Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating

Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating. Li Zhao et al. Developmental Science, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/desc.12585/abstract

Abstract: The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.

The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children

The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children. Libertad González and Tarja Viitanen. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12200/abstract

Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of children, by exploiting the different timing of divorce legalization across Europe. We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts raised when divorce was banned with those of cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have ‘control’ countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to legal divorce as children. We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.

Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field

Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field.Michael Kirchler, Stefan Palan. Experimental Economics, Aug 02 2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-017-9536-1

Abstract: Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.

Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization

Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization. Cory J. Clark et al.  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011597

Abstract: Five studies tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives’ higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.

Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology

Not having schadenfreude can be a signal of Huntington's

Corticostriatal signatures of schadenfreude: evidence from Huntington's disease. Sandra Baez et al. Journal of NeuroIogy, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, on-line Aug 01 2017. http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/early/2017/07/31/jnnp-2017-316055

Abstract: Schadenfreude—pleasure at others’ misfortunes—is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.

Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships

Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships. Kayla Knopp, Shelby Scott, Lane Ritchie, Galena K. Rhoades, Howard J. Markman, Scott M. Stanley. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-017-1018-1

Abstract: Although there is a large body of research addressing predictors of relationship infidelity, no study to our knowledge has specifically addressed infidelity in a previous relationship as a risk factor for infidelity in a subsequent relationship. The current study addressed risk for serial infidelity by following adult participants (N = 484) longitudinally through two mixed-gender romantic relationships. Participants reported their own extra-dyadic sexual involvement (ESI) (i.e., having sexual relations with someone other than their partner) as well as both known and suspected ESI on the part of their partners in each romantic relationship. Findings from logistic regressions showed that those who reported engaging in ESI in the first relationship were three times more likely to report engaging in ESI in their next relationship compared to those who did not report engaging in ESI in the first relationship. Similarly, compared to those who reported that their first-relationship partners did not engage in ESI, those who knew that their partners in the first relationships had engaged in ESI were twice as likely to report the same behavior from their next relationship partners. Those who suspected their first-relationship partners of ESI were four times more likely to report suspicion of partner ESI again in their next relationships. These findings controlled for demographic risk factors for infidelity and held regardless of respondent gender or marital status. Thus, prior infidelity emerged as an important risk factor for infidelity in next relationships. Implications for novel intervention targets for prevention of serial relationship infidelity are discussed.

Keywords: Dating relationships, Extra-dyadic sexual involvement, Infidelity

The limitations of Nyhan and Reifler's backfire effect

The limitations of the backfire effect. Kathryn Haglin. Research & Politics, July 3, 2017. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017716547

Abstract: Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) document a “backfire effect,” wherein attempts to correct factual misperceptions increase the prevalence of false beliefs. These results are widely cited both in and outside of political science. In this research note, I report the results of a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccine study that was embedded in a larger study about flu vaccines. The backfire effect was not replicated in my experiment. The main replication result suggests the need for additional studies to verify the backfire effect and identify conditions under which it occurs.

Introduction
Political scientists are increasingly aware of the effect of misperceptions on behavioral intentions and attitudes. While Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) famously note that most citizens do not have much factual knowledge about politics, Kuklinski et al. (2000) point out the differences between being uninformed and misinformed. When a person is misinformed, false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information can create the basis for their policy preferences. Further, the sources used to obtain the misinformation are often directly related to a person’s political preferences.

