Time ago it was desertification, 'turning the Earth barren,' and 'leaving entire countries facing famine'; now the worry is that in the receding drylands 'vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies'

Although by then it was well-known that it was a better theory that the deserts were receding and the earth was greening, than the opposite one (the deserts were extending), since at least 2016*, and that there was a continental-scale greening (not specifically of dry areas) since 1997**, The Guardian, as late as 2021, had the nerve to say (my emphasis):

"Desertification is turning the Earth barren – but a solution is still within reach. The expansion of drylands is leaving entire countries facing famine. It’s time to change the way we think about agriculture" — David R Montgomery. The Guardian, Jun 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/sep/02/desertification-barren-solution-famine-agriculture

The guy is not a journo... It is (& was at the moment) professor of geomorphology at the University of Washington.

When I thought the revenge finally came, a top notch university saying the drylands were going green, as was known for a decade:

With CO2 Levels Rising, World’s Drylands Are Turning Green. Fred Pearce. Yale Environment 360, Jul 16 2024. https://e360.yale.edu/features/greening-drylands-carbon-dioxide-climate-change

, I had to experience a deep disappointment... Unfortunately, even admitting to this stuff of a greening earth, of course they found that something bad and very worrying is happening, despite this positive "news": "But scientists warn this added vegetation may soak up scarce water supplies." :-)

* Zhu, Z., Piao, S., Myneni, R. et al. Greening of the Earth and its drivers. Nature Clim Change 6, 791–795 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3004

** Myneni, R. B., Keeling, C. D., Tucker, C. J., Asrar, G. & Nemani, R. R. Increased plant growth in the northern high latitudes from 1981 to 1991. Nature 386, 698–702 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1038/386698a0

It is reassuring to read these sycophants explaining that shooting down Nancy Pelosi was discarded as an idea; it also certifies that the tyrant won't go to war over Taiwan

China ramps ups military education for younger ages to help sow ‘seeds’ of patriotism. Amber Wang in Beijing. Southern China Morning Post, Jul 16 2024.

More primary and secondary schoolchildren are participating in pilot programmes to improve their military awareness and skills

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3270546/china-ramps-ups-military-education-younger-ages-help-sow-seeds-patriotism

My emphasis:

Days after former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022, hundreds of students at a school in mainland China gathered for a lecture in which they were told how the trip represented US moves to “contain” Beijing’s rise.

“Why did Pelosi risk being condemned by the world for visiting Taiwan? Why didn’t we shoot it down?” asked a teacher at the No 10 Middle School in Liuyang, Hunan province, according to an online post by the school.

The question prompted heated discussion among the students – all clad in combat uniforms – before the teacher wrapped up the lecture.

Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which prompted Beijing to launch unprecedented military exercises around the self-ruled island, happened “against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict” and represented “the latest manifestation of great power competition”, the teacher reasoned.

“The intention of the US elite is to use the Taiwan issue to disrupt our development rhythm and curb our rise,” the teacher concluded.

The “national defence education class”, which according to the school was intended to “train student minds to resist the erosion of foreign ideology”, was one of many similar sessions being held around the country as Beijing ramps up efforts to raise awareness among young people about national security.

They come as patriotic fervour is on the rise – driven by Beijing – in response to geopolitical rivalries, notably with countries like the US, and as analysts express concerns about declining military recruitment levels due to factors such as falling birth rates.

Meanwhile, in recent years, drones and rocket launchers have been introduced into combat training at some universities, while groups of children as young as kindergarten age have been sent to tour military camps so that the “seeds” of a “strong military” can be planted, as military commanders have described it.

China is also making changes to a law in a bid to boost national defence education, including exploring ways to enhance the combat skills of teenagers to prepare for potential risks in a “complex and ever-changing security and development environment”.

The trends, according to experts, underline growing concerns in Beijing over what are seen as geopolitical risks, and challenges to attract young people to join the military, all while experts attempt to extract military lessons from key battlegrounds like Ukraine.

“The world is not peaceful, the education on patriotism and national defence should be cultivated from an early age,” Chinese military analyst Fu Qianshao said.

“In the future, when war breaks out, all citizens must be mobilised, which can be seen in the Ukraine war.”

Reaching younger kids

For decades, in addition to its mostly voluntary conscription system, China has deployed a system of public military education that includes compulsory training in high schools and universities. The approach, while not common, has also been used in Russia and North Korea.

Russia revived compulsory military training for high school students in 2023, a year after it invaded Ukraine, and decades since the practice was dropped following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Most countries offer some form of national defence education for their young people through optional courses or specialised military academies, or organisations that teach values and skills.

[A large screen shows a promotion for China’s military on a street in Beijing in August 2022. Photo: AFP]

Military training in Chinese high schools has shades of the Scouts of America, founded in 1910, which also weaves in messages of patriotism across a range of activities and educational programmes. The key difference is the Chinese version is mandatory.

But as geopolitical headwinds intensify, Beijing now believes that more must be done to rally China’s youth to support its military.

Under new amendments to China’s National Defence Education Law, the first changes since 2018, a key focus will be on military education among the country’s teenagers.

For the first time since the law was introduced more than two decades ago, primary school pupils from about age six are now required to have military “awareness” through compulsory classes, according to a draft submitted in April for first reading to the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC).

Meanwhile, according to the draft, junior high schools may, for the first time, organise military training for students ages 12-15 to master combat skills, following the implementation of the mandatory programme in universities and high schools in the past.

The amendments, which have to pass a second or possibly third reading, were part of an array of many similar policy readouts in recent years.

For example, according to rules issued in 2022 by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, national defence education should be incorporated into school curriculums and examination processes, and primary schools are urged to conduct seven-day combat training sessions.

As of January this year, 2,431 primary and secondary schools had been selected for pilot programmes to improve military awareness and skills among children.

Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese naval academy in Kaohsiung, said the most important component of national defence education is learning patriotism.

“If you receive national defence education as early as possible, whether it is physical fitness, national identity, or the construction of patriotic thinking, you will have a correct view on how to protect the country,” Lu said.

“Now that the US is joining forces with allies to launch all-round containment on China, including in science and technology, strengthening defence education is very important for uniting national consciousness,” he added.

Combat training and drones

When they were first adopted in the 1980s, these short-term military training sessions for Chinese students were little more than military marching, formation drills and physical exercise.

