Some people are just naturally better at comparing—matching—different visual patterns (faces, firearms, fingerprints) side by side

Match me if you can: Evidence for a domain-general visual comparison ability. Bethany Growns, James D. Dunn, Erwin J. A. T. Mattijssen, Adele Quigley-McBride & Alice Towler. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, Jan 7 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13423-021-02044-2

Abstract: Visual comparison—comparing visual stimuli (e.g., fingerprints) side by side and determining whether they originate from the same or different source (i.e., “match”)—is a complex discrimination task involving many cognitive and perceptual processes. Despite the real-world consequences of this task, which is often conducted by forensic scientists, little is understood about the psychological processes underpinning this ability. There are substantial individual differences in visual comparison accuracy amongst both professionals and novices. The source of this variation is unknown, but may reflect a domain-general and naturally varying perceptual ability. Here, we investigate this by comparing individual differences (N = 248 across two studies) in four visual comparison domains: faces, fingerprints, firearms, and artificial prints. Accuracy on all comparison tasks was significantly correlated and accounted for a substantial portion of variance (e.g., 42% in Exp. 1) in performance across all tasks. Importantly, this relationship cannot be attributed to participants’ intrinsic motivation or skill in other visual-perceptual tasks (visual search and visual statistical learning). This paper provides novel evidence of a reliable, domain-general visual comparison ability.

General discussion

Across two experiments, we explored whether there is a generalizable and domain-general perceptual skill underpinning the ability to compare—or “match”—different visual stimuli. Participants’ sensitivity in four different comparison tasks were all significantly correlated with each other, and a substantial portion of variance (41.99% in Experiment 1 and 34.92% in Experiment 2) across all tasks was accounted for by one shared “matching” component in both experiments. Together, these results support the conclusion that individual differences in visual comparison accuracy are explained by a shared ability that generalizes across a range of visual stimuli. Notably, intrinsic motivation (Experiment 1), visual search and visual statistical learning (Experiment 2) did not significantly correlate with sensitivity in any comparison task and loaded onto separate components that accounted for large proportions of the variance across all tasks (20.95% in Experiment 1 and 19.07% in Experiment 2). This suggests that individual differences in visual comparison cannot be attributed to individual differences in intrinsic motivation or other visual-perceptual tasks.

Importantly, our study also provides evidence of stimulus-specific individual differences. This is reflected in the moderate correlations seen between sensitivity in all comparison tasks across both experiments, and the principal components analysis, where additional components featured loadings from just one or a subset of comparison tasks. This suggests there are also likely individual stimulus-specific skills where some people are better at comparing specific stimuli over other stimuli. Overall, our results are the first to suggest that visual comparison is an interplay between an overarching generalizable comparison ability, as well as individual stimulus-specific ability.

This stimulus-specific skill may be partially attributed to stimulus familiarity and experience. Face-comparison performance—the most familiar stimuli—demonstrated the highest stimulus-specific variance: face-comparison sensitivity had the lowest average correlation with all other tasks (r = .267 in Experiment 1 and .289 in Experiment 2); and accounted for the third to fourth-largest portion of variation (16.37% in Experiment 1 and 11.55% in Experiment 2) across all tasks. In contrast to faces, fingerprint, firearms and artificial-print sensitivity accounted for less variance in our data—where familiarity with these stimuli ranges from unfamiliar to entirely novel. This is consistent with research that suggests there is a shift from domain-general to domain-specific mechanisms with increased perceptual experience in a domain (Chang & Gauthier, 2020, 2021; Sunday et al., 2018; Wong et al., 2014; Wong & Gauthier, 2010, 2012), and research that links experience and visual comparison performance (Thompson & Tangen, 2014).

Our results highlight visual comparison as a natural and generalizable ability that varies in the general population—yet the precise mechanisms underpinning this skill are only beginning to be explored (see Growns & Martire, 2020b, for review). It is possible that holistic processing—or the ability to view images as a ‘whole’ rather than a collection of features (Maurer et al., 2002)—underpins visual comparison performance: both facial and fingerprint examiners show evidence of holistic processing when viewing domain-specific stimuli (Busey & Vanderkolk, 2005; Towler, White, & Kemp, 2017b; Vogelsang et al., 2017). In contrast, featural processing—or the ability to view images as separate features—is also important in visual comparison. Professional performance is improved when examiners have an opportunity to engage featural processing: both facial and fingerprint examiners demonstrate greater performance gains than novices in domain-specific visual comparison tasks (Thompson et al., 2014; Towler, White, & Kemp, 2017; White, Phillips, et al., 2015). Novices’ face-comparison performance also correlates with featural processing tasks such as the NAVON and figure-matching tasks (Burton et al., 2010; McCaffery et al., 2018), and novices’ comparison performance is improved by instructing participants to rate or label features (Searston & Tangen, 2017c; Towler, White, & Kemp, 2017b). Low-performing novices also derive greater benefit from featural comparison training than high-performers—suggesting high-performers may already use such strategies (Towler, Keshwa, et al., 2021b). The role of holistic and featural processing in visual comparison performance remains an important avenue for future research.

These results have important applied implications. Whilst empirically based training for existing examiners is important to improve ongoing professional performance (Growns & Martire, 2020a), our results suggest that larger gains in performance could be achieved by selecting trainee examiners based on visual comparison ability. A similar approach has been used in applied domains: recruiting individuals with superior face recognition improves performance in real-world face identification tasks (Robertson et al., 2016; White, Dunn, et al., 2015). Professional performance in other forensic feature-comparison disciplines could likely be similarly improved by recruiting individuals with superior performance on a test battery of visual comparison tasks. Importantly, our results do not suggest that examiners would benefit from practicing outside of their primary domain of experience. Despite identifying a generalizable visual comparison ability, we also identified individual differences in stimulus-specific skills that suggest part of accurate visual comparison performance is domain specific.

