Remarks by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSIS, Washington, D.C. Jan 07, 2009
MR. HADLEY: Thank you, John, very much for those kind words. I'm honored to be here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. I thank you for the research you conduct, the analysis you provide, and the policy ideas that you develop.
In less than two weeks, a new President will take the oath of office. And a watching world will witness the greatest of democratic transitions and traditions -- the peaceful transfer of power. President Bush's administration has been working closely with the President-elect's team to make this transition the smoothest in history. The stakes are clear.
America is a nation at war. And in the post-9/11 world, we face complex challenges that will not pause for a change in administrations.
Last month, President Bush delivered a series of speeches about how we have worked to confront these challenges over the past eight years. At the Saban Forum, the President discussed how our approach to the Middle East changed after 9/11. At West Point, the President explained how the military has transformed to meet the dangers of a new century. And at the Army War College, the President outlined the steps we have taken to keep America safe here at home, and to promote liberty abroad as the great alternative to terror.
Today I would like to talk to you about the core convictions that have formed the basis of President Bush's foreign policy -- what this administration has accomplished in key regions of the world -- and what opportunities and challenges await the next administration.
Over the past eight years, President Bush's foreign policy has been guided by three firm convictions. The President believes that liberty is God's gift to every man, woman, and child; that effective democratic states are the critical building blocks of a peaceful and prosperous international order; and that America is called to lead this community of democracies.
Ultimately, people will make the best decisions for themselves and for their societies if given the political freedom to do so. But to exercise that freedom, they must also be free from violence and injustice -- and be offered the means to overcome ignorance, want, and disease. Democratic states with effective institutions are best able to meet these needs and are our best partners in building a more peaceful and prosperous world. But these nations need American leadership. We are a wealthy and powerful nation with the capacity to make the world safer and better. And that imposes on us a moral obligation to do so. As President Bush often says, "To whom much is given, much is required."
These core convictions have helped President Bush steer his foreign policy through four popularly perceived but ultimately false choices.
The first false choice is between a "realistic" and an "idealistic" foreign policy. After 9/11, President Bush recognized that an idealistic foreign policy based on promoting liberty was the only realistic strategy for advancing America's fundamental interests. We are engaged in a great ideological struggle. And to prevail, we must counter the terrorists' dark ideology with a more hopeful alternative. As the President said in his second inaugural address: "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the worldt[and so] America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one."
The second false choice is between unilateralism and multilateralism. President Bush recognizes that the United States can rarely achieve its objectives by acting alone. So our preference is always to work with allies and partners. Yet international partnerships are not self-justifying. They must produce results. And when necessary, like every modern President before him, President Bush has been prepared to act alone to defend America's security.
The third false choice is between hard power and soft power, or military force and diplomacy. The President understands that we do not have to choose between these tools. Instead, we must integrate all elements of national power -- including diplomatic, economic, and military -- to advance our interests. When properly employed, these tools can be mutually reinforcing. Hard power makes soft power more effective. And by maintaining the credible threat of military force and economic sanctions, we add weight to our diplomacy.
The fourth false choice is between popularity and principle. America has always been defined by our ideals of liberty and justice. These ideals have made our nation a beacon of hope and opportunity for people around the world. In the short run, acting on principle can be unpopular -- because our principles challenge the world views of many, and our power thwarts the hegemonic ambitions of the few. But ultimately it is our principles that make us attractive to most of the world -- and if we hold to them, the world will see, respect, and support us.
By defying these false choices, President Bush has pursued a foreign policy that has delivered results around the world.
In Europe, President Bush has worked to build a continent that is whole, free, and at peace; that is united by common values; and that joins with America to confront the challenges of the 21st century.
Under the President's leadership, America has helped consolidate post-[Cold] War democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe. Today ten nations that were once behind the Iron Curtain are now members of Euro-Atlantic institutions. The people of Ukraine and Georgia have cast off tyranny and cast their votes in free elections. A reforming and democratic Turkey has a stronger relationship with the United States, and is moving closer to membership in the European Union. An expanded NATO alliance is fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and transforming to conduct operations beyond its borders.
Our strong relations across Europe present the next administration with many opportunities. Working with our European partners, the next administration should be able to enforce tougher sanctions on Iran; complete the integration of the Balkan states, including Kosovo and Serbia, into the transatlantic community; bring freedom to Belarus; and diversify the sources and routes of Europe's gas and oil supply.
On Russia, President Bush has worked to shift America's relationship from the rivalries of the Cold War to partnering with Russia in areas where we share common interests -- while managing our differences in a frank, consistent, and transparent way.
Today Russia and America are partnering on many fronts. We are working together to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. We are working together to prevent nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists. We are working together to ensure that Iran and North Korea cannot threaten their neighbors with nuclear weapons. And we are working together to support negotiations in the Holy Land for a Palestinian state and a durable peace.
At the same time, we understand that true partnerships depend on shared democratic values. And insofar as Russia falls short of respecting the rights and freedoms of its people and its neighbors, the scope of our partnership is necessarily and correspondingly limited. President Bush has made clear to Russia's leaders that the "great powers" of the 21st century cannot pursue the coercive policies of the 19th century. A Russia that continues to threaten its neighbors and manipulate their access to energy will compromise any aspirations for greater global influence. The next administration will have the challenge of building on our cooperation with Russia while also confronting that nation's aggressiveness and uncertain intentions.
In the Middle East, President Bush emphatically rejected the widely held view that the Arab world was unsuited for democracy and its people unready for freedom. Instead, the President has promoted democracy, liberty, and tolerance throughout the region, supported our friends and allies, and confronted extremist states and groups. In many respects, the Middle East has become the center of gravity of American foreign policy -- the principal theater of operations and deployment of our military, the testing ground for the strength of our principles and ideals, and the focus of our most important diplomacy.
Today, despite the violence in Gaza, there is the prospect of a freer and more hopeful future for the region. With help from the United States, our Gulf allies have greater defensive capabilities and more confidence in their ability to confront terrorism and other threats. Saudi Arabia -- the birthplace of 15 of the 9/11 hijackers -- is one of America's most capable partners in counterterrorism operations. Libya has abandoned its dangerous weapons of mass destruction programs, ended its support for terror, paid more than $1 billion to victims of past terrorist activities, and welcomed its first U.S. ambassador in three decades. Lebanon has regained its sovereignty, independence, and democracy after nearly 30 years of Syrian occupation, thanks to the courage of its people and the joint diplomacy of France and the United States. And across the Middle East, more people participate in competitive elections -- and more women vote and hold office -- than ever before.
We also see reasons for hope in the Holy Land. Israelis and Palestinians have been negotiating the peace -- with Arab support -- based on a vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. The United States is facilitating these talks. But we are not substituting ourselves for the parties or imposing our views on either side. In parallel with these negotiations, the United States is supporting Palestinian Authority President -- Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in his efforts to build the security, economic, and political institutions of a democratic state.
For the next administration, the biggest challenge in this region is Iran. Negotiations with Iran, as some have proposed, without leverage on Iran will not produce a change in Iranian behavior or advance U.S. interests. The outgoing administration and its international partners will leave the incoming team with significantly increased leverage on Iran. The issue is how the new team will use this leverage to produce a different Iranian policy on its nuclear program, terrorism, and Middle East peace.
Perhaps surprisingly, the biggest opportunity for the new administration may be Middle East peace. I hope the new team will not feel compelled to "reinvent the wheel," but will use the Annapolis process -- which has been embraced by the states of the region and enshrined in United States [sic] Security Council Resolution 1850 -- as an opportunity to advance the cause of peace. First and foremost, this means helping complete the building of the democratic institutions of a Palestinian state. This work is critical to any future peace. Second, it means using the confidential bilateral negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis already underway to negotiate the peace -- and build on the substantial progress that already has been made.
On Iraq, you have heard President Bush describe his strategy many times: to build a democratic Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, sustain itself, and be an ally in the war on terror. This goal has not changed. It has not been "dumbed-down" in response to hard going on the ground. And its realization is now in view.
It is in view because in January 2007, President Bush made the decision to "surge" additional forces into Iraq and give them a mission of securing the population. President Bush took this decision at a time when many government officials and military officers initially recommended against it, when many in the intelligence community, Washington think tanks, and on the editorial pages thought Iraq was lost to civil war, and Congress was trying to constrain funds for the effort. But events have vindicated the President's decision.
Today, violence is down across Iraq. The Iraqi people govern themselves under one of the most progressive constitutions in the Middle East. And for the first time in the region's history, Sunni, Shia, and Kurds are working together within a democratic framework to build a more hopeful future for their country.
As the "return on success" of its policies, the administration has been reducing troops in Iraq from post-surge levels since the end of 2007. And we recently concluded agreements that envision the completion of the U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011. As the members of the next administration carry out the status of forces agreement, they will have the opportunity to successfully conclude the American effort in Iraq. And as they implement the companion strategic framework agreement, America will gain a long-term democratic partner in the Middle East. Together, a democratic Iraq, a free Lebanon, and a democratic Palestinian state can be the keys to a transformed and more hopeful Middle East.
The Asia-Pacific is a region of increasing importance to America's security and economic well-being. President Bush has strengthened the institutional relationships that will allow the new President the better to advance our interests there. President Bush's strategy has been to revitalize existing alliances, establish new strategic partnerships, bring China into the international system as a responsible player, confront terrorist and proliferation threats, and promote freedom and democracy.
America is helping the people of Afghanistan recover from years of tyranny under the Taliban -- and build a more hopeful future of freedom. Today Afghanistan has a new democratic constitution, an elected parliament and president, more than 6 million children in school, 8,000 kilometers of new paved roads, and a growing military of 80,000 personnel.
We have maintained close relations with Afghanistan's neighbor -- Pakistan. We recognize that Pakistan faces enormous economic, political, and security challenges. But we also understand that Pakistan has a better chance of successfully meeting these challenges with a freely elected democratic government. And today Pakistan has such a government thanks in no small part to President Bush's skillful diplomacy.
We have formed a new strategic partnership with the world's largest democracy -- India. An historic agreement for civil nuclear cooperation has helped transform our relationship and make us global partners.
We have rebuilt relations with Indonesia -- the nation with the largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia has now ended the insurgency in Aceh and is combating the threat of terrorism.
We have revitalized our security alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. We have realigned and repositioned our military forces in these nations -- so we can better meet future challenges and reduce the burdens on local populations. And we have joined with our democratic allies to create the Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership to strengthen freedom in the region.
We have built a stronger relationship with China based on cooperation where we agree and candor where we disagree. Tensions with -- over Taiwan have eased considerably. And we continue to press China on human rights and religious freedom.
We have used the multilateral framework of the six-party talks to pressure North Korea to follow through on its agreements to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. These talks will be an early challenge for the incoming administration. North Korea will test the new administration by once again trying to split the six parties and renegotiate the deal. We have seen it before. And when its efforts to do so fail, North Korea will need to accept a verification agreement -- so we can verify the disablement and then dismantlement of that country's nuclear capabilities. Without this verification agreement, there can be no progress. This is especially true because some in the intelligence community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.
Afghanistan will be another early challenge for the new administration. The Taliban remain a serious threat. Its fighters have found safe haven across the border in Pakistan. And if the extremists succeed in destabilizing Pakistan, the chaos will threaten peace and progress throughout the region. So stabilizing Pakistan must be a first priority of the new administration -- as it has been one of ours.
The new administration also has the opportunity to build on our efforts to link the countries of Central Asia with the nations of South Asia through a new axis of trade and energy. This axis can be the key to a more stable, prosperous, and democratic region.
And finally, I hope the new administration will continue pushing the cause of human rights and freedom in Burma.
In the Western Hemisphere, President Bush confronted the challenges of a region where many had begun to doubt the benefits of democracy and freedom. The President's strategy has been to help democratic governments in the region better serve their people -- and demonstrate that democracy can deliver and that freedom is the path to prosperity and a better life.
Under President Bush's leadership, the United States has renewed its commitment to social justice in the region. We've pledged $2 billion for new initiatives to improve access to health care, education, affordable housing, and economic opportunity. We have helped lift the burden of more than $3 billion of debt. We've negotiated free trade agreements with 10 nations, including two agreements awaiting approval from Congress. We've pledged $1.3 billion to help Mexico and Central American nations fight organized crime networks and drug traffickers. We are helping Colombia defeat the FARC and other narco-terrorists. We have formed an important strategic partnership with Brazil. And we are working with states like Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay to showcase the benefits of markets, democracy, and freedom -- as the alternative to competing visions based on populist rhetoric, statist economics, and authoritarian politics.
The commitment of these states represents an important opportunity for the new administration. As a good first step, the new Congress should approve the free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama -- as well as South Korea. And the most dramatic opportunity for advancing America's agenda in the hemisphere would be for the new administration to work with Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform -- and build an immigration system that is compassionate and fair.
As seen best in Africa, President Bush has followed an approach to development that embraces partnership instead of paternalism. We work with democracies that govern justly, fight corruption, invest in the health and education of their people, embrace free trade and free markets to lift people out of poverty, and achieve results. President Bush and Congress have backed this strategy with unprecedent resources. During the President's first term, our nation tripled bilateral assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. And we are on a pace to double our assistance again by 2010.
Across Africa, a new day of hope is dawning. Major conflicts have ended in Liberia, Angola, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. With American support, African leaders and regional organizations are stepping forward to help end violence in Darfur, Congo, and Somalia. Together, the countries of the G8 have relieved $34 billion of debt for 19 African countries. Through new initiatives, the United States is partnering with African nations to improve education, promote free enterprise, and combat the scourge of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases through the international Global Fund and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. And through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, we have signed 11 compacts with African nations to help their people build a brighter future. The people of Africa have a strong and reliable partner in the United States -- and I hope the next administration will continue this approach.
Finally, around the world, President Bush has led a global campaign against terror. After September 11th, 2001, President Bush recognized that terrorism was not just an issue of law enforcement, but a war to be won, a battle of arms and ideas.
One of the President's most significant contributions has been to establish the basic principles for waging this struggle: We will not wait for new threats to gather. We will fight the terrorists abroad -- so we do not have to face them here at home. We will make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them. We will counter the ideology of violent extremism with a more hopeful vision of tolerance and freedom. And we will make clear that violence against civilians is never justified -- by any cause or creed.
We have seen the results of this approach. Together with a coalition of more than 90 nations, we have used all elements of our national power to kill or capture terrorist leaders, deny them safe haven, and choke off their financing. And thanks to the courage of the men and women who work day and night to defend our nation, we have saved lives around the world -- and have not experienced a terrorist attack on our soil for more than seven years.
The biggest threat to our nation would be the world's most dangerous weapons falling into the hands of the world's most dangerous terrorists. President Bush has placed great emphasis on countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He created the Proliferation Security Initiative, which now includes over 90 countries that cooperate together to interdict the movement of WMD materials and technology on land, at sea, and in the air. Through other initiatives, the administration is helping to secure WMD materials and technology around the globe. And we have enhanced our defenses against the WMD threat. This includes building missile defenses that provide protection to the U.S. homeland, our deployed troops, and our allies from attacks by rogue states that might possess these weapons.
President Bush has put in place the tools that will permit future Presidents to succeed in the long struggle ahead. And I hope the next administration will preserve these tools and use them effectively to defend our security and freedom.
President Bush has led our nation during a time of great consequence. Few presidents have faced more challenges. But when the history books are written, they will tell the story of a man who never wavered from his principles, who kept our nation safe, and who helped spread the blessing of liberty to millions around the world.
As this administration ends and a new one begins, we can have confidence in the future of our nation -- because we can have confidence in the character of our people, the power of our ideals, and the enduring strength of our democracy. Along with every other American, I wish the President-Elect Obama and his team all the best and every success. Thank you. (Applause.)
DR. HAMRE: Thank you very much, Steve. We've got about 15 minutes for questions, and so let me open up the floor for those that would like -- please identify yourself so that I know who you are so that we can get -- get the ball rolling, please.
Q I am from Freedom House. And I represent an international non-profit organization that monitors freedom and democracy around the world since 1972. And we -- we release annual surveys with ratings on freedom in every country in the world. And we use complex methodology that is internationally recognized and respected. And our surveys show --
DR. HAMRE: Do you have a question? Let's have a question.
Q Yes. Our surveys show that for the past three years freedom was in retreat around the world. President Bush declared his freedom agenda to be a priority in the U.S. foreign policy. And I would like to know how you can -- what you can say about the -- how you can comment that our ratings show retreat in freedom around the world?
MR. HADLEY: I think one of the things we know is the advance of freedom is hard work and a long-term project. And I think it's had its ups and downs. And I think a three-year sample -- I'm sure that all your metrics are right, and you can say that it may have declined over the last three years.
I think what the President's agenda is based on the following notion. One, we need to hold the ideal of freedom out there as a rallying point for people. But also, they are national projects that advance the hard work of freedom that are going to take time.
I think -- the point I made with respect to the Middle East, I think that, as I said, there are more people voting, there are more people -- more women participating in government than there were in the past. But the truth is the project to bring freedom to the Middle East is going to depend on the success of the efforts in Lebanon, the success on the efforts in Iraq, and the success on building a Palestinian state, so that there are examples of free societies that are succeeding to give hope and examples in the region.
If you look at what's going on in Iraq, Tariq Aziz, the -- Dr. Rubaie, the National Security Advisor for Iraq, was in yesterday. And one of the things I talked to him about was what is really going on there is unprecedented in the history of Iraq, and unprecedented in the Middle East. Sunni, Shia, and Kurds are trying to work together in a democratic framework to advance a future for their country -- not Shia on top, Sunni on the bottom, or the reverse, which has been the history in the region -- but with them working together in a democratic framework.
The success of that experiment is terribly important if the issue of tensions within the Middle East is going to be resolved. If that experiment can succeed and be an example for the rest of the Middle East, you can, over time -- and it is the work of a long period of time -- advance and bring freedom to the Middle East. But it's going to take time, and it's not going to be something that you can take the temperature every year and say are we succeeding and failing, useful as that activity is.
