Threat Vocalisations Are Acoustically Similar Between Humans (homo Sapiens) and Chimpanzees (pan Troglodytes)

Kamiloglu, Roza G., Cantay Çalışkan, Katie Slocombe, and Disa Sauter. 2022. “Threat Vocalisations Are Acoustically Similar Between Humans (homo Sapiens) and Chimpanzees (pan Troglodytes).” PsyArXiv. November 25. psyarxiv.com/asvwz

Abstract: In behavioural contexts like fighting, eating, and playing, acoustically distinctive vocalisations are produced across many mammalian species. Such expressions may be conserved in evolution, pointing to the possibility of acoustic regularities in the vocalisations of phylogenetically related species. Here, we test this hypothesis by examining the degree of acoustic similarity between human and chimpanzee vocalisations produced in 10 equivalent behavioural contexts. We use two complementary analysis methods: Pairwise acoustic distance measures and acoustic separability metrics based on unsupervised learning algorithms. Acoustic features of vocalisations produced when threatening another individual were distinct from other types of vocalisations and highly similar across species. Using a multimethod approach, these findings demonstrate that human vocalisations produced when threatening another person are acoustically similar to chimpanzee vocalisations in the same situation, likely reflecting a phylogenetically ancient vocal signalling system.

Inequity aversion: Bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards by refusing tokens and rewards, and by leaving the experimental area

Behavioral and physiological response to inequity in bonobos (Pan paniscus). Jonas Verspeek, Jeroen M. G. Stevens. American Journal of Primatology, November 23 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/ajp.23455

Abstract: Inequity aversion (IA), the affective, cognitive, and behavioral response to inequitable outcomes, allows individuals to avoid exploitation and therefore stabilizes cooperation. The presence of IA varies across animal species, which has stimulated research to investigate factors that might explain this variation, and to investigate underlying affective responses. Among great apes, IA is most often studied in chimpanzees. Here, we investigate IA in bonobos, a reputedly tolerant and cooperative species for which few IA studies are available. We describe how bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards than a partner in a token exchange task. We show that bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards by refusing tokens and rewards, and by leaving the experimental area. Bonobos never refused a trial when receiving preferred rewards, and thus showed no advantageous IA. We also investigate the variability in the disadvantageous IA response on a dyadic level, because the level of IA is expected to vary, depending on characteristics of the dyad. Like in humans and chimpanzees, we show that the tolerance towards inequity was higher in bonobo dyads with more valuable relationships. To study the affective component of IA, we included behavioral and physiological measures of arousal: a displacement behavior (rough self-scratching) and changes in salivary cortisol levels. Both measures of arousal showed large variability, and while analyses on rough self-scratching showed no significant effects, salivary cortisol levels seemed to be lower in subjects that received less than their partner, but higher in subjects that received more than their partner, albeit that both were not significantly different from the equity condition. This suggests that although overcompensated bonobos showed no behavioral response, they might be more aroused. Our data support the cooperation hypothesis on an interspecific and intraspecific level. They show inequity aversion in bonobos, a reputedly cooperative species, and suggest that the variability in IA in bonobos can be explained by their socioecology. Most successful cooperative interactions happen between mothers and their sons and among closely bonded females. The limited need to monitor the partners' investment within these dyads can result in a higher tolerance towards inequity. We therefore suggest future studies to consider relevant socioecological characteristics of the species when designing and analyzing IA studies.

Research highlights

    Bonobos responded to inequity by refusing tokens and moving away from the experimenter
    Overcompensated subjects showed more arousal, as measured by salivary cortisol
    The level of inequity aversion decreased with increasing relationship quality

Women estimated their IQ significantly lower than men and estimated their EQ higher

Sex Difference in Estimated Intelligence and Estimated Emotional Intelligence and IQ Scores. Adrian Furnham & Charlotte Robinson. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, Nov 23 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221325.2022.2140025

Abstract: In five different online studies of community samples, participants (N > 2,200) estimated their IQ and EQ on a single scale and completed three different, short, untimed intelligence tests. In all studies, women estimated their IQ significantly lower than men (effect sizes from 0.22–0.47) and estimated their EQ higher (effect size 0.04–0.32). In only one study were there actual sex differences in IQ test scores. All correlations between the two estimates were significant and positive, and ranged from .37 < r < .47. The robustness of the IQ-EQ hubris-humility effect across measures and populations is discussed. Limitations are acknowledged, particularly in the use of tests.

Keywords: EQintelligenceIQself-estimatessex differences

A blind spot for attractiveness discrimination compared to more prototypical types of discrimination (i.e., gender and race discrimination)

Jaeger, Bastian, Gabriele Paolacci, and Johannes Boegershausen. 2022. “A Blind Spot for Attractiveness Discrimination.” PsyArXiv. November 24. psyarxiv.com/5uz8g

Abstract: Discrimination remains a key challenge for social equity. There is widespread agreement that discrimination is unfair and should be punished. A prerequisite for this is that instances of discrimination are detected. Yet, some types of discrimination may be less apparent than others. Across seven studies (N = 3,486, five preregistered), we find that attractiveness discrimination often goes undetected compared to more prototypical types of discrimination (i.e., gender and race discrimination). This blind spot does not emerge because people perceive attractiveness discrimination to be unproblematic or desirable. Rather, our findings suggest that people’s ability to detect discrimination is bounded. People only focus on a few salient dimensions, such as gender and race, when scrutinizing decision outcomes (e.g., hiring or sentencing decisions) for bias. Consistent with this account, two interventions that increased the salience of attractiveness increased the detection of attractiveness discrimination, but also decreased the detection of gender and race discrimination.