As the participants in this study were untrained novices, it is unclear whether these results could generalize to practicing professionals. While investigating individual differences in the general population requires a novice sample, it is entirely plausible that a domain-general visual comparison mechanism may be diminished or negated for experts in this task as expertise is typically conceptualized as narrow and domain-specific (Charness et al., 2005; Ericsson, 2007, 2014). However, emerging evidence suggests domain-specific expertise may lend advantages to domain-general skill. For example, although facial examiners outperform fingerprint examiners in face comparison (i.e., facial examiners’ domain-specific expertise), fingerprint examiners outperform novices in the same task—despite it being outside their primary area of expertise (Phillips et al., 2018). Whether this domain-general advantage is developed alongside domain-specific expertise or is the result of preexisting individual differences in this ability will be an important avenue for future research.

This study provided the first evidence of a generalizable ability to underpinning the ability to compare or “match” different, complex visual stimuli. We demonstrated that the ability to compare stimuli such as faces, fingerprints, firearms, and artificial prints is in part due to a generalizable and domain-general ability—although subject to stimulus-specific constraints. These results have important theoretical and applied implications for both behavioural and forensic science. Importantly, test batteries of visual comparison tasks could be used to identify and recruit top-performing individuals to improve performance in forensic feature-comparison disciplines.

The net effect of traditional media on well-being is similar to that of social media: too close to zero to be perceived by users, or to have practical significance for people’s lived experience

No effect of different types of media on well-being. Niklas Johannes, Tobias Dienlin, Hasan Bakhshi & Andrew K. Przybylski. Scientific Reports volume 12, Article number: 61. Jan 6 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-03218-7

Abstract: It is often assumed that traditional forms of media such as books enhance well-being, whereas new media do not. However, we lack evidence for such claims and media research is mainly focused on how much time people spend with a medium, but not whether someone used a medium or not. We explored the effect of media use during one week on well-being at the end of the week, differentiating time spent with a medium and use versus nonuse, over a wide range of different media types: music, TV, films, video games, (e-)books, (digital) magazines, and audiobooks. Results from a six-week longitudinal study representative of the UK population 16 years and older (N = 2159) showed that effects were generally small; between-person relations but rarely within-person effects; mostly for use versus nonuse and not time spent with a medium; and on affective well-being, not life satisfaction.

Discussion

New media like social networking sites allegedly exert an almost addictive effect on their users, whereas traditional media like books are considered a beneficial pastime. However, the alleged benefits of traditional media remain speculative without much evidence of their effects on well-being. We set out to deliver initial evidence of the broad, ‘net’ effect of a range of traditional media. First, we investigated media effects across a wide range of seven traditional media. Second, in a reciprocal analysis we separated within-person effects from between-person relations. Third, we treated use versus nonuse and time spent with a medium as different processes. Last, we analyzed data with a shorter time lag than most previous work, testing which facets of well-being are affected most by media use. Our findings provide little cause for alarm: Almost all differences were between users and nonusers on a stable between-person level, with small to negligible within-person effects in either direction. The few effects we found were comparable across media and largely on the (more volatile) affective well-being, rather than more stable life satisfaction.

Distinguishing use versus nonuse and time spent with a medium proved important. Most differences we observed were on the between-person level between users and nonusers. Likewise, the few small within-person effects incompatible with zero as the true effect occurred when a person went from not using a medium in one week to using a medium the next week. The time spent with a medium played a negligible role. In other words, our findings are not in line with the dominant linear dose–response model that (often implicitly) assumes that going from zero use to one minute of use has the same effect as going from one hour of use to one hour and one minute of use30,31. Instead, the decision to use a medium appears to represent a threshold; once a user crosses that threshold, the amount of time they spend with a medium is of little consequence for their well-being.

This conclusion almost exclusively applies to the between-person level: Media users (i.e., those who have crossed the threshold) in general feel slightly worse than nonusers (i.e., those who have not crossed the threshold). However, those differences were around a third of a point on an eleven-point scale. Such an effect is likely too small have practical significance for people’s lived experience45,46,47. On the within-person level, going from nonuse to use had generally small effects across media. The effects of time spent with a medium were even smaller. Our results speak against pronounced causal effects—neither positive nor negative—of media use during the week on well-being by the end of the week. The pattern of small between-person relations but negligible within-person effects aligns with previous research on new media8,9,23.

There were no substantial differences across the seven traditional media types we studied. (E-) book and (digital) magazine readers as well as audiobooks listeners did not experience less affective well-being unlike those engaging with music, TV, films, and games. That finding applies in both directions: Those with lower well-being were more likely to engage with these media. However, those differences all but disappeared on the within-person level, with most effect sizes close to a null effect. Only TV and music use versus nonuse on the within-level showed a small positive effect on affect. Together, the results stand in contrast to public opinion, where traditional media are valued highly1,48. It appears the broad, net effect of traditional media is similar to that of social media: too close to zero to be perceived by media users45.

