Washington Has Always Demonized Wall Street. By Zachary Karabell
WSJ, Mar 19, 2009
'Wall Street, as we knew it, is dead. The system that allowed the U.S. economy to be a dynamic innovator has been fundamentally broken and the implications of these structural changes have yet to be fully felt."
It's now commonly accepted that the economic meltdown has forever changed the nature of the financial industry. But the words above weren't written in the past weeks. They were penned by financial analyst Richard Wayman in 2003, after investigations by then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer led to a structural shift in the relationship between research and investment banking following the stock-market collapse of 2001-02.
Among the many remarkable aspects of our present crisis is the speed with which we have collectively forgotten past crises, even ones that happened recently. The current meltdown is substantial, dramatic, and systemically dangerous -- but it is hardly the first to merit that description. And each crisis, without fail, results in unequivocal pronouncements that such excesses will never again be allowed.
When President Barack Obama lambastes Wall Street bonuses as "shameful," he is keeping up with the American tradition of vilifying Wall Street. Almost since the founding of the country, the U.S. has oscillated between admiration and condemnation of money men. When the first Bank of the United States was established in Philadelphia in 1791, it was amid fears that it would allow merchants and speculators to subvert the new republic for their own gain. Decades later, Andrew Jackson's presidency was bolstered by his staunch opposition to the Second Bank of the United States. He positioned himself as the defender of the common man against supporters of the bank who used their money to obtain influence.
From the 19th century to the present day, denunciation of financiers has gone hand in hand with each recession, speculative bust and depression. Each time the economy falls, the chattering classes announce that the old ways have brought the country to the brink of ruin and that the riches of society will no longer remain in the hands of the greedy few.
Little recalled now is "The Long Depression" of the 1870s that began with the Panic of 1873. The Panic was triggered by the collapse of the Jay Cooke and Company Bank, which came on the heels of Jay Gould's infamous attempt to corner the national gold market in 1869 and the speculative boom in railroad building. During the 1870s, as much as 50% of the U.S. labor force was out of work at one time or another, making it by far the worst economic collapse in the country's history. In the agrarian heartland of the country, early stirrings of populism led to attacks on eastern barons for robbing Americans of their birthright.
From then on, busts followed almost like clockwork every 20 years, with the panics of 1873 and 1877 followed by the panic of 1893 and then the "Bankers' Panic" of 1907, when J.P. Morgan orchestrated the recapitalization of the financial system from his mansion in Manhattan. It was the TARP, the "bad bank," and the stimulus of its day, and it earned Morgan the gratitude of a nation and the applause of President Theodore Roosevelt.
Having lionized Morgan, a few years later the country turned on him and his ilk with a vengeance. In 1913, a populist congressman from Louisiana, Arsène Pujo, launched an investigation of the so-called "Money Trust" that he claimed was exerting undue and deleterious influence on the body politic. Exhibit No. 1 was none other than one-time savior Morgan, who was interrogated by the committee as if he had committed a heinous crime. One member of the committee said Morgan represented "a moneyed oligarchy more despotic and dangerous to industrial freedom than anything civilization has ever known." Strict regulations followed -- as they always have on the heels of such crises.
Yet 20 years later, the market imploded with the crash of 1929. The ranks of the unemployed swelled to at least 25%, and the country was plunged into the Great Depression. Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously indicted the "money changers" in his 1933 inaugural address, but he was even more caustic in private, vowing to end forever "speculation with other people's money." The raft of modern regulatory institutions, from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, was one result. Wall Street was tamed and quiet for a while.
Later on, the "Go-Go" years of Wall Street in the late 1960s quickly gave way to the bust of the so-called "Nifty-Fifty," the 50 largest blue-chip companies. Then came inflation, severe unemployment, and the stock market collapse of 1973-74. Between 1964 and 1982, the major stock indices went nowhere fast -- the Dow began that period at about 800 and ended at the same. Wall Street in those years was more of a cottage industry, one that few suspected would again return to its prominent and controversial position at the apex of American society.
The booming 1980s -- mergers and acquisitions and arbitrage -- were capped by the highly publicized trials of Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, who were pursued by the Eliot Spitzer of his day, Rudy Giuliani. Combined with the market crash of 1987, the subsequent Savings and Loan debacle (which had little to do with Wall Street per se, but was wrapped up with the same crowd in public imagining), and the recession of 1991-92, Wall Street was once again pronounced immoral and in need of tight reins. Yet within a few years, the Nasdaq was soaring, animal spirits were in control, and the Internet bubble was in full bloom.
Wall Street's obituary has been written many times. Yet what is striking today is that cycles that used to take a few decades now take a few years. And our cultural amnesia has gotten worse. The rapid sequence of the dot-com bubble of the 1990s, the recession of 2001, and the 2002 collapse of Enron combined with major fines levied against investment banks, all became a distant echo in a surprisingly short amount of time. At the rate we've been going, we're due for a new boom with obscene profits for the financial industry -- albeit with different names and different companies -- before Mr. Obama runs for re-election.
The fact that we have been in similar places in the past doesn't make the specific problems we face any less pressing. New regulations may prevent an exact recurrence of yesterday's crises, but our relentless capacity for reinvention means that we will produce innovations that will in turn create new problems.
Recognizing that our present is not quite so breathlessly unprecedented doesn't make the challenges less critical, but it could lead to a more level approach. That can begin with steady leadership from President Obama. Wall Street has been humbled and will change, but capital will continue to flow. That much, at least, is certain.
Mr. Karabell is president of River Twice Research. His new book, "In the Red: How China and America Became One Superpower Economy," will be published by Simon & Schuster in October.
Thursday, March 19, 2009
WSJ Editorial Page: Obama's AIG Panic
Obama's AIG Panic. WSJ Editorial
WSJ, Mar 19, 2009
The AIG Beltway bonfire continued yesterday with the spectacle of Ed Liddy, AIG's government-appointed CEO, enduring the wrath of Congress for embarrassing the Members with post-bailout bonuses. What we now have is a full-blown political panic ignited by no less than President Obama himself that is threatening to engulf his attempts to revive the financial system, and is undermining confidence in his leadership. This is no way to promote an economic recovery.
As recently as Sunday morning, White House economist Larry Summers was saying the bonuses were regrettable but there wasn't much that could be done to stop them. "We are a country of law. There are contracts. The government cannot just abrogate contracts," he said, with great good sense. Assorted Congressmen then did what comes naturally, which is declare their mock outrage. Rather than keep his legendary cool, Mr. Obama and the White House panicked as well and joined the braying pack.
Speaking on Monday of the $165 million paid to members of AIG's Financial Products division, the President asked, "How do they justify this outrage to the taxpayers who are keeping this company afloat?" Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who had known about the bonuses, was also trotted out to express his "outrage" and declare that Treasury would somehow try to claw back the bonuses. By shouting "greed" in a crowded and panicky Washington, our supposed financial stewards thus gave license to everyone in the media and Capitol Hill to see who could claim to be most shocked and appalled at AIG.
We've now got a full-fledged mob on our hands, with Congress looking to string up bankers in whatever bunker they can be found. Senators Chuck Grassley and Max Baucus want to double the current income tax on these bonuses, to 70% from 35%, and that's one of the more reasonable proposals. Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, the Democrat from silk-stocking Manhattan, wants to tax it all -- at 100%.
Senator Chris Dodd, down in the 2010 election polls after his sweetheart Countrywide mortgages, is busy rewriting the TARP compensation limits he only recently stuck in the stimulus bill. His last-minute measure explicitly exempted from compensation limits bonuses agreed to prior to the passage of the stimulus bill: "The prohibition required under clause (i) shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to a written employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009 . . ." So Senator Hedge Fund is suddenly morphing into Huey Long to save his career.
This is all too much even for Rep. Charlie Rangel, the House's chief tax writer, who says the tax code shouldn't be deployed as a "political weapon." He's right. AIG's managers may be this week's political target of choice, but the message to every banker in America, indeed every business in America, is that you could be next. At least we haven't yet seen the resolution that was proposed in the English parliament, in 1720 in the aftermath of the South Sea bubble, that bankers be tied in sacks filled with snakes and tipped into the Thames. But it's still early days.
One consequence will be that every bank executive in America will try to repay his Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, money as rapidly as possible. The political punishment for accepting public money is becoming higher than the benefits of the extra capital cushion. According to Wells Fargo Chairman Richard Kovacevich, "If we were not forced to take the TARP money, we would have been able to raise private capital." On Tuesday, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis joined the rush for the TARP exits, saying he hoped to pay back the $45 billion BofA has received by 2010 if not sooner. It's hard to argue with the sentiment.
For the larger banking system, however, this is exactly the wrong time to be shedding capital. The main point of the TARP was to backstop the financial system against systemic failure. Treasury botched the roll out and the execution, but with the economy still in recession and housing prices still falling, banking losses will surely grow. Mr. Geithner has projected the need for more than $1 trillion more in public capital, and the FDIC has asked Congress to increase its credit line to as much as $500 billion.
If we're lucky, the banks will be able to use today's steep yield curve to earn their way out of this mess, but no one can be sure and before this is over the FDIC and Treasury are going to need more public capital to protect depositors of failed institutions. The last thing we need is for this year's political panic to recreate the circumstances for another financial panic like the one we had last fall.
The Beltway's banker baiting seems to increase in direct proportion to the government's incompetence in nurturing a financial recovery. Anger rises when Americans learn after three bailout revisions that they haven't been told the truth that the AIG nationalization was a conduit to save counterparties, and even hedge funds, that gambled on housing. Only two weeks ago, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn told Congress he couldn't disclose who AIG's counterparties were. Americans also wonder why taxpayer guarantees should be provided to Citigroup, a three-time loser, but with little accountability for the board and managers who brought the company low.
Reviving a financial system is a long process that requires a combination of capital support, workout ability and discipline for mistakes. The public has to believe the end result will be a better, sturdier system in return for taxpayer support, while at the same time being assured that gamblers aren't saved from their own mistakes.
If this balance is beyond the ability of Mr. Obama's current economic team, he needs a better team. The worst mistake he can make is to deflect attention away from government's mistakes by joining the attack on the very bankers he needs to lead an economic recovery. That's how a deep recession becomes a Depression.
WSJ, Mar 19, 2009
The AIG Beltway bonfire continued yesterday with the spectacle of Ed Liddy, AIG's government-appointed CEO, enduring the wrath of Congress for embarrassing the Members with post-bailout bonuses. What we now have is a full-blown political panic ignited by no less than President Obama himself that is threatening to engulf his attempts to revive the financial system, and is undermining confidence in his leadership. This is no way to promote an economic recovery.
As recently as Sunday morning, White House economist Larry Summers was saying the bonuses were regrettable but there wasn't much that could be done to stop them. "We are a country of law. There are contracts. The government cannot just abrogate contracts," he said, with great good sense. Assorted Congressmen then did what comes naturally, which is declare their mock outrage. Rather than keep his legendary cool, Mr. Obama and the White House panicked as well and joined the braying pack.
Speaking on Monday of the $165 million paid to members of AIG's Financial Products division, the President asked, "How do they justify this outrage to the taxpayers who are keeping this company afloat?" Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who had known about the bonuses, was also trotted out to express his "outrage" and declare that Treasury would somehow try to claw back the bonuses. By shouting "greed" in a crowded and panicky Washington, our supposed financial stewards thus gave license to everyone in the media and Capitol Hill to see who could claim to be most shocked and appalled at AIG.
