Why Working from Home Will Stick -- Plus: Only one-fifth of the productivity gains will show up in conventional productivity measures, because they do not capture the time savings from less commuting

Why Working from Home Will Stick. Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom & Steven J. Davis. NBER Working Paper 28731, April 2021. DOI 10.3386/w28731

COVID-19 drove a mass social experiment in working from home (WFH). We survey more than 30,000 Americans over multiple waves to investigate whether WFH will stick, and why. Our data say that 20 percent of full workdays will be supplied from home after the pandemic ends, compared with just 5 percent before. We develop evidence on five reasons for this large shift: better-than-expected WFH experiences, new investments in physical and human capital that enable WFH, greatly diminished stigma associated with WFH, lingering concerns about crowds and contagion risks, and a pandemic-driven surge in technological innovations that support WFH. We also use our survey data to project three consequences: First, employees will enjoy large benefits from greater remote work, especially those with higher earnings. Second, the shift to WFH will directly reduce spending in major city centers by at least 5-10 percent relative to the pre-pandemic situation. Third, our data on employer plans and the relative productivity of WFH imply a 5 percent productivity boost in the post-pandemic economy due to re-optimized working arrangements. Only one-fifth of this productivity gain will show up in conventional productivity measures, because they do not capture the time savings from less commuting.

This research documents a “light = healthy” intuition, such that consumers perceive foods that weigh less are healthier than their heavier counterparts with the same serving size

The Light = Healthy Intuition. Yi Li  Nico Heuvinck  Mario Pandelaere. Journal of Consumer Psychology, May 2 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1249

Abstract: This research documents a “light = healthy” intuition, such that consumers perceive foods that weigh less are healthier than their heavier counterparts with the same serving size. Subsequently, consumers consume a larger quantity of lighter‐weight foods. The intuition is based on a co‐activation of two meanings of the word “light”: light in physical weight and light in calorie content. An implicit attitude test finds support for this association between physical weight and food healthiness. Two studies show that physically lighter foods are perceived to be healthier because they are assumed to contain fewer calories. In line with the proposed co‐activation mechanism, the intuition is bi‐directional, where consumers also expect healthier foods to weigh less. Consequently, they discredit health claims issued for heavier foods. Finally, it was found that activating a competing intuition is effective at debiasing the “light = healthy” intuition.

Those with low self-esteem and a weaker sense of control over their fates are more likely to blame the political system for the challenges they face in their lives

Why Some Blame Politics for Their Personal Problems. Vanessa Baird, Jennifer Wolak. American Politics Research, May 2, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211013463

Abstract: Why do some people blame the political system for the problems in their lives? We explore the origins of these grievances and how people assign responsibility and blame for the challenges they face. We propose that individual differences in the personality traits of locus of control and self-esteem help explain why some blame the political system for their personal problems. Using responses from a module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show that those with low self-esteem and a weaker sense of control over their fates are more likely to blame the political system for the challenges they face in their lives. We also demonstrate that this assignment of blame is politically consequential, where those who intertwine the personal and the political are more likely to evaluate elected officials based on pocketbook economic conditions rather than sociotropic considerations.

Keywords: self-esteem, locus of control, personality, attribution of blame

Maternal grandmothers tend to improve child survival rates as do potential sibling helpers at the nest (though the latter observation is based on rather few studies); fathers have little effect on child survival

Who keeps children alive? A review of the effects of kin on child survival. Rebecca Sear, Ruth Mace. Evolution and Human Behavior, Volume 29, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.10.001

Abstract: Children pose a problem. The extended period of childhood dependency and short interbirth intervals mean that human mothers have to care for several dependent children simultaneously. Most evolutionary anthropologists now agree that this is too much of an energetic burden for mothers to manage alone and that they must enlist help from other relatives to share the costs of raising children. Which kin help is the subject of much debate. Here, we review the evidence for whether the presence of kin affects child survival rates, in order to infer whether mothers do receive help in raising offspring and who provides this help. These 45 studies come from a variety of (mostly) natural fertility populations, both historical and contemporary, across a wide geographical range. We find that in almost all studies, at least one relative (apart from the mother) does improve the survival rates of children but that relatives differ in whether they are consistently beneficial to children or not. Maternal grandmothers tend to improve child survival rates as do potential sibling helpers at the nest (though the latter observation is based on rather few studies). Paternal grandmothers show somewhat more variation in their effects on child survival. Fathers have surprisingly little effect on child survival, with only a third of studies showing any beneficial effects. Overall, this review suggests that whilst help from kin may be a universal feature of human child-rearing, who helps is dependent on ecological conditions.

Keywords: Cooperative breedingGrandmothersFathersChild mortalityLife history

Parental & sibling incarceration has beneficial effects on some important outcomes for children, reducing their likelihood of incarceration by 4.9 pct points and improving their adult neighborhood quality

The Effects of Parental and Sibling Incarceration: Evidence from Ohio. Samuel Norris, Matthew Pecenco, Jeffrey Weaver. American Economic Review, Apr 2021. https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20190415

Abstract: Every year, millions of Americans experience the incarceration of a family member. Using 30 years of administrative data from Ohio and exploiting differing incarceration propensities of randomly assigned judges, this paper provides the first quasi-experimental estimates of the effects of parental and sibling incarceration in the US. Parental incarceration has beneficial effects on some important outcomes for children, reducing their likelihood of incarceration by 4.9 percentage points and improving their adult neighborhood quality. While estimates on academic performance and teen parenthood are imprecise, we reject large positive or negative effects. Sibling incarceration leads to similar reductions in criminal activity.

Reactions from academia: Emmerich Davies on Twitter: "What are we even doing here? "Parental incarceration has beneficial effects on some important outcomes for children, reducing their likelihood of incarceration by 4.9 percentage points and improving their adult neighborhood quality."

Check also Parental Incarceration and Children’s Educational Attainment. Carolina Arteaga. Department of Economics, University of Toronto. November 24, 2020. https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5664c583e4b0c0bb910ceb3b/t/60253d569ce8df19c83b7999/1613053272962/Parentalncarceration_Nov2020.pdf

Abstract: This paper presents new evidence showing that parental incarceration increases children’s educational attainment. I collect criminal records for 90,000 low-income parents who have been convicted of a crime in Colombia, and link them with administrative data on the educational attainment of their children. I exploit exogenous variation in incarceration resulting from the random assignment of defendants to judges, and extend the standard framework to incorporate both conviction and incarceration decisions. I show that the effect of incarceration for a given conviction threshold can be identified. My results indicate that parental incarceration increases educational attainment by 0.78 years for the children of convicted parents on the margin of incarceration.