Our study also addresses the choice of time lag and well-being indicator. Media effects are typically small49 and it is unlikely that media use will affect long-term evaluations of people’s lives16. If anything, media use should influence short-term affect. Our results deliver weak evidence that this distinction also applies to traditional media. The few differences we observed appeared almost exclusively on the more volatile positive affect, not stable life satisfaction. These results align well with research that shows little to no long-term effects of new media on life satisfaction9,27,28,35. We deliver evidence that traditional media are unlikely to impact life satisfaction within the intermediate time frame of one week that we studied. At the same time, the few effects on affect were small, similar to research on social media with much shorter time lags34,38,39. Either we missed the optimal time lag after which the effects disappeared40 or net effects of traditional media are indeed negligible.

What do our results mean? The straightforward answer is: The effect of traditional media on well-being is too small to matter. However, such an answer might overlook important nuance. First, throughout this manuscript, we have spoken of between-person relations, but of within-person effects. As we have noted, within-person relations can be effects under the assumption that there are no time-varying confounders. Therefore, what we call effects is causal only under that assumption20,21,50. There might well be time-varying factors that mask a true effect51. For example, spending time using media may have a negative effect on well-being which gets balanced out by an indirect positive effect via less time worrying. Similarly, a stable confounder (e.g., employment status) might drive the small negative between-person relation. Alternatively, people who do not feel well might indeed be more inclined to pick up a new medium as a mood management strategy52.

Second, we only investigated the broad, net effect of traditional media. We did not assess what content people engaged with or what their motivation for use was. Although we believe such net effects are important to investigate as first step, they may mask important interactions between content and user motivations31,48,53. Therefore, even though within-effects of traditional media are small, there may be meaningful under certain conditions54. Such an argument aligns with research which found noteworthy variation in the effect of social media34. Third, we looked at an intermediate time lag of one week, which might have missed the effect. Therefore, to revise the answer from above: Under our assumptions of causality, the broad, net effect of traditional media during the week on well-being at the end of the week is likely too small to matter.

Limitations

Besides the questions of causality and scope of media use, there are several limitations to our study. The self-reported estimates of time spent with a medium we relied on will be almost certainly a noisy measure of true media engagement55,56. In addition to that noise, the measures also reminded participants of their response in the previous week. That reminder might have reduced variance or introduced bias. By contrast, we believe self-reports of use versus nonuse in a one-week period have lower measurement error, simply because there are more biases in retrieving exact estimates of the behavior compared to a dichotomous yes/no retrieval. We call for more research directly measuring media use. Similarly, although they displayed decent psychometric properties, the well-being measures in the data set were not validated. The measure of affect in particular referred to affective well-being on the previous day, not the previous week. Although it allows a sensible test of the cumulative effect of media use during the week on well-being at the end of that week, the opposite direction is less plausible: Affect at the beginning of the week might not be strong enough to influence media use during the week that follows. Most important, we did not assess social media use, which prevents us from a direct comparison of the effects of traditional media versus new media. Although our results fit into the larger picture of the literature, a direct comparison will be more informative.

Are U.S. Professionals and Managers More Left Than Blue-Collar Workers? An Analysis of the General Social Survey, 1974 to 2018

Are U.S. Professionals and Managers More Left Than Blue-Collar Workers? An Analysis of the General Social Survey, 1974 to 2018. Steven Brint, Michaela Curran, Matthew C. Mahutga. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World January 6, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/23780231211068654

Abstract: Social science interest in professionals and managers as a left- and liberal-trending stratum has increased in recent years. Using General Social Survey data over a 44-year period, the authors examine 15 attitudes spanning social, economic, and political identity liberalism. On nearly all attitudes, professionals and managers have trended in a liberal direction, have liberalized more quickly than blue-collar workers, and are either as or more liberal than blue-collar workers. The authors find that the higher levels of education among professionals and managers, their tendency to adopt nonauthoritarian outlooks, and their lower propensity to identify with fundamentalist religion mediate their more liberal trends vis-à-vis blue-collar workers. Conversely, their higher relative incomes suppress the extent of their economic and criminal justice liberalism. The authors’ theorization links changes in the macro-economy to growing gaps in the composition of the two strata and the activities of politicians and parties to consolidate emerging political differences.

Keywords: professionals and managers, blue-collar workers, political attitudes, political realignment, political trends

Discussion

The left-liberal-trends thesis gains considerably more support in these analyses than it did in analyses conducted in the 1980s and 1990s. On social issues, PM are trending liberal more quickly on two of six issues and at the same rate on one. BC, who were far behind PM at the beginning of the period, are trending more liberal on the remaining three of the issues. PM are now more liberal than BC on three of six social issues, indistinguishable in their liberalism on two, and less liberal on one. On economic issues, PM are trending more liberal than BC on six of seven outcomes and are indistinguishable on one. In the most recent period, they are now more liberal in their level of support for economic liberalism in two cases, indistinguishable on three, and less liberal on only two. In the political identity liberalism domain, PM are trending more liberal than BC on both outcomes and are now more attached to the Democratic Party and more liberal in political ideology than BC. These results are largely robust to shifts in the definition of occupational groups, differences in political attitudes between whites and racial-ethnic minorities, and treatments of scale items as continuous rather than categorical.

This level of support for the left-liberal-trends thesis contrasts with the lesser accuracy of the divided-trends thesis. The latter accurately predicts the direction of change of the two strata on social liberalism issues but not the faster rates of change among PM. It fails to predict the direction of change on nearly all economic issues, as well as the rates of change between the two strata. It also fails to predict either the direction or rate of change in the political identity liberalism domain (see Table 1).

