Our findings suggest that doing nothing can be just as costly—if not more costly—than exerting effort

Wu, R., Ferguson, A. M., & Inzlicht, M. (2022). Do humans prefer cognitive effort over doing nothing? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Nov 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001320

Abstract: Humans and other animals find mental (and physical) effort aversive and have the fundamental drive to avoid it. However, doing nothing is also aversive. Here, we ask whether people choose to avoid effort when the alternative is to do nothing at all. Across 12 studies, participants completed variants of the demand selection task, in which they repeatedly selected between a cognitively effortful task (e.g., simple addition, Stroop task, and symbol-counting task) and a task that required no effort (e.g., doing nothing, watching the computer complete the Stroop, and symbol-viewing). We then tabulated people’s choices. Across our studies and an internal meta-analysis, we found little evidence that people choose to avoid effort (and hints that people sometimes prefer effort) when the alternative was doing nothing. Our findings suggest that doing nothing can be just as costly—if not more costly—than exerting effort.

Selection in utero (spontaneuous abortion) against male twins in the United States early in the COVID-19 pandemic confirms reproductive suppression (natural selection aborts fetuses unlikely to thrive)

Selection in utero against male twins in the United States early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Tim A. Bruckner, Brenda Bustos, Claire Margerison, Alison Gemmill, Joan Casey, Ralph Catalano. American Journal of Human Biology, November 5 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajhb.23830

Abstract
Objectives: We aim to contribute to the literature reporting tests of selection in utero. The theory of reproductive suppression predicts that natural selection would conserve mechanisms, referred to collectively as selection in utero, that spontaneously abort fetuses unlikely to thrive as infants in the prevailing environment. Tests of this prediction include reports that women give birth to fewer than expected male twins, historically among the frailest of infants, during stressful times. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States in Spring 2020 demonstrably stressed the population. We test the hypothesis that conception cohorts in gestation at the onset of the pandemic in the United States yielded fewer than expected live male twin births.

Methods: We retrieved deidentified data on the universe of live births in the United States from the National Center for Health Statistics birth certificate records. We applied Box-Jenkins time-series methods to the twin secondary sex ratio computed for 77 monthly conception cohorts spanning August 2013 to December 2019 to detect outlying cohorts in gestation at the onset of the pandemic.

Results: The twin secondary sex ratio fell below expected values in three conception cohorts (i.e., July, September, and October 2019, all p < .05) exposed in utero to the onset of the pandemic.

Conclusions: Our results add to prior findings consistent with selection in utero. The role of selection in utero in shaping the characteristics of live births cohorts, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, warrants further scrutiny.

4 DISCUSSION

Whereas much literature finds changes in live birth outcomes following the initial phase of COVID-19, less work examines the possibility that the stressful nature of the early pandemic induced selection in utero. We used conception cohorts and focused on male twin gestations, a subgroup which much theory and empirical work identifies as a sensitive gauge of selection in utero. Results using the universe of births in the United States indicate fewer than expected male twin births among three monthly conception cohorts in utero at the time of COVID-19 “shelter-in-place” policies in March 2020. We hope these findings will encourage further research into the extent to which selection in utero accounts for unexpected patterns of perinatal outcomes in months immediately after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The magnitude of our results (in terms of percentage reduction of male twins during COVID-19 shelter-in-place policies) appears smaller than that reported for Norway, where odds of male twin births decreased by 27% (Catalano et al., 2021). We, however, caution against direct comparisons for two reasons. First, our US study examined conception, rather than birth, cohorts. Second, we focused on cohorts conceived before January 2020 because earlier research reports these exhibited characteristics (e.g., fewer than expected preterm births) consistent with selection in utero. By contrast, the largest declines in male twinning in Norway occurred among birth cohorts likely conceived after December 2019. We expect that the large observed reductions in fertility, as well as reduced availability of assisted reproductive technology in March 2020 (Vermeulen et al., 2020), could similarly reduce male twinning in the United States among cohorts conceived in 2020.

Strengths of the study involve the conception cohort approach, use of the universe of twin births in the United States, and application of rigorous time-series methods to rule out confounding by factors that affect male and female twin births equally. Well-developed theory of selection in utero, combined with a narrow time window specified a priori in which the onset of the pandemic likely affected male twin gestations, further enhances internal validity. In addition, although twin births appear more frequent among pregnancies conceived using assisted reproductive technologies (ART) (Maalouf et al., 2014; Supramaniam et al., 2019), our findings cannot arise from COVID-induced disruptions in ART service provision that occurred in March and April of 2020, since the affected cohorts we identified were conceived in July, September, and October of 2019. Likewise, changes in fertility behaviors caused by the pandemic cannot drive our findings because the affected cohorts were conceived prior to the pandemic.

Limitations include the lack of direct measures of selection in utero such as fetal loss and/or spontaneous pregnancy losses before the second trimester. Our study relies solely on the live birth data and the gestational age of delivery of live births. Very few countries (e.g., Denmark), however, routinely collect data describing early pregnancy loss at the population level and these data were not available to us. We also do not have information on the zygosity of twins, which precludes examination of whether selection against male twins occurred more for monozygotic than dizygotic twin gestations. We are currently pursuing the feasibility of both analyses using Scandinavian data.

The U.S. data include only month and year of birth thereby requiring us to randomly assign parturition to days of the birth month. Although this strategy may lead to error in estimation of conception date, we know of no reason to infer that such errors biased counts of twin male births toward pre-pandemic conception cohorts. Finally, our analyses assess the United States in aggregate. Different regions of the United States may have responded differently to COVID-19 pandemic exposure or experienced stressors at different time points (e.g., New York City faced the brunt of the pandemic early on) (Van Dorn, Dorn et al., 2020). Future studies may wish to assess regional impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on male twin births.

