Dominance, phylogenetically ancient, and prestige, unique to humans, are ways to gain or maintain high rank

Dominance and Prestige: A Tale of Two Hierarchies. Jon K. Maner. Current Directions in Psychological Science.  https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417714323

Abstract: Dominance and prestige represent evolved strategies used to navigate social hierarchies. Dominance is a strategy through which people gain and maintain social rank by using coercion, intimidation, and power. Prestige is a strategy through which people gain and maintain social rank by displaying valued knowledge and skills and earning respect. The current article synthesizes recent lines of research documenting differences between dominance- versus prestige-oriented individuals, including personality traits and emotions, strategic behaviors deployed in social interactions, leadership strategies, and physiological correlates of both behaviors. The article also reviews effects that dominance versus prestige have on the functioning and well-being of social groups. The article also presents opportunities for future research and discusses links between dominance and prestige and the social psychological literature on power and status.

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Although both dominance and prestige serve as viable routes to high social rank, the propensity to use one strategy over the other varies across individuals. Some work indicates no correlation between people’s use of dominance and prestige (Cheng et al., 2013), suggesting that use of one strategy is not contingent on use of the other. Other work suggests a positive correlation, as both strategies share in common the motivation for high rank (Maner & Mead, 2010).

The two strategies have different implications for groups and the individuals who comprise them. For example, the two strategies are characterized by different personality traits. Whereas people who use dominance are relatively aggressive, disagreeable, manipulative, and high in dark-triad traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy), people who use prestige instead are
high in self-esteem, agreeableness, need for affiliation, social monitoring, fear of negative evaluation, and conscientiousness (Case & Maner, 2017; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Semenya & Honey, 2015).

Dominance and prestige are also marked by different types of emotion. Dominance is associated with feelings of arrogance, superiority, and conceit (hubristic pride; Cheng et al., 2010), whereas prestige is associated with feelings of achievement, but without a sense of superiority or arrogance (authentic pride; Cheng et al., 2010; see also Liu, Yuan, Chen, & Yu, 2016). Another emotion that distinguishes dominance from prestige is humility (Weidman, Cheng, & Tracy, 2016). Prestige, but not dominance, is associated with appreciative humility, which results from a sense of personal success and leads people to celebrate others. Given these distinct profiles of personality and emotion, it comes as no surprise that people adopting a prestige strategy tend to be more well-liked than people adopting a dominance strategy (Cheng et al., 2013).

Clear evidence for physiological correlates of dominance and prestige is limited. Many findings have linked dominance to high levels of testosterone (Mazur & Booth, 1998), yet studies in humans have tended not to differentiate between dominance and prestige. One study that did so found no correlation between dominance and testosterone; instead, the study documented a negative relation between testosterone and prestige (Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007), consistent with the hypothesis that prestige is associated with an active downplaying of aggression and competitiveness. Another found that testosterone was linked with use of dominance but not with one’s actual rank in the hierarchy (van der Meij, Schaveling, & Van Vugt, 2016). Dominance (but not prestige) has been linked with wider facial width-to-height ratio (Mileva, Cowan, Cobey, Knowles, & Little, 2014)—a morphological cue associated with greater testosterone, aggressiveness, and unethical behavior (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett, & Penke, 2013; but see Bird et al., 2016). The literature on physiological aspects of dominance and prestige would benefit from further development.

Assessments of twins’ general homophobia targeting gay men

Genetic Variance in Homophobia: Evidence from Self-and Peer Reports. Alexandra Zapko-Willmes and Christian Kandler. Behavior Genetics, accepted,  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320963054_Genetic_Variance_in_Homophobia_Evidence_from_Self-and_Peer_Reports

Abstract: The present twin study combined self- and peer assessments of twins’ general homophobia targeting gay men in order to replicate previous behavior genetic findings across different rater perspectives and to disentangle self-rater-specific variance from common variance in self- and peer-reported homophobia (i.e., rater-consistent variance). We hypothesized rater-consistent variance in homophobia to be attributable to genetic and nonshared environmental effects, and self-rater-specific variance to be partially accounted for by genetic influences. A sample of 869 twins and 1329 peer raters completed a seven item scale containing cognitive, affective, and discriminatory homophobic tendencies. After correction for age and sex differences, we found most of the genetic contributions (62%) and significant nonshared environmental contributions (16%) to individual differences in self-reports on homophobia to be also reflected in peer-reported homophobia. A significant genetic component, however, was self-report-specific (38%), suggesting that self-assessments alone produce inflated heritability estimates to some degree. Different explanations are discussed.