We've now got a full-fledged mob on our hands, with Congress looking to string up bankers in whatever bunker they can be found. Senators Chuck Grassley and Max Baucus want to double the current income tax on these bonuses, to 70% from 35%, and that's one of the more reasonable proposals. Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, the Democrat from silk-stocking Manhattan, wants to tax it all -- at 100%.
Senator Chris Dodd, down in the 2010 election polls after his sweetheart Countrywide mortgages, is busy rewriting the TARP compensation limits he only recently stuck in the stimulus bill. His last-minute measure explicitly exempted from compensation limits bonuses agreed to prior to the passage of the stimulus bill: "The prohibition required under clause (i) shall not be construed to prohibit any bonus payment required to be paid pursuant to a written employment contract executed on or before February 11, 2009 . . ." So Senator Hedge Fund is suddenly morphing into Huey Long to save his career.
This is all too much even for Rep. Charlie Rangel, the House's chief tax writer, who says the tax code shouldn't be deployed as a "political weapon." He's right. AIG's managers may be this week's political target of choice, but the message to every banker in America, indeed every business in America, is that you could be next. At least we haven't yet seen the resolution that was proposed in the English parliament, in 1720 in the aftermath of the South Sea bubble, that bankers be tied in sacks filled with snakes and tipped into the Thames. But it's still early days.
One consequence will be that every bank executive in America will try to repay his Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, money as rapidly as possible. The political punishment for accepting public money is becoming higher than the benefits of the extra capital cushion. According to Wells Fargo Chairman Richard Kovacevich, "If we were not forced to take the TARP money, we would have been able to raise private capital." On Tuesday, Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis joined the rush for the TARP exits, saying he hoped to pay back the $45 billion BofA has received by 2010 if not sooner. It's hard to argue with the sentiment.
For the larger banking system, however, this is exactly the wrong time to be shedding capital. The main point of the TARP was to backstop the financial system against systemic failure. Treasury botched the roll out and the execution, but with the economy still in recession and housing prices still falling, banking losses will surely grow. Mr. Geithner has projected the need for more than $1 trillion more in public capital, and the FDIC has asked Congress to increase its credit line to as much as $500 billion.
If we're lucky, the banks will be able to use today's steep yield curve to earn their way out of this mess, but no one can be sure and before this is over the FDIC and Treasury are going to need more public capital to protect depositors of failed institutions. The last thing we need is for this year's political panic to recreate the circumstances for another financial panic like the one we had last fall.
The Beltway's banker baiting seems to increase in direct proportion to the government's incompetence in nurturing a financial recovery. Anger rises when Americans learn after three bailout revisions that they haven't been told the truth that the AIG nationalization was a conduit to save counterparties, and even hedge funds, that gambled on housing. Only two weeks ago, Federal Reserve Vice Chairman Donald Kohn told Congress he couldn't disclose who AIG's counterparties were. Americans also wonder why taxpayer guarantees should be provided to Citigroup, a three-time loser, but with little accountability for the board and managers who brought the company low.
Reviving a financial system is a long process that requires a combination of capital support, workout ability and discipline for mistakes. The public has to believe the end result will be a better, sturdier system in return for taxpayer support, while at the same time being assured that gamblers aren't saved from their own mistakes.
If this balance is beyond the ability of Mr. Obama's current economic team, he needs a better team. The worst mistake he can make is to deflect attention away from government's mistakes by joining the attack on the very bankers he needs to lead an economic recovery. That's how a deep recession becomes a Depression.
Elaine Chao: Two Steps Back on Labor Rights
Two Steps Back on Labor Rights, by Elaine Chao
WSJ, Mar 19, 2009
The Obama administration's zeal to not "waste a good crisis," as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, has been stunning even for Washington insiders to behold. In the first 50 days of Barack Obama's presidency, Congress approved $1.2 trillion dollars in new spending, or $24 billion a day. That's $1 billion every hour. The national debt now is $11 trillion and climbing.
The Democratic Party's governing elite has long believed there is no problem that European-style policies cannot cure. This is why President Obama's agenda centers on vastly expanding entitlement programs, strengthening unions, and increasing government control over the private sector.
The stimulus bill contains multiple provisions that burden the already strained unemployment insurance system with new entitlements, such as paying workers who choose to leave the workforce for "family-related" reasons. Imposing such entitlements on an insurance system designed to support workers who are laid off compromises the integrity of the program. To sustain the expanded system in the future, states will have to levy higher unemployment insurance taxes on employers. And raising taxes on jobs will only lead to fewer job opportunities. That is why some governors such as Rick Perry (R., Texas) and Bobby Jindal (R., La.), are taking a pass on stimulus money that would broaden their states' unemployment benefits.
In a move that certainly pleased unions, within days of taking office Mr. Obama issued executive orders rescinding requirements for workers to be informed of their right not to pay portions of union dues attributable to political activities with which they may disagree. These orders are mere prelude to the forthcoming congressional debate over the "Employee Free Choice Act," which should more accurately be called the "Employee No Choice Act." This bill will deprive workers of their right to secret ballot elections in unionization efforts, and impose a 120-day deadline for companies to sign a labor contract -- after which government arbitrators would dictate labor contracts.
Efforts are also underway to cut the budget of the lone federal agency charged with protecting union members' rights and ensuring union integrity. In January, the Department of Labor's Office of Labor-Management Standards implemented a rule requiring that relevant information on union finances be provided to rank-and-file union members to better ensure transparency and accountability, as required by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. In the rush of actions after the inauguration, the Obama administration delayed the effective date of this rule. It remains to be seen if other union transparency and accountability rules will be gutted or revoked.
Americans should also be concerned about the protectionist impulses -- as evidenced by the "Buy American" provision of the stimulus package -- of those now in charge, which run counter to one of the painful lessons of the Great Depression. Impeding international trade will ignite retaliation by America's trading partners, deepening and prolonging the economic downturn. Policy makers should also resist closing America's doors to skilled workers from overseas, many of whom are educated in our universities and whose talent can help make our economy stronger. Yet provisions like the "Employ American Workers Act" in the stimulus package limits banks that receive government funding from employing skilled foreign workers.
European-style interventions to which the Obama administration is inclined will not make America more competitive in the world-wide economy. Such policies will not increase growth, will not decrease unemployment, and will not increase wages for workers. Evidence of this has been apparent for decades in Europe's declining growth rates, higher unemployment, lower per-capita income, and longer durations of unemployment. America has problems; Europe's are worse.
Yet despite all of this, the Obama administration seems intent on radically expanding government's role. This is because, as White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel has stated, "crises are opportunities to do big things."
It was telling that in his recent address to Congress, the president downplayed the credit crisis's culpability for the recession and swiftly segued to implicating oil, health care and education. Why would the president draw a line between the recession and these other issues, unless he wants to exploit the current situation to advance an agenda unrelated -- and even antithetical -- to fixing the economy?
Perhaps spending trillions of taxpayers' yet unearned dollars seems trivial when socialized medicine and rewarding political allies are your priorities. But it is not the change most Americans had in mind.
Ms. Chao was the 24th U.S. Secretary of Labor.
WSJ, Mar 19, 2009
The Obama administration's zeal to not "waste a good crisis," as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it, has been stunning even for Washington insiders to behold. In the first 50 days of Barack Obama's presidency, Congress approved $1.2 trillion dollars in new spending, or $24 billion a day. That's $1 billion every hour. The national debt now is $11 trillion and climbing.
The Democratic Party's governing elite has long believed there is no problem that European-style policies cannot cure. This is why President Obama's agenda centers on vastly expanding entitlement programs, strengthening unions, and increasing government control over the private sector.
The stimulus bill contains multiple provisions that burden the already strained unemployment insurance system with new entitlements, such as paying workers who choose to leave the workforce for "family-related" reasons. Imposing such entitlements on an insurance system designed to support workers who are laid off compromises the integrity of the program. To sustain the expanded system in the future, states will have to levy higher unemployment insurance taxes on employers. And raising taxes on jobs will only lead to fewer job opportunities. That is why some governors such as Rick Perry (R., Texas) and Bobby Jindal (R., La.), are taking a pass on stimulus money that would broaden their states' unemployment benefits.
In a move that certainly pleased unions, within days of taking office Mr. Obama issued executive orders rescinding requirements for workers to be informed of their right not to pay portions of union dues attributable to political activities with which they may disagree. These orders are mere prelude to the forthcoming congressional debate over the "Employee Free Choice Act," which should more accurately be called the "Employee No Choice Act." This bill will deprive workers of their right to secret ballot elections in unionization efforts, and impose a 120-day deadline for companies to sign a labor contract -- after which government arbitrators would dictate labor contracts.
Efforts are also underway to cut the budget of the lone federal agency charged with protecting union members' rights and ensuring union integrity. In January, the Department of Labor's Office of Labor-Management Standards implemented a rule requiring that relevant information on union finances be provided to rank-and-file union members to better ensure transparency and accountability, as required by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. In the rush of actions after the inauguration, the Obama administration delayed the effective date of this rule. It remains to be seen if other union transparency and accountability rules will be gutted or revoked.
Americans should also be concerned about the protectionist impulses -- as evidenced by the "Buy American" provision of the stimulus package -- of those now in charge, which run counter to one of the painful lessons of the Great Depression. Impeding international trade will ignite retaliation by America's trading partners, deepening and prolonging the economic downturn. Policy makers should also resist closing America's doors to skilled workers from overseas, many of whom are educated in our universities and whose talent can help make our economy stronger. Yet provisions like the "Employ American Workers Act" in the stimulus package limits banks that receive government funding from employing skilled foreign workers.
European-style interventions to which the Obama administration is inclined will not make America more competitive in the world-wide economy. Such policies will not increase growth, will not decrease unemployment, and will not increase wages for workers. Evidence of this has been apparent for decades in Europe's declining growth rates, higher unemployment, lower per-capita income, and longer durations of unemployment. America has problems; Europe's are worse.
Yet despite all of this, the Obama administration seems intent on radically expanding government's role. This is because, as White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel has stated, "crises are opportunities to do big things."
It was telling that in his recent address to Congress, the president downplayed the credit crisis's culpability for the recession and swiftly segued to implicating oil, health care and education. Why would the president draw a line between the recession and these other issues, unless he wants to exploit the current situation to advance an agenda unrelated -- and even antithetical -- to fixing the economy?
Perhaps spending trillions of taxpayers' yet unearned dollars seems trivial when socialized medicine and rewarding political allies are your priorities. But it is not the change most Americans had in mind.
Ms. Chao was the 24th U.S. Secretary of Labor.
Canadian Energy Industry to Target Asian Trade, Avoid New U.S. Regulations
Canadian Energy Industry to Target Asian Trade, Avoid New U.S. Regulations
The Institute for Energy Research, Mar 18, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. - In response to a Globe and Mail report that indicated that Canadian energy producers will increasingly look to Asia to sell their energy resources thanks to President Obama’s proposed new and costly regulations and taxes, IER President Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement:
“The Obama administration knows that Canada’s energy resources are among the most significant in the world, and with a population one-tenth the size of the United States, our neighbors to the north have always been ready and willing to share. In spite of that knowledge, the administration developed and proposed plans that will force Canada’s energy producers to send their products to Asia to avoid America’s regulatory and tax-related mess.
“If President Obama won’t let us import oil and natural gas from Canada, he will force us to buy higher-priced energy from highly unstable and largely unfriendly nations in the Middle East. The Obama administration may understand this reality and it may be concerned, but it is not fighting to keep Americans’ access to Canada’s affordable, reliable, and abundant energy resources intact. We hope the administration will take notice and see that their proposals have serious and detrimental consequences.”