So I think -- and the other thing I would say is, you know, there are setbacks. You know, we saw in 2004/2005 the advance of freedom. We saw, you know, the Rose Revolution, the Cedar Revolution, the Orange Revolution. And what we found in 2006 is the empire has a way of striking back, and the forces of reaction are strong.
So this work of freedom is going to take a long time. It is not the work of the Bush administration; it has been the project of America since its inception. We are founded as a nation not because of common language or common ethnic background; we are founded as a nation on a set of principles, and they have freedom and liberty on their core. And that is who we are as a people. And that is what we've done throughout our history. We have fought in world wars in order to advance the cause of freedom and democracy; it's what we are as a nation. And I think it is what every administration has done, with more or less emphasis.
And my hope for the new administration is that they maintain the emphasis, because as I think we've seen, and the President strongly believes, the challenges we face are from forces that oppose freedom and have a different view. And we are only going to defeat them is if we can offer an alternative to people of a democratic -- and a structure and society that will over time deliver a better life for their peoples.
Q Mr. Hadley, I was wondering if you could comment on an article in The New York Times a couple of weeks ago that spoke of an unprecedented effort on the part of the outgoing Bush administration to bring the incoming Obama national security and foreign policy team up to speed on the world's hot spots, drawing up special contingency plans. Can you confirm basically the gist of the article? And to what extent should anyone view this, if in fact this is the case, as an admission on the part of the outgoing administration that they're leaving a lot of loose ends for the incoming people to pick up?
MR. HADLEY: Well, I think "loose ends" is putting it mildly. (Laughter.) Look, there has, I think, rarely been a President who has had more challenges -- he would say opportunities -- than President Bush. And that means that there rarely has been an incoming President who has as many challenges and opportunities as President-Elect Obama.
We are doing this transition for the first time in over 50 years when the nation is at war, and when our forces are deployed in a global war on terror, but also with theaters in Iraq and Afghanistan. So it seems only appropriate in this different kind of historical time we have a different kind of transition. And this is very much a mutual effort by the outgoing team and the incoming team.
I was in the transition from President Ford to President Carter, and I must say I was surprised -- I stayed on with the new team for about three weeks, and all the vaunted secure filing cabinets in the Old EOB were empty. There was not a single piece of paper that was transitioned to the new team. And I've always thought this was very -- not good governance at its best.
So what we are doing is the following: One of the things we've done is we have taken the 40 key issues in this administration and we have prepared a document, which basically, on each one is a memorandum that says, this is what we found, this is what our strategy was, this is what we think we've accomplished, and this is the work that remains to be done. And behind that memorandum is a chronology of events within our administration and all the various source documents.
Why do we do this? The new team doesn't need to read them, certainly doesn't need to follow the policies in them. But we thought it was important, in this different kind of transition, for them to know what they have to work with -- what kind of policy is in place, what kind of relationships are in place, and what kind of tools they have available, and what we at least think are the challenges that are going to hit them quickly.
We've also got, as you would expect, the series of briefing memorandums and view-graph briefings on the issues of the day. We're also going to try and see if we can have some sessions where the outgoing NSC team meets with the incoming NSC team, sits down and has some briefings on particularly sensitive topics, brief them together so we can have some interaction and they can get a sense of how the various departments and agencies are working together on these -- some of these common problems.
So it is -- we are, both sides, with the direction of both President Bush and President-Elect Obama, trying to make this a very different transition, because we're in a very different time, and we all, as Americans, want the new team to succeed and to be able to take these challenges and turn them into opportunities for the country.
Q Thank you. Mr. Hadley, thank you very much. This is a great speech. I think this is the first time in many, many years I have heard this -- maybe a farewell speech by President Bush. My question is that you said that Pakistan has become a safe haven for terrorists. And it's been eight years now that many think tanks are saying that Pakistan is today a factory for terrorists, which they are exporting around the globe, including against India and also in the Middle East and so forth. It's been eight years now that billions of dollars has gone to Pakistan to curb the terrorists and also hatred against the West and against the U.S., and to close down madrassas and so forth. But still, in eight years, terrorism has not gone down, but it has gone up --
DR. HAMRE: I need a question. I need a question.
Q The question is that, what happened in eight years that we could not control terrorism there? And what advice do you have for your counterpart of the new administration, how they will do it and which we could not do -- and we still have at large Osama bin Laden? Thank you.
MR. HADLEY: Yes, I think that Pakistan is a victim of terror. And one of the things that people have focused on is, well, activities in certain of the border regions of Pakistan make more difficult achieving democratic stability in Afghanistan, which is true.
But I think one of the things we've also seen is that those -- that terrorist presence -- Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups -- also are a threat to Pakistan. And I think the -- this democratic government in Pakistan understands that. If you talk to President Zardari, he says, you don't need to tell me that Pakistanis are victims of terror; the terrorists killed my wife.
So what you have is a democratic government in Pakistan, and we think that is a real opportunity, because we think that democratic government has the opportunity to rally the people of Pakistan in -- behind what is going to be a very difficult fight. This is a new government. It is getting its bearings. It faces severe terrorist threats from organizations that have deep roots into the society. They have a military force that was designed for conventional conflict with India, not for dealing with counterterrorism.
What we've learned in all of these things, that it takes a long time. I think in the early years after the war on terror, we made some great progress. I think we should not underestimate the difficulty of President Musharraf after 9/11 being called upon to make a strategic shift and going against al Qaeda and being willingness -- willing to do so. And in the years past 2001, in the first three or four years of the war on terror, most of the al Qaeda leadership which were killed or captured were killed or captured in Pakistan.
But there was a period of time, about two to three years ago, when Pakistan tried negotiating arrangements with tribal groups on the grounds that they would control the terrorists, and I think those arrangements for a lot of reasons did not work. And then Pakistan went into a very difficult political transition from which this new government has emerged.
And that's where we are -- a new government that I think is talking clearly that it wants to confront terror, but does not really at this point have the tools and has probably as difficult a challenge to deal with the various groups that it has of any nation.
And that's why I think it is going to be one of the key challenges, because success in Pakistan, overcoming this challenge, is important for stability in Pakistan, which is important to us in itself. But stability in Pakistan is also going to be important and success in the war on terror in Pakistan is also going to be important if we're going to take care of the problem in Afghanistan and if we are going to get Pakistan and Indian relations to continue on a positive footing.
So there is a lot at stake in Pakistan, and they have as daunting a task as any government today. And it is going to be very important for the new team to support their efforts, and I'm encouraged. I think you've seen statements from President-Elect Obama, certainly from President-Elect -- Vice President Biden, that I think they understand the challenge that Pakistan faces, and that means the challenge we face.
Q Mr. Hadley, could you say a little bit more about Mexico? You mentioned the Mérida program, which your administration effectively saw through. Has the money been released? And -- but more generally, is the problem being effectively tackled in Mexico? The Calderón government has deployed 36,000 troops across the country, and yet the killings continue and there seems to be a real problem there.
MR. HADLEY: I did not probably say enough about that. I think that is a real challenge for the new team, as well. Mexico I think is -- obviously if you talk to Mexican authorities, they feel very much under threat. And it's -- you know, the way to understate it is to say it is a terrorism problem, it is a narco-trafficking problem. I think a better way to see it is that it is a potential threat to the future of a democratic Mexico. And I think if you listen to President Calderón, that's how he sees it. It is very much the kind of threat that President Uribe faced in Colombia.
There are things we can do, and the Mérida Initiative has a long list of training, equipment, and other things we can provide to make Mexican authorities more effective in dealing with this problem. But the Mexican authorities have some choices they have to make, as well, and it's this old problem -- for the moment, it is being fought in the context of a law enforcement model, with the military now engaged, which has been a difficult issue for Mexican society, but in this odd arrangement in conjunction and in support of the law enforcement.
So my understanding is the military go after people with a warrant in hand. You can work that, I suppose, but I think the real question for the Mexican authorities and for their politics: Is the level of effort and commitment they are making proportional to the threat that the problem is -- poses to the future of that government? And then the question for us is, are we doing all we can to support them, to make them more capable and more effective? That in itself is a difficult issue for Mexico, given the history between the United States and Mexico. And I think they have been quite courageous, and it's an indication of the measure of seriousness with which they view the problem is that they are willing to consider a kind of cooperation with the United States that would have been unthinkable 10 years ago.
The President is -- President Bush is very impressed with President Calderón. We think he has the right plan. He has a challenge, obviously, to mobilize his society to make the commitment to deal with this problem. And then we in turn need to do what we need -- what we can to help them, because a problem on the southern side of the border, if we do not handle it, will be an even more severe problem on the north of the border -- that is to say, in the United States. It's a problem now, and it could get worse.
So we think what we have left for the new team is a good framework. Thanks to the Congress we have some -- an initial down payment of some important resources to put into it. But again, this is going to be one of those long, long struggles.
I think the importance of what has happened in Colombia in a program started by the Clinton administration and continued by ours, and really because of President Uribe in Colombia, is, this can be done. Democratic societies do not need to give in to these narco-terrorists. It's a long fight. It requires a commitment. It requires help. But I think the lesson from Colombia is that these fights can be won, and we need to then help Mexico to win its fight, as well.
Q Sir, you mentioned U.S.-China relations. You touched upon cross-strait relationship, the reduction of tension. How -- could you elaborate a little bit more on the current state of U.S.-China relations, which seems to be one of the bright spots of President Bush's foreign policy successes, and also the current state of U.S.-Taiwan relations, which experienced some very hard times over the last eight years? Thank you very much.
MR. HADLEY: What President Bush has tried to do is have a course that basically respects, you know, the One China policy and all the rest, and the three communiqués which are the bulwark of our policy with respect to China, but also to make very clear that we -- that both sides, China and Taiwan, need to respect the status quo, and there needs to be no unilateral actions by either side. And that was very much his -- the framework of his policy with respect to China, and at the same time making very clear to China that we would carry out our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to make sure that Taiwan had the capacity to provide for its own defense.
And the President stood very firm with respect to those principles. And I think that helped get through a difficult patch in the relations between China and Taiwan, and have helped encourage what is really a very hopeful turn in relations between China and Taiwan.
But I want to make another point, which is that when China -- when President Bush approached Asia, he approached it not by starting first with our relations with China, but starting first with our relations with our traditional allies. And he took, as part of his -- a central feature of his Asia policy -- to strengthen those alliances and to try and deal with a pretty long list of unresolved issues and irritants in those relationships, dealing with our force presence, the location of our forces, and all the rest, and working with successive governments in Japan and South Korea.
We have really worked through that list over these last eight years. And I think those relationships are very strong. And that provides a platform for the United States in dealing with China, both the opportunities and challenges presented by China.
So I think it is also very important for the new administration to think in the same way about how they are going to approach the issue of Asia more generally, and to see our relations with China in that broader context.
DR. HAMRE: Ladies and gentlemen, I know there are more questions, I'm sorry, but we promised the National Security Advisor we'd be out by 11:30 a.m., so thank you all. Please stay in your seats just so we could get him out through the security pattern. Thank you. Let's all thank him for a great presentation. (Applause.)
END 11:32 A.M. EST
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Pakistan's FATA--A Most Dangerous Place
FATA--A Most Dangerous Place. By Shuja Nawaz et al.
Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
CSIS, Jan 07, 2009
Increased militancy and violence in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), have brought this region into sharper focus, as U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani leaders attempt to find solutions to the problems underlying the situation there. This most dangerous spot on the map may well be the source of another 9/11 type of attack on the Western world or its surrogates in the region. Should such an attack occur, it likely will be spawned in the militancy that grips FATA and contiguous areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Failure to bring peace and to restore a modicum of stability to FATA will have widespread repercussions for the region and perhaps the world.
This report attempts to define the conditions that spawn militancy and violence among the Pashtun tribesmen that inhabit FATA and to suggest measures that can be taken in the short term (next 1-2 years) and the medium term (next 3-5 years). Specific recommendations are directed individually to the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States, the Pakistani military, and the U.S. military and CENTCOM.
Download the PDF here.
Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan
CSIS, Jan 07, 2009
Increased militancy and violence in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), have brought this region into sharper focus, as U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani leaders attempt to find solutions to the problems underlying the situation there. This most dangerous spot on the map may well be the source of another 9/11 type of attack on the Western world or its surrogates in the region. Should such an attack occur, it likely will be spawned in the militancy that grips FATA and contiguous areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan today. Failure to bring peace and to restore a modicum of stability to FATA will have widespread repercussions for the region and perhaps the world.
This report attempts to define the conditions that spawn militancy and violence among the Pashtun tribesmen that inhabit FATA and to suggest measures that can be taken in the short term (next 1-2 years) and the medium term (next 3-5 years). Specific recommendations are directed individually to the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States, the Pakistani military, and the U.S. military and CENTCOM.
Download the PDF here.
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan Hosts Afghan Women Lawyers Training Conference in the US
Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan Hosts Afghan Women Lawyers Training Conference in the United States
Media Note
US State Dept, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, January 7, 2009
The U.S. Department of State’s Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan, working in close collaboration with the American legal community, will host a group of 14 prominent Afghan women judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in Riverside, California and Washington, DC, from January 9-24. Under the leadership of the former Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, Dr. Kerry Healey, and United States District Judge Stephen G. Larson of the Central District of California, the women will participate in two weeks of intensive legal seminars, roundtable events, and consultations with senior officials from the State of California and the U.S. Government, including former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. During these sessions, the women will explore current topics in the Afghan and American legal systems, legal decision-making and mediation, domestic violence, and family, mental health, and narcotics law, while gaining hands-on exposure to the American judicial system.
Launched by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in December 2007, the Public-Private Partnership has received pledges exceeding $1.3 million in monetary and in-kind contributions. The Public-Private Partnership is co-chaired by David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Robert C. O’Brien, a partner at Arent Fox LLP and former U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations.
This effort is possible through the financial and in-kind contributions of the law firms of Akin Gump, Arent Fox, Bingham, the Law Offices of Don Edgar, Irell & Manella, Jones Day, Korbel Media, Quinn Emanuel, Shernoff Bidart Darras & Echeverria, Vinson & Elkins and former Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, as well as the Leo A. Deegan Inn of Court, the Embassy of Afghanistan, the Federal Bar Association (Riverside), the Riverside and San Bernardino county bar associations, Loyola College, La Verne College of Law, The George Washington University School of Law, and the Federal Judicial Center. Duane and Kelly Roberts, proprietors of the historic Mission Inn, have contributed lodging, meeting space, and food for the delegation in Riverside, California.
Electronic Access via Internet More information about the Public-Private Partnership is available for download from the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/partnership/index.htm
Media Note
US State Dept, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, January 7, 2009
The U.S. Department of State’s Public-Private Partnership for Justice Reform in Afghanistan, working in close collaboration with the American legal community, will host a group of 14 prominent Afghan women judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in Riverside, California and Washington, DC, from January 9-24. Under the leadership of the former Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts, Dr. Kerry Healey, and United States District Judge Stephen G. Larson of the Central District of California, the women will participate in two weeks of intensive legal seminars, roundtable events, and consultations with senior officials from the State of California and the U.S. Government, including former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor. During these sessions, the women will explore current topics in the Afghan and American legal systems, legal decision-making and mediation, domestic violence, and family, mental health, and narcotics law, while gaining hands-on exposure to the American judicial system.
Launched by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in December 2007, the Public-Private Partnership has received pledges exceeding $1.3 million in monetary and in-kind contributions. The Public-Private Partnership is co-chaired by David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Robert C. O’Brien, a partner at Arent Fox LLP and former U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations.
This effort is possible through the financial and in-kind contributions of the law firms of Akin Gump, Arent Fox, Bingham, the Law Offices of Don Edgar, Irell & Manella, Jones Day, Korbel Media, Quinn Emanuel, Shernoff Bidart Darras & Echeverria, Vinson & Elkins and former Ambassador Thomas A. Schweich, as well as the Leo A. Deegan Inn of Court, the Embassy of Afghanistan, the Federal Bar Association (Riverside), the Riverside and San Bernardino county bar associations, Loyola College, La Verne College of Law, The George Washington University School of Law, and the Federal Judicial Center. Duane and Kelly Roberts, proprietors of the historic Mission Inn, have contributed lodging, meeting space, and food for the delegation in Riverside, California.
Electronic Access via Internet More information about the Public-Private Partnership is available for download from the State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/partnership/index.htm
How Should Developing Nations Regulate Health Care?
How Should Developing Nations Regulate Health Care?, by Michael F. Cannon
Cato, January 6, 2009 @ 1:54 pm
The latest issue of the journal Health Affairs publishes a letter I wrote to the editors concerning articles on health care regulation in China and India. The entire letter follows (links added):
Recent articles on China and India (Jul/Aug 08) share the assumptions that markets for medical care and health insurance require extensive government regulation and that each nation should focus on universal coverage.
I am unfamiliar with the history of regulation in those nations. But the track record of clinician and insurance regulation in the United States is not encouraging. Both have been used by incumbents to block competition, leading to higher costs and lower quality. Gerald Bloom and colleagues worry that unless India imposes clinician licensing, “the natural process of competition is expected to force each insurer to come up with its own accreditation policy and reimbursement procedures.” Does that mean that prepayment would compete openly with fee-for-service? And that physicians could not increase costs by blocking health plans from employing mid-levels when appropriate? Dear God—not that.
Ashoke Bhattacharjya and Puneet Sapra write, “It is encouraging to note that notwithstanding the myriad issues and challenges discussed above, both countries are developing a constructive working framework to balance the interests of government, providers, employers, the insurance industry, and patients, en route to the goal of universal coverage and fairness in health care financing.” That’s just the problem: a policy of universal coverage puts too much power in the hands of elites. It inevitably “balances” those interests, when patients’ interests should trump all others. Does not the fact that “these countries lack the fiscal resources required for universal coverage because of their…low average wages” suggest that many residents have more pressing needs than health insurance? For things that might just deliver greater health improvements? In a profession where universal coverage is a religion, such questions are heresy, I know.
China and India are in the process of a slow climb out of poverty. It is entirely possible that the best thing those governments could do to improve these markets and population health would be to enforce contracts, punish torts, contain contagion, and nothing else.
Michael F. Cannon
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.