But recently, the exercises have become much more immersive, as some training features the use of combat equipment such as drones, and the simulation of real battlefield environments, according to publicly available information.

In China’s southern Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region, which borders Vietnam, students at Guilin University of Electronic Technology underwent combat training with rocket launchers and simulated drone bombings, according to a report by The Beijing News last September.

That same month, students at Peking University in Beijing conducted target practice with guns, while 5,000 students at Shanghai Jiao Tong University marched at night while learning how to avoid air attacks, according to a report by The Paper.

China’s unique short-term military training programmes are unlike those of many other countries, which operate some form of conscription that requires longer stints of military service, with 32 of them requiring more than 18 months of service for men.

However, military education in China is systematically conducted across different levels of schools through courses and lectures beginning in primary schools, as well as activities such as visits to military memorial sites and military training camps.

In April, a group of kindergarten children was sent to observe the training of frontline soldiers in the Eastern Theatre Command Air Force, according to an official military post on Weibo.

“The zero distance” engagement between the kids and soldiers allowed the “seeds” of a “strong military” and patriotism to be planted in the hearts of the children, the post on Weibo said.

National defence education in primary and secondary schools is the “foundation” of the national security strategy, Ma Dan, a researcher with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Sciences wrote in an article in Guangming Daily last year.

“Exposing the enemy’s lies by explaining the truth has become an urgent issue that national defence education in primary and secondary schools must face in a new era,” said Ma, who is part of the team responsible for the country’s defence education system.

Military awareness and basic combat skills should be cultivated gradually from childhood so that they can “spontaneously and proactively” react with national defence behaviours to help prevent threats like separatism and defend territorial integrity, Ma wrote in the article.

Recruitment problems

The trend to ramp up military indoctrination among Chinese youth comes as concerns grow in Beijing over having enough recruits to sustain the country’s military, as conflicts like Moscow’s war in Ukraine cast a spotlight on military preparedness.

In several addresses, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed Taiwan’s “reunification” with the mainland as “inevitable”, preferably through peaceful means, but never renouncing the use of force to accomplish the task.

[Mainland China launches PLA blockade around Taiwan, 3 days after William Lai speech]

The NPC argues that the amendments to the national defence education law are necessary to cope with what has been described as a complex security environment and various growing risks, according to an explanation presented alongside the amendments in April.

Other government papers have linked military education to the overall strength of the PLA, as it becomes increasingly challenging to recruit members among China’s youth.

According to those papers, the tasks of national defence education are difficult but greatly important in safeguarding national sovereignty, and achieving the army centenary goal in 2027.

Many of China’s challenges in attracting people to enlist in military service can be traced to demographics, as the country’s population ages and the proportion of young people declines.

However, a “weak sense” of national defence is also a factor, according to a paper published in Contemporary Youth Research in 2014. Because they have grown up in an extended era of peacetime, younger generations are increasingly influenced by “hedonistic” trends in social media that steer them away from military service, according to a proposal by a Chinese local advisory body.

Fu Qianshao, the military analyst, said young people are part of the country’s reserve forces that could play roles in wartime, so it is necessary to cultivate their awareness and skills from an early age, though the enhancement of education was not “directly” related to the recruitment considerations.

But some have expressed doubts about how effective such initiatives will be in addressing Beijing’s concerns.

“The programmes aim to bolster patriotic enthusiasm and perhaps expand the ranks of potential recruits for the PLA,” said Timothy Heath, a senior international and defence analyst at the RAND Corporation, who expressed doubts that coordinated indoctrination could effectively address those challenges.

“Nor will the measures fundamentally improve the PLA’s recruitment situation, because young people do not like to experience hardship and life in the barracks in China, or anywhere else in the developed world.”

---

My comments on several of the sad sentences by these emaciated running dogs (like why "did Pelosi risk being condemned by the world"!?!?!?!?!?):

1  Their words are revolting, I'm throwing up reading the bootlickers.

2  Those who promote educating the young for war and the military are, for the most part, just extracting rent from the taxpayer. This education program won't work, and they know it is not effective, but they make a living of this. Nauseating.

3  As I said above, reading these kowtowing minions contemplating shooting down Nancy Pelosi means there will be no war over Taiwan. Tyrant Chin-p'ing Hsi has said to von der Leyen, and to his lackeys*, that "the US was trying to trick China into invading Taiwan, but that he would not take the bait," and the greasy slaves supra confirm this.

4  To finish the comments, let me express my hope that we may, at the end, see the tyrant's fall and harmony on the Strait.

* [Chin-p'ing] claimed US wants China to attack Taiwan https://www.ft.com/content/7d6ca06c-d098-4a48-818e-112b97a9497a

Gen. Wei, a senior party and PLA leader, had “a collapse of faith and a loss of loyalty” and “seriously polluted the political ecosystem of the PLA”; Gen. Li had “abandoned the original mission and lost the principles of the party” & seriously contaminated the PLA’s military equipment industry

China’s military commits to full ‘rectification’ in corruption investigations’ wake. Xinlu Liang in Beijing. South China Morning Post, Jul 11 2024

The Central Military Commission says political education is crucial to advancing the PLA and war preparations

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3270001/chinas-military-commits-full-rectification-corruption-investigations-wake

China’s military will double down on political education following the downfall of two former defence ministers accused of “polluting” the armed forces.

The Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s top military decision-making body, said on Wednesday that the People’s Liberation Army would undergo complete “rectification” as part of its combat-readiness mission.

“Deepening the military’s political education and training is crucial for advancing the military’s development and achieving its strategic goals,” the CMC said.

“It is a serious and significant political task that requires unwavering determination and practical actions.

“We must integrate our efforts into the struggle, preparation for war, and construction of the military ... We must also continuously consolidate the Communist Party’s leadership in the new era and achieve the great goal of building a strong military.”

This process, it said using a rarely used phrase, would include “rectification of the mind, personnel appointments, organisation, working style and discipline”.

It would also involve a thorough review of the military’s policies and practices, as well as the promotion of a sense of discipline and responsibility among its personnel, state news agency Xinhua reported.

            video: China sacks defence minister Li Shangfu with no explanation after nearly two-month absence 

The wide-ranging pledge comes two weeks after authorities announced that former defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were under investigation for alleged corruption.