Note: The Globe and Mail quoted the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers president David Collyer as saying, “We see potential constraints to access to the U.S. market…the only realistic option, as an alternative to the U.S. in the near term, would be exports off the West Coast to the Far East.”
More from IER on domestic energy policy:
IER Study: Low Carbon Fuel Standards: Recipes for Higher Gasoline Prices and More Middle East Oil
Primer on Oil Shale: What is it? How much do we have? How do we produce it?
Press Release: Embrace Canadian Energy
IER Study: Green Jobs: Fact or Fiction?
The Institute for Energy Research, Mar 18, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. - In response to a Globe and Mail report that indicated that Canadian energy producers will increasingly look to Asia to sell their energy resources thanks to President Obama’s proposed new and costly regulations and taxes, IER President Thomas J. Pyle released the following statement:
“The Obama administration knows that Canada’s energy resources are among the most significant in the world, and with a population one-tenth the size of the United States, our neighbors to the north have always been ready and willing to share. In spite of that knowledge, the administration developed and proposed plans that will force Canada’s energy producers to send their products to Asia to avoid America’s regulatory and tax-related mess.
“If President Obama won’t let us import oil and natural gas from Canada, he will force us to buy higher-priced energy from highly unstable and largely unfriendly nations in the Middle East. The Obama administration may understand this reality and it may be concerned, but it is not fighting to keep Americans’ access to Canada’s affordable, reliable, and abundant energy resources intact. We hope the administration will take notice and see that their proposals have serious and detrimental consequences.”
Note: The Globe and Mail quoted the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers president David Collyer as saying, “We see potential constraints to access to the U.S. market…the only realistic option, as an alternative to the U.S. in the near term, would be exports off the West Coast to the Far East.”
More from IER on domestic energy policy:
IER Study: Low Carbon Fuel Standards: Recipes for Higher Gasoline Prices and More Middle East Oil
Primer on Oil Shale: What is it? How much do we have? How do we produce it?
Press Release: Embrace Canadian Energy
IER Study: Green Jobs: Fact or Fiction?
Japan: Number of households receiving single-mother allowance tops 1 mil
Number of households receiving single-mother allowance tops 1 mil
Japan Today, Thursday 19th March, 05:26 AM JST
TOKYO —
The number of households receiving allowances for low-income single-mother families has topped 1 million for the first time on record, the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry said Wednesday. The figure stood at 1,000,552 as of December against a backdrop of a rising number of divorces, while the average income of single-mother households remained at around 40% of average households.
The latest figure represents an increase of about 10,000 from December 2007, when it stood at around 990,000. Of the 1 million households, 878,000 became single-mother families through divorce while the families of unmarried mothers accounted for 79,000. State and municipal governments provide up to 42,000 yen in monthly allowances to single-mother families with one child.
Japan Today, Thursday 19th March, 05:26 AM JST
TOKYO —
The number of households receiving allowances for low-income single-mother families has topped 1 million for the first time on record, the Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry said Wednesday. The figure stood at 1,000,552 as of December against a backdrop of a rising number of divorces, while the average income of single-mother households remained at around 40% of average households.
The latest figure represents an increase of about 10,000 from December 2007, when it stood at around 990,000. Of the 1 million households, 878,000 became single-mother families through divorce while the families of unmarried mothers accounted for 79,000. State and municipal governments provide up to 42,000 yen in monthly allowances to single-mother families with one child.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
Why the US Should Not Join the Inter-Parliamentary Union
Why the United States Should Not Join the Inter-Parliamentary Union. By Ted R. Bromund
Heritage WebMemo #2348
March 18, 2009
[Full article w/notes at the link above]
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), founded in 1888 by Frédéric Passy of France and William Randal Cremer of Great Britain, originally sought to promote peace by encouraging regular contacts between parliamentarians from established democracies. The IPU also supported free trade and arbitration, on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, between nation states. In short, the IPU was a manifestation of late 19th-century liberal internationalism.
The IPU of today bears no resemblance to the organization founded by Passy and Cremer. It is an unhappy reminder of how institutions that were devised by liberal internationalists have been captured and perverted by autocracies and anti-sovereignty activists. The IPU now:
The IPU as It Was Founded
The IPU originally sought to increase cooperation between sovereign democracies—nations that would not wish to fight their fellow democracies and would therefore desire to settle disputes through diplomacy and arbitration. There was no place in this vision for dictatorships: At the second meeting of the IPU, in 1889, the only states represented were Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Hungary, the U.S., and Liberia.[1] The founders of the IPU sought a world in which inter-state relations would look like they do today between Britain and the U.S., a world in which war would be unthinkable and disagreements would be settled peaceably.
The Modern IPU
Sadly, the IPU of today bears no relation to the organization founded in 1888: It has no standards for membership and, as such, provides token legitimacy to many of the world's worst dictatorships. The widely respected Freedom House annually ranks the political and economic freedom of all the world's nations. Of its "Worst of the Worst," four—Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan—are members of the IPU.[2] So are dictatorships or autocracies such as Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Laos, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Other deeply illiberal IPU members include Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ukraine, and Venezuela.[3]
The mere fact that North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are members in good standing of an organization supposedly dedicated to "the firm establishment of representative democracy" is enough to condemn the IPU.[4] But the broader membership of the IPU is also suspect. The organization does contain states—such as all 26 of America's allies in NATO—that are democratic and respectable. But these are the old members, the ones present at the IPU's creation. The original members are now completely outnumbered by the newer members, such as the 88 members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and by the 49 members of the Organization of Islamic Countries. Between these two organizations, states with weak or no commitment to liberal and democratic values control 94 of the 154 seats in the IPU.[5]
Illiberal Policies
The policies the IPU endorses reflect the illiberalism of its members. The IPU no longer mentions free trade, as it once did. Instead, the organization is in favor of "fair" trade—by which it means systematic discrimination in trade that favors the developing world—and the creation of global institutions that would reduce the sovereignty of democratic states. It no longer argues that free trade reduces the power of autocratic states. Instead, the IPU urges states to regulate and structure every aspect of economic life, a call that gives unlimited license to its dictatorial members to justify their intrusive tyranny.[6]
Instead of recognizing that arbitration requires two willing partners, the IPU makes token representations against Palestinian terrorism while condemning Israel at great length for exercising its right of self-defense.[7] Instead of defending the international state system on which it was founded by decisively condemning terrorism, the organization emphasizes "the need to distinguish between terrorism and the struggles of peoples to liberate their land and regain their legitimate rights."[8] And instead of defending the great liberal principle of free speech, IPU delegates refer to the need to control "defamation of religions," a code word for censorship of speech that is critical of Islamic radicalism.[9]
IPU Hypocrisy
The hypocrisy of many of the IPU's delegates, and of the IPU itself, is breathtaking. In October 2008, during a discussion of "freedom of expression and the right to information," the Chinese delegate claimed that "all Chinese citizens had the right to express themselves freely and could communicate their criticisms to State authorities and public officials." In reality, and in the words of the executive director of Freedom House, Jennifer Windsor, China operates "an intricate system of restrictions on the free circulation of ideas."[10]
In December 2008, the IPU held a "Conference of Women Parliamentarians and Women in Political Decision-making Positions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States." The GCC states include Saudi Arabia, where, as the IPU admits, women are allowed neither to vote nor to hold public office.[11] In the eyes of the IPU, that did not disqualify Saudi Arabia from participating in the conference.
The hypocrisy of the IPU does not simply make nonsense of its idealistic words; it tarnishes the honor and impugns the seriousness of the democratic states participating in this farce. Seeking to achieve a consensus through multilateral negotiation about women's rights with Saudi Arabia, the freedom of the press with China, or the definition of democracy with North Korea is both foolish and dangerous. By pursuing such a consensus, the good states grant legitimacy to the bad ones and imply that they are worthy of being listened to when human liberty is at stake. The autocracies use the process only to confuse and sow self-doubt among the democracies, and they pervert a forum supposedly dedicated to liberty to gain international recognition of their tyrannical regimes. The way to promote the values of freedom is not to negotiate them on the basis of multilateral consensus with their enemies; it is to demonstrate that the free states esteem these values so highly that they feel no need to lend the dignity of negotiation to dictators.
A Friend of Dictatorships
The fate of the IPU, like the fate of other international organizations that grew out of the liberal internationalism of the late 19th century, is genuinely tragic. From expressing a sincere hope for a better world founded in free trade, democracy, and cooperation on the basis of the sovereign will of the people, they have been led into backing precisely the opposite values.
By admitting states that did not share their founding values as full and equal members, these organizations gave away their birthright. They are now so dominated by these enemies within that they cannot be reformed, because the autocracies can simply vote down any measure that threatens their stranglehold. This is precisely the problem that led the Obama Administration to withdraw from the Durban Review Conference: The IPU is now simply a continuous Durban.[12]
This reality is regrettable, but it must be recognized for what it is. Therefore, the United States should not join the IPU. To do so would imply the IPU is a respectable international organization, not the friend of dictatorships and the enemy of liberal values and democratic sovereignty it has sadly become.
Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Heritage WebMemo #2348
March 18, 2009
[Full article w/notes at the link above]
The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), founded in 1888 by Frédéric Passy of France and William Randal Cremer of Great Britain, originally sought to promote peace by encouraging regular contacts between parliamentarians from established democracies. The IPU also supported free trade and arbitration, on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, between nation states. In short, the IPU was a manifestation of late 19th-century liberal internationalism.
The IPU of today bears no resemblance to the organization founded by Passy and Cremer. It is an unhappy reminder of how institutions that were devised by liberal internationalists have been captured and perverted by autocracies and anti-sovereignty activists. The IPU now:
- has no standards for membership and is therefore dominated by repressive and illiberal regimes;
- serves no serious purpose but by providing these regimes with a recognized forum enhances the perception that they are legitimate and responsible;
- is an active proponent of measures that would limit the sovereignty of democracies and restrict their freedom of speech.
The IPU as It Was Founded
The IPU originally sought to increase cooperation between sovereign democracies—nations that would not wish to fight their fellow democracies and would therefore desire to settle disputes through diplomacy and arbitration. There was no place in this vision for dictatorships: At the second meeting of the IPU, in 1889, the only states represented were Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Hungary, the U.S., and Liberia.[1] The founders of the IPU sought a world in which inter-state relations would look like they do today between Britain and the U.S., a world in which war would be unthinkable and disagreements would be settled peaceably.