Our results add to the empirical research consistent with the argument that reproductive suppression in humans includes selection in utero. They also suggest that selection in utero may account for some as yet unknown, but worth estimating, fraction of the unusual characteristics (e.g., low frequency of preterm births) of infants born during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Further attempts to quantify selection in utero during the pandemic would benefit from arraying putatively frail sets of gestations by conception, rather than by birth, cohorts.

The Emotional Rewards of Prosocial Spending Are Robust and Replicable in Large Samples

The Emotional Rewards of Prosocial Spending Are Robust and Replicable in Large Samples. Lara B. Aknin et al. Current Directions in Psychological Science, November 9, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/09637214221121100

Abstract: Past studies show that spending money on other people—prosocial spending—increases a person’s happiness. However, foundational research on this topic was conducted prior to psychology’s credibility revolution (or “replication crisis”), so it is essential to ask whether the evidence supporting this claim is robust and replicable. Here, we consider all 15 published preregistered experiments on prosocial spending to evaluate whether there is causal evidence for the idea that spending money on other people promotes happiness. Although the evidence appears somewhat mixed, we argue that the emotional benefits of prosocial spending are robust and replicable in large samples. These benefits are particularly likely when people have some choice about whether or how to give and when they understand how their generosity makes a difference. This review provides renewed support for the idea that prosocial spending promotes happiness and offers a template for revisiting phenomena that were established prior to the credibility revolution.

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In 2021, during the second year of the pandemic, responses to a global survey revealed that more than one third (36.7%) of people had donated to charity in the past month, a figure nearly 6% higher than global estimates from before the pandemic (Helliwell et al., 2022). What accounts for such high levels of generosity, even during a global crisis? One possibility is that using financial resources to help other people—called prosocial spending—feels good. Indeed, in the first experiment on this topic, people randomly assigned to spend $5 or $20 on others were significantly happier than people randomly assigned to spend on themselves (Dunn et al., 2008). Since then, the emotional benefits of generosity have been observed in diverse areas of the world, from South Africa to Vanuatu (Aknin et al., 2013, 2015), as well as among toddlers (Aknin et al., 2012; see Dunn et al., 2014, for a review). These findings have been cited widely in the literature, discussed in popular culture (e.g., Grant, 2014), and used to inform government policy (e.g., the 2013 report on charitable giving by the United Kingdom Cabinet Office Behavioural Insight Team). But how robust and replicable is the evidence that spending money on other people improves happiness?

Here, we review all relevant experiments implementing the current best practice of preregistration to answer the question of whether spending money on other people causally increases well-being. We conclude that the causal impact of prosocial spending on well-being is robust and replicable in large samples (n ≥ 200 per condition). We also extract key lessons on when it appears that these emotional benefits are most likely to be detected: when paradigms involve actual behavior, when participants have a choice in deciding who or how to help, and when participants receive information on how their actions help other people. These lessons underscore the hedonic benefits of actual generous behaviors that provide a sense of choice and the feeling that one has created positive change.

Estimates suggest high-speed wireless internet significantly increased teen girls' mental health diagnoses--by 90%--relative to teen boys over the period when visual social media became dominant among teenagers

Social Media and Teenage Mental Health: Quasi-Experimental Evidence. Nov 2022. Elaine Guo. Working Paper. https://www.dropbox.com/s/5v9c6ajvmu2of8d/Guo_social_media.pdf

Abstract: Teenage mental health has been a source of growing concern over the past decade, with recent whistleblower testimony pointing to the mental health risks of spending time on social media platforms, especially for girls. This paper investigates the extent to which social media are harmful for teenagers, leveraging rich administrative data from the Canadian province of British Columbia and quasi-experimental variation related to the rollout of wireless internet there. I show neighbourhoods covered by high-speed wireless internet have significantly higher social media use, based on Google search volumes. In the main analysis, I link federally-collected broadband data with 20 years of student records that provide detailed information about individual student health. I then estimate a triple-difference model using this novel data linkage, comparing teen girls to teen boys in terms of school-reported mental health diagnoses, before and after major social media launches, and across neighbourhoods with and without access to high-speed wireless internet. Estimates suggest high-speed wireless internet significantly increased teen girls' mental health diagnoses -- by 90\% -- relative to teen boys over the period when visual social media became dominant among teenagers. I find similar effects across all subgroups, indicating they are not driven by differences in confounding characteristics.  When applying the same strategy, I find null effects for placebo health conditions -- ones for which there is no clear channel for social media to operate. The evidence points to adverse effects of visual social media, in light of large gender gaps in visual social media use and documented risks. In turn, the analysis calls attention to policy interventions that could mitigate the harm to young people due to their online activities.

Despite Google's filtering/ranking, users still appear to be able to tailor their information exposure to maintain their prior beliefs, hence defying that algorithmic impact

Adapting the Selective Exposure Perspective to Algorithmically Governed Platforms: The Case of Google Search. Laura Slechten et al. Communication Research, April 30, 2021, Volume 49, Issue 8. https://doi.org/10.1177/00936502211012154

Abstract: Experimental research on selective exposure on online platforms is generally limited by a narrow focus on specific parts of the information selection process, rather than integrating the entire sequence of user-platform interactions. The current study, focusing on online search, incorporates the entire process that stretches from formulating an initial query to finally satisfying an information need. As such, it comprehensively covers how both users and platforms exercise agency by enabling and constraining each other in progressively narrowing down the available information. During a tailored online experiment, participants are asked to search for social and political information in a fully tracked, manipulated Google Search environment. Although the results show a structural impact of varying search result rankings, users still appear to be able to tailor their information exposure to maintain their prior beliefs, hence defying that algorithmic impact. This corroborates the need to conceptually and methodologically expand online selective exposure research.