In unusually harsh language about the two former generals, the official reports said, Wei, a senior party and PLA leader, had “a collapse of faith and a loss of loyalty” and “seriously polluted the political ecosystem of the PLA”. Meanwhile, Li had “abandoned the original mission and lost the principles of the party” and seriously contaminated the PLA’s military equipment industry.

Their actions “betrayed the trust of the party’s central leadership and the CMC … and caused great damage to the party’s cause, national defence and the construction of the PLA, as well as to the image of the senior leading cadres”, official reports said.

The investigations uncovered evidence of other possible “serious disciplinary and criminal offences” by the two men, according to the CMC, and both will face criminal prosecution.

China has emphasised the importance of maintaining a clean and efficient military, and has vowed to take decisive action against any officials found to be tainted by corruption. The campaign is seen as a key part of President Xi Jinping’s efforts to strengthen party control over the military and instil a culture of integrity within its ranks.

In June, Xi told the top brass that the PLA must show absolute loyalty to the party and there could be no room for corruption in the military.

“We must make it clear that the barrels of guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party … And we must make it clear that there is no place for any corrupt elements in the military,” Xinhua quoted Xi as saying.

He warned that the world was undergoing complex and profound changes, and the military must adapt to these changes by promoting politics in its development and ensuring that the nature and principles of the people’s army remain unchanged.

“[PLA] cadres at all levels, the senior ones in particular, must step forward, dare to lose face and face their own shortcomings and flaws … make earnest rectifications, and resolve problems that are deeply rooted in their thinking,” Xi said.

China has seen a number of high-profile corruption cases involving senior military officers in recent years.

Nine senior generals – including past and serving top commanders of the PLA Rocket Force, a former air force commander and a series of CMC officials with the Equipment Development Department – were removed from their positions in December.

The disasters of excessive patriotic zeal, or of dotardness, I can't tell... Corrupt running dog, bootlicker, (p)sycophant and mafioso Shih-ts'un Wu urges to construct narratives defending Chinese maritime claims raiding Western archives/libraries

South China Sea: Chinese academics urged to ‘construct narratives’ to defend maritime claims. Laura Zhou. South China Morning Post, Jun 30 2024.

China faces ‘an increasingly arduous battle’ to win over public opinion in the disputed waters, speakers tell an academic seminar in Hainan

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3268562/south-china-sea-chinese-academics-urged-construct-narratives-defend-maritime-claims

Preserving a copy for posterity, they may very well end up removing this filth. My emphasis:

Chinese academics have called for more studies of the country’s claims to the disputed South China Sea.

“Narrative construction and discourse building are essential if we are to effectively defend our rights and interests in the South China Sea – both in the present and in future,” Wu Shicun, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, told a seminar held in Hainan province last week.

Beijing lays claim to much of the South China Sea, citing historic activities and records in support.

Its claims were rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 2016 in a case filed by the Philippines.

Recently the two countries have been involved in a series of clashes near disputed reefs – including collisions, China using water cannons and a recent incident in which a Philippine sailor lost a thumb. These have raised fears that the situation may escalate into a more serious conflict.

Without naming any country, Wu said China faced “an increasingly arduous battle over public perception and opinion”, adding that “rival claimants” were “stepping up cooperation with extraterritorial forces in the study of historical and legal issues” concerning the South China Sea.

Beijing has dismissed the Hague ruling as “null and void” and continued to build up its infrastructure and troop presence in the South China Sea.

But the Philippines and other claimants – which include Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei – along with the United States and its allies have repeatedly urged China to abide by international law.

The Philippines has signalled that it may turn to the Hague for another ruling, fuelling worries in Beijing that it would put the country in a bind and harm its reputation as a peacemaker and friendly neighbour in the region.

Yi Xianliang, a former ambassador to Norway who previously served as deputy director of the foreign ministry’s boundary and ocean affairs department, also spoke at Tuesday’s seminar and dismissed the 2016 ruling as a “bad joke”.

But he warned “we have to ask why the ruling is flawed” and ask if it “will happen again and how we can prevent it from happening again”.

Wu, who now chairs the Huayang Institute for Research on Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, denied China had violated international law in its disputes with the Philippines, and accused the US and its allies for “taking sides … by supporting whoever confronts China and violates China’s rights in the South China Sea”.

“Some strange theories which deliberately distort the history of the South China Sea and maliciously smear China’s rights and claims in the South China Sea have begun to circulate in the international academic community,” Wu said.

He urged the 100 or so historians and legal scholars present to help “restore the rightful background on South China Sea issues from historical and legal perspectives”.

Wu also said the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – which governs maritime rights and the freedom of navigation – could not take precedence over countries’ historical titles and rights, citing a previous case involving Eritrea and Yemen in the 1990s.

He said scholars could make their case by tapping into foreign manuscript collections, maritime histories and Western naval literature to support China’s claims.

This would allow them to “give a forceful response to the false narratives that China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea, that China has failed to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, Wu said.

This, he said, would help rebut accusations that Beijing was making “excessive maritime claims”.

---

My comment (and my emphasis): Shih-ts'un Wu, founder of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究院 (nanhai.org.cn)), now (it seems) the capo at the Huayang Institute for Research on Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance (can't get website of that snake pit, and its name varies wildly, sometimes is Center on Maritime, or Research Center on Maritime), told seminar assistants in Hainan province last week to construct narratives defending Chinese maritime claims with any means necessary, including raiding Western archives/libraries: "scholars could make their case by tapping into foreign manuscript collections, maritime histories and Western naval literature to support China’s claims, which would allow them to 'give a forceful response to the false narratives that China is changing the status quo in the South China Sea, that China has failed to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.'"

My assessment is that the lackeys will not only covertly, clandestinely infiltrate libraries and research institues, but that they, in their demented patriotic cowardice, will plunder and scavenge the archives, like the vulptures they are, destroying documents that support the Philippines' claims.

This is the implicit command of these savages of the Party.

---

Board of Governors (中国南海研究院 (nanhai.org.cn)), page now lost:

Wu Shicun has a PhD in history and is president and senior research fellow of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies, chairman of board of directors of China-Southeast Asia Research Center on the South China Sea, vice president of China Institute for Free Trade Ports Studies, deputy director of the Collaborative Innovation Center of South China Sea Studies, Nanjing University.