The Modern IPU
Sadly, the IPU of today bears no relation to the organization founded in 1888: It has no standards for membership and, as such, provides token legitimacy to many of the world's worst dictatorships. The widely respected Freedom House annually ranks the political and economic freedom of all the world's nations. Of its "Worst of the Worst," four—Libya, North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan—are members of the IPU.[2] So are dictatorships or autocracies such as Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Laos, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Other deeply illiberal IPU members include Angola, Burundi, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Togo, Ukraine, and Venezuela.[3]
The mere fact that North Korea, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe are members in good standing of an organization supposedly dedicated to "the firm establishment of representative democracy" is enough to condemn the IPU.[4] But the broader membership of the IPU is also suspect. The organization does contain states—such as all 26 of America's allies in NATO—that are democratic and respectable. But these are the old members, the ones present at the IPU's creation. The original members are now completely outnumbered by the newer members, such as the 88 members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and by the 49 members of the Organization of Islamic Countries. Between these two organizations, states with weak or no commitment to liberal and democratic values control 94 of the 154 seats in the IPU.[5]
Illiberal Policies
The policies the IPU endorses reflect the illiberalism of its members. The IPU no longer mentions free trade, as it once did. Instead, the organization is in favor of "fair" trade—by which it means systematic discrimination in trade that favors the developing world—and the creation of global institutions that would reduce the sovereignty of democratic states. It no longer argues that free trade reduces the power of autocratic states. Instead, the IPU urges states to regulate and structure every aspect of economic life, a call that gives unlimited license to its dictatorial members to justify their intrusive tyranny.[6]
Instead of recognizing that arbitration requires two willing partners, the IPU makes token representations against Palestinian terrorism while condemning Israel at great length for exercising its right of self-defense.[7] Instead of defending the international state system on which it was founded by decisively condemning terrorism, the organization emphasizes "the need to distinguish between terrorism and the struggles of peoples to liberate their land and regain their legitimate rights."[8] And instead of defending the great liberal principle of free speech, IPU delegates refer to the need to control "defamation of religions," a code word for censorship of speech that is critical of Islamic radicalism.[9]
IPU Hypocrisy
The hypocrisy of many of the IPU's delegates, and of the IPU itself, is breathtaking. In October 2008, during a discussion of "freedom of expression and the right to information," the Chinese delegate claimed that "all Chinese citizens had the right to express themselves freely and could communicate their criticisms to State authorities and public officials." In reality, and in the words of the executive director of Freedom House, Jennifer Windsor, China operates "an intricate system of restrictions on the free circulation of ideas."[10]
In December 2008, the IPU held a "Conference of Women Parliamentarians and Women in Political Decision-making Positions of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States." The GCC states include Saudi Arabia, where, as the IPU admits, women are allowed neither to vote nor to hold public office.[11] In the eyes of the IPU, that did not disqualify Saudi Arabia from participating in the conference.
The hypocrisy of the IPU does not simply make nonsense of its idealistic words; it tarnishes the honor and impugns the seriousness of the democratic states participating in this farce. Seeking to achieve a consensus through multilateral negotiation about women's rights with Saudi Arabia, the freedom of the press with China, or the definition of democracy with North Korea is both foolish and dangerous. By pursuing such a consensus, the good states grant legitimacy to the bad ones and imply that they are worthy of being listened to when human liberty is at stake. The autocracies use the process only to confuse and sow self-doubt among the democracies, and they pervert a forum supposedly dedicated to liberty to gain international recognition of their tyrannical regimes. The way to promote the values of freedom is not to negotiate them on the basis of multilateral consensus with their enemies; it is to demonstrate that the free states esteem these values so highly that they feel no need to lend the dignity of negotiation to dictators.
A Friend of Dictatorships
The fate of the IPU, like the fate of other international organizations that grew out of the liberal internationalism of the late 19th century, is genuinely tragic. From expressing a sincere hope for a better world founded in free trade, democracy, and cooperation on the basis of the sovereign will of the people, they have been led into backing precisely the opposite values.
By admitting states that did not share their founding values as full and equal members, these organizations gave away their birthright. They are now so dominated by these enemies within that they cannot be reformed, because the autocracies can simply vote down any measure that threatens their stranglehold. This is precisely the problem that led the Obama Administration to withdraw from the Durban Review Conference: The IPU is now simply a continuous Durban.[12]
This reality is regrettable, but it must be recognized for what it is. Therefore, the United States should not join the IPU. To do so would imply the IPU is a respectable international organization, not the friend of dictatorships and the enemy of liberal values and democratic sovereignty it has sadly become.
Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
US and Rotary Clubs Join to Provide Clean Water and Improved Sanitation Worldwide
USAID and Rotary Clubs Join to Provide Clean Water and Improved Sanitation Worldwide
Collaboration merges Rotary's grassroots strength with agency's technical expertise
USAID, March 18, 2009
ISTANBUL, TURKEY - MARCH 18, 2009 - The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Rotary International (RI) are teaming-up to save lives by bringing clean drinking water and basic sanitation to communities in the developing world. The partnership was announced today at the World Water Forum in Istanbul, Turkey, in celebration of the March 22nd observance of World Water Day.
The public-private alliance will leverage the resources of both organizations to implement sustainable, long-term water supply, sanitation, and hygiene projects in three countries: Dominican Republic, Ghana, and the Philippines. Other countries will follow based on the success of these pilot experiences. Alliance activities in each country will be funded jointly by USAID and Rotary International, with an expected minimum of $2 million per country in the initial phase.
USAID Acting Administrator Alonzo Fulgham noted, "The service ethic and commitment of Rotary clubs in these countries will be complemented by USAID's development expertise and technical leadership. This partnership will yield a significant, sustainable increase in water supply and sanitation coverage for the planet's poorest and most vulnerable populations."
Former Rotary International President William B. Boyd, chair of the collaboration's steering committee, added "We intend this joint effort to be a model for future alliances with other strategic partners and in this way to enhance our contribution to world understanding, goodwill, and peace."
Worldwide, more than one billion people lack access to reliable sources of safe water, and twice that many lack access to sanitary human waste disposal systems, creating an environment that allows the disease-poverty cycle to thrive. Each year, more than 1.8 million people --most of them children -- die of diarrhea alone. Economic development also suffers as women and girls forgo education and occupations to spend hours a day fetching water for their families.
Rotary, a global humanitarian service organization and USAID see the collaboration as an effective, resource-efficient way to contribute to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which call for a 50 percent reduction in the proportion of the world's population without access to safe water and basic sanitation by 2015.
For more information about Rotary International, please visit www.rotary.org.
For more information about USAID and other water projects, please visit: www.usaid.gov.
Collaboration merges Rotary's grassroots strength with agency's technical expertise
USAID, March 18, 2009
ISTANBUL, TURKEY - MARCH 18, 2009 - The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and Rotary International (RI) are teaming-up to save lives by bringing clean drinking water and basic sanitation to communities in the developing world. The partnership was announced today at the World Water Forum in Istanbul, Turkey, in celebration of the March 22nd observance of World Water Day.
The public-private alliance will leverage the resources of both organizations to implement sustainable, long-term water supply, sanitation, and hygiene projects in three countries: Dominican Republic, Ghana, and the Philippines. Other countries will follow based on the success of these pilot experiences. Alliance activities in each country will be funded jointly by USAID and Rotary International, with an expected minimum of $2 million per country in the initial phase.
USAID Acting Administrator Alonzo Fulgham noted, "The service ethic and commitment of Rotary clubs in these countries will be complemented by USAID's development expertise and technical leadership. This partnership will yield a significant, sustainable increase in water supply and sanitation coverage for the planet's poorest and most vulnerable populations."
Former Rotary International President William B. Boyd, chair of the collaboration's steering committee, added "We intend this joint effort to be a model for future alliances with other strategic partners and in this way to enhance our contribution to world understanding, goodwill, and peace."
Worldwide, more than one billion people lack access to reliable sources of safe water, and twice that many lack access to sanitary human waste disposal systems, creating an environment that allows the disease-poverty cycle to thrive. Each year, more than 1.8 million people --most of them children -- die of diarrhea alone. Economic development also suffers as women and girls forgo education and occupations to spend hours a day fetching water for their families.
Rotary, a global humanitarian service organization and USAID see the collaboration as an effective, resource-efficient way to contribute to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals, which call for a 50 percent reduction in the proportion of the world's population without access to safe water and basic sanitation by 2015.
For more information about Rotary International, please visit www.rotary.org.
For more information about USAID and other water projects, please visit: www.usaid.gov.
Partnership to Prevent HIV among Vulnerable Russian Youth
Partnership to Prevent HIV among Vulnerable Russian Youth
USAID, HealthRight International and Johnson & Johnson formalize a partnership to prevent the spread of HIV among street children and at-risk youth in St. Petersburg, Russia.
USAID, March 18, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. - A public-private partnership to prevent the spread of HIV and increase access to HIV treatment and care among street children and other vulnerable youth in St. Petersburg, Russia was announced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), HealthRight International and Johnson & Johnson at the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation today.
Estimates indicate that there are up to 10,000 street children and youth in St. Petersburg, many of whom struggle with substance abuse and other risky behaviors. Studies demonstrate extremely high rates of HIV transmission (37.4%) among this group, who have limited access to clinical treatment and care.
With support from USAID's Russia program and Johnson & Johnson, HealthRight International (formerly Doctors of the World-USA) together with its local partner, Doctors to Children, will reach 500 vulnerable youth with effective HIV prevention messages and a broad continuum of services, including mobile voluntary testing for HIV and referrals to treatment and care. The project will also develop a cadre of social workers trained in HIV prevention among street youth and disseminate a package of HIV prevention best practices to government institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across St. Petersburg.
"We are very pleased to join Johnson & Johnson and HealthRight International in a partnership to reach the most vulnerable youth with critically needed HIV prevention messages and services," said Leon Waskin, USAID's Director in Russia. "This initiative builds on a previous collaboration that has demonstrated the impact we can achieve when we combine our resources and capabilities. I also want to thank the government in St. Petersburg for their support for this effort, both in the past and going forward, which is so important for the project's success."
"Johnson & Johnson and HealthRight International are long-time partners on HIV/AIDS prevention and support for abandoned, neglected and at-risk children and youth in St. Petersburg," said Naira Adamian, managing director for Janssen-Cilag Russia, the pharmaceutical division of Johnson & Johnson in Russia. "Investing in children infected or affected by the disease is a key strategy within our HIV/AIDS philanthropy portfolio. We are excited to work together with USAID to advance HealthRight's mission."
"Partnerships such as this-engaging the local community, NGOs, private support, and public support from both the Russian and U.S. governments-is exactly the formula we need to ensure that children and youth in crisis not only get assistance today, but have a real chance at a future," said HealthRight executive director Tom Dougherty. "These projects take time and investment, but the pay off is well worth it."Building on the Success of Past Collaboration
Since 2004, USAID has supported HealthRight International and its Russian partner, Doctors to Children, to develop a model community reintegration program for street youth. Johnson & Johnson began supporting the initiative in 2005, along with the St. Petersburg City Administration and other partners. In 2005 and 2006, the project established the first municipal drop-in center for street children and youth and an overnight shelter for HIV-positive clients in the Fruzensky District of St. Petersburg. The shelter provides medical and psychological assistance, referrals to social and health care, and access to anti-retroviral treatment at the St. Petersburg AIDS Center. About USAID
USAID is the lead agency of the U.S. government providing development and humanitarian assistance in over 100 countries worldwide. USAID has been operating in Russia since 1992, supporting Russian and international organizations in the areas of health, child welfare, civil society, rule of law, economic growth and local governance. USAID works in partnership with Russia to help improve the quality of life of the Russian people and to cooperatively address global issues that impact both our countries.
About HealthRight International
HealthRight International (formerly Doctors of the World-USA) is a private, not-for-profit, global health and human rights organization working to build lasting access to health for excluded communities. The organization conducts projects and partnerships in the Russian Federation addressing the needs of street children and at-risk youth. For more information, go to http://www.healthright.org/
About Johnson & Johnson
Caring for the world, one person at a time…inspires and unites the people of Johnson & Johnson. We embrace research and science - bringing innovative ideas, products and services to advance the health and well-being of people. Our 119,000 employees at more than 250 Johnson & Johnson companies work with partners in health care to touch the lives of over a billion people every day, throughout the world. Johnson & Johnson supports more than 100 HIV/AIDS philanthropy programs in 50 countries.
USAID, HealthRight International and Johnson & Johnson formalize a partnership to prevent the spread of HIV among street children and at-risk youth in St. Petersburg, Russia.
USAID, March 18, 2009
WASHINGTON, D.C. - A public-private partnership to prevent the spread of HIV and increase access to HIV treatment and care among street children and other vulnerable youth in St. Petersburg, Russia was announced by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), HealthRight International and Johnson & Johnson at the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation today.