These findings are consequential for social science analyses of American politics. No previous studies have shown a dominant left and liberal trend in PM attitudes across a wide range of issues or such broadly consistent evidence of variation in PM and BC trends. We were able to detect these trends through the use of a longer time series, a larger number of items and scales, and better controlled analyses than social scientists have previously used. Our findings contrast not only with the prevailing view from the 1980s and 1990s but also with arguments that emphasize traditional lines of class division (Bartels 2008; Gelman et al. 2010), as well as those that emphasize trendless fluctuation in class politics (Manza, Hout, and Brooks 1995).

The mediators we propose also matter for explaining the attitude gaps between PM and BC. Differences in graduate education, nonauthoritarian values, nonfundamentalist religion, and income help explain observed attitude gaps between PM and BC in all three domains of liberalism. Nonauthoritarian values appear to be the most important compositional difference between PM and BC. Their indirect effect was significantly different from zero 31 of 45 times. The next most important was graduate degrees, which were significantly different from zero 25 of 45 times. In general, the mediating effects of nonauthoritarian values and graduate education are trending in a liberal direction, as evidenced by the positive trends on the graduate degree and nonauthoritarian values coefficients in Figure 2. Nonfundamentalist religion was the least consistent influence on liberal attitudes, as it was significant in 21 of 45 tests. Unlike the other gaps we have discussed, the gap between PM and BC in affiliation with nonfundamentalist religion is narrowing moderately rather than widening, suggesting the possibility that the politics of the two strata could become more similar in the future in so far as these identifications mediate the trends we have observed.

Although income was the third most important compositional factor (significantly different from zero 22 of 45 times), the sign was generally opposite from our expectation. Income showed the expected effects on three social issues, but it showed a conservatizing effect on most issues involving crime control, the power of business and labor, and economic redistribution. It was also not associated with higher levels of adoption of Democratic Party identification or with higher levels of support for government social spending. Income also appears to be trending in a conservative direction, as evidenced in the downward slopes for income in Figure 2. Thus, income generally has no effect or an increasingly conservatizing effect on the attitude gap between PM and BC. These results are consistent with the work of others who have found that higher incomes tend to increase conservatism (Bartels 2008; Hout and Greeley 2010; Tilly 1998). PM are becoming, and in many cases have already become, more liberal and left than BC despite the growing income gap between these two groups rather than because of this gap.

These findings on compositional influences are also consequential for social science analyses of American politics. As far as we know, no social scientists have shown the extent to which attitude trends in the two strata can be explained by macro-level changes that are mediated by changes in the composition of the two strata over time. A next step for researchers will be to explicate the portion of the gaps between PM and BC that cannot be accounted for by these compositional dynamics.

When others are waiting in line, customers tend to accelerate their own service time, and in doing so, sacrifice their own consumption utility; the effect is diminished when they themselves have waited (it is perceived as fair to let others wait if one also had to wait)

Social Queues (Cues): Impact of Others’ Waiting in Line on One’s Service Time. Sezer Ülkü , Chris Hydock, Shiliang Cui. Management Science, Jan 6 2022. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4282

Abstract: The traditional queueing literature assumes that service time is largely independent of social influences. However, queues are social systems; and social considerations are therefore likely to impact customers’ service time decision to the extent they have control. Through a series of experiments, we show that when others are waiting in line, customers tend to accelerate their own service time, and in doing so, sacrifice their own consumption utility. This behavior is driven by concern for others. Notably, the effect is diminished when they themselves have waited, as it is perceived as fair to let others wait if one also had to wait. We further show that obscuring the visibility between customers in service and those waiting in line diminishes the negative effect of others queueing on one’s own service time.

Women prefer less risk & less competition, prioritize equality over efficiency and report a greater willingness to share wealth

Gender preference gaps & voting for redistribution. Eva Ranehill & Roberto A. Weber. Experimental Economics, Jan 6 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-021-09741-8

Abstract: There is substantial evidence that women tend to support different policies and political candidates than men. Many studies also document gender differences in a variety of important preference dimensions, such as risk-taking, competition and pro-sociality. However, the degree to which differential voting by men and women is related to these gaps in more basic preferences requires an improved understanding. We conduct an experiment in which individuals in small laboratory “societies” repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and engage in production. We find that women vote for more egalitarian redistribution and that this difference persists with experience and in environments with varying degrees of risk. This gender voting gap is accounted for partly by both gender gaps in preferences and by expectations regarding economic circumstances. However, including both these controls in a regression analysis indicates that the latter is the primary driving force. We also observe policy differences between male- and female-controlled groups, though these are substantially smaller than the mean individual differences—a natural consequence of the aggregation of individual preferences into collective outcomes.

Conclusion

We study the relationship between gender gaps in policy preferences and gaps in more basic preferences. There is widespread evidence that men and women differ in their attitudes toward risk, competition and inequality. Several studies also document that men and women sometimes exhibit different voting behavior, with women favoring greater redistribution. However, the degree to which gender gaps in the policy preferences of men and women are the direct result of more basic preference gaps—rather than of other factors, such as differential economic circumstances—requires better understanding.

To investigate this question, we design an experimental environment in which individuals repeatedly vote for redistribution policies and then engage in production subject to these policies. Consistent with evidence from outside the laboratory, women tend to vote for more egalitarian redistributive policies than men. This gap is substantial and persists with experience and is also very similar in environments with and without risk in the relationship between work and initial income.