Dr Wu’s research interests cover the history and geography of the South China Sea, maritime delimitation, maritime economy, international relations and regional security strategy. His main single-authored books include What One Needs to Know about the South China Sea (Current Affairs Press, 2016), What One Needs to Know about the Disputes between China and the Philippines (Current Affairs Press,2014), Solving Disputes for Regional Cooperation and Development in the South China Sea: A Chinese perspective (Chandos Publishing, 2013). His main edited books include: The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: Challenges and Opportunities for Asia and Europe (Routledge, 2019), South China Sea Law fare: Post-Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects (South China Sea Think Tank / Taiwan Center for Security Studies, 2017), Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea: Philippines versus China (Ashgate, 2016), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China Sea (Ashgate, 2015),  Non-Traditional Security Issues and the South China Sea-Shaping a New Framework for Cooperation (Ashgate, 2014), Recent Developments in the South China Sea Dispute: The Prospect of a Joint Development Regime (Routledge, 2014), Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia—Legal and Political Dimensions (Chandos Publishing, 2013). Dr Wu has published widely in academic journals and been the subject of frequent media interviews as a senior commentator on South China Sea, regional security issues, the Belt & Road Initiative and the development of Hainan Province.

--------------

Update Jul 10 2024. The reprobate imperious colonizer, highly dishonorable, recidivist offender, and intemperate, libelous, impious, defiling, noxious, pretentious, harmful, poisonous, virulent,  vitiating, "malignant" (he writes ' "tumor" ' infra), pestilential, indecent, injurious, contaminative, pernicious, sinful, ignoble, polluting, maleficent, venomous, sinister, debasing, demoralizing, corrupting, venenose, lachrymose, environmentally unfriendly Shih-ts'un Wu, the psychotic, sacrilegious mafioso, one of the most loyal lieutenant desecrators, the most indecorous, immodest one, with no regrets ever, a hooligan, a refurbished, recalcitrant lackey, in a joint effort with the Global Times published the article below.

The viperous, provincial, felonious, demonic, depraved, truth eclipser, disreputable, impish, septic Global Times, who shamelessly, almost with voluptuousness, delights in schadenfreude, let this hatchet job of Shih-th'un see the light and in doing so detracted from the sum of human knowledge once again.

The GT editorial board and many of the gossipers there seems to experience extreme pleasure with their soiled words, it is a study case of lack of benevolence from the Heights of Power. The butlers there despise the dissident, the free-thinker, and the hoi polloi, and have no qualms about crushing others' rights.

The revolting piece, calling to reject not only what the arbitral court (Permanent Court of Arbitration) said more than a lustrum ago, but also what it may decide in the future, shows how low we can sink when we are enemies of Reason. A sure way to go that path is to become slaves of sentimentality, blindly follow a political party, and gush about the Fatherland, seeing the other peoples as inferior.

It is the old, repulsive imperial view that for so many centuries we had to endure of these brutes, who, like proverbial capital-city dwellers, behave as bullies but see themselves as refined, polite professionals, good lads that have to suffer the obnoxious, illiterate, unsophisticated peasants who deserve no voice. Why the rough, ungraceful country cousins think still of having the right to avoid taxation when there is no representation? The mandarinate knows better. Always knew.

Urgent call to clear toxicity of [the] SCS arbitration award. Shih-ts'un Wu.

https://en.nanhai.org.cn/index/research/paper_c/id/598.html

My emphasis:

With the approach of the 8th anniversary of the illegal award on the South China Sea arbitration, some troubling developments have recently emerged in the region. A number of extraterritorial countries have increased their military activities in the South China Sea, and the Philippines has ratcheted up legal motions and maritime actions aimed at solidifying this arbitration award. Certain countries have intensified unilateral actions to consolidate and expand their vested interests. 

In less than two years, the current Philippine government has nearly dismantled the good practices established over recent years for managing maritime differences and properly handling the South China Sea issue between China and the Philippines. The bilateral relationship, which had gradually emerged from the shadow of the illegal South China Sea arbitration case, now appears to have reset and is even regressing.

The international community is widely aware of China's position of not accepting or recognizing the award. However, some countries have not fully grasped the significant damage and harm that the award has caused to the handling of the South China Sea dispute, the rule-building in the region, the fairness and authority of international dispute settlement mechanisms, and the international order based on international law. Some even harbor unrealistic fantasies about the award. 

Judging from the current provocative actions of the Philippines against China's rights and claims in the South China Sea, the current Philippine government has intensified its use of the award to change the status quo, consolidate illegal gains and expand the scope of infringement. Since taking office, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has frequently cited the award as a so-called "basis" to attack and smear China's actions of safeguarding legitimate rights at the Ren'ai Jiao and Huangyan Dao. In fact, the arbitration award contains significant errors and flaws in legal interpretation and application, fact-finding and evidence acceptance. China's stance is precisely an act of maintaining its legitimate rights and interests, maintaining maritime peace and stability and upholding the rule of law.

Looking back at the volatile situation in the South China Sea since the award was issued eight years ago, it can be asserted that the award has not brought, and indeed cannot bring, peace and tranquility to the South China Sea. The arbitration award has become a "troublemaker" for peace and stability in the South China Sea, a "spoiler" for bilateral relations between China and relevant parties, and a "roadblock" for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the orderly advancement of consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

We must recognize that the arbitration award has had an extremely negative impact on political mutual trust at all levels between China and the Philippines. Outside the Philippines, some other disputant sides also occasionally refer to or cite the arbitration award as the basis for their respective claims. Additionally, some extraterritorial countries hold the arbitration award as a standard, pressuring the Chinese government to "respect" or "implement" the award. Therefore, it is crucial to make relevant countries within and outside the region clearly understand the essence and dangers of the award, and to promote the relevant parties to return to the correct track of resolving disputes through negotiation and consultation, mitigating differences through maritime cooperation and managing crises through rule-building.

As for the Philippines' threat to initiate new arbitration against China, it is, in a sense, a manifestation of the lingering toxicity of this arbitration award. No matter how the Philippine government packages the so-called "second arbitration," its content will definitely be related to some errors in the previous arbitration award. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and the adjacent waters. It needs to repeatedly and continuously clarify the toxicity of the arbitration award from a legal standpoint to thoroughly eradicate this "tumor" that has long undermined the rule of law and order at sea.