Estimates indicate that there are up to 10,000 street children and youth in St. Petersburg, many of whom struggle with substance abuse and other risky behaviors. Studies demonstrate extremely high rates of HIV transmission (37.4%) among this group, who have limited access to clinical treatment and care.
With support from USAID's Russia program and Johnson & Johnson, HealthRight International (formerly Doctors of the World-USA) together with its local partner, Doctors to Children, will reach 500 vulnerable youth with effective HIV prevention messages and a broad continuum of services, including mobile voluntary testing for HIV and referrals to treatment and care. The project will also develop a cadre of social workers trained in HIV prevention among street youth and disseminate a package of HIV prevention best practices to government institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across St. Petersburg.
"We are very pleased to join Johnson & Johnson and HealthRight International in a partnership to reach the most vulnerable youth with critically needed HIV prevention messages and services," said Leon Waskin, USAID's Director in Russia. "This initiative builds on a previous collaboration that has demonstrated the impact we can achieve when we combine our resources and capabilities. I also want to thank the government in St. Petersburg for their support for this effort, both in the past and going forward, which is so important for the project's success."
"Johnson & Johnson and HealthRight International are long-time partners on HIV/AIDS prevention and support for abandoned, neglected and at-risk children and youth in St. Petersburg," said Naira Adamian, managing director for Janssen-Cilag Russia, the pharmaceutical division of Johnson & Johnson in Russia. "Investing in children infected or affected by the disease is a key strategy within our HIV/AIDS philanthropy portfolio. We are excited to work together with USAID to advance HealthRight's mission."
"Partnerships such as this-engaging the local community, NGOs, private support, and public support from both the Russian and U.S. governments-is exactly the formula we need to ensure that children and youth in crisis not only get assistance today, but have a real chance at a future," said HealthRight executive director Tom Dougherty. "These projects take time and investment, but the pay off is well worth it."Building on the Success of Past Collaboration
Since 2004, USAID has supported HealthRight International and its Russian partner, Doctors to Children, to develop a model community reintegration program for street youth. Johnson & Johnson began supporting the initiative in 2005, along with the St. Petersburg City Administration and other partners. In 2005 and 2006, the project established the first municipal drop-in center for street children and youth and an overnight shelter for HIV-positive clients in the Fruzensky District of St. Petersburg. The shelter provides medical and psychological assistance, referrals to social and health care, and access to anti-retroviral treatment at the St. Petersburg AIDS Center. About USAID
USAID is the lead agency of the U.S. government providing development and humanitarian assistance in over 100 countries worldwide. USAID has been operating in Russia since 1992, supporting Russian and international organizations in the areas of health, child welfare, civil society, rule of law, economic growth and local governance. USAID works in partnership with Russia to help improve the quality of life of the Russian people and to cooperatively address global issues that impact both our countries.
About HealthRight International
HealthRight International (formerly Doctors of the World-USA) is a private, not-for-profit, global health and human rights organization working to build lasting access to health for excluded communities. The organization conducts projects and partnerships in the Russian Federation addressing the needs of street children and at-risk youth. For more information, go to http://www.healthright.org/
About Johnson & Johnson
Caring for the world, one person at a time…inspires and unites the people of Johnson & Johnson. We embrace research and science - bringing innovative ideas, products and services to advance the health and well-being of people. Our 119,000 employees at more than 250 Johnson & Johnson companies work with partners in health care to touch the lives of over a billion people every day, throughout the world. Johnson & Johnson supports more than 100 HIV/AIDS philanthropy programs in 50 countries.
Challenging Ultra-skeptic Climate Claims on CO2 Emissions
Part I in an Occasional Series Challenging Ultra-skeptic Climate Claims. By Chip Knappenberger
Master Resource, March 18, 2009
In the realm of climate science, as in most topics, there exists a range of ideas as to what is going on, and what it means for the future. At the risk of generalizing, the gamut looks something like this: Ultra-alarmists think that human greenhouse-gas-producing activities will vastly change the face of the planet and make the earth inhospitable for humans; they therefore demand large and immediate action to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. Alarmists understand that human activities are changing the earth’s climate and think that the potential changes are sufficient to warrant some pre-emptive action to try to mitigate them. Skeptics think that humans activities are changing the earth’s climate but, by and large, they think that the changes, in net, are not likely to be terribly disruptive and that drastic action to curtail greenhouse gas emissions is unnecessary, difficult, and ineffective. Ultra-skeptics think that human greenhouse gas-producing activities are impacting the earth’s climate in no way whatsoever.
Most of my energy tends to be directed at countering alarmist claims about impending climate catastrophe, but the scientist in me gets just as bent out of shape about some of the contentions made by the ultra-skeptics, which are simply unsupported by virtually any scientific evidence. Primary among these claims is that human activities are not responsible for the observed build-up of atmospheric carbon dioxide. This is just plain wrong.
We have good measurement of how much carbon dioxide is building up in the atmosphere each year, and we have good estimates of how much carbon dioxide is being emitted from human activities each year. It turns out that there are more than enough anthropogenic emissions to account for how much the atmosphere is accumulating. In fact, the great mystery concerns the “missing carbon,” that is, where exactly is the extra carbon dioxide going that is emitted by humans but that doesn’t end up staying in the atmosphere. (Only about half of the human CO2 emissions end up accumulating in the atmosphere; the rest end up somewhere else—in the oceans, in the terrestrial biosphere, etc.) In my opinion, it would be much more useful for folks interested in the carbon cycle to try to better understand the behavior of the CO2 sinks and how that behavior may change in the future (if at all) rather than in trying for come up with sources of CO2 other than human activities to explain the atmospheric concentration growth—as it is, we already have too much, not too little.
What this means is: The argument that the increase in atmospheric CO2 results from a natural temperature recovery from the depths of the Little Ice Age in the mid-to-late 1800s just doesn’t work.
In fact, all lines of evidence are against it.
This argument has its foundation in the carbon-dioxide and temperature trends of the past 400 to 600 thousand years, which we know from air bubbles trapped in ice that has been extracted from ice cores taken in Antarctica and Greenland. Basically, the data from the ice cores show that periods when the earth’s climate has been warm are also periods when there have been relatively higher CO2 concentrations (Figure 1). Al Gore uses this to say that the higher CO2 caused the higher temperatures; ultra-skeptics counter by pointing out that, if you look closely enough, you’ll see that the temperature rises before the CO2 rises, so rising temperatures cause rising CO2, not vice versa. The fact is that both interpretations are correct—rising temperatures led to rising CO2, which led to more rising temperatures. But the only relevance that this has to the current situation is that this natural positive feedback between temperature variations and CO2 variations didn’t run away in the past, and so we shouldn’t expect it to run away now. It carries no relevance as to what is causing the ongoing increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
[Figure 1. Variability in atmospheric CO2 (red, left-hand axis) and temperatures (blue, right-hand axis) derived from ice core air samples extending back more than 400,000 years.]
But anyone who looks at the data (shown in Figure 1) will see that no matter which caused the other, the changes in temperature from ice-age cold to interglacial warmth are about 10ºC while the change in CO2 is about 100ppm. Since the late 1800s, the temperature has warmed a bit less than 1ºC , while the CO2 concentration has increased by a bit less than 100ppm. In other words, the natural, historical relationship between CO2 and temperature is about 10 times weaker than that observed over the past 100 or so years. Thus, there is no way that the temperature rise from the Little Ice Age to the present can be the cause of an atmospheric CO2 increase of nearly 100ppm—the reasonable expectation would be about 10ppm. This line of reasoning is off by an order of magnitude.
And where do ultra-skeptics think the CO2 building up in the atmosphere is coming from, if not from humans? Their answer is typically “the oceans”—as the oceans warm, they outgas carbon dioxide. While this is certainly true, an opposite effect is also ongoing—a greater concentration of CO2 in the air drives more CO2 into the oceans. One way of determining how much CO2 is dissolved in the oceans is to observe the pH of the ocean waters. Long-term trends show a gradual decline in ocean pH (the source of the ocean “acidification” scare—the subject of a future MasterResource article). This means that the ocean is gaining more CO2 than it is losing. So, it can’t be the source of the large CO2 increase observed in the atmosphere.
Another way to figure out where the extra CO2 that is now part of the annual flux is coming from is through an isotopic analysis. CO2 that is released from fossil fuels carries a different (lighter) molecular weight than that which is usually part of the annual CO2 flux from land and oceans and atmosphere. CO2 released by fossil fuel has a lower 13C/12C ratio than does most other CO2 and long-term records show that the overall 13C/12C ratio in the atmosphere has been declining—an indication that an increasing proportion of atmospheric CO2 is coming from fossil fuel sources.
So there are (at least) three independent methods of determining the source of the extra CO2 that is building-up in the atmosphere, and all three of them finger fossil-fuel combustion as the primary culprit.
Yet, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence, the ultra-skeptics persist on forwarding the concept that the observed atmospheric CO2 growth is not caused by human actions. And sadly, since this notion is extremely pleasing to those folks (politicians et al.) who are actively fighting legislation aimed at limiting greenhouse gas emissions, it is widely incorporated into their stump speeches. Some even go so far as to suggest that the respiration of 6.5 (and growing) billion humans plays a role in the CO2 increases—again, pure nonsense. We humans breathe out only what we take in, and since we eat plants, which extract atmospheric CO2 for their carbon source in producing carbohydrates, it is a completely closed loop. (Now if we ate coal, or drank oil, perhaps things would be different.)
Fighting bad science with bad science is just a bad idea. There are numerous reasons to oppose restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, but the notion that they aren’t contributing to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide isn’t one of them.
In future articles, if I have time between combating alarmist outbreaks, I may point out some other ultra-skeptic fallacies—such as, “The build-up of atmospheric greenhouse gases isn’t responsible for elevating global average surface temperatures” or “Natural variations can fully explain the observed ‘global warming’.”
Master Resource, March 18, 2009
In the realm of climate science, as in most topics, there exists a range of ideas as to what is going on, and what it means for the future. At the risk of generalizing, the gamut looks something like this: Ultra-alarmists think that human greenhouse-gas-producing activities will vastly change the face of the planet and make the earth inhospitable for humans; they therefore demand large and immediate action to curtail greenhouse gas emissions. Alarmists understand that human activities are changing the earth’s climate and think that the potential changes are sufficient to warrant some pre-emptive action to try to mitigate them. Skeptics think that humans activities are changing the earth’s climate but, by and large, they think that the changes, in net, are not likely to be terribly disruptive and that drastic action to curtail greenhouse gas emissions is unnecessary, difficult, and ineffective. Ultra-skeptics think that human greenhouse gas-producing activities are impacting the earth’s climate in no way whatsoever.
Most of my energy tends to be directed at countering alarmist claims about impending climate catastrophe, but the scientist in me gets just as bent out of shape about some of the contentions made by the ultra-skeptics, which are simply unsupported by virtually any scientific evidence. Primary among these claims is that human activities are not responsible for the observed build-up of atmospheric carbon dioxide. This is just plain wrong.
We have good measurement of how much carbon dioxide is building up in the atmosphere each year, and we have good estimates of how much carbon dioxide is being emitted from human activities each year. It turns out that there are more than enough anthropogenic emissions to account for how much the atmosphere is accumulating. In fact, the great mystery concerns the “missing carbon,” that is, where exactly is the extra carbon dioxide going that is emitted by humans but that doesn’t end up staying in the atmosphere. (Only about half of the human CO2 emissions end up accumulating in the atmosphere; the rest end up somewhere else—in the oceans, in the terrestrial biosphere, etc.) In my opinion, it would be much more useful for folks interested in the carbon cycle to try to better understand the behavior of the CO2 sinks and how that behavior may change in the future (if at all) rather than in trying for come up with sources of CO2 other than human activities to explain the atmospheric concentration growth—as it is, we already have too much, not too little.