Cato, January 6, 2009 @ 1:54 pm
The latest issue of the journal Health Affairs publishes a letter I wrote to the editors concerning articles on health care regulation in China and India. The entire letter follows (links added):
Recent articles on China and India (Jul/Aug 08) share the assumptions that markets for medical care and health insurance require extensive government regulation and that each nation should focus on universal coverage.
I am unfamiliar with the history of regulation in those nations. But the track record of clinician and insurance regulation in the United States is not encouraging. Both have been used by incumbents to block competition, leading to higher costs and lower quality. Gerald Bloom and colleagues worry that unless India imposes clinician licensing, “the natural process of competition is expected to force each insurer to come up with its own accreditation policy and reimbursement procedures.” Does that mean that prepayment would compete openly with fee-for-service? And that physicians could not increase costs by blocking health plans from employing mid-levels when appropriate? Dear God—not that.
Ashoke Bhattacharjya and Puneet Sapra write, “It is encouraging to note that notwithstanding the myriad issues and challenges discussed above, both countries are developing a constructive working framework to balance the interests of government, providers, employers, the insurance industry, and patients, en route to the goal of universal coverage and fairness in health care financing.” That’s just the problem: a policy of universal coverage puts too much power in the hands of elites. It inevitably “balances” those interests, when patients’ interests should trump all others. Does not the fact that “these countries lack the fiscal resources required for universal coverage because of their…low average wages” suggest that many residents have more pressing needs than health insurance? For things that might just deliver greater health improvements? In a profession where universal coverage is a religion, such questions are heresy, I know.
China and India are in the process of a slow climb out of poverty. It is entirely possible that the best thing those governments could do to improve these markets and population health would be to enforce contracts, punish torts, contain contagion, and nothing else.
Michael F. Cannon
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.
Darfur: Ban welcomes US pledge to airlift critical supplies to UN-African Union force
Darfur: Ban welcomes US pledge to airlift critical supplies to UN-African Union force
UN, New York, Jan 7 2009 2:10PM
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has thanked United States President George W. Bush for his country’s recent commitment to airlift supplies urgently needed by the joint United Nations-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in the strife-torn Darfur region of Sudan.
“The expedited arrival to Darfur of this material, which includes trucks and other essential equipment, will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and carry out other aspects of its mandate,” Mr. Ban’s spokesperson said in a <"statement'>http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3649">statement.
The hybrid force, known as <"http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/index.html%22%3EUNAMID, was set up by the Security Council to protect civilians in Darfur, where an estimated 300,000 people have been killed and another 2.7 million have been forced from their homes since fighting erupted in 2003, pitting rebels against Government forces and allied Janjaweed militiamen.
The US initiative “sets a constructive precedent for broad international support to expeditiously deploy UNAMID,” the statement noted, adding that the Secretary-General calls on other Member States to consider similar efforts to speed up the deployment of the mission.
At full strength, UNAMID, which marked its first anniversary last week, is slated to become the world body’s largest peacekeeping operation with some 26,000 military and police personnel.
One year on from transferring the task of suppressing the violence to UNAMID from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), some 12,374 blue helmets are now in place across Darfur, which is 63 per cent of the 19,555 military personnel authorized by the Security Council.
Jan 7 2009 2:10PM
________________
For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news
UN, New York, Jan 7 2009 2:10PM
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has thanked United States President George W. Bush for his country’s recent commitment to airlift supplies urgently needed by the joint United Nations-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force in the strife-torn Darfur region of Sudan.
“The expedited arrival to Darfur of this material, which includes trucks and other essential equipment, will strengthen the ability of the United Nations to protect civilians and carry out other aspects of its mandate,” Mr. Ban’s spokesperson said in a <"statement'>http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=3649">statement.
The hybrid force, known as <"http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/index.html%22%3EUNAMID, was set up by the Security Council to protect civilians in Darfur, where an estimated 300,000 people have been killed and another 2.7 million have been forced from their homes since fighting erupted in 2003, pitting rebels against Government forces and allied Janjaweed militiamen.
The US initiative “sets a constructive precedent for broad international support to expeditiously deploy UNAMID,” the statement noted, adding that the Secretary-General calls on other Member States to consider similar efforts to speed up the deployment of the mission.
At full strength, UNAMID, which marked its first anniversary last week, is slated to become the world body’s largest peacekeeping operation with some 26,000 military and police personnel.
One year on from transferring the task of suppressing the violence to UNAMID from the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), some 12,374 blue helmets are now in place across Darfur, which is 63 per cent of the 19,555 military personnel authorized by the Security Council.
Jan 7 2009 2:10PM
________________
For more details go to UN News Centre at http://www.un.org/news
"The Future of Babylon": Management & Conservation Plan for Ancient Site in Iraq
"The Future of Babylon" Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Funds Project to Develop Management and Conservation Plan for Ancient Site in Iraq
Media Note
US State Dept, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, January 7, 2009
The U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce its support of a project to develop a plan for the management and preservation of the archaeological site of Babylon. Funded to nearly $700,000, this project will be carried out by the World Monuments Fund (WMF) in partnership with the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH). Babylon stands out among Iraq’s rich contributions to humanity and “The Future of Babylon” project exemplifies the American people’s commitment to the preservation of human heritage and their respect for the cultural heritage of Iraq.
The management plan is expected to be completed within two years. Using a process driven by the significance of the site and the interests of the Iraqi stakeholders, the project will identify the purposes for which the site will be conserved and managed, and specify goals and policies to direct, guide, and regulate future uses and interventions at the site. The SBAH has dedicated a group of professional staff to collaborate on the planning and fieldwork tasks for the Babylon project. This process will produce methodologies for site management to benefit heritage sites throughout Iraq.
WMF, which has worked for over 40 years with communities and countries around the world to support the conservation and preservation of endangered architectural and cultural heritage sites, will collaborate with the SBAH on the Babylon site management plan as part of a larger ongoing project, the Getty Conservation Institute-World Monuments Fund joint “Initiative to Conserve Iraqi Cultural Heritage.” Among the goals of the Babylon project will be the development of technologically and culturally appropriate conservation solutions that also meet international standards; incorporation of holistic preservation approaches embracing environmental, social and economic factors; and economic self-sufficiency. For more information, visit http://www.wmf.org/.
The Cultural Heritage Center of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs supports foreign affairs functions related to the preservation of cultural heritage. Since 2003, the Center has supported numerous projects directed at safeguarding Iraq's cultural heritage and is currently engaged in the Iraq Cultural Heritage Project to assist in the preservation of the ancient history of Iraq. For more information, visit http://exchanges.state.gov/chc.html.
2008/015
Media Note
US State Dept, Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC, January 7, 2009
The U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce its support of a project to develop a plan for the management and preservation of the archaeological site of Babylon. Funded to nearly $700,000, this project will be carried out by the World Monuments Fund (WMF) in partnership with the Iraq State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH). Babylon stands out among Iraq’s rich contributions to humanity and “The Future of Babylon” project exemplifies the American people’s commitment to the preservation of human heritage and their respect for the cultural heritage of Iraq.
The management plan is expected to be completed within two years. Using a process driven by the significance of the site and the interests of the Iraqi stakeholders, the project will identify the purposes for which the site will be conserved and managed, and specify goals and policies to direct, guide, and regulate future uses and interventions at the site. The SBAH has dedicated a group of professional staff to collaborate on the planning and fieldwork tasks for the Babylon project. This process will produce methodologies for site management to benefit heritage sites throughout Iraq.
WMF, which has worked for over 40 years with communities and countries around the world to support the conservation and preservation of endangered architectural and cultural heritage sites, will collaborate with the SBAH on the Babylon site management plan as part of a larger ongoing project, the Getty Conservation Institute-World Monuments Fund joint “Initiative to Conserve Iraqi Cultural Heritage.” Among the goals of the Babylon project will be the development of technologically and culturally appropriate conservation solutions that also meet international standards; incorporation of holistic preservation approaches embracing environmental, social and economic factors; and economic self-sufficiency. For more information, visit http://www.wmf.org/.
The Cultural Heritage Center of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs supports foreign affairs functions related to the preservation of cultural heritage. Since 2003, the Center has supported numerous projects directed at safeguarding Iraq's cultural heritage and is currently engaged in the Iraq Cultural Heritage Project to assist in the preservation of the ancient history of Iraq. For more information, visit http://exchanges.state.gov/chc.html.
2008/015
Russian Energy Supply Conflict: Domestic Resources Key To U.S. Energy Security
Russian Energy Supply Conflict: Further Evidence Domestic Resources Key To U.S. Energy Security
IER urges Congress to focus on America’s oil and natural gas resources in both energy and economic policies
Institute for Energy Research, Wednesday, January 7, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. —As the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee prepares to hold its first hearing on energy security tomorrow, Institute for Energy Research (IER) Senior Vice President for Policy Daniel Kish is reminding lawmakers that the answer to both our economic recovery and energy future lies in our nation’s vast domestic natural resources.
Russia’s sudden decision to shut off natural gas supply to neighboring Ukraine last week further reinforces the need to reduce U.S. reliance on unstable foreign regimes for oil and natural gas imports. As such, any effort by the 111th Congress to increase energy production at home would reduce America’s reliance on imported oil while simultaneously creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and providing a major boost to the national economy.
IER urges Congress to focus on America’s oil and natural gas resources in both energy and economic policies
Institute for Energy Research, Wednesday, January 7, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. —As the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee prepares to hold its first hearing on energy security tomorrow, Institute for Energy Research (IER) Senior Vice President for Policy Daniel Kish is reminding lawmakers that the answer to both our economic recovery and energy future lies in our nation’s vast domestic natural resources.
Russia’s sudden decision to shut off natural gas supply to neighboring Ukraine last week further reinforces the need to reduce U.S. reliance on unstable foreign regimes for oil and natural gas imports. As such, any effort by the 111th Congress to increase energy production at home would reduce America’s reliance on imported oil while simultaneously creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and providing a major boost to the national economy.
“With Congress beginning to map out an agenda to address our nation’s energy security, our lawmakers should consider the havoc wreaked last week by Russia’s abrupt decision to shut off the supply of natural gas to the Ukraine,” says Kish. “This rash action imperiled almost 20 percent of central Europe’s gas supplies — which must first pass through the Ukraine.
“As this overseas energy supply conflict illustrates, any plan to improve America’s energy security must involve reducing U.S. reliance on imports from unstable foreign regimes like Russia. While Europe may be forced to rely on Russia and other imported energy, the US has no excuse. North America is chock full of natural gas, conventional and unconventional oil and coal that can be cleanly converted to energy. With less than 4% of our governments’ lands leased for energy, Congress should be asking if we can afford to say ‘Nyet’ to domestic energy production. And that’s not the only reason Capitol Hill should act to expand access to our energy supplies here at home.
“Amid a faltering economy and rising unemployment rates, ‘job security’ has joined ‘energy security’ as one of many Americans’ top priorities.Fortunately, our domestic natural resources hold answers to the current recession too. Recent research shows that developing America’s oil and gas resources will create jobs, stimulate the economy, and generate massive revenues for taxpayers.
“Policies that encourage greater exploration and development of our nation’s vast energy resources will ensure that Americans are able to take control of their energy and financial future.”
Bombay attacks, Pakistan international duties
Pakistan’s Accountability and International Obligations, by S.R. Subramanian
IDSA, January 06, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
Taking into account domestic pressure for perceptible results, India has moved the “1267 Committee” of the UN Security Council to ban the Jamat-ud-Dawah, the predecessor of Lashkhar-e-Taiba, for its involvement in the [Bombay attacks, Dec 2008]. The world body had already on May 2, 2005 listed Lashkhar-e-Taiba as one of the “entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida”. Even before the Mumbai attacks, India had been demanding that the Jamat-ud-Dawah be brought under the purview of international measures (“Consolidated List”) but it could not materialize for evidentiary reasons. The Committee was not convinced of the available proof to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1390.
However, the startling revelations of the connections between the Lashkhar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawah in the aftermath of the attacks had forced the international community to proscribe the terrorist organization. As the decision goes, now Jamat-ud-Dawah with all its spellings and variations is considered an off-shoot of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba. Simultaneously, the entries of two other entities – al-Rashid Trust and al-Akhtar Trust International – are amended to include their disguised appearances. The Committee has also named four leaders of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba as “individuals associated with Al-Qaida”.
The listing under UNSC Resolution 1267 demands three specific actions: effective measures of assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. All members of the United Nations shall take measures to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of these individuals and entities including those derived from property owned or controlled by them or persons acting on their behalf, directly or indirectly. The proscribed individuals will also be prevented from entering into or transiting through the territories of other states. Significantly, the ban prevents the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materials of all types including technical advice and assistance to these individuals and entities within their territories or by their nationals outside their territories.
However, Pakistan placed Hafiz Saeed, only one of the four listed individuals, under house arrest for three months and technically froze the bank account after all the monies were flushed out. It does not appear that Pakistan is actively and decisively acting against the terrorists who have committed crimes against humanity and threatened regional tranquillity.
Though Pakistan had already placed Jamat-ud-Dawah on the Watch List in 2003, but still allowed it to generate financial resources through the hawala route. Jamat-ud-Dawah has heavily invested in the establishment of model schools and dispensaries. Pakistan should remind itself that the provision of assets freeze under Paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 is not only limited to those existing assets but applies to any other funds, economic resources that may be available to such person’s benefit by their nationals or by persons within their territory.
Moreover, Pakistan is insisting on ‘credible information and evidence’ for further action at its end, ostensibly to fulfil the requirements of domestic laws and procedure. However, a cursory reading of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2001 (reportedly in force) would show that the standard of proof demanded of the action is not onerous. Section 11A empowers the federal government to ban any organization and to take up consequent measures if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the organization is ‘concerned in terrorism’. Hence, it is clear that the judgment of the executive will prevail over the legal process of enforcement. Also, the report of a leading international non- governmental organization made an assessment that Pakistan has done very little in the area of counter terrorism despite obligations under Resolution 1373.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan is failing in its international obligations. It should remind itself that UN Security Council 1373 obligates it to not only to refrain from providing any form of support, but to prevent the use of its territories against other states or their citizens. If it can be established that Pakistan had supported terrorist groups, this may represent a breach of international obligations and may be held accountable.
S.R. Subramanian is working as an Assistant Professor at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Chhattisgarh and was with the Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC), Vienna.
IDSA, January 06, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
Taking into account domestic pressure for perceptible results, India has moved the “1267 Committee” of the UN Security Council to ban the Jamat-ud-Dawah, the predecessor of Lashkhar-e-Taiba, for its involvement in the [Bombay attacks, Dec 2008]. The world body had already on May 2, 2005 listed Lashkhar-e-Taiba as one of the “entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida”. Even before the Mumbai attacks, India had been demanding that the Jamat-ud-Dawah be brought under the purview of international measures (“Consolidated List”) but it could not materialize for evidentiary reasons. The Committee was not convinced of the available proof to meet the requirements of the UN Security Council Resolution 1390.
However, the startling revelations of the connections between the Lashkhar-e-Taiba and Jamat-ud-Dawah in the aftermath of the attacks had forced the international community to proscribe the terrorist organization. As the decision goes, now Jamat-ud-Dawah with all its spellings and variations is considered an off-shoot of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba. Simultaneously, the entries of two other entities – al-Rashid Trust and al-Akhtar Trust International – are amended to include their disguised appearances. The Committee has also named four leaders of the Lashkhar-e-Taiba as “individuals associated with Al-Qaida”.
The listing under UNSC Resolution 1267 demands three specific actions: effective measures of assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo. All members of the United Nations shall take measures to freeze without delay funds and other financial assets of these individuals and entities including those derived from property owned or controlled by them or persons acting on their behalf, directly or indirectly. The proscribed individuals will also be prevented from entering into or transiting through the territories of other states. Significantly, the ban prevents the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materials of all types including technical advice and assistance to these individuals and entities within their territories or by their nationals outside their territories.
However, Pakistan placed Hafiz Saeed, only one of the four listed individuals, under house arrest for three months and technically froze the bank account after all the monies were flushed out. It does not appear that Pakistan is actively and decisively acting against the terrorists who have committed crimes against humanity and threatened regional tranquillity.
Though Pakistan had already placed Jamat-ud-Dawah on the Watch List in 2003, but still allowed it to generate financial resources through the hawala route. Jamat-ud-Dawah has heavily invested in the establishment of model schools and dispensaries. Pakistan should remind itself that the provision of assets freeze under Paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 is not only limited to those existing assets but applies to any other funds, economic resources that may be available to such person’s benefit by their nationals or by persons within their territory.
Moreover, Pakistan is insisting on ‘credible information and evidence’ for further action at its end, ostensibly to fulfil the requirements of domestic laws and procedure. However, a cursory reading of Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2001 (reportedly in force) would show that the standard of proof demanded of the action is not onerous. Section 11A empowers the federal government to ban any organization and to take up consequent measures if it has ‘reason to believe’ that the organization is ‘concerned in terrorism’. Hence, it is clear that the judgment of the executive will prevail over the legal process of enforcement. Also, the report of a leading international non- governmental organization made an assessment that Pakistan has done very little in the area of counter terrorism despite obligations under Resolution 1373.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Pakistan is failing in its international obligations. It should remind itself that UN Security Council 1373 obligates it to not only to refrain from providing any form of support, but to prevent the use of its territories against other states or their citizens. If it can be established that Pakistan had supported terrorist groups, this may represent a breach of international obligations and may be held accountable.
S.R. Subramanian is working as an Assistant Professor at the Hidayatullah National Law University, Chhattisgarh and was with the Terrorism Prevention Branch, Division for Treaty Affairs, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC), Vienna.
Richard Perle on Bush guidance and autonomous behaviour of the Administration
Ambushed on the Potomac, by Richard Perle
National Interest, Jan 06, 2009
Full text w/references: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20486
FOR EIGHT years George W. Bush pulled the levers of government—sometimes frantically—never realizing that they were disconnected from the machinery and the exertion was largely futile. As a result, the foreign and security policies declared by the president in speeches, in public and private meetings, in backgrounders and memoranda often had little or no effect on the activities of the sprawling bureaucracies charged with carrying out the president’s policies. They didn’t need his directives: they had their own.
