"The Future of Babylon" Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Funds Project to Develop Management and Conservation Plan for Ancient Site in Iraq
Media Note
US State Dept, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, January 7, 2009
The U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce its support of a project to develop a plan for the management and preservation of the archaeological site of Babylon. Funded to nearly $700,000, this project will be carried out by the World Monuments Fund (WMF) in partnership with the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH). Babylon stands out among Iraq’s rich contributions to humanity and “The Future of Babylon” project exemplifies the American people’s commitment to the preservation of human heritage and their respect for the cultural heritage of Iraq.
The management plan is expected to be completed within two years. Using a process driven by the significance of the site and the interests of the Iraqi stakeholders, the project will identify the purposes for which the site will be conserved and managed, and specify goals and policies to direct, guide, and regulate future uses and interventions at the site. The SBAH has dedicated a group of professional staff to collaborate on the planning and fieldwork tasks for the Babylon project. This process will produce methodologies for site management to benefit heritage sites throughout Iraq.
WMF, which has worked for over 40 years with communities and countries around the world to support the conservation and preservation of endangered architectural and cultural heritage sites, will collaborate with the SBAH on the Babylon site management plan as part of a larger ongoing project, the Getty Conservation Institute-World Monuments Fund joint “Initiative to Conserve Iraqi Cultural Heritage.” Among the goals of the Babylon project will be the development of technologically and culturally appropriate conservation solutions that also meet international standards; incorporation of holistic preservation approaches embracing environmental, social and economic factors; and economic self-sufficiency. For more information, visit http://www.wmf.org/.
The Cultural Heritage Center of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs supports foreign affairs functions related to the preservation of cultural heritage. Since 2003, the Center has supported numerous projects directed at safeguarding Iraq's cultural heritage and is currently engaged in the Iraq Cultural Heritage Project to assist in the preservation of the ancient history of Iraq. For more information, visit http://exchanges.state.gov/chc.html.
2008/015
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
Russian Energy Supply Conflict: Domestic Resources Key To U.S. Energy Security
Russian Energy Supply Conflict: Further Evidence Domestic Resources Key To U.S. Energy Security
IER urges Congress to focus on America’s oil and natural gas resources in both energy and economic policies
Institute for Energy Research, Wednesday, January 7, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. —As the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee prepares to hold its first hearing on energy security tomorrow, Institute for Energy Research (IER) Senior Vice President for Policy Daniel Kish is reminding lawmakers that the answer to both our economic recovery and energy future lies in our nation’s vast domestic natural resources.
Russia’s sudden decision to shut off natural gas supply to neighboring Ukraine last week further reinforces the need to reduce U.S. reliance on unstable foreign regimes for oil and natural gas imports. As such, any effort by the 111th Congress to increase energy production at home would reduce America’s reliance on imported oil while simultaneously creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and providing a major boost to the national economy.
IER urges Congress to focus on America’s oil and natural gas resources in both energy and economic policies
Institute for Energy Research, Wednesday, January 7, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. —As the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee prepares to hold its first hearing on energy security tomorrow, Institute for Energy Research (IER) Senior Vice President for Policy Daniel Kish is reminding lawmakers that the answer to both our economic recovery and energy future lies in our nation’s vast domestic natural resources.
Russia’s sudden decision to shut off natural gas supply to neighboring Ukraine last week further reinforces the need to reduce U.S. reliance on unstable foreign regimes for oil and natural gas imports. As such, any effort by the 111th Congress to increase energy production at home would reduce America’s reliance on imported oil while simultaneously creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and providing a major boost to the national economy.
“With Congress beginning to map out an agenda to address our nation’s energy security, our lawmakers should consider the havoc wreaked last week by Russia’s abrupt decision to shut off the supply of natural gas to the Ukraine,” says Kish. “This rash action imperiled almost 20 percent of central Europe’s gas supplies — which must first pass through the Ukraine.
“As this overseas energy supply conflict illustrates, any plan to improve America’s energy security must involve reducing U.S. reliance on imports from unstable foreign regimes like Russia. While Europe may be forced to rely on Russia and other imported energy, the US has no excuse. North America is chock full of natural gas, conventional and unconventional oil and coal that can be cleanly converted to energy. With less than 4% of our governments’ lands leased for energy, Congress should be asking if we can afford to say ‘Nyet’ to domestic energy production. And that’s not the only reason Capitol Hill should act to expand access to our energy supplies here at home.
“Amid a faltering economy and rising unemployment rates, ‘job security’ has joined ‘energy security’ as one of many Americans’ top priorities.Fortunately, our domestic natural resources hold answers to the current recession too. Recent research shows that developing America’s oil and gas resources will create jobs, stimulate the economy, and generate massive revenues for taxpayers.
“Policies that encourage greater exploration and development of our nation’s vast energy resources will ensure that Americans are able to take control of their energy and financial future.”
Bombay attacks, Pakistan international duties
Pakistan’s Accountability and International Obligations, by S.R. Subramanian
IDSA, January 06, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
Taking into account domestic pressure for perceptible results, India has moved the “1267 Committee” of the UN Security Council to ban the Jamat-ud-Dawah, the predecessor of Lashkhar-e-Taiba, for its involvement in the [Bombay attacks, Dec 2008]. The world body had already on May 2, 2005 listed Lashkhar-e-Taiba as one of the “entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida”. Even before the Mumbai attacks, India had been demanding that the Jamat-ud-Dawah be brought under the purview of international measures (“Consolidated List”) but it could not materialize for evidentiary reasons. The Committee was not convinced of the available proof to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1390.
However, the startling revelations of the connections between the Lashkhar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawah in the aftermath of the attacks had forced the international community to proscribe the terrorist organization. As the decision goes, now Jamat-ud-Dawah with all its spellings and variations is considered an off-shoot of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba. Simultaneously, the entries of two other entities – al-Rashid Trust and al-Akhtar Trust International – are amended to include their disguised appearances. The Committee has also named four leaders of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba as “individuals associated with Al-Qaida”.
The listing under UNSC Resolution 1267 demands three specific actions: effective measures of assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. All members of the United Nations shall take measures to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of these individuals and entities including those derived from property owned or controlled by them or persons acting on their behalf, directly or indirectly. The proscribed individuals will also be prevented from entering into or transiting through the territories of other states. Significantly, the ban prevents the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materials of all types including technical advice and assistance to these individuals and entities within their territories or by their nationals outside their territories.
However, Pakistan placed Hafiz Saeed, only one of the four listed individuals, under house arrest for three months and technically froze the bank account after all the monies were flushed out. It does not appear that Pakistan is actively and decisively acting against the terrorists who have committed crimes against humanity and threatened regional tranquillity.
Though Pakistan had already placed Jamat-ud-Dawah on the Watch List in 2003, but still allowed it to generate financial resources through the hawala route. Jamat-ud-Dawah has heavily invested in the establishment of model schools and dispensaries. Pakistan should remind itself that the provision of assets freeze under Paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 is not only limited to those existing assets but applies to any other funds, economic resources that may be available to such person’s benefit by their nationals or by persons within their territory.
Moreover, Pakistan is insisting on ‘credible information and evidence’ for further action at its end, ostensibly to fulfil the requirements of domestic laws and procedure. However, a cursory reading of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2001 (reportedly in force) would show that the standard of proof demanded of the action is not onerous. Section 11A empowers the federal government to ban any organization and to take up consequent measures if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the organization is ‘concerned in terrorism’. Hence, it is clear that the judgment of the executive will prevail over the legal process of enforcement. Also, the report of a leading international non- governmental organization made an assessment that Pakistan has done very little in the area of counter terrorism despite obligations under Resolution 1373.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan is failing in its international obligations. It should remind itself that UN Security Council 1373 obligates it to not only to refrain from providing any form of support, but to prevent the use of its territories against other states or their citizens. If it can be established that Pakistan had supported terrorist groups, this may represent a breach of international obligations and may be held accountable.
S.R. Subramanian is working as an Assistant Professor at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Chhattisgarh and was with the Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC), Vienna.
IDSA, January 06, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
Taking into account domestic pressure for perceptible results, India has moved the “1267 Committee” of the UN Security Council to ban the Jamat-ud-Dawah, the predecessor of Lashkhar-e-Taiba, for its involvement in the [Bombay attacks, Dec 2008]. The world body had already on May 2, 2005 listed Lashkhar-e-Taiba as one of the “entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida”. Even before the Mumbai attacks, India had been demanding that the Jamat-ud-Dawah be brought under the purview of international measures (“Consolidated List”) but it could not materialize for evidentiary reasons. The Committee was not convinced of the available proof to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1390.
However, the startling revelations of the connections between the Lashkhar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawah in the aftermath of the attacks had forced the international community to proscribe the terrorist organization. As the decision goes, now Jamat-ud-Dawah with all its spellings and variations is considered an off-shoot of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba. Simultaneously, the entries of two other entities – al-Rashid Trust and al-Akhtar Trust International – are amended to include their disguised appearances. The Committee has also named four leaders of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba as “individuals associated with Al-Qaida”.
The listing under UNSC Resolution 1267 demands three specific actions: effective measures of assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. All members of the United Nations shall take measures to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of these individuals and entities including those derived from property owned or controlled by them or persons acting on their behalf, directly or indirectly. The proscribed individuals will also be prevented from entering into or transiting through the territories of other states. Significantly, the ban prevents the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materials of all types including technical advice and assistance to these individuals and entities within their territories or by their nationals outside their territories.
However, Pakistan placed Hafiz Saeed, only one of the four listed individuals, under house arrest for three months and technically froze the bank account after all the monies were flushed out. It does not appear that Pakistan is actively and decisively acting against the terrorists who have committed crimes against humanity and threatened regional tranquillity.
Though Pakistan had already placed Jamat-ud-Dawah on the Watch List in 2003, but still allowed it to generate financial resources through the hawala route. Jamat-ud-Dawah has heavily invested in the establishment of model schools and dispensaries. Pakistan should remind itself that the provision of assets freeze under Paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 is not only limited to those existing assets but applies to any other funds, economic resources that may be available to such person’s benefit by their nationals or by persons within their territory.
Moreover, Pakistan is insisting on ‘credible information and evidence’ for further action at its end, ostensibly to fulfil the requirements of domestic laws and procedure. However, a cursory reading of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2001 (reportedly in force) would show that the standard of proof demanded of the action is not onerous. Section 11A empowers the federal government to ban any organization and to take up consequent measures if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the organization is ‘concerned in terrorism’. Hence, it is clear that the judgment of the executive will prevail over the legal process of enforcement. Also, the report of a leading international non- governmental organization made an assessment that Pakistan has done very little in the area of counter terrorism despite obligations under Resolution 1373.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan is failing in its international obligations. It should remind itself that UN Security Council 1373 obligates it to not only to refrain from providing any form of support, but to prevent the use of its territories against other states or their citizens. If it can be established that Pakistan had supported terrorist groups, this may represent a breach of international obligations and may be held accountable.
S.R. Subramanian is working as an Assistant Professor at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Chhattisgarh and was with the Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC), Vienna.
Richard Perle on Bush guidance and autonomous behaviour of the Administration
Ambushed on the Potomac, by Richard Perle
National Interest, Jan 06, 2009
Full text w/references: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20486
FOR EIGHT years George W. Bush pulled the levers of government—sometimes frantically—never realizing that they were disconnected from the machinery and the exertion was largely futile. As a result, the foreign and security policies declared by the president in speeches, in public and private meetings, in backgrounders and memoranda often had little or no effect on the activities of the sprawling bureaucracies charged with carrying out the president’s policies. They didn’t need his directives: they had their own.
Again and again the president declared “unacceptable” activities that his administration went on to accept: North Korean nuclear weapons; North Korean missile tests; Iran’s nuclear-weapons program; the Russian invasion of Georgia; genocide in Sudan; Syrian and Iranian support for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere—the list is long. Throughout his presidency, Bush demanded that these states change their ways. When they declined to do so, policy shifted to an unanchored, foundering diplomacy engineered by a diplomatic establishment, unencumbered, especially in the second term, by even the weak, largely useless scrutiny it had come to expect from the National Security Council. When Condoleezza Rice moved to the Department of State, the gamekeeper (however ineffective) turned poacher, and the Bush presidency—its credibility gravely diminished—became indistinguishable from the institutional worldview of the State Department. There it remains today.
Those who expect an Obama foreign policy to differ significantly from the most recent policy of the outgoing administration will be surprised by what is likely to be a seamless transition: not from White House to White House, but from State Department to State Department. On all the main issues—Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, Islamist terrorism, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, relations with allies—Obama’s first term is likely to look like Bush’s second.
It will not be easy to assess objectively the foreign and security policy of the Bush administration anytime soon. Its central feature, the war in Iraq, has generated emotions that all but preclude rational discourse. And it will be nearly impossible to persuade those whose minds are made up—often on the basis of tendentious reporting and reckless blogs—to reconsider what they firmly believe they know. Too much has been written and said that is wildly inaccurate and too many of those who have expressed judgments have done so, not as disinterested observers, but as partisan participants in a rancorous debate. Nevertheless, I have tried in what follows to offer a view of what the Bush policy was in the beginning and what it became in the end.
I SHOULD say at once that while I believe Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy, I also believe he got some very large issues right, especially the immediate response to 9/11 and a still-developing strategy for countering terrorism. And, right or wrong, he acted honestly and courageously, doing what he thought necessary to protect the country that elected him and the Constitution to which he swore fidelity. The charge that he lied about Iraq is itself a lie, and an unrelenting effort to show he was untruthful has not produced a shred of evidence. Guileless to a fault, George W. Bush has been among the most straightforward American presidents in my lifetime. And, contrary to his critics, he was far less inclined to play politics with national security than either his predecessors or his opponents in Congress. Becoming president at a moment of unprecedented American primacy, he could not have anticipated that he would lead a White House at war, a fractious, dysfunctional executive branch and a deeply divided nation.
[...]
UNDERSTANDING BUSH’S foreign and defense policy requires clarity about its origins and the thinking behind the administration’s key decisions. That means rejecting the false claim that the decision to remove Saddam, and Bush policies generally, were made or significantly influenced by a few neoconservative “ideologues” who are most often described as having hidden their agenda of imperial ambition or the imposition of democracy by force or the promotion of Israeli interests at the expense of American ones or the reshaping of the Middle East for oil—or all of the above. Despite its seemingly endless repetition by politicians, academics, journalists and bloggers, that is not a serious argument.
I may have missed something, but I know of no statement, public or private, by any neoconservative in or near government, advocating the invasion of Iraq primarily for the purpose of promoting democracy or advancing some grand neoconservative vision. As for oil, most neoconservatives believe in markets and think the best way to obtain oil is to buy it. And as for Israeli interests, well, the Israelis, who believed that Iran posed the greater threat, were strongly and often vociferously against the United States going into Iraq.
There are, however, a great many wrenched-from-context or even fabricated quotations in circulation. They are easy to spot since they are never sourced.1 Sometimes the attempt to defend these insupportable claims is laughable, as when Vice President Dick Cheney is first misrepresented and then described as a “neoconservative,” or when two subcabinet Defense Department officials, the vice president’s national-security adviser, one or two members of the NSC staff and a handful of commentators are said to have bamboozled the president, the vice president, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On the Left, George Packer’s Assassins Gate and Jacob Heilbrunn’s They Knew They Were Right share an obsession with neoconservative influence, but they fail utterly to describe or document that influence. The same is true of much of what has appeared in the New York Times, Vanity Fair, the Guardian and the New Yorker, among others. Pat Buchanan and his acolytes on the Right mirror the Left’s obsession, along with Lyndon LaRouche, David Duke, Paul Craig Roberts and any number of conspiracy theorists. This neoconservative conspiracy is nonsense, of course, and no serious observer of the Bush administration would argue such a thing, not least because there is not, and cannot be, any evidence to substantiate it.
So if it was not a neocon master plan, how did we end up invading Iraq? What were the considerations that led Bush to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime by force? What was the role of neoconservatives in his decision to go to war in Iraq? Many people believe they know the answer to these questions because so much has been written, with seeming authority, by so many commentators. Could 50 million blogs be wrong?
I BELIEVE that Bush went to war for the reasons—and only the reasons—he gave at the time: because he believed Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States that was far greater than the likely cost of removing him from power. To recall his thinking we must go back to 9/11—which was, for Bush’s foreign and security policy, the beginning of time.