Rebutting the arbitration award and countering the erroneous statements of countries within and outside the region are not intended to provoke a new round of legal battles, but to make a rightful response to actions and forces that disrupt peace and stability in the South China Sea, interfere with China-Philippine relations and profit from the award. This will further reveal to the international community the political background of the arbitral tribunal's composition and the historical errors of the arbitration award, and lay bare the irreversible severe harm the award has caused to the rule of law and maritime order.

Wu Shicun is the chairman of the Huayang Research Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance and founding president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies.

Link: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315786.shtml

Check Rolf Degen's Twitter page to get great summaries of Psychology papers

 Check Rolf Degen's takes! @DegenRolf

Today’s suggested packing lists for 7-week camps can include, inter alia, 2 sets of sheets, 6 towels, 3 pairs of sneakers, 25 pairs of underwear, 25 pairs of socks, sports equipment, toiletries, more than 20 tops and shorts, and 10 pairs of pajamas—split between lightweight and heavy

These Parents Are Shelling Out to Have Someone Else Pack Their Kids for Camp. By Tara Weiss

https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/elite-summer-camp-packing-experts-85ed70ee

At elite sleep-away camps, some costing upward of $15,000, the pressure is on for parents to send junior off with all the right gear

June 6, 2024 8:00 am ET

Hayley Mooney recoiled as she opened her son’s trunk after it returned from seven weeks at overnight camp. She was hit with an odor so foul she figured an animal had crawled inside and croaked.  

Nope, just a moldy wet bathing suit. 

So when she learned First Class Laundry Services in West Palm Beach, Fla., offers post-camp trunk pickup and drop-off, she eagerly ponied up $450 — $225 per trunk—to have everything washed, folded and returned to her front door. Mooney could catch up with her kids instead of sorting through muddy socks and grass-stained shirts. 

Popular sleep-away camps, which can run upward of $15,000, are significantly more intense than when today’s parents attended in the ’80s and ’90s. Social media showcases an array of perceived must-haves. (Are monogrammed gel seat cushions for bleacher-sitting a necessity or extravagance? Discuss.) 

The 100+ item packing list provided by some camps is driving some parents to outsource the buying, labeling, packing to experts—and of course all that dirty laundry.

“If you have disposable income and you don’t want to touch it, you’re sending it out,” says First Class Laundry owner Natalie Matus, who launched post-camp service last summer. “A lot of my clients won’t even let their housekeepers touch them.” 

Today’s suggested packing lists for seven-week camps can include a light blanket and warm comforter, two sets of sheets, six towels, three pairs of sneakers, 25 pairs of underwear, 25 pairs of socks, sports equipment and toiletries. Then, there are clothes for most every weather scenario, including a raincoat and boots, fleece jacket, more than 20 tops and shorts, and 10 pairs of pajamas—split between lightweight and heavy.

Miscellaneous items include foldable Crazy Creek chairs, a kaboodle to hold hair ties, makeup and nail polish, flashlights, decorative pillows for optimal bunk coziness, family photos to fend off homesickness, games and personalized lockboxes for, say, smuggled-in candy. 

“Color War” is its own sartorial challenge. At this epic end-of-summer tournament, campers sport their team’s color and compete in events. But since the kids don’t know what color they’ll be assigned, parents often pack for four possibilities.

For the buying, many families make a “camp appointment” with a personal shopper at Denny’s, a children’s boutique in New York, New Jersey and South Florida. Associates greet them with their camp’s packing list printed out. Spencer Klein, whose family has owned Denny’s since 1978, says the average spend for a new camper appointment is $1,500 to $2,000. (A coveted perk: the store labels everything for free.)

Beth Leffel, of Boca Raton, Fla., spent about $2,000 at Denny’s three years ago preparing for her daughter’s first summer of camp and $250 at Party City, buying each potential color spiritwear her daughter could be assigned for color war. She said sending a child to camp well-equipped is a way parents can show love from afar.

“I wanted her to have everything everyone has,” says Leffel, an interior designer. “I didn’t want her to be without, especially since I’m not there. I didn’t want her to feel different because other kids have this or that. That first summer I went above and beyond.”

The next summer, Leffel started researching deals and dupes of name-brand wares, snagging attire on Amazon that looks like the Lululemon brand for a fraction of the price. Now, she shares her finds with fellow camp parents via her Instagram handle, The Savvy Camp Mom.

This year, for the first time, Dara Grandis, a Manhattan mom of three, hired professional organizer Meryl Bash to pack for her three children, who head off in late June for seven weeks at camp.

“This is the first week I haven’t traveled for work in a few months and I’d rather spend time with my kids versus stressing out over what is going into the trunk,” says Grandis, an executive. “Right now my living room is a dumping zone,” she adds. “It looks like an organized tornado.”

Bash will swoop into the family’s home to assess the packing situation and figure out what’s missing from the list. (For an additional charge, she will come before the packing day and have campers try on last season’s clothes to see what still fits.)

On packing day, Bash and her team arrive armed with tape and an assortment of storage cubes and bags. They meticulously pack each with a designated category: shirts and shorts; bedding and towels, bathing suits, socks and bras; toiletries; bunk junk like games, Mad Libs and books. 

Anything not already marked gets labeled along the way. For prep and packing days, Bash charges $125 per hour, and $100 per hour for an additional packer. It takes three to six hours, depending on the number of campers per household.

Her team even addresses envelopes—which are then neatly stored in a Ziploc with stationery—to make writing home easier. “If the space feels organized, it gives them a leg up,” says Bash, of campers and their bunks.

Nicole Fisch of Larchmont, N.Y., breathed a sigh of relief when her neighbor launched Camp Kits, a camp toiletry company, this year. Fisch recalls the summer she was “so crazed” about properly wrapping them that she accidentally sent all of her son’s toiletries in her daughter’s trunk.

Camp Kits’ bundles of toiletries, costing from $98-$185, magically appear on bunks before camp starts -without the parents lifting a finger.

“A lot of our clients believe the best thing you can spend your money on is your time,” says Diana Cooper, co-owner of The Concierge Crew, a Boca Raton-based personal-assistant company offering camp shopping, packing and labeling. “Let the crew take the stress out of camp prep,” says its website.