JEL No. I24,J24,K42

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Multiple mechanisms could explain a negative causal effect of parental incarceration on child outcomes. The incarceration of a parent is typically a shocking experience for a child (Parke and Clarke-Stewart, 2003). It is usually followed by financial hardship, disruptions in children’s daily lives, such as unstable childcare arrangements and moves among homes or schools, and growing up without a parent has been linked to adverse outcomes for children (McLanahan et al., 2013). Working in the opposite direction, there are reasons to believe that parental incarceration might be positive for some children. Parents in prison have very high rates of drug and alcohol abuse, are more likely to suffer from mental health disorders and to have experienced childhood trauma, and are also more likely to have engaged in intimate partner violence.1 As a result, for some families, removing a violent parent or a negative role model from the household can create a safer environment for a child. Furthermore, a large literature documents the intergenerational transmission of violence, substance abuse and crime (Hjalmarsson and Lindquist, 2012), and incarceration can help to limit or break such transmission. Ultimately, the sign and size of such effects are empirical matters, motivating the current analysis.

When asked to choose between two similar donation targets, we are more likely to opt out of donating than when asked to donate to a single target; due to a the conflict between the wish to be helpful and the wish to be fair

The Adverse Effect of Choice in Donation Decisions. Danit Ein‐Gar  Liat Levontin  Tehila Kogut. Journal of Consumer Psychology, February 22 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1230

Abstract: Many charitable organizations offer potential donors the option to choose their donation recipients—suggesting that organizations perceive the availability of such choice as beneficial to donation raising. Building upon research on choice aversion in the context of consumer goods and on the identifiable victim effect in the context of donation giving, we propose that the need to choose one target among multiple needy targets might, in fact, hinder donations. Results of six studies show that when prospective donors are asked to choose between two similar donation targets, they are more likely to opt out of donating altogether than when asked to donate to a single target. We show that the effect of choice on opt‐out rates in donation settings is driven by the conflict between the wish to be helpful and the wish to be fair. We further show that when the conflict is resolved and the choice does not raise fairness concerns, the effect is attenuated and opt‐out rates decline.

Accepting non-classical logic is associated with having had a self-transcendent experience; non-realism regarding aesthetics and morality is associated with having used psychoactive substances such as psychedelics and marijuana

The psychology of philosophy: Associating philosophical views with psychological traits in professional philosophers. David B. Yaden & Derek E. Anderson. Philosophical Psychology, Apr 27 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.1915972

Abstract: Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, well-being, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included non-technical ‘translations’ of these views for eventual use in other populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value.

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Digest: What Predicts Professional Philosophers’ Views? (updated) | Daily Nous / Justin Weinberg

Some of their results were negative, or findings of a lack of correlation:

• Age, gender, relationship status, income, ethnicity, professional status yielded no significant findings of correlations with particular philosophical views.
• None of the five factor model’s list of personality traits (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) were associated with specific philosophical views.
• Neither exercise nor meditation were associated with any views.
• “Anti-naturalism” (a cluster of beliefs including libertarian notions of free will, nonphysicalism about the mind, belief in God, non-naturalism, belief in the metaphysical possibility of philosophical Zombies, and the further fact view of personal identity) is largely unassociated with particular personality traits or well-being.

But they did find some positive correlations:

• Theism is associated with agreeableness.
• Hard determinism is associated with lower life satisfaction and higher depression/anxiety.
• Consequentialism, realism, physicalism, and correspondence theories of truth are associated with more numerical interest
• Believing philosophical zombies are metaphysically possible is associated with conscientiousness
• Theism and idealism are associated with having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience.
• Accepting non-classical logic is associated with having had a self-transcendent experience.
• Non-realism regarding aesthetics and morality is associated with having used psychoactive substances such as psychedelics and marijuana.
• Contextualism about knowledge claims is associated with supporting more public education about philosophy
• Naturalism is associated with the notion that projects such as this one by Yaden and Anderson have philosophical value

The authors also found evidence of correlations between being an analytic philosopher and supporting certain philosophical views, such as the correspondence theory of truth, realism about the external world, invariantism about knowledge claims, scientific realism, and that one ought to pull the switch (sacrifice one person to save five others) in the bystander part of the trolley problem.

Additionally, they found that being more politically right-leaning was associated with several philosophical views, such as theism, free will libertarianism, nonphysicalist views in philosophy of mind, and the correspondence theory of truth.

From 2012... Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains: Fact, value, and religion

Evolutionary debunking arguments in three domains: Fact, value, and religion. John S. Wilkins, Paul E. Griffiths. In James Maclaurin Greg Dawes (ed.), A New Science of Religion. Routledge (2012). Phil Papers, https://philpapers.org/archive/WILEDA-3

Abstract: Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our  minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they  produce are true, rather than merely useful? We consider this problem for beliefs in three  different domains: religion, morality, and commonsense and scientific claims about matters of empirical fact. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. One reply is that evolution can be expected to design systems that produce true beliefs in some domain. This reply works for commonsense beliefs and can be extended to scientific beliefs. But it does not work for moral or religious beliefs. An alternative reply which has been used defend moral beliefs is that their truth does not consist in their tracking some external state  of affairs. Whether or not it is successful in the case of moral beliefs, this reply is less plausible for religious beliefs. So religious beliefs emerge as particularly vulnerable to evolutionary  debunking.