The shock of 9/11 was followed by the chilling realization that the people who killed three thousand Americans that day would inflict even more damage if they had the means and opportunity. Within the government it was widely believed that 9/11 had been incubating for twelve to eighteen months and that at any given time al-Qaeda was working on multiple schemes to kill Americans. Were there other plots in preparation? What were the most serious immediate threats? And what could we do to protect against them?
Destroying the sanctuary that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan was essential and so became the first order of business. With it, al-Qaeda could plan, recruit, train, communicate, and manage the intelligence, logistics, and organization that 9/11 and its possible successors required. Without a sanctuary, al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out another 9/11 would be greatly diminished. Moreover, the destruction of the Taliban regime would send a signal to other governments that allowed terrorists to operate from their territory: we would no longer regard terrorist acts of mass murder as crimes to be dealt with by the institutions of law enforcement alone. A state found to be complicit in, or even hospitable to, acts of terror would be treated harshly. As the president put it: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” With a sustained effort to discourage the granting of sanctuary or other forms of assistance to terrorists, a threat that could not be wiped out could at least be diminished.
The president’s approach, later elaborated, took shape on 9/11 itself, when he advanced a new policy just hours after the attack. He said, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”2
I believe these will turn out to have been the most important words of the Bush presidency. No longer would we respond to acts of terror solely by chasing the individuals who pulled the triggers. They could move; they could hide—and there was a generous supply of would-be martyrs waiting for their turn to kill and die. No longer would we watch as our troops, our citizens, our embassies, our ships and now our homeland came under attack. We would strike back at those who harbored terrorists—at governments that could neither run nor hide, but that could certainly be replaced.
I believe the decision to respond to 9/11 by removing the Taliban regime was right. Predictions about the “Arab street” rising up against us proved to be wrong. Al-Qaeda was driven into hiding and the people of Afghanistan, especially Afghan women, were liberated from a brutal, repressive Taliban regime. I also believe the subsequent decision to remove Saddam Hussein was right. In neither case were the considerations “ideological,” not for the president or vice president, not for the secretaries of state and defense, not for the national-security adviser—not for neoconservatives and certainly not for me. Let me explain.
OUR PRE-9/11 concept of security assumed that terrorists wished to survive their attacks. Al-Qaeda’s recruitment and training of suicidal terrorists eager for martyrdom meant that would have to change. The main concern was understood immediately: if men with box cutters could kill three thousand people, what could they do with weapons of mass destruction? What if nuclear weapons or radioactive material or chemical or biological agents wound up in the hands of terrorists eager to die as they committed mass murder? The possibility of a future attack with tens or hundreds of thousands of victims had to be taken seriously.
So the administration did the obvious: it made up a list of hostile states thought to possess WMD and set about developing plans to protect against their use either directly or, more ominously, if made available to terrorists. Heading the list was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Alone among heads of state, Saddam had cheered the attacks of 9/11. He had a long history of building WMD, actually using nerve gas in attacks against Kurdish civilians and Iranian troops. He had successfully concealed a nuclear-weapons program found, after the Gulf War in 1991, to be far more advanced than had been suspected—even though Iraq was then under IAEA international inspections. After defecting in 1995, Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, revealed a well-concealed chemical-and-biological-weapons program, directing us to a stash of documents hidden on a chicken farm.
Those following Iraq, both UN inspectors and American and allied intelligence organizations, reported a history of Saddam’s deceit and deception. Components of WMD that were known to have been produced or imported could not be accounted for. On one occasion we were able to photograph boxes being loaded onto trucks at the back entrance to a military installation while UN inspectors were prevented from entering at the front. The presumption that what could not be audited had been hidden, though later proved incorrect, was logical and widely accepted.
The former–UN arms inspector David Kay told me he was never able to surprise the Iraqis—they always learned inspectors were en route well before the UN could hope to arrive in time to catch them red-handed. During the time Bush was thinking about whether to remove Saddam, the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies were certain that he possessed WMD. I have often been critical of the CIA. But in this case everything seemed to point toward a concealed Iraqi program.
In any case, the salient issue was not whether Saddam had stockpiles of WMD but whether he could produce them and place them in the hands of terrorists. The administration’s appalling inability to explain that this is what it was thinking and doing allowed the unearthing of stockpiles to become the test of whether it had correctly assessed the risk that Saddam might provide WMD to terrorists. When none were found, the administration appeared to have failed the test even though considerable evidence of Saddam’s capability to produce WMD was found in postwar inspections by the Iraq Survey Group chaired by Charles Duelfer.
I am not alone in having been asked, “If you knew that Saddam did not have WMD, would you still have supported invading Iraq?” But what appears to some to be a “gotcha” question actually misses the point. The decision to remove Saddam stands or falls on one’s judgment at the time the decision was made, and with the information then available, about how to manage the risk that he would facilitate a catastrophic attack on the United States. To say the decision to remove him was mistaken because stockpiles of WMD were never found is akin to saying that it was a mistake to buy fire insurance last year because your house didn’t burn down or health insurance because you didn’t become ill. No one would take seriously the question, “Would you have bought Enron stock if you had known it would go down?” and no one should take seriously the facile conclusion that invading Iraq was mistaken because we now know Saddam did not possess stockpiles of WMD.
Bush might have decided differently: that the safer course was to leave Saddam in place and hope he would not cause or enable the use of WMD against the United States. How would we now assess his presidency if, say, Iraqi anthrax had later been used to kill thousands of Americans? He would have been accused—rightly in my view—of having taken a foolish risk by not acting against a regime we had good reason to consider extremely dangerous. (And no one would be so stupid as to ask: Would you have left Saddam in place if you had known he was going to supply anthrax to terrorists?)
THE REASON for dwelling on the question of risk management is because it explains why the administration decided as it did, and why many of us who supported and even urged that decision agreed with it. I, for one, was taught long ago to weigh the risks in these matters as objectively as possible and always to consider the consequences of a wrong choice. Between going to war to end Saddam’s regime and leaving him in place, I believed that war was, unhappily, the prudent choice for managing the risks we faced.3
The administration’s view, which I shared, was that few Iraqis would fight for Saddam while most would consider themselves liberated from the long nightmare of his reign of terror. I expected a quick victory and thought the cost was justified compared to the risk of another terrorist attack, this time with chemical or biological weapons.
When war came, Baghdad fell in twenty-one days with few casualties on either side. For several months thereafter there was relative calm. Sadly, the sense of liberation was squandered as the quick victory was followed by shockingly inept post-Saddam policies. The seminal error was, in my view, the failure to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam’s regime collapsed. History does not allow instant replays so we will never know whether that policy could have averted the disastrous insurgency—carried out by Saddam loyalists and foreign jihadists—sustained by terror, the incitement of confessional and ethnic divisions, and outside assistance. Had Iraq been enabled to stand up an interim government pending free elections to be held in, say, eighteen months, we might well have escaped the invidious role of an occupier. In blundering from liberation to occupation, we opened the way to nearly five years of suffering that only now, with the progress of the “surge,” is finally subsiding.
The administration’s failure to trust Iraqis with their own future was well-meaning—and yet arrogant. We sent thousands of Americans to Baghdad’s “green zone,” volunteers eager to help build a new Iraq—often in our image. Many had to secure passports because they had never been abroad; when they got there, most never left the protected area. Few knew anything of Iraq, its history or its culture.
Believing that we knew how to do things better than the Iraqis, we sidelined them, refused their counsel and frequently vetoed their ideas. A perfect example: when L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad to head the Coalition Provisional Authority he told Iraqi leaders, most of whom had long opposed Saddam from outside (or from the Kurdish north which was not under Saddam’s control), that he was in charge and the most he expected from them was advice, which he might or might not accept.
I believe the decision to attempt a comprehensive occupation of Iraq was the worst and most fateful of many mistakes. That decision followed a bureaucratic victory by the State Department, the CIA and the NSC that defeated proposals by Defense Department officials for a quick handover. (In fact, the Defense Department had actually supported training, preparing and equipping Iraqi exiles even before the invasion.) But then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, his deputy Richard Armitage and then–CIA Director George Tenet strongly opposed working with the Iraqi opposition both before and after the invasion. They distrusted long-time opponents of Saddam’s regime (many of whom have now emerged as Iraq’s political leadership). They waged a malicious campaign against the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a broad coalition umbrella group of Saddam’s opponents, in part because they intensely disliked the INC chairman, Ahmad Chalabi. A group of lesser officials, including State Department and CIA officers seconded to the NSC, joined them in sinking policy initiatives that might have enabled us to return Iraq quickly to the Iraqis. Condi Rice, then national-security adviser, was passive and indecisive. The result was an occupation that proved tragic for Americans and Iraqis alike.
A second mistake of immense importance was the policy of dealing with Iraq in isolation. It was clear from the beginning that the problem of Saddam’s Iraq was in fact a broader, regional problem: only with well-integrated strategies for Iran and Syria (and beyond) could we hope to deal effectively with post-Saddam Iraq. But no such integrated strategy was forthcoming; while the president asked repeatedly for one to be developed, it never was.
Of course, responsibility for an ill-advised occupation and an inadequate regional strategy ultimately lies with President Bush himself. He failed to oversee the post-Saddam strategy, intervening only sporadically when things had deteriorated to the point where confidence in cabinet-level management could no longer be sustained. He did finally assert presidential authority when he rejected the defeatist advice of the Baker-Hamilton commission and Condi Rice’s State Department, ordering instead the “surge,” a decision that he surely hopes will eclipse the dismal period from 2004 to January 2007. But that is but one victory for the White House among many failures at Langley, at the Pentagon and in Foggy Bottom.
I BELIEVE the cost of removing Saddam and achieving a stable future for Iraq has turned out to be very much higher than it should have been, and certainly higher than it was reasonable to expect.
But about the many mistakes made in Iraq, one thing is certain: they had nothing to do with ideology. They did not draw inspiration from or reflect neoconservative ideas and they were not the product of philosophical or ideological influences outside the government.
Some of the confusion on this point undoubtedly stems from the president’s rhetoric in 2002 and 2003, especially as it related to democracy in Iraq (claimed by critics a cornerstone of the neoconservative agenda). As Douglas Feith, described (wrongly) by his detractors as another “architect” of the war, has observed, Bush’s rhetoric on our mission in Iraq shifted dramatically after we concluded that WMD would not be found. The president’s emphasis on the benefits of bringing democracy to Iraq—for Iraqis and the region—began in the fall of 2003, six months after the invasion. In his excellent War and Decision, which stands out for its rich documentation and attention to context, Feith demonstrates that shift convincingly. The statistics are striking: from September 2002 until July 1, 2003, the number of paragraphs in Bush’s speeches and events that referred to the threat from Saddam averaged 13.7 while the number referring to Iraqi democracy averaged 3.4. From September 7, 2003, until September 2004 the threat was referred to an average of 1.1 times while references to democracy averaged 10.6 times per speech or event. Embarrassed and defensive about the absence of WMD stockpiles, the White House simply decided to change the subject.
The decision to go to war, judgments about prewar intelligence, decisions on the conduct of the war and its aftermath, the assessment of personalities in Iraq, the choice of the military and civilian leadership in and responsible for Iraq—none of these reflected anything that could properly be called an ideology. They were, rather, prudential judgments, pragmatic decisions—though sometimes ill-advised—made by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national-security adviser and the senior military and intelligence leadership.
THE SENIOR officials responsible for policy formation were advised by a small army of civil servants, some of whom had strong opinions and deep prejudices. These opinions and prejudices—of which the hostility to working with the Iraqi opposition is an important example—had a far greater influence on administration policies than any philosophy, ideology or doctrine.
Early in 2003 one senior foreign-service officer answered my question, “How many of your colleagues at the State Department share the president’s views on foreign policy?” with a quick and confident, “About 15 percent.” The number may well have been even smaller at the CIA, which made egregious intelligence errors and then applied its skill at tweaking and leaking to undermine the president who acted on its advice.4
Sometime early in the second term a wise and experienced journalist, himself critical of the administration, returned from visits to London, Paris, Berlin and Rome and told me that he was astonished at how blatantly our senior embassy officials—sent abroad to implement the government’s foreign policy—openly denounced it, frequently to, or in the presence of, foreign officials, opinion leaders and the press.5 Never in my experience—maybe never, period—has the resulting disconnect between a president’s policies and beliefs and the actions of his administration been so profound, so prolonged and so consequential.
The hijacking of foreign policy simply did not stop at Iraq’s borders. And I believe this disconnect between the president and his appointees explains the glaring inconsistencies of much of the Bush administration’s policy stance: tough talk on Iran, Syria and North Korea, followed by debilitating inaction. The soaring rhetoric about encouraging democracy, “implemented” with winks and nods by bureaucracies content to take favored dictatorships as we find them. Perhaps in one of the most egregious examples, consider Bush’s radically new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. His speech of June 24, 2002, put forward a new American policy, pledging for the first time to support a Palestinian state provided the Palestinians elected “new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” and built “a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.” In only ten months this was neatly transformed by the State Department into yet another version of its preferred, well-worn “land for peace” policy. It is not clear whether the president understood that the “road map” substituted for, and effectively killed, his push for a new policy. This is why Obama’s promise of “change” at least on the foreign-policy front may be greatly exaggerated.
If ever there were a security policy that lacked philosophical underpinnings, it was that of the Bush administration. Whenever the president attempted to lay out a philosophy, as in his argument for encouraging the freedom of expression and dissent that might advance democratic institutions abroad, it was throttled in its infancy by opponents within and outside the administration.
I BELIEVE Bush ultimately failed to grasp the demands of the American presidency. He saw himself (MBA that he was) as a chief executive whose job was to give broad direction that would then be automatically translated into specific policies and faithfully implemented by the departments of the executive branch. I doubt that such an approach could be made to work. But without a team that shared his ideas and a determination to see them realized, there was no chance he could succeed. His carefully drafted, often eloquent speeches, intended as marching orders, were seldom developed into concrete policies. And when his ideas ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the executive departments, as they often did, debilitating compromise was the result: the president spoke the words and the departments pronounced the policies.
Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the Reagan administration, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
National Interest, Jan 06, 2009
Full text w/references: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20486
FOR EIGHT years George W. Bush pulled the levers of government—sometimes frantically—never realizing that they were disconnected from the machinery and the exertion was largely futile. As a result, the foreign and security policies declared by the president in speeches, in public and private meetings, in backgrounders and memoranda often had little or no effect on the activities of the sprawling bureaucracies charged with carrying out the president’s policies. They didn’t need his directives: they had their own.
Again and again the president declared “unacceptable” activities that his administration went on to accept: North Korean nuclear weapons; North Korean missile tests; Iran’s nuclear-weapons program; the Russian invasion of Georgia; genocide in Sudan; Syrian and Iranian support for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere—the list is long. Throughout his presidency, Bush demanded that these states change their ways. When they declined to do so, policy shifted to an unanchored, foundering diplomacy engineered by a diplomatic establishment, unencumbered, especially in the second term, by even the weak, largely useless scrutiny it had come to expect from the National Security Council. When Condoleezza Rice moved to the Department of State, the gamekeeper (however ineffective) turned poacher, and the Bush presidency—its credibility gravely diminished—became indistinguishable from the institutional worldview of the State Department. There it remains today.
Those who expect an Obama foreign policy to differ significantly from the most recent policy of the outgoing administration will be surprised by what is likely to be a seamless transition: not from White House to White House, but from State Department to State Department. On all the main issues—Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, Islamist terrorism, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, relations with allies—Obama’s first term is likely to look like Bush’s second.
It will not be easy to assess objectively the foreign and security policy of the Bush administration anytime soon. Its central feature, the war in Iraq, has generated emotions that all but preclude rational discourse. And it will be nearly impossible to persuade those whose minds are made up—often on the basis of tendentious reporting and reckless blogs—to reconsider what they firmly believe they know. Too much has been written and said that is wildly inaccurate and too many of those who have expressed judgments have done so, not as disinterested observers, but as partisan participants in a rancorous debate. Nevertheless, I have tried in what follows to offer a view of what the Bush policy was in the beginning and what it became in the end.
I SHOULD say at once that while I believe Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy, I also believe he got some very large issues right, especially the immediate response to 9/11 and a still-developing strategy for countering terrorism. And, right or wrong, he acted honestly and courageously, doing what he thought necessary to protect the country that elected him and the Constitution to which he swore fidelity. The charge that he lied about Iraq is itself a lie, and an unrelenting effort to show he was untruthful has not produced a shred of evidence. Guileless to a fault, George W. Bush has been among the most straightforward American presidents in my lifetime. And, contrary to his critics, he was far less inclined to play politics with national security than either his predecessors or his opponents in Congress. Becoming president at a moment of unprecedented American primacy, he could not have anticipated that he would lead a White House at war, a fractious, dysfunctional executive branch and a deeply divided nation.