Again and again the president declared “unacceptable” activities that his administration went on to accept: North Korean nuclear weapons; North Korean missile tests; Iran’s nuclear-weapons program; the Russian invasion of Georgia; genocide in Sudan; Syrian and Iranian support for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere—the list is long. Throughout his presidency, Bush demanded that these states change their ways. When they declined to do so, policy shifted to an unanchored, foundering diplomacy engineered by a diplomatic establishment, unencumbered, especially in the second term, by even the weak, largely useless scrutiny it had come to expect from the National Security Council. When Condoleezza Rice moved to the Department of State, the gamekeeper (however ineffective) turned poacher, and the Bush presidency—its credibility gravely diminished—became indistinguishable from the institutional worldview of the State Department. There it remains today.
Those who expect an Obama foreign policy to differ significantly from the most recent policy of the outgoing administration will be surprised by what is likely to be a seamless transition: not from White House to White House, but from State Department to State Department. On all the main issues—Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, Islamist terrorism, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, relations with allies—Obama’s first term is likely to look like Bush’s second.
It will not be easy to assess objectively the foreign and security policy of the Bush administration anytime soon. Its central feature, the war in Iraq, has generated emotions that all but preclude rational discourse. And it will be nearly impossible to persuade those whose minds are made up—often on the basis of tendentious reporting and reckless blogs—to reconsider what they firmly believe they know. Too much has been written and said that is wildly inaccurate and too many of those who have expressed judgments have done so, not as disinterested observers, but as partisan participants in a rancorous debate. Nevertheless, I have tried in what follows to offer a view of what the Bush policy was in the beginning and what it became in the end.
I SHOULD say at once that while I believe Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy, I also believe he got some very large issues right, especially the immediate response to 9/11 and a still-developing strategy for countering terrorism. And, right or wrong, he acted honestly and courageously, doing what he thought necessary to protect the country that elected him and the Constitution to which he swore fidelity. The charge that he lied about Iraq is itself a lie, and an unrelenting effort to show he was untruthful has not produced a shred of evidence. Guileless to a fault, George W. Bush has been among the most straightforward American presidents in my lifetime. And, contrary to his critics, he was far less inclined to play politics with national security than either his predecessors or his opponents in Congress. Becoming president at a moment of unprecedented American primacy, he could not have anticipated that he would lead a White House at war, a fractious, dysfunctional executive branch and a deeply divided nation.
[...]
UNDERSTANDING BUSH’S foreign and defense policy requires clarity about its origins and the thinking behind the administration’s key decisions. That means rejecting the false claim that the decision to remove Saddam, and Bush policies generally, were made or significantly influenced by a few neoconservative “ideologues” who are most often described as having hidden their agenda of imperial ambition or the imposition of democracy by force or the promotion of Israeli interests at the expense of American ones or the reshaping of the Middle East for oil—or all of the above. Despite its seemingly endless repetition by politicians, academics, journalists and bloggers, that is not a serious argument.
I may have missed something, but I know of no statement, public or private, by any neoconservative in or near government, advocating the invasion of Iraq primarily for the purpose of promoting democracy or advancing some grand neoconservative vision. As for oil, most neoconservatives believe in markets and think the best way to obtain oil is to buy it. And as for Israeli interests, well, the Israelis, who believed that Iran posed the greater threat, were strongly and often vociferously against the United States going into Iraq.
There are, however, a great many wrenched-from-context or even fabricated quotations in circulation. They are easy to spot since they are never sourced.1 Sometimes the attempt to defend these insupportable claims is laughable, as when Vice President Dick Cheney is first misrepresented and then described as a “neoconservative,” or when two subcabinet Defense Department officials, the vice president’s national-security adviser, one or two members of the NSC staff and a handful of commentators are said to have bamboozled the president, the vice president, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On the Left, George Packer’s Assassins Gate and Jacob Heilbrunn’s They Knew They Were Right share an obsession with neoconservative influence, but they fail utterly to describe or document that influence. The same is true of much of what has appeared in the New York Times, Vanity Fair, the Guardian and the New Yorker, among others. Pat Buchanan and his acolytes on the Right mirror the Left’s obsession, along with Lyndon LaRouche, David Duke, Paul Craig Roberts and any number of conspiracy theorists. This neoconservative conspiracy is nonsense, of course, and no serious observer of the Bush administration would argue such a thing, not least because there is not, and cannot be, any evidence to substantiate it.
So if it was not a neocon master plan, how did we end up invading Iraq? What were the considerations that led Bush to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime by force? What was the role of neoconservatives in his decision to go to war in Iraq? Many people believe they know the answer to these questions because so much has been written, with seeming authority, by so many commentators. Could 50 million blogs be wrong?
I BELIEVE that Bush went to war for the reasons—and only the reasons—he gave at the time: because he believed Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States that was far greater than the likely cost of removing him from power. To recall his thinking we must go back to 9/11—which was, for Bush’s foreign and security policy, the beginning of time.
The shock of 9/11 was followed by the chilling realization that the people who killed three thousand Americans that day would inflict even more damage if they had the means and opportunity. Within the government it was widely believed that 9/11 had been incubating for twelve to eighteen months and that at any given time al-Qaeda was working on multiple schemes to kill Americans. Were there other plots in preparation? What were the most serious immediate threats? And what could we do to protect against them?
Destroying the sanctuary that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan was essential and so became the first order of business. With it, al-Qaeda could plan, recruit, train, communicate, and manage the intelligence, logistics, and organization that 9/11 and its possible successors required. Without a sanctuary, al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out another 9/11 would be greatly diminished. Moreover, the destruction of the Taliban regime would send a signal to other governments that allowed terrorists to operate from their territory: we would no longer regard terrorist acts of mass murder as crimes to be dealt with by the institutions of law enforcement alone. A state found to be complicit in, or even hospitable to, acts of terror would be treated harshly. As the president put it: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” With a sustained effort to discourage the granting of sanctuary or other forms of assistance to terrorists, a threat that could not be wiped out could at least be diminished.
The president’s approach, later elaborated, took shape on 9/11 itself, when he advanced a new policy just hours after the attack. He said, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”2
I believe these will turn out to have been the most important words of the Bush presidency. No longer would we respond to acts of terror solely by chasing the individuals who pulled the triggers. They could move; they could hide—and there was a generous supply of would-be martyrs waiting for their turn to kill and die. No longer would we watch as our troops, our citizens, our embassies, our ships and now our homeland came under attack. We would strike back at those who harbored terrorists—at governments that could neither run nor hide, but that could certainly be replaced.
I believe the decision to respond to 9/11 by removing the Taliban regime was right. Predictions about the “Arab street” rising up against us proved to be wrong. Al-Qaeda was driven into hiding and the people of Afghanistan, especially Afghan women, were liberated from a brutal, repressive Taliban regime. I also believe the subsequent decision to remove Saddam Hussein was right. In neither case were the considerations “ideological,” not for the president or vice president, not for the secretaries of state and defense, not for the national-security adviser—not for neoconservatives and certainly not for me. Let me explain.
OUR PRE-9/11 concept of security assumed that terrorists wished to survive their attacks. Al-Qaeda’s recruitment and training of suicidal terrorists eager for martyrdom meant that would have to change. The main concern was understood immediately: if men with box cutters could kill three thousand people, what could they do with weapons of mass destruction? What if nuclear weapons or radioactive material or chemical or biological agents wound up in the hands of terrorists eager to die as they committed mass murder? The possibility of a future attack with tens or hundreds of thousands of victims had to be taken seriously.
So the administration did the obvious: it made up a list of hostile states thought to possess WMD and set about developing plans to protect against their use either directly or, more ominously, if made available to terrorists. Heading the list was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Alone among heads of state, Saddam had cheered the attacks of 9/11. He had a long history of building WMD, actually using nerve gas in attacks against Kurdish civilians and Iranian troops. He had successfully concealed a nuclear-weapons program found, after the Gulf War in 1991, to be far more advanced than had been suspected—even though Iraq was then under IAEA international inspections. After defecting in 1995, Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, revealed a well-concealed chemical-and-biological-weapons program, directing us to a stash of documents hidden on a chicken farm.
Those following Iraq, both UN inspectors and American and allied intelligence organizations, reported a history of Saddam’s deceit and deception. Components of WMD that were known to have been produced or imported could not be accounted for. On one occasion we were able to photograph boxes being loaded onto trucks at the back entrance to a military installation while UN inspectors were prevented from entering at the front. The presumption that what could not be audited had been hidden, though later proved incorrect, was logical and widely accepted.
The former–UN arms inspector David Kay told me he was never able to surprise the Iraqis—they always learned inspectors were en route well before the UN could hope to arrive in time to catch them red-handed. During the time Bush was thinking about whether to remove Saddam, the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies were certain that he possessed WMD. I have often been critical of the CIA. But in this case everything seemed to point toward a concealed Iraqi program.
In any case, the salient issue was not whether Saddam had stockpiles of WMD but whether he could produce them and place them in the hands of terrorists. The administration’s appalling inability to explain that this is what it was thinking and doing allowed the unearthing of stockpiles to become the test of whether it had correctly assessed the risk that Saddam might provide WMD to terrorists. When none were found, the administration appeared to have failed the test even though considerable evidence of Saddam’s capability to produce WMD was found in postwar inspections by the Iraq Survey Group chaired by Charles Duelfer.
I am not alone in having been asked, “If you knew that Saddam did not have WMD, would you still have supported invading Iraq?” But what appears to some to be a “gotcha” question actually misses the point. The decision to remove Saddam stands or falls on one’s judgment at the time the decision was made, and with the information then available, about how to manage the risk that he would facilitate a catastrophic attack on the United States. To say the decision to remove him was mistaken because stockpiles of WMD were never found is akin to saying that it was a mistake to buy fire insurance last year because your house didn’t burn down or health insurance because you didn’t become ill. No one would take seriously the question, “Would you have bought Enron stock if you had known it would go down?” and no one should take seriously the facile conclusion that invading Iraq was mistaken because we now know Saddam did not possess stockpiles of WMD.
Bush might have decided differently: that the safer course was to leave Saddam in place and hope he would not cause or enable the use of WMD against the United States. How would we now assess his presidency if, say, Iraqi anthrax had later been used to kill thousands of Americans? He would have been accused—rightly in my view—of having taken a foolish risk by not acting against a regime we had good reason to consider extremely dangerous. (And no one would be so stupid as to ask: Would you have left Saddam in place if you had known he was going to supply anthrax to terrorists?)
THE REASON for dwelling on the question of risk management is because it explains why the administration decided as it did, and why many of us who supported and even urged that decision agreed with it. I, for one, was taught long ago to weigh the risks in these matters as objectively as possible and always to consider the consequences of a wrong choice. Between going to war to end Saddam’s regime and leaving him in place, I believed that war was, unhappily, the prudent choice for managing the risks we faced.3
The administration’s view, which I shared, was that few Iraqis would fight for Saddam while most would consider themselves liberated from the long nightmare of his reign of terror. I expected a quick victory and thought the cost was justified compared to the risk of another terrorist attack, this time with chemical or biological weapons.
When war came, Baghdad fell in twenty-one days with few casualties on either side. For several months thereafter there was relative calm. Sadly, the sense of liberation was squandered as the quick victory was followed by shockingly inept post-Saddam policies. The seminal error was, in my view, the failure to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam’s regime collapsed. History does not allow instant replays so we will never know whether that policy could have averted the disastrous insurgency—carried out by Saddam loyalists and foreign jihadists—sustained by terror, the incitement of confessional and ethnic divisions, and outside assistance. Had Iraq been enabled to stand up an interim government pending free elections to be held in, say, eighteen months, we might well have escaped the invidious role of an occupier. In blundering from liberation to occupation, we opened the way to nearly five years of suffering that only now, with the progress of the “surge,” is finally subsiding.
The administration’s failure to trust Iraqis with their own future was well-meaning—and yet arrogant. We sent thousands of Americans to Baghdad’s “green zone,” volunteers eager to help build a new Iraq—often in our image. Many had to secure passports because they had never been abroad; when they got there, most never left the protected area. Few knew anything of Iraq, its history or its culture.
Believing that we knew how to do things better than the Iraqis, we sidelined them, refused their counsel and frequently vetoed their ideas. A perfect example: when L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad to head the Coalition Provisional Authority he told Iraqi leaders, most of whom had long opposed Saddam from outside (or from the Kurdish north which was not under Saddam’s control), that he was in charge and the most he expected from them was advice, which he might or might not accept.
I believe the decision to attempt a comprehensive occupation of Iraq was the worst and most fateful of many mistakes. That decision followed a bureaucratic victory by the State Department, the CIA and the NSC that defeated proposals by Defense Department officials for a quick handover. (In fact, the Defense Department had actually supported training, preparing and equipping Iraqi exiles even before the invasion.) But then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, his deputy Richard Armitage and then–CIA Director George Tenet strongly opposed working with the Iraqi opposition both before and after the invasion. They distrusted long-time opponents of Saddam’s regime (many of whom have now emerged as Iraq’s political leadership). They waged a malicious campaign against the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a broad coalition umbrella group of Saddam’s opponents, in part because they intensely disliked the INC chairman, Ahmad Chalabi. A group of lesser officials, including State Department and CIA officers seconded to the NSC, joined them in sinking policy initiatives that might have enabled us to return Iraq quickly to the Iraqis. Condi Rice, then national-security adviser, was passive and indecisive. The result was an occupation that proved tragic for Americans and Iraqis alike.
A second mistake of immense importance was the policy of dealing with Iraq in isolation. It was clear from the beginning that the problem of Saddam’s Iraq was in fact a broader, regional problem: only with well-integrated strategies for Iran and Syria (and beyond) could we hope to deal effectively with post-Saddam Iraq. But no such integrated strategy was forthcoming; while the president asked repeatedly for one to be developed, it never was.
Of course, responsibility for an ill-advised occupation and an inadequate regional strategy ultimately lies with President Bush himself. He failed to oversee the post-Saddam strategy, intervening only sporadically when things had deteriorated to the point where confidence in cabinet-level management could no longer be sustained. He did finally assert presidential authority when he rejected the defeatist advice of the Baker-Hamilton commission and Condi Rice’s State Department, ordering instead the “surge,” a decision that he surely hopes will eclipse the dismal period from 2004 to January 2007. But that is but one victory for the White House among many failures at Langley, at the Pentagon and in Foggy Bottom.
I BELIEVE the cost of removing Saddam and achieving a stable future for Iraq has turned out to be very much higher than it should have been, and certainly higher than it was reasonable to expect.
But about the many mistakes made in Iraq, one thing is certain: they had nothing to do with ideology. They did not draw inspiration from or reflect neoconservative ideas and they were not the product of philosophical or ideological influences outside the government.
Some of the confusion on this point undoubtedly stems from the president’s rhetoric in 2002 and 2003, especially as it related to democracy in Iraq (claimed by critics a cornerstone of the neoconservative agenda). As Douglas Feith, described (wrongly) by his detractors as another “architect” of the war, has observed, Bush’s rhetoric on our mission in Iraq shifted dramatically after we concluded that WMD would not be found. The president’s emphasis on the benefits of bringing democracy to Iraq—for Iraqis and the region—began in the fall of 2003, six months after the invasion. In his excellent War and Decision, which stands out for its rich documentation and attention to context, Feith demonstrates that shift convincingly. The statistics are striking: from September 2002 until July 1, 2003, the number of paragraphs in Bush’s speeches and events that referred to the threat from Saddam averaged 13.7 while the number referring to Iraqi democracy averaged 3.4. From September 7, 2003, until September 2004 the threat was referred to an average of 1.1 times while references to democracy averaged 10.6 times per speech or event. Embarrassed and defensive about the absence of WMD stockpiles, the White House simply decided to change the subject.
The decision to go to war, judgments about prewar intelligence, decisions on the conduct of the war and its aftermath, the assessment of personalities in Iraq, the choice of the military and civilian leadership in and responsible for Iraq—none of these reflected anything that could properly be called an ideology. They were, rather, prudential judgments, pragmatic decisions—though sometimes ill-advised—made by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national-security adviser and the senior military and intelligence leadership.
THE SENIOR officials responsible for policy formation were advised by a small army of civil servants, some of whom had strong opinions and deep prejudices. These opinions and prejudices—of which the hostility to working with the Iraqi opposition is an important example—had a far greater influence on administration policies than any philosophy, ideology or doctrine.
Early in 2003 one senior foreign-service officer answered my question, “How many of your colleagues at the State Department share the president’s views on foreign policy?” with a quick and confident, “About 15 percent.” The number may well have been even smaller at the CIA, which made egregious intelligence errors and then applied its skill at tweaking and leaking to undermine the president who acted on its advice.4
Sometime early in the second term a wise and experienced journalist, himself critical of the administration, returned from visits to London, Paris, Berlin and Rome and told me that he was astonished at how blatantly our senior embassy officials—sent abroad to implement the government’s foreign policy—openly denounced it, frequently to, or in the presence of, foreign officials, opinion leaders and the press.5 Never in my experience—maybe never, period—has the resulting disconnect between a president’s policies and beliefs and the actions of his administration been so profound, so prolonged and so consequential.
The hijacking of foreign policy simply did not stop at Iraq’s borders. And I believe this disconnect between the president and his appointees explains the glaring inconsistencies of much of the Bush administration’s policy stance: tough talk on Iran, Syria and North Korea, followed by debilitating inaction. The soaring rhetoric about encouraging democracy, “implemented” with winks and nods by bureaucracies content to take favored dictatorships as we find them. Perhaps in one of the most egregious examples, consider Bush’s radically new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. His speech of June 24, 2002, put forward a new American policy, pledging for the first time to support a Palestinian state provided the Palestinians elected “new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” and built “a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.” In only ten months this was neatly transformed by the State Department into yet another version of its preferred, well-worn “land for peace” policy. It is not clear whether the president understood that the “road map” substituted for, and effectively killed, his push for a new policy. This is why Obama’s promise of “change” at least on the foreign-policy front may be greatly exaggerated.