5. Evolutionary skepticism and ethics

Since the late nineteenth century most moral philosophers have rejected attempts to derive moral principles from evolution. But most of these philosophers have not supposed that evolution actively undermines our moral principles. But there is an evolutionary debunking argument which has precisely this implication. The argument suggests is that evolution of the moral sense is an ‘offtrack’ process because it has no intrinsic tendency to produce a moral sense that tracks moral truths. This idea can be found in Darwin’s own discussion of the evolution of morality:

“In the same manner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines of conduct. If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering.”(Darwin 1981 [1871])vi

Darwin argues that if our ecology had been different, then we would judge different things to be right and wrong, just as different species of animals judge different things to be beautiful. Animals are aesthetically attracted to things to which it is fitness-enhancing for them to be attracted. Just so, Darwin argues, they will approve whatever actions which it is fitness-enhancing for them to approve. This would seem to imply either that evolution is an off-track process with respect to evaluative truth, or that evaluative truths are truths about what maximises reproductive fitness. If this is right, then the only alternative to moral scepticism would, indeed, be evolutionary ethics.vii There is no Milvian bridge connecting moral truth to pragmatic success and thus defending morality from evolutionary skepticism, because contemporary evolutionary explanations of morality, just like Darwin’s explanation, do not involve any adaptive advantages produced by detecting and acting in accordance with objective moral facts.viii But Kahane notes that the assumption that moral truths correspond to objective moral facts is one that is questioned by many moral philosophers for independent reasons.

The evolutionary skeptical argument against ethics would be better stated as follows:

1. Causal premise. Our evolutionary history explains why we have the evaluative beliefs we have. 

2. Epistemic premise. Evolution is not a truth-tracking process with respect to evaluative truth.

3. Metaethical assumption. Objectivism (moral realism) is the correct account of evaluative discourse 

 C. Evaluative scepticism. None of our evaluative beliefs is justified.

If we deny the assumption that evaluative beliefs denote moral realities then conclusion fails to follow. Non-cognitivist ethical theories, according to which the function of ethical judgments is not to express facts but to express allegiance to a norm, remain viable in moral philosophy (van Roojen 2009). Moreover, it has been argued that some forms of cognitivism also evade the argument because their account of moral truths does not involve the existence of moral facts which need to be ‘tracked’ in the manner envisaged by the argument (Harms 2000; Carruthers and James 2008). So the evolutionary debunking argument is best conceived as an argument against strong forms of moral realism, rather than simply against moral truth. The case of ethics shows that there are two responses to an evolutionary debunking argument. The first is to build a Milvian bridge, and argue that evolution will select cognitive faculties that track truth in a domain. The second is to argue that ‘truth’ in a certain domain is not a matter of tracking some external state of affairs, so that the question of whether evolution is an off-track process in that domain does not arise. In the next section we ask if either of these responses is available when evolutionary skepticism is applied to religious beliefs.

Behavioural sex differences are to some extent related to sex differences in brain structure, but that this is mainly driven by differences in brain size, and causality should be interpreted cautiously

van Eijk, Liza, Dajiang Zhu, Baptiste Couvy-Duchesne, Lachlan T. Strike, Anthony J. Lee, Narelle K. Hansell, Paul Thompson, et al. 2021. “Are Sex Differences in Human Brain Structure Associated with Sex Differences in Behaviour?” PsyArXiv. April 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8fcve

Abstract: On average, men and women differ in brain structure and behaviour, raising the possibility of a link between sex differences in brain and behaviour. But women and men are also subject to different societal and cultural norms. We navigated this challenge by investigating variability of sex-differentiated brain structure within each sex. Using data from the Queensland Twin IMaging study (N=1,040) and Human Connectome Project (N=1,113), we obtained data-driven measures of individual differences along a male-female dimension for brain and behaviour based on average sex differences in brain structure and behaviour, respectively. We found a weak association between these brain and behavioural differences, driven by brain size. These brain and behavioural differences were moderately heritable. Our findings suggest that behavioural sex differences are to some extent related to sex differences in brain structure, but that this is mainly driven by differences in brain size, and causality should be interpreted cautiously.

Grumpy face during adult sleep: A clue to negative emotion during sleep?

Grumpy face during adult sleep: A clue to negative emotion during sleep? Jean‐Baptiste Maranci  Alexia Aussel  Marie Vidailhet  Isabelle Arnulf. Journal of Sleep Research, April 29 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/jsr.13369

Summary: Negative facial expressions and frowns have been studied (albeit more rarely than smiles) in fetus’ and neonate’ sleep, but they have not been investigated during adult sleep. Video polysomnography (including corrugator muscle electromyography and face‐focussed video) was used to study negative facial expressions in sleeping adults, including healthy subjects and patients with/out parasomnia. Frowns were observed during sleep in 89/91 (97.8%) adults during normal (29 healthy subjects) and abnormal sleep (29 patients without parasomnia, 15 patients with disorders of arousal and 18 patients with rapid eye movement [REM] sleep behaviour disorder [RBD]). In healthy subjects, the following events occurred in decreasing frequency: isometric corrugator activations, brief frowns, and then prolonged frowns and raised eyebrows (both similarly rare). Frowns predominated in REM sleep, and had a lower frequency in non‐REM sleep. In healthy subjects, frowns were elementary and not associated with other face movements to the point of composing negative expressions. In contrast, frowns were occasionally associated with overt negative facial expressions in REM sleep in patients with RBD and a young patient with night terrors. They included mostly painful expressions and rarely sadness and anger in connection with apparently negative behaviours (shouts, painful moaning, and speeches). Frowns persist during normal sleep (mostly in REM sleep) in adults, but overt negative facial expressions are restricted to patients with parasomnia. Whether elementary frowns translate a negative dream emotion should be determined, but overt negative facial expressions during RBD could be used as a direct access to dream emotions.

Why surprisingly? "Surprisingly, sons—and not daughters—have a systematic negative effect on feminist self‐identification & support for electing more women, & a positive effect on support for traditional gender roles"

The Effect of Children's Gender on Parents’ Attitudes Toward Women. Nicole Y. Wesley  James C. Garand. Social Science Quarterly, April 26 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12976

Abstract: Scholars have found that the gender of children—particularly, having daughters—has a discernible effect on parents’ attitudinal and behavioral support for the empowerment of women. In this article, we explore how the gender of children affects the gender attitudes of parents. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Study (ANES) survey, we estimate the effects of children's gender on parents’ feminist self‐identification, support for more women representatives, and attitudes toward traditional gender roles, both in general and separately for men and women. Surprisingly, we find that sons—and not daughters—have a systematic negative effect on feminist self‐identification and support for electing more women, as well as a positive effect on support for traditional gender roles. The effects of sons on feminist self‐identification and traditional gender roles are observed for both men and women, while the effects of sons on support for more women representatives are limited to women. It appears that having a son decreases support for feminist and egalitarian gender attitudes in both men and women to varying degrees across a variety of dimensions.