[...]
UNDERSTANDING BUSH’S foreign and defense policy requires clarity about its origins and the thinking behind the administration’s key decisions. That means rejecting the false claim that the decision to remove Saddam, and Bush policies generally, were made or significantly influenced by a few neoconservative “ideologues” who are most often described as having hidden their agenda of imperial ambition or the imposition of democracy by force or the promotion of Israeli interests at the expense of American ones or the reshaping of the Middle East for oil—or all of the above. Despite its seemingly endless repetition by politicians, academics, journalists and bloggers, that is not a serious argument.
I may have missed something, but I know of no statement, public or private, by any neoconservative in or near government, advocating the invasion of Iraq primarily for the purpose of promoting democracy or advancing some grand neoconservative vision. As for oil, most neoconservatives believe in markets and think the best way to obtain oil is to buy it. And as for Israeli interests, well, the Israelis, who believed that Iran posed the greater threat, were strongly and often vociferously against the United States going into Iraq.
There are, however, a great many wrenched-from-context or even fabricated quotations in circulation. They are easy to spot since they are never sourced.1 Sometimes the attempt to defend these insupportable claims is laughable, as when Vice President Dick Cheney is first misrepresented and then described as a “neoconservative,” or when two subcabinet Defense Department officials, the vice president’s national-security adviser, one or two members of the NSC staff and a handful of commentators are said to have bamboozled the president, the vice president, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On the Left, George Packer’s Assassins Gate and Jacob Heilbrunn’s They Knew They Were Right share an obsession with neoconservative influence, but they fail utterly to describe or document that influence. The same is true of much of what has appeared in the New York Times, Vanity Fair, the Guardian and the New Yorker, among others. Pat Buchanan and his acolytes on the Right mirror the Left’s obsession, along with Lyndon LaRouche, David Duke, Paul Craig Roberts and any number of conspiracy theorists. This neoconservative conspiracy is nonsense, of course, and no serious observer of the Bush administration would argue such a thing, not least because there is not, and cannot be, any evidence to substantiate it.
So if it was not a neocon master plan, how did we end up invading Iraq? What were the considerations that led Bush to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime by force? What was the role of neoconservatives in his decision to go to war in Iraq? Many people believe they know the answer to these questions because so much has been written, with seeming authority, by so many commentators. Could 50 million blogs be wrong?
I BELIEVE that Bush went to war for the reasons—and only the reasons—he gave at the time: because he believed Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States that was far greater than the likely cost of removing him from power. To recall his thinking we must go back to 9/11—which was, for Bush’s foreign and security policy, the beginning of time.
The shock of 9/11 was followed by the chilling realization that the people who killed three thousand Americans that day would inflict even more damage if they had the means and opportunity. Within the government it was widely believed that 9/11 had been incubating for twelve to eighteen months and that at any given time al-Qaeda was working on multiple schemes to kill Americans. Were there other plots in preparation? What were the most serious immediate threats? And what could we do to protect against them?
Destroying the sanctuary that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan was essential and so became the first order of business. With it, al-Qaeda could plan, recruit, train, communicate, and manage the intelligence, logistics, and organization that 9/11 and its possible successors required. Without a sanctuary, al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out another 9/11 would be greatly diminished. Moreover, the destruction of the Taliban regime would send a signal to other governments that allowed terrorists to operate from their territory: we would no longer regard terrorist acts of mass murder as crimes to be dealt with by the institutions of law enforcement alone. A state found to be complicit in, or even hospitable to, acts of terror would be treated harshly. As the president put it: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” With a sustained effort to discourage the granting of sanctuary or other forms of assistance to terrorists, a threat that could not be wiped out could at least be diminished.
The president’s approach, later elaborated, took shape on 9/11 itself, when he advanced a new policy just hours after the attack. He said, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”2
I believe these will turn out to have been the most important words of the Bush presidency. No longer would we respond to acts of terror solely by chasing the individuals who pulled the triggers. They could move; they could hide—and there was a generous supply of would-be martyrs waiting for their turn to kill and die. No longer would we watch as our troops, our citizens, our embassies, our ships and now our homeland came under attack. We would strike back at those who harbored terrorists—at governments that could neither run nor hide, but that could certainly be replaced.
I believe the decision to respond to 9/11 by removing the Taliban regime was right. Predictions about the “Arab street” rising up against us proved to be wrong. Al-Qaeda was driven into hiding and the people of Afghanistan, especially Afghan women, were liberated from a brutal, repressive Taliban regime. I also believe the subsequent decision to remove Saddam Hussein was right. In neither case were the considerations “ideological,” not for the president or vice president, not for the secretaries of state and defense, not for the national-security adviser—not for neoconservatives and certainly not for me. Let me explain.
OUR PRE-9/11 concept of security assumed that terrorists wished to survive their attacks. Al-Qaeda’s recruitment and training of suicidal terrorists eager for martyrdom meant that would have to change. The main concern was understood immediately: if men with box cutters could kill three thousand people, what could they do with weapons of mass destruction? What if nuclear weapons or radioactive material or chemical or biological agents wound up in the hands of terrorists eager to die as they committed mass murder? The possibility of a future attack with tens or hundreds of thousands of victims had to be taken seriously.
So the administration did the obvious: it made up a list of hostile states thought to possess WMD and set about developing plans to protect against their use either directly or, more ominously, if made available to terrorists. Heading the list was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Alone among heads of state, Saddam had cheered the attacks of 9/11. He had a long history of building WMD, actually using nerve gas in attacks against Kurdish civilians and Iranian troops. He had successfully concealed a nuclear-weapons program found, after the Gulf War in 1991, to be far more advanced than had been suspected—even though Iraq was then under IAEA international inspections. After defecting in 1995, Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, revealed a well-concealed chemical-and-biological-weapons program, directing us to a stash of documents hidden on a chicken farm.
Those following Iraq, both UN inspectors and American and allied intelligence organizations, reported a history of Saddam’s deceit and deception. Components of WMD that were known to have been produced or imported could not be accounted for. On one occasion we were able to photograph boxes being loaded onto trucks at the back entrance to a military installation while UN inspectors were prevented from entering at the front. The presumption that what could not be audited had been hidden, though later proved incorrect, was logical and widely accepted.
The former–UN arms inspector David Kay told me he was never able to surprise the Iraqis—they always learned inspectors were en route well before the UN could hope to arrive in time to catch them red-handed. During the time Bush was thinking about whether to remove Saddam, the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies were certain that he possessed WMD. I have often been critical of the CIA. But in this case everything seemed to point toward a concealed Iraqi program.
In any case, the salient issue was not whether Saddam had stockpiles of WMD but whether he could produce them and place them in the hands of terrorists. The administration’s appalling inability to explain that this is what it was thinking and doing allowed the unearthing of stockpiles to become the test of whether it had correctly assessed the risk that Saddam might provide WMD to terrorists. When none were found, the administration appeared to have failed the test even though considerable evidence of Saddam’s capability to produce WMD was found in postwar inspections by the Iraq Survey Group chaired by Charles Duelfer.
I am not alone in having been asked, “If you knew that Saddam did not have WMD, would you still have supported invading Iraq?” But what appears to some to be a “gotcha” question actually misses the point. The decision to remove Saddam stands or falls on one’s judgment at the time the decision was made, and with the information then available, about how to manage the risk that he would facilitate a catastrophic attack on the United States. To say the decision to remove him was mistaken because stockpiles of WMD were never found is akin to saying that it was a mistake to buy fire insurance last year because your house didn’t burn down or health insurance because you didn’t become ill. No one would take seriously the question, “Would you have bought Enron stock if you had known it would go down?” and no one should take seriously the facile conclusion that invading Iraq was mistaken because we now know Saddam did not possess stockpiles of WMD.
Bush might have decided differently: that the safer course was to leave Saddam in place and hope he would not cause or enable the use of WMD against the United States. How would we now assess his presidency if, say, Iraqi anthrax had later been used to kill thousands of Americans? He would have been accused—rightly in my view—of having taken a foolish risk by not acting against a regime we had good reason to consider extremely dangerous. (And no one would be so stupid as to ask: Would you have left Saddam in place if you had known he was going to supply anthrax to terrorists?)
THE REASON for dwelling on the question of risk management is because it explains why the administration decided as it did, and why many of us who supported and even urged that decision agreed with it. I, for one, was taught long ago to weigh the risks in these matters as objectively as possible and always to consider the consequences of a wrong choice. Between going to war to end Saddam’s regime and leaving him in place, I believed that war was, unhappily, the prudent choice for managing the risks we faced.3
The administration’s view, which I shared, was that few Iraqis would fight for Saddam while most would consider themselves liberated from the long nightmare of his reign of terror. I expected a quick victory and thought the cost was justified compared to the risk of another terrorist attack, this time with chemical or biological weapons.
When war came, Baghdad fell in twenty-one days with few casualties on either side. For several months thereafter there was relative calm. Sadly, the sense of liberation was squandered as the quick victory was followed by shockingly inept post-Saddam policies. The seminal error was, in my view, the failure to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam’s regime collapsed. History does not allow instant replays so we will never know whether that policy could have averted the disastrous insurgency—carried out by Saddam loyalists and foreign jihadists—sustained by terror, the incitement of confessional and ethnic divisions, and outside assistance. Had Iraq been enabled to stand up an interim government pending free elections to be held in, say, eighteen months, we might well have escaped the invidious role of an occupier. In blundering from liberation to occupation, we opened the way to nearly five years of suffering that only now, with the progress of the “surge,” is finally subsiding.
The administration’s failure to trust Iraqis with their own future was well-meaning—and yet arrogant. We sent thousands of Americans to Baghdad’s “green zone,” volunteers eager to help build a new Iraq—often in our image. Many had to secure passports because they had never been abroad; when they got there, most never left the protected area. Few knew anything of Iraq, its history or its culture.
Believing that we knew how to do things better than the Iraqis, we sidelined them, refused their counsel and frequently vetoed their ideas. A perfect example: when L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad to head the Coalition Provisional Authority he told Iraqi leaders, most of whom had long opposed Saddam from outside (or from the Kurdish north which was not under Saddam’s control), that he was in charge and the most he expected from them was advice, which he might or might not accept.
I believe the decision to attempt a comprehensive occupation of Iraq was the worst and most fateful of many mistakes. That decision followed a bureaucratic victory by the State Department, the CIA and the NSC that defeated proposals by Defense Department officials for a quick handover. (In fact, the Defense Department had actually supported training, preparing and equipping Iraqi exiles even before the invasion.) But then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, his deputy Richard Armitage and then–CIA Director George Tenet strongly opposed working with the Iraqi opposition both before and after the invasion. They distrusted long-time opponents of Saddam’s regime (many of whom have now emerged as Iraq’s political leadership). They waged a malicious campaign against the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a broad coalition umbrella group of Saddam’s opponents, in part because they intensely disliked the INC chairman, Ahmad Chalabi. A group of lesser officials, including State Department and CIA officers seconded to the NSC, joined them in sinking policy initiatives that might have enabled us to return Iraq quickly to the Iraqis. Condi Rice, then national-security adviser, was passive and indecisive. The result was an occupation that proved tragic for Americans and Iraqis alike.
A second mistake of immense importance was the policy of dealing with Iraq in isolation. It was clear from the beginning that the problem of Saddam’s Iraq was in fact a broader, regional problem: only with well-integrated strategies for Iran and Syria (and beyond) could we hope to deal effectively with post-Saddam Iraq. But no such integrated strategy was forthcoming; while the president asked repeatedly for one to be developed, it never was.
Of course, responsibility for an ill-advised occupation and an inadequate regional strategy ultimately lies with President Bush himself. He failed to oversee the post-Saddam strategy, intervening only sporadically when things had deteriorated to the point where confidence in cabinet-level management could no longer be sustained. He did finally assert presidential authority when he rejected the defeatist advice of the Baker-Hamilton commission and Condi Rice’s State Department, ordering instead the “surge,” a decision that he surely hopes will eclipse the dismal period from 2004 to January 2007. But that is but one victory for the White House among many failures at Langley, at the Pentagon and in Foggy Bottom.
I BELIEVE the cost of removing Saddam and achieving a stable future for Iraq has turned out to be very much higher than it should have been, and certainly higher than it was reasonable to expect.
But about the many mistakes made in Iraq, one thing is certain: they had nothing to do with ideology. They did not draw inspiration from or reflect neoconservative ideas and they were not the product of philosophical or ideological influences outside the government.
Some of the confusion on this point undoubtedly stems from the president’s rhetoric in 2002 and 2003, especially as it related to democracy in Iraq (claimed by critics a cornerstone of the neoconservative agenda). As Douglas Feith, described (wrongly) by his detractors as another “architect” of the war, has observed, Bush’s rhetoric on our mission in Iraq shifted dramatically after we concluded that WMD would not be found. The president’s emphasis on the benefits of bringing democracy to Iraq—for Iraqis and the region—began in the fall of 2003, six months after the invasion. In his excellent War and Decision, which stands out for its rich documentation and attention to context, Feith demonstrates that shift convincingly. The statistics are striking: from September 2002 until July 1, 2003, the number of paragraphs in Bush’s speeches and events that referred to the threat from Saddam averaged 13.7 while the number referring to Iraqi democracy averaged 3.4. From September 7, 2003, until September 2004 the threat was referred to an average of 1.1 times while references to democracy averaged 10.6 times per speech or event. Embarrassed and defensive about the absence of WMD stockpiles, the White House simply decided to change the subject.
The decision to go to war, judgments about prewar intelligence, decisions on the conduct of the war and its aftermath, the assessment of personalities in Iraq, the choice of the military and civilian leadership in and responsible for Iraq—none of these reflected anything that could properly be called an ideology. They were, rather, prudential judgments, pragmatic decisions—though sometimes ill-advised—made by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national-security adviser and the senior military and intelligence leadership.
THE SENIOR officials responsible for policy formation were advised by a small army of civil servants, some of whom had strong opinions and deep prejudices. These opinions and prejudices—of which the hostility to working with the Iraqi opposition is an important example—had a far greater influence on administration policies than any philosophy, ideology or doctrine.
Early in 2003 one senior foreign-service officer answered my question, “How many of your colleagues at the State Department share the president’s views on foreign policy?” with a quick and confident, “About 15 percent.” The number may well have been even smaller at the CIA, which made egregious intelligence errors and then applied its skill at tweaking and leaking to undermine the president who acted on its advice.4
Sometime early in the second term a wise and experienced journalist, himself critical of the administration, returned from visits to London, Paris, Berlin and Rome and told me that he was astonished at how blatantly our senior embassy officials—sent abroad to implement the government’s foreign policy—openly denounced it, frequently to, or in the presence of, foreign officials, opinion leaders and the press.5 Never in my experience—maybe never, period—has the resulting disconnect between a president’s policies and beliefs and the actions of his administration been so profound, so prolonged and so consequential.
The hijacking of foreign policy simply did not stop at Iraq’s borders. And I believe this disconnect between the president and his appointees explains the glaring inconsistencies of much of the Bush administration’s policy stance: tough talk on Iran, Syria and North Korea, followed by debilitating inaction. The soaring rhetoric about encouraging democracy, “implemented” with winks and nods by bureaucracies content to take favored dictatorships as we find them. Perhaps in one of the most egregious examples, consider Bush’s radically new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. His speech of June 24, 2002, put forward a new American policy, pledging for the first time to support a Palestinian state provided the Palestinians elected “new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” and built “a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.” In only ten months this was neatly transformed by the State Department into yet another version of its preferred, well-worn “land for peace” policy. It is not clear whether the president understood that the “road map” substituted for, and effectively killed, his push for a new policy. This is why Obama’s promise of “change” at least on the foreign-policy front may be greatly exaggerated.
If ever there were a security policy that lacked philosophical underpinnings, it was that of the Bush administration. Whenever the president attempted to lay out a philosophy, as in his argument for encouraging the freedom of expression and dissent that might advance democratic institutions abroad, it was throttled in its infancy by opponents within and outside the administration.