If ever there were a security policy that lacked philosophical underpinnings, it was that of the Bush administration. Whenever the president attempted to lay out a philosophy, as in his argument for encouraging the freedom of expression and dissent that might advance democratic institutions abroad, it was throttled in its infancy by opponents within and outside the administration.
I BELIEVE Bush ultimately failed to grasp the demands of the American presidency. He saw himself (MBA that he was) as a chief executive whose job was to give broad direction that would then be automatically translated into specific policies and faithfully implemented by the departments of the executive branch. I doubt that such an approach could be made to work. But without a team that shared his ideas and a determination to see them realized, there was no chance he could succeed. His carefully drafted, often eloquent speeches, intended as marching orders, were seldom developed into concrete policies. And when his ideas ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the executive departments, as they often did, debilitating compromise was the result: the president spoke the words and the departments pronounced the policies.
Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the Reagan administration, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
National Interest, Jan 06, 2009
Full text w/references: http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20486
FOR EIGHT years George W. Bush pulled the levers of government—sometimes frantically—never realizing that they were disconnected from the machinery and the exertion was largely futile. As a result, the foreign and security policies declared by the president in speeches, in public and private meetings, in backgrounders and memoranda often had little or no effect on the activities of the sprawling bureaucracies charged with carrying out the president’s policies. They didn’t need his directives: they had their own.
Again and again the president declared “unacceptable” activities that his administration went on to accept: North Korean nuclear weapons; North Korean missile tests; Iran’s nuclear-weapons program; the Russian invasion of Georgia; genocide in Sudan; Syrian and Iranian support for jihadists in Iraq and elsewhere—the list is long. Throughout his presidency, Bush demanded that these states change their ways. When they declined to do so, policy shifted to an unanchored, foundering diplomacy engineered by a diplomatic establishment, unencumbered, especially in the second term, by even the weak, largely useless scrutiny it had come to expect from the National Security Council. When Condoleezza Rice moved to the Department of State, the gamekeeper (however ineffective) turned poacher, and the Bush presidency—its credibility gravely diminished—became indistinguishable from the institutional worldview of the State Department. There it remains today.
Those who expect an Obama foreign policy to differ significantly from the most recent policy of the outgoing administration will be surprised by what is likely to be a seamless transition: not from White House to White House, but from State Department to State Department. On all the main issues—Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, Islamist terrorism, Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, relations with allies—Obama’s first term is likely to look like Bush’s second.
It will not be easy to assess objectively the foreign and security policy of the Bush administration anytime soon. Its central feature, the war in Iraq, has generated emotions that all but preclude rational discourse. And it will be nearly impossible to persuade those whose minds are made up—often on the basis of tendentious reporting and reckless blogs—to reconsider what they firmly believe they know. Too much has been written and said that is wildly inaccurate and too many of those who have expressed judgments have done so, not as disinterested observers, but as partisan participants in a rancorous debate. Nevertheless, I have tried in what follows to offer a view of what the Bush policy was in the beginning and what it became in the end.
I SHOULD say at once that while I believe Bush mostly failed to implement an effective foreign and defense policy, I also believe he got some very large issues right, especially the immediate response to 9/11 and a still-developing strategy for countering terrorism. And, right or wrong, he acted honestly and courageously, doing what he thought necessary to protect the country that elected him and the Constitution to which he swore fidelity. The charge that he lied about Iraq is itself a lie, and an unrelenting effort to show he was untruthful has not produced a shred of evidence. Guileless to a fault, George W. Bush has been among the most straightforward American presidents in my lifetime. And, contrary to his critics, he was far less inclined to play politics with national security than either his predecessors or his opponents in Congress. Becoming president at a moment of unprecedented American primacy, he could not have anticipated that he would lead a White House at war, a fractious, dysfunctional executive branch and a deeply divided nation.
[...]
UNDERSTANDING BUSH’S foreign and defense policy requires clarity about its origins and the thinking behind the administration’s key decisions. That means rejecting the false claim that the decision to remove Saddam, and Bush policies generally, were made or significantly influenced by a few neoconservative “ideologues” who are most often described as having hidden their agenda of imperial ambition or the imposition of democracy by force or the promotion of Israeli interests at the expense of American ones or the reshaping of the Middle East for oil—or all of the above. Despite its seemingly endless repetition by politicians, academics, journalists and bloggers, that is not a serious argument.
I may have missed something, but I know of no statement, public or private, by any neoconservative in or near government, advocating the invasion of Iraq primarily for the purpose of promoting democracy or advancing some grand neoconservative vision. As for oil, most neoconservatives believe in markets and think the best way to obtain oil is to buy it. And as for Israeli interests, well, the Israelis, who believed that Iran posed the greater threat, were strongly and often vociferously against the United States going into Iraq.
There are, however, a great many wrenched-from-context or even fabricated quotations in circulation. They are easy to spot since they are never sourced.1 Sometimes the attempt to defend these insupportable claims is laughable, as when Vice President Dick Cheney is first misrepresented and then described as a “neoconservative,” or when two subcabinet Defense Department officials, the vice president’s national-security adviser, one or two members of the NSC staff and a handful of commentators are said to have bamboozled the president, the vice president, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, George Tenet, Condoleezza Rice and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On the Left, George Packer’s Assassins Gate and Jacob Heilbrunn’s They Knew They Were Right share an obsession with neoconservative influence, but they fail utterly to describe or document that influence. The same is true of much of what has appeared in the New York Times, Vanity Fair, the Guardian and the New Yorker, among others. Pat Buchanan and his acolytes on the Right mirror the Left’s obsession, along with Lyndon LaRouche, David Duke, Paul Craig Roberts and any number of conspiracy theorists. This neoconservative conspiracy is nonsense, of course, and no serious observer of the Bush administration would argue such a thing, not least because there is not, and cannot be, any evidence to substantiate it.
So if it was not a neocon master plan, how did we end up invading Iraq? What were the considerations that led Bush to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime by force? What was the role of neoconservatives in his decision to go to war in Iraq? Many people believe they know the answer to these questions because so much has been written, with seeming authority, by so many commentators. Could 50 million blogs be wrong?
I BELIEVE that Bush went to war for the reasons—and only the reasons—he gave at the time: because he believed Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States that was far greater than the likely cost of removing him from power. To recall his thinking we must go back to 9/11—which was, for Bush’s foreign and security policy, the beginning of time.
The shock of 9/11 was followed by the chilling realization that the people who killed three thousand Americans that day would inflict even more damage if they had the means and opportunity. Within the government it was widely believed that 9/11 had been incubating for twelve to eighteen months and that at any given time al-Qaeda was working on multiple schemes to kill Americans. Were there other plots in preparation? What were the most serious immediate threats? And what could we do to protect against them?
Destroying the sanctuary that al-Qaeda enjoyed in Afghanistan was essential and so became the first order of business. With it, al-Qaeda could plan, recruit, train, communicate, and manage the intelligence, logistics, and organization that 9/11 and its possible successors required. Without a sanctuary, al-Qaeda’s capacity to carry out another 9/11 would be greatly diminished. Moreover, the destruction of the Taliban regime would send a signal to other governments that allowed terrorists to operate from their territory: we would no longer regard terrorist acts of mass murder as crimes to be dealt with by the institutions of law enforcement alone. A state found to be complicit in, or even hospitable to, acts of terror would be treated harshly. As the president put it: “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.” With a sustained effort to discourage the granting of sanctuary or other forms of assistance to terrorists, a threat that could not be wiped out could at least be diminished.
The president’s approach, later elaborated, took shape on 9/11 itself, when he advanced a new policy just hours after the attack. He said, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”2
I believe these will turn out to have been the most important words of the Bush presidency. No longer would we respond to acts of terror solely by chasing the individuals who pulled the triggers. They could move; they could hide—and there was a generous supply of would-be martyrs waiting for their turn to kill and die. No longer would we watch as our troops, our citizens, our embassies, our ships and now our homeland came under attack. We would strike back at those who harbored terrorists—at governments that could neither run nor hide, but that could certainly be replaced.
I believe the decision to respond to 9/11 by removing the Taliban regime was right. Predictions about the “Arab street” rising up against us proved to be wrong. Al-Qaeda was driven into hiding and the people of Afghanistan, especially Afghan women, were liberated from a brutal, repressive Taliban regime. I also believe the subsequent decision to remove Saddam Hussein was right. In neither case were the considerations “ideological,” not for the president or vice president, not for the secretaries of state and defense, not for the national-security adviser—not for neoconservatives and certainly not for me. Let me explain.
OUR PRE-9/11 concept of security assumed that terrorists wished to survive their attacks. Al-Qaeda’s recruitment and training of suicidal terrorists eager for martyrdom meant that would have to change. The main concern was understood immediately: if men with box cutters could kill three thousand people, what could they do with weapons of mass destruction? What if nuclear weapons or radioactive material or chemical or biological agents wound up in the hands of terrorists eager to die as they committed mass murder? The possibility of a future attack with tens or hundreds of thousands of victims had to be taken seriously.
So the administration did the obvious: it made up a list of hostile states thought to possess WMD and set about developing plans to protect against their use either directly or, more ominously, if made available to terrorists. Heading the list was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Alone among heads of state, Saddam had cheered the attacks of 9/11. He had a long history of building WMD, actually using nerve gas in attacks against Kurdish civilians and Iranian troops. He had successfully concealed a nuclear-weapons program found, after the Gulf War in 1991, to be far more advanced than had been suspected—even though Iraq was then under IAEA international inspections. After defecting in 1995, Saddam’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, revealed a well-concealed chemical-and-biological-weapons program, directing us to a stash of documents hidden on a chicken farm.
Those following Iraq, both UN inspectors and American and allied intelligence organizations, reported a history of Saddam’s deceit and deception. Components of WMD that were known to have been produced or imported could not be accounted for. On one occasion we were able to photograph boxes being loaded onto trucks at the back entrance to a military installation while UN inspectors were prevented from entering at the front. The presumption that what could not be audited had been hidden, though later proved incorrect, was logical and widely accepted.
The former–UN arms inspector David Kay told me he was never able to surprise the Iraqis—they always learned inspectors were en route well before the UN could hope to arrive in time to catch them red-handed. During the time Bush was thinking about whether to remove Saddam, the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies were certain that he possessed WMD. I have often been critical of the CIA. But in this case everything seemed to point toward a concealed Iraqi program.
In any case, the salient issue was not whether Saddam had stockpiles of WMD but whether he could produce them and place them in the hands of terrorists. The administration’s appalling inability to explain that this is what it was thinking and doing allowed the unearthing of stockpiles to become the test of whether it had correctly assessed the risk that Saddam might provide WMD to terrorists. When none were found, the administration appeared to have failed the test even though considerable evidence of Saddam’s capability to produce WMD was found in postwar inspections by the Iraq Survey Group chaired by Charles Duelfer.
I am not alone in having been asked, “If you knew that Saddam did not have WMD, would you still have supported invading Iraq?” But what appears to some to be a “gotcha” question actually misses the point. The decision to remove Saddam stands or falls on one’s judgment at the time the decision was made, and with the information then available, about how to manage the risk that he would facilitate a catastrophic attack on the United States. To say the decision to remove him was mistaken because stockpiles of WMD were never found is akin to saying that it was a mistake to buy fire insurance last year because your house didn’t burn down or health insurance because you didn’t become ill. No one would take seriously the question, “Would you have bought Enron stock if you had known it would go down?” and no one should take seriously the facile conclusion that invading Iraq was mistaken because we now know Saddam did not possess stockpiles of WMD.
Bush might have decided differently: that the safer course was to leave Saddam in place and hope he would not cause or enable the use of WMD against the United States. How would we now assess his presidency if, say, Iraqi anthrax had later been used to kill thousands of Americans? He would have been accused—rightly in my view—of having taken a foolish risk by not acting against a regime we had good reason to consider extremely dangerous. (And no one would be so stupid as to ask: Would you have left Saddam in place if you had known he was going to supply anthrax to terrorists?)
THE REASON for dwelling on the question of risk management is because it explains why the administration decided as it did, and why many of us who supported and even urged that decision agreed with it. I, for one, was taught long ago to weigh the risks in these matters as objectively as possible and always to consider the consequences of a wrong choice. Between going to war to end Saddam’s regime and leaving him in place, I believed that war was, unhappily, the prudent choice for managing the risks we faced.3
The administration’s view, which I shared, was that few Iraqis would fight for Saddam while most would consider themselves liberated from the long nightmare of his reign of terror. I expected a quick victory and thought the cost was justified compared to the risk of another terrorist attack, this time with chemical or biological weapons.
When war came, Baghdad fell in twenty-one days with few casualties on either side. For several months thereafter there was relative calm. Sadly, the sense of liberation was squandered as the quick victory was followed by shockingly inept post-Saddam policies. The seminal error was, in my view, the failure to turn Iraq over to the Iraqis immediately after Saddam’s regime collapsed. History does not allow instant replays so we will never know whether that policy could have averted the disastrous insurgency—carried out by Saddam loyalists and foreign jihadists—sustained by terror, the incitement of confessional and ethnic divisions, and outside assistance. Had Iraq been enabled to stand up an interim government pending free elections to be held in, say, eighteen months, we might well have escaped the invidious role of an occupier. In blundering from liberation to occupation, we opened the way to nearly five years of suffering that only now, with the progress of the “surge,” is finally subsiding.
The administration’s failure to trust Iraqis with their own future was well-meaning—and yet arrogant. We sent thousands of Americans to Baghdad’s “green zone,” volunteers eager to help build a new Iraq—often in our image. Many had to secure passports because they had never been abroad; when they got there, most never left the protected area. Few knew anything of Iraq, its history or its culture.
Believing that we knew how to do things better than the Iraqis, we sidelined them, refused their counsel and frequently vetoed their ideas. A perfect example: when L. Paul Bremer III arrived in Baghdad to head the Coalition Provisional Authority he told Iraqi leaders, most of whom had long opposed Saddam from outside (or from the Kurdish north which was not under Saddam’s control), that he was in charge and the most he expected from them was advice, which he might or might not accept.
I believe the decision to attempt a comprehensive occupation of Iraq was the worst and most fateful of many mistakes. That decision followed a bureaucratic victory by the State Department, the CIA and the NSC that defeated proposals by Defense Department officials for a quick handover. (In fact, the Defense Department had actually supported training, preparing and equipping Iraqi exiles even before the invasion.) But then–Secretary of State Colin Powell, his deputy Richard Armitage and then–CIA Director George Tenet strongly opposed working with the Iraqi opposition both before and after the invasion. They distrusted long-time opponents of Saddam’s regime (many of whom have now emerged as Iraq’s political leadership). They waged a malicious campaign against the Iraqi National Congress (INC), a broad coalition umbrella group of Saddam’s opponents, in part because they intensely disliked the INC chairman, Ahmad Chalabi. A group of lesser officials, including State Department and CIA officers seconded to the NSC, joined them in sinking policy initiatives that might have enabled us to return Iraq quickly to the Iraqis. Condi Rice, then national-security adviser, was passive and indecisive. The result was an occupation that proved tragic for Americans and Iraqis alike.
A second mistake of immense importance was the policy of dealing with Iraq in isolation. It was clear from the beginning that the problem of Saddam’s Iraq was in fact a broader, regional problem: only with well-integrated strategies for Iran and Syria (and beyond) could we hope to deal effectively with post-Saddam Iraq. But no such integrated strategy was forthcoming; while the president asked repeatedly for one to be developed, it never was.
Of course, responsibility for an ill-advised occupation and an inadequate regional strategy ultimately lies with President Bush himself. He failed to oversee the post-Saddam strategy, intervening only sporadically when things had deteriorated to the point where confidence in cabinet-level management could no longer be sustained. He did finally assert presidential authority when he rejected the defeatist advice of the Baker-Hamilton commission and Condi Rice’s State Department, ordering instead the “surge,” a decision that he surely hopes will eclipse the dismal period from 2004 to January 2007. But that is but one victory for the White House among many failures at Langley, at the Pentagon and in Foggy Bottom.
I BELIEVE the cost of removing Saddam and achieving a stable future for Iraq has turned out to be very much higher than it should have been, and certainly higher than it was reasonable to expect.
But about the many mistakes made in Iraq, one thing is certain: they had nothing to do with ideology. They did not draw inspiration from or reflect neoconservative ideas and they were not the product of philosophical or ideological influences outside the government.
Some of the confusion on this point undoubtedly stems from the president’s rhetoric in 2002 and 2003, especially as it related to democracy in Iraq (claimed by critics a cornerstone of the neoconservative agenda). As Douglas Feith, described (wrongly) by his detractors as another “architect” of the war, has observed, Bush’s rhetoric on our mission in Iraq shifted dramatically after we concluded that WMD would not be found. The president’s emphasis on the benefits of bringing democracy to Iraq—for Iraqis and the region—began in the fall of 2003, six months after the invasion. In his excellent War and Decision, which stands out for its rich documentation and attention to context, Feith demonstrates that shift convincingly. The statistics are striking: from September 2002 until July 1, 2003, the number of paragraphs in Bush’s speeches and events that referred to the threat from Saddam averaged 13.7 while the number referring to Iraqi democracy averaged 3.4. From September 7, 2003, until September 2004 the threat was referred to an average of 1.1 times while references to democracy averaged 10.6 times per speech or event. Embarrassed and defensive about the absence of WMD stockpiles, the White House simply decided to change the subject.
The decision to go to war, judgments about prewar intelligence, decisions on the conduct of the war and its aftermath, the assessment of personalities in Iraq, the choice of the military and civilian leadership in and responsible for Iraq—none of these reflected anything that could properly be called an ideology. They were, rather, prudential judgments, pragmatic decisions—though sometimes ill-advised—made by the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national-security adviser and the senior military and intelligence leadership.
THE SENIOR officials responsible for policy formation were advised by a small army of civil servants, some of whom had strong opinions and deep prejudices. These opinions and prejudices—of which the hostility to working with the Iraqi opposition is an important example—had a far greater influence on administration policies than any philosophy, ideology or doctrine.