While there is some evidence that providing relevant facts has the ability to change people’s issue opinions (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000), information is often received in a much noisier environment. Other studies have found that individuals are often resistant to evidence that contradicts their opinions (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). The literature, however, remains unsettled as to exactly when and how misperceptions can be corrected. In addition, the role of the “backfire effect,” where corrective information can actually make false beliefs more prevalent, in these processes remains unclear. For example, Weeks and Garrett (2014) do not find evidence for the backfire effect in a study about correcting rumors in the 2008 presidential campaign. Similarly, Ecker et al.’s (2014) study of racial attitudes finds those attitudes do not change the effectiveness of discounting information. Looking at similar attitudes, Garrett et al. (2013) find no evidence of these backfire effects in a study about a proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City. By contrast, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) find evidence for a backfire effect in a vaccines context as well as in the case of being correctly informed about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

This research note reports a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccines study embedded within a larger experimental study of flu vaccine intentions and attitudes. Data generated in the experiment do not replicate the backfire effect or the finding that corrections reduce misperceptions about vaccine safety. This suggests that more work is needed to validate the backfire effect, establishing the conditions under which it occurs and the size of its effect.

Keywords Vaccine, replication, backfire effect, misperception

In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior

In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior. William Bazley, Henrik Cronqvist & Milica Mormann. University of Miami Working Paper, June 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992812

Abstract: Financial decisions in today's society are made in environments that involve color stimuli. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the effects of color on investment behavior. First, we find that when investors are displayed potential losses in red, risk taking is reduced. Second, when investors are shown past negative stock price paths in red, expectations about future stock returns are reduced. Consistent with red causing "avoidance behavior," red color reduces investors' propensity to purchase stocks. The findings are robust to a series of checks involving colorblind investors and alternative colors to control for salience effects. Finally, the effects are muted in a cultural setting, e.g., China, where red is not used to visualize financial losses. A contribution of this study is to introduce hypotheses from color psychology and visual science to enhance our understanding of the behavior of individual investors.

Keywords: Investment behavior; Color psychology
JEL Classification: G02, G11

Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016)

Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016). Jarret Crawford & Allison Fournier, https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/c43bk/

Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) reported that subtle money cues impacted a range of behaviors, including working independently without asking for assistance, contributing less to charity, and providing less assistance to experimenters and confederates. Other research found that money priming effects decreased empathy, compassion, and people’s willingness to volunteer and donate time and money (Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009).

Further, Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) reasoned that because money is a symbol of American free-market capitalism, subtle money reminders would make people more accepting of free-market and other belief systems that justify existing structural inequality. They reported five studies suggesting that money priming increased support for such beliefs systems (i.e., System Justification, Belief in a Just World [BJW], Social Dominance Orientation, and Fair Market Ideology).

These findings have been called into question by notable failed replication attempts.
[...]
We conclude that the original findings may have been the result of sampling error, and the findings of “small telescopes” analyses are consistent with this conclusion. We discuss implications for money priming effects, and replication attempts in general.


Keywords: money priming; system justification; BJW; priming effects; replication

My Spanish commentary: many who I know are supportive of free markets and do not contribute less to charities or help less coworkers (being very, very competitive at the same time)... They just re-orient my contributions from organizations perceived as failures or corrupt ones (an example is any European Red Cross society, which brags about their universal, impartial, neutral, etc., character, but does not deliver) to others perceived as less crooked in their conduct codes and actual behavior (American Red Cross). Or don't give to child cancer research, which produces very scant results in disorganized societies, but contribute to medical organizations that are the best in their city and are in the first position in the place they live in (Mount Sinai Hospital, Barcelona Clinic Hospital, La Paz Hospital). Or do not contribute to museums or libraries in disorganized societies, but contribute to others perceived as with top-notch credentials (Library of Congress). Or do not volunteer for traditional parties, but help and contribute to other parties and organizations (e.g., Libertarian ones). This is just a bunch of anecdotes, but many people with lots of money and assets contribute a lot. Obviously those non-replicable studies are quite defective... too many exceptions.

How Linguistic Metaphor Scaffolds Reasoning

How Linguistic Metaphor Scaffolds Reasoning. Paul H. Thibodeau, Rose K. Hendricks, Lera Boroditsky. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Aug 05 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.07.001

Abstract: Language helps people communicate and think. Precise and accurate language would seem best suited to achieve these goals. But a close look at the way people actually talk reveals an abundance of apparent imprecision in the form of metaphor: ideas are ‘light bulbs’, crime is a ‘virus’, and cancer is an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’. In this article, we review recent evidence that metaphoric language can facilitate communication and shape thinking even though it is literally false. We first discuss recent experiments showing that linguistic metaphor can guide thought and behavior. Then we explore the conditions under which metaphors are most influential. Throughout, we highlight theoretical and practical implications, as well as key challenges and opportunities for future research.