We also replicate many previously observed gender gaps in more basic preferences. Women prefer less risk and less competition, prioritize equality over efficiency and report a greater willingness to share wealth. They are also less confident about their relative baseline performance in the task that we employ as the production activity, despite there being no gap in actual baseline performance. We then investigate the extent to which these gaps in basic preferences and expectations can account for the gender gap in voting. Our data suggest that preferences do play a role in voting behavior—particularly social preferences and competitiveness. However, differential expectations of future economic outcomes between men and women appear to have a larger impact on voting behavior. In combination, these two sets of factors go a long way in explaining the gender gap in policy preferences.

Finally, we also study whether the gender gap in policy preferences yields different policies enacted in groups where women, rather than men, hold the majority. We find this to be the case, but the magnitude and statistical strength of the group-level policy gaps is considerably smaller than the gaps at the individual level. Some of this naturally reflects a centralizing tendency of many social choice rules, including those like ours in which the median preferences have a large degree of impact.

Our work is important for better understanding how policies enacted in societies and organizations may change as women exert greater influence and control. First, our finding that expectations about relative performance appear to be a more important factor in explaining the gender gap in voting than gaps in more fundamental preferences indicates that the tendency for women to favor greater redistribution than men may diminish as women obtain better economic outcomes and security. Second, the relatively small policy gaps that we observe at the group level between male-dominated and female-dominated groups indicates that changes in policy outcomes from women exerting greater policy control may not be as dramatic as one might expect when extrapolating from average preference gaps at the individual level. Thus, claims that the world would be a fundamentally different place if women were to control policymaking should be tempered by the fact that such impacts may be relatively small. Our findings also provide an interpretation for why male- and female-majority groups often do not produce very different outcomes, despite the fact that gender differences in preferences seem quite reliable.

It is also worth noting that our evidence comes from contexts that we designed to create a straightforward relationship between the types of preferences often found to differ by gender and the unidimensional policy domain over which people vote. A natural open question is whether such differences persist in other contexts—for example, when the relationship between gender gaps in preferences for risk, competition and equality do not line up to predict concordant directional effects on policy preferences. Our work thus highlights the need for more careful study of precisely how gender differences scale up and persist over time to shape firms, institutions and societies.

Testing associations between women’s cycle phase or hormone levels and pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity, the authors find no compelling evidence for upregulated pathogen disgust in the luteal phase or higher progesterone levels

Hormones, ovulatory cycle phase and pathogen disgust: A longitudinal investigation of the Compensatory Prophylaxis Hypothesis. Julia Stern, Victor Shiramizu. Hormones and Behavior, Volume 138, February 2022, 105103. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2021.105103

Highlights

• Testing associations between women’s cycle phase or hormone levels and pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity

• No compelling evidence for upregulated pathogen disgust in the luteal phase or when progesterone levels are higher

• Results in contrast to the Compensatory Prophylaxis Hypothesis

• No differences in results for women with a current infection

Abstract: Multiple studies have argued that disgust, especially pathogen disgust and contamination sensitivity, change across women's ovulatory cycle, with higher levels in the luteal phase due to an increase in progesterone levels. According to the Compensatory Prophylaxis Hypothesis (CPH), women have a higher disgust sensitivity to pathogen cues when in the luteal phase (or when progesterone levels are higher), because progesterone is associated with suppressed immune responses. Evidence for this hypothesis is rather mixed and uncertain, as the largest study conducted so far reported no compelling evidence for an association between progesterone levels and pathogen disgust. Further, ovulatory cycle research has been criticized for methodological shortcomings, such as invalid cycle phase estimates, no direct hormone assessments, small sample sizes or between-subjects studies. To address these issues and to contribute to the literature, we employed a large, within-subjects design (N = 257 with four sessions each), assessments of salivary hormone levels and cycle phase estimates based on luteinizing hormone tests. A variety of multilevel models suggest no compelling evidence that self-reported pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity is upregulated in the luteal phase or tracks changes in women's hormone levels. We further found no compelling evidence for between-subjects associations of pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity and hormone levels. Results remain robust across different analytical decisions (e.g. in a subsample of women reporting feeling sick). We discuss explanations for our results, limitations of the current study and provide directions for future research.

Keywords: Pathogen disgustContamination sensitivityProgesteroneHormonesOvulatory cycleCompensatory Prophylaxis Hypothesis

4. Discussion

In the current study, we aimed to test the CPH by employing a longitudinal design, a large sample size, direct hormone assessments and LH-test validated cycle phase estimates. Across a variety of different analyses, we found no compelling evidence that pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity is related to LH-validated cycle phase or different hormones levels (within-subjects and between-subjects). We further found no significant effects for women who reported feeling sick in our data.

Previous studies testing the CPH yield mixed findings. Our results are in line with the results by Jones et al. (2018) who also reported no compelling evidence that pathogen disgust tracks changes in women's salivary progesterone, estradiol, testosterone, or cortisol. They are further in line with studies not reporting compelling evidence for an association of different cycle phases and increased pathogen disgust (e.g. Fessler and Navarrete, 2003; Żelaźniewicz et al., 2016), but in contrast to previous studies reporting significant effects for either (within-subjects or between-subjects) hormone levels or different cycle phases.