Early in 2003 one senior foreign-service officer answered my question, “How many of your colleagues at the State Department share the president’s views on foreign policy?” with a quick and confident, “About 15 percent.” The number may well have been even smaller at the CIA, which made egregious intelligence errors and then applied its skill at tweaking and leaking to undermine the president who acted on its advice.4
Sometime early in the second term a wise and experienced journalist, himself critical of the administration, returned from visits to London, Paris, Berlin and Rome and told me that he was astonished at how blatantly our senior embassy officials—sent abroad to implement the government’s foreign policy—openly denounced it, frequently to, or in the presence of, foreign officials, opinion leaders and the press.5 Never in my experience—maybe never, period—has the resulting disconnect between a president’s policies and beliefs and the actions of his administration been so profound, so prolonged and so consequential.
The hijacking of foreign policy simply did not stop at Iraq’s borders. And I believe this disconnect between the president and his appointees explains the glaring inconsistencies of much of the Bush administration’s policy stance: tough talk on Iran, Syria and North Korea, followed by debilitating inaction. The soaring rhetoric about encouraging democracy, “implemented” with winks and nods by bureaucracies content to take favored dictatorships as we find them. Perhaps in one of the most egregious examples, consider Bush’s radically new approach to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. His speech of June 24, 2002, put forward a new American policy, pledging for the first time to support a Palestinian state provided the Palestinians elected “new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” and built “a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty.” In only ten months this was neatly transformed by the State Department into yet another version of its preferred, well-worn “land for peace” policy. It is not clear whether the president understood that the “road map” substituted for, and effectively killed, his push for a new policy. This is why Obama’s promise of “change” at least on the foreign-policy front may be greatly exaggerated.
If ever there were a security policy that lacked philosophical underpinnings, it was that of the Bush administration. Whenever the president attempted to lay out a philosophy, as in his argument for encouraging the freedom of expression and dissent that might advance democratic institutions abroad, it was throttled in its infancy by opponents within and outside the administration.
I BELIEVE Bush ultimately failed to grasp the demands of the American presidency. He saw himself (MBA that he was) as a chief executive whose job was to give broad direction that would then be automatically translated into specific policies and faithfully implemented by the departments of the executive branch. I doubt that such an approach could be made to work. But without a team that shared his ideas and a determination to see them realized, there was no chance he could succeed. His carefully drafted, often eloquent speeches, intended as marching orders, were seldom developed into concrete policies. And when his ideas ran counter to the conventional wisdom of the executive departments, as they often did, debilitating compromise was the result: the president spoke the words and the departments pronounced the policies.
Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy in the Reagan administration, is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard On Biotech Opponents
Biotech Opponents Are Playing with Human Lives, by Till Behrend
Nobel laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard discusses the environmentalists' war against genetically modified food.
Pajamas Media, January 3, 2009
There is a specter haunting Europe: the specter of genetically modified foods. Although regularly consumed in the U.S. and around the world, in Europe GM foods are the target of veritable scare campaigns by environmental pressure groups and in the media. As a consequence, even GM crops that have been formally approved by the European Commission are the subject of increasing restrictions in Germany, France, and other European countries. GM crops — including such as have been planted merely for experimental purposes — are regularly destroyed by anti-GM militants in acts of would-be “civil disobedience.” Till Behrend of [1] the German weekly Focus spoke with the geneticist and Nobel Prize laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard about the sources of biotech-phobia.
John Rosenthal (Translator)
***
FOCUS: Professor Nüsslein-Volhard, farmers all around the world are cultivating genetically modified crops on an ever larger scale. But many Germans appear to be afraid of the new technology. Are they right to be?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Well, we Germans are always afraid of new things. But what are these people actually afraid about? They’re afraid that they will assimilate alien genes while eating genetically modified foods. But that’s nonsense. The genes are digested, broken down, and eliminated from the body just like in the case of traditional foods. This has been proven beyond any shadow of a doubt. The human genome is sequential and you can examine whether there are any cow genes or plant genes in there. Have no fear: there aren’t any.
FOCUS: What distinguishes, then, classically bred crops from genetically modified crops?
Nüsslein-Volhard: People seem to be unaware that practically all the grains and vegetables that we eat nowadays have been highly genetically modified as compared to their natural forms. There’s hardly any crop as artificial as a potato. In the wild, potatoes are tiny and highly poisonous. It took thousands of generations to turn the potato into a decent sort of food. In contrast to the classical development of new plant strains, “green” biotechnology has the advantage that with its help one can proceed much faster and in a much more targeted fashion.
FOCUS: It’s true that for plant breeders that might be a fine thing. But lots of people want to do what’s right for nature and for themselves, and consequently they insist on “organic” products.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Given our level of material well-being and the fertility of our soil, we can afford to do that. But actually that’s a snobby, elitist attitude. Organic farming cannot feed large cities. And it certainly cannot feed the world’s population. It’s not possible, since the yields of organic farming are too small and the area one has to plant is way too much. It really makes more sense to use the particularly rich fields that we have intensively and in a sustainable manner by planting high-yield crops. The environment benefits, too, since then we can return other fields to their natural state.
FOCUS: Nonetheless, organic farming is thought to stand for a more respectful treatment of the environment.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Wrongly. Or do you imagine perhaps that organic farming can do without the spraying of pesticides? On organic farms, too, one sprays pesticides constantly and all over the place! In this respect, genetic engineering really has more intelligent solutions to offer. For example, with the help of genetic engineering we can make corn or cotton that is resistant to insect damage. If we incorporate a particular gene, they become poisonous for harmful insects, but not for humans or for mice. Then you can do without the insecticide. I find this rather smart. There are also strains being developed that grow with less water or that grow on salt-affected soils. It’s both sophisticated and ecologically beneficial!
FOCUS: If green biotechnology is so beneficial, why hasn’t it gained ground here in Germany?
Nüsslein-Volhard: We have groups like Greenpeace to thank for that: groups that put ideology above everything else — regardless of all the positive results that have been had [with GM crops] in the meanwhile in many countries. As a consequence, green biotechnology is practically a social taboo here.
FOCUS: What are the implications for scientific research?
Nüsslein-Volhard: For theoretical research, there are no consequences. But as soon as it’s a matter of practical applications, things become difficult for the scientists. In Germany, there are practically no positions to be found anymore that would permit them to translate their ideas and research into practice. We do have a biotechnology law, which to some extent makes possible the field experiments that are necessary to gain authorization [for GM crops]. But if the fields are constantly being destroyed and nothing is done about it, then it’s just not possible. Not far from here, at the University of Hohenheim, a whole course had to be canceled because anti-GM militants tore up all the experimental fields. The consequence is that Germany exports exceptionally well-trained scientists to other countries. They don’t see any future for themselves here.
FOCUS: Using the techniques of genetic engineering, German scientists have developed the so-called golden rice. The rice is enriched with vitamin A and it has the potential to spare millions of people in the world’s poorest countries from losing their eyesight. Greenpeace is opposed to the golden rice, because they don’t want people in the Third World to serve as guinea pigs. Do you share this concern?
Nüsslein-Volhard: But that’s total nonsense. The behavior of Greenpeace in this matter is profoundly inhuman! Without a second thought, they are playing with human lives. I’ll give you another example. A few years ago, the Americans sent aid shipments of corn to African countries that were suffering from famine. The corn was genetically modified. In America, everyone eats it (including the German tourist), but the starving Africans were not permitted to eat the corn, because Greenpeace and other groups warned that it was genetically modified. These are unbelievable absurdities. I find it extremely depressing.
FOCUS: Critics of green biotechnologies complain that small farmers in the Third World become dependent on the big agro-industrial firms, which have their newly developed crop strains patented.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Okay, I find this criticism bizarre. As if it is somehow immoral to sell corn kernels as seed. Nobody is giving cars away, after all! The seed for all high-performance crop strains, including those that have not been genetically engineered, is specially produced nowadays, in order to guarantee the maximum yield. It’s just that hardly anyone knows that. The image of the farmer who retains a part of his harvest and replants the kernels the following spring is very romantic, of course. But in the case of corn, for example, such behavior would be totally irrational, since he would then only be able to collect half of the potential yields. But farmers have to try to get as much out of their land as possible. When they don’t manage to do so in an economically efficient fashion, then they need subsidies. Of course, we could pay them such subsidies, in order for them to continue sowing seed that they have themselves harvested. But I don’t find this particularly shrewd.
FOCUS: You’re reputed to be a passionate cook and you’ve even published a cookbook. As a cook, what would you like to see done with biotechnology?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Sometimes I regret the fact that you can’t find certain old-fashioned sorts of fruit in the stores anymore, simply because they spoil too quickly. There are particularly tasty sorts of strawberries or sour cherries, for example, that don’t keep well. You can tell that many types of fruits and vegetables are cultivated for their robustness and the quantity of the yield, but not for their flavor. If it would be possible by using genetic engineering to make the tastier sort of strawberries keep longer, personally I’d have nothing against it. You can’t have everything. But by using genetic engineering you can perhaps have more.
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard is the director of the Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tübingen. In 1995, she was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine. The above interview first appeared on the German news site [2] Focus-Online. The German version is available [3] here. The English translation is by John Rosenthal.
[References at the original link at the beginning]
Nobel laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard discusses the environmentalists' war against genetically modified food.
Pajamas Media, January 3, 2009
There is a specter haunting Europe: the specter of genetically modified foods. Although regularly consumed in the U.S. and around the world, in Europe GM foods are the target of veritable scare campaigns by environmental pressure groups and in the media. As a consequence, even GM crops that have been formally approved by the European Commission are the subject of increasing restrictions in Germany, France, and other European countries. GM crops — including such as have been planted merely for experimental purposes — are regularly destroyed by anti-GM militants in acts of would-be “civil disobedience.” Till Behrend of [1] the German weekly Focus spoke with the geneticist and Nobel Prize laureate Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard about the sources of biotech-phobia.
John Rosenthal (Translator)
***
FOCUS: Professor Nüsslein-Volhard, farmers all around the world are cultivating genetically modified crops on an ever larger scale. But many Germans appear to be afraid of the new technology. Are they right to be?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Well, we Germans are always afraid of new things. But what are these people actually afraid about? They’re afraid that they will assimilate alien genes while eating genetically modified foods. But that’s nonsense. The genes are digested, broken down, and eliminated from the body just like in the case of traditional foods. This has been proven beyond any shadow of a doubt. The human genome is sequential and you can examine whether there are any cow genes or plant genes in there. Have no fear: there aren’t any.
FOCUS: What distinguishes, then, classically bred crops from genetically modified crops?
Nüsslein-Volhard: People seem to be unaware that practically all the grains and vegetables that we eat nowadays have been highly genetically modified as compared to their natural forms. There’s hardly any crop as artificial as a potato. In the wild, potatoes are tiny and highly poisonous. It took thousands of generations to turn the potato into a decent sort of food. In contrast to the classical development of new plant strains, “green” biotechnology has the advantage that with its help one can proceed much faster and in a much more targeted fashion.
FOCUS: It’s true that for plant breeders that might be a fine thing. But lots of people want to do what’s right for nature and for themselves, and consequently they insist on “organic” products.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Given our level of material well-being and the fertility of our soil, we can afford to do that. But actually that’s a snobby, elitist attitude. Organic farming cannot feed large cities. And it certainly cannot feed the world’s population. It’s not possible, since the yields of organic farming are too small and the area one has to plant is way too much. It really makes more sense to use the particularly rich fields that we have intensively and in a sustainable manner by planting high-yield crops. The environment benefits, too, since then we can return other fields to their natural state.
FOCUS: Nonetheless, organic farming is thought to stand for a more respectful treatment of the environment.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Wrongly. Or do you imagine perhaps that organic farming can do without the spraying of pesticides? On organic farms, too, one sprays pesticides constantly and all over the place! In this respect, genetic engineering really has more intelligent solutions to offer. For example, with the help of genetic engineering we can make corn or cotton that is resistant to insect damage. If we incorporate a particular gene, they become poisonous for harmful insects, but not for humans or for mice. Then you can do without the insecticide. I find this rather smart. There are also strains being developed that grow with less water or that grow on salt-affected soils. It’s both sophisticated and ecologically beneficial!
FOCUS: If green biotechnology is so beneficial, why hasn’t it gained ground here in Germany?
Nüsslein-Volhard: We have groups like Greenpeace to thank for that: groups that put ideology above everything else — regardless of all the positive results that have been had [with GM crops] in the meanwhile in many countries. As a consequence, green biotechnology is practically a social taboo here.
FOCUS: What are the implications for scientific research?
Nüsslein-Volhard: For theoretical research, there are no consequences. But as soon as it’s a matter of practical applications, things become difficult for the scientists. In Germany, there are practically no positions to be found anymore that would permit them to translate their ideas and research into practice. We do have a biotechnology law, which to some extent makes possible the field experiments that are necessary to gain authorization [for GM crops]. But if the fields are constantly being destroyed and nothing is done about it, then it’s just not possible. Not far from here, at the University of Hohenheim, a whole course had to be canceled because anti-GM militants tore up all the experimental fields. The consequence is that Germany exports exceptionally well-trained scientists to other countries. They don’t see any future for themselves here.
FOCUS: Using the techniques of genetic engineering, German scientists have developed the so-called golden rice. The rice is enriched with vitamin A and it has the potential to spare millions of people in the world’s poorest countries from losing their eyesight. Greenpeace is opposed to the golden rice, because they don’t want people in the Third World to serve as guinea pigs. Do you share this concern?
Nüsslein-Volhard: But that’s total nonsense. The behavior of Greenpeace in this matter is profoundly inhuman! Without a second thought, they are playing with human lives. I’ll give you another example. A few years ago, the Americans sent aid shipments of corn to African countries that were suffering from famine. The corn was genetically modified. In America, everyone eats it (including the German tourist), but the starving Africans were not permitted to eat the corn, because Greenpeace and other groups warned that it was genetically modified. These are unbelievable absurdities. I find it extremely depressing.
FOCUS: Critics of green biotechnologies complain that small farmers in the Third World become dependent on the big agro-industrial firms, which have their newly developed crop strains patented.
Nüsslein-Volhard: Okay, I find this criticism bizarre. As if it is somehow immoral to sell corn kernels as seed. Nobody is giving cars away, after all! The seed for all high-performance crop strains, including those that have not been genetically engineered, is specially produced nowadays, in order to guarantee the maximum yield. It’s just that hardly anyone knows that. The image of the farmer who retains a part of his harvest and replants the kernels the following spring is very romantic, of course. But in the case of corn, for example, such behavior would be totally irrational, since he would then only be able to collect half of the potential yields. But farmers have to try to get as much out of their land as possible. When they don’t manage to do so in an economically efficient fashion, then they need subsidies. Of course, we could pay them such subsidies, in order for them to continue sowing seed that they have themselves harvested. But I don’t find this particularly shrewd.
FOCUS: You’re reputed to be a passionate cook and you’ve even published a cookbook. As a cook, what would you like to see done with biotechnology?
Nüsslein-Volhard: Sometimes I regret the fact that you can’t find certain old-fashioned sorts of fruit in the stores anymore, simply because they spoil too quickly. There are particularly tasty sorts of strawberries or sour cherries, for example, that don’t keep well. You can tell that many types of fruits and vegetables are cultivated for their robustness and the quantity of the yield, but not for their flavor. If it would be possible by using genetic engineering to make the tastier sort of strawberries keep longer, personally I’d have nothing against it. You can’t have everything. But by using genetic engineering you can perhaps have more.
Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard is the director of the Max Planck Institute for Developmental Biology in Tübingen. In 1995, she was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine. The above interview first appeared on the German news site [2] Focus-Online. The German version is available [3] here. The English translation is by John Rosenthal.
[References at the original link at the beginning]
Media Botches Story on Obama’s NASA Plans
Media Botches Story on Obama’s NASA Plans, by Rand Simberg
Panic over "tearing down" barriers between military and civilian space programs is much ado about nothing.
Pajamas Media, January 6, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
The same thing happens in the news business, particularly when the reporters aren’t very familiar with the field on which they’re reporting — and particularly when they think they are more familiar than they actually are. We had a good example of this over the holidays, when Bloomberg news came out with a “[1] scoop.” The Obama transition team was considering recommending a merger of NASA and the Air Force, to address the threat of the Yellow Peril — Chinese beating us to the moon. Shortly afterward, it was breathlessly picked up by [2] Fox News, [3] DBTechno, and [4] the Register in the UK, probably among others.
The story was nonsensical on several levels, right from the very first paragraph:
While there may be “long-standing barriers” between civilian and military space programs — this is, in fact, why Dwight Eisenhower originally established a purely civilian space agency half a century ago — there is nothing in the article to indicate that they are going to be “torn down.” The only evidence that they come up with is that one of the options being considered for future human spaceflight is the so-called Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), specifically Boeing’s Delta IV and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V:
The only problem with this is that — unless they are talking about some other vehicles, and if so, it’s hard to imagine what they are — the EELVs aren’t “military rockets.” Their development was subsidized with Air Force funds, but they were developed with Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s money as well, and they are commercial rockets, available to the military, commercial users, and NASA. There is no need to “tear down a barrier” for NASA to use them, as evidenced by the fact that NASA is already using them. For example, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter was blasted to orbit and off to Mars with an Atlas V/Centaur [5] over three years ago.
There is NASA resistance to using EELVs, but not because they are “military rockets.” It’s because they are seen as a threat to the agency’s — or more specifically, administrator Mike Griffin’s — desire to develop a new NASA-only vehicle, called Ares 1, and perhaps later, the larger version of it, Ares 5. If the EELVs become viewed as viable launchers for the human missions, the case for the Ares, already weak — particularly considering its [6] extensive development teething problems — becomes much weaker, perhaps to the point at which the program dies. (It should be noted that five years ago, prior to becoming NASA administrator, Dr. Griffin, who is [7] apparently desperately attempting to hang on to his job, had [8] no problems with using EELVs for crewed spaceflight.)