Observation of Masturbation After Visual Sexual Stimuli From Conspecifics in a Captive Male Monkey

Observation of Masturbation After Visual Sexual Stimuli From Conspecifics in a Captive Male Bearded Capuchin (Sapajus libidinosus). Paula Coutinho, Adrian Barnett, Cynthia Cavalcanti, Yuri MarinhoValença & Bruna Bezerra. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Nov 23 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-022-02475-5

Abstract: Masturbation is part of the natural behavioral repertoire of primates, with visual sexual stimuli known to trigger this behavior. Here, we report masturbation events triggered by visual sexual stimulus (VSS) in the South American primate Sapajus libidinosus. We observed a multi-male multi-female captive colony of 17 bearded capuchins between January and October 2014. Over this period, we registered 11 copulation events, 68 attempt copulations, and five masturbation events. The same low-ranking male (named Fu) performed all masturbation events. Fu directly looked at other individuals engaged in sexual displays while he masturbated in three events. The masturbation events associated with VSS lasted up to 2 min and 40 s. Our observations show that VSS can trigger masturbation in capuchin monkeys. The low hierarchy rank of the male, and the consequent lack of mating opportunities in the multi-male multi-female recently formed group in captivity, may have prompted the masturbation events.

The intergenerational transmission of political engagement is solely driven by genetic factors, except in highly politicized families

Parental Transmission and the Importance of the (Noncausal) Effects of Education on Political Engagement: Missing the Forest for the Trees. Stig Hebbelstrup Rye Rasmussen et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, November 23, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221137161

Abstract: By most accounts, an important prerequisite for a well-functioning democracy is engaged citizens. A very prominent explanation of variation in political engagement suggests that parental transmission through socialization accounts for individual-level differences in political engagement. In this paper, we show, using a large Danish twin survey (N = 2,071), that classic formulations of parental transmission theory can be supplemented by findings from the biopolitics literature, allowing us to disentangle when heritable factors are important and when socialization factors are important predictors of political engagement. We show that as the level of family politicization and consistency increases, the influence of genes decreases. We take this to imply that family socialization can compensate for (genetic) individual differences and foster increased political engagement. By only focusing on the “causal” effect of education, we are missing the forest for the trees.

Do people believe that you can have too much money? The relationship between hypothetical lottery wins and expected happiness

Do people believe that you can have too much money? The relationship between hypothetical lottery wins and expected happiness. Tessa Haesevoets  Kim Dierckx  Alain Van Hiel. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. ‍17, No. ‍6, November 2022, pp. 1229-1254. https://journal.sjdm.org/22/220824/jdm220824.html

Abstract: Do people think that there is such a thing as too much money? The present research investigated this question in the context of hypothetical lottery wins. By employing a mental simulation approach, we were able to examine how people respond to increasing envisioned jackpot amounts, and whether there are individual differences in people’s reactions. Across five empirical studies (total N = 1,504), we consistently found that, overall, the relationship between imagined lottery wins and expected happiness is characterized by an inverted U-shaped curve, with expected happiness being highest around an envisioned win of roughly 10 million pounds. Both lower and higher envisioned wins reduced participants’ overall expected happiness. In addition to this overall pattern, we identified three clusters of participants who react differently to expected increases in wealth. These clusters mainly differed in terms of how soon the top of the expected happiness curve was reached, and if and when the curve started to drop. Finally, we also found some interesting cluster differences in terms of participants’ prosocial and proself motivations.

Keywords: hypothetical lottery wins; expected happiness; inverted U-curve; cluster analysis; individual differences

7 General Discussion

We started our paper with a quote attributed to Wallis Simpson, “You can never be too rich or too thin.” Most people will recognize that you can be too thin, and, as our results illustrate, many people also seem to believe that you can be too rich. Across five studies, we consistently found that, overall, the relationship between hypothetical lottery wins and expected happiness is characterized by an inverted U-shaped pattern, with the overall desired optimal lottery win being a jackpot amount of approximately 10 million pounds. Considering that in our studies participants were explicitly told that there was no upper boundary to the amount of money that they could possibly win, it can be concluded that this ‘overall’ optimum is situated at the rather low end of the continuum (and considerably lower than the global jackpot average which is situated around 29 million pounds; see Rodger, 2017). After this particular point, the overall expected happiness curve started to drop, which illustrates that, on average, the prospect of receiving too much money negatively impacts people’s overall expected happiness.

Importantly, however, is that our cluster analyses revealed that this general pattern is actually the mere mean tendency of distinct subgroups of people reacting differently to expected increases in wealth, rather than a uniform psychological reaction that is shared by all people. More specifically, our pairwise comparison data revealed the existence of a first cluster of participants (i.e., Cluster 1) who react according to the ‘more-is-better’ (non-satiation) logic. For these people, the expected happiness curve continued to rise when the amount of money that they supposedly won increased, and this even up until the highest included monetary amount of 10 billion euro (in Study 4) and 1 trillion pounds (in Study 5). So, for this type of people there does not seem to be a point of satiation (although the results of Study 5 indicate that they do not necessarily want to have “all the money in the world”). Conversely, the responses of the other two identified clusters (i.e., Clusters 2 and 3) were more in accordance with the ‘too-much-of-a-good-thing’ logic, as these participants expected to be more satisfied with the intermediate wins than with the smallest and the largest envisaged wins. So, for these types of people there is a point beyond which they anticipate that more money will negatively affect their happiness; this point was reached much sooner in the third cluster than in the second cluster. And, at very high lottery amounts the curve of the third cluster even plummeted towards the bottom of the expected happiness scale. This latter finding suggests that this particular subgroup of people does not seem to value money when it comes in great amounts, and even anticipates that this will make them quite unhappy.

