past month than their male peers for the first time since researchers began measuring such behaviors

Gender Differences in the Epidemiology of Alcohol Use and Related Harms in the United States. Aaron White. American Academy of Anti-Aging, Preventative, and Regenerative Medicine, Nov 5 2020. https://www.worldhealth.net/news/gender-differences-epidemiology-alcohol-use-and-related-harms-united-states/

Over the past century, differences in alcohol use and related harms between males and females in the United States have diminished considerably. In general, males still consume more alcohol and experience and cause more alcohol-related injuries and deaths than females do, but the gaps are narrowing. Among adolescents and emerging adults, gaps in drinking have narrowed primarily because alcohol use among males has declined more than alcohol use among females. Among adults, alcohol use is increasing for women but not for men. Rates of alcohol-related emergency department visits, hospitalizations, and deaths all have increased among adults during the past 2 decades. Consistent with the changing patterns of alcohol use, increases in these outcomes have been larger for women. Recent studies also suggest that females are more susceptible than males to alcohol-induced liver inflammation, cardiovascular disease, memory blackouts, hangovers, and certain cancers. Prevention strategies that address the increases in alcohol consumption and unique health risks for women are needed.

Summary

For at least a century, differences in the prevalence and amount of alcohol consumption between males and females in the United States have been narrowing.73-76 As a result, so have rates of alcohol-related harms, including DUIs, ED visits, hospitalizations, and deaths. Although men still account for more total alcohol consumption and the negative outcomes that follow, the gaps are slowly disappearing. In fact, among adolescents and emerging adults, females are now more likely to report drinking and getting drunk in the past month than their male peers for the first time since researchers began measuring such behaviors.

Importantly, it is not the case that women in the U.S. are simply drinking more like men. Instead, women and men appear to be moving toward one another in terms of drinking patterns and harms. Among adolescents and emerging adults, narrowing gaps are being driven primarily by faster declines in alcohol use by males than females. Among adults, gaps are narrowing primarily because women are drinking more while men are either drinking less or maintaining their levels.

Knowledge of the unique risks that alcohol poses for women—including an increased likelihood of memory blackouts and hangovers and a faster progression of liver disease and AUD—makes recent increases in alcohol use by women more concerning.77 Although alcohol use by pregnant women has declined, research regarding the impact of prenatal alcohol exposure has accelerated and suggests that relatively small amounts of alcohol can produce detectable changes in morphology and deficits in cognitive and motor function. It is important to consider the unique factors that might influence alcohol use among women, and the unique direct and secondhand health effects that alcohol poses for women, when developing prevention strategies to address alcohol use and related harms.

Hippocampal Volume and Navigational Ability: The Map(ping) Is Not to Scale

Weisberg, Steven M., and Arne Ekstrom. 2020. “Hippocampal Volume and Navigational Ability: The Map(ping) Is Not to Scale.” PsyArXiv. November 5. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ckh7s

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1324408676262825990

Abstract: A critical question regards the neural basis of complex cognitive skill acquisition. One extensively studied skill is navigation, with evidence suggesting that humans vary widely in navigation abilities. Yet, data supporting the neural underpinning of these individual differences are mixed. Some evidence suggests robust structure-function relations between hippocampal volume and navigation ability, whereas other experiments show no such correlation. We focus on several possibilities for these discrepancies: 1) volumetric hippocampal changes are relevant only at the extreme ranges of navigational abilities; 2) hippocampal volume correlates across individuals but only for specific measures of navigation skill; 3) hippocampal volume itself does not correlate with navigation skill acquisition; connectivity patterns are more relevant. To explore this third possibility, we present a model emphasizing functional connectivity changes, particularly to extra-hippocampal structures. This class of models arises from the premise that navigation is dynamic and that good navigators flexibly solve spatial challenges. These models pave the way for research on other skills and provide more precise predictions for the neural basis of skill acquisition.

How the COVID‐19 pandemic has changed our lives: A study of psychological correlates across 59 countries

How the COVID‐19 pandemic has changed our lives: A study of psychological correlates across 59 countries. Elisabet Alzueta  Paul Perrin  Fiona C. Baker  Sendy Caffarra  Daniela Ramos‐Usuga  Dilara Yuksel  Juan Carlos Arango‐Lasprilla. Journal of Clinical Psychology, October 31 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.23082

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1324384844302999554

Abstract

Objective: This study examined the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic and subsequent social restrictions or quarantines on the mental health of the global adult population.

Method: A sample of 6,882 individuals (Mage = 42.30; 78.8% female) from 59 countries completed an online survey asking about several pandemic‐related changes in life and psychological status.