Keywords: analogy; decision making; framing; language and thought; metaphor; reasoning

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Linguistic metaphors describe a topic of discussion in terms of a semantically unrelated domain [1–8]. Recent work in cognitive science has demonstrated that metaphors can shape the way people think (Table1). For instance, in one study, Alan Turing was seen as more of a genius with more exceptional inventions when his ideas were described as lightbulbs rather than as seeds [9]. In an other study, people were more likely to support reform, rather than enforcement-oriented, approaches to crime reduction when crime was described as a virus than as a beast. Experiments have also shown that personifying changes in stock prices (‘climbing’ and ‘slipping’), rather than objectifying them (‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ in value), makes people more likely to think recent price trajectories will continue into the future. And framing cancer as an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’ has been found to reduce people’s intentions to engage in self-limiting preventative behaviors (e.g., eating less red meat, smoking less; [14]) and to think that it would be harder for cancer patients to come to terms with their situation [15]. Metaphors have also beens hown to affect behavior [16–20]. For instance, metaphor-based interventions – describing the brain as a ‘muscle’ that ‘grows’ with practice – can encourage students to adopt an incremental, rather than fixed, theory of intelligence [21]. In turn, an incremental theory of intelligence leads students to be more committed to their learning goals and persistent in the face of adversity.

[...] Neuroimaging studies have shown that vivid sensorimotor metaphors engage neural networks that represent the corresponding sensation or action. For example, hearing 'she grasped the idea' activates [the] motor cortex; hearing 'she is sweet' activates gustatory areas...

[...] One meta-analysis estimated that metaphorical language is about 6 percent more persuasive than comparable literal language...

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My Spanish commentary: demagogues know about this and use it constantly. And I detect the use of these techniques in daily newspapers, like the NY Times, Financial Times and the Washington Post, or non-daily publications like The Economist, Nature/Science (especially regarding climate) or Scientific American. I guess that advertising uses this too, like images of tasty steaks in a grill, etc.

Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists

Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists. Will M. Gervais et al. Nature Human Behavior, 1, Article number: 0151 (2017). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0151

Mounting evidence supports long-standing claims that religions can extend cooperative networks. However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component. Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a given religious group, promoting regional violence, intergroup conflict and tacit prejudice against non-believers. Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in increasingly secular societies —affects employment, elections, family life and broader social inclusion. Preliminary work in the United States suggests that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N = 3,256; 13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and morality, people in most—but not all— of these countries viewed extreme moral violations as representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist participants around the world. The results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries, and imply that the recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful influence on moral judgements persists, even among non-believers in secular societies.

How short is too short? An ultra-brief measure of the big-five personality domains implicates “agreeableness” as a risk for all-cause mortality

How short is too short? An ultra-brief measure of the big-five personality domains implicates “agreeableness” as a risk for all-cause mortality. Benjamin P Chapman, Ari J Elliot
Journal of Health Psychology, Aug 03 2017, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1359105317720819

Abstract: Controversy exists over the use of brief Big Five scales in health studies. We investigated links between an ultra-brief measure, the Big Five Inventory-10, and mortality in the General Social Survey. The Agreeableness scale was associated with elevated mortality risk (hazard ratio = 1.26, p = .017). This effect was attributable to the reversed-scored item “Tends to find fault with others,” so that greater fault-finding predicted lower mortality risk. The Conscientiousness scale approached meta-analytic estimates, which were not precise enough for significance. Those seeking Big Five measurement in health studies should be aware that the Big Five Inventory-10 may yield unusual results.

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"Those reporting that they often criticized others lived longer."