Ample prior studies have demonstrated that people fundamentally differ with respect to their prosocial and proself tendencies (e.g., Au & Kwong, 2004; Bogaert el al., 2008; Van Lange, 2000). To contribute to this body of research, as a third objective, we examined if and how the clusters that could empirically be distinguished differed from each other in terms of participants’ proself and prosocial motivations. Across our studies, and in line with our expectations, we consistently found that the cluster of participants for whom there is no satiation effect (i.e., Cluster 1, which reacted according to the ‘more-is-better’ logic) is generally more proself and less prosocially oriented than the other two clusters which included participants for whom there is a point after which expected happiness decreased (i.e., Clusters 2 and 3, which reacted according to the ‘too-much-of-a-good-thing’ logic). Interestingly, our discriminant analysis clarified that the three clusters also differ in terms of more specific proself and prosocial motives. In particular, we found that participants in Cluster 1 were more greedy and also felt more entitled than those in Clusters 2 and 3, with these differences being most pronounced between Cluster 1 and Cluster 3. Furthermore, participants in Cluster 1 are not only driven more by these two specific proself motivations, they are also less concerned about fairness considerations and the welfare of others (which constitute two specific prosocial motivations).

7.1 Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research

An important strength of our work is that we collected data using a variety of research methods, including both a between-subjects design (Study 2), within-subjects designs (Studies 3 and 5), and pairwise comparisons (Studies 4 and 5). The fact that we could replicate our key findings using this divergence in methods and designs strengthens our confidence in the robustness and generalizability of the reported findings. Yet, our approach to employ hypothetical lottery scenarios also contains two important constraints. First, because the lottery wins in our studies were imagined, participants did not really experience the surprise of receiving the message or actually using the money. Instead, they formed a mental model of what they believed would happen. Secondly, lottery wins are a windfall gain whereas other sources of wealth often have a strong link to meritocracy (or at least the illusion of it). In this vein, Donnelly et al. (2018) have shown that earned wealth is associated with greater happiness than inherited wealth.

Although we found some interesting motivational differences between the three emerging clusters, we did not consider all relevant motivational traits and personality factors in our research. A first important motivation that we did not consider in any of our studies is inequality aversion. Given that lotteries by their nature increase inequality, this concept might be particularly relevant to consider in future studies. Another important personality factor that was not included in the present research is the Honesty-Humility dimension of the HEXACO model (Hilbig & Zettler, 2009), which specifically contains a facet called greed avoidance. Low scorers on this trait want to enjoy and display wealth and privilege, whereas high scorers are not especially motivated by monetary or social-status considerations. In light of our research, it can be expected that those whose reactions are in accordance with the ‘too-much-of-a-good thing’ logic (i.e., Clusters 2 and 3) will score higher on inequality aversion and greed avoidance than those whose reactions endorse the ‘more-is-better’ logic (i.e., Cluster 1), but future research is needed to verify these claims.

The Napoleon complex, revisited: Those high on the Dark Triad traits are dissatisfied with their height and are short

The Napoleon complex, revisited: Those high on the Dark Triad traits are dissatisfied with their height and are short. Monika A. Kozłowska, Daniel Talbot, Peter K. Jonason. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 203, March 2023, 111990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111990

Abstract: In this study (N = 367; 62.53 % men) we reconsidered the Napoleon complex that suggests shorter people—men in particular—may compensate for their shortness with antagonistic behaviors. We conceptualized antagonism as individual differences in the Dark Triad traits (i.e., psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) and found they were associated with not only being shorter but also with the wish to be taller; these associations were similar in the sexes. We discussed our results from an evolutionary (i.e., calibrating formidability) perspective.

Introduction

The Napoleon complex is the popular belief that shorter stature is a disadvantage for men which leads to compensatory behaviors. For example, shorter men may exhibit indirect aggressive behaviors towards taller men, show behavioral flexibility in securing resources when they are physically less competitive, and are more likely to be jealous of their romantic partners (Brewer & Riley, 2009; Just & Morris, 2003; Knapen et al., 2018). In this study, we provide evidence for such a complex in those characterized by the Dark Triad traits of psychopathy (i.e., callousness, criminality), narcissism (i.e., inflated sense of self, grandiosity), and Machiavellianism (i.e., pragmatic cynicism, duplicity).

The Napoleon complex could be a marker of inferiority as in the complex theory (Adler, 1927) or an adaptive strategy to compensate for diminished intrasexual competitive abilities (Barber, 1995). Although the origins of the Napoleon complex are attributed specifically to the former, its premises do not sufficiently predict and explain systematic connections between lower stature, varied compensatory behaviors, and sex differences therein. In contrast, the adaptationist perspective may provide a more specific explanation of the Napoleon complex. It leads to the prediction that physical characteristics of key importance in the context of natural and sexual selection may be linked to psychological functioning. The variable of interest—height—is one of the traits that may affect one's success in intersexual selection and intrasexual competition. For both men and women, height is an essential factor in determining suitability for relationships, attractiveness, and reproductive success (Pawlowski et al., 2000; Perkins et al., 2021). Height may also play an important role in intrasexual selection because physical characteristics, like strength and size, provide advantages during physical confrontations (Archer & Thanzami, 2007; Sell et al., 2012).

There is considerable research linking personality traits to body image concerns (Adams, 1980; Allen & Robson, 2020; Ishikawa et al., 2001), including the Dark Triad traits. For instance, narcissism is related to eating disorders, body checking, and excessive exercise in women (Campbell & Waller, 2010; Waller et al., 2008). Additionally, Machiavellianism is a risk factor in the relationship between body image concerns and self-objectification (Dryden & Anderson, 2019). However, this research tends to focus more on weight than height.

Given that height is a key contributor to body image and satisfaction, and quality of life for both sexes (Griffiths et al., 2019; Perkins et al., 2021), and there are established relationships between body-related variables and personality traits, we explored the relationship between height, attitudes about one's height, and the Dark Triad traits. Based on previous studies, we hypothesized that shorter participants and those with more negative attitudes towards their height should score higher on Dark Triad traits. Based on Adlerian views, we tested whether those correlations were stronger in men than women.