The Development of the Liking Gap: Children Older Than 5 Years Think That Partners Evaluate Them Less Positively Than They Evaluate Their Partners

The Development of the Liking Gap: Children Older Than 5 Years Think That Partners Evaluate Them Less Positively Than They Evaluate Their Partners. Wouter Wolf, Amanda Nafe, Michael Tomasello. Psychological Science, April 29, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620980754

Abstract: After two strangers have briefly interacted with one another, both believe that they like their partner more than their partner likes them. A plausible explanation for this liking gap is that people are constantly worrying about how others are evaluating them. If so, one would expect the liking gap to emerge in young children as they become more concerned with their reputations and the impression they make on other people. The current study (N = 241 U.S. children; age range = 4–11 years) supported this hypothesis, showing a liking gap beginning when children were 5 years old, the age at which they first become concerned with other people’s evaluations of them. Moreover, the liking gap became more pronounced as children got older. These findings provide the first developmental description of the liking gap and support the hypothesis that this phenomenon is related to individuals’ concerns for how others evaluate them.

Keywords: childhood development, interpersonal interaction, social interaction, social perception, self-esteem, open data, preregistered

Couple Simulation: A Novel Approach for Evaluating Models of Human Mate Choice

Couple Simulation: A Novel Approach for Evaluating Models of Human Mate Choice. Daniel Conroy-Beam. Personality and Social Psychology Review, January 7, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868320971258

Popular version Computer Love | The UCSB Current

Abstract: Choosing a mate is perhaps the most important decision a sexually reproducing organism makes in its lifetime. And yet, psychologists lack a precise description of human mate choice, despite sustained attention from several theoretical perspectives. Here, I argue this limited progress owes to the complexity of mate choice and describe a new modeling approach, called “couple simulation,” designed to compare models of mate choice by challenging them to reproduce real couples within simulated mating markets. I present proof-of-concept simulations that demonstrate couple simulation can identify a population’s true model of mate choice. Furthermore, I apply couple simulation to two samples of real couples and find that the method (a) successfully reconstructs real-world couples, (b) discriminates between models of mate choice, and (c) predicts a wide range of dimensions of relationship quality. Collectively, these results provide evidence that couple simulation offers a framework useful for evaluating theories of human mate choice.

Keywords: mate choice, human mating, relationships, agent-based modeling

The (bidirectional) associations between romantic attachment orientations and mate retention behavior in male-female romantic couples

The (bidirectional) associations between romantic attachment orientations and mate retention behavior in male-female romantic couples. Nicole Barbaro et al. Evolution and Human Behavior, April 29 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.04.005

Abstract: Attachment orientations of anxiety and avoidance are associated with many important romantic relationship outcomes. An evolutionary perspective has informed research on the associations between attachment orientations and mate retention behaviors, which individuals perform to retain their romantic partner and maintain their relationship. In the current article, we report two dyadic studies (n = 104, United States; n = 978, Germany, Switzerland, Austria) that evaluated: (1) whether bivariate associations between attachment orientations and mate retention domains are replicable; (2) whether an individual's attachment orientation predicts their partner's mate retention behaviors; and (3) whether, over time, mate retention behaviors predict attachment orientations within couples. Results of both studies replicated previous bivariate associations between attachment anxiety and cost-inflicting mate retention behaviors. Longitudinal dyadic data from Study 2 demonstrated that cost-inflicting mate retention behaviors, specifically, predict future attachment anxiety in romantic partners. These results contribute to the emerging body of research addressing the associations between attachment orientations and mate retention behaviors, and suggest an important (bidirectional) role of attachment anxiety in predicting negative partner-directed behaviors in romantic relationships.

Keywords: AttachmentClose relationshipsMate retentionAPIM

Within age-gap relationships, older men & women were perceived as reaping greater rewards than their younger partners; perceived inequity predicted prejudice towards age-gap, but not age-matched, couples

Perceived inequity predicts prejudice towards age-gap relationships. Brian Collisson & Luciana Ponce De Leon. Current Psychology volume 39, pages2108–2115, Dec 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-018-9895-6

Abstract: Age-gap couples often elicit negative stereotypes and prejudice. According to social exchange and equity theories, we predicted that prejudice towards age-gap couples may stem from perceived relational inequity. We hypothesized that age-gap, as compared to age-matched, couples were perceived as less equitable and, as a result, less liked. To test these hypotheses, people evaluated, and inferred the equity of, age-gap and age-matched relationships. We found that age-gap, as compared to age-matched, couples were more disliked and perceived as less equitable. Within age-gap relationships, older men and women were perceived as reaping greater rewards than their younger partners. Importantly, perceived inequity predicted prejudice towards age-gap, but not age-matched, couples. In exploratory analyses, age-gap couples consistently elicited significantly more prejudice than other types of couples. Implications for age-gap relationships and future research are discussed.

Discussion

In sum, our hypotheses were largely confirmed. People

expressed greater prejudice towards age-gap couples than

age-matched couples. People also perceived greater inequity

among age-gap couples, such that they perceived that older

partners reap greater rewards than their younger partners.

Furthermore, perceived inequity predicted prejudice towards

age-gap, but not age-matched, couples. That is, the more onesided

people perceived age-gap relationships to be, the more

prejudice they expressed.

However, it is also important to note that for both types of

age-gap couples (i.e., old man/young woman, young man/old

woman), people expressed greater prejudice and perceived

greater inequity than they did for age-matched couples (i.e.,

young man, young woman, old man/old woman). However,

the relation between perceived inequity and prejudice was

greater for old man/young woman couples than young man/

old woman. Although this null effect should be interpreted

cautiously, it does suggest that the degree to which people

perceive certain relationships as inequitable may better predict

prejudice towards some couples more than others.

Furthermore, our exploratory analyses found that participants

own age and gender did not moderate their prejudice

towards age-gap couples. However, exploratory analyses did

reveal differences in the amount of prejudice elicited by different

types of couples (e.g., those who differ in race, weight,

or finances). Interestingly, people evaluated age-gap couples

less favorably than interracial, mixed-weight, or mixedsocioeconomic

status couples. Because this finding was not

predicted, it should be interpreted cautiously. Nonetheless, it

suggests the need for further research on age-gap couples, in

general, and the potential reasons why age-gap couples might

elicit greater prejudice than other types of couples,

specifically.