Results: Of these participants, 25.4% and 19.5% reported moderate‐to‐severe depression (DASS‐21) and anxiety symptoms (GAD‐7), respectively. Demographic characteristics (e.g. higher‐income country), COVID‐19 exposure (e.g., having had unconfirmed COVID‐19 symptoms), government‐imposed quarantine level, and COVID‐19‐based life changes (e.g., having a hard time transitioning to working from home; increase in verbal arguments or conflict with other adult in home) explained 17.9% of the variance in depression and 21.5% in anxiety symptoms.

Conclusions: In addition to posing a high risk to physical health, the COVID‐19 pandemic has robustly affected global mental health, so it is essential to ensure that mental health services reach individuals showing pandemic‐related depression and anxiety symptoms.

4 DISCUSSION

This study examined the effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic on the mental health of adults in the general population of five global regions, as well as the demographic risk factors that may have made depression and anxiety symptoms more likely. This is one of the first studies to provide a global perspective on the pandemic's effects on mental health. While the majority of the sample had low or mild levels of depression and anxiety symptoms during the pandemic, a significant proportion of respondents reported moderate to severe symptoms of depression (25.4%) and anxiety (19.5%). These prevalence rates help generalize to a much larger global population the high rates of mental health issues found in previous studies of specific global regions or countries (Solomou & Constantinidou, 2020). COVID‐19‐related life changes were the strongest predictors of higher depression and anxiety symptoms over and above effects of demographics, quarantine level, and COVID‐19 exposure. Myriad consequences of the pandemic, including challenges paying bills, inability to access food, conflict in the home, and separation from loved ones were linked with poorer mental health.

In line with the current results, emerging studies have consistently reported a high prevalence of depression and anxiety symptoms in populations around the world during the COVID‐19 pandemic (Ahmed et al., 2020; Gao et al., 2020; Li et al., 2020; Mazza et al., 2020; Moghanibashi‐Mansourieh, 2020, Solomou & Constantinidou, 2020; Ueda et al., 2020; Wang, Wang, et al., 2020). While most of these cross‐sectional studies—including the current study—can only show levels of and not change in depression and anxiety symptoms in the populations studied during the pandemic, a cross‐sectional study in China (Ahmed et al., 2020) comparing the psychological impact during the outbreak with an epidemiological study conducted before the pandemic (Huang et al., 2019) concluded that the rates of anxiety, depression, and alcohol consumption were higher, and mental well‐being was lower, among Chinese people during the COVID‐19 outbreak than before. In addition, a longitudinal study comparing pre‐ and during‐pandemic levels of depression, anxiety, and well‐being in two UK population cohorts reported a significant decrease in well‐being and a higher probability of anxiety disorders during the pandemic (24% in vs. the previous 13%; Kwong et al., 2020). Altogether, evidence so far points to the pandemic's negative effect on mental health.

Certain populations may be more vulnerable to the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic on mental health. In line with previous studies (Kwong et al., 2020; Mazza et al., 2020; Moghanibashi‐Mansourieh, 2020; Solomou & Constantinidou; 2020; Stanton et al., 2020; Wang, Wang, et al., 2020), the current study found a higher prevalence of depression and anxiety symptoms among women or people with a nonbinary/transgender relative to men. These findings also are consistent with the literature showing a strong association between woman gender and a higher prevalence of anxiety and depression in the general population in nonpandemic times (Baxter et al., 2014; Kessler, 2003), suggesting gender‐role influences on coping with or reporting of mental health symptoms (Mrazek, and Haggerty, 1994; Sandanger et al., 2004). This somewhat consistent finding is complex, and researchers and theorists have postulated many explanations for it, ranging from social norms for the gender‐role based experience of emotion, to personality traits, to hormones (Albert, 2015). Whatever the source of these effects, the current findings suggest that women and nonbinary‐trans individuals may be at greater risk for mental health symptoms during the pandemic.

The current study found other demographic factors, such as younger age, not being partnered, and living in a high‐income country to be associated with higher levels of depression and anxiety symptoms during the pandemic. In terms of age, others researchers have reported that younger adults may be more vulnerable to the effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic (Moghanibashi‐Mansourieh, 2020; Qiu et al., 2020; Stanton et al., 2020), which could be a consequence of greater exposure to media, how they are affected by financial crisis, and managing workload responsibilities (Ahmed et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020). Also, studies about previous outbreaks have attributed the greater vulnerability of young people to a less effective use of coping strategies than older adults (Yeung & Fung, 2007). The current finding that being not partnered was associated with more depression and anxiety symptoms supports findings in the general population that being separated or divorced are risk factors for some psychological disorders (Afifi et al., 2006; Andrade et al., 2003).