Portfolio outcomes: Higher IQ is not associated with enhanced investment performance

The effects of personality and IQ on portfolio outcomes. Chris Firth et al. Finance Research Letters, November 4 2022, 103464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.103464

Highlights

• We investigate the effects of personality (Big Five traits) and IQ on individuals’ stock portfolio outcomes (activity, biases and performance)

• We use 1238 customers’ responses to a self-report survey and matched with their portfolio trading data.

• Traits have small but significant effects; higher IQ is not associated with enhanced investment performance.

• Other factors, such as customer age, portfolio size and portfolio risk, much better explain outcomes. Financial literacy shows little effect.

Abstract: We use responses to a self-report survey and matched administrative data to investigate the effects of personality (Big Five traits) and IQ on individuals’ stock trading portfolios. Traits have small but significant effects: openness and extraversion are associated with undesirable outcomes whereas conscientiousness is associated beneficially. Higher IQ is associated with lower trading activity but not enhanced investment performance. We postulate these factors influence outcomes in a complex manner, and exert over long timeframes. With portfolio size held constant, financial literacy has little effect. Other factors, such as customer age, portfolio size and portfolio risk, better explain outcomes.

JEL: D14 D91 G11

Keywords: individual decision-makingpersonality traitsBig Fiveinvestment biasesfinancial literacyIQ

3.1. Big Five personality traits

Internal consistency, measured by Cronbach's alpha, ranges from 0.31 to 0.72 for the five TIPI-derived traits and is consistent with (Gosling et al. 2003) (who also show strong correlations from a much longer inventory).

Coefficient sizes from the regressions for trait variables are consistently small7. Typical is the coefficient of 0.05 on conscientiousness (Big5_C) for the regression on Sharpe (investment performance). We interpret this as saying that on average a one standard deviation increase in conscientiousness improves performance by 5% of a standard deviation of the variable Sharpe. Despite the weak effects, the presence or not of statistical significance and the signs of coefficients offer useful insights. In summary: openness (Big5_O) has a negative association with login rate and positive associations with overconfidence and idiosyncratic risk; extraversion (Big5_E) has positive associations with overconfidence and negative associations with idiosyncratic risk and investment performance. We could explain this by suggesting that extraverts – being easily bored – take excessive, unrewarded risk. We might also speculate they would trade more and be more vulnerable to the disposition effect but that does not feature in our results.

Conscientiousness (Big5_C) has positive associations with overconfidence and investment performance. Roberts et al. (2011) report that conscientious people earn more money, which is comparable to our finding of a positive link between conscientious individuals and better returns. Kleine et al. (2016) report that openness tends to have a negative impact on portfolios; we too see that openness is associated with less desirable portfolio outcomes.

3.2. IQ

The IQ scores in our sample are as expected for a general population (see online appendix); we may reasonably state that the brokerage customers are not exceptionally intelligent. The regressions indicate that IQ very weakly predicts lower portfolio activity8. We observe no significant associations between IQ and biases of disposition effect and idiosyncratic risk, though there is a lessening effect for overconfidence. We report no statistically significant effect of IQ on the economically relevant measure (Sharpe). Although these coefficients are directionally consistent with results in (Grinblatt et al. 2012), their lack of statistical significance is somewhat surprising. However, there could be plausible reasons this. Firstly, we have a much smaller sample size than do Grinblatt et al. (2012), and, secondly, the IQ measure we use – from Raven and Court (1998) – is arguably independent of formal education (Almlund et al. 2011) which avoids potentially confounding IQ with numeracy9. Numeracy is known to be an important predictor of success in everyday risk and financial decisions (Smith et al. 2010; Cokely et al. 2012; Peters 2012).

3.3. Financial literacy

Financial literacy (FinLit) shows no statistically significant effects across six of the regressions, the main exception being the (undesirable) positive coefficient on overconfidence (OverCon). There is also weak evidence of a reduction in the disposition effect (Disp). Fernandes et al. (2014) find that effects of financial literacy diminish when variables for psychological traits are added. Instead, we observe an analogous role for portfolio size (Size). In regressions with Size excluded, financial literacy shows significant effects (see online appendix). These coefficients moderate sharply with Size included (expressed alternatively: with portfolio size held constant, financial literacy does not affect outcomes). For example, excluding Size, a one standard deviation increase in financial literacy lowers idiosyncratic risk by 8% of a standard deviation of the variable Idio. With Size, the effect of literacy is not distinguishable from zero and the coefficient for Size is 17% (see Table 4). We record a correlation of 0.21 (significant at 1%) between IQ and financial literacy (see online appendix). Muñoz-Murillo et al. (2020) likewise find that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are more financially literate.

Taken together, these results hint at a nuanced causal relationship in which those with larger portfolios are more financially literate—either because those more literate are confident enough to hold larger portfolios or because those who plan to hold larger portfolios deliberately acquire a higher level of literacy—but that variance in financial literacy over and above that due to portfolio size has no further effect.

We repeat our earlier caution that the high but uniform financial literacy of our sample customers – in itself noteworthy – could hinder inferences. Moreover, financial literacy could be endogenous, leading to biased parameter estimates. We attempt to overcome this by conducting age-instrumented estimates of the effects of financial literacy (see online appendix) based on the premise that customer age is exogenous, together with evidence from Agarwal et al. (2009) that financial mistakes decrease with age (until the onset of mental impairment). While our IV results are consistent with the overall pattern in our main analysis, we conclude that the methodological hurdles surrounding our financial literacy variable leave the question of its effects unsettled.