Generalized tendency to make extreme trait judgements from faces

Generalized tendency to make extreme trait judgements from faces. Atsunobu Suzuki, Saori Tsukamoto and Yusuke Takahashi. Royal Society Open Science, November 23 2022. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.220172

Abstract: People differ in their tendency to infer others' personalities and abilities from their faces. An extreme form of such face-based trait inference (FBTI) is problematic because of its unwarranted impact on real-world decision making. Evolutionary perspectives on FBTI suggest that its inter-individual variation would be trait-specific: e.g. those who make extreme face-based inferences about trustworthiness may not necessarily do so about dominance. However, there are several psychological variables that can increase the FBTI extremity across traits. Here, we show that there is a generalized individual tendency to make extreme FBTI across traits, in support of the latter view. We found that the degrees of extremity of face-based inferences about seven traits had high cross-trait correlations, constituting a general factor. This generalized FBTI extremity had good test–retest reliability and was neither an artefact of extreme nor socially desirable response biases. Moreover, it was positively associated with facial emotion recognition ability and tendencies to believe physiognomy and endorse stereotypes. Our results demonstrate that there are individuals who have a temporally stable disposition to draw extreme conclusions about various traits of others from facial appearance as well as their psychological characteristics.

4. General discussion

4.1. Summary of main findings

Studies 1 and 2 consistently showed that those who make extreme face-based judgements on a certain trait also tend to make extreme judgements on other traits, providing evidence for generalized FBTI extremity. The results are in contrast with the evolutionary perspectives on FBTI [22–24] that its inter-individual variation would be trait-specific. Instead, they are more compatible with psychology theory-based predictions that there are several variables that could enhance the FBTI extremity across traits. In partial accordance with our hypotheses, generalized FBTI extremity was positively associated with physiognomic belief, facial emotion recognition ability and stereotype endorsement, but not with cognitive miserliness. In short, we demonstrate that there are individuals who have a temporally stable disposition to draw extreme conclusions about various traits of others from facial appearance as well as their psychological characteristics. These findings and continued research into this issue will contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the excessive impact of face on social decision making, sometimes called face-ism [6], and to an identification of a prime target population for its intervention [15,16].

4.2. Generalized face-based trait inference extremity

Our analyses ensured that the generalized FBTI extremity reflects true individual differences in social cognition and is not merely a by-product of methodological artefacts. First, the well-established trustworthiness-by-dominance model of facial impressions [17,25,26] was reproduced from the present data, dismissing the possibility that our task format prompted participants to judge faces solely on a single dimension. Second, high cross-trait correlations of the FBTI extremity were demonstrated even after controlling for non-specific response biases such as extreme response style [51] and socially desirable responding [52]. Third, we showed that the generalized FBTI extremity had good test–retest reliability over a 2-month interval. Electronic supplementary material, text S2 also includes a complementary study we conducted to determine whether the temporal stability of the generalized FBTI extremity was explained by response biases. While this study exhibited a somewhat lower test–retest correlation of generalized FBTI extremity (r = 0.699, 95% CI [0.586, 0.786]) than Study 1, the value changed only slightly after controlling for extreme response style and socially desirable responding (r = 0.681, 95% CI [0.563, 0.772]). These results indicate that the generalized FBTI extremity is a temporally stable disposition.

Concerns may be raised if our attempts to rule out a response-bias account are sufficient. First, the extreme response bias when rating others' faces may not be well captured by the bias when rating self-descriptive verbal statements (i.e. Extreme Response Style Measure [51]). To address this issue, extreme response bias was quantified using data from the face-based trait-rating task. Taking trustworthiness as an example, 10 faces that were not classified as either stereotypically trustworthy- or untrustworthy-looking (i.e. whose mean trustworthiness rating ranked between 11 and 20 out of 30 faces) were selected separately from male and female faces. Then, for each participant, the ratings were recoded such that higher values reflected a greater tendency to choose extreme categories on the scale (i.e. ratings of 6, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 were recoded into 3, 2, 1, 1, 2 and 3, respectively), and the recoded ratings were averaged across the selected 20 faces. Bias scores for other trait judgements were defined in the same way, and the averages of trait-specific scores were treated as an overall index of extreme response bias in the face-based trait-rating task. Even when controlling for this additional measure of extreme responses, high cross-trait correlations of the FBTI extremity were reproduced. Moreover, while the association of generalized FBTI extremity with physiognomic belief was not significant, its associations with facial emotion recognition ability and stereotype endorsement were replicated. Second, it may be argued that, since the face-based trait-rating task had participants rate all traits at once for each face, lazy response behaviours, such as frequently choosing the same values on the rating scale, and/or strategic response behaviours, such as trying to provide a consistent (plausible) pattern of ratings, could have inflated cross-trait correlations of FBTI extremity. Regarding this point, we would like to note that in the face-based trait-rating task, desirable traits appeared almost evenly on the left and right sides (figure 1a)—in other words, there were reverse items for each face, and the order of the trait dimensions was randomized across trials. Therefore, it is unlikely that a lazy response leads to high cross-trait correlations. In addition, this counterbalanced and randomized setting would require significant effort when viewing the scale to provide a consistent pattern of ratings. Thus, we used survey completion times as viable measures of participant effort [58] and examined their correlations with the variables of interest in the present research. We found that the generalized FBTI extremity did not correlate positively with completion times, whereas it negatively correlated with squared completion times. Albeit a post hoc speculation, it is possible that participants finishing the survey at a moderate pace made the strongest effort, which might have elevated cross-trait correlations of FBTI extremity. This interpretation could explain the negative correlation between the squared completion times and generalized FBTI extremity. However, controlling for completion times (including their squares) did not change our main findings. Based on these additional analyses (see electronic supplementary material, text S3 for details), we believe that the generalized FBTI extremity would not be an artefact of the response bias.