Yamada Kurumi, a client, works at a brothel to earn enough money to visit the clubs, which she does about once a week. She had boyfriends in the past but finds hosts more exciting. She is unsure whether to seek an office job after graduating from college or to carry on with sex work, which pays better.

The controversial cult of the host club in Japan. The Economist. May 21st 2024

https://www.economist.com/culture/2024/05/21/the-controversial-cult-of-the-host-club-in-japan

Why women pay men in make-up to flatter them

In kabukicho, a red-light district in Tokyo, four young men surround your female correspondent. Hiragi Saren, a 25-year-old with bleached hair, a black tank top and a silver necklace, sits closest. He chatters warmly and glances seductively, his pink eyeshadow glimmering under the chandeliers. His three assistants keep filling your correspondent’s shochu glass and shower her with compliments about her appearance. She doubts their sincerity, but is strangely pleased. After an hour and a half, the bill is ¥30,000 ($200).

Host clubs are booming in Japan. Some 21,000 hosts—well-dressed young men, often wearing make-up like k-pop stars—work at 900 such establishments. They pamper and flatter their female clients. Sex is not part of the bargain but could happen, somewhere else. Clients usually seek psychological rather than physical intimacy and a break from reality. Hosts refer to them as hime (princess), and never ask how old they are or what they do for a living.

To understand the cult of the host, start with two statistics. More than 60% of Japanese women in their late 20s are unmarried, double the rate in the mid-1980s. A recent survey found that more than a third of unmarried adults aged 20-49 had never dated. Many single women visit host clubs because they are lonely. They get a thrill from meeting “the kind of men they don’t meet in everyday life”, Mr Hiragi says.

The first host club opened in the mid-1960s, mostly serving as a dance hall for rich matrons and widows. Early hosts described themselves as “male geishas”, says Hojo Yuichi, who runs Ai Honten, the oldest active host club. At first, the clubs were seen as a fringe, sleazy business. But that stigma has faded.

Successful hosts are now celebrities. In the 2000s they started appearing on tv shows. Today many have a big social-media following. Billboards and trucks display pictures of the highest earners. Hosts feature as characters in manga and anime, too. They have become “an archetype within Japanese popular culture”, says Thomas Baudinette, an anthropologist at Macquarie University. Mr Hiragi moved to Tokyo from a rural area with dreams of becoming a famous host. “I wanted to be part of a world that’s glamorous,” he says.

Glamorous, yet controversial. Feminist groups accuse host clubs of exploitation: overcharging for drinks and manipulating clients into racking up huge tabs. Hosts praise those who spend the most, calling them “ace”. Some customers end up in debt after paying millions of yen for a single visit. Takahashi Ichika, a client, recalls that her favourite host would ignore her and fiddle with his phone when she refused to order champagne. “I would spend more money because I didn’t want him to dislike me. I wanted his attention,” she says.

Some women go to extraordinary lengths to feed their host habit. A survey last year showed that among women arrested for selling sex around Okubo Park, a popular pickup spot, over 40% were trying to earn enough money to go to host clubs. Politicians have started discussing ways to regulate the industry, for example by cracking down on opaque pricing. Host-club owners hope to pre-empt this with better self-regulation.

Some see a link between the cult of the host and obsessive fan culture. In a survey in 2023, 72% of Japanese women in their 20s said they indulged in oshikatsu (avidly supporting a celebrity, for example by buying several copies of each new hit). The objects of their adoration were often pop idols. But some are switching their allegiance to hosts, to whom they can get much closer. Ms Takahashi says she used to spend a lot on boy bands, but when concerts stopped during covid, she started to splurge on hosts instead.

Many other Japanese businesses, such as cuddle cafés, offer intimate services, usually to men. Mr Baudinette worries, though, that for many Japanese people, “Intimacy can only be accessed through commoditised forms.”

Yamada Kurumi, a client, works at a brothel to earn enough money to visit the clubs, which she does about once a week. She had boyfriends in the past but finds hosts more exciting. She is unsure whether to seek an office job after graduating from college or to carry on with sex work, which pays better. “A lot of people start losing touch with friends once they get addicted to host clubs,” says Ms Yamada. “My host is already part of my everyday life…If I get a normal job, I probably won’t be able to see him any more. That scares me.”

I have one partner now with three kids. He is transmasc, and he’s radical about the way he raises them. They’re radically home-schooled. They’re 17 and nonbinary, 6 and 5. They know everything in age-appropriate ways. They’ve seen their mommy undergo the transmasc experience

Lessons From a 20-Person Polycule. Interviews by Daniel Bergner, photographs by Anne Vetter. The New York Times, Apr 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/04/15/magazine/polycule-polyamory-boston.html

Ann: I have one partner now with three kids. He is transmasc, and he’s radical about the way he raises them. They’re radically home-schooled. They’re 17 and nonbinary, 6 and 5. They know everything in age-appropriate ways. They’ve seen their mommy undergo the transmasc experience, seen their mom become who they really are.

I was up late last night with him in a hotel room, and the 17-year-old was in the room snoozing, so we just sat on the bathroom floor chatting about our relationship all night, and while that was happening my husband was texting to say, Oh, I got a last-minute match, so I’m going to meet this girl for a date. And then I get a text while we were still on the bathroom floor vibing, it was 4 in the morning, and he said, We had a great date, a great connection, she’s looking for friends with benefits, we had sex. And I was smiling. You know you’re really poly when you’re with one of your partners talking about how much you love each other and you’re so happy your husband had this awesome night. Of course, I experience pangs of jealousy, but there are these moments, these gems, of being so happy for someone else’s happiness.

'Soberising' the enemy with a nuke or two, avoiding escalation — Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear tactical strikes

Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike. Max Seddon and Chris Cook in London

https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7

Doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons outlined in training scenarios for an invasion by China

Vladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of conflict with a major world power, according to leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an invasion by China.

The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger “strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945.

Although the files date back 10 years and more, experts claim they remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine. The documents were shown to the FT by western sources.

The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement.

In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in 2012. The war in Ukraine has cemented Russia’s status as a junior partner in their relationship, with China throwing Moscow a vital economic lifeline to help stave off western sanctions.

Yet even as the countries became closer, the training materials show Russia’s eastern military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.