The finding that living in a high‐income country during the pandemic is a risk factor for depression and anxiety might seem counterintuitive, though it is in line with studies showing that citizens of these countries report more stress relative to those in low‐to‐middle income countries (Br et al., 2011). A related (and likely overlapping) finding was that countries belonging to the Latin America and Caribbean cluster showed a lower prevalence of mental health symptoms compared to countries belonging to North America, Europe and Central Asia, and Sub‐Saharan Africa clusters. Comparing psychological symptoms across different cultures and countries presents complex challenges (Van Bavel et al., 2020), and therefore these findings should be interpreted with caution. However, differences found in symptoms across global regions might in part be explained by the timing of data collection. The COVID‐19 pandemic outbreak has evolved rapidly and asynchronously across countries. At the time of data collection, the outbreak was more severe in North America, Europe, and Central Asia in comparison to the Latin America and Caribbean region (see report from World Health Organization, 2020). Prevalence studies during the pandemic have shown the severity of psychological symptoms are especially high in areas most affected by COVID‐19 (Moghanibashi‐Mansourieh, 2020; Solomou & Constantinidou, 2020). Therefore, lower levels of depression and anxiety reported in global regions might be explained by a possible lower perception of COVID‐19 severity or threat.

The main finding of this study is that even though certain demographic characteristics and COVID‐19 exposure were associated with increased symptoms of depression and anxiety, the effects that COVID‐19 had on a person's life were generally the most robust predictors of negative psychological effects. The most notable effects included the impact that the COVID‐19 pandemic had on economic stability (i.e., being unable to get enough food or healthy food, being unable to pay important bills like rent or utilities), work (i.e., having a hard time doing one's job well because of needing to take care of people in the home, having a hard time making the transition to working from home), and social aspects (i.e., being separated from family or close friends, having an increase in verbal arguments or conflict with other adults in home). Somewhat surprisingly, level of quarantine or social restrictions issued by governments at the time of data collection was not a notable predictor of depression and anxiety symptoms. Thus, depression and anxiety in the current sample were not directly accounted for by governmental restrictions but rather likely the consequences of these restrictions and the pandemic as a whole on participants’ lives. Studies from prior epidemics have shown that social isolation during a quarantine period is commonly associated with anxiety and depression symptoms (DiGiovanni et al., 2004; Hawryluck et al., 2004). Also, comparing data from a quarantined population versus no‐quarantined population during the COVID‐19 outbreak in China (n = 1593), a study reported a higher prevalence of depression (22.4% vs 11.9%) and anxiety (12.9% vs 6.7%) in the quarantined group (Lei et al., 2020).

The specific unique effects found within the regression provide evidence that COVID‐19‐related life changes, especially in home and work spheres, were associated with increased depression and anxiety symptoms. Changes in family structure and roles can cause psychological distress, ultimately affecting the relational environment at home (Prime et al., 2020). In this sense, caregivers who must adapt their work routines to care for others at home are at a higher risk of burden. In addition, results from the present study show that verbal arguments or conflicts with others at home during the confinement were very strongly associated with depression and anxiety symptoms. A previously problematic family environment combined with financial strain and social isolation—both well‐known domestic abuse risk factors (Usher et al., 2020)—might lead to escalating conflicts and violence at home during confinement. Indeed, there has been an unprecedented wave of intimate partner violence during the COVID‐19 pandemic (Campbell 2020). Economic insecurity, increase exposure to possible abusive relationships, as well as limited access to support in the community, among others, have been related to intimate partner violence during the COVID‐19 pandemic (Peterman et al. 2020). Therefore, providing accessible mental health support to vulnerable families while confined is critical.

Findings presented here need to be interpreted in the context of several study limitations. First, the ongoing COVID‐19 pandemic is a volatile phenomenon affecting countries in different ways. This cross‐sectional study represents the effects of the pandemic on an adult population in several global regions during a specific period of time (April–May 2020), and therefore, different countries and even different regions within a country were experiencing different scenarios in relation to the pandemic. However, it is important to note that many of the countries were experiencing a prominent peak in the COVID‐19 pandemic, and all participants’ countries were under some kind of social isolation measures at the time of data collection. Also, with the cross‐sectional design, it is not possible to conclude directionality of the relationships found, and people with poor mental health also could have reported worse life changes based on depression‐ or anxiety‐driven viewpoints. In addition, even while much effort was made to achieve a generalizable global sample, the representation of countries in different global regions or of specific demographic characteristics was not equal. Therefore, comparisons between global regions, and generalizability to the entire global population, must be viewed with caution. Certain global regions (e.g., North America, Europe) had a much higher representation than other regions (e.g., Asia, Africa) due to limitations in the snowball data collection approach and languages used. Due to the high representation of women in the sample, a finding commonly observed in other psychological studies (Plomecka et al., 2020; Solomou & Constantinidou, 2020), generalizations to men also should be made with an appropriate degree of caution.