Listeners can reliably determine a speaker's sincerity through prosodic cues, since sincere compliments are spoken faster and with a higher pitch

The sound of (in)sincerity. Karyn Fish, Kathrin Rothermich, Marc D.Pella. Journal of Pragmatics, Volume 121, November 2017, Pages 147-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2017.10.008

Highlights
•    Sincere compliments and prosocial lies occur frequently in communication.
•    Listeners can reliably determine a speaker's sincerity through prosodic cues.
•    Sincere compliments are spoken faster and with a higher pitch.
•    Social context biases impressions of sincerity in compliments.
•    Prosody and speaker attitude are both important for understanding speaker intentions.

Abstract: In social life, humans do not always communicate their sincere feelings, and speakers often tell ‘prosocial lies’ to prevent others from being hurt by negative truths. Data illuminating how a speaker's voice carries sincere or insincere attitudes in speech, and how social context shapes the expression and perception of (in)sincere utterances, are scarce. Here, we studied the communication of social, other-oriented lies occurring in short dialogues. We recorded paired questions (So, what do you think of my new hairdo?) and responses (I think it looks really amazing!) using a paradigm that elicited compliments which reflected the true positive opinion of the speaker (sincere) or were meant to hide their negative opinion (insincere/prosocial lie). These Question–Response pairs were then presented to 30 listeners, who rated the sincerity of the person uttering the compliment on a 5-point scale. Results showed that participants could successfully differentiate sincere compliments from prosocial lies based largely on vocal speech cues. Moreover, sincerity impressions were biased by how the preceding question was phrased (confident or uncertain). Acoustic analyses on a subset of utterances that promoted strong impressions of sincerity versus insincerity revealed that compliments perceived as being sincere were spoken faster and began with a higher pitch than those that sounded insincere, while compliments rated as insincere tended to get louder as the utterance unfolded. These data supply new evidence of the importance of vocal cues in evaluating sincerity, while emphasizing that motivations of both the speaker and hearer contribute to impressions of speaker sincerity.

Adjusting communication to take into account information available to one’s audience is routine in humans -- Now in chimpanzees

Vocalizing in chimpanzees is influenced by social-cognitive processes. Catherine Crockford, Roman M. Wittig and Klaus Zuberbühler. Science Advances  Nov 15 2017, Vol. 3, no. 11, e1701742. DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1701742

Abstract: Adjusting communication to take into account information available to one’s audience is routine in humans but is assumed absent in other animals, representing a recent development on the lineage leading to humans. This assumption may be premature. Recent studies show changes in primate alarm signaling to threats according to the receivers’ risk. However, a classic problem in these and other perspective-taking studies is discerning whether signalers understand the receivers’ mental states or simply are responding to their behavior. We designed experiments to exclude concurrent reading of the receivers’ behavior by simulating receivers using prerecorded calls of other group members. Specifically, we tested whether wild chimpanzees emitted differing signals in response to a snake model when simulated receivers previously emitted either snake-related calls (indicating knowledge) or acoustically similar non–snake-related calls (indicating ignorance). Signalers showed more vocal and nonvocal signaling and receiver-directed monitoring when simulated receivers had emitted non–snake-related calls. Results were not explained by signaler arousal nor by receiver identity. We conclude that chimpanzees are aware enough of another’s perspective to target information toward ignorant group members, suggesting that the integration of signaling and social cognition systems was already emerging in early hominoid lineages before the advent of more language-specific features, such as syntax.

Blocking nocturnal blue light for insomnia: A randomized controlled trial.

Blocking nocturnal blue light for insomnia: A randomized controlled trial. Ari Shechter et al. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 2017 Oct 21;96:196-202. doi: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2017.10.015

Abstract: The use of light-emitting electronic devices before bedtime may contribute to or exacerbate sleep problems. Exposure to blue-wavelength light in particular from these devices may affect sleep by suppressing melatonin and causing neurophysiologic arousal. We aimed to determine if wearing amber-tinted blue light-blocking lenses before bedtime improves sleep in individuals with insomnia. Fourteen individuals (n = 8 females; age ± SD 46.6 ± 11.5 y) with insomnia symptoms wore blue light-blocking amber lenses or clear placebo lenses in lightweight wraparound frames for 2 h immediately preceding bedtime for 7 consecutive nights in a randomized crossover trial (4-wk washout). Ambulatory sleep measures included the Pittsburgh Insomnia Rating Scale (PIRS) completed at the end of each intervention period, and daily post-sleep questionnaire and wrist-actigraphy. PIRS total scores, and Quality of Life, Distress, and Sleep Parameter subscales, were improved in amber vs. clear lenses condition (p-values less than 0.05). Reported wake-time was significantly delayed, and mean subjective total sleep time (TST), overall quality, and soundness of sleep were significantly higher (p-values less than 0.05) in amber vs. clear lenses condition over the 7-d intervention period. Actigraphic measures of TST only were significantly higher in amber vs. clear lenses condition (p = 0.035). Wearing amber vs. clear lenses for 2-h preceding bedtime for 1 week improved sleep in individuals with insomnia symptoms. These findings have health relevance given the broad use of light-emitting devices before bedtime and prevalence of insomnia. Amber lenses represent a safe, affordable, and easily implemented therapeutic intervention for insomnia symptoms.