Although exploratory analyses are interesting and potentially

meaningful for future theory development, exploratory

findings should be interpreted cautiously. They were not predicted

and are currently not supported by theory. For instance,

it is possible that people may perceive that age-gap couples are

more inequitable than other types of couples and therefore,

elicit greater prejudice. It is also possible that people perceive

age-related prejudice as more socially acceptable than race or

weight-related prejudice and therefore, feel more comfortable

rating age-gap couples negatively. Replicating and explaining

why age-gap couples elicit greater prejudice than other couples

may be a fruitful avenue for future research.

Implications

These findings may have implications for people currently

within, or who may later form, age-gap relationships. For those

currently in age-gap relationships, people’s perceptions of inequity

and corresponding prejudice may stigmatize the couple

and possibly lead to relationship dissolution. Indeed, age-gap

couples tend to be less committed to their relationships than

non-stigmatized couples (Lehmiller and Agnew 2006, 2008).

Future research is needed to more clearly identify how prejudice

towards age-gap relationships may lead to increased conflict,

dissatisfaction, and possibly relationship dissolution.

Future research studies may also explore whether age-gap,

and other marginalized, couples’ lower levels of commitment

to their relationships reflect societal disapproval and stigma or

true differences in inequity. More research is needed to survey

actual age-gap couples and determine the extent to which one

partner contributes more, or less, than the other. If people’s

stereotypic perceptions of inequity are accurate, then actual

age-gap couples may be less committed than other couples

because of their inequitable investment. Certainly, more research

is needed to explore the commitment experienced within

age-gap relationships.

For those who may later form age-gap relationships, a

younger partner may stereotypically infer that the older partner

contributes more to the relationship as an effort to equalize

the partnership. Similarly, it is possibly that the partner perceived

to benefit more may feel pressure to highlight the rewards

he or she may bring to a relationship to provide equity.

For instance, older partners may highlight their wealth or

wisdom to attract younger partners and combat perceived inequity

inferences from others (e.g., friends and family).

Conversely, people may stereotypically infer that the younger

partner in an age-gap relationship contributes more than

his or her partner. It is possible that this inference may pressure

younger partners to downplay his or her contributions to the

relationship and thus avoid perceived inequity from others.

Future studies which survey the experiences of actual couples

within age-gap relationships seems like a logical extension of

the current research.

Furthermore, the current research may also have implications

for later stigma-reduction interventions. If perceived inequity

underlies people’s prejudice towards age-gap couples,

then future studies which manipulate perceived equity may

find decreases in prejudice. Indeed, other studies regarding

Bmismatched^ couples, such as interracial relationships

(Miller et al. 2004a, b) and mixed-weight relationships

(Collisson et al. 2016) show that perceived inequity is indeed

related to people’s attitudes towards couples. It is possible that

highlighting equity among age-gap couples, and other dissimilar

couples, may reduce prejudice.

Strengths & Limitations

The current research has many strengths, as well as limitations.

In regard to strengths, first, the current research replicates

and extends the only study which qualitatively assessed

age-gap prejudice (Banks and Arnold 2001) and provides theoretical

support for the role of equity within age-gap relationships

(Lehmiller and Agnew 2011). Second, the current research

draws upon social exchange and relationship theories

to offer an empirically supported explanation regarding why

people may dislike age-gap relationships. Indeed, it bridges

romantic relationship and prejudice literatures in a novel and

theoretically meaningful way. Third, the current research

shows the relationship between perceived inequity and prejudice

towards age-gap couples in a hypothetical context.

Indeed, people may describe unknown couples in such generic

terms, such as the Byoung man^ dating the Bolder woman.^

Regardless, given psychology’s concern about replicability

(see Klein et al., 2014), these findings would be replicated

using other, more naturalistic paradigms. Indeed, viewing a

picture or video of an age-gap couple may be another way to

assess people’s perceived inequity and prejudicial attitudes. In

the current study, it may have been difficult for participants to

imagine age-gap couples given its hypothetical and generic

wording. In more realistic scenarios, people may have more

information of the couple to base their level of prejudice and

perceptions of equity. When this information is lacking, it

appears that people generally express prejudice towards agegap

couples and perceive them as inequitable.

Furthermore, people’s prejudicial attitudes towards agegap

couples were limited to response scales. Future research

may choose to assess prejudice and potential discrimination

towards age-gap couples in more ecologically valid, real

world situations, such as dating scenes or marriage venues.

Additionally, the findings were limited in their experimental

realism. For instance, asking participants to rate hypothetical

couples not reflect the true feelings people may experience

when witnessing such couples. Future studies may ethically

replicate and extend the current research in more natural

settings.

In addition, the current research offered a more general

description of age-gaps (e.g., a young person dating an old

person). Future studies may choose to use more specific interval

ranges (e.g., dating someone 5, 10, 15 years younger/

older). More specific age ranges would allow researchers to

test whether the specific age range affects people’s prejudice

and perceptions of equity.

Another limitation of the current research is in regard to its

online sample of participants. Although Amazon’s

Mechanical Turk allows researchers to recruit a significantly

more diverse and representative sample than traditional college

students (Buhrmester, Kwang,&Gosling, 2011), it still is

not a fully representative sample. Online samples tend to be

more educated and participate for intrinsically motivating reasons,

such as enjoyment of research. Future studies may

choose to selectively recruit a representative sample which

varies more widely in age, education, and ethnicity to more

aptly test whether participants’ own demographic variables

relate to their perceptions of age-gap couples. It may be possible,

for instance, that younger people may give greater

weight to appearance and vitality; whereas, older people

may give greater weight to financial stability and life management

skills.

As a rule, regulation is not acquired by “the industry,” and it is not designed and operated primarily for its benefit; it greatly matters whether regulators believe that regulations will, all things considered, have good consequences

Sunstein, Cass R., Interest-Group Theories of Regulation: A Skeptical Note (April 18, 2021). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3829993

Abstract: As a rule, regulation is not acquired by “the industry,” and it is not designed and operated primarily for its benefit. The mechanisms behind the promulgation of regulations are multiple, and almost all of the time, it greatly matters whether regulators believe that regulations will, all things considered, have good consequences. In terms of understanding the sources of regulations, it would therefore be valuable to obtain more clarity about the sources of the beliefs of regulators — about what information they receive and find credible, and why.