As for the “China space race” part, it makes little sense, either. This part is true, as far as it goes:
Yes, the Pentagon is legitimately concerned about the Chinese space threat, particularly since they have demonstrated the ability to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite a couple of years ago, making a [9] terrible mess up there in the process. But this part of the story is a complete non sequitur:
Despite what some of the (non-transition) sources quoted say, there is little relationship between a human moon landing and space warfare in near-earth orbit. Guidance systems for the latter are easily developed in the absence of orbital rendezvous and docking, which have different requirements. And despite [10] myths promulgated by science fiction about being bombarded from the moon, it is really not a militarily useful high ground against the earth.
Yes, it will save costs if NASA can use existing, or modified existing, vehicles, but this wouldn’t involve any “tearing down of walls,” and it should be done regardless of what the Chinese are doing, simply to make the program more affordable and sustainable.
How did this confusing and misleading story happen? In an email from someone familiar with the transition team’s activities, it seems pretty simple:
Which demonstrates the old adage about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. Unfortunately, to paraphrase Mark Twain, a confusing story can find its way halfway around the world — and perhaps to the moon — before the reality can get its boots on. Particularly at Internet speed.
[References in the original link above]
Panic over "tearing down" barriers between military and civilian space programs is much ado about nothing.
Pajamas Media, January 6, 2009
Excerpts:
[...]
The same thing happens in the news business, particularly when the reporters aren’t very familiar with the field on which they’re reporting — and particularly when they think they are more familiar than they actually are. We had a good example of this over the holidays, when Bloomberg news came out with a “[1] scoop.” The Obama transition team was considering recommending a merger of NASA and the Air Force, to address the threat of the Yellow Peril — Chinese beating us to the moon. Shortly afterward, it was breathlessly picked up by [2] Fox News, [3] DBTechno, and [4] the Register in the UK, probably among others.
The story was nonsensical on several levels, right from the very first paragraph:
President-elect Barack Obama will probably tear down long-standing barriers
between the U.S.’s civilian and military space programs to speed up a mission to
the moon amid the prospect of a new space race with China.
While there may be “long-standing barriers” between civilian and military space programs — this is, in fact, why Dwight Eisenhower originally established a purely civilian space agency half a century ago — there is nothing in the article to indicate that they are going to be “torn down.” The only evidence that they come up with is that one of the options being considered for future human spaceflight is the so-called Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), specifically Boeing’s Delta IV and Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V:
Obama’s transition team is considering a collaboration between the Defense
Department and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration because
military rockets may be cheaper and ready sooner than the space agency’s planned
launch vehicle, which isn’t slated to fly until 2015, according to people who’ve
discussed the idea with the Obama team.
The only problem with this is that — unless they are talking about some other vehicles, and if so, it’s hard to imagine what they are — the EELVs aren’t “military rockets.” Their development was subsidized with Air Force funds, but they were developed with Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s money as well, and they are commercial rockets, available to the military, commercial users, and NASA. There is no need to “tear down a barrier” for NASA to use them, as evidenced by the fact that NASA is already using them. For example, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter was blasted to orbit and off to Mars with an Atlas V/Centaur [5] over three years ago.
There is NASA resistance to using EELVs, but not because they are “military rockets.” It’s because they are seen as a threat to the agency’s — or more specifically, administrator Mike Griffin’s — desire to develop a new NASA-only vehicle, called Ares 1, and perhaps later, the larger version of it, Ares 5. If the EELVs become viewed as viable launchers for the human missions, the case for the Ares, already weak — particularly considering its [6] extensive development teething problems — becomes much weaker, perhaps to the point at which the program dies. (It should be noted that five years ago, prior to becoming NASA administrator, Dr. Griffin, who is [7] apparently desperately attempting to hang on to his job, had [8] no problems with using EELVs for crewed spaceflight.)
As for the “China space race” part, it makes little sense, either. This part is true, as far as it goes:
The potential change comes as Pentagon concerns are rising over China’s space
ambitions because of what is perceived as an eventual threat to U.S. defense
satellites, the lofty battlefield eyes of the military.
Yes, the Pentagon is legitimately concerned about the Chinese space threat, particularly since they have demonstrated the ability to destroy a low-earth-orbit satellite a couple of years ago, making a [9] terrible mess up there in the process. But this part of the story is a complete non sequitur:
China, which destroyed one of its aging satellites in a surprise missile test in
2007, is making strides in its spaceflight program. The military-run effort
carried out a first spacewalk in September and aims to land a robotic rover on
the moon in 2012, with a human mission several years later.
Despite what some of the (non-transition) sources quoted say, there is little relationship between a human moon landing and space warfare in near-earth orbit. Guidance systems for the latter are easily developed in the absence of orbital rendezvous and docking, which have different requirements. And despite [10] myths promulgated by science fiction about being bombarded from the moon, it is really not a militarily useful high ground against the earth.
Yes, it will save costs if NASA can use existing, or modified existing, vehicles, but this wouldn’t involve any “tearing down of walls,” and it should be done regardless of what the Chinese are doing, simply to make the program more affordable and sustainable.
How did this confusing and misleading story happen? In an email from someone familiar with the transition team’s activities, it seems pretty simple:
This story is very strange. We asked questions about EELVs; about how the DOD
and NASA cooperate; and what has been discussed with China. They were unrelated
questions. It seems as though the reporter tied them together for his odd
conclusion.
Which demonstrates the old adage about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing. Unfortunately, to paraphrase Mark Twain, a confusing story can find its way halfway around the world — and perhaps to the moon — before the reality can get its boots on. Particularly at Internet speed.
[References in the original link above]
Do Obama “Green Jobs” Plan Requires Expanding Government Payroll with 600K Bureaucrats?
Job Mirage: Obama “Green Jobs” Plan Requires Expanding Government Payroll with 600K Bureaucrats
Institute for Energy Research, January 6, 2009
Washington, DC – Institute for Energy Research president Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement today in response to the president-elect’s announcement this past weekend that his plan to generate three million so-called “green jobs” includes expanding the government’s payroll to accommodate 600,000 new wage earners:
NOTE: On Saturday, President-elect Obama offered a revised assessment of how many new “green jobs” could be created by his administration, upping the number to three million – “more than eighty percent of them in the private sector.” The burden of supporting the remaining 20 percent would presumably fall to the public sector, which means that 600,000 new government jobs would need to be created to meet the president-elect’s goal
Institute for Energy Research, January 6, 2009
Washington, DC – Institute for Energy Research president Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement today in response to the president-elect’s announcement this past weekend that his plan to generate three million so-called “green jobs” includes expanding the government’s payroll to accommodate 600,000 new wage earners:
“The road back to economic recovery and long-term prosperity will be built by an active, job-creating private-sector, paved by reliable, affordable energy, and financed by the revenues and royalties generated as a result of it. Expanding the government’s payroll in times of unemployment is no different than printing out more money in times of recession – both may change the short-term perception of the economy, but neither will improve the actual performance of it.
“You can create all the new government jobs you want, but if those jobs can’t survive the night without the constant nourishment of subsidies, mandates and distorted tax treatment, you haven’t created any new wealth – only re-distributed it. A national policy that requires consumers to pay more for their energy will only price American goods above foreign ones, and contribute to economic decline.
“Activity is not the same thing as achievement, and to the extent we continue confusing the two, the more protracted and severe our current economic downturn will be.”
NOTE: On Saturday, President-elect Obama offered a revised assessment of how many new “green jobs” could be created by his administration, upping the number to three million – “more than eighty percent of them in the private sector.” The burden of supporting the remaining 20 percent would presumably fall to the public sector, which means that 600,000 new government jobs would need to be created to meet the president-elect’s goal
Change.gov: No earmarks
No earmarks, by Dan McSwain
Change.gov, Tuesday, January 6, 2009 02:24pm EST
President-elect Barack Obama said today in a meeting with members of his budget team that he will ban earmarks from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that will soon go before Congress.
The President-elect also said he expects his administration to inherit a budget deficit of up to $1 trillion.
He was joined in the meeting by Peter Orszag, Director-designate, Office of Managment and Budget; Christina Romer, Christina Romer, Director-designate, Council of Economic Advisors and Lawrence Summers, Director-designate, National Economic Council, among others.
Below are pictures and video from the event.
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/budget_draft/
Change.gov, Tuesday, January 6, 2009 02:24pm EST
President-elect Barack Obama said today in a meeting with members of his budget team that he will ban earmarks from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that will soon go before Congress.
The President-elect also said he expects his administration to inherit a budget deficit of up to $1 trillion.
He was joined in the meeting by Peter Orszag, Director-designate, Office of Managment and Budget; Christina Romer, Christina Romer, Director-designate, Council of Economic Advisors and Lawrence Summers, Director-designate, National Economic Council, among others.
Below are pictures and video from the event.
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/budget_draft/
RealClimate FAQ on climate models: Part II
FAQ on climate models: Part II. By Gavin Schmidt
Real Climate, Jan 06, 2009 @ 8:09 AM
[This is a continuation of a previous post including interesting questions from the comments.]
What are parameterisations?
Some physics in the real world, that is necessary for a climate model to work, is only known empirically. Or perhaps the theory only really applies at scales much smaller than the model grid size. This physics needs to be 'parameterised' i.e. a formulation is used that captures the phenomenology of the process and its sensitivity to change but without going into all of the very small scale details. These parameterisations are approximations to the phenomena that we wish to model, but which work at the scales the models actually resolve. A simple example is the radiation code - instead of using a line-by-line code which would resolve the absorption at over 10,000 individual wavelengths, a GCM generally uses a broad-band approximation (with 30 to 50 bands) which gives very close to the same results as a full calculation. Another example is the formula for the evaporation from the ocean as a function of the large-scale humidity, temperature and wind-speed. This is really a highly turbulent phenomena, but there are good approximations that give the net evaporation as a function of the large scale ('bulk') conditions. In some parameterisations, the functional form is reasonably well known, but the values of specific coefficients might not be. In these cases, the parameterisations are 'tuned' to reproduce the observed processes as much as possible.
How are the parameterisations evaluated?
In at least two ways. At the process scale, and at the emergent phenomena scale. For instance, taking one of the two examples mentioned above, the radiation code can be tested against field measurements at specific times and places where the composition of the atmosphere is known alongside a line-by-line code. It would need to capture the variations seen over time (the daily cycle, weather, cloudiness etc.). This is a test at the level of the actual process being parameterised and is a necessary component in all parameterisations. The more important tests occur when we examine how the parameterisation impacts larger-scale or emergent phenomena. Does changing the evaporation improve the patterns of precipitation? the match of the specific humidity field to observations? etc. This can be an exhaustive set of tests but again are mostly necessary. Note that most 'tunings' are done at the process level. Only those that can't be constrained using direct observations of the phenomena are available for tuning to get better large scale climate features. As mentioned in the previous post, there are only a handful of such parameters that get used in practice.
Are clouds included in models? How are they parameterised?
Models do indeed include clouds, and do allow changes in clouds as a response to forcings. There are certainly questions about how realistic those clouds are and whether they have the right sensitivity - but all models do have them! In general, models suggest that they are a positive feedback - i.e. there is a relative increase in high clouds (which warm more than they cool) compared to low clouds (which cool more than they warm) - but this is quite variable among models and not very well constrained from data.
Cloud parameterisations are amongst the most complex in the models. The large differences in mechanisms for cloud formation (tropical convection, mid-latitude storms, marine stratus decks) require multiple cases to be looked at and many sensitivities to be explored (to vertical motion, humidity, stratification etc.). Clouds also have important micro-physics that determine their properties (such as cloud particle size and phase) and interact strongly with aerosols. Standard GCMs have most of this physics included, and some are even going so far as to embed cloud resolving models in each grid box. These models are supposed to do away with much of the parameterisation (though they too need some, smaller-scale, ones), but at the cost of greatly increased complexity and computation time. Something like this is probably the way of the future.
What is being done to address the considerable uncertainty associated with cloud and aerosol forcings?
As alluded to above, cloud parameterisations are becoming much more detailed and are being matched to an ever larger amount of observations. However, there are still problems in getting sufficient data to constrain the models. For instance, it's only recently that separate diagnostics for cloud liquid water and cloud ice have become available. We still aren't able to distinguish different kinds of aerosols from satellites (though maybe by this time next year).
However, none of this is to say that clouds are a done deal, they certainly aren't. In both cloud and aerosol modelling the current approach is get as wide a spectrum of approaches as possible and to discern what is and what is not robust among those results. Hopefully soon we will start converging on the approaches that are the most realistic, but we are not there yet.
Forcings over time are a slightly different issue, and there it is likely that substantial uncertainties will remain because of the difficulty in reconstructing the true emission data for periods more than a few decades back. That involves making pretty unconstrained estimates of the efficiency of 1930s technology (for instance) and 19th Century deforestation rates. Educated guesses are possible, but independent constraints (such as particulates in ice cores) are partial at best.
Do models assume a constant relative humidity?
No. Relative humidity is a diagnostic of the models' temperature and water distribution and will vary according to the dynamics, convection etc. However, many processes that remove water from the atmosphere (i.e. cloud formation and rainfall) have a clear functional dependence on the relative humidity rather than the total amount of water (i.e. clouds form when air parcels are saturated at their local temperature, not when humidity reaches X g/m3). These leads to the phenomenon observed in the models and the real world that long-term mean relative humidity is pretty stable. In models it varies by a couple of percent over temperature changes that lead to specific humidity (the total amount of water) changing by much larger amounts. Thus a good estimate of the model relative humidity response is that it is roughly constant, similar to the situation seen in observations. But this is a derived result, not an assumption. You can see for yourself here (select Relative Humidty (%) from the diagnostics).
What are boundary conditions?
These are the basic data input into the models that define the land/ocean mask, the height of the mountains, river routing and the orbit of the Earth. For standard models additional inputs are the distribution of vegetation types and their properties, soil properties, and mountain glacier, lake, and wetland distributions. In more sophisticated models some of what were boundary conditions in simpler models have now become prognostic variables. For instance, dynamic vegetation models predict the vegetation types as a function of climate. Other examples in a simple atmospheric model might be the distribution of ozone or the level of carbon dioxide. In more complex models that calculate atmospheric chemistry or the carbon cycle, the boundary conditions would instead be the emissions of ozone precursors or anthropogenic CO2. Variations in these boundary conditions (for whatever reason) will change the climate simulation and can be considered forcings in the most general sense (see the next few questions).
Does the climate change if the boundary conditions are stable?
The answer to this question depends very much on perspective. On the longest timescales a climate model with constant boundary conditions is stable - that is, the mean properties and their statistical distribution don't vary. However, the spectrum of variability can be wide, and so there is variation from one decade to the next, from one century to the next, that are the result of internal variations in (for instance) the ocean circulation. While the long term stability is easy to demonstrate in climate models, it can't be unambiguously determined whether this is true in the real world since boundary conditions are always changing (albeit slowly most of the time).
Does the climate change if boundary conditions change?
Yes. If any of the factors that influence the simulation change, there will be a response in the climate. It might be large or small, but it will always be detectable if you run the model for long enough. For example, making the Rockies smaller (as they were a few million years ago) changes the planetary wave patterns and the temperature patterns downstream. Changing the ozone distribution changes temperatures, the height of the tropopause and stratospheric winds. Changing the land-ocean mask (because of sea level rise or tectonic changes for instance) changes ocean circulation, patterns of atmospheric convection and heat transports.
What is a forcing then?
The most straightforward definition is simply that a forcing is a change in any of the boundary conditions. Note however that this definition is not absolute with respect to any particular bit of physics. Take ozone for instance. In a standard atmospheric model, the ozone distribution is fixed and any change in that fixed distribution (because of stratospheric ozone depletion, tropospheric pollution, or changes over a solar cycle) would be a forcing causing the climate to change. In a model that calculates atmospheric chemistry, the ozone distribution is a function of the emissions of chemical precursors, the solar UV input and the climate itself. In such a model, ozone changes are a response (possibly leading to a feedback) to other imposed changes. Thus it doesn't make sense to ask whether ozone changes are or aren't a forcing without discussing what kind of model you are talking about.
There is however a default model setup in which many forcings are considered. This is not always stated explicitly and leads to (somewhat semantic) confusion even among specialists. This setup consists of an atmospheric model with a simple mixed-layer ocean model, but that doesn't include chemistry, aerosol vegetation or dynamic ice sheet modules. Not coincidentally this corresponds to the state-of-the-art of climate models around 1980 when the first comparisons of different forcings started to be done. It persists in the literature all the way through to the latest IPCC report (figure xx). However, there is a good reason for this, and that is observation that different forcings that have equal 'radiative' impacts have very similar responses. This allows many different forcings to be compared in magnitude and added up.
The 'radiative forcing' is calculated (roughly) as the net change in radiative fluxes (both short wave and long wave) at the top of the atmosphere when a component of the default model set up is changed. Increased solar irradiance is an easy radiative forcing to calculate, as is the value for well-mixed greenhouse gases. The direct effect of aerosols (the change in reflectance and absorption) is also easy (though uncertain due to the distributional uncertainty), while the indirect effect of aerosols on clouds is a little trickier. However, some forcings in the general sense defined above don't have an easy-to-caclulate 'radiative forcing' at all. What is the radiative impact of opening the isthmus of Panama? or the collapse of Lake Agassiz? Yet both of these examples have large impacts on the models' climate. Some other forcings have a very small global radiative forcing and yet lead to large impacts (orbital changes for instance) through components of the climate that aren't included in the default set-up. This isn't a problem for actually modelling the effects, but it does make comparing them to other forcings without doing the calculations a little more tricky.
What are the differences between climate models and weather models?
Conceptually they are very similar, but in practice they are used very differently. Weather models use as much data as there is available to start off close to the current weather situation and then use their knowledge of physics to step forward in time. This has good skill for a few days and some skill for a little longer. Because they are run for short periods of time only, they tend to have much higher resolution and more detailed physics than climate models (but note that the Hadley Centre for instance, uses the same model for climate and weather purposes). Weather models develop in ways that improve the short term predictions, though the impact for long term statistics or the climatology needs to be assessed independently. Curiously, the best weather models often have a much worse climatology than the best climate models. There are many current attempts to improve the short-term predictability in climate models in line with the best weather models, though it is unclear what impact that will have on projections.
How are solar variations represented in the models?