The exercises offer a rare insight into how Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of its defence policy — and how it trains forces to be able to carry out a nuclear first strike in some battlefield conditions.

One exercise outlining a hypothetical attack by China notes that Russia, dubbed the “Northern Federation” for the purpose of the war game, could respond with a tactical nuclear strike in order to stop “the South” from advancing with a second wave of invading forces.

“The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike,” the document said.

China’s foreign ministry denied there were any grounds for suspicion of Moscow. “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries,” a spokesperson said. “The ‘threat theory’ has no market in China and Russia.”

Putin’s spokesperson said on Wednesday: “The main thing is that the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is absolutely transparent and is spelled out in the doctrine. As for the documents mentioned, we strongly doubt their authenticity.”

A separate training presentation for naval officers, unrelated to the China war games, outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.

The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the state security of Russia”.

Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.

Russia’s military is also expected to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons for a broad array of goals, including “containing states from using aggression […] or escalating military conflicts”, “stopping aggression”, preventing Russian forces from losing battles or territory, and making Russia’s navy “more effective”.

Putin said last June that he felt “negatively” about using tactical nuclear strikes, but then boasted that Russia had a larger non-strategic arsenal than Nato countries. “Screw them, you know, as people say,” Putin said. The US has estimated Russia has at least 2,000 such weapons.

Putin said last year that Russian nuclear doctrine allowed two possible thresholds for using nuclear weapons: retaliation against a first nuclear strike by an enemy, and if “the very existence of Russia as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used”.

But Putin himself added that neither criteria was likely to be met, and dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold.

The materials are aimed at training Russian units for situations in which the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons, said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, rather than setting out a rule book for their use.

“At this level, the requirement is for units to maintain — over the course of a conflict — the credible option for policymakers to employ nuclear weapons,” Watling added. “This would be a political decision.”

While Moscow has drawn close to Beijing since the war games and moved forces from the east to Ukraine, it has continued to build up its eastern defences. “Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “A lot of these systems only have the range to strike China.”

Russia was still behaving in accordance with the “theory of use” of nuclear weapons set out in the documents, Alberque said. “We have not seen a fundamental rethink,” he said, adding that Russia is probably concerned that China may seek to take advantage of Moscow being distracted “to push the Russians out of Central Asia”.

The documents reflect patterns seen in exercises the Russian military held regularly before and since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Alberque, who previously worked for Nato and the US defence department on arms control, pointed to examples of Russian exercises held in June and November last year using nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two regions bordering China.

While Russia’s president has the sole authority to launch a first nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use set out in the documents conforms with a doctrine some western observers refer to as “escalating to de-escalate”.

Under this strategy a tactical weapon could be used to try to prevent Russia from becoming embroiled in a sprawling war, particularly one in which the US might intervene. Using what it calls “fear inducement”, Moscow would seek to end the conflict on its own terms by shocking the country’s adversary with the early use of a small nuclear weapon — or securing a settlement through the threat to do so.

“They talk about ‘soberising’ their adversaries — knocking them out of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear weapons,” said Alberque. “The best way that they think they can do that is to use what they call a lower ‘dosage’ of nuclear weapons at a much lower level of combat to prevent escalation.”

Ukrainian officials argued that Putin’s nuclear threats convinced US and other allies not to arm Kyiv more decisively early in the conflict, when advanced Nato weaponry could have turned the tide in Ukraine’s favour.

Alberque said Russia would probably have a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which does not have its own nuclear capability or the ability to launch a ground invasion on the same scale, than against China or the US.

Russian leaders believe that, whereas a nuclear strike against China or the US could be “soberising”, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be likely to escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the US or UK, Alberque said. “That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants.”

Additional reporting by Joe Leahy in Beijing

Unelected elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like overestimate a lot how much the general population agrees with their own political views

The people think what I think: False consensus and unelected elite misperception of public opinion. Alexander C. Furnas, Timothy M. LaPira. American J of Pol Sci, January 24 2024. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12833

Abstract: Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of public opinion shows that reelection-motivated politicians systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil servants, journalists, and the like, and report alternative empirical findings. These unelected elites hold similarly inaccurate perceptions about public opinion, though not in a single ideological direction. We find this elite population exhibits egocentrism bias, rather than partisan confirmation bias, as their perceptions about others' opinions systematically correspond to their own policy preferences. Thus, we document a remarkably consistent false consensus effect among unelected political elites, which holds across subsamples by party, occupation, professional relevance of party affiliation, and trust in party-aligned information sources.

---

Our tests of competing explanations for these misperceptions are robust and consistent: Unelected political elites demonstrate a false consensus effect in their estimates of public opinion. Simply, elites believe that the policies they support are more popular among the general public than they actually are, and that the policies they oppose are less popular than they actually are. This relationship is true regardless of the elite's party identification, professional specialization, or information environment.

Treatment of the Taiwanese in Chinese Communist Documents and Statements: 1928-1943

The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943. Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 446-467. Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2757657

Extracts.

[...]

Treatment of the Taiwanese in Chinese Communist Documents and Statements: 1928-1943