Government, trusts, and the making of better roads in early nineteenth century England and Wales

Government, trusts, and the making of better roads in early nineteenth century England and Wales. Alan Rosevear, Dan Bogart & Leigh Shaw-Taylor. Univ. of California at Irvine, Aug 31 2022. https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2021-2022/turnpike_road_quality%20after_31_Aug_2022.pdf

Abstract: This paper introduces new data to explain how public, private, and non-profit sectors sponsored, financed, and technically developed better roads in early 19th century England and Wales. Our findings show that central Government direct financing was limited to sections of the politically important London-Holyhead Mail Road. By comparison non-profit organizations, known as turnpike trusts, built more new roads by attracting private investors and capable surveyors. We also show the Government Mail Road had the highest quality. Nevertheless, most turnpike trust roads were good quality, indicating their practical achievements. The  broader implications for infrastructure and state capacity are also explained. 

Keywords: State capacity, infrastructure, roads, turnpike trusts, non-profit sector, public private partnerships

JEL: N7, N4, H1, R4

Adolescent females: Rape victimization was predicted by greater curvaceousness and weight but was unrelated to interviewer-rated attractiveness

Association between Dimensions of Physical Attractiveness and Risk of Rape Victimization among Adolescent Females. Anthony W. Hoskin &Daniel Moody. Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma, Nov 6 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/10926771.2022.2142180

Abstract: This study addresses the following question: “Does female physical attractiveness predict the risk of rape victimization?” Data were analyzed from a large sample of females who participated in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health). Three conceptualizations of physical attractiveness were operationalized: overall attractiveness, curvaceousness, and weight. Bivariate analysis revealed that rape victimization was predicted by greater curvaceousness and weight but was unrelated to interviewer-rated attractiveness. Respondent age, Hispanic ethnicity, race, general health, physical maturation, and number of sexual partners were added to multivariate models in a stepwise fashion, but physical attractiveness and rape victimization were found to be unrelated in all models, and the positive association between weight and victimization fell to statistical non-significance when general health was added to the model. By contrast, curvaceousness consistently predicted greater victimization risk across all models. Among control variables, females who are older, less healthy, and who have more sexual partners face a higher risk of victimization. Add Health data do not present a straightforward picture of the relationship between various dimensions of physical attractiveness and rape victimization. Findings, study limitations, and theoretical implications are discussed.

Keywords: Sexual assaultrapevictimizationphysical attractiveness

Individualization and the decline of homicide: England 1250–1750

Individualization and the decline of homicide: England 1250–1750. Mark Cooney, Jeffery Patterson. Journal of Criminal Justice, November 3 2022, 101997. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2022.101997

Abstract: A key issue in criminology is to account for variation in rates of violence across time and place. An important variable largely neglected in the literature is individualism. Building on theoretical ideas proposed by Durkheim, Black, and Baumgartner, we illustrate the role of increased individualism with a case study: the decline of homicide in England, 1250–1750. The qualitative historical materials we present reveal the growth of more individualized conflicts evident in less third-party partisan intervention and a reduced concern with honor. More individualized conflicts were, in turn, a product of a more individualized society, one characterized by increased social distance and mobility. As conflicts individualized they became less lethal, resulting in declining aggregate rates of homicide. Although the case study is historical, our argument has implications for understanding contemporary criminal violence.

People in historically rice-farming areas are less happy and socially compare more than people in wheat-farming areas

Lee, C.-S., Talhelm, T., & Dong, X. (2022). People in historically rice-farming areas are less happy and socially compare more than people in wheat-farming areas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Nov 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000324

Abstract: Using two nationally representative surveys, we find that people in China’s historically rice-farming areas are less happy than people in wheat areas. This is a puzzle because the rice area is more interdependent, and relationships are an important predictor of happiness. We explore how the interdependence of historical rice farming may have paradoxically undermined happiness by creating more social comparison than wheat farming. We build a framework in which rice farming leads to social comparison, which makes people unhappy (especially people who are worse off). If people in rice areas socially compare more, then people’s happiness in rice areas should be more closely related to markers of social status like income. In two studies, national survey data show that income, self-reported social status, and occupational status predict people’s happiness twice as strongly in rice areas than wheat areas. In Study 3, we use a unique natural experiment comparing two nearby state farms that effectively randomly assigned people to farm rice or wheat. The rice farmers socially compare more, and farmers who socially compare more are less happy. If interdependence breeds social comparison and erodes happiness, it could help explain the paradox of why the interdependent cultures of East Asia are less happy than similarly wealthy cultures.

Partisan bias in false memories for misinformation about the 2021 Capitol riot: For both true and false events, participants remembered more events that favoured their political party

Partisan bias in false memories for misinformation about the 2021 U.S. Capitol riot. Dustin P. Calvillo, Justin D. Harris & Whitney C. Hawkins. Memory, Sep 28 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2022.2127771

Abstract: Memory for events can be biased. For example, people tend to recall more events that support than oppose their current worldview. The present study examined partisan bias in memory for events related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot in the United States. Participants rated their memory for true and false events that were either favourable to their political party or the other major political party in the United States. For both true and false events, participants remembered more events that favoured their political party. Regression analyses showed that the number of false memories that participants reported was positively associated with their tendency to support conspiracy beliefs and with their self-reported engagement with the Capitol riot. These results suggest that Democrats and Republicans remember the Capitol Riot differently and that certain individual difference factors can predict the formation of false memories in this context. Misinformation played an influential role in the Capitol riot and understanding differences in memory for this event is beneficial to avoiding similar tragedies in the future.