I BELIEVE Bush ultimately failed to grasp the demands of the American presidency. He saw himself (MBA that he was) as a chief executive whose job was to give broad direction that would then be automatically translated into specific policies and faithfully implemented by the departments of the executive branch. I doubt that such an approach could be made to work. But without a team that shared his ideas and a determination to see them realized, there was no chance he could succeed. His carefully drafted, often eloquent speeches, intended as marching orders, were seldom developed into concrete policies. And when his ideas ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the executive departments, as they often did, debilitating compromise was the result: the president spoke the words and the departments pronounced the policies.
Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the Reagan administration, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard On Biotech Opponents
Biotech Opponents Are Playing with Human Lives, by Till Behrend
Nobel laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard discusses the environmentalists' war against genetically modified food.
Pajamas Media, January 3, 2009
There is a specter haunting Europe: the specter of genetically modified foods. Although regularly consumed in the U.S. and around the world, in Europe GM foods are the target of veritable scare campaigns by environmental pressure groups and in the media. As a consequence, even GM crops that have been formally approved by the European Commission are the subject of increasing restrictions in Germany, France, and other European countries. GM crops — including such as have been planted merely for experimental purposes — are regularly destroyed by anti-GM militants in acts of would-be “civil disobedience.” Till Behrend of [1] the German weekly Focus spoke with the geneticist and Nobel Prize laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard about the sources of biotech-phobia.
John Rosenthal (Translator)
***
FOCUS: Professor Nüsslein-Volhard, farmers all around the world are cultivating genetically modified crops on an ever larger scale. But many Germans appear to be afraid of the new technology. Are they right to be?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Well, we Germans are always afraid of new things. But what are these people actually afraid about? They’re afraid that they will assimilate alien genes while eating genetically modified foods. But that’s nonsense. The genes are digested, broken down, and eliminated from the body just like in the case of traditional foods. This has been proven beyond any shadow of a doubt. The human genome is sequential and you can examine whether there are any cow genes or plant genes in there. Have no fear: there aren’t any.
FOCUS: What distinguishes, then, classically bred crops from genetically modified crops?
Nüsslein-Volhard: People seem to be unaware that practically all the grains and vegetables that we eat nowadays have been highly genetically modified as compared to their natural forms. There’s hardly any crop as artificial as a potato. In the wild, potatoes are tiny and highly poisonous. It took thousands of generations to turn the potato into a decent sort of food. In contrast to the classical development of new plant strains, “green” biotechnology has the advantage that with its help one can proceed much faster and in a much more targeted fashion.
FOCUS: It’s true that for plant breeders that might be a fine thing. But lots of people want to do what’s right for nature and for themselves, and consequently they insist on “organic” products.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Given our level of material well-being and the fertility of our soil, we can afford to do that. But actually that’s a snobby, elitist attitude. Organic farming cannot feed large cities. And it certainly cannot feed the world’s population. It’s not possible, since the yields of organic farming are too small and the area one has to plant is way too much. It really makes more sense to use the particularly rich fields that we have intensively and in a sustainable manner by planting high-yield crops. The environment benefits, too, since then we can return other fields to their natural state.
FOCUS: Nonetheless, organic farming is thought to stand for a more respectful treatment of the environment.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Wrongly. Or do you imagine perhaps that organic farming can do without the spraying of pesticides? On organic farms, too, one sprays pesticides constantly and all over the place! In this respect, genetic engineering really has more intelligent solutions to offer. For example, with the help of genetic engineering we can make corn or cotton that is resistant to insect damage. If we incorporate a particular gene, they become poisonous for harmful insects, but not for humans or for mice. Then you can do without the insecticide. I find this rather smart. There are also strains being developed that grow with less water or that grow on salt-affected soils. It’s both sophisticated and ecologically beneficial!
FOCUS: If green biotechnology is so beneficial, why hasn’t it gained ground here in Germany?
Nüsslein-Volhard: We have groups like Greenpeace to thank for that: groups that put ideology above everything else — regardless of all the positive results that have been had [with GM crops] in the meanwhile in many countries. As a consequence, green biotechnology is practically a social taboo here.
FOCUS: What are the implications for scientific research?
Nüsslein-Volhard: For theoretical research, there are no consequences. But as soon as it’s a matter of practical applications, things become difficult for the scientists. In Germany, there are practically no positions to be found anymore that would permit them to translate their ideas and research into practice. We do have a biotechnology law, which to some extent makes possible the field experiments that are necessary to gain authorization [for GM crops]. But if the fields are constantly being destroyed and nothing is done about it, then it’s just not possible. Not far from here, at the University of Hohenheim, a whole course had to be canceled because anti-GM militants tore up all the experimental fields. The consequence is that Germany exports exceptionally well-trained scientists to other countries. They don’t see any future for themselves here.
FOCUS: Using the techniques of genetic engineering, German scientists have developed the so-called golden rice. The rice is enriched with vitamin A and it has the potential to spare millions of people in the world’s poorest countries from losing their eyesight. Greenpeace is opposed to the golden rice, because they don’t want people in the Third World to serve as guinea pigs. Do you share this concern?
Nüsslein-Volhard: But that’s total nonsense. The behavior of Greenpeace in this matter is profoundly inhuman! Without a second thought, they are playing with human lives. I’ll give you another example. A few years ago, the Americans sent aid shipments of corn to African countries that were suffering from famine. The corn was genetically modified. In America, everyone eats it (including the German tourist), but the starving Africans were not permitted to eat the corn, because Greenpeace and other groups warned that it was genetically modified. These are unbelievable absurdities. I find it extremely depressing.
FOCUS: Critics of green biotechnologies complain that small farmers in the Third World become dependent on the big agro-industrial firms, which have their newly developed crop strains patented.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Okay, I find this criticism bizarre. As if it is somehow immoral to sell corn kernels as seed. Nobody is giving cars away, after all! The seed for all high-performance crop strains, including those that have not been genetically engineered, is specially produced nowadays, in order to guarantee the maximum yield. It’s just that hardly anyone knows that. The image of the farmer who retains a part of his harvest and replants the kernels the following spring is very romantic, of course. But in the case of corn, for example, such behavior would be totally irrational, since he would then only be able to collect half of the potential yields. But farmers have to try to get as much out of their land as possible. When they don’t manage to do so in an economically efficient fashion, then they need subsidies. Of course, we could pay them such subsidies, in order for them to continue sowing seed that they have themselves harvested. But I don’t find this particularly shrewd.
FOCUS: You’re reputed to be a passionate cook and you’ve even published a cookbook. As a cook, what would you like to see done with biotechnology?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Sometimes I regret the fact that you can’t find certain old-fashioned sorts of fruit in the stores anymore, simply because they spoil too quickly. There are particularly tasty sorts of strawberries or sour cherries, for example, that don’t keep well. You can tell that many types of fruits and vegetables are cultivated for their robustness and the quantity of the yield, but not for their flavor. If it would be possible by using genetic engineering to make the tastier sort of strawberries keep longer, personally I’d have nothing against it. You can’t have everything. But by using genetic engineering you can perhaps have more.
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard is the director of the Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tübingen. In 1995, she was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine. The above interview first appeared on the German news site [2] Focus-Online. The German version is available [3] here. The English translation is by John Rosenthal.
[References at the original link at the beginning]
Nobel laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard discusses the environmentalists' war against genetically modified food.
Pajamas Media, January 3, 2009
There is a specter haunting Europe: the specter of genetically modified foods. Although regularly consumed in the U.S. and around the world, in Europe GM foods are the target of veritable scare campaigns by environmental pressure groups and in the media. As a consequence, even GM crops that have been formally approved by the European Commission are the subject of increasing restrictions in Germany, France, and other European countries. GM crops — including such as have been planted merely for experimental purposes — are regularly destroyed by anti-GM militants in acts of would-be “civil disobedience.” Till Behrend of [1] the German weekly Focus spoke with the geneticist and Nobel Prize laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard about the sources of biotech-phobia.
John Rosenthal (Translator)
***
FOCUS: Professor Nüsslein-Volhard, farmers all around the world are cultivating genetically modified crops on an ever larger scale. But many Germans appear to be afraid of the new technology. Are they right to be?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Well, we Germans are always afraid of new things. But what are these people actually afraid about? They’re afraid that they will assimilate alien genes while eating genetically modified foods. But that’s nonsense. The genes are digested, broken down, and eliminated from the body just like in the case of traditional foods. This has been proven beyond any shadow of a doubt. The human genome is sequential and you can examine whether there are any cow genes or plant genes in there. Have no fear: there aren’t any.
FOCUS: What distinguishes, then, classically bred crops from genetically modified crops?
Nüsslein-Volhard: People seem to be unaware that practically all the grains and vegetables that we eat nowadays have been highly genetically modified as compared to their natural forms. There’s hardly any crop as artificial as a potato. In the wild, potatoes are tiny and highly poisonous. It took thousands of generations to turn the potato into a decent sort of food. In contrast to the classical development of new plant strains, “green” biotechnology has the advantage that with its help one can proceed much faster and in a much more targeted fashion.
FOCUS: It’s true that for plant breeders that might be a fine thing. But lots of people want to do what’s right for nature and for themselves, and consequently they insist on “organic” products.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Given our level of material well-being and the fertility of our soil, we can afford to do that. But actually that’s a snobby, elitist attitude. Organic farming cannot feed large cities. And it certainly cannot feed the world’s population. It’s not possible, since the yields of organic farming are too small and the area one has to plant is way too much. It really makes more sense to use the particularly rich fields that we have intensively and in a sustainable manner by planting high-yield crops. The environment benefits, too, since then we can return other fields to their natural state.
FOCUS: Nonetheless, organic farming is thought to stand for a more respectful treatment of the environment.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Wrongly. Or do you imagine perhaps that organic farming can do without the spraying of pesticides? On organic farms, too, one sprays pesticides constantly and all over the place! In this respect, genetic engineering really has more intelligent solutions to offer. For example, with the help of genetic engineering we can make corn or cotton that is resistant to insect damage. If we incorporate a particular gene, they become poisonous for harmful insects, but not for humans or for mice. Then you can do without the insecticide. I find this rather smart. There are also strains being developed that grow with less water or that grow on salt-affected soils. It’s both sophisticated and ecologically beneficial!
FOCUS: If green biotechnology is so beneficial, why hasn’t it gained ground here in Germany?
Nüsslein-Volhard: We have groups like Greenpeace to thank for that: groups that put ideology above everything else — regardless of all the positive results that have been had [with GM crops] in the meanwhile in many countries. As a consequence, green biotechnology is practically a social taboo here.
FOCUS: What are the implications for scientific research?
Nüsslein-Volhard: For theoretical research, there are no consequences. But as soon as it’s a matter of practical applications, things become difficult for the scientists. In Germany, there are practically no positions to be found anymore that would permit them to translate their ideas and research into practice. We do have a biotechnology law, which to some extent makes possible the field experiments that are necessary to gain authorization [for GM crops]. But if the fields are constantly being destroyed and nothing is done about it, then it’s just not possible. Not far from here, at the University of Hohenheim, a whole course had to be canceled because anti-GM militants tore up all the experimental fields. The consequence is that Germany exports exceptionally well-trained scientists to other countries. They don’t see any future for themselves here.
FOCUS: Using the techniques of genetic engineering, German scientists have developed the so-called golden rice. The rice is enriched with vitamin A and it has the potential to spare millions of people in the world’s poorest countries from losing their eyesight. Greenpeace is opposed to the golden rice, because they don’t want people in the Third World to serve as guinea pigs. Do you share this concern?
Nüsslein-Volhard: But that’s total nonsense. The behavior of Greenpeace in this matter is profoundly inhuman! Without a second thought, they are playing with human lives. I’ll give you another example. A few years ago, the Americans sent aid shipments of corn to African countries that were suffering from famine. The corn was genetically modified. In America, everyone eats it (including the German tourist), but the starving Africans were not permitted to eat the corn, because Greenpeace and other groups warned that it was genetically modified. These are unbelievable absurdities. I find it extremely depressing.
FOCUS: Critics of green biotechnologies complain that small farmers in the Third World become dependent on the big agro-industrial firms, which have their newly developed crop strains patented.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Okay, I find this criticism bizarre. As if it is somehow immoral to sell corn kernels as seed. Nobody is giving cars away, after all! The seed for all high-performance crop strains, including those that have not been genetically engineered, is specially produced nowadays, in order to guarantee the maximum yield. It’s just that hardly anyone knows that. The image of the farmer who retains a part of his harvest and replants the kernels the following spring is very romantic, of course. But in the case of corn, for example, such behavior would be totally irrational, since he would then only be able to collect half of the potential yields. But farmers have to try to get as much out of their land as possible. When they don’t manage to do so in an economically efficient fashion, then they need subsidies. Of course, we could pay them such subsidies, in order for them to continue sowing seed that they have themselves harvested. But I don’t find this particularly shrewd.
FOCUS: You’re reputed to be a passionate cook and you’ve even published a cookbook. As a cook, what would you like to see done with biotechnology?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Sometimes I regret the fact that you can’t find certain old-fashioned sorts of fruit in the stores anymore, simply because they spoil too quickly. There are particularly tasty sorts of strawberries or sour cherries, for example, that don’t keep well. You can tell that many types of fruits and vegetables are cultivated for their robustness and the quantity of the yield, but not for their flavor. If it would be possible by using genetic engineering to make the tastier sort of strawberries keep longer, personally I’d have nothing against it. You can’t have everything. But by using genetic engineering you can perhaps have more.
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard is the director of the Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tübingen. In 1995, she was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine. The above interview first appeared on the German news site [2] Focus-Online. The German version is available [3] here. The English translation is by John Rosenthal.
[References at the original link at the beginning]
Media Botches Story on Obama’s NASA Plans
Media Botches Story on Obama’s NASA Plans, by Rand Simberg
Panic over "tearing down" barriers between military and civilian space programs is much ado about nothing.
Pajamas Media, January 6, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
The same thing happens in the news business, particularly when the reporters aren’t very familiar with the field on which they’re reporting — and particularly when they think they are more familiar than they actually are. We had a good example of this over the holidays, when Bloomberg news came out with a “[1] scoop.” The Obama transition team was considering recommending a merger of NASA and the Air Force, to address the threat of the Yellow Peril — Chinese beating us to the moon. Shortly afterward, it was breathlessly picked up by [2] Fox News, [3] DBTechno, and [4] the Register in the UK, probably among others.
The story was nonsensical on several levels, right from the very first paragraph:
While there may be “long-standing barriers” between civilian and military space programs — this is, in fact, why Dwight Eisenhower originally established a purely civilian space agency half a century ago — there is nothing in the article to indicate that they are going to be “torn down.” The only evidence that they come up with is that one of the options being considered for future human spaceflight is the so-called Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), specifically Boeing’s Delta IV and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V:
The only problem with this is that — unless they are talking about some other vehicles, and if so, it’s hard to imagine what they are — the EELVs aren’t “military rockets.” Their development was subsidized with Air Force funds, but they were developed with Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s money as well, and they are commercial rockets, available to the military, commercial users, and NASA. There is no need to “tear down a barrier” for NASA to use them, as evidenced by the fact that NASA is already using them. For example, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter was blasted to orbit and off to Mars with an Atlas V/Centaur [5] over three years ago.
There is NASA resistance to using EELVs, but not because they are “military rockets.” It’s because they are seen as a threat to the agency’s — or more specifically, administrator Mike Griffin’s — desire to develop a new NASA-only vehicle, called Ares 1, and perhaps later, the larger version of it, Ares 5. If the EELVs become viewed as viable launchers for the human missions, the case for the Ares, already weak — particularly considering its [6] extensive development teething problems — becomes much weaker, perhaps to the point at which the program dies. (It should be noted that five years ago, prior to becoming NASA administrator, Dr. Griffin, who is [7] apparently desperately attempting to hang on to his job, had [8] no problems with using EELVs for crewed spaceflight.)
As for the “China space race” part, it makes little sense, either. This part is true, as far as it goes:
Yes, the Pentagon is legitimately concerned about the Chinese space threat, particularly since they have demonstrated the ability to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite a couple of years ago, making a [9] terrible mess up there in the process. But this part of the story is a complete non sequitur:
Despite what some of the (non-transition) sources quoted say, there is little relationship between a human moon landing and space warfare in near-earth orbit. Guidance systems for the latter are easily developed in the absence of orbital rendezvous and docking, which have different requirements. And despite [10] myths promulgated by science fiction about being bombarded from the moon, it is really not a militarily useful high ground against the earth.