It is also worthwhile to discuss the distinctions between explicit rating tasks akin to the one used in this study and those tasks measuring FBTI in a more indirect fashion. A seminal work proposing the trustworthiness-by-dominance model of facial impressions was based on the data of explicit trait ratings of faces [17]. Subsequent influential studies that replicated and extended the two-dimensional model ([23,25,34]; for a review, see [26]) and recent pursuits of perceiver effects on FBTI [3–5,21,59] also used explicit rating tasks. Therefore, our results indicating the presence of individuals who explicitly form extreme facial impressions across traits would be a valuable addition to the literature on FBTI, which relies heavily on data from explicit rating tasks. On the other hand, facial impressions have also been assessed by more indirect measures, such as the latency and dynamics of responses related to trait inference [60–62] and decision making in simulated social settings [53,63,64]. In general, explicit and indirect measures assess related but distinct constructs [65], and one measure is not necessarily superior to the other. For example, perceived trustworthiness of a given face is often measured using trust games in which participants are asked to decide how much money they are willing to entrust to the owner of the face [53,63,64]. Trust games may appear to provide a better indicator of trustworthiness impressions than explicit rating tasks given that money has an objective unit of measurement (e.g. British Pound), whereas the meaning of verbal anchors on a rating scale (e.g. very trustworthy) is subjective and may vary across participants. However, the relationship between monetary decisions in trust games and trustworthiness impressions of game partners is actually not straightforward and depends on participants, because those decisions are influenced by various factors, such as the participant's general trust, preference for fairness and betrayal aversion [66]. In addition, the use of indirect measures is usually recommended when explicit measures are likely to be biased by people's tendency to hide socially undesired responses [65]. Importantly, such social desirability bias was found to have a nearly null correlation with generalized FBTI extremity in the present study. Therefore, we suggest that the use of an explicit rating task does not significantly undermine our findings. Moreover, a fruitful direction for further research is to investigate individual differences in FBTI using indirect measures, since even their basic characteristics (e.g. how large and temporally stable the individual differences are) remain unknown.

4.3. Correlates of generalized face-based trait inference extremity

The positive association between the physiognomic belief and the generalized FBTI extremity means that those who believe that various traits can be inferred from faces tend toward extreme FBTI, which is in line with previous work [29]. This association was more clearly shown with the Physiognomic Belief Scale [29] than with the other questionnaire [53], perhaps because the former contains more items than the latter (14 versus 3) and, consequently, has higher scale reliability (Cronbach's α = 0.918 versus 0.817), and because the items of the former directly refer to the trait dimensions in the face-based trait-rating task, while those of the latter do not. In any case, the correlations were small, ranging from 0.104 to 0.171. The weak correlations may be reasonable considering that the questionnaires we used assessed the strength of the physiognomic belief without referring to any stereotypical facial cues to trait inference. It would thus be interesting in future research to measure the strength of explicit verbalizable beliefs about commonly held face–trait relations (e.g. ‘A kind-hearted person has big, round eyes’ [9]) and examine its links with the FBTI extremity.

It is noteworthy that we successfully demonstrated in an adult population that those who were adept at recognizing facial expressions tended toward extreme FBTI. While such a relationship is consistent with an emotion overgeneralization account of FBTI [17,22,30,31], a recent developmental study showed that emotion comprehension skills (including facial emotion recognition ability) covaried with the extremity of face-based trustworthiness inference only in 5-year-old children and not in 7-year olds [20]. The authors opined that covariation was absent in older children because their emotion comprehension skills were more developed and thus less variable. In the present study, the facial emotion-rating task scores were more variable than the facial emotion identification task scores, which approached a ceiling effect, and the former scores had a larger correlation with generalized FBTI extremity than the latter. These results indicate that if individual differences in facial emotion recognition are quantified using sensitive tests [35,36], their association with FBTI can be detected even in adulthood.

Our research partially supports the tendency toward extreme FBTI among people who endorse stereotypes. Specifically, the category-based trait-rating task scores moderately and positively correlated with generalized FBTI extremity, while the Acceptance of Stereotyping Questionnaire [39] scores hardly did. In addition, the two measures, which were assumed to reflect the same construct (i.e. stereotype endorsement), were almost entirely uncorrelated with each other. A critical difference between the two indices is that whereas the rating task explicitly deals with stereotypes about social categories that are closely connected with FBTI (i.e. smiling people [17,33], babies [37] and women [38]), the questionnaire does not specify any social categories. Thus, if participants who self-identified as White (i.e. the majority of the study participants) answered the questionnaire with stereotypes about racial outgroups in mind [67], it is natural that the answers showed little correlation with the FBTI extremity, considering the exclusive use of Caucasian faces (i.e. ingroup faces) in the face-based trait-rating task.

The fact that the hypothesized positive correlations between generalized FBTI extremity and cognitive miserliness were not observed may be taken as evidence of the cognitive impenetrability of FBTI [68]. However, a caveat is that the face is the only information available to perform the face-based trait-rating task. This could obscure possible facilitative effects of cognitive miserliness on FBTI, since even those participants who doubted the validity of their intuitive impression of the face—our measures of cognitive miserliness are supposed to assess such a tendency (not) to rely on intuition—had no choice but to make a face-based inference. Thus, it is important to examine whether cognitive miserliness boosts reliance on facial appearance in trait inference when more diagnostic but cognitively taxing cues (e.g. a record of previous cooperative and cheating behaviours [69]) are available.