Keywords: False memoryfake newsmemory biaspolitical ideology

Most people feel others’ social lives are richer and livelier than theirs

Keeping Up With the Joneses: How Cognitive Availability Biases Everyday Social Comparisons. Sebastian Marc Deri. PhD dissertation, Cornell University 2022. https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/111944/Deri_cornellgrad_0058F_13102.pdf?sequence=1

Abstract: This dissertation documents the role that cognitive availability plays in distorting the conclusions that people reach about how they measure up to others in domains of everyday concern. The first chapter provides a review of the social comparison literature and an explanation of how my account of social comparison is novel. The second chapter (N=3,293, 11 studies, 3 pre-registered) documents the fact that most people feel others’ social lives are livelier than theirs, and that this is because they can’t help but to bring to mind highly social exemplars when making such comparisons. The third chapter (N= 2,747, 12 studies, 4 pre-registered) documents a robust tendency to compare to above average standards, which cannot solely be explained by motivational factors like social desirability or self-enhancement—adding a wrinkle to the standard above average effect literature by showing that, although people tend to think of themselves as above average in many domains, they also hold and compare themselves to above average standards. The fourth chapter (N=1,703, 3 studies, 1 pre-registered) documents the fact that people feel they are financially worse off than others when thinking about positive instances of wealth (e.g. having a lot in savings) and that this effect can be reversed if people are made to think of positive instances of low economic standing (e.g. having a lot of debt). The fifth and final chapter synthesizes these empirical findings, summarizes my cognitive availability account of social comparison, reviews why it is a novel contribution, and addresses any outstanding concerns.

FDA Deregulation Increases Safety and Innovation and Reduces Prices

Regulating the Innovators: Approval Costs and Innovation in Medical Technologies. Parker Rogers, October 27, 2022. https://parkerrogers.github.io/Papers/RegulatingtheInnovators_Rogers.pdf

Abstract: How does FDA regulation affect innovation and market concentration? I examine this question by exploiting FDA deregulation events that affected certain medical device types but not others. I use text analysis to gather comprehensive data on medical device innovation, device safety, firm entry, prices, and regulatory changes. My analysis of these data yields three core results. First, these deregulation events significantly increase the quantity and quality of new technologies in affected medical device types relative to control groups. These increases are particularly strong among small and inexperienced firms. Second, these events increase firm entry and lower the prices of medical procedures that use affected medical device types. Third, the rates of serious injuries and deaths attributable to defective devices do not increase measurably after these events. Perhaps counterintuitively, deregulating certain device types lowers adverse event rates significantly, consistent with firms increasing their emphasis on product safety as deregulation exposes them to more litigation.

 

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After moving from Class III (high regulation) to II (moderate), device types exhibited a 200% increase in patenting and FDA submission rates relative to control groups. Patents filed after these events were also of significantly higher quality, as measured by a 200% increase in received citations and market valuations. These effects do not spill over into similar device types.1 For Class II to I deregulations, the rate of patent filings increased by 50%, though insignificantly, and the quality of patent filings exhibited a significant 10-fold improvement, suggesting that litigation better promotes innovation.

[...]

Down-classification yields considerable benefits, as the proponents of deregulation would predict, but what of product safety? Perhaps counterintuitively, I find that deregulation can improve product safety by exposing firms to more litigation. Despite some adverse event rates increasing after Class III to II events (albeit insignificantly), Class II to I events are associated with significantly lower adverse event rates.3 My analysis of patent texts also reveals that inventors focus more on product safety after deregulation. These results suggest that litigation encourages product safety more than regulation [...]

People who are more prone to cry also place a higher focus on morality in their judgements and actions

Only the Good Cry: Investigating the Relationship Between Crying Proneness and Moral Judgments and Behavior. Janis H. Zickfeld et al. Social Psychological Bulletin, Volume 17, Nov 3 2022. https://doi.org/10.32872/spb.6475

Abstract: People cry for various reasons and in numerous situations, some involving highly moral aspects such as altruism or moral beauty. At the same time, criers have been found to be evaluated as more morally upright—they are perceived as more honest, reliable, and sincere than non-criers. The current project provides a first comprehensive investigation to test whether this perception is adequate. Across six studies sampling Dutch, Indian, and British adults (N = 2325), we explored the relationship between self-reported crying proneness and moral judgments and behavior, employing self-report measures and actual behavior assessments. Across all studies, we observed positive correlations of crying proneness with moral judgments (r = .27 [.17, .38]) and prosocial behavioral tendencies and behaviors (r = .20 [.12, .28]). These associations held in three (moral judgment) or two (prosocial tendencies and behaviors) out of five studies when controlling for other important variables. Thus, the current project provides first evidence that crying is related to moral evaluation and behavior, and we discuss its importance for the literature on human emotional crying.

Those with the lowest ability to evaluate scientific evidence overestimate their skill the most

Calibration of scientific reasoning ability. Caitlin Drummond Otten, Baruch Fischhoff. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, November 4 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2306

Abstract: Scientific reasoning ability, the ability to reason critically about the quality of scientific evidence, can help laypeople use scientific evidence when making judgments and decisions. We ask whether individuals with greater scientific reasoning ability are also better calibrated with respect to their ability, comparing calibration for skill with the more widely studied calibration for knowledge. In three studies, participants (Study 1: N = 1022; Study 2: N = 101; and Study 3: N = 332) took the Scientific Reasoning Scale (SRS; Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017), comprised of 11 true–false problems, and provided confidence ratings for each problem. Overall, participants were overconfident, reporting mean confidence levels that were 22.4–25% higher than their percentages of correct answers; calibration improved with score. Study 2 found similar calibration patterns for the SRS and another skill, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), measuring the ability to avoid intuitive but incorrect answers. SRS and CRT scores were both associated with success at avoiding negative decision outcomes, as measured by the Decision Outcomes Inventory; confidence on the SRS, above and beyond scores, predicted worse outcomes. Study 3 added an alternative measure of calibration, asking participants to estimate the number of items answered correctly. Participants were less overconfident by this measure. SRS scores predicted correct usage of scientific information in a drug facts box task and holding beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus on controversial issues; confidence, above and beyond SRS scores, predicted worse drug facts box performance but stronger science-consistent beliefs. We discuss the implications of our findings for improving science-relevant decision-making.