What this means is: The argument that the increase in atmospheric CO2 results from a natural temperature recovery from the depths of the Little Ice Age in the mid-to-late 1800s just doesn’t work.
In fact, all lines of evidence are against it.
This argument has its foundation in the carbon-dioxide and temperature trends of the past 400 to 600 thousand years, which we know from air bubbles trapped in ice that has been extracted from ice cores taken in Antarctica and Greenland. Basically, the data from the ice cores show that periods when the earth’s climate has been warm are also periods when there have been relatively higher CO2 concentrations (Figure 1). Al Gore uses this to say that the higher CO2 caused the higher temperatures; ultra-skeptics counter by pointing out that, if you look closely enough, you’ll see that the temperature rises before the CO2 rises, so rising temperatures cause rising CO2, not vice versa. The fact is that both interpretations are correct—rising temperatures led to rising CO2, which led to more rising temperatures. But the only relevance that this has to the current situation is that this natural positive feedback between temperature variations and CO2 variations didn’t run away in the past, and so we shouldn’t expect it to run away now. It carries no relevance as to what is causing the ongoing increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
[Figure 1. Variability in atmospheric CO2 (red, left-hand axis) and temperatures (blue, right-hand axis) derived from ice core air samples extending back more than 400,000 years.]
But anyone who looks at the data (shown in Figure 1) will see that no matter which caused the other, the changes in temperature from ice-age cold to interglacial warmth are about 10ºC while the change in CO2 is about 100ppm. Since the late 1800s, the temperature has warmed a bit less than 1ºC , while the CO2 concentration has increased by a bit less than 100ppm. In other words, the natural, historical relationship between CO2 and temperature is about 10 times weaker than that observed over the past 100 or so years. Thus, there is no way that the temperature rise from the Little Ice Age to the present can be the cause of an atmospheric CO2 increase of nearly 100ppm—the reasonable expectation would be about 10ppm. This line of reasoning is off by an order of magnitude.
And where do ultra-skeptics think the CO2 building up in the atmosphere is coming from, if not from humans? Their answer is typically “the oceans”—as the oceans warm, they outgas carbon dioxide. While this is certainly true, an opposite effect is also ongoing—a greater concentration of CO2 in the air drives more CO2 into the oceans. One way of determining how much CO2 is dissolved in the oceans is to observe the pH of the ocean waters. Long-term trends show a gradual decline in ocean pH (the source of the ocean “acidification” scare—the subject of a future MasterResource article). This means that the ocean is gaining more CO2 than it is losing. So, it can’t be the source of the large CO2 increase observed in the atmosphere.
Another way to figure out where the extra CO2 that is now part of the annual flux is coming from is through an isotopic analysis. CO2 that is released from fossil fuels carries a different (lighter) molecular weight than that which is usually part of the annual CO2 flux from land and oceans and atmosphere. CO2 released by fossil fuel has a lower 13C/12C ratio than does most other CO2 and long-term records show that the overall 13C/12C ratio in the atmosphere has been declining—an indication that an increasing proportion of atmospheric CO2 is coming from fossil fuel sources.
So there are (at least) three independent methods of determining the source of the extra CO2 that is building-up in the atmosphere, and all three of them finger fossil-fuel combustion as the primary culprit.
Yet, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence, the ultra-skeptics persist on forwarding the concept that the observed atmospheric CO2 growth is not caused by human actions. And sadly, since this notion is extremely pleasing to those folks (politicians et al.) who are actively fighting legislation aimed at limiting greenhouse gas emissions, it is widely incorporated into their stump speeches. Some even go so far as to suggest that the respiration of 6.5 (and growing) billion humans plays a role in the CO2 increases—again, pure nonsense. We humans breathe out only what we take in, and since we eat plants, which extract atmospheric CO2 for their carbon source in producing carbohydrates, it is a completely closed loop. (Now if we ate coal, or drank oil, perhaps things would be different.)
Fighting bad science with bad science is just a bad idea. There are numerous reasons to oppose restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, but the notion that they aren’t contributing to increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide isn’t one of them.
In future articles, if I have time between combating alarmist outbreaks, I may point out some other ultra-skeptic fallacies—such as, “The build-up of atmospheric greenhouse gases isn’t responsible for elevating global average surface temperatures” or “Natural variations can fully explain the observed ‘global warming’.”
Federal President secretly ends program that let pilots carry guns
Guns on a plane. Washington Times Editorial
Obama secretly ends program that let pilots carry guns
The Washington Times, Tuesday, March 17, 2009
After the September 11 attacks, commercial airline pilots were allowed to carry guns if they completed a federal-safety program. No longer would unarmed pilots be defenseless as remorseless hijackers seized control of aircraft and rammed them into buildings.
Now President Obama is quietly ending the federal firearms program, risking public safety on airlines in the name of an anti-gun ideology.
The Obama administration this past week diverted some $2 million from the pilot training program to hire more supervisory staff, who will engage in field inspections of pilots.
This looks like completely unnecessary harassment of the pilots. The 12,000 Federal Flight Deck Officers, the pilots who have been approved to carry guns, are reported to have the best behavior of any federal law enforcement agency. There are no cases where any of them has improperly brandished or used a gun. There are just a few cases where officers have improperly used their IDs.
Fewer than one percent of the officers have any administrative actions brought against them and, we are told, virtually all of those cases “are trumped up.”
Take a case against one flight officer who had visited the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles within the last few weeks. While there, the pilot noticed that federal law enforcement officers can, with the approval of a superior, obtain a license plate that cannot be traced, a key safety feature for law enforcement personnel. So the pilot asked if, as a member of the federal program, he was eligible. The DMV staffer checked and said “no.” The next day administrative actions were brought against the pilot for “misrepresenting himself.” These are the kinds of cases that President Obama wants to investigate.
Since Mr. Obama's election, pilots have told us that the approval process for letting pilots carry guns on planes slowed significantly. Last week the problem went from bad to worse. Federal Flight Deck Officers - the pilots who have been approved to carry guns - indicate that the approval process has stalled out.
Pilots cannot openly speak about the changing policies for fear of retaliation from the Transportation Security Administration. Pilots who act in any way that causes a “loss of confidence” in the armed pilot program risk criminal prosecution as well as their removal from the program. Despite these threats, pilots in the Federal Flight Deck Officers program have raised real concerns in multiple interviews.
Arming pilots after Sept. 11 was nothing new. Until the early 1960s, American commercial passenger pilots on any flight carrying U.S. mail were required to carry handguns. Indeed, U.S. pilots were still allowed to carry guns until as recently as 1987. There are no records that any of these pilots (either military or commercial) ever causing any significant problems.
Screening of airplane passengers is hardly perfect. While armed marshals are helpful, the program covers less than 3 percent of the flights out of Washington D.C.'s three airports and even fewer across the country. Sky marshals are costly and quit more often than other law-enforcement officers.
Armed pilots are a cost-effective backup layer of security. Terrorists can only enter the cockpit through one narrow entrance, and armed pilots have some time to prepare themselves as hijackers penetrate the strengthened cockpit doors. With pilots, we have people who are willing to take on the burden of protecting the planes for free. About 70 percent of the pilots at major American carriers have military backgrounds.
Frankly, as a matter of pure politics, we cannot understand what the administration is thinking. Nearly 40 House Democrats are in districts were the NRA is more popular than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. We can't find any independent poll in which the public is demanding that pilots disarm. Why does this move make sense?
Only anti-gun extremists and terrorist recruits are worried about armed pilots. So why is the Obama administration catering to this tiny lobby at the expense of public safety?
Obama secretly ends program that let pilots carry guns
The Washington Times, Tuesday, March 17, 2009
After the September 11 attacks, commercial airline pilots were allowed to carry guns if they completed a federal-safety program. No longer would unarmed pilots be defenseless as remorseless hijackers seized control of aircraft and rammed them into buildings.
Now President Obama is quietly ending the federal firearms program, risking public safety on airlines in the name of an anti-gun ideology.
The Obama administration this past week diverted some $2 million from the pilot training program to hire more supervisory staff, who will engage in field inspections of pilots.
This looks like completely unnecessary harassment of the pilots. The 12,000 Federal Flight Deck Officers, the pilots who have been approved to carry guns, are reported to have the best behavior of any federal law enforcement agency. There are no cases where any of them has improperly brandished or used a gun. There are just a few cases where officers have improperly used their IDs.
Fewer than one percent of the officers have any administrative actions brought against them and, we are told, virtually all of those cases “are trumped up.”
Take a case against one flight officer who had visited the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles within the last few weeks. While there, the pilot noticed that federal law enforcement officers can, with the approval of a superior, obtain a license plate that cannot be traced, a key safety feature for law enforcement personnel. So the pilot asked if, as a member of the federal program, he was eligible. The DMV staffer checked and said “no.” The next day administrative actions were brought against the pilot for “misrepresenting himself.” These are the kinds of cases that President Obama wants to investigate.
Since Mr. Obama's election, pilots have told us that the approval process for letting pilots carry guns on planes slowed significantly. Last week the problem went from bad to worse. Federal Flight Deck Officers - the pilots who have been approved to carry guns - indicate that the approval process has stalled out.
Pilots cannot openly speak about the changing policies for fear of retaliation from the Transportation Security Administration. Pilots who act in any way that causes a “loss of confidence” in the armed pilot program risk criminal prosecution as well as their removal from the program. Despite these threats, pilots in the Federal Flight Deck Officers program have raised real concerns in multiple interviews.
Arming pilots after Sept. 11 was nothing new. Until the early 1960s, American commercial passenger pilots on any flight carrying U.S. mail were required to carry handguns. Indeed, U.S. pilots were still allowed to carry guns until as recently as 1987. There are no records that any of these pilots (either military or commercial) ever causing any significant problems.
Screening of airplane passengers is hardly perfect. While armed marshals are helpful, the program covers less than 3 percent of the flights out of Washington D.C.'s three airports and even fewer across the country. Sky marshals are costly and quit more often than other law-enforcement officers.
Armed pilots are a cost-effective backup layer of security. Terrorists can only enter the cockpit through one narrow entrance, and armed pilots have some time to prepare themselves as hijackers penetrate the strengthened cockpit doors. With pilots, we have people who are willing to take on the burden of protecting the planes for free. About 70 percent of the pilots at major American carriers have military backgrounds.
Frankly, as a matter of pure politics, we cannot understand what the administration is thinking. Nearly 40 House Democrats are in districts were the NRA is more popular than House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. We can't find any independent poll in which the public is demanding that pilots disarm. Why does this move make sense?
Only anti-gun extremists and terrorist recruits are worried about armed pilots. So why is the Obama administration catering to this tiny lobby at the expense of public safety?
Conservative views on the American Bar Association
ABA Subservience to Obama Administration, by Ed Whelan
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
It’s no surprise that the Obama administration has restored the ABA judicial-evaluation committee’s pre-Bush 43 privileged role in reviewing prospective nominees before the president formally nominates them. But the timing of yesterday’s announcement by the ABA is curious and would seem to provide more evidence that the ABA is eager to play handmaiden to the Obama administration’s political agenda.