Keywords: interest groups, regulation, motivated reasoning

JEL Classification: D00, D73

Safetyism (cultures that treat safety as a sacred value): Students’ self-reported prevalence of cognitive distortions positively predicted their endorsement of safetyism beliefs; they saw the opposite for analytic thinking

Celniker, Jared, Megan Ringel, Karli Nelson, and Peter Ditto. 2021. “Correlates of “coddling”: Cognitive Distortions, Believing Words Can Harm, and Intuitive Thinking Predict Safetyism Beliefs” PsyArXiv. April 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5g7nc

Abstract: In their book, The Coddling of the American Mind, Lukianoff and Haidt (2018) contend that the rise of “safetyism” – cultures that treat safety as a sacred value – is hindering college students’ socioemotional development. One of their most controversial claims was that college students’ safetyism beliefs are rooted in and supported by cognitively distorted thinking (e.g., emotional reasoning). However, no empirical work has substantiated an association between cognitive distortions and safetyism beliefs. In a large (N = 786), ethnically and economically diverse sample of college students, we conducted the first examination of the relationship between these variables. Aligning with Lukianoff and Haidt’s assertions, we found that students’ self-reported prevalence of cognitive distortions positively predicted their endorsement of safetyism beliefs, even when controlling for other relevant demographic and psychological predictors. The belief that words can harm and intuitive thinking were also robust, positive predictors of safetyism beliefs. Considering our results, we argue that greater empirical scrutiny of safetyism-inspired practices (e.g., broad use of trigger warnings) is warranted before such customs become more widely adopted.

Media use on well-being (music, TV, films, video games, (e-)books, (digital) magazines, and audiobooks): The effects were generally small & do not support policies intended to encourage or discourage media use because of well-being

Johannes, Niklas, Tobias Dienlin, Hasan Bakhshi, and Andrew K. Przybylski. 2021. “No Effect of Different Types of Media on Well-being.” PsyArXiv. April 28. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zgb5y

Abstract: It is often assumed that traditional forms of media such as books enhance well-being, whereas digital media do not. However, we lack evidence for such claims and media research is mainly focused on how much time people spend with a medium, but not whether someone used a medium or not. We investigated the effect of media use on well-being, differentiating time spent with a medium and use vs. nonuse, over a wide range of different media types: music, TV, films, video games, (e-)books, (digital) magazines, and audiobooks. Results from a six-week longitudinal study representative of the UK population (N = 2,159) showed that effects were generally small; between but rarely within people; mostly for use vs. nonuse and not time spent with a medium; and on affective well-being, not life satisfaction. Together, these results do not support policies intended to encourage or discourage media use because of effects on well-being.

Lack of transgenerational effects of ionizing radiation exposure from the Chernobyl accident

Lack of transgenerational effects of ionizing radiation exposure from the Chernobyl accident. Meredith Yeager et al. Science  Apr 22 2021:eabg2365. DOI: 10.1126/science.abg2365

Abstract: Effects of radiation exposure from the Chernobyl nuclear accident remain a topic of interest. We investigated whether children born to parents employed as cleanup workers or exposed to occupational and environmental ionizing radiation post-accident were born with more germline de novo mutations (DNMs). Whole-genome sequencing of 130 children (born 1987-2002) and their parents did not reveal an increase in the rates, distributions, or types of DNMs versus previous studies. We find no elevation in total DNMs regardless of cumulative preconception gonadal paternal (mean = 365 mGy, range = 0-4,080 mGy) or maternal (mean = 19 mGy, range = 0-550 mGy) exposure to ionizing radiation and conclude over this exposure range, evidence is lacking for a substantial effect on germline DNMs in humans, suggesting minimal impact on health of subsequent generations.

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There was no evidence for a relationship between the total number of DNMs and preconception ionizing radiation dose (cumulative estimated gonadal dose at 38 weeks before birth) for maternal (−0.02 DNM per mGy, 95% CI: −0.04-0.007, p = 0.17) or paternal (−0.0007 DNM per mGy, 95% CI: −0.003-0.002, p = 0.56) exposures (Table 2 and fig. S2). In an analysis restricted to DNMs with known parent-of-origin (42%; Table 1), no effect of radiation was observed (table S4) whereas the effect of parental age remained robust; the parent-of-origin point estimates for paternal and maternal age effects were 0.71 and 0.28, respectively. Further investigation did not reveal evidence for an effect of preconception dose for any individual class of DNMs evaluated (table S5). Sensitivity analysis conducted with doses truncated at 1000 mGy or log transformed (ln(1+dose(mGy))) did not reveal an impact of maternal and paternal dose modeling on association with DNMs (Table 3). We further investigated categorical dose levels and found no increase in DNMs for any dose category, even 1000+mGy paternal dose (table S6). No effect of time since exposure was observed between parental preconception ionizing radiation exposure and DNM count for children born in the years immediately following the Chernobyl accident (Fig. 1). Moreover, when restricting to SNVs, there was no difference in the distribution of nucleotide substitutions based on quartile of maternal and paternal dose (fig. S3). Furthermore, the rates and types (molecular spectra) of DNMs observed in the current study were similar to those observed in prior studies conducted in general populations (Fig. 2 and fig. S4) (2–4, 6, 8).

Since lifestyle exposures such as smoking have been associated with alterations of DNA (for example, mosaic loss of Y chromosome (32)), we also investigated possible effects of prenatal parental alcohol consumption and smoking on DNMs. We observed no association between the number of DNMs and either paternal tobacco smoking at conception (6.78, 95% CI = −16.62-14.87, p = 0.13, Table 2 and Fig. 1) or maternal tobacco smoking at conception (23.38, 95% CI = −2.00-48.77, p = 0.07, Table 2 and Fig. 1). Similarly, no effect was observed for increasing levels of paternal (p = 0.12) or maternal (p = 0.12) preconception alcohol consumption. In addition, sequencing batch had no impact on the number of DNMs (4.45, 95% CI = −5.07-13.97, p = 0.34).