Fleischman and Fessler (2018) published three possible explanations for the null results reported by Jones et al. (2018): a) that the CPH might be entirely wrong, b) measurement issues might explain differences in findings, c) progesterone might not be the driving factor. We argue that these three explanations might also pertain to our findings, as they were virtually identical to the findings published by Jones et al. (2018), although Jones et al. (2018) did not specifically assess women's cycle phases. Of course, it is possible that the CPH is wrong and that “changes in immune functioning are too small or not consistent enough to exert selective pressure on mechanisms governing behavior” (Fleischman and Fessler, 2018, p. 468). However, we refrain from such strong conclusions based on our findings, given that there are always limitations in single datasets, that absence of evidence does not equal evidence of absence and that our results might not be generalizable to other contexts or samples (e.g. pregnant women). Nevertheless, we think that our findings further challenge the CPH. We agree that differences in used measures might at least partly explain differences in findings between studies. For example, we did not investigate disgust responses to pictures depicting disease cues, for which some previous studies reported findings in line with the CPH (Fleischman and Fessler, 2011; Miłkowska et al., 2021). However, not using pictures in the current study does not explain differences in findings of self-reported pathogen disgust or contamination sensitivity via questionnaires also used by Fleischman and Fessler (2011) or Milkowska et al., 2019, Miłkowska et al., 2021. Other differences in methods (besides used stimuli) might be more likely to explain differences in findings. For example, the study by Jones et al. (2018) and the current study are the studies with the largest sample sizes so far, and also the only large-scale within-subject studies with direct hormone assessments. Further, our study used randomized sessions (e.g. not all participants started testing in the same cycle phase), whereas every participant had her first testing session in the fertile phase in the studies by Milkowska et al., 2019, Miłkowska et al., 2021. Interestingly, Fleischman and Fessler (2018) also stated that the higher test power in the study by Jones et al. (2018) suggests that the CPH might rather be wrong than differences in results could be explained by measurement issues. Regarding the potential explanation that progesterone is not the driving factor that regulates disgust sensitivity, we agree that other factors related to pregnancy might lead to upregulated disgust sensitivity. To investigate which factors are actually responsible for fluctuations in disgust sensitivity (and higher disgust sensitivity when pregnant), we suggest that future studies should collect data from pregnant women, as only testing pregnant women can answer this research question properly.

4.1. Limitations

We note several limitations regarding our study that might be addressed in subsequent research. First, whereas we investigated whether different self-report questionnaires or different analyses yield different findings regarding our research question, we did not investigate disgust responses to pictures or videos depicting disease cues. Second, we cannot draw strong conclusions on whether having an infection might moderate shifts in disgust sensitivity across the cycle. Although we did not find compelling evidence for this claim, only a very small number of our participants reported feeling sick (potentially as, if they were truly sick, they would not have attended the session). Third, due to ethical constraints, our study was observational, not experimental. Hence, it remains unclear whether progesterone administration might raise disgust, comparably to mice (Bressan and Kramer, 2021).

Although sex hormones play a key role in sex differences in susceptibility, severity, outcomes, and response to therapy of different diseases, sex chromosomes are also increasingly recognized as an important factor

Y chromosome is moving out of sex determination shadow. Raheleh Heydari, Zohreh Jangravi, Samaneh Maleknia, Mehrshad Seresht-Ahmadi, Zahra Bahari, Ghasem Hosseini Salekdeh & Anna Meyfour. Cell & Bioscience volume 12, Article number: 4. January 4 2022. https://cellandbioscience.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13578-021-00741-y

Abstract: Although sex hormones play a key role in sex differences in susceptibility, severity, outcomes, and response to therapy of different diseases, sex chromosomes are also increasingly recognized as an important factor. Studies demonstrated that the Y chromosome is not a ‘genetic wasteland’ and can be a useful genetic marker for interpreting various male-specific physiological and pathophysiological characteristics. Y chromosome harbors male‑specific genes, which either solely or in cooperation with their X-counterpart, and independent or in conjunction with sex hormones have a considerable impact on basic physiology and disease mechanisms in most or all tissues development. Furthermore, loss of Y chromosome and/or aberrant expression of Y chromosome genes cause sex differences in disease mechanisms. With the launch of the human proteome project (HPP), the association of Y chromosome proteins with pathological conditions has been increasingly explored. In this review, the involvement of Y chromosome genes in male-specific diseases such as prostate cancer and the cases that are more prevalent in men, such as cardiovascular disease, neurological disease, and cancers, has been highlighted. Understanding the molecular mechanisms underlying Y chromosome-related diseases can have a significant impact on the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of diseases.

Conclusion

Although most sex differences in occurrence and prevalence of diseases have been associated with the function of sex hormones, molecular studies have assigned a hormone-independent role to the differential expression of genes, especially those located on sex chromosomes. Y chromosome genes independently and/or in conjunction with sex hormones, beyond their X-linked collective tasks determine the male-specific characteristics. In this review, we highlighted major recent findings on the contribution of Y chromosome genes to disease susceptibility to various human diseases and showed that how LOY and translation/function failure of Y chromosome genes can affect the pathogenesis of male-specific diseases.

Despite the vast investigation, little knowledge exists on the molecular mechanisms involved in these sex disparities. This might have been originated from the biological limitations and/or experimental issues such as low expression of MSY genes in rare organs or cell types, high similarity with their X counterparts, hormone effects on intracellular processes, and the absence of mixed-sex experimental groups in cellular, animal, and human studies. In the human Y chromosome proteome project, as a part of the Chromosome-Centric Human Proteome Project (C-HPP), the function of MSY proteins was explored in organ development by taking advantage of PSCs, which are capable of differentiation into all cell types of the human body [171]. We believe that hormone-free systems like PSC and their derivatives as well as organoids, which are in vitro generated copies of human organs, can facilitate the mechanistic studies to explore the role of Y chromosome genes in health and disease and provide novel insights into gender disparity and sex-specific therapeutic strategies for diseases.