Consider that the ABA’s announcement came on the very day that President Obama made his first judicial nomination, David Hamilton (to the Sixth Circuit)—and on the very day that the ABA committee issued its rating (“well qualified”) of Hamilton. The fact that the ABA committee issued its rating yesterday indicates that the White House restored the ABA’s pre-nomination role some weeks ago. (This ABA document—especially pages 5 to 9—describes the lengthy evaluation procedures that the ABA committee undertakes. Although that document has not been revised to reflect the ABA’s restored pre-nomination role, the exercise of that role would begin with the White House’s informing the committee who the intended nominee is.)
In other words, at the very time the media were speculating whether the Obama White House would restore the ABA’s old role, the ABA had almost certainly already had its role restored. Why did the ABA not say so at the time? And why did its announcement yesterday obscure when its role was restored? I’d guess that the White House asked the ABA to keep mum—in order to avoid giving conservative opposition a heads-up that nominations might be imminent—and that the ABA happily complied with this purely political request.
By the way, yesterday’s statement by the ABA’s president repeats the canard that the ABA committee “does not consider a potential nominee’s ideological or political philosophy.” I’ve exposed the falsehood of that assertion in this post. The National Law Journal also reports today that “a soon-to-be-released study by political scientists concludes” that the ABA’s ratings “are biased against potential conservative nominees.” Given how the members of the ABA committee are selected (a matter that I discuss at length in this essay), that’s hardly a surprise.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009
It’s no surprise that the Obama administration has restored the ABA judicial-evaluation committee’s pre-Bush 43 privileged role in reviewing prospective nominees before the president formally nominates them. But the timing of yesterday’s announcement by the ABA is curious and would seem to provide more evidence that the ABA is eager to play handmaiden to the Obama administration’s political agenda.
Consider that the ABA’s announcement came on the very day that President Obama made his first judicial nomination, David Hamilton (to the Sixth Circuit)—and on the very day that the ABA committee issued its rating (“well qualified”) of Hamilton. The fact that the ABA committee issued its rating yesterday indicates that the White House restored the ABA’s pre-nomination role some weeks ago. (This ABA document—especially pages 5 to 9—describes the lengthy evaluation procedures that the ABA committee undertakes. Although that document has not been revised to reflect the ABA’s restored pre-nomination role, the exercise of that role would begin with the White House’s informing the committee who the intended nominee is.)
In other words, at the very time the media were speculating whether the Obama White House would restore the ABA’s old role, the ABA had almost certainly already had its role restored. Why did the ABA not say so at the time? And why did its announcement yesterday obscure when its role was restored? I’d guess that the White House asked the ABA to keep mum—in order to avoid giving conservative opposition a heads-up that nominations might be imminent—and that the ABA happily complied with this purely political request.
By the way, yesterday’s statement by the ABA’s president repeats the canard that the ABA committee “does not consider a potential nominee’s ideological or political philosophy.” I’ve exposed the falsehood of that assertion in this post. The National Law Journal also reports today that “a soon-to-be-released study by political scientists concludes” that the ABA’s ratings “are biased against potential conservative nominees.” Given how the members of the ABA committee are selected (a matter that I discuss at length in this essay), that’s hardly a surprise.
WaPo:Politicians of both parties pile on AIG
The Big Bash, WaPo Editorial
Politicians of both parties pile on AIG.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009; Page A12
YESTERDAY, we were more skeptical than most about the "populist" backlash against the $165 million in bonuses that went to some employees of government-owned AIG. The events of the past 24 hours have only confirmed our view. We don't love the fact that the men and women of this disgraced company are insisting upon the compensation they signed up for before the company collapsed into the arms of the taxpayers. But whether they are being greedy, or simply human, is hardly relevant to what is in the public interest now. AIG's demagogic critics in both parties should keep that in mind.
For better or worse, the U.S. government -- i.e., all of us -- now owns AIG. The firm is hemorrhaging knowledgeable employees at precisely the time when it -- and therefore we -- need them most. No matter how morally satisfying, taking back bonuses now, as proposed yesterday in belated outrage by Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), would probably accelerate the exodus, with the likely effect that the country would lose much more money on AIG than it would otherwise. Yes, $165 million is a lot of money. But it is 0.09 percent of the total AIG bailout cost, $173 billion. The relevant policy question here is not whether we feel like spending $165 million on bonuses; it is whether doing so will help wrap up the AIG rescue as cheaply and quickly as possible.
The company's chief executive, Edward M. Liddy, who was brought in from outside at $1 per year to unwind AIG on behalf of the government, seems to think that it will. Others who are not in his position of responsibility are fully exploiting their freedom to disagree. Thus, the attorney general of New York, Andrew M. Cuomo, among other Democrats, floated the argument that the AIG employees should get stiffed because "it is only by the grace of American taxpayers that members of Financial Products even have jobs, let alone a pool of retention bonus money." True. But the bonuses were set in motion well before the U.S. takeover of AIG, which was done to avoid a Lehman Brothers-like meltdown that would have cost taxpayers a lot more than $165 million, and the compensation plan has been public information for a year. And then there is Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), who first suggested that the folks at AIG should consider committing suicide, samurai-style -- before saying he would settle for some "contrition."
Under the circumstances, we can understand why President Obama feels that he must join this opportunistic chorus rather than resist it. Still, this has not been a stellar moment for the man who came into office arguing that "the time has come to set aside childish things." With hundreds of billions of dollars in necessary repairs to the financial system still to come, Mr. Obama must find a way to explain those costs in terms that neither inflame the public nor insult its intelligence. The best we've heard so far came from a non-politician, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke. AIG's irresponsible behavior angers Mr. Bernanke, too, but he's not losing his cool. On CBS's "60 Minutes" last Sunday, he likened the firm to a neighbor who sets his house on fire by smoking in bed; the town has a choice between letting the place burn down to teach him a lesson, or dousing the flames to prevent them from consuming the homes of non-smoking neighbors. "That's where we are now," he said. "We have a fire going on." This is no time to be throwing more fuel on it.
Politicians of both parties pile on AIG.
Wednesday, March 18, 2009; Page A12
YESTERDAY, we were more skeptical than most about the "populist" backlash against the $165 million in bonuses that went to some employees of government-owned AIG. The events of the past 24 hours have only confirmed our view. We don't love the fact that the men and women of this disgraced company are insisting upon the compensation they signed up for before the company collapsed into the arms of the taxpayers. But whether they are being greedy, or simply human, is hardly relevant to what is in the public interest now. AIG's demagogic critics in both parties should keep that in mind.
For better or worse, the U.S. government -- i.e., all of us -- now owns AIG. The firm is hemorrhaging knowledgeable employees at precisely the time when it -- and therefore we -- need them most. No matter how morally satisfying, taking back bonuses now, as proposed yesterday in belated outrage by Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), would probably accelerate the exodus, with the likely effect that the country would lose much more money on AIG than it would otherwise. Yes, $165 million is a lot of money. But it is 0.09 percent of the total AIG bailout cost, $173 billion. The relevant policy question here is not whether we feel like spending $165 million on bonuses; it is whether doing so will help wrap up the AIG rescue as cheaply and quickly as possible.
The company's chief executive, Edward M. Liddy, who was brought in from outside at $1 per year to unwind AIG on behalf of the government, seems to think that it will. Others who are not in his position of responsibility are fully exploiting their freedom to disagree. Thus, the attorney general of New York, Andrew M. Cuomo, among other Democrats, floated the argument that the AIG employees should get stiffed because "it is only by the grace of American taxpayers that members of Financial Products even have jobs, let alone a pool of retention bonus money." True. But the bonuses were set in motion well before the U.S. takeover of AIG, which was done to avoid a Lehman Brothers-like meltdown that would have cost taxpayers a lot more than $165 million, and the compensation plan has been public information for a year. And then there is Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), who first suggested that the folks at AIG should consider committing suicide, samurai-style -- before saying he would settle for some "contrition."
Under the circumstances, we can understand why President Obama feels that he must join this opportunistic chorus rather than resist it. Still, this has not been a stellar moment for the man who came into office arguing that "the time has come to set aside childish things." With hundreds of billions of dollars in necessary repairs to the financial system still to come, Mr. Obama must find a way to explain those costs in terms that neither inflame the public nor insult its intelligence. The best we've heard so far came from a non-politician, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke. AIG's irresponsible behavior angers Mr. Bernanke, too, but he's not losing his cool. On CBS's "60 Minutes" last Sunday, he likened the firm to a neighbor who sets his house on fire by smoking in bed; the town has a choice between letting the place burn down to teach him a lesson, or dousing the flames to prevent them from consuming the homes of non-smoking neighbors. "That's where we are now," he said. "We have a fire going on." This is no time to be throwing more fuel on it.
US Completes Oil Spill Cleanup in Lebanon
USAID Completes Oil Spill Cleanup
March 17, 2009
BEIRUT, LEBANON -- The United States Agency for International Development has completed the cleanup of forty-three locations along a sixty kilometer stretch of the northern seashore from Tabarja to Enfeh. The devastation and subsequent clean-up followed the July 2006 conflict with Israel. Clean-up sites were selected in close coordination with the Lebanese Ministry of Environment. This program was part of a $230 million package provided to Lebanon from the U.S. to support humanitarian, reconstruction and security assistance following the conflict.
The $5.8 million cleanup project employed more than 220 local laborers, many of whom were fisherman who lost their livelihoods and boats, to support the cleanup using local machinery, equipment, caterers, and transporters. More than 100 fishermen’s boats were rapidly cleaned at the Byblos Port Jetty, allowing the fishermen to resume fishing quickly so they could generate income for their families. Following the cleanup, several tourist areas, marinas, hotels and beach resorts were able to resume their normal activities.
USAID’s program implementers collected approximately 1,300 cubic meters of oil-contaminated waste and more than 2,000 cubic meters of oil-contaminated sand from all locations. The Lebanese Ministry of Environment coordinated the removal of the contaminated sand from an interim storage location in Byblos to a designated area in Beirut.
USAID has worked in Lebanon since 1951 and implemented development projects to benefit Lebanese citizens. With funds from the American people, USAID creates jobs, invests in youth and protects the environment. USAID’s work reflects the strong friendship between the Lebanese and American people.
March 17, 2009
BEIRUT, LEBANON -- The United States Agency for International Development has completed the cleanup of forty-three locations along a sixty kilometer stretch of the northern seashore from Tabarja to Enfeh. The devastation and subsequent clean-up followed the July 2006 conflict with Israel. Clean-up sites were selected in close coordination with the Lebanese Ministry of Environment. This program was part of a $230 million package provided to Lebanon from the U.S. to support humanitarian, reconstruction and security assistance following the conflict.
The $5.8 million cleanup project employed more than 220 local laborers, many of whom were fisherman who lost their livelihoods and boats, to support the cleanup using local machinery, equipment, caterers, and transporters. More than 100 fishermen’s boats were rapidly cleaned at the Byblos Port Jetty, allowing the fishermen to resume fishing quickly so they could generate income for their families. Following the cleanup, several tourist areas, marinas, hotels and beach resorts were able to resume their normal activities.
USAID’s program implementers collected approximately 1,300 cubic meters of oil-contaminated waste and more than 2,000 cubic meters of oil-contaminated sand from all locations. The Lebanese Ministry of Environment coordinated the removal of the contaminated sand from an interim storage location in Byblos to a designated area in Beirut.
USAID has worked in Lebanon since 1951 and implemented development projects to benefit Lebanese citizens. With funds from the American people, USAID creates jobs, invests in youth and protects the environment. USAID’s work reflects the strong friendship between the Lebanese and American people.