Third-person self-talk facilitates emotion regulation without engaging cognitive control: Converging evidence from ERP and fMRI

Third-person self-talk facilitates emotion regulation without engaging cognitive control: Converging evidence from ERP and fMRI. Jason Moser et al. Scientific Reports, July 2017, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-04047-3

Abstract: Does silently talking to yourself in the third-person constitute a relatively effortless form of self control? We hypothesized that it does under the premise that third-person self-talk leads people to think about the self similar to how they think about others, which provides them with the psychological distance needed to facilitate self control. We tested this prediction by asking participants to reflect on feelings elicited by viewing aversive images (Study 1) and recalling negative autobiographical memories (Study 2) using either “I” or their name while measuring neural activity via ERPs (Study 1) and fMRI (Study 2). Study 1 demonstrated that third-person self-talk reduced an ERP marker of self-referential emotional reactivity (i.e., late positive potential) within the first second of viewing aversive images without enhancing an ERP marker of cognitive control (i.e., stimulus preceding negativity). Conceptually replicating these results, Study 2 demonstrated that third-person self-talk was linked with reduced levels of activation in an a priori defined fMRI marker of self-referential processing (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex) when participants reflected on negative memories without eliciting increased levels of activity in a priori defined fMRI markers of cognitive control. Together, these results suggest that third-person self-talk may constitute a relatively effortless form of self-control.

Buying time promotes happiness

Buying time promotes happiness. Ashley V. Whillans et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/07/18/1706541114.full

Significance: Despite rising incomes, people around the world are feeling increasingly pressed for time, undermining well-being. We show that the time famine of modern life can be reduced by using money to buy time. Surveys of large, diverse samples from four countries reveal that spending money on time-saving services is linked to greater life satisfaction. To establish causality, we show that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. This research reveals a previously unexamined route from wealth to well-being: spending money to buy free time.

Abstract: Around the world, increases in wealth have produced an unintended consequence: a rising sense of time scarcity. We provide evidence that using money to buy time can provide a buffer against this time famine, thereby promoting happiness. Using large, diverse samples from the United States, Canada, Denmark, and The Netherlands (n = 6,271), we show that individuals who spend money on time-saving services report greater life satisfaction. A field experiment provides causal evidence that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. Together, these results suggest that using money to buy time can protect people from the detrimental effects of time pressure on life satisfaction.

The Psychological Health Benefits of Accepting Negative Emotions and Thoughts: Laboratory, Diary, and Longitudinal Evidence

The Psychological Health Benefits of Accepting Negative Emotions and Thoughts: Laboratory, Diary, and Longitudinal Evidence. Brett Ford et al. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28703602

Abstract: Individuals differ in the degree to which they tend to habitually accept their emotions and thoughts without judging them — a process here referred to as habitual acceptance. Acceptance has been linked with greater psychological health, which we propose may be due to the role acceptance plays in negative emotional responses to stressors: acceptance helps keep individuals from reacting to — and thus exacerbating — their negative mental experiences. Over time, experiencing lower negative emotion should promote psychological health. To test these hypotheses, Study 1 (N = 1,003) verified that habitually accepting mental experiences broadly predicted psychological health (psychological well-being, life satisfaction, and depressive and anxiety symptoms), even when controlling for potentially related constructs (reappraisal, rumination, and other mindfulness facets including observing, describing, acting with awareness, and nonreactivity). Next, in a laboratory study (Study 2, N = 156), habitual acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotional responses to a standardized stressor. Finally, in a longitudinal design (Study 3, N = 222), acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotion experienced during daily stressors that, in turn, accounted for the link between acceptance and psychological health 6 months later. This link between acceptance and psychological health was unique to accepting mental experiences and was not observed for accepting situations. Additionally, we ruled out potential confounding effects of gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and life stress severity. Overall, these results suggest that individuals who accept rather than judge their mental experiences may attain better psychological health, in part because acceptance helps them experience less negative emotion in response to stressors.