Relative telomere length was measured by qPCR (33) in participants to investigate the potential transgenerational impact of parental ionizing radiation on leukocyte telomere length in children. As expected, an overall relationship was observed between increasing age at blood draw and shorter relative telomere length due to age-related telomere length attrition (p = 4.49×10−19, fig. S5). We did not observe an effect of paternal or maternal age at conception on relative telomere length in adult children (p = 0.95 and 0.06, respectively; table S7). While our analysis did not find evidence for an effect of total paternal preconception ionizing radiation exposure on relative leukocyte telomere length (p = 0.88), we did observe a possible effect of total maternal preconception exposure that requires confirmation (−2.75×10−4, 95% CI = −5.20×10−4 - −2.90×10−5, p = 0.03; table S7). There was no evidence for a transgenerational effect of paternal or maternal smoking on child’s telomere length (p = 0.91 and 0.22, respectively, table S7).

Although it is reassuring that no transgenerational effects of ionizing radiation were observed in adult children of Chernobyl cleanup workers and evacuees in the current study, additional investigation is needed to address the effects of acute high-dose parental gonadal exposure closer to conception. The upper 95% confidence bound suggests the largest effect consistent with our data is <1 DNM per 100 mGy from paternal or maternal exposure (Table 3 and tables S8 and S9). Previously, Dubrova et al. (22, 29) reported a two-fold increase in mini-satellite mutations in children born to parents living in a highly exposed region of Belarus. Weinberg et al. (34) reported an increase in the mutation rate at microsatellite loci among children born to cleanup workers. Subsequent small studies have not reported an increased mini-satellite or microsatellite mutation rate in children of cleanup workers, including those with low doses (0.09-0.23 Gy) (21, 30, 35) or in children of the atomic-bomb survivors of Hiroshima or Nagasaki (31).

Our study evaluated peripheral blood from adult children conceived months or years after the Chernobyl accident, which limited the ability to assess exposure closer to conception; however, there was no evidence of notable differences in DNMs in children born the following year (1987). Since these families were recruited several decades after the accident, we acknowledge potential survivor bias among sampled children, although this is unlikely since there is no consistent demonstration in humans of sustained clinical effects of preconception ionizing radiation exposure (36). The number of parental gonadal radiation-induced double strand breaks could be fewer than anticipated based on animal data, which often assesses acute exposure (as a single burst) at higher doses (2-4 Gy; (13, 37)). Doses to the Chernobyl liquidators were mostly lower and exposure was fractionated over an extended period of time, which could have decreased the probability of gonadal DNM events. Moreover, it is plausible that the balance between radiation-induced mutations and accurate repair over time favored the latter. Additionally, there could have been a loss of power due to dose errors. Further human studies are needed to investigate the frequency of radiation-induced mutations and the subsequent response to address both the accuracy and efficiency of DNA repair. In a genomic landscape analysis of 440 cases of papillary thyroid cancer following the Chernobyl accident, increased radiation exposure was associated with a shift in tumor drivers from point mutations to small indels and non-homologous end joining events underlying fusions and other structural variants (38). Notably, there was no evidence of a radiation-specific single base substitution signature, gene expression pattern or methylation profile in cases of thyroid cancer with comparable radiation exposure history; instead, these were strongly associated with the tumor driver.

The rate, class distribution, and SNV type distribution of DNMs in adult children born to parents exposed to ionizing radiation, specifically of the type and amount relevant to Chernobyl cleanup workers and evacuees, are comparable to those reported in the general population. No effect of radiation on the specific classes of DNMs (SNVs, indels, complex variants, or clusters) was observed (table S5). Paternal age remains the strongest contributor to DNMs, although with maternal age DNMs also increase albeit with lower magnitude (Table 2 and table S4; (12)). Our study sample did not include mothers with high exposure (>1 Gy), but lower maternal dose was not associated with elevated DNMs, consistent with animal studies (13). Furthermore, our analysis of 130 adult children from 105 couples using 80X coverage of short-read technology suggests that if such effects on human germline DNA occur, they are uncommon or of small magnitude. This is one of the first studies to systematically evaluate alterations in human mutation rates in response to a man-made disaster, such as accidental radiation exposure. Investigation of trios drawn from survivors of the Hiroshima atomic bomb could shed further light on this public health question. In conclusion, children of individuals exposed to either occupational or environmental radiation do not appear to experience elevated rates of DNMs from their parents’ exposure. Thus, our study does not provide support for a transgenerational effect of ionizing radiation on germline DNA in humans.

Ref31 M. Kodaira, 

H. Ryo, 

N. Kamada, 

K. Furukawa, 

N. Takahashi, 

H. Nakajima, 

T. Nomura, 

N. Nakamura

, No evidence of increased mutation rates at microsatellite loci in offspring of A-bomb survivors. Radiat. Res.173, 205–213 (2010). doi:10.1667/RR1991.1pmid:20095853

Compared to controls, professional comedians had greater cortical surface area in brain regions that have been previously implicated in abstract, divergent thinking and the default-mode network

Mapping the “Funny Bone”: Neuroanatomical Correlates of Humor Creativity in Professional Comedians. Jacob Brawer, Ori Amir. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, nsab049, April 28 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsab049

Abstract: What are the neuroanatomical correlates of expertise in a specific creative domain? Professional comedians, amateurs, and controls underwent a T1 MRI anatomical scan. Measures of cortical surface area (gyrification and sulcal depth) and thickness were extracted for each participant. Compared to controls, professional comedians had greater cortical surface area in the left inferior temporal gyrus, angular gyrus, precuneus, and right medial prefrontal cortex. These regions have been previously implicated in abstract, divergent thinking and the default-mode network. The high degree of overlap between the regions of greater surface area in professional comedians with the regions showing greater activation in the same group during comedy improvisation in our previous work (particularly the temporal regions and angular gyrus), suggests these regions may be specifically involved in humor creativity.

Keywords: Creativity, Expertise, Neuroanatomy, Comedians, Humor

Science Skepticism Across 24 Countries: General faith in science was predicted by spirituality, suggesting that it, more than religiosity, may be the ‘enemy’ of science acceptance

Science Skepticism Across 24 Countries. Bastiaan T. Rutjens et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 28, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211001329

Abstract: Efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science are impeded by lack of insight into how it varies in degree and in kind around the world. The current work investigates science skepticism in 24 countries (N = 5,973). Results show that while some countries stand out as generally high or low in skepticism, predictors of science skepticism are relatively similar across countries. One notable effect was consistent across countries though stronger in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) nations: General faith in science was predicted by spirituality, suggesting that it, more than religiosity, may be the ‘enemy’ of science acceptance. Climate change skepticism was mainly associated with political conservatism especially in North America. Other findings were observed across WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations: Vaccine skepticism was associated with spirituality and scientific literacy, genetic modification skepticism with scientific literacy, and evolution skepticism with religious orthodoxy. Levels of science skepticism are heterogeneous across countries, but predictors of science skepticism are heterogeneous across domains.