4.4. Limitations

This study has some other limitations worthy of mention. First, a direct and more extensive investigation into the causal mechanisms of generalized FBTI extremity is important in future research. Our major contribution is the demonstration of high cross-trait correlations of the FBTI extremity, or the existence of a generalized FBTI extremity, providing new directions for and constraints on further studies and theorizing about FBTI. As an initial attempt to explain the generalized FBTI extremity, we proposed and examined several variables that can potentially foster it. However, those variables were a small subset of possible causal factors, and the present study provided only partial and correlational evidence for our hypotheses. Second, different researchers have adopted different methods to score FBTI performance [3,20,21,29,59]. For example, when agreement scores [21] (see the Introduction for a definition) were computed using the present data, they had high correlations (above 0.7) with extremity scores. However, the scatter plots between the two types of scores showed that there were larger variations in extremity scores when the agreement scores were higher (see electronic supplementary material, text S4 for details). In other words, individuals with higher agreement scores can have both low and high extremity scores. Thus, FBTI extremity is not only related to agreement scores but also contains distinct perceiver characteristics. Future investigations need to explore a set of quantifications that can efficiently and comprehensively capture individual differences in FBTI. Third, our surveys started with a block of socio-demographic questions, since collecting certain socio-demographic data (i.e. current residence, primary language and age) was necessary to confirm participants' eligibility to participate in the surveys. These questions might have directed participants' attention to their age, sex and ethnicity, which in turn could have influenced how they approached the subsequent social cognitive tasks. However, the participants' age and sex were controlled for in the statistical analyses presented here. In addition, the results remained virtually unchanged when we analysed the data of only White participants (i.e. a large majority of participants). Therefore, we suggest that even if participants' age, sex and ethnicity had been activated by socio-demographic questions, they should have exerted little impact on our findings. Finally, our studies only targeted native English speakers in the USA, given the availability of well-normed materials in English, leaving cross-cultural similarities and differences unexplored [25].

We know little about where users draw the line when it comes to offensive language, and what measures they wish to see implemented when content crosses the boundary of what is deemed acceptable

Pradel, Franziska, Jan Zilinsky, Spyros Kosmidis, and Yannis Theocharis. 2022. “Do Users Ever Draw a Line? Offensiveness and Content Moderation Preferences on Social Media.” OSF Preprints. November 22. doi:10.31219/osf.io/y4xft

Abstract: When is content on social media offensive enough to warrant content moderation? While social media platforms impose limits to what can be posted, we know little about where users draw the line when it comes to offensive language, and what measures they wish to see implemented when content crosses the boundary of what is deemed acceptable. Conducting randomized experiments with over 5,000 participants we study how different types of offensive language causally affect users' content moderation preferences. We quantify causal effects of uncivil, intolerant, and threatening language by randomly introducing these aspects into fictitious social media posts targeting various social groups. While overall there is limited demand for action against offensive behavior, the severity of the attack matters to the average participant. Amongst our treatments, violent threats cause the greatest support for content moderation of various types, including punishments that would be viewed as censorship in some contexts, such as taking down content or suspending accounts.

Aggressive and violent behavior: Analysis of topic popularity within a child sexual exploitation Tor hidden service

Analysis of topic popularity within a child sexual exploitation Tor hidden service. Jessica N. Owens et al. Aggression and Violent Behavior, November 21 2022, 101808. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2022.101808

Highlights

• Quantifies offender consumption of child sexual abuse material – i.e., preferences and frequency of access – in absence of saved collections on electronic devices.

• More interest and activity was observed among threads with hardcore child sexual abuse material, and the overt action of giving “thanks” served to reinforce and perpetuate the amount of hardcore content on the site.

• Threads containing visual material were viewed most frequently among the members of this Tor hidden service community.

• Thread titles relating to soft core/non-nude material or modeling visual material decreased the frequency of viewing.

• More egregious (hardcore) child sexual abuse material is viewed, downloaded, and “thanked” most often within Darkweb child sexual exploitation communities; despite a copious variety of child sexual abuse material available and equally advertised.

Abstract: Knowledge about the online bulletin board communities dedicated to child sexual exploitation (CSE) located on the Darkweb (Tor) has generally been limited to those that investigate and prosecute individuals participating in those sites, as accessing them and viewing the abuse material is a crime. This leaves many of those in the CSE field without a scientifically validated foundation of the behaviors typically demonstrated by members of these CSE online communities. The following research empirically examines topic popularity of one Darkweb CSE Tor hidden service that was seized by a federal law enforcement agency. Analyses reveal that some topics tend to be viewed significantly more often, and descriptors about specific sexual acts and the ages of children portrayed in the thread titles correlate with the frequency of viewing, approving and downloading of that material. Implications of these findings for professionals working in the CSE field will be discussed.

Keywords: Child sexual exploitation (CSE)Child sexual abuse material (CSAM)Child pornographyDarkwebTorOnline community

High intelligence is not linked to more mental health disorders, but is linked to less frequent general anxiety and PTSD

High Intelligence is Not Associated with a Greater Propensity for Mental Health Disorders. Camille Michèle Williams et al. European Psychiatry, Nov 18 2022. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-psychiatry/article/high-intelligence-is-not-associated-with-a-greater-propensity-for-mental-health-disorders/E101AE4EDBC8FBAEE5170F6C0679021C

Abstract 

38 Background: Studies reporting that highly intelligent individuals have more mental health 

39 disorders often have sampling bias, no or inadequate control group, or insufficient sample size. 

40 We addressed these caveats by examining the difference in the prevalence of mental health 

41 disorders between individuals with high and average general intelligence (g-factor) in the UK 

42 Biobank. 

43 

44 Methods: Participants with general intelligence (g-factor) scores standardized relative to the 

45 same-age UK population, were divided into 2 groups: a high g-factor group (g-factor 2 SD 

46 above the UK mean; N=16,137) and an average g-factor group (g-factor within 2 SD of the UK 

47 mean; N=236,273). Using self-report questionnaires and medical diagnoses, we examined 

48 group differences in prevalence across 32 phenotypes, including mental health disorders, 

49 trauma, allergies, and other traits. 