Yes, it will save costs if NASA can use existing, or modified existing, vehicles, but this wouldn’t involve any “tearing down of walls,” and it should be done regardless of what the Chinese are doing, simply to make the program more affordable and sustainable.
How did this confusing and misleading story happen? In an email from someone familiar with the transition team’s activities, it seems pretty simple:
Which demonstrates the old adage about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. Unfortunately, to paraphrase Mark Twain, a confusing story can find its way halfway around the world — and perhaps to the moon — before the reality can get its boots on. Particularly at Internet speed.
[References in the original link above]
Panic over "tearing down" barriers between military and civilian space programs is much ado about nothing.
Pajamas Media, January 6, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
The same thing happens in the news business, particularly when the reporters aren’t very familiar with the field on which they’re reporting — and particularly when they think they are more familiar than they actually are. We had a good example of this over the holidays, when Bloomberg news came out with a “[1] scoop.” The Obama transition team was considering recommending a merger of NASA and the Air Force, to address the threat of the Yellow Peril — Chinese beating us to the moon. Shortly afterward, it was breathlessly picked up by [2] Fox News, [3] DBTechno, and [4] the Register in the UK, probably among others.
The story was nonsensical on several levels, right from the very first paragraph:
President-elect Barack Obama will probably tear down long-standing barriers
between the U.S.’s civilian and military space programs to speed up a mission to
the moon amid the prospect of a new space race with China.
While there may be “long-standing barriers” between civilian and military space programs — this is, in fact, why Dwight Eisenhower originally established a purely civilian space agency half a century ago — there is nothing in the article to indicate that they are going to be “torn down.” The only evidence that they come up with is that one of the options being considered for future human spaceflight is the so-called Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), specifically Boeing’s Delta IV and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V:
Obama’s transition team is considering a collaboration between the Defense
Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because
military rockets may be cheaper and ready sooner than the space agency’s planned
launch vehicle, which isn’t slated to fly until 2015, according to people who’ve
discussed the idea with the Obama team.
The only problem with this is that — unless they are talking about some other vehicles, and if so, it’s hard to imagine what they are — the EELVs aren’t “military rockets.” Their development was subsidized with Air Force funds, but they were developed with Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s money as well, and they are commercial rockets, available to the military, commercial users, and NASA. There is no need to “tear down a barrier” for NASA to use them, as evidenced by the fact that NASA is already using them. For example, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter was blasted to orbit and off to Mars with an Atlas V/Centaur [5] over three years ago.
There is NASA resistance to using EELVs, but not because they are “military rockets.” It’s because they are seen as a threat to the agency’s — or more specifically, administrator Mike Griffin’s — desire to develop a new NASA-only vehicle, called Ares 1, and perhaps later, the larger version of it, Ares 5. If the EELVs become viewed as viable launchers for the human missions, the case for the Ares, already weak — particularly considering its [6] extensive development teething problems — becomes much weaker, perhaps to the point at which the program dies. (It should be noted that five years ago, prior to becoming NASA administrator, Dr. Griffin, who is [7] apparently desperately attempting to hang on to his job, had [8] no problems with using EELVs for crewed spaceflight.)
As for the “China space race” part, it makes little sense, either. This part is true, as far as it goes:
The potential change comes as Pentagon concerns are rising over China’s space
ambitions because of what is perceived as an eventual threat to U.S. defense
satellites, the lofty battlefield eyes of the military.
Yes, the Pentagon is legitimately concerned about the Chinese space threat, particularly since they have demonstrated the ability to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite a couple of years ago, making a [9] terrible mess up there in the process. But this part of the story is a complete non sequitur:
China, which destroyed one of its aging satellites in a surprise missile test in
2007, is making strides in its spaceflight program. The military-run effort
carried out a first spacewalk in September and aims to land a robotic rover on
the moon in 2012, with a human mission several years later.
Despite what some of the (non-transition) sources quoted say, there is little relationship between a human moon landing and space warfare in near-earth orbit. Guidance systems for the latter are easily developed in the absence of orbital rendezvous and docking, which have different requirements. And despite [10] myths promulgated by science fiction about being bombarded from the moon, it is really not a militarily useful high ground against the earth.
Yes, it will save costs if NASA can use existing, or modified existing, vehicles, but this wouldn’t involve any “tearing down of walls,” and it should be done regardless of what the Chinese are doing, simply to make the program more affordable and sustainable.
How did this confusing and misleading story happen? In an email from someone familiar with the transition team’s activities, it seems pretty simple:
This story is very strange. We asked questions about EELVs; about how the DOD
and NASA cooperate; and what has been discussed with China. They were unrelated
questions. It seems as though the reporter tied them together for his odd
conclusion.
Which demonstrates the old adage about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. Unfortunately, to paraphrase Mark Twain, a confusing story can find its way halfway around the world — and perhaps to the moon — before the reality can get its boots on. Particularly at Internet speed.
[References in the original link above]
Do Obama “Green Jobs” Plan Requires Expanding Government Payroll with 600K Bureaucrats?
Job Mirage: Obama “Green Jobs” Plan Requires Expanding Government Payroll with 600K Bureaucrats
Institute for Energy Research, January 6, 2009
Washington, DC – Institute for Energy Research president Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement today in response to the president-elect’s announcement this past weekend that his plan to generate three million so-called “green jobs” includes expanding the government’s payroll to accommodate 600,000 new wage earners:
NOTE: On Saturday, President-elect Obama offered a revised assessment of how many new “green jobs” could be created by his administration, upping the number to three million – “more than eighty percent of them in the private sector.” The burden of supporting the remaining 20 percent would presumably fall to the public sector, which means that 600,000 new government jobs would need to be created to meet the president-elect’s goal
Institute for Energy Research, January 6, 2009
Washington, DC – Institute for Energy Research president Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement today in response to the president-elect’s announcement this past weekend that his plan to generate three million so-called “green jobs” includes expanding the government’s payroll to accommodate 600,000 new wage earners:
“The road back to economic recovery and long-term prosperity will be built by an active, job-creating private-sector, paved by reliable, affordable energy, and financed by the revenues and royalties generated as a result of it. Expanding the government’s payroll in times of unemployment is no different than printing out more money in times of recession – both may change the short-term perception of the economy, but neither will improve the actual performance of it.
“You can create all the new government jobs you want, but if those jobs can’t survive the night without the constant nourishment of subsidies, mandates and distorted tax treatment, you haven’t created any new wealth – only re-distributed it. A national policy that requires consumers to pay more for their energy will only price American goods above foreign ones, and contribute to economic decline.
“Activity is not the same thing as achievement, and to the extent we continue confusing the two, the more protracted and severe our current economic downturn will be.”
NOTE: On Saturday, President-elect Obama offered a revised assessment of how many new “green jobs” could be created by his administration, upping the number to three million – “more than eighty percent of them in the private sector.” The burden of supporting the remaining 20 percent would presumably fall to the public sector, which means that 600,000 new government jobs would need to be created to meet the president-elect’s goal
Change.gov: No earmarks
No earmarks, by Dan McSwain
Change.gov, Tuesday, January 6, 2009 02:24pm EST
President-elect Barack Obama said today in a meeting with members of his budget team that he will ban earmarks from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that will soon go before Congress.
The President-elect also said he expects his administration to inherit a budget deficit of up to $1 trillion.
He was joined in the meeting by Peter Orszag, Director-designate, Office of Managment and Budget; Christina Romer, Christina Romer, Director-designate, Council of Economic Advisors and Lawrence Summers, Director-designate, National Economic Council, among others.
Below are pictures and video from the event.
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/budget_draft/
Change.gov, Tuesday, January 6, 2009 02:24pm EST
President-elect Barack Obama said today in a meeting with members of his budget team that he will ban earmarks from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that will soon go before Congress.
The President-elect also said he expects his administration to inherit a budget deficit of up to $1 trillion.
He was joined in the meeting by Peter Orszag, Director-designate, Office of Managment and Budget; Christina Romer, Christina Romer, Director-designate, Council of Economic Advisors and Lawrence Summers, Director-designate, National Economic Council, among others.
Below are pictures and video from the event.
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/budget_draft/
RealClimate FAQ on climate models: Part II
FAQ on climate models: Part II. By Gavin Schmidt
Real Climate, Jan 06, 2009 @ 8:09 AM
[This is a continuation of a previous post including interesting questions from the comments.]
What are parameterisations?
Some physics in the real world, that is necessary for a climate model to work, is only known empirically. Or perhaps the theory only really applies at scales much smaller than the model grid size. This physics needs to be 'parameterised' i.e. a formulation is used that captures the phenomenology of the process and its sensitivity to change but without going into all of the very small scale details. These parameterisations are approximations to the phenomena that we wish to model, but which work at the scales the models actually resolve. A simple example is the radiation code - instead of using a line-by-line code which would resolve the absorption at over 10,000 individual wavelengths, a GCM generally uses a broad-band approximation (with 30 to 50 bands) which gives very close to the same results as a full calculation. Another example is the formula for the evaporation from the ocean as a function of the large-scale humidity, temperature and wind-speed. This is really a highly turbulent phenomena, but there are good approximations that give the net evaporation as a function of the large scale ('bulk') conditions. In some parameterisations, the functional form is reasonably well known, but the values of specific coefficients might not be. In these cases, the parameterisations are 'tuned' to reproduce the observed processes as much as possible.
How are the parameterisations evaluated?
In at least two ways. At the process scale, and at the emergent phenomena scale. For instance, taking one of the two examples mentioned above, the radiation code can be tested against field measurements at specific times and places where the composition of the atmosphere is known alongside a line-by-line code. It would need to capture the variations seen over time (the daily cycle, weather, cloudiness etc.). This is a test at the level of the actual process being parameterised and is a necessary component in all parameterisations. The more important tests occur when we examine how the parameterisation impacts larger-scale or emergent phenomena. Does changing the evaporation improve the patterns of precipitation? the match of the specific humidity field to observations? etc. This can be an exhaustive set of tests but again are mostly necessary. Note that most 'tunings' are done at the process level. Only those that can't be constrained using direct observations of the phenomena are available for tuning to get better large scale climate features. As mentioned in the previous post, there are only a handful of such parameters that get used in practice.
Are clouds included in models? How are they parameterised?
Models do indeed include clouds, and do allow changes in clouds as a response to forcings. There are certainly questions about how realistic those clouds are and whether they have the right sensitivity - but all models do have them! In general, models suggest that they are a positive feedback - i.e. there is a relative increase in high clouds (which warm more than they cool) compared to low clouds (which cool more than they warm) - but this is quite variable among models and not very well constrained from data.
Cloud parameterisations are amongst the most complex in the models. The large differences in mechanisms for cloud formation (tropical convection, mid-latitude storms, marine stratus decks) require multiple cases to be looked at and many sensitivities to be explored (to vertical motion, humidity, stratification etc.). Clouds also have important micro-physics that determine their properties (such as cloud particle size and phase) and interact strongly with aerosols. Standard GCMs have most of this physics included, and some are even going so far as to embed cloud resolving models in each grid box. These models are supposed to do away with much of the parameterisation (though they too need some, smaller-scale, ones), but at the cost of greatly increased complexity and computation time. Something like this is probably the way of the future.
What is being done to address the considerable uncertainty associated with cloud and aerosol forcings?
As alluded to above, cloud parameterisations are becoming much more detailed and are being matched to an ever larger amount of observations. However, there are still problems in getting sufficient data to constrain the models. For instance, it's only recently that separate diagnostics for cloud liquid water and cloud ice have become available. We still aren't able to distinguish different kinds of aerosols from satellites (though maybe by this time next year).
However, none of this is to say that clouds are a done deal, they certainly aren't. In both cloud and aerosol modelling the current approach is get as wide a spectrum of approaches as possible and to discern what is and what is not robust among those results. Hopefully soon we will start converging on the approaches that are the most realistic, but we are not there yet.
Forcings over time are a slightly different issue, and there it is likely that substantial uncertainties will remain because of the difficulty in reconstructing the true emission data for periods more than a few decades back. That involves making pretty unconstrained estimates of the efficiency of 1930s technology (for instance) and 19th Century deforestation rates. Educated guesses are possible, but independent constraints (such as particulates in ice cores) are partial at best.
Do models assume a constant relative humidity?
No. Relative humidity is a diagnostic of the models' temperature and water distribution and will vary according to the dynamics, convection etc. However, many processes that remove water from the atmosphere (i.e. cloud formation and rainfall) have a clear functional dependence on the relative humidity rather than the total amount of water (i.e. clouds form when air parcels are saturated at their local temperature, not when humidity reaches X g/m3). These leads to the phenomenon observed in the models and the real world that long-term mean relative humidity is pretty stable. In models it varies by a couple of percent over temperature changes that lead to specific humidity (the total amount of water) changing by much larger amounts. Thus a good estimate of the model relative humidity response is that it is roughly constant, similar to the situation seen in observations. But this is a derived result, not an assumption. You can see for yourself here (select Relative Humidty (%) from the diagnostics).
What are boundary conditions?
These are the basic data input into the models that define the land/ocean mask, the height of the mountains, river routing and the orbit of the Earth. For standard models additional inputs are the distribution of vegetation types and their properties, soil properties, and mountain glacier, lake, and wetland distributions. In more sophisticated models some of what were boundary conditions in simpler models have now become prognostic variables. For instance, dynamic vegetation models predict the vegetation types as a function of climate. Other examples in a simple atmospheric model might be the distribution of ozone or the level of carbon dioxide. In more complex models that calculate atmospheric chemistry or the carbon cycle, the boundary conditions would instead be the emissions of ozone precursors or anthropogenic CO2. Variations in these boundary conditions (for whatever reason) will change the climate simulation and can be considered forcings in the most general sense (see the next few questions).
Does the climate change if the boundary conditions are stable?
The answer to this question depends very much on perspective. On the longest timescales a climate model with constant boundary conditions is stable - that is, the mean properties and their statistical distribution don't vary. However, the spectrum of variability can be wide, and so there is variation from one decade to the next, from one century to the next, that are the result of internal variations in (for instance) the ocean circulation. While the long term stability is easy to demonstrate in climate models, it can't be unambiguously determined whether this is true in the real world since boundary conditions are always changing (albeit slowly most of the time).
Does the climate change if boundary conditions change?
Yes. If any of the factors that influence the simulation change, there will be a response in the climate. It might be large or small, but it will always be detectable if you run the model for long enough. For example, making the Rockies smaller (as they were a few million years ago) changes the planetary wave patterns and the temperature patterns downstream. Changing the ozone distribution changes temperatures, the height of the tropopause and stratospheric winds. Changing the land-ocean mask (because of sea level rise or tectonic changes for instance) changes ocean circulation, patterns of atmospheric convection and heat transports.
What is a forcing then?
The most straightforward definition is simply that a forcing is a change in any of the boundary conditions. Note however that this definition is not absolute with respect to any particular bit of physics. Take ozone for instance. In a standard atmospheric model, the ozone distribution is fixed and any change in that fixed distribution (because of stratospheric ozone depletion, tropospheric pollution, or changes over a solar cycle) would be a forcing causing the climate to change. In a model that calculates atmospheric chemistry, the ozone distribution is a function of the emissions of chemical precursors, the solar UV input and the climate itself. In such a model, ozone changes are a response (possibly leading to a feedback) to other imposed changes. Thus it doesn't make sense to ask whether ozone changes are or aren't a forcing without discussing what kind of model you are talking about.
There is however a default model setup in which many forcings are considered. This is not always stated explicitly and leads to (somewhat semantic) confusion even among specialists. This setup consists of an atmospheric model with a simple mixed-layer ocean model, but that doesn't include chemistry, aerosol vegetation or dynamic ice sheet modules. Not coincidentally this corresponds to the state-of-the-art of climate models around 1980 when the first comparisons of different forcings started to be done. It persists in the literature all the way through to the latest IPCC report (figure xx). However, there is a good reason for this, and that is observation that different forcings that have equal 'radiative' impacts have very similar responses. This allows many different forcings to be compared in magnitude and added up.
The 'radiative forcing' is calculated (roughly) as the net change in radiative fluxes (both short wave and long wave) at the top of the atmosphere when a component of the default model set up is changed. Increased solar irradiance is an easy radiative forcing to calculate, as is the value for well-mixed greenhouse gases. The direct effect of aerosols (the change in reflectance and absorption) is also easy (though uncertain due to the distributional uncertainty), while the indirect effect of aerosols on clouds is a little trickier. However, some forcings in the general sense defined above don't have an easy-to-caclulate 'radiative forcing' at all. What is the radiative impact of opening the isthmus of Panama? or the collapse of Lake Agassiz? Yet both of these examples have large impacts on the models' climate. Some other forcings have a very small global radiative forcing and yet lead to large impacts (orbital changes for instance) through components of the climate that aren't included in the default set-up. This isn't a problem for actually modelling the effects, but it does make comparing them to other forcings without doing the calculations a little more tricky.