 

Loss of Faith and Decrease in Trust in a Higher Source During COVID-19 in Germany: Developments were observed in both Catholics & Protestants, and in both younger & older persons

Loss of Faith and Decrease in Trust in a Higher Source During COVID-19 in Germany. Arndt Büssing, Klaus Baumann & Janusz Surzykiewicz. Journal of Religion and Health, Jan 5 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-021-01493-2

Abstract: Many people relied on their faith as one resource in order to cope during the COVID-19 pandemic. In Germany, between the eighteen months from June 2020 to November 2021, different participants at different times were assessed during different phases of the COVID-19 pandemic. The total sample of this continuous cross-sectional survey consisted of 4,693 participants. Analyses revealed that with the 2nd wave of the infection and its 2nd lockdown, trust in a Higher Source, along with praying and meditation decreased. Also, the sharp increase in corona-related stressors was associated with a decline of wellbeing and a continuing loss of faith. These developments were observed in both Catholics and Protestants, and in both younger and older persons. In addition, the long phases of insecurity and social isolation lacking the significant support usually given by religious communities may have likewise challenged the religious-coping capacities of religious/spiritual people themselves.

Discussion

This cross-sectional survey of different participants at different times during the different phases of the pandemic found that stressor scores rose sharply while wellbeing decreased during the 2nd wave of the pandemic (Table 1). In accord with this, trust in a supporting “Higher Source” declined parallel to the decline of wellbeing, and numerous people stated that they had lost their faith (increasing from 3 to 22%) because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The respective pattern of decline persisted during the first half of 2021, and only started to improve slightly during the 4th wave. These changes cannot be solely explained by differences in the cohorts with respect to non-religious persons or younger participants who may not have held strong bounds to institutional religiosity. This loss of faith and decrease in trust was observed not only in both Catholics and Protestants, but also in those who are not religiously affiliated but may have other sources of spiritual trust. These non-religiously affiliated persons were not necessarily lacking spiritual sources, but rather may have distanced themselves from institutional religiosity. In fact, 17% stated that have faith which is a strong hold in difficult times and 24% stated that they have confidence in a higher power that is sustaining them. Further, a small fraction of these non-religiously affiliated is still praying or practicing meditation, and therefore this small fraction (some of which may have lost what they may call their ‘faith’) may rely on their personal spiritual resources -, resources which were not or no longer institutionally organized.

The age differences within cohorts cannot fully explain the observed changes either, as Loss of faith and decline of trust in a Higher Source are observed in both younger persons (< = 40 years of age) and older persons > 40 years of age. While Loss of faith showed no significant gender-related effect, trust in a Higher Source was stronger in women than men. Regression analyses confirmed that (for participants´ Loss of faith) the recruiting time prior and after the 2nd wave was the best predictor of the increase in stressors and the decline of wellbeing. Thus, the 2nd lockdown (with a much stronger increase in infected persons and hospitalized patients after the all-too-confident summer months that followed the shock of the 1st lockdown) was associated with a rise of perceived stressors such as restrictions in daily life, of being under pressure/stressed, of anxiety/insecurity, of loneliness/social isolation, and of financial-economic difficulties due to the corona pandemic (these are the topics of the 5NRS addressing the “Stressors”). While a considerable part of respondents reported that they had found hope in their faith to cope with the outcomes of the pandemic in the first phase, later with the months-long continuation of the pandemic and its strict distance recommendations, many of these faithful may have lost some of their courage and faith. Similarly, we observed a decline of praying and meditation during the pandemic, and a decrease in participants´ satisfaction with the support of their local religious/spiritual communities. This was found not only in both Catholics and Protestants, but also in those who stated they are not religiously affiliated (but may nevertheless have interest in religious and spiritual resources). However, in Germany the first vaccinations of older persons and groups-at-risk started at the end of December 2020, and a year later in December 2021 all those who were willing to be vaccinated had received it (about 2/3 of the population). This seems to have reduced some of the fears of a complicated course of COVID-19 in many participants, and could be the reason why participants´ wellbeing was starting to improve slightly during the 4th wave of the pandemic (which so far affects predominantly, but not exclusively, non-vaccinated people). Nevertheless, Loss of faith is still increasing, and religious trust and confidence are still rather low.

International studies and statements from the first phase of the pandemic would assume that faith/religiosity is an important resource to cope with the pandemic (Asadzandi et al., 2020; Barmania & Reiss 2020; Edara et al., 2021; Koenig 2020; Kowalczyk et al., 2020; Peteet 2020; Pirutinsky et al., 2020). A study from Poland assumed a “protective influence” of a person´s faith (Kowalczyk et al., 2020). In that study, 72% of Catholics from Poland agreed that their faith was important to cope with the pandemic, and more women than men stated that their faith was strengthened because of the hazard. Further, particularly young women from Poland assumed that their “faith will protect them from the coronavirus infection, probably because they may assume that God as the ‘merciful father’ will save them from all evil and suffering (Kowalczyk et al., 2020). In American Orthodox Jews, trust in God and related positive religious coping was related to less stress, while struggles with God and negative religious coping was related to more stress and other negative impacts related to the pandemic (Pirutinsky et al., 2020). Among Muslims from Iran, phases of spiritual dryness (related to the perception that God is not responding and not helping) were reported during the pandemic, although most would still regard themselves as religious (Büssing et al., 2021b). Both the view of God as a helping one, and positive expectations that God will intervene have been expressed particularly in the first phase of the pandemic when hope was prevailing predominantly in religious societies and specific faith groups. However, for both Catholics and Protestants in rather secular Germany, there was an obvious decline of religious trust and confidence associated with the sharp rise of infection rates during the 2nd wave of the pandemic, which seems to persist during the next waves. This would indicate that their expectations of a helping God may have declined during the course of the pandemic as death rates increased (that those who died were not ‘rescued’ or protected from the virus by God). Whether this can be interpreted in terms of magic beliefs, or of fideism, or of the theodicy question, or as a matter of (passive) resignation, is open to discussion and probably differs individually.