50 

51 Results: High and average g-factor groups differed across 15/32 phenotypes and did not 

52 depend on sex and/or age. Individuals with high g-factors had less general anxiety (OR=0.69, 

53 95%CI[0.64;0.74]) and PTSD (OR=0.67, 95%CI[0.61;0.74])), were less neurotic (β=-0.12, 

54 95%CI[-0.15;-0.10]), less socially isolated (OR=0.85, 95%CI[0.80;0.90]), and were less likely 

55 to have experienced childhood stressors and abuse, adulthood stressors, or catastrophic trauma 

56 (OR=0.69-0.90). They did not differ in any other mental health disorder or trait. However, they 

57 generally had more allergies (e.g., eczema; OR=1.13-1.33). 

58 

59 Conclusions: The present study provides robust evidence that highly intelligent individuals 

60 have no more mental health disorders than the average population. High intelligence even 

61 appears as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD. 

Key words: Intelligence; Psychopathology; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; Anxiety; Allergies 

In addition to homophily, people’s social tie decisions are driven by political acrophily, the tendency to associate with others who have more extreme political views (rather than more moderate)

Homophily and acrophily as drivers of political segregation. Amit Goldenberg, Joseph M. Abruzzo, Zi Huang, Jonas Schöne, David Bailey, Robb Willer, Eran Halperin & James J. Gross. Nature Human Behaviour, November 21 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-022-01474-9

Abstract: Political segregation is an important social problem, increasing polarization and impeding effective governance. Previous work has viewed the central driver of segregation to be political homophily, the tendency to associate with others who have similar views. Here we propose that, in addition to homophily, people’s social tie decisions are driven by political acrophily, the tendency to associate with others who have more extreme political views (rather than more moderate). We examined this using a paradigm in which participants share emotions and attitudes on political policies, observe others’ responses and choose which others to affiliate with. In four studies (N = 1,235), both liberal and conservative participants’ social tie decisions reflected the presence of acrophily. We found that participants who viewed peers who expressed more extreme views as more prototypical of their political group also tended to engage in greater acrophily. These studies identify a previously overlooked tendency in tie formation.

Contrary to the deterioration hypothesis, we find that market-oriented societies have a greater aversion to unethical behavior, higher levels of trust, & are not significantly associated with lower levels of morality under any model specification

The moral costs of markets: Testing the deterioration hypothesis. Justin Callais, Colin Harris, Ben Borchard. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 204, December 2022, Pages 200-220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.007

Abstract: The expansion of markets has generated significant material benefits. Yet some worry that this increase in wealth has come at a significant moral cost. Markets may crowd out or even corrupt existing moral values, causing moral deterioration. We test this hypothesis using both fixed effects and matching methods to estimate the impact of market institutions on a society's moral values. Contrary to the deterioration hypothesis, we find that market-oriented societies have a greater aversion to unethical behavior, higher levels of trust, and are not significantly associated with lower levels of morality under any model specification. Furthermore, we find that becoming more market oriented does not cause a significant reduction in a society's moral values. Together, our results suggest that being or becoming more market oriented does not cause moral deterioration.

Introduction

The world is becoming more interconnected due in part to the expansion of markets. And while most people accept that markets generate significant material benefits, there remains debate “concerning whether the wealth that societies gain by embracing markets comes at too high a moral cost” (Storr and Choi 2019: 11). On one side of the debate is the position that markets crowd out or even corrupt existing moral values, resulting in moral deterioration (Rousseau [1754] 1984; Marx [1844] 2000; Radin 1987, 1989; Anderson 1993; Sandel 2012; Bowles 2016). On the other side is the claim that markets actually promote moral virtues, or at worst act as neutral spaces to be filled in by the existing values of the market participants (Mandeville [1714, 1732] 1988; Montesquieu [1748] 1989; Smith [1759] 1982, [1776] 1977; Friedman [1962] 2002; McCloskey 2006; Storr 2009; Storr and Choi 2019). Even though each position presents a testable hypothesis, the debate has largely remained one of philosophical conjecture. This is unsatisfying as the question of the moral costs of markets is “at root an empirical, rather than a philosophical, claim” (Storr and Choi 2019: 12). Do markets cause moral deterioration?

The most thorough attempt at addressing this question empirically comes from Storr and Choi (2019). Their aim is to assess the moral character of markets and the impact that market institutions have on morality, and in doing so provide a plausible retort to both the market's most stringent critics and its most tepid supporters.1 A major contribution of their work is in identifying empirical measures which either directly or indirectly measure morality.2 Indirect measures include variables like income, life expectancy, and infant mortality. These variables cannot directly address the empirical claim that markets cause moral deterioration, yet nonetheless have moral significance. If markets made people worse off on a variety of important margins, markets may be morally suspect regardless of their effect on moral values.

The direct measures capture moral values related to trust, tolerance, materialism, fairness, altruism, and the acceptance of unethical behavior using nationally representative surveys or behavioral variables like how much (and often) people give to charity. These measures capture at least part of the concern critics have over the deterioration of moral values, particularly as it relates to cosmopolitanism and integrity. Sandel (2012: 6) for example, a prominent moral critic of markets, suggests that the “appropriate way” to treat and value human beings is as “persons worthy of dignity and respect, rather than as instruments of gain and objects of use.” Being trustworthy and treating others as equals is a part of it means to treat people appropriately. If market institutions cause moral deterioration, we should expect lower levels of these measured moral values in market-oriented societies.

Storr and Choi (2019: 243) find the opposite: “Rather than being incompatible with morality, markets are not only consistent with morality but seem to promote morality.” Still, their empirical approach is limited, about which they are very forthright.3 We build on the foundation of their work using panel data. We first test the markets-cause-moral-deterioration hypothesis using both fixed effects and matching methods to estimate the impact of market institutions on a society's moral values. Contrary to the deterioration hypothesis, we find that market-oriented societies have a greater aversion to unethical behavior, higher levels of trust, and are not significantly associated with lower levels of morality, regardless of which measure is used for moral values or market orientation.