What are the differences between climate models and weather models?
Conceptually they are very similar, but in practice they are used very differently. Weather models use as much data as there is available to start off close to the current weather situation and then use their knowledge of physics to step forward in time. This has good skill for a few days and some skill for a little longer. Because they are run for short periods of time only, they tend to have much higher resolution and more detailed physics than climate models (but note that the Hadley Centre for instance, uses the same model for climate and weather purposes). Weather models develop in ways that improve the short term predictions, though the impact for long term statistics or the climatology needs to be assessed independently. Curiously, the best weather models often have a much worse climatology than the best climate models. There are many current attempts to improve the short-term predictability in climate models in line with the best weather models, though it is unclear what impact that will have on projections.
How are solar variations represented in the models?
This varies a lot because of uncertainties in the past record and complexities in the responses. But given a particular estimate of solar activity there are a number of modelled responses. First, the total amount of solar radiation (TSI) can be varied - this changes the total amount of energy coming into the system and is very easy to implement. Second, the variation over the the solar cycle at different frequencies (from the UV to the near infra-red) don't all vary with the same amplitude - UV changes are about 10 times as large as those in the total irradiance. Since UV is mostly absorbed by ozone in the stratosphere, including these changes increases the magnitude of the solar cycle variability in the stratosphere. Furthermore, the change in UV has an impact on the production of ozone itself (even down into the troposphere). This can be calculated with chemistry-climate models, and is increasingly being used in climate model scenarios (see here for instance).
There are also other hypothesised impacts of solar activity on climate, most notably the impact of galactic cosmic rays (which are modulated by the solar magnetic activity on solar cycle timescales) on atmospheric ionisation, which in turn has been linked to aerosol formation, and in turn linked to cloud amounts. Most of these links are based on untested theories and somewhat dubious correlations, however, as was recognised many years ago (Dickinson, 1975), this is a plausible idea. Implementing it in climate models is however a challenge. It requires models to have a full model of aerosol creation, growth, accretion and cloud nucleation. There are many other processes that affect aerosols and GCR-related ionisation is only a small part of that. Additionally there is a huge amount of uncertainty in aerosol-cloud effects (the 'aerosol indirect effect'). Preliminary work seems to indicate that the GCR-aerosol-cloud link is very small (i.e. the other effects dominate), but this is still in the early stages of research. Should this prove to be significant, climate models will likely incorporate this directly (using embedded aerosol codes), or will parameterise the effects based on calculated cloud variations from more detailed models. What models can't do (except perhaps as a sensitivity study) is take purported global scale correlations and just 'stick them in' - cloud processes and effects are so tightly wound up in the model dynamics and radiation and have so much spatial and temporal structure that this couldn't be done in a way that made physical sense. For instance, part of the observed correlation could be due to the other solar effects, and so how could they be separated out? (and that's even assuming that the correlations actually hold up over time, which doesn't seem to be the case).
What do you mean when you say model has “skill”?
'Skill' is a relative concept. A model is said to have skill if it gives more information than a naive heuristic. Thus for weather forecasts, a prediction is described as skilful if it works better than just assuming that each day is the same as the last ('persistence'). It should be noted that 'persistence' itself is much more skillful than climatology (the historical average for that day) for about a week. For climate models, there is a much larger range of tests available and there isn't necessarily an analogue for 'persistence' in all cases. For a simulation of a previous time period (say the mid-Holocene), skill is determined relative to a 'no change from the present'. Thus if a model predicts a shift northwards of the tropical rain bands (as was observed), that would be skillful. This can be quantified and different models can exhibit more or less skill with respect to that metric. For the 20th Century, models show skill for the long-term changes in global and continental-scale temperatures - but only if natural and anthropogenic forcings are used - compared to an expectation of no change. Standard climate models don't show skill at the interannual timescales which depend heavily on El Niño's and other relatively unpredictable internal variations (note that initiallised climate model projections that use historical ocean conditions may show some skill, but this is still a very experimental endeavour).
How much can we learn from paleoclimate?
Lots! The main issue is that for the modern instrumental period the changes in many aspects of climate have not been very large - either compared with what is projected for the 21st Century, or from what we see in the past climate record. Thus we can't rely on the modern observations to properly assess the sensitivity of the climate to future changes. For instance, we don't have any good observations of changes in the ocean's thermohaline circulation over recent decades because a) the measurements are difficult, and b) there is a lot of noise. However, in periods in the past, say around 8,200 years ago, or during the last ice age, there is lots of evidence that this circulation was greatly reduced, possibly as a function of surface freshwater forcing from large lake collapses or from the ice sheets. If those forcings and the response can be quantified they provide good targets against which the models' sensitivity can be tested. Periods that are of possibly the most interest for testing sensitivities associated with uncertainties in future projections are the mid-Holocene (for tropical rainfall, sea ice), the 8.2kyr event (for the ocean thermohaline circulation), the last two millennia (for decadal/multi-decadal variability), the last interglacial (for ice sheets/sea level) etc. There are plenty of other examples, and of course, there is a lot of intrinsic interest in paleoclimate that is not related to climate models at all!
As before, if there are additional questions you'd like answered, put them in the comments and we'll collate the interesting ones for the next FAQ.
Real Climate, Jan 06, 2009 @ 8:09 AM
[This is a continuation of a previous post including interesting questions from the comments.]
What are parameterisations?
Some physics in the real world, that is necessary for a climate model to work, is only known empirically. Or perhaps the theory only really applies at scales much smaller than the model grid size. This physics needs to be 'parameterised' i.e. a formulation is used that captures the phenomenology of the process and its sensitivity to change but without going into all of the very small scale details. These parameterisations are approximations to the phenomena that we wish to model, but which work at the scales the models actually resolve. A simple example is the radiation code - instead of using a line-by-line code which would resolve the absorption at over 10,000 individual wavelengths, a GCM generally uses a broad-band approximation (with 30 to 50 bands) which gives very close to the same results as a full calculation. Another example is the formula for the evaporation from the ocean as a function of the large-scale humidity, temperature and wind-speed. This is really a highly turbulent phenomena, but there are good approximations that give the net evaporation as a function of the large scale ('bulk') conditions. In some parameterisations, the functional form is reasonably well known, but the values of specific coefficients might not be. In these cases, the parameterisations are 'tuned' to reproduce the observed processes as much as possible.
How are the parameterisations evaluated?
In at least two ways. At the process scale, and at the emergent phenomena scale. For instance, taking one of the two examples mentioned above, the radiation code can be tested against field measurements at specific times and places where the composition of the atmosphere is known alongside a line-by-line code. It would need to capture the variations seen over time (the daily cycle, weather, cloudiness etc.). This is a test at the level of the actual process being parameterised and is a necessary component in all parameterisations. The more important tests occur when we examine how the parameterisation impacts larger-scale or emergent phenomena. Does changing the evaporation improve the patterns of precipitation? the match of the specific humidity field to observations? etc. This can be an exhaustive set of tests but again are mostly necessary. Note that most 'tunings' are done at the process level. Only those that can't be constrained using direct observations of the phenomena are available for tuning to get better large scale climate features. As mentioned in the previous post, there are only a handful of such parameters that get used in practice.
Are clouds included in models? How are they parameterised?
Models do indeed include clouds, and do allow changes in clouds as a response to forcings. There are certainly questions about how realistic those clouds are and whether they have the right sensitivity - but all models do have them! In general, models suggest that they are a positive feedback - i.e. there is a relative increase in high clouds (which warm more than they cool) compared to low clouds (which cool more than they warm) - but this is quite variable among models and not very well constrained from data.
Cloud parameterisations are amongst the most complex in the models. The large differences in mechanisms for cloud formation (tropical convection, mid-latitude storms, marine stratus decks) require multiple cases to be looked at and many sensitivities to be explored (to vertical motion, humidity, stratification etc.). Clouds also have important micro-physics that determine their properties (such as cloud particle size and phase) and interact strongly with aerosols. Standard GCMs have most of this physics included, and some are even going so far as to embed cloud resolving models in each grid box. These models are supposed to do away with much of the parameterisation (though they too need some, smaller-scale, ones), but at the cost of greatly increased complexity and computation time. Something like this is probably the way of the future.
What is being done to address the considerable uncertainty associated with cloud and aerosol forcings?
As alluded to above, cloud parameterisations are becoming much more detailed and are being matched to an ever larger amount of observations. However, there are still problems in getting sufficient data to constrain the models. For instance, it's only recently that separate diagnostics for cloud liquid water and cloud ice have become available. We still aren't able to distinguish different kinds of aerosols from satellites (though maybe by this time next year).
However, none of this is to say that clouds are a done deal, they certainly aren't. In both cloud and aerosol modelling the current approach is get as wide a spectrum of approaches as possible and to discern what is and what is not robust among those results. Hopefully soon we will start converging on the approaches that are the most realistic, but we are not there yet.
Forcings over time are a slightly different issue, and there it is likely that substantial uncertainties will remain because of the difficulty in reconstructing the true emission data for periods more than a few decades back. That involves making pretty unconstrained estimates of the efficiency of 1930s technology (for instance) and 19th Century deforestation rates. Educated guesses are possible, but independent constraints (such as particulates in ice cores) are partial at best.
Do models assume a constant relative humidity?
No. Relative humidity is a diagnostic of the models' temperature and water distribution and will vary according to the dynamics, convection etc. However, many processes that remove water from the atmosphere (i.e. cloud formation and rainfall) have a clear functional dependence on the relative humidity rather than the total amount of water (i.e. clouds form when air parcels are saturated at their local temperature, not when humidity reaches X g/m3). These leads to the phenomenon observed in the models and the real world that long-term mean relative humidity is pretty stable. In models it varies by a couple of percent over temperature changes that lead to specific humidity (the total amount of water) changing by much larger amounts. Thus a good estimate of the model relative humidity response is that it is roughly constant, similar to the situation seen in observations. But this is a derived result, not an assumption. You can see for yourself here (select Relative Humidty (%) from the diagnostics).
What are boundary conditions?
These are the basic data input into the models that define the land/ocean mask, the height of the mountains, river routing and the orbit of the Earth. For standard models additional inputs are the distribution of vegetation types and their properties, soil properties, and mountain glacier, lake, and wetland distributions. In more sophisticated models some of what were boundary conditions in simpler models have now become prognostic variables. For instance, dynamic vegetation models predict the vegetation types as a function of climate. Other examples in a simple atmospheric model might be the distribution of ozone or the level of carbon dioxide. In more complex models that calculate atmospheric chemistry or the carbon cycle, the boundary conditions would instead be the emissions of ozone precursors or anthropogenic CO2. Variations in these boundary conditions (for whatever reason) will change the climate simulation and can be considered forcings in the most general sense (see the next few questions).
Does the climate change if the boundary conditions are stable?
The answer to this question depends very much on perspective. On the longest timescales a climate model with constant boundary conditions is stable - that is, the mean properties and their statistical distribution don't vary. However, the spectrum of variability can be wide, and so there is variation from one decade to the next, from one century to the next, that are the result of internal variations in (for instance) the ocean circulation. While the long term stability is easy to demonstrate in climate models, it can't be unambiguously determined whether this is true in the real world since boundary conditions are always changing (albeit slowly most of the time).
Does the climate change if boundary conditions change?
Yes. If any of the factors that influence the simulation change, there will be a response in the climate. It might be large or small, but it will always be detectable if you run the model for long enough. For example, making the Rockies smaller (as they were a few million years ago) changes the planetary wave patterns and the temperature patterns downstream. Changing the ozone distribution changes temperatures, the height of the tropopause and stratospheric winds. Changing the land-ocean mask (because of sea level rise or tectonic changes for instance) changes ocean circulation, patterns of atmospheric convection and heat transports.
What is a forcing then?
The most straightforward definition is simply that a forcing is a change in any of the boundary conditions. Note however that this definition is not absolute with respect to any particular bit of physics. Take ozone for instance. In a standard atmospheric model, the ozone distribution is fixed and any change in that fixed distribution (because of stratospheric ozone depletion, tropospheric pollution, or changes over a solar cycle) would be a forcing causing the climate to change. In a model that calculates atmospheric chemistry, the ozone distribution is a function of the emissions of chemical precursors, the solar UV input and the climate itself. In such a model, ozone changes are a response (possibly leading to a feedback) to other imposed changes. Thus it doesn't make sense to ask whether ozone changes are or aren't a forcing without discussing what kind of model you are talking about.
There is however a default model setup in which many forcings are considered. This is not always stated explicitly and leads to (somewhat semantic) confusion even among specialists. This setup consists of an atmospheric model with a simple mixed-layer ocean model, but that doesn't include chemistry, aerosol vegetation or dynamic ice sheet modules. Not coincidentally this corresponds to the state-of-the-art of climate models around 1980 when the first comparisons of different forcings started to be done. It persists in the literature all the way through to the latest IPCC report (figure xx). However, there is a good reason for this, and that is observation that different forcings that have equal 'radiative' impacts have very similar responses. This allows many different forcings to be compared in magnitude and added up.
The 'radiative forcing' is calculated (roughly) as the net change in radiative fluxes (both short wave and long wave) at the top of the atmosphere when a component of the default model set up is changed. Increased solar irradiance is an easy radiative forcing to calculate, as is the value for well-mixed greenhouse gases. The direct effect of aerosols (the change in reflectance and absorption) is also easy (though uncertain due to the distributional uncertainty), while the indirect effect of aerosols on clouds is a little trickier. However, some forcings in the general sense defined above don't have an easy-to-caclulate 'radiative forcing' at all. What is the radiative impact of opening the isthmus of Panama? or the collapse of Lake Agassiz? Yet both of these examples have large impacts on the models' climate. Some other forcings have a very small global radiative forcing and yet lead to large impacts (orbital changes for instance) through components of the climate that aren't included in the default set-up. This isn't a problem for actually modelling the effects, but it does make comparing them to other forcings without doing the calculations a little more tricky.
What are the differences between climate models and weather models?
Conceptually they are very similar, but in practice they are used very differently. Weather models use as much data as there is available to start off close to the current weather situation and then use their knowledge of physics to step forward in time. This has good skill for a few days and some skill for a little longer. Because they are run for short periods of time only, they tend to have much higher resolution and more detailed physics than climate models (but note that the Hadley Centre for instance, uses the same model for climate and weather purposes). Weather models develop in ways that improve the short term predictions, though the impact for long term statistics or the climatology needs to be assessed independently. Curiously, the best weather models often have a much worse climatology than the best climate models. There are many current attempts to improve the short-term predictability in climate models in line with the best weather models, though it is unclear what impact that will have on projections.
How are solar variations represented in the models?
This varies a lot because of uncertainties in the past record and complexities in the responses. But given a particular estimate of solar activity there are a number of modelled responses. First, the total amount of solar radiation (TSI) can be varied - this changes the total amount of energy coming into the system and is very easy to implement. Second, the variation over the the solar cycle at different frequencies (from the UV to the near infra-red) don't all vary with the same amplitude - UV changes are about 10 times as large as those in the total irradiance. Since UV is mostly absorbed by ozone in the stratosphere, including these changes increases the magnitude of the solar cycle variability in the stratosphere. Furthermore, the change in UV has an impact on the production of ozone itself (even down into the troposphere). This can be calculated with chemistry-climate models, and is increasingly being used in climate model scenarios (see here for instance).
There are also other hypothesised impacts of solar activity on climate, most notably the impact of galactic cosmic rays (which are modulated by the solar magnetic activity on solar cycle timescales) on atmospheric ionisation, which in turn has been linked to aerosol formation, and in turn linked to cloud amounts. Most of these links are based on untested theories and somewhat dubious correlations, however, as was recognised many years ago (Dickinson, 1975), this is a plausible idea. Implementing it in climate models is however a challenge. It requires models to have a full model of aerosol creation, growth, accretion and cloud nucleation. There are many other processes that affect aerosols and GCR-related ionisation is only a small part of that. Additionally there is a huge amount of uncertainty in aerosol-cloud effects (the 'aerosol indirect effect'). Preliminary work seems to indicate that the GCR-aerosol-cloud link is very small (i.e. the other effects dominate), but this is still in the early stages of research. Should this prove to be significant, climate models will likely incorporate this directly (using embedded aerosol codes), or will parameterise the effects based on calculated cloud variations from more detailed models. What models can't do (except perhaps as a sensitivity study) is take purported global scale correlations and just 'stick them in' - cloud processes and effects are so tightly wound up in the model dynamics and radiation and have so much spatial and temporal structure that this couldn't be done in a way that made physical sense. For instance, part of the observed correlation could be due to the other solar effects, and so how could they be separated out? (and that's even assuming that the correlations actually hold up over time, which doesn't seem to be the case).