5 GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across three studies, we find that people with greater ability to evaluate scientific evidence, as measured by scores on the SRS, have greater metacognitive ability to assess that skill. Using a confidence elicitation paradigm common to studies of confidence in knowledge, we found that individuals with low SRS scores greatly overestimate their skill, while those with high skills slightly underestimate their skill, a pattern previously found with confidence in beliefs (e.g., Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Moore & Healy, 2008).

Study 2 replicated these patterns with confidence in SRS skills and with calibration for another skill-based task, the CRT, which assesses the ability to avoid immediately appealing but incorrect “fast lure” answers and then find correct ones (Attali & Bar-Hillel, 2020; Frederick, 2005; Pennycook et al., 2017). As a test of external validity, Study 2 also found that people with better SRS scores had better scores on the DOI, a self-report measure of avoiding negative decision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007); confidence on the SRS, controlling for knowledge, was associated with worse DOI scores.

Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2, asking participants how confident they are in each SRS answer, now called “local calibration.” It also assessed “global calibration,” derived from asking participants how many items they thought they answered correctly. Overconfidence was much smaller with the global measure, as found elsewhere (e.g., Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Griffin & Buehler, 1999; Stone et al., 2011). This finding suggests that global calibration may be more appropriate for situations where individuals reflect and act on a set of tasks, rather than act on tasks one by one. However, in an experimental setting, it may also convey a demand characteristic, with an implicit challenge to be less confident (if interpreted as, “How many do you think that you really got right?”), artifactually reducing performance estimates and overconfidence.

Study 3 also included additional measures of construct and external validity. As a test of construct validity, we found that global confidence, controlling for scores, was unrelated to a self-report measure of intellectual humility (Leary et al., 2017), and local confidence, controlling for scores, was unexpectedly positively related to self-reported intellectual humility. These findings may reflect the limitations of self-report measures, including a desirability bias in reporting.

Study 3 further found that SRS scores predicted performance on two science-related tasks: extracting information from a drug facts box (Woloshin & Schwartz, 2011) and holding beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus (as in previous work, Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017). However, confidence, controlling for knowledge, played different roles for these outcomes: It was negatively associated with scores on the drug facts box test, but positively associated with holding beliefs consistent with science on controversial issues. These findings suggest that while those with greater confidence in their scientific reasoning ability may also be more confident in their beliefs on scientific issues, confidence that is out of step with knowledge may hinder decision-making. Neither scores nor confidence was related to self-reported adoption of pandemic health behaviors, perhaps reflecting partisan divisions that reduce the role of individual cognition (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2020). Future work could examine the role of confidence, above and beyond knowledge, in other science-relevant judgments and decisions, including falling sway to pseudoscientific claims or products.

Individuals' metacognitive understanding of the extent of their knowledge has been related to life events in many domains (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker et al., 2018; Peters et al., 2019; Tetlock & Gardner, 2015). Overall, we find that unjustified confidence (Parker & Stone, 2014) in scientific reasoning ability, as reflected in self-reported confidence in the correctness of one's answer adding predictive value to SRS scores (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017), is associated with reduced avoidance of negative outcomes and worse performance on tasks that require using scientific information, but greater acceptance of the scientific consensus on controversial issues. Unlike Peters et al. (2019), who found that mismatches between skill and confidence were associated with worse outcomes, we found that unjustified confidence (measured both locally and globally) was associated similarly with outcomes at all levels of reasoning ability. These findings may reflect differences between numeracy and scientific reasoning, differences between the studies' measures of confidence and outcomes, or interactions too weak to be detected with the statistical power of the present research. Our findings may also reflect our measures' range restrictions: Here, confidence was elicited as expected performance, thus restricting the extent to which participants with very low or high performance could display underconfidence or overconfidence, respectively. Future work could seek other measures that could further separate the respective contributions of scientific reasoning ability and metacognition about it, such as a subjective scientific reasoning ability scale similar to the Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007).

Overall, we observed patterns of metacognition for cognitive skills similar to those observed for beliefs, using conventional confidence elicitation methods with known artifacts. Prior research has proposed a variety of methods for measuring overconfidence, with varying strengths and limitations. We discuss several key limitations below; for further discussion of these measurement issues, we refer readers to Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), Erev et al. (1994), Moore and Healy (2008), Fiedler and Unkelbach (2014), Parker and Stone (2014), and Yates (1982).

The dramatically poor performance of the lowest quartile, for both SRS and CRT, is notable. As the groups were identified based on SRS and CRT scores, some of the spread is artifactual (as noted by Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977, and others). One known artifact is the truncated 50–100% response mode, which precludes perfect calibration for participants who answer fewer than 50% of the SRS questions correctly (N = 444 [43% of respondents] in Study 1; N = 34 [34%] in Study 2; and N = 148 [45%] in Study 3). In a post hoc analysis, we treated these respondents as though they had answered 50% of questions correctly. Even with this change, they were still overconfident, by, on average, 29.8% in Study 1 (SD = 10), 31.5% in Study 2 (SD = 11), and 30.5% in Study 3 (SD = 10).