Keywords: science skepticism, spirituality, ideology, climate change, vaccination, WEIRD, genetic modification, evolution, religion

Discussion

The extent to which science skepticism varies in degree and in kind around the world is not well understood. Up to now, a systematic cross-national investigation of the relative impact of various potential predictors of science skepticism across domains was lacking. This lacuna has obstructed efforts to understand and remedy the rejection of science—a phenomenon that is causing catastrophic health, economic, and environmental harms (Gallup, 2019; World Health Organization, 2019). The current paper reports the results of the first large-scale effort to address this lacuna. In so doing, this work provides clear support for the heterogeneity of science skepticism, both in degree (levels of skepticism vary across domains but also across countries) and in kind (different predictors drive science skepticism in different domains). As formalized in our main hypotheses (Hypotheses 1–6), we expected different predictors to drive skepticism in different domains, within and across nations. All main hypotheses were supported, except for Hypothesis 2 (we did not find evidence that religious orthodoxy uniquely contributes to vaccine skepticism). We had also expected some heterogeneity to manifest between nations such that WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations would show systematic variation in patterns of science skepticism. These predictions were formalized in the country-level hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 2b, 6a, and 6b). It was indeed found that the impact of political conservatism on climate change skepticism was the strongest in the United States (Hypothesis 1a), but note that it was equally strong in Canada (followed by other WEIRD nations; Australia and the Netherlands). Evidence for the hypotheses that vaccine skepticism and low faith in science would be best predicted by spirituality in WEIRD nations (Hypotheses 2a–6a) and by orthodoxy in non-WEIRD nations (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) was found for faith in science but not for vaccine skepticism. Taken together, the results show that, of the various beliefs and ideologies examined as predictors of science skepticism, spirituality is among the most important.

Indeed, confirming previous results obtained in the Netherlands (Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020)—and providing strong support for Hypothesis 6—the current data speak to the crucial role of spirituality in fostering low faith in science, more generally, beyond its domain-specific effects on vaccine skepticism. This indicates that the negative impact of spirituality on faith in science represents a cross-national phenomenon that is more generalizable than might be expected based on the large variety (Muthukrishna et al., 2020) of countries included here. A possible explanation for the robustness of this effect may lie in the inherent irreconcilability of the intuitive epistemology of a spiritual belief system with science (Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020). (If so, then we might look at a potentially much larger problem that extends beyond spirituality and applies more generally to “post-truth” society, in which truth and perceptions of reality may be based on feelings rather than facts; Martel et al., 2020; Rutjens & Brandt, 2018.) However, these results do not mean that traditional religiosity as a predictor of science skepticism (McPhetres & Zuckermann, 2018; Rutjens, Heine, et al., 2018; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018) has now become irrelevant: Not only did religious orthodoxy significantly contribute to low faith in science, it was also found to be a very consistent cross-national predictor of evolution skepticism (but not of other forms of science skepticism included in the study).

Research has started to challenge the widespread notion that science skepticism primarily results from a lack of knowledge.¹⁰ In the current work, scientific literacy was the main driver of science skepticism only in the domain of GM. This corroborates previous research and observations that suggest that merely addressing information deficits to combat science skepticism is in most cases not sufficient (McPhetres et al., 2019; Rutjens, Heine, et al., 2018; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020).

The cross-national approach of the current work is important because it provides support for the emerging theoretical understanding of what causes skepticism across different domains of science (Hornsey et al., 2018a, 2018b; McPhetres et al., 2019; McPhetres & Zuckermann, 2018; Rutjens, Heine, et al., 2018; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020) and does so by including various countries that have been virtually absent from the psychological science database (Apicella et al., 2020; Hruschka et al., 2018; Muthukrishna et al., 2020). The present results demonstrate that while predictors of science skepticism to some extent vary in predictable ways between countries, many of the hypothesized effects were observed across many of the included countries. Levels of skepticism showed more regional variation. This heterogeneity of science skepticism in degree is illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 1, with some countries standing out as being especially high or low on skepticism. For example, in Egypt, Romania, and Venezuela, science skepticism is much stronger than in Australia or Canada. Additionally, remarkable differences in science skepticism were observed within countries, depending on the domain (e.g., GM skepticism vs. skepticism in other domains in France, general faith in science vs. domain-specific skepticism in Turkey).

One obvious and important limitation to the current work concerns the limited nature of the measures used. Many of the key measures employed were self-report single-item (i.e., most outcome variables) or two-item indices (i.e., most of the predictor variables). The brevity of the materials was necessary in order to keep study length constrained. Thus, the construct validity and (cross-cultural) reliability of these measures are necessarily limited, and we hope that future research will replicate and extend (some of) these results with better measures and extensive equivalence testing. That being said, the current measures have been used frequently in previous work; the single-item outcome measures have been shown to produce similar results as multi-item variants (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020), and the spirituality and religious orthodoxy indices consist of the items with the highest factor loadings (Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018; Rutjens & van der Lee, 2020).

In conclusion, the present results can support the further development of our understanding of the various causes of science skepticism in different domains and in different cultures and countries, which in turn may help support interventions and communication strategies. Indeed, these results may be particularly informative when the aim is to understand how trust in science and compliance with its recommendations vary across individuals and countries, for example, during a global pandemic like COVID-19. To illustrate, let us return to the more general problem of vaccine hesitancy as an example of how skepticism can pose serious risks to public health. The current results suggest that increasing scientific literacy might prove to be a more fruitful approach in some cultural contexts than in others (see Figure 3C). In contrast, a better understanding of the relation between spiritual beliefs and general science skepticism is likely to be extremely informative regardless of cultural context. Regardless, it is evident that any strategy aimed at combating science skepticism needs to be underpinned by a nuanced theoretical and empirical understanding of its causes across domains as well as cultural contexts.