This varies a lot because of uncertainties in the past record and complexities in the responses. But given a particular estimate of solar activity there are a number of modelled responses. First, the total amount of solar radiation (TSI) can be varied - this changes the total amount of energy coming into the system and is very easy to implement. Second, the variation over the the solar cycle at different frequencies (from the UV to the near infra-red) don't all vary with the same amplitude - UV changes are about 10 times as large as those in the total irradiance. Since UV is mostly absorbed by ozone in the stratosphere, including these changes increases the magnitude of the solar cycle variability in the stratosphere. Furthermore, the change in UV has an impact on the production of ozone itself (even down into the troposphere). This can be calculated with chemistry-climate models, and is increasingly being used in climate model scenarios (see here for instance).
There are also other hypothesised impacts of solar activity on climate, most notably the impact of galactic cosmic rays (which are modulated by the solar magnetic activity on solar cycle timescales) on atmospheric ionisation, which in turn has been linked to aerosol formation, and in turn linked to cloud amounts. Most of these links are based on untested theories and somewhat dubious correlations, however, as was recognised many years ago (Dickinson, 1975), this is a plausible idea. Implementing it in climate models is however a challenge. It requires models to have a full model of aerosol creation, growth, accretion and cloud nucleation. There are many other processes that affect aerosols and GCR-related ionisation is only a small part of that. Additionally there is a huge amount of uncertainty in aerosol-cloud effects (the 'aerosol indirect effect'). Preliminary work seems to indicate that the GCR-aerosol-cloud link is very small (i.e. the other effects dominate), but this is still in the early stages of research. Should this prove to be significant, climate models will likely incorporate this directly (using embedded aerosol codes), or will parameterise the effects based on calculated cloud variations from more detailed models. What models can't do (except perhaps as a sensitivity study) is take purported global scale correlations and just 'stick them in' - cloud processes and effects are so tightly wound up in the model dynamics and radiation and have so much spatial and temporal structure that this couldn't be done in a way that made physical sense. For instance, part of the observed correlation could be due to the other solar effects, and so how could they be separated out? (and that's even assuming that the correlations actually hold up over time, which doesn't seem to be the case).
What do you mean when you say model has “skill”?
'Skill' is a relative concept. A model is said to have skill if it gives more information than a naive heuristic. Thus for weather forecasts, a prediction is described as skilful if it works better than just assuming that each day is the same as the last ('persistence'). It should be noted that 'persistence' itself is much more skillful than climatology (the historical average for that day) for about a week. For climate models, there is a much larger range of tests available and there isn't necessarily an analogue for 'persistence' in all cases. For a simulation of a previous time period (say the mid-Holocene), skill is determined relative to a 'no change from the present'. Thus if a model predicts a shift northwards of the tropical rain bands (as was observed), that would be skillful. This can be quantified and different models can exhibit more or less skill with respect to that metric. For the 20th Century, models show skill for the long-term changes in global and continental-scale temperatures - but only if natural and anthropogenic forcings are used - compared to an expectation of no change. Standard climate models don't show skill at the interannual timescales which depend heavily on El Niño's and other relatively unpredictable internal variations (note that initiallised climate model projections that use historical ocean conditions may show some skill, but this is still a very experimental endeavour).
How much can we learn from paleoclimate?
Lots! The main issue is that for the modern instrumental period the changes in many aspects of climate have not been very large - either compared with what is projected for the 21st Century, or from what we see in the past climate record. Thus we can't rely on the modern observations to properly assess the sensitivity of the climate to future changes. For instance, we don't have any good observations of changes in the ocean's thermohaline circulation over recent decades because a) the measurements are difficult, and b) there is a lot of noise. However, in periods in the past, say around 8,200 years ago, or during the last ice age, there is lots of evidence that this circulation was greatly reduced, possibly as a function of surface freshwater forcing from large lake collapses or from the ice sheets. If those forcings and the response can be quantified they provide good targets against which the models' sensitivity can be tested. Periods that are of possibly the most interest for testing sensitivities associated with uncertainties in future projections are the mid-Holocene (for tropical rainfall, sea ice), the 8.2kyr event (for the ocean thermohaline circulation), the last two millennia (for decadal/multi-decadal variability), the last interglacial (for ice sheets/sea level) etc. There are plenty of other examples, and of course, there is a lot of intrinsic interest in paleoclimate that is not related to climate models at all!
As before, if there are additional questions you'd like answered, put them in the comments and we'll collate the interesting ones for the next FAQ.
Real Climate, Jan 06, 2009 @ 8:09 AM
[This is a continuation of a previous post including interesting questions from the comments.]
What are parameterisations?
Some physics in the real world, that is necessary for a climate model to work, is only known empirically. Or perhaps the theory only really applies at scales much smaller than the model grid size. This physics needs to be 'parameterised' i.e. a formulation is used that captures the phenomenology of the process and its sensitivity to change but without going into all of the very small scale details. These parameterisations are approximations to the phenomena that we wish to model, but which work at the scales the models actually resolve. A simple example is the radiation code - instead of using a line-by-line code which would resolve the absorption at over 10,000 individual wavelengths, a GCM generally uses a broad-band approximation (with 30 to 50 bands) which gives very close to the same results as a full calculation. Another example is the formula for the evaporation from the ocean as a function of the large-scale humidity, temperature and wind-speed. This is really a highly turbulent phenomena, but there are good approximations that give the net evaporation as a function of the large scale ('bulk') conditions. In some parameterisations, the functional form is reasonably well known, but the values of specific coefficients might not be. In these cases, the parameterisations are 'tuned' to reproduce the observed processes as much as possible.
How are the parameterisations evaluated?
In at least two ways. At the process scale, and at the emergent phenomena scale. For instance, taking one of the two examples mentioned above, the radiation code can be tested against field measurements at specific times and places where the composition of the atmosphere is known alongside a line-by-line code. It would need to capture the variations seen over time (the daily cycle, weather, cloudiness etc.). This is a test at the level of the actual process being parameterised and is a necessary component in all parameterisations. The more important tests occur when we examine how the parameterisation impacts larger-scale or emergent phenomena. Does changing the evaporation improve the patterns of precipitation? the match of the specific humidity field to observations? etc. This can be an exhaustive set of tests but again are mostly necessary. Note that most 'tunings' are done at the process level. Only those that can't be constrained using direct observations of the phenomena are available for tuning to get better large scale climate features. As mentioned in the previous post, there are only a handful of such parameters that get used in practice.
Are clouds included in models? How are they parameterised?
Models do indeed include clouds, and do allow changes in clouds as a response to forcings. There are certainly questions about how realistic those clouds are and whether they have the right sensitivity - but all models do have them! In general, models suggest that they are a positive feedback - i.e. there is a relative increase in high clouds (which warm more than they cool) compared to low clouds (which cool more than they warm) - but this is quite variable among models and not very well constrained from data.
Cloud parameterisations are amongst the most complex in the models. The large differences in mechanisms for cloud formation (tropical convection, mid-latitude storms, marine stratus decks) require multiple cases to be looked at and many sensitivities to be explored (to vertical motion, humidity, stratification etc.). Clouds also have important micro-physics that determine their properties (such as cloud particle size and phase) and interact strongly with aerosols. Standard GCMs have most of this physics included, and some are even going so far as to embed cloud resolving models in each grid box. These models are supposed to do away with much of the parameterisation (though they too need some, smaller-scale, ones), but at the cost of greatly increased complexity and computation time. Something like this is probably the way of the future.
What is being done to address the considerable uncertainty associated with cloud and aerosol forcings?
As alluded to above, cloud parameterisations are becoming much more detailed and are being matched to an ever larger amount of observations. However, there are still problems in getting sufficient data to constrain the models. For instance, it's only recently that separate diagnostics for cloud liquid water and cloud ice have become available. We still aren't able to distinguish different kinds of aerosols from satellites (though maybe by this time next year).
However, none of this is to say that clouds are a done deal, they certainly aren't. In both cloud and aerosol modelling the current approach is get as wide a spectrum of approaches as possible and to discern what is and what is not robust among those results. Hopefully soon we will start converging on the approaches that are the most realistic, but we are not there yet.
Forcings over time are a slightly different issue, and there it is likely that substantial uncertainties will remain because of the difficulty in reconstructing the true emission data for periods more than a few decades back. That involves making pretty unconstrained estimates of the efficiency of 1930s technology (for instance) and 19th Century deforestation rates. Educated guesses are possible, but independent constraints (such as particulates in ice cores) are partial at best.
Do models assume a constant relative humidity?
No. Relative humidity is a diagnostic of the models' temperature and water distribution and will vary according to the dynamics, convection etc. However, many processes that remove water from the atmosphere (i.e. cloud formation and rainfall) have a clear functional dependence on the relative humidity rather than the total amount of water (i.e. clouds form when air parcels are saturated at their local temperature, not when humidity reaches X g/m3). These leads to the phenomenon observed in the models and the real world that long-term mean relative humidity is pretty stable. In models it varies by a couple of percent over temperature changes that lead to specific humidity (the total amount of water) changing by much larger amounts. Thus a good estimate of the model relative humidity response is that it is roughly constant, similar to the situation seen in observations. But this is a derived result, not an assumption. You can see for yourself here (select Relative Humidty (%) from the diagnostics).
What are boundary conditions?
These are the basic data input into the models that define the land/ocean mask, the height of the mountains, river routing and the orbit of the Earth. For standard models additional inputs are the distribution of vegetation types and their properties, soil properties, and mountain glacier, lake, and wetland distributions. In more sophisticated models some of what were boundary conditions in simpler models have now become prognostic variables. For instance, dynamic vegetation models predict the vegetation types as a function of climate. Other examples in a simple atmospheric model might be the distribution of ozone or the level of carbon dioxide. In more complex models that calculate atmospheric chemistry or the carbon cycle, the boundary conditions would instead be the emissions of ozone precursors or anthropogenic CO2. Variations in these boundary conditions (for whatever reason) will change the climate simulation and can be considered forcings in the most general sense (see the next few questions).
Does the climate change if the boundary conditions are stable?
The answer to this question depends very much on perspective. On the longest timescales a climate model with constant boundary conditions is stable - that is, the mean properties and their statistical distribution don't vary. However, the spectrum of variability can be wide, and so there is variation from one decade to the next, from one century to the next, that are the result of internal variations in (for instance) the ocean circulation. While the long term stability is easy to demonstrate in climate models, it can't be unambiguously determined whether this is true in the real world since boundary conditions are always changing (albeit slowly most of the time).
Does the climate change if boundary conditions change?
Yes. If any of the factors that influence the simulation change, there will be a response in the climate. It might be large or small, but it will always be detectable if you run the model for long enough. For example, making the Rockies smaller (as they were a few million years ago) changes the planetary wave patterns and the temperature patterns downstream. Changing the ozone distribution changes temperatures, the height of the tropopause and stratospheric winds. Changing the land-ocean mask (because of sea level rise or tectonic changes for instance) changes ocean circulation, patterns of atmospheric convection and heat transports.
What is a forcing then?
The most straightforward definition is simply that a forcing is a change in any of the boundary conditions. Note however that this definition is not absolute with respect to any particular bit of physics. Take ozone for instance. In a standard atmospheric model, the ozone distribution is fixed and any change in that fixed distribution (because of stratospheric ozone depletion, tropospheric pollution, or changes over a solar cycle) would be a forcing causing the climate to change. In a model that calculates atmospheric chemistry, the ozone distribution is a function of the emissions of chemical precursors, the solar UV input and the climate itself. In such a model, ozone changes are a response (possibly leading to a feedback) to other imposed changes. Thus it doesn't make sense to ask whether ozone changes are or aren't a forcing without discussing what kind of model you are talking about.
There is however a default model setup in which many forcings are considered. This is not always stated explicitly and leads to (somewhat semantic) confusion even among specialists. This setup consists of an atmospheric model with a simple mixed-layer ocean model, but that doesn't include chemistry, aerosol vegetation or dynamic ice sheet modules. Not coincidentally this corresponds to the state-of-the-art of climate models around 1980 when the first comparisons of different forcings started to be done. It persists in the literature all the way through to the latest IPCC report (figure xx). However, there is a good reason for this, and that is observation that different forcings that have equal 'radiative' impacts have very similar responses. This allows many different forcings to be compared in magnitude and added up.
The 'radiative forcing' is calculated (roughly) as the net change in radiative fluxes (both short wave and long wave) at the top of the atmosphere when a component of the default model set up is changed. Increased solar irradiance is an easy radiative forcing to calculate, as is the value for well-mixed greenhouse gases. The direct effect of aerosols (the change in reflectance and absorption) is also easy (though uncertain due to the distributional uncertainty), while the indirect effect of aerosols on clouds is a little trickier. However, some forcings in the general sense defined above don't have an easy-to-caclulate 'radiative forcing' at all. What is the radiative impact of opening the isthmus of Panama? or the collapse of Lake Agassiz? Yet both of these examples have large impacts on the models' climate. Some other forcings have a very small global radiative forcing and yet lead to large impacts (orbital changes for instance) through components of the climate that aren't included in the default set-up. This isn't a problem for actually modelling the effects, but it does make comparing them to other forcings without doing the calculations a little more tricky.
What are the differences between climate models and weather models?
Conceptually they are very similar, but in practice they are used very differently. Weather models use as much data as there is available to start off close to the current weather situation and then use their knowledge of physics to step forward in time. This has good skill for a few days and some skill for a little longer. Because they are run for short periods of time only, they tend to have much higher resolution and more detailed physics than climate models (but note that the Hadley Centre for instance, uses the same model for climate and weather purposes). Weather models develop in ways that improve the short term predictions, though the impact for long term statistics or the climatology needs to be assessed independently. Curiously, the best weather models often have a much worse climatology than the best climate models. There are many current attempts to improve the short-term predictability in climate models in line with the best weather models, though it is unclear what impact that will have on projections.
How are solar variations represented in the models?
This varies a lot because of uncertainties in the past record and complexities in the responses. But given a particular estimate of solar activity there are a number of modelled responses. First, the total amount of solar radiation (TSI) can be varied - this changes the total amount of energy coming into the system and is very easy to implement. Second, the variation over the the solar cycle at different frequencies (from the UV to the near infra-red) don't all vary with the same amplitude - UV changes are about 10 times as large as those in the total irradiance. Since UV is mostly absorbed by ozone in the stratosphere, including these changes increases the magnitude of the solar cycle variability in the stratosphere. Furthermore, the change in UV has an impact on the production of ozone itself (even down into the troposphere). This can be calculated with chemistry-climate models, and is increasingly being used in climate model scenarios (see here for instance).
There are also other hypothesised impacts of solar activity on climate, most notably the impact of galactic cosmic rays (which are modulated by the solar magnetic activity on solar cycle timescales) on atmospheric ionisation, which in turn has been linked to aerosol formation, and in turn linked to cloud amounts. Most of these links are based on untested theories and somewhat dubious correlations, however, as was recognised many years ago (Dickinson, 1975), this is a plausible idea. Implementing it in climate models is however a challenge. It requires models to have a full model of aerosol creation, growth, accretion and cloud nucleation. There are many other processes that affect aerosols and GCR-related ionisation is only a small part of that. Additionally there is a huge amount of uncertainty in aerosol-cloud effects (the 'aerosol indirect effect'). Preliminary work seems to indicate that the GCR-aerosol-cloud link is very small (i.e. the other effects dominate), but this is still in the early stages of research. Should this prove to be significant, climate models will likely incorporate this directly (using embedded aerosol codes), or will parameterise the effects based on calculated cloud variations from more detailed models. What models can't do (except perhaps as a sensitivity study) is take purported global scale correlations and just 'stick them in' - cloud processes and effects are so tightly wound up in the model dynamics and radiation and have so much spatial and temporal structure that this couldn't be done in a way that made physical sense. For instance, part of the observed correlation could be due to the other solar effects, and so how could they be separated out? (and that's even assuming that the correlations actually hold up over time, which doesn't seem to be the case).
What do you mean when you say model has “skill”?
'Skill' is a relative concept. A model is said to have skill if it gives more information than a naive heuristic. Thus for weather forecasts, a prediction is described as skilful if it works better than just assuming that each day is the same as the last ('persistence'). It should be noted that 'persistence' itself is much more skillful than climatology (the historical average for that day) for about a week. For climate models, there is a much larger range of tests available and there isn't necessarily an analogue for 'persistence' in all cases. For a simulation of a previous time period (say the mid-Holocene), skill is determined relative to a 'no change from the present'. Thus if a model predicts a shift northwards of the tropical rain bands (as was observed), that would be skillful. This can be quantified and different models can exhibit more or less skill with respect to that metric. For the 20th Century, models show skill for the long-term changes in global and continental-scale temperatures - but only if natural and anthropogenic forcings are used - compared to an expectation of no change. Standard climate models don't show skill at the interannual timescales which depend heavily on El Niño's and other relatively unpredictable internal variations (note that initiallised climate model projections that use historical ocean conditions may show some skill, but this is still a very experimental endeavour).
How much can we learn from paleoclimate?
Lots! The main issue is that for the modern instrumental period the changes in many aspects of climate have not been very large - either compared with what is projected for the 21st Century, or from what we see in the past climate record. Thus we can't rely on the modern observations to properly assess the sensitivity of the climate to future changes. For instance, we don't have any good observations of changes in the ocean's thermohaline circulation over recent decades because a) the measurements are difficult, and b) there is a lot of noise. However, in periods in the past, say around 8,200 years ago, or during the last ice age, there is lots of evidence that this circulation was greatly reduced, possibly as a function of surface freshwater forcing from large lake collapses or from the ice sheets. If those forcings and the response can be quantified they provide good targets against which the models' sensitivity can be tested. Periods that are of possibly the most interest for testing sensitivities associated with uncertainties in future projections are the mid-Holocene (for tropical rainfall, sea ice), the 8.2kyr event (for the ocean thermohaline circulation), the last two millennia (for decadal/multi-decadal variability), the last interglacial (for ice sheets/sea level) etc. There are plenty of other examples, and of course, there is a lot of intrinsic interest in paleoclimate that is not related to climate models at all!
As before, if there are additional questions you'd like answered, put them in the comments and we'll collate the interesting ones for the next FAQ.
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