KEYWORDS: Actigraphy; Behavioral intervention; Blue blocker; Insomnia; Randomized controlled trial; Sleep

Focusing on the present predicts improvements in life satisfaction but not happiness

Being present: Focusing on the present predicts improvements in life satisfaction but not happiness. Peter Felsman et al. Emotion. 2017 Oct;17(7):1047-1051. doi: 10.1037/emo0000333

Abstract: Mindfulness theorists suggest that people spend most of their time focusing on the past or future rather than the present. Despite the prevalence of this assumption, no research that we are aware of has evaluated whether it is true or what the implications of focusing on the present are for subjective well-being. We addressed this issue by using experience sampling to examine how frequently people focus on the present throughout the day over the course of a week and whether focusing on the present predicts improvements in the 2 components of subjective well-being over time — how people feel and how satisfied they are with their lives. Results indicated that participants were present-focused the majority of the time (66%). Moreover, focusing on the present predicted improvements in life satisfaction (but not happiness) over time by reducing negative rumination. These findings advance our understanding of how temporal orientation and well-being relate.

Women’s relationship satisfaction was related to similarity in left-right and liberal-conservative political attitudes

Leikas, Sointu, Ville J Ilmarinen, Markku Verkasalo, Hanna-Leena Vartiainen, and Jan-Erik Lönnqvist. 2017. “Relationship Satisfaction and Similarity of Personality Traits, Personal Values, and Attitudes”. PsyArXiv. November 15. psyarxiv.com/cs62j

Abstract: Spousal similarity and its consequences are widely studied, but methodologically challenging topics. We employed Response Surface Analysis to examine similarity along political attitudes, personal values, and personality traits. Opposite-sex couples (624 individuals) expecting a child were recruited. Spouses were highly similar regarding their political attitudes and moderately similar regarding trait Openness and the personal values Universalism and Tradition. Similarity for other traits and values was weak (e.g. Conscientiousness, Power values) or non-existent (e.g. Neuroticism, Benevolence values). Similarity in conservative vs. liberal attitudes was non-linear: a conservative-conservative union was most common. Women’s relationship satisfaction was related to similarity in left-right and liberal-conservative political attitudes, and both partners’ satisfaction was related to similarity in Self-Direction values. Similarity in personality traits was unrelated to relationship satisfaction.

Examining Overlap in Behavioral and Neural Representations of Morals, Facts, and Preferences

Theriault, Jordan E, Adam Waytz, Larisa Heiphetz, and Liane Young. 2017. “Examining Overlap in Behavioral and Neural Representations of Morals, Facts, and Preferences.”. PsyArXiv. November 14. doi:10.1037/xge0000350

Abstract: Moral objectivists generally believe that moral claims are akin to facts, whereas moral subjectivists generally believe that moral claims are more akin to preferences. Evidence from developmental and social psychology has generally favored an objectivist view; however, this work has typically relied on few examples, and analyses have disallowed statistical generalizations beyond these few stimuli. The present work addresses whether morals are represented as fact-like or preference-like, using behavioral and neuroimaging methods, in combination with statistical techniques that can a) generalize beyond our sample stimuli, and b) test whether particular item features are associated with neural activity. Behaviorally, and contrary to prior work, morals were perceived as more preference-like than fact-like. Neurally, morals and preferences elicited common magnitudes and spatial patterns of activity, particularly within dorsal-medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a critical region for social cognition. This common DMPFC activity for morals and preferences was present across whole-brain conjunctions, and in individually localized functional regions of interest (targeting the Theory of Mind network). By contrast, morals and facts did not elicit any neural activity in common. Follow-up item analyses suggested that the activity elicited in common by morals and preferences was explained by their shared tendency to evoke representations of mental states. We conclude that morals are represented as far more subjective than prior work has suggested. This conclusion is consistent with recent theoretical research, which has argued that morality is fundamentally about regulating social relationships.