What do you mean when you say model has “skill”?
'Skill' is a relative concept. A model is said to have skill if it gives more information than a naive heuristic. Thus for weather forecasts, a prediction is described as skilful if it works better than just assuming that each day is the same as the last ('persistence'). It should be noted that 'persistence' itself is much more skillful than climatology (the historical average for that day) for about a week. For climate models, there is a much larger range of tests available and there isn't necessarily an analogue for 'persistence' in all cases. For a simulation of a previous time period (say the mid-Holocene), skill is determined relative to a 'no change from the present'. Thus if a model predicts a shift northwards of the tropical rain bands (as was observed), that would be skillful. This can be quantified and different models can exhibit more or less skill with respect to that metric. For the 20th Century, models show skill for the long-term changes in global and continental-scale temperatures - but only if natural and anthropogenic forcings are used - compared to an expectation of no change. Standard climate models don't show skill at the interannual timescales which depend heavily on El Niño's and other relatively unpredictable internal variations (note that initiallised climate model projections that use historical ocean conditions may show some skill, but this is still a very experimental endeavour).
How much can we learn from paleoclimate?
Lots! The main issue is that for the modern instrumental period the changes in many aspects of climate have not been very large - either compared with what is projected for the 21st Century, or from what we see in the past climate record. Thus we can't rely on the modern observations to properly assess the sensitivity of the climate to future changes. For instance, we don't have any good observations of changes in the ocean's thermohaline circulation over recent decades because a) the measurements are difficult, and b) there is a lot of noise. However, in periods in the past, say around 8,200 years ago, or during the last ice age, there is lots of evidence that this circulation was greatly reduced, possibly as a function of surface freshwater forcing from large lake collapses or from the ice sheets. If those forcings and the response can be quantified they provide good targets against which the models' sensitivity can be tested. Periods that are of possibly the most interest for testing sensitivities associated with uncertainties in future projections are the mid-Holocene (for tropical rainfall, sea ice), the 8.2kyr event (for the ocean thermohaline circulation), the last two millennia (for decadal/multi-decadal variability), the last interglacial (for ice sheets/sea level) etc. There are plenty of other examples, and of course, there is a lot of intrinsic interest in paleoclimate that is not related to climate models at all!
As before, if there are additional questions you'd like answered, put them in the comments and we'll collate the interesting ones for the next FAQ.
Open Thread: Appreciation of Past and Current Federal Commander-in-Chiefs
Please add your appreciation posts for past and current Federal Commander-in-Chiefs here.
Let's start with the current one:
1 President Bush Attends Military Appreciation Parade with Chairman of the Joint of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia, January 6, 2009
10:21 A.M. EST
ADMIRAL MULLEN: President and Mrs. Bush; Mr. Vice President; Secretary and Mrs. Gates; members of the Cabinet; distinguished members of Congress; fellow members of the Joint Chiefs; members of the Armed Forces of the United States, past and present; ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for honoring us with your presence, and welcome to the grounds of the Old Guard, which both sanctify our past and herald our future.
On behalf of the 2.2 million uniform men and women of our Armed Forces, I am humbled to be able to formally thank President and Mrs. Bush for all they have done for our military and for our nation. More than 280,000 are walking point right now on the front lines. They stand tallest with us on this day, and it is right to thank them for making this celebration possible. (Applause.)
Truly it is not my privilege alone to tell the story of the Bush name -- a story that waits not only to be said in volumes, but one carried in the hearts of those patriots out there; a story which rushes with the oral history of life, warm with gratitude, flush with inspiration; a story best told by the voices of our service members themselves, who recently had an opportunity to place in a journal their thoughts to President and Mrs. Bush. Deborah and I passed that journal to the troops as we recently traveled around the world.
And so if you don't mind, Mr. President and Madam First Lady, I wanted to share a few handwritten lines from them.
"Mr. President, thank you and your family for your service. I am proud to serve under you, sir. You are awesome, and made a difference in the world." Staff Sergeant Ward, Queens, New York.
"Sir, nice to see that our President is still quick on his feet after eight years in office." (Laughter.) "Next time, pick up the shoe and throw it back." (Laughter and applause.) "We got your back." Master Sergeant Michael Frazier, United States Air Force.
"Sir, you truly set the standard to uphold the peace and our very way of life so our kids can grow up in a peaceful world. We will always stand tall, one great nation and one great state -- Texas." (Hoo-ah.) Sergeant First Class Claude Corey, Waco, Texas.
"Mrs. Bush, your class and dignity were an inspiration to us all." Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rainey, United States Army, Baghdad.
"Sir, thank you for your service, example and leadership. We have not faltered, we will not fail. With greatest respect and honor, we serve." Signed simply, Your Soldiers.
Those voices are an answering volley to you for your high regard and great respect for every single man and woman who serves this nation.
After this nation was attacked by a rising evil, the same evil which later murdered many others in places like London, Madrid, Islamabad and Mumbai, you quickly led us from the grip of fear to a serenity of purpose and unity of action -- serenity well beyond our dreams on September 12th, when all thought further attack was not only likely, but gravely imminent. And through your vision, a new national security was rendered to reach our enemies where they hid and trained and celebrated deadly crimes.
We sent our forces to hills and caves, alongside tribesman on horseback to root them out and hunt them down. We liberated Iraq from tyranny, now on the road to renewal. And we are shifting our focus to Afghanistan. We applauded as you, Mrs. Bush, worked for the freedom and education of young women, and gave hope to children scarred by hate. And always, sir, we felt your unmatched confidence in us, which only made us better.
Yes, we know these images well and we treasure them. But what wasn't always often an image was how you, as our First Family, fully embraced our military family with words of love and prayers of hope. For you have proven that how well we care for our wounded and the families of the fallen defines who and what we really are as a nation. You made it personal, and that has made all the difference.
With quiet dignity, you stretched out hands to those touched by loss, unimaginable loss that can never be made whole so they might be touched yet again.
There are many moments I will never forget, such as when you, Mr. President, presented Michael Monsoor's family with the Medal of Honor, and how in that very presidential setting you were so visibly moved. We will never know of all the private embraces and words of healing that you provided, but we do know the wholeness they created. For with every minute which melted into many gracious hours spent with our veterans and families, you gave something precious to us all -- gifts which will forever adorn our chords of memory.
Indeed, not far from these grounds where both Union and Confederate soldiers lay in white, tented hospitals, President Lincoln also walked through the lines and personally brought the meaning of hope and sacrifice to those straining to touch it from every side. So true today. A reporter who followed Lincoln wrote, "From the outset, he was the personal friend of every soldier he sent to the front, and somehow, every man seemed to know it." So true today.
In my 44 years of wearing this uniform, I have never seen the American public and our military as bonded in understanding, purpose, and spirit as I do right now. For this, Mr. President, we owe you our greatest gratitude.
Finally, sir, I want to personally thank you for your trust in me as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and, honestly, a trust I do not hold alone, a confidence every other uniformed member also holds so dear: the honor to serve and represent the American people.
Mr. President, you have selected a tremendous civilian leadership team in Secretary Gates and the Deputy Secretary, our former Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England. It is a great personal honor to serve alongside them.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to introduce to you the Secretary of Defense, the honorable Robert Gates. (Applause.)
SECRETARY GATES: Thank you, Admiral Mullen.
Some of you of a certain generation might remember a line from the John Wayne movie, "Red River" -- an epic story of a thousand-mile cattle drive across Texas. At one point, one of the characters says, "There's three times in a life -- in a man's life when he has the right to yell at the moon -- when he marries, when his children come, and when he finishes a job he had to be crazy to start." (Laughter.) Well, before President Bush finishes his job, I'm pleased to have this chance, on behalf of the United States military, to pay tribute to our Commander-in-Chief, and to give him proper thanks.
The legacy of George W. Bush in matters of war and peace began taking form more than a year before he first took the oath of office. In the fall of 1999, then Governor Bush gave a speech at the Citadel, titled, "A Period of Consequences." He observed that nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States military was still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century -- what he called an era of car-bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber-terrorists and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators, all the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds.
On a bright Tuesday morning in September, eight months into President Bush's first term, we learned how dangerous and unpredictable this new era could be, and saw in the starkest terms how necessary was the task of transforming the American defense establishment to meet these challenges. It was a task inspired by the vision of President Bush, propelled by the energetic advocacy of Secretary Rumsfeld, informed by the experience of our senior military leaders, and accelerated by the urgent demands of two unconventional ground wars.
The result is an American military that has become more agile, lethal, and prepared to deal with the full spectrum of 21st century conflict -- and on a personal note, a force that is dramatically more deployable and expeditionary than when I last served in government 15 years ago.
Consider just a few of the historical changes: The Army has undergone its most significant restructuring in more than two generations, moving from a division-based to a modular brigades-based force. The Navy's fleet response plan has nearly doubled the number of strike carrier groups that can be surged in the first weeks of a crisis.
America's Special Forces have seen vast increases in budget, personnel, authorities, and most importantly, in capabilities in the campaign against terrorism worldwide. The number of unmanned aerial vehicles has grown some 40-fold, to more than 6,000, and we have seen a genuine revolution in the military's ability to fuse intelligence and operations.
Cold War basing arrangements in Germany, Korea and Japan have been modernized and sized to better reflect the security requirements of this century. New authorities and programs enable the military to build the capacity of allies and partners in cooperation with civilian agencies and organizations. And much, much more.
As this historical institutional shift was underway, President Bush led our military through two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a broader struggle against terrorist networks worldwide. He has not flinched when faced with difficult wartime decisions, including the momentous decision two years ago to send more troops into Iraq and revamp our strategy there.
Nor has the President ever hidden from the human consequences of his decisions. We have seen this in countless visits with the wounded at Walter Reed, Bethesda, and other military hospitals. And there are the meetings that he and the First Lady have held with thousands of family members of wounded and fallen troops. The President's deep regard and affection for our service members and their families has played out in ways big and small: Surprise visits to Iraq and Afghanistan to shake hands and high-five, and personal phone calls to those deployed over Thanksgiving, even the occasional chest bump to unwary cadets.
Some might remember the story of Staff Sergeant Michael McNaughton of Louisiana National Guard. In January 2003, he stepped on a landmine 30 miles north of Kabul, and lost his right leg. President Bush visited Michael at Walter Reed, and suggested they go for a run when he received his prosthetic. Months later, Michael and the President jogged around the South Lawn of the White House together. A single promise to a single soldier: A small act that reflects President Bush's commitment to care for and honor every member of the Armed Forces.
Mr. President, every day these volunteers execute your orders with courage and determination, facing down danger for the greater good of America. On behalf of more than two million men and women in uniform, we are deeply grateful for your leadership and service to America in a time of war.
Finally, and personally, I would like to thank you for granting me the opportunity to serve as Secretary of Defense. It is true that I have been known to grouse from time to time about coming back to Washington, D.C. Yet working every day with our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines has been the greatest honor of my life. And I will always owe you a debt of gratitude for that. I have appreciated your steadfast confidence and support over these past two years, and I wish you and Laura the very best as you begin the next phase of your lives.
Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States. (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. At ease.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for the kind introduction -- and thank you for being an outstanding Secretary of Defense. (Applause.) For a while, we expected this event to be a joint retirement party. It didn't turn out that way, did it? (Laughter.) I am pleased that President-Elect Obama has asked you to stay on, and I am confident that you'll continue to be a strong leader as the Secretary of Defense. (Applause.)
And, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your strong advice, your clear thinking, and your years of service to our country. (Applause.)
I want to thank you for honoring Laura, who's been a fabulous First Lady. (Applause.) The military gave her the Distinguished Service Award -- a lot of friends from Texas think she deserved the Purple Heart. (Laughter.) I wish I'd have thought of the roses.
Mr. Vice President, I am proud to have served with you for eight years. The military has had no stauncher defender in my administration than Vice President Dick Cheney. (Applause.)
I thank members of the Cabinet, members of the administration, and former members of the Cabinet, especially the former Secretary of Defense, who did an outstanding job -- Secretary Don Rumsfeld. (Applause.)
I thank the current members of the Joint Chiefs and their families, as well as the former members of the Joint Chiefs and their families for joining us today. I want to thank those who wear the uniform; distinguished guests.
As my time in office winds down, the days bring a series of "lasts." I made my last overseas trip on Air Force One. I have delivered my final college commencement as President. And after much consideration, I pardoned my last Thanksgiving turkey. (Laughter.) These have all been wonderful experiences. But nothing compares to the honor of standing before you today, and addressing America's Armed Forces as your Commander-in-Chief.
Over the past eight years, I have seen the valor of the American military time and time again. I saw your valor on September the 11th, 2001, in service members rushing into smoke-filled corridors to save their colleagues at the Pentagon -- and in planes patrolling the skies above New York City and Washington. I saw your valor in the days after the attack, when Americans crowded into recruiting centers across our country, raised their hands to serve, and pledged to defend our people and our freedom.
I saw your valor in the forces who deployed to Afghanistan. Within weeks of September the 11th, you closed down the terrorist training camps, and you drove the Taliban from power. I saw your valor in the fearless troops who stormed across the Iraqi desert -- and destroyed a regime that threatened America. I saw your valor in battle-tested warriors who signed up for a second, or third, or fourth tour -- and made the surge in Iraq one of the great successes in America's military history.
The valor of America's Armed Forces have made our nation safer. Because you've taken the fight to the terrorists abroad, we have not had to face them here at home. And the world has seen something that almost no one thought possible: More than seven years after September the 11th, there has not been another attack on American soil.
The decisions I made as your Commander-in-Chief have not always been popular. But the cause you have served has always been just and right. The missions you have carried out have always been necessary. And the work you have done has every bit -- has been every bit as courageous and idealistic as that of any generation that came before you.
In the years since the war on terror began, America's Armed Forces have led the largest military liberation since World War II. Because of your actions, more than 50 million Afghans and Iraqis have seen the chains of despotism broken -- and are living in the liberty that the Creator intended. The new wave of freedom in the Middle East has made America more secure at home -- because it is undermining the culture of tyranny that fosters radicalism.
There will become a day when your grandchildren will ask, what did you do during your time in uniform? And you'll be able to say: We made the military stronger. We made the world freer. And we made America more secure.
You'll be able to tell them the story of the first decade in the 21st century -- their early days of a generational struggle against terror and extremism. It is a story of a global coalition led by the United States that is dedicated to eliminating the forces of oppression and fear. It is the story of the Iraqi people proudly holding up ink-stained fingers to show that the threat of violence could not break their commitment to liberty. It is the story of young girls going to school in Afghanistan after years when educating a woman could be punished with beatings or imprisonment. It is the story about the character in men and women who volunteered to leave the comforts of home to defend freedom and keep our nation safe.
On behalf of the American people, I thank you for making that sacrifice. I know you have not shouldered the burdens of military life alone. You've had the support of strong and loving families to sustain you. And this morning, I want all of you and your families to hear your Commander-in-Chief loud and clear: We appreciate you, we love you, and we honor your service. (Applause.)
We also honor our wounded warriors -- and those who never returned home from the field of battle. In their sacrifices, we see one of the extraordinary legacies of our Armed Forces -- the willingness to give everything to secure safety at home and liberty abroad.
As the Admiral pointed out, we saw that selfless spirit in people like Petty Officer Michael Monsoor, a Navy SEAL who served in Iraq. In the fall of 2006, on a rooftop in Iraq, Mike threw himself onto a grenade in order to save the lives of his teammates. As Admiral Mullen mentioned, I had the honor of presenting Michael Monsoor's parents his posthumous Medal of Honor in the White House. On that day, I saw the deep sadness that is familiar to anyone who has lost a loved one in the line of duty. But I also saw the pride that comes with such noble sacrifice -- and the recognition that our freedom and our security only endure because of the acts of bravery like Michael Monsoor's.