One limitation of these results is that the SRS or CRT tests might have demand effects atypical of real-life tests of cognitive skills, such that participants assume that an experimental task would not be as difficult as these proved to be or want to appear knowledgeable in this setting (Fischhoff & Slovic, 1980). A second possible limitation is that reliance on imperfectly reliable empirical measures somehow affects the patterns of correlations and not just the differences between the groups (Erev et al., 1994; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Attempts to correct for such unreliability have had mixed results (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Krueger & Mueller, 2002; Kruger & Dunning, 2002). Third, task incentives were entirely intrinsic; conceivably, if clearly explained, calibration-based material rewards might have improved performance. Here, too, prior results have been mixed (Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Mellers et al., 2014). Fourth, our measure of science education, whether participants had a college course, may have been too poor to detect a latent relationship. Fifth, for Study 2, some participants may have seen the CRT items before (Haigh, 2016; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016), potentially increasing their scores (Bialek & Pennycook, 2018), with uncertain effects on confidence and calibration. Finally, our version of the CRT, which asked participants to choose between the fast lure and the correct answer, produced higher scores that the usual open-ended response mode and hence might not generalize to other CRT research.

If our results regarding the similarity between calibration for cognitive skill and knowledge prove robust, future work might seek to improve public understanding of science (e.g., Bauer et al., 2007; Miller, 1983, 1998, 2004) by addressing separately the ability to think critically and the need to stop and think critically. If people are as overconfident in their scientific reasoning ability as many participants were here, it may not be enough to correct erroneous beliefs through science communication and education (e.g., Bauer et al., 2007; Miller, 1983, 1998, 2004). People may also need help in reflecting on the limits to their ability to evaluate evidence and their potential vulnerability to manipulation by misleading arguments as well as by misleading evidence. Mental models approaches to science communication offer one potential strategy, by affording an intuitive feeling for how complex processes work (e.g., Bruine de Bruin & Bostrom, 2013; Downs, 2014). The inoculation approach to combating misinformation (Cook et al., 2017; van der Linden et al., 2017) offers another potential strategy, refuting misinformation in advance, so that people have a better feeling for when and how to think about the issues and when and how they can be deceived. Developing effective interventions requires research examining the separate contributions of scientific reasoning ability and metacognition to improving science-relevant judgments and decisions.

The idea that conservatives are more sensitive to disgust than liberals is a basic tenet of political psychology — and it may be a mere artifact of self-reports

Investigating the conservatism-disgust paradox in reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic: A reexamination of the interrelations among political ideology, disgust sensitivity, and pandemic response. Benjamin C. Ruisch et al. PLoS One, November 4, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0275440

Abstract: Research has documented robust associations between greater disgust sensitivity and (1) concerns about disease, and (2) political conservatism. However, the COVID-19 disease pandemic raised challenging questions about these associations. In particular, why have conservatives—despite their greater disgust sensitivity—exhibited less concern about the pandemic? Here, we investigate this “conservatism-disgust paradox” and address several outstanding theoretical questions regarding the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, ideology, and pandemic response. In four studies (N = 1,764), we identify several methodological and conceptual factors—in particular, an overreliance on self-report measures—that may have inflated the apparent associations among these constructs. Using non-self-report measures, we find evidence that disgust sensitivity may be a less potent predictor of disease avoidance than is typically assumed, and that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be amplified by self-report measures. These findings suggest that the true pattern of interrelations among these factors may be less “paradoxical” than is typically believed.

General discussion

This research provides important insight into the conservatism-disgust paradox in responses to the pandemic, as well as the relations among each of these target constructs—disgust sensitivity, political ideology, and pandemic response. These studies identified multiple factors that influence the (apparent) strength of the relations among these variables, thereby pinpointing several factors that are likely to have contributed to this seemingly contradictory pattern of results (Table 3).

Table 3. List of hypotheses, the study in which each hypothesis was tested, and whether or not each hypothesis was supported.

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0275440.t003

One contributing factor appears to be the predominant use of self-report measures of pandemic response in past research. Indeed, using a behavioral measure of virtual social distancing, we found that the relations between pandemic response and both ideology and disgust sensitivity were significantly attenuated, compared with self-report pandemic response measures. These findings are consistent with the possibility that these self-report measures may suffer from IV-DV conceptual overlap, while also being more susceptible to social desirability and other reporting biases [36–38]. Particularly given that this same virtual behavioral measure has been shown to out-predict self-reports in predicting who contracts the COVID-19 virus [21], these results suggest that behavioral measures of pandemic response may provide a more accurate estimate of the extent of ideological differences in responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as of the predictive power of disgust sensitivity for pandemic response. We found a similar divergence between self-report and non-self-report measures in the domain of disgust sensitivity. In this case, however, it was our experiential measure of disgust sensitivity that was the more powerful predictor of pandemic response. These findings identify important additional caveats and considerations for research examining the impact of disgust sensitivity on real-world outcomes, suggesting, in line with some past research, that self-reports of disgust sensitivity may correlate only modestly with other, more experiential or indirect indices of sensitivity to disgust—and that these measures/operationalizations may have different predictive power for different kinds of attitudes and behavior.