The results of these tests (section 5.1 and 5.2) are comparable to Storr and Choi's (2019) in that we find that being a market-oriented society is not associated with lower levels of moral values (and in some instances it is associated with higher levels). However, fixed effects and matching methods alone cannot address the problem of endogeneity. Market-oriented societies may have higher levels of moral values and yet the expansion of markets may still deteriorate morals. Thankfully, while our move to panel data reduces the number of countries in the sample compared to Storr and Choi's (2019) cross-section, the added time component allows us to investigate how changes in market orientation impacts moral values. By looking at instances of pro-market reform, we are able to employ differencing and matching to remove time-invariant factors and balance covariates, bringing our estimates closer to causal (An and Winship 2017). With this method, we find that becoming a more market-oriented society does not cause a significant reduction in a society's moral values. Together, our results suggest that being or becoming a more market-oriented society does not cause moral deterioration.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the central claims of the deterioration hypothesis, including the mechanisms by which deterioration is believed to occur and the main moral values likely to be affected. Section three explains our data for market orientation and moral values. Section four outlines our empirical strategy for testing the deterioration hypothesis and section five presents our results. Section six concludes.

Men, but not women, in medium-status occupations report lower life satisfaction than those above or below when stuck in the middle

Occupational status and life satisfaction in the UK: The miserable middle? Yannis Georgellis et al. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 204, December 2022, Pages 509-527. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.045

Abstract: We use British panel data to explore the link between occupational status and life satisfaction. We find puzzling evidence for men of a U-shaped relationship in cross-section data: employees in medium-status occupations report lower life satisfaction scores than those of employees in either low- or high-status occupations. This puzzle disappears in panel data: the satisfaction of any man rises as he moves up the status ladder. The culprit seems to be immobility: the miserable middle is caused by men who have always been in medium-status occupations. There is overall little evidence of a link between occupational status and life satisfaction for women, although this relationship for higher-educated women does look more like that for men.

Keywords: Occupational statusLife satisfactionOccupational mobility

JEL I31J24Z13

5. Discussion and conclusion

Our results have supplied one answer to the question of whether labour-market success paves the path to a happier life. This success can be defined in many ways, and we have here focused on occupational status (with and without controlling for labour income), as measured by the CAMSIS scale.

Occupational status is not the same thing as income, as there is (at least for men) a significant relationship between status and life satisfaction conditional on labour income;22 this status relationship is far weaker for women. Contrary to almost all of the existing literature, we allow for this occupational-status relationship to be non-monotonic, considering the correlation between life satisfaction and low-, medium- and high occupational-status jobs. In the cross-section (for men) this relationship does indeed turn out to be non-monotonic: medium-status men are less satisfied than are either those with low- or high-status jobs.

This finding might be thought to be in line with aspirations and frustration, as in the Silver-Medal effect (Medvec et al., 1995), where the dominant counterfactual for Silver Medallists is the Gold Medal, whereas that of the Bronze Medallist is no medal at all. In our context, individuals who move from low- to middle-status jobs may be frustrated not to have made the move up to high-status jobs. On the contrary, men who have always been low status do not experience this kind of frustration.

The data that we analyse is panel, and a number of individuals change from jobs with one occupational status to another over time. This allows us to address the Silver-Medal effect: Are men who rise from low to middle status less satisfied (as in the cross-section)? The panel estimation results tell a different story: following the same individual over time, those who move up the occupational-status ladder report higher levels of life satisfaction. Rather than frustration, moving up the status ladder produces satisfaction.

The panel and cross-section results are therefore contradictory. One interpretation of the perhaps surprising cross-section finding is that middle-status jobs have more unobserved unattractive features than do low-status or high-status jobs, and so are genuinely less attractive. But our panel findings of a positive relationship between life satisfaction and status run contrary to this argument. Another possibility is that there is something about individuals in medium-status jobs, rather than the characteristics of the jobs themselves: the men who end up in middle-status jobs may well be “unhappy types”. We check this by splitting the sample up into individuals who never change occupational status group and those who do change, and re-estimating cross-section regressions. The results are clear-cut: medium-status men who are (status-) mobile are more satisfied than low-status men; immobile medium-status men are less satisfied than low-status men.

The miserable middle does not then reflect the experience of men who move through medium-status jobs, but rather the experience of men who never leave them. Immobility in the middle is worse than immobility in low- or high-status jobs. This might be thought of as a dynamic version of the Silver-Medal hypothesis: these men have the Silver occupational medal, and even over time will never have any other type.

Following on from the heterogeneity analysis in Section 4.3, it is of interest to reflect on why some workers are observed to be immobile. Two possible barriers to job movements are family commitments and labour-market conditions. We have investigated the role of these barriers by first estimating separate regressions for male parents and male non-parents, finding only a very slight difference between the two, and no difference in the male cross-section status coefficients according to home-ownership. On the contrary, there does seem to be a role for labour-market health, with the miserable middle for men only being found in high-unemployment regions (see Table B10 in Online Appendix B).23 As such, the immobility that seems to lie behind our main results suggest that labour-market health may play a role in producing this specific type of immobility.

It is worth underlining the differences we find in the labour market between men and women. There is first a positive relationship between earnings and life satisfaction for both sexes, but one that is larger in size for men than for women. At the same time, there is little association between occupational status and life satisfaction for women, while that for men is U-shaped in the cross-section and positive in panel data. In the panel results, men gain more from both status and labour income than do women. This is consistent with men being more comparison-sensitive than women in the labour market, and with the notion of labour-market success being affected by social norms. Fortin (2005) notes that, across most OECD countries, these norms reinforce women's role as homemakers and men's role as breadwinners, corresponding to the observed patterns in labour-force participation. In this context, the stronger correlation between occupational status and life satisfaction for men may be unsurprising. There is however heterogeneity in this sex difference, and higher-educated women look more like men in terms of the relationship between occupational status and life satisfaction. With the sharp rise in women's education (which now exceeds that of men),24 occupational status may be poised to play an increasingly important role in the subjective well-being of all workers.