That kind of courage, character, and devotion defines our Armed Forces. So this morning, I cannot accept your kind tribute unless I'm allowed to return the favor. To the men and women of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and all those who serve in the Department of Defense: You have the respect of a grateful nation that you have kept safe. You have the admiration of millions around the world who would have never tasted freedom without you. You have the undying love and respect of a man who has been proud to call himself your Commander-in-Chief.
Two weeks from today, Laura and I will take our final trip back to Texas -- or, as you Texans understand, back to the promised land. We have the honor of doing it onboard a 747 piloted by the United States Air Force -- Colonel Mark Tillman will be the lead pilot. This brings a fitting symmetry: The military brought me to Washington eight years ago -- and on January the 20th, the military is taking me home.
We will take with us many fond memories that we will cherish for the rest of our lives. We will always remember that you answered the call to serve when your nation needed you most. We will always remember that you did your duty with honor and dignity. And we will always remember the debt of gratitude that each of us who lives in freedom owes to each of you who has protected it.
May God bless you. And may God always bless the United States. (Applause.)
END 10:49 A.M. EST
2 Tribute to President Obama
Celebrities pay powerful, heartfelt tribute to President Obama
3 Remarks by the Federal President to the Troops in Baghdad
Al Faw Palace
Baghdad, Iraq
6:08 P.M. (Local)
4 Remarks by the Federal President on Memorial Day
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON MEMORIAL DAY
Memorial Amphitheater
Arlington National Cemetery
5 'He Just Does What He Thinks Is Right'
By Peggy Noonan
Let's start with the current one:
1 President Bush Attends Military Appreciation Parade with Chairman of the Joint of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
Fort Myer, Arlington, Virginia, January 6, 2009
10:21 A.M. EST
ADMIRAL MULLEN: President and Mrs. Bush; Mr. Vice President; Secretary and Mrs. Gates; members of the Cabinet; distinguished members of Congress; fellow members of the Joint Chiefs; members of the Armed Forces of the United States, past and present; ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for honoring us with your presence, and welcome to the grounds of the Old Guard, which both sanctify our past and herald our future.
On behalf of the 2.2 million uniform men and women of our Armed Forces, I am humbled to be able to formally thank President and Mrs. Bush for all they have done for our military and for our nation. More than 280,000 are walking point right now on the front lines. They stand tallest with us on this day, and it is right to thank them for making this celebration possible. (Applause.)
Truly it is not my privilege alone to tell the story of the Bush name -- a story that waits not only to be said in volumes, but one carried in the hearts of those patriots out there; a story which rushes with the oral history of life, warm with gratitude, flush with inspiration; a story best told by the voices of our service members themselves, who recently had an opportunity to place in a journal their thoughts to President and Mrs. Bush. Deborah and I passed that journal to the troops as we recently traveled around the world.
And so if you don't mind, Mr. President and Madam First Lady, I wanted to share a few handwritten lines from them.
"Mr. President, thank you and your family for your service. I am proud to serve under you, sir. You are awesome, and made a difference in the world." Staff Sergeant Ward, Queens, New York.
"Sir, nice to see that our President is still quick on his feet after eight years in office." (Laughter.) "Next time, pick up the shoe and throw it back." (Laughter and applause.) "We got your back." Master Sergeant Michael Frazier, United States Air Force.
"Sir, you truly set the standard to uphold the peace and our very way of life so our kids can grow up in a peaceful world. We will always stand tall, one great nation and one great state -- Texas." (Hoo-ah.) Sergeant First Class Claude Corey, Waco, Texas.
"Mrs. Bush, your class and dignity were an inspiration to us all." Lieutenant Colonel Scott Rainey, United States Army, Baghdad.
"Sir, thank you for your service, example and leadership. We have not faltered, we will not fail. With greatest respect and honor, we serve." Signed simply, Your Soldiers.
Those voices are an answering volley to you for your high regard and great respect for every single man and woman who serves this nation.
After this nation was attacked by a rising evil, the same evil which later murdered many others in places like London, Madrid, Islamabad and Mumbai, you quickly led us from the grip of fear to a serenity of purpose and unity of action -- serenity well beyond our dreams on September 12th, when all thought further attack was not only likely, but gravely imminent. And through your vision, a new national security was rendered to reach our enemies where they hid and trained and celebrated deadly crimes.
We sent our forces to hills and caves, alongside tribesman on horseback to root them out and hunt them down. We liberated Iraq from tyranny, now on the road to renewal. And we are shifting our focus to Afghanistan. We applauded as you, Mrs. Bush, worked for the freedom and education of young women, and gave hope to children scarred by hate. And always, sir, we felt your unmatched confidence in us, which only made us better.
Yes, we know these images well and we treasure them. But what wasn't always often an image was how you, as our First Family, fully embraced our military family with words of love and prayers of hope. For you have proven that how well we care for our wounded and the families of the fallen defines who and what we really are as a nation. You made it personal, and that has made all the difference.
With quiet dignity, you stretched out hands to those touched by loss, unimaginable loss that can never be made whole so they might be touched yet again.
There are many moments I will never forget, such as when you, Mr. President, presented Michael Monsoor's family with the Medal of Honor, and how in that very presidential setting you were so visibly moved. We will never know of all the private embraces and words of healing that you provided, but we do know the wholeness they created. For with every minute which melted into many gracious hours spent with our veterans and families, you gave something precious to us all -- gifts which will forever adorn our chords of memory.
Indeed, not far from these grounds where both Union and Confederate soldiers lay in white, tented hospitals, President Lincoln also walked through the lines and personally brought the meaning of hope and sacrifice to those straining to touch it from every side. So true today. A reporter who followed Lincoln wrote, "From the outset, he was the personal friend of every soldier he sent to the front, and somehow, every man seemed to know it." So true today.
In my 44 years of wearing this uniform, I have never seen the American public and our military as bonded in understanding, purpose, and spirit as I do right now. For this, Mr. President, we owe you our greatest gratitude.
Finally, sir, I want to personally thank you for your trust in me as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and, honestly, a trust I do not hold alone, a confidence every other uniformed member also holds so dear: the honor to serve and represent the American people.
Mr. President, you have selected a tremendous civilian leadership team in Secretary Gates and the Deputy Secretary, our former Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England. It is a great personal honor to serve alongside them.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to introduce to you the Secretary of Defense, the honorable Robert Gates. (Applause.)
SECRETARY GATES: Thank you, Admiral Mullen.
Some of you of a certain generation might remember a line from the John Wayne movie, "Red River" -- an epic story of a thousand-mile cattle drive across Texas. At one point, one of the characters says, "There's three times in a life -- in a man's life when he has the right to yell at the moon -- when he marries, when his children come, and when he finishes a job he had to be crazy to start." (Laughter.) Well, before President Bush finishes his job, I'm pleased to have this chance, on behalf of the United States military, to pay tribute to our Commander-in-Chief, and to give him proper thanks.
The legacy of George W. Bush in matters of war and peace began taking form more than a year before he first took the oath of office. In the fall of 1999, then Governor Bush gave a speech at the Citadel, titled, "A Period of Consequences." He observed that nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States military was still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century -- what he called an era of car-bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber-terrorists and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators, all the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds.
On a bright Tuesday morning in September, eight months into President Bush's first term, we learned how dangerous and unpredictable this new era could be, and saw in the starkest terms how necessary was the task of transforming the American defense establishment to meet these challenges. It was a task inspired by the vision of President Bush, propelled by the energetic advocacy of Secretary Rumsfeld, informed by the experience of our senior military leaders, and accelerated by the urgent demands of two unconventional ground wars.
The result is an American military that has become more agile, lethal, and prepared to deal with the full spectrum of 21st century conflict -- and on a personal note, a force that is dramatically more deployable and expeditionary than when I last served in government 15 years ago.
Consider just a few of the historical changes: The Army has undergone its most significant restructuring in more than two generations, moving from a division-based to a modular brigades-based force. The Navy's fleet response plan has nearly doubled the number of strike carrier groups that can be surged in the first weeks of a crisis.
America's Special Forces have seen vast increases in budget, personnel, authorities, and most importantly, in capabilities in the campaign against terrorism worldwide. The number of unmanned aerial vehicles has grown some 40-fold, to more than 6,000, and we have seen a genuine revolution in the military's ability to fuse intelligence and operations.
Cold War basing arrangements in Germany, Korea and Japan have been modernized and sized to better reflect the security requirements of this century. New authorities and programs enable the military to build the capacity of allies and partners in cooperation with civilian agencies and organizations. And much, much more.
As this historical institutional shift was underway, President Bush led our military through two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a broader struggle against terrorist networks worldwide. He has not flinched when faced with difficult wartime decisions, including the momentous decision two years ago to send more troops into Iraq and revamp our strategy there.
Nor has the President ever hidden from the human consequences of his decisions. We have seen this in countless visits with the wounded at Walter Reed, Bethesda, and other military hospitals. And there are the meetings that he and the First Lady have held with thousands of family members of wounded and fallen troops. The President's deep regard and affection for our service members and their families has played out in ways big and small: Surprise visits to Iraq and Afghanistan to shake hands and high-five, and personal phone calls to those deployed over Thanksgiving, even the occasional chest bump to unwary cadets.
Some might remember the story of Staff Sergeant Michael McNaughton of Louisiana National Guard. In January 2003, he stepped on a landmine 30 miles north of Kabul, and lost his right leg. President Bush visited Michael at Walter Reed, and suggested they go for a run when he received his prosthetic. Months later, Michael and the President jogged around the South Lawn of the White House together. A single promise to a single soldier: A small act that reflects President Bush's commitment to care for and honor every member of the Armed Forces.
Mr. President, every day these volunteers execute your orders with courage and determination, facing down danger for the greater good of America. On behalf of more than two million men and women in uniform, we are deeply grateful for your leadership and service to America in a time of war.
Finally, and personally, I would like to thank you for granting me the opportunity to serve as Secretary of Defense. It is true that I have been known to grouse from time to time about coming back to Washington, D.C. Yet working every day with our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines has been the greatest honor of my life. And I will always owe you a debt of gratitude for that. I have appreciated your steadfast confidence and support over these past two years, and I wish you and Laura the very best as you begin the next phase of your lives.
Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States. (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. At ease.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for the kind introduction -- and thank you for being an outstanding Secretary of Defense. (Applause.) For a while, we expected this event to be a joint retirement party. It didn't turn out that way, did it? (Laughter.) I am pleased that President-Elect Obama has asked you to stay on, and I am confident that you'll continue to be a strong leader as the Secretary of Defense. (Applause.)
And, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your strong advice, your clear thinking, and your years of service to our country. (Applause.)
I want to thank you for honoring Laura, who's been a fabulous First Lady. (Applause.) The military gave her the Distinguished Service Award -- a lot of friends from Texas think she deserved the Purple Heart. (Laughter.) I wish I'd have thought of the roses.
Mr. Vice President, I am proud to have served with you for eight years. The military has had no stauncher defender in my administration than Vice President Dick Cheney. (Applause.)
I thank members of the Cabinet, members of the administration, and former members of the Cabinet, especially the former Secretary of Defense, who did an outstanding job -- Secretary Don Rumsfeld. (Applause.)
I thank the current members of the Joint Chiefs and their families, as well as the former members of the Joint Chiefs and their families for joining us today. I want to thank those who wear the uniform; distinguished guests.
As my time in office winds down, the days bring a series of "lasts." I made my last overseas trip on Air Force One. I have delivered my final college commencement as President. And after much consideration, I pardoned my last Thanksgiving turkey. (Laughter.) These have all been wonderful experiences. But nothing compares to the honor of standing before you today, and addressing America's Armed Forces as your Commander-in-Chief.
Over the past eight years, I have seen the valor of the American military time and time again. I saw your valor on September the 11th, 2001, in service members rushing into smoke-filled corridors to save their colleagues at the Pentagon -- and in planes patrolling the skies above New York City and Washington. I saw your valor in the days after the attack, when Americans crowded into recruiting centers across our country, raised their hands to serve, and pledged to defend our people and our freedom.
I saw your valor in the forces who deployed to Afghanistan. Within weeks of September the 11th, you closed down the terrorist training camps, and you drove the Taliban from power. I saw your valor in the fearless troops who stormed across the Iraqi desert -- and destroyed a regime that threatened America. I saw your valor in battle-tested warriors who signed up for a second, or third, or fourth tour -- and made the surge in Iraq one of the great successes in America's military history.
The valor of America's Armed Forces have made our nation safer. Because you've taken the fight to the terrorists abroad, we have not had to face them here at home. And the world has seen something that almost no one thought possible: More than seven years after September the 11th, there has not been another attack on American soil.
The decisions I made as your Commander-in-Chief have not always been popular. But the cause you have served has always been just and right. The missions you have carried out have always been necessary. And the work you have done has every bit -- has been every bit as courageous and idealistic as that of any generation that came before you.
In the years since the war on terror began, America's Armed Forces have led the largest military liberation since World War II. Because of your actions, more than 50 million Afghans and Iraqis have seen the chains of despotism broken -- and are living in the liberty that the Creator intended. The new wave of freedom in the Middle East has made America more secure at home -- because it is undermining the culture of tyranny that fosters radicalism.
There will become a day when your grandchildren will ask, what did you do during your time in uniform? And you'll be able to say: We made the military stronger. We made the world freer. And we made America more secure.
You'll be able to tell them the story of the first decade in the 21st century -- their early days of a generational struggle against terror and extremism. It is a story of a global coalition led by the United States that is dedicated to eliminating the forces of oppression and fear. It is the story of the Iraqi people proudly holding up ink-stained fingers to show that the threat of violence could not break their commitment to liberty. It is the story of young girls going to school in Afghanistan after years when educating a woman could be punished with beatings or imprisonment. It is the story about the character in men and women who volunteered to leave the comforts of home to defend freedom and keep our nation safe.
On behalf of the American people, I thank you for making that sacrifice. I know you have not shouldered the burdens of military life alone. You've had the support of strong and loving families to sustain you. And this morning, I want all of you and your families to hear your Commander-in-Chief loud and clear: We appreciate you, we love you, and we honor your service. (Applause.)
We also honor our wounded warriors -- and those who never returned home from the field of battle. In their sacrifices, we see one of the extraordinary legacies of our Armed Forces -- the willingness to give everything to secure safety at home and liberty abroad.
As the Admiral pointed out, we saw that selfless spirit in people like Petty Officer Michael Monsoor, a Navy SEAL who served in Iraq. In the fall of 2006, on a rooftop in Iraq, Mike threw himself onto a grenade in order to save the lives of his teammates. As Admiral Mullen mentioned, I had the honor of presenting Michael Monsoor's parents his posthumous Medal of Honor in the White House. On that day, I saw the deep sadness that is familiar to anyone who has lost a loved one in the line of duty. But I also saw the pride that comes with such noble sacrifice -- and the recognition that our freedom and our security only endure because of the acts of bravery like Michael Monsoor's.
That kind of courage, character, and devotion defines our Armed Forces. So this morning, I cannot accept your kind tribute unless I'm allowed to return the favor. To the men and women of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and all those who serve in the Department of Defense: You have the respect of a grateful nation that you have kept safe. You have the admiration of millions around the world who would have never tasted freedom without you. You have the undying love and respect of a man who has been proud to call himself your Commander-in-Chief.
Two weeks from today, Laura and I will take our final trip back to Texas -- or, as you Texans understand, back to the promised land. We have the honor of doing it onboard a 747 piloted by the United States Air Force -- Colonel Mark Tillman will be the lead pilot. This brings a fitting symmetry: The military brought me to Washington eight years ago -- and on January the 20th, the military is taking me home.
We will take with us many fond memories that we will cherish for the rest of our lives. We will always remember that you answered the call to serve when your nation needed you most. We will always remember that you did your duty with honor and dignity. And we will always remember the debt of gratitude that each of us who lives in freedom owes to each of you who has protected it.
May God bless you. And may God always bless the United States. (Applause.)
END 10:49 A.M. EST
2 Tribute to President Obama
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
Celebrities pay powerful, heartfelt tribute to President Obama
3 Remarks by the Federal President to the Troops in Baghdad
Tuesday, April 7, 2009
Al Faw Palace
Baghdad, Iraq
6:08 P.M. (Local)
4 Remarks by the Federal President on Memorial Day
Monday, May 25, 2009
REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON MEMORIAL DAY
Memorial Amphitheater
Arlington National Cemetery
5 'He Just Does What He Thinks Is Right'
Wall Street Journal, Saturday, December 26, 2009
By Peggy Noonan
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