These findings also provide a means of beginning to reconcile some of the puzzling associations uncovered in other research on the COVID-19 pandemic. In particular, recent work suggests that—despite the putative disease-protective function of disgust—individuals who scored higher on self-reported disgust sensitivity may actually have been more likely to contract COVID-19 than those who self-reported less disgust sensitivity [23]. As documented here, however, self-reported disgust sensitivity appears to be only a relatively weak predictor of behavioral responses to the pandemic (indeed, adjusting for our experiential disgust measure rendered this association effectively nonexistent). Thus, although questions remain, these findings may bring us a step closer to understanding how self-reported disgust sensitivity could be a positive predictor of contracting the COVID-19 virus.

Perhaps the most intriguing findings, however, concern the relation of political ideology to self-report and experiential measures of disgust sensitivity. Using the DS-R, we replicated the well-documented ideological differences in self-reported disgust sensitivity. However, using our more experiential measure of disgust sensitivity—which presented participants with visual stimuli that closely corresponded to those described in the DS-R vignettes—we found no evidence of liberal-conservative differences in sensitivity to disgust.

Taken together, the findings discussed above suggest that methodological features of past research—particularly the heavy reliance on self-report measures of disgust sensitivity and pandemic response—may have inflated the relations among these three variables, and, thus, contributed to this seemingly contradictory pattern of results. In identifying the influence of these methodological factors, this research brings us a step closer to resolving the conservatism-disgust paradox, suggesting that the true pattern of interrelations among these variables is not as “paradoxical” as is typically assumed. That is, if, as these findings suggest, (1) the true relation between disgust sensitivity and pandemic response is smaller than previously suggested, and (2) ideological differences in disgust sensitivity are overestimated, then it is less surprising that conservatives exhibit less concern about the virus—particularly given that (3) ideological differences in responses to the pandemic may not be as dramatic as has been suggested by past research. The relatively small size of these effects makes it more likely that they would be subsumed by other concerns and motivations such as ideological identification and elite cues.

More generally, these findings also pose some challenges for past research and theory—particularly work suggesting a general relation between disgust sensitivity and political ideology. At the very least, these findings appear to suggest that liberals and conservatives do not differ in the form of disgust sensitivity that is most predictive of pandemic response. A more pessimistic interpretation, however, is that ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may generally be overestimated. That is, consistent with some recent critiques, it may be that self-report measures such as the DS-R amplify the true degree of ideological differences in disgust sensitivity, at least compared with measures that rely less on self-reports and self-beliefs about one’s own sensitivity to disgust.

Of course, our findings stand in contrast to a large body of research that suggests a connection between ideology and disgust, and, clearly, liberals and conservatives do reliably differ on many measures of disgust sensitivity (in particular, the DS-R and similar vignette-based measures). However, our findings also seem to align with other recent failures to replicate ideological differences in sensitivity to disgust using more indirect or experiential measures (e.g., [45]). Particularly in light of other research suggesting that people may have limited introspective ability into their own level of disgust sensitivity (e.g., work showing that self-reports sometimes do not significantly correlate with more indirect measures of disgust sensitivity; e.g., [18, 57, 58]) a closer examination of the nature and extent of ideological differences in disgust sensitivity may be warranted.

These findings therefore suggest that there may be a theoretical gap in our understanding of the relation between ideology and disgust sensitivity: Why is it that ideological differences reliably emerge on some measures of disgust sensitivity (e.g., the DS-R) but not others—even, as we found, measures that assess responses to closely related, or even identical, situations and stimuli? One possibility is that the ideological differences on the DS-R and similar vignette-based measures of sensitivity to disgust can in part be attributed to factors other than disgust sensitivity per se.

For example, forthcoming research suggests that conservatives tend to self-report greater interoceptive sensitivity—that is, to subjectively feel that they are more sensitive to the internal physiological states and signals of their own bodies—although by objective metrics they are actually less sensitive than are liberals [68]. Moreover, other research suggests that conservatives’ overconfidence may extend beyond interoception to experiences, judgments, and perceptions writ large [69]. Extending these past findings to the domain of disgust sensitivity would seem to suggest that conservatives may be likely to subjectively feel that they are more sensitive to disgust than they actually are, perhaps explaining why self-report measures of disgust sensitivity—which in part assess self-beliefs about one’s own degree of sensitivity to disgust—show more robust associations with conservatism than measures of disgust that are rooted in more immediate experience.

Less interestingly, another potential explanation for the weaker relation between ideology and our experiential disgust measure may be that previously documented ideological differences in personality traits such as conscientiousness [70] lead conservatives to complete survey measures more thoughtfully, perhaps reading more carefully or engaging more deeply with the material. This, too, could help explain why conservatives report experiencing greater disgust in response to these vignettes—which require a degree of cognitive effort to process and mentally represent—but do not appear to differ as greatly when these same stimuli are presented visually. Future research may wish to assess these possibilities to deepen our understanding of the nature of the relation between ideology and sensitivity to disgust.

More generally, these findings suggest that caution may be warranted in the development and use of measures to assess these constructs—disgust sensitivity, political ideology, and pandemic response—and, especially, their interrelations. Given the close connections among these factors, coupled with potential confounds such as self-presentational concerns that may be at play for such impactful and politicized issues as the COVID-19 pandemic, the use of self-report measures, in particular, should be subject to close scrutiny.

Finally, it is important to note that while our studies consistently show that using self-report scales may overestimate the strength of the interrelations among disgust sensitivity, pandemic response, and political ideology, some of these effects may be specific to the population that we sampled. Indeed, the sociopolitical context surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic in the U.S. was in many ways unique, and these factors are likely to have shaped some of our effects. In particular, as discussed above, the stark political polarization surrounding the pandemic in the U.S. is likely to have been at least partially responsible for the inflated ideological differences in self-reported (versus behavioral) responses to the pandemic. Future research will need to examine the degree to which these processes extend beyond the U.S. to other nations and cultural contexts.