At the CCP's Sixth National Congress, held in Moscow in 1928, the Chinese Communists took the first step toward accepting Taiwan's future political autonomy by acknowledging that the Taiwanese were ethnically separate from the Han. This is evident in their explicit reference to the Taiwanese as a distinct "nationality," and, on occasion, as a separate "race" (zhongzu) or "stock" (zongzu). (Further discussion of terminological differences is presented below). The first CCP statement referring to Taiwanese focused on the "Taiwanese in Fukien." According to the Sixth Congress' "Resolution on the Nationality Problem," the Sixth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party considers that the problems of minority nationalities within Chinese territory (Mongols and Mohammedans in the North, Koreans in Manchuria, Taiwanese in Fukien, the aborigines of Miao and Li nationalities in the South, and in Sinkiang [Uighur] and Tibetan nationalities) have important significance [emphasis added]. In other words, the "Taiwanese in Fukien" were considered to be a "minority nationality" and not simply members of one provincial group residing in another province. More importantly, the Taiwanese were grouped with other minority nationalities—Mongols, Mohammedans, Miao, Uighurs, etc.—which had maintained their ethnic identity throughout the dynastic era and had been able to assert some political autonomy vis-à-vis the imperial court. This position of the Sixth Congress was reiterated in the same year by the Fifth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League, which in its regulations noted that the "minority nationalities" in China included "Mongols, Koreans, Taiwanese, Annamese, etc.," and urged that local organs form national minority committees. Two years later in Kiangsi, the "Draft Constitution of the China Soviet Republic," adopted by the First All-China Soviet Congress (November 7, 1931), extended constitutional rights to these same minority nationalities. According to Item 4 of this document, all races, that is the "Han, Manchu, Mongol, Mohammedan, Tibetan, Miao, Li and also the Taiwanese, Koreans, and Annamese who reside in China, are equal under the laws of Soviet China [emphasis added]." 7 Taiwanese were seen not as Han but as a different "nationality" and even "race," who like the Koreans and the Annamese, but unlike the other minorities, came from a homeland separate from China.8 This view is strengthened by the fact that the CCP never referred to the Taiwanese as "brethren" (dixiong), or "the offspring of the Yellow Emperor," or "compatriots" (tongbao), who would de facto belong to the Han after they return to China. Indeed, a 1928 Central Committee Notice, while calling for the recovery from Japan of sovereignty over Shantung and Manchuria, failed to mention a similar goal for Taiwan in its seventeen "general goals of the present mass movement." Since the ideological perspectives of the early Chinese Communist elite were heavily influenced by an anti-Japanese (as well as an anti-Western) nationalism born out of the May Fourth Movement, this exclusion of Taiwan from recoverable sovereign territory of China is revealing.

Mao Tse-tung's earliest comments on the Taiwanese came in his January 1934 "Report of the China Soviet Republic Central Executive Committee and the People's Committee to the Second All-China Soviet Congress." Commenting on various provisions in the 1931 Constitution, he said:

"Item 15 of the Draft Constitution of Soviet China has the following statement: To every nationality in China who is persecuted because of revolutionary acts and to the revolutionary warriors of the whole world, the Chinese Soviet Government grants the right of their being protected in Soviet areas, and assists them in renewing their struggle until a total victory of the revolutionary movement for their nationality and nation has been achieved.

In the Soviet areas, many revolutionary comrades from Korea, Taiwan, and Annam are residing. In the First All-China Soviet Congress, representatives of Korea had attended. In the present Congress, there are a few representatives from Korea, Taiwan, and Annam. This proves that this Declaration of the Soviet is a correct one." 10

Mao not only reaffirmed the Chinese Communist position that Taiwanese residing outside Taiwan and in China were a "minority nationality," but also implied CCP recognition and support of an independent Taiwan national liberation movement, which would be united in a joint effort with the Chinese movement, but with a different purpose, i.e., the establishment of an independent state similar to other Japanese colonies, such as Korea.

A year later, Mao and P'eng Teh-huai manifestly dissociated Taiwan's political movement from China by incorporating it into the anti-imperialist revolution led by the Japanese Communist Party.

According to the "Resolution on the Current Political Situation and the Party's Responsibility," passed at a meeting of the CCP Central Political Bureau on 25 December 1935, and signed by P'eng and Mao:

"Under the powerful leadership of the Japanese Communist Party, the Japanese workers and peasants and the oppressed nationalities (Korea, Taiwan) are preparing great efforts in struggling to defeat Japanese Imperialism and to establish a Soviet Japan. This is to unite the Chinese revolution and Japanese revolution on the basis of the common targets of 'defeating Japanese imperialism.' The Japanese revolutionary people are a powerful helper of the Chinese revolutionary people." 11

Here Taiwanese were not considered an integral part of the "Chinese revolutionary people," but were treated as a people whose natural political role was to fight alongside the "Japanese workers and peasants" in establishing a Soviet Japan. Whether Mao and P'eng expected the Taiwanese (and Koreans) formally to join a newly-created Soviet Japan is unclear from this resolution. But nowhere in this or other documents examined by the authors did CCP leaders suggest that the Taiwanese should fight to return to their "motherland" and join Soviet China—a point they would not make until after 1943.

The independent character afforded the Taiwanese national liberation struggle by the CCP is most clearly stated in materials available from the period 1937 to 1941. At this time, when Mao Tse-tung stressed the "internationalist" character of the Chinese revolution, official decisions of Party organs and personal statements by CCP leaders point to Communist agreement that in the anti-Japanese struggle Taiwan possessed an independent political status. For instance, Mao's October 1938 Political Report "On the New Stage—the New Stage of Development in the Anti-Japanese National War and the Anti-Japanese National United Front," given to the CCP's Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth National Congress, extended independence to the movements of various "oppressed nationalities of Korea, Taiwan, etc." by advocating that they join the Chinese nation in common action against Japanese imperialism. 13

---

Notes

7 Item 14, however, asserts ". . . the right of self determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China, and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self determination, i.e., they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer. The Soviet regime of China will do its utmost to assist the national minorities in liberating themselves from the yoke of imperialists, the KMT militarists, t'u-ssu [native officials], the princes, lamas and others, and in achieving complete freedom and autonomy. The Soviet regime must encourage the development of the national cultures and the national languages of these peoples." Unlike Item 4, Taiwanese were not mentioned here, nor were the Manchus and Annamese. This may have been simply an oversight by the drafters of this constitution. On the other hand, since very few Taiwanese resided on China's mainland (mostly in Fukien, which was not a major part of Soviet China), and unlike the Koreans, which numbered 700,000 in 1934 (see Japan-Manchoukuo Year Book 1937, p. 48), perhaps the CCP logically excluded Taiwanese from a provision, borrowed from the U.S.S.R., which granted rights of secession, or alter- natively, created autonomous areas. Such a provision would not have been applicable to those groups which were not considered a minority within the existing political boundaries of China.

8 Throughout CCP documents from this period the Taiwanese are consistently grouped with the Koreans and Annamese. There are several possible reasons for this pattern. One is that the Taiwanese shared with the Koreans and Annamese a common bond to Chinese culture and a past inclusion in the Chinese empire at different points in history. A second is that all three areas were colonies of foreign powers which, as we shall argue below, led the CCP to grant them greater political autonomy than the minority nationalities within China, which although non- Chinese were also non-colonized peoples. A third is that Taiwan's experience with Japan made the Taiwanese less "Chinese" and more like the Koreans and Vietnamese, who combined Chinese cultural influence with their own unique identity. See, John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).