The observed decrease in participants’ trust in a Higher Source (whatever may support them during the pandemic) along with the 2nd and the following waves was predicted best by the levels of a person’s religious affiliation, increased age, strong wellbeing, and time of recruitment before the 2nd lockdown. It can be expected that religious trust can best be explained by a person´s religiosity, and religious people are more often older. However, the corona-related burden affected both religious and non-religious people, and both groups showed a loss of confidence. While there are several studies that underline the idea that religious coping is helpful to deal with stressful life events, this study would indicate that long phases of insecurity and social isolation with the lack of support by religious/spiritual communities (and thus declining satisfaction with their support) may have likewise challenged the religious coping capacities of religious persons themselves. This could be seen in the context of ‘defeat stress’ resulting in feelings of loneliness and social isolation on the one hand (Büssing 2022), and ‘spiritual exclusion’ on the other hand. All in terms of pandemic-related social exclusion due to the required restrictions imposed in order to protect people at risk.

Particularly during the pandemic, circumstances arose that put religious institutions at trouble and constituted a challenge to the personal religiosity and religious commitment of believers. As a result, the important functions of religion as revealed in its integrative and meaning-making role were severely curtailed. Likewise, the ritual and communal performance of religious practices had been limited (due to the restrictions) and subsequently transferred online and to private living. Religious activities had temporarily changed from the prevailing congregational forms of faith to more individual and private ones, e.g., realized in the family at home. In our study, we have observed a decline parallel to the course of the pandemic in the frequency of praying and meditation in Catholics and Protestants. It seems as if the pandemic did not generally encourage people to rely more strongly on traditional religiosity. Instead, more flexible forms of religiosity were practiced in private and according to one's own preferences. This could also explain the observation that the non-religiously affiliated participants, (who nevertheless may have interest in religious and spiritual issues), stated that they have confidence in a higher supporting source and are more active in meditation than they are in praying.

The challenge for the communities and institutions will be to re-attract and re-integrate into their liturgies and services all those who have experienced that their religiosity can be practiced even without the religious institutions or the communal forms of worship services. A study from Ireland explored how the Christian clergy have framed their adoption of online ministries during the COVID-19 pandemic as opportunities for the churches to retain some significance (Ganiel 2021). During the first phase of the pandemic, older Seventh-day Adventists from Germany benefited from the free church´s digital media resources and experienced a positive impact on their wellbeing in spite of the lockdown restrictions (Büssing et al., 2021c). A study from Italy showed that people who reported a COVID-19 contagion in their family were more frequently using digital religious services (via web, radio and television) and prayer during the pandemic. Whether these short-term coping strategies have changed their religious behavior and faith in the long run is unclear. Under difficult circumstances, a short-term religious revival might take place, even in contexts where the process of secularization is in progress (Molteni et al., 2021). In fact, the increase in existential insecurity can result in needs for religious reassurance (Höllinger & Muckenhuber 2019; Molteni et al., 2021), and thus religious beliefs and behaviors can indeed play a beneficial role when experiencing such insecurity or anxiety (Davis et al., 2021; Narimani & Eyni 2021; Prazeres et al., 2020). Yet, as shown in this study, in some societies this might not be true on a larger scale.

It seems that, due to the long course of social distancing and related restrictions, more or less vital social and religious bonds between people and local religious communities were affected and even disrupted. In Germany, the satisfaction with the support from the local religious communities during the first phases of the pandemic was rather low (33% persons with a religious affiliation stated satisfaction, as compared to 74% of religious brothers and sisters) (Büssing 2021). Here we underline a constant decline of such satisfaction with support from the local communities. Further, when sacred spaces (i.e., the churches) are not easily accessible, people may lose access to the center of their public religious life, and thus they may either develop new forms of spiritual practices in privacy or simply get used to the loss. Counted et al., (2020) described that the pandemic has affected the connections with other people not only in the direct neighborhood and in the faith community, but also in places of work and of worship – and this may have resulted in spiritual struggles which can be indicated by the loss of faith as seen in this study.

Limitations

This study refers to data collected from different participants recruited via snowball sampling. We have no control over who has participated nor over whom we did not reach with this approach, and therefore we do not assume that the findings are representative of the general Germany society. Due to the fact that we relied on an online survey tool, people without internet access could not participate, and therefore we certainly have not reached all social groups in a comparable manner.

The compositions of the different ‘time cohorts’ of persons continuously recruited during the course of the pandemic are quite similar, but nevertheless differ in specific details. It seems that participants who stated that they have no (or not any longer) religious affiliation may have increased with the later phases of the pandemic. To overcome this potential bias, we also differentiated the responses of a) persons with and without a religious affiliation, b) those specifically with a Catholic and a Protestant background (the group of other religious affiliations was too small to rely on), and c) those with lower age (< = 40 years) and higher age (> 40 years). Religious persons living in monastic structures (brothers and sisters, monks and nuns) who were participating predominantly directly after the first lockdown were excluded from the analyses to avoid a bias due to the responses of these highly religious persons. However, the addressed effects were observed in all the remaining sub-groups.