The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security
The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy: How It Threatens Transatlantic Security, by Sally McNamara
Heritage Backgrounder #2250
March 17, 2009
[Full article w/notes at the link above]
A series of international events over the past year have pushed the European Union to the front of the international stage. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it was the EU that took the reins of leadership. When Russia turned off the gas taps to Ukraine in December, the EU again assumed the position of negotiator in chief.
Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the European Union has sought to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) precisely to take the lead in times of global crises. When Europe's collective weaknesses were cruelly exposed by Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, EU leaders tried to expedite the EU's foreign policy integration. Institutionally and politically, the EU has centralized elements of foreign-policy making in Brussels so that all EU members may "speak with one voice" on international issues.[1] Under proposals in the Lisbon Treaty (successor to the European Constitution) this centralization process would receive its most significant boost to date—removing foreign policy from the intergovernmental sphere and making it a supranational EU competence.
The EU sent a six-page letter to President Obama in early February, seeking to play a greater role on the international stage.[2] When Vice President Joe Biden outlined the Obama Administration's foreign policy vision at the Munich Security Conference that same month, he presented enthusiastic agreement.
But the United States should be wary of relinquishing its transatlantic leadership role to the European Union. Rather than realizing America's need for Europe to take on more of its own security burden, a common EU foreign policy is more likely to drain the already limited military capabilities of the member countries and potentially serve as a tool for those in Europe who believe that American global power must be "counterbalanced." The United States should not seek a single phone line to Europe: It will undermine America's fruitful bilateral relationships, such as the Anglo–American Special Relationship, which have served American interests well since the end of World War II.
The Creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans.[3]
—Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos on the EU's mediation efforts in Yugoslavia, June 1991
When the Yugoslav state started to disintegrate in 1991 and the prospect of widespread regional conflict loomed, the EU claimed leadership of the crisis, epitomized by Jacques Poos's infamous proclamation that the hour of Europe had arrived.[4] Taking place at the same time as the negotiations for the Treaty of Maastricht, which proposed huge centralizing initiatives, such as the Single Currency, the EU immediately sought a unified line on Yugoslavia as a vehicle for proving its foreign policy credentials.
The United States was relieved to see Europe step up to the plate and happily deferred leadership. Achieving a successful resolution of the Yugoslavia crisis presented the EU with an opportunity to both prove itself on the international stage, and to disentangle America from European security arrangements.
At the very outset, however, the EU failed to comprehend the sheer complexity of the problem, its own institutional and military limitations, and the very different historical perspectives and policies of its 12 constituent members. The tragedies that followed laid rest to the claim that Europe's time had come or that the EU was even unified. Having failed to secure peace through diplomacy and unable to agree on the deployment of a European peacekeeping "interposition force" in September 1991, Germany pushed the EU to reverse its previous policy and recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.[5] The EU's initial strategy of maintaining the territorial unity of the Yugoslav Federation at all costs was left in tatters.[6]
Breaking with the EU position and disregarding strong British and French objections, Germany forced Europe's hand by unilaterally recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states on December 23, 1991.[7] The other members of the European Community followed suit on January 15, 1992, in an attempt to reconcile Europe's growing divisions, and thereafter proceeded to steadily hand off leadership of the growing Balkan crisis to NATO and the United States. As European analyst Mario Zucconi notes, "The Western Europeans used Yugoslavia to gratify their vanity."[8] "In the end," he concludes, "the Yugoslav conflict dealt a serious blow to the image and credibility of the organization, to its perceived weight as a major unitary actor, and to its aspiration to anchor the emerging political order on the European continent."[9]
EU Treaties: The Juggernaut of Integration
In the midst of its early failures over Yugoslavia, the EU signed the Treaty of Maastricht which included institutional and political mechanisms to advance a Common Foreign and Security Policy.[10] The EU quickly drew the conclusion that if Europe had had better decision-making procedures and centralized institutions, its performance in Yugoslavia would have been better. The driving ethos behind the CFSP's creation was the idea that the nations of Europe could be stronger collectively than they are separately. Despite the gaping holes in European unity over Yugoslavia, it was assumed that new institutional arrangements would create unity by themselves.
Since its formulation in the Treaty of Maastricht, the backbone of a common EU foreign policy has been that Europe should seek a common position that no EU member state should break, regardless of evolving circumstances. The Maastricht treaty states:
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with."[11]
As stated in Maastricht, the goal of a common defense policy is to reinforce, "the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world."[12] The treaty also called on member states to coordinate positions at international institutions and to "uphold the common positions in such fora."[13] Maastricht specifically called on the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and Britain) to defend EU positions at the U.N.[14]
The EU argued that the CFSP was an attempt to address its foreign policy shortcomings and to improve its military capabilities, which were nakedly displayed over Yugoslavia. The EU's credibility gap, however, was once again exposed when America was forced to supply the vast majority of equipment used during NATO's air campaign against Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.[15] In addition to revealing a massive chasm between Europe and America in terms of military capability, Kosovo also demonstrated the vital role of American leadership in the Balkans. After years of failed EU negotiations with Milosevic, using lucrative carrots but less credible sticks, only America was able to legitimately threaten action, which was ultimately taken through NATO without an explicit authorizing resolution from the U.N. Security Council (in part due to French opposition to a further resolution authorizing military action).[16]
Resentment festered in many European quarters that NATO, and more specifically the United States, had once again been called in to resolve a European conflict.[17] Having failed to play the lead role, or even a meaningful part in resolving the Kosovo conflict, the EU decided once more that further centralization of power was the answer. It is significant that after every foreign policy failure the EU's analysis led to the conclusion that ever more concentration of power and more institution-building in Brussels could remedy the problem. The EU's failures in Kosovo, combined with the impetus for European military integration after the St. Malo summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in 1998, gave EU planners a green light to propose ever bolder initiatives to supra-nationalize European foreign policy.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and implemented in 1999, created the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—effectively an EU Foreign Minister. Amsterdam also reformed decision making for the CFSP, introducing the concept of "constructive abstention," and extended qualified majority voting to some areas of foreign policy.[18]
The ensuing Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and implemented in 2003, provided for the development of autonomous EU military arrangements, including the creation of permanent political and military structures and commitment to an EU-level rapid reaction force. Nice established defense policy as a formal EU competence for the first time and spearheaded the development of the EU's military policy.[19] Through the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, foreign policy was centralized in Brussels step by step.
Components of Failure
The creation of new institutional mechanisms and the centralization of foreign-policy making in Brussels have not created a stronger Europe capable of handling global, or even European, security. Instead, the CFSP has resulted in inaction, or been subject to domination by France and Germany. It has also frequently been used as a platform from which to confront America and frustrate U.S. policy, particularly the war on terrorism. In fact, three characteristics can be drawn from looking at the performance of the CFSP to date.
1. Inaction. Many Europeans have argued that the members of the European Union can exert greater influence in the world if they act together rather than separately; and that following the decline of Europe's major powers, individual states' power can collectively create a more powerful and credible European voice on the world stage. Elements of this philosophy are also to be found in the Obama Administration's theory that when acting within a multilateral alliance, the legitimacy and effectiveness of a specific action is enhanced. During the presidential election campaign, Barack Obama called for America and Europe to embrace new forms of multilateralism for the 21st century, to jointly confront "dangerous currents," such as climate change, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.[20]
Sovereignty, however, cannot be traded for influence. The ability to project power, whether regionally or globally, depends on several factors, including leadership, credibility, military capability, popular support, and dependable allies. The EU lacks all of these qualities and in assembling its constituent parts, it, therefore, tends to adopt the position of its slowest actors. Or, as The Times opined in 1996 as the EU stood impotent before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, "It looks impressive but the increase in size has been bought by losing punch."[21]
In order for 27 member states to agree on a united foreign policy, almost all the meat will have to be taken off the bones of that policy in order to build a consensus. However, that consensus, no matter how weak, may then restrict member states from taking stronger actions outside its parameters. As EU academic analyst Professor Simon Hix explains:
The reforms contained in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties may have reduced the institutional constraints on the capacity for common action, but the rival historical and political interests of the member states prevent the definition of a common European security identity, and undermine any possibility of acting upon this identity in a united front.[22]
The EU's policy on Zimbabwe illustrates the fallacy of this approach. In 2003, the EU failed to renew travel sanctions against brutal dictator Robert Mugabe after French President Jacques Chirac invited him to attend a Franco–African summit in Paris.[23] Despite indisputable proof of Mugabe's systematic violation of human rights and political freedoms, he was once again given the red-carpet treatment in 2007 when Portugal officially broke with an EU travel ban (with Brussels' political blessing) to allow Mugabe and his senior aides to travel to Lisbon for an EU–Africa Summit.[24] Despite British protestations and a boycott by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Mugabe attended the Summit, and Britain sent a low-level government representative in order to conform to the EU's consensus decision that Mugabe should be welcomed by the EU.[25]
Considering Mugabe's tyrannical and oppressive leadership, with routine politically motivated violence and economic collapse, a united policy sanctioning the dictator's travel would seem an obvious one. Yet the EU was incapable of forming any substantial policy, while simultaneously preventing other members from meaningful dissention.
2. Franco–German Dominance. While the EU rarely manages to speak with one voice in any meaningful way, there have been certain instances where the EU has taken the lead role on an international issue. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 is one such instance where French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as the EU's biggest political figure and then-president of the European Council, assumed the role of world spokesman.
Unfortunately, Sarkozy's handling of the crisis was a disaster and represented a barely concealed Franco–German agenda to restore EU–Russian relations as quickly as possible. From the very outset of the crisis, Sarkozy focused exclusively on achieving a six-point ceasefire—a ceasefire that was thrust upon Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and which Moscow had no intention of observing. With no enforcement mechanisms, Sarkozy failed to compel Russia to fulfill the conditions of the ceasefire and also failed to prevent Russia's subsequent de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Further, despite German Chancellor Angela Merkel's trip to Tbilisi during the height of the conflict where she publicly affirmed Germany's support for Georgia's membership in NATO, she soon reversed position to veto it during NATO's Foreign Ministerial summit in Brussels in December 2008.[26]
Despite the failure of his ceasefire and Russia's redrawing of Europe's borders by force, Sarkozy went on to engineer a return to "business as usual" between Russia and the EU. This was done without any formal negotiation with the Secretary General of NATO, who had suspended all high-level diplomatic contact with Russia in support of the EU-led ceasefire negotiations. In a bid to protect Europe's relationship with Moscow, especially Russian–German energy projects and a deal for Russian helicopters for the EU's mission to Chad, Sarkozy sidelined NATO and used the European Union as a cosmetic cover for Franco–German interests.[27]
3. Limiting American Power. Successive American Administrations have argued that a stronger Europe means greater help for realizing American goals of international peace and stability. President George W. Bush spent much of his second term trying to repair ties in Europe, hoping to engage Europe in supporting a transatlantic agenda on issues such as free trade, energy security, and stabilizing Afghanistan. But the EU chose to obstruct American policies instead of engaging on areas of mutual concern. In areas such as the rendition of terrorists, visa waiver policy, and data sharing, the European Union purposefully obstructed American policy.[28]
Some European leaders also describe the EU as a check on American global power. Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin described America as an "unchecked hyper-power."[29] Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt talked about EU integration in terms of its "emancipation" from the United States.[30] Current Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero openly talked about deconstructing American global influence within two decades.[31]
A report published by the U.K. House of Lords in July 2003 found that the EU tended to oppose U.S. policy "simply to make its voice heard."[32] This explains why, standing next to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in November 2008, EU president Sarkozy called for a temporary moratorium on the planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.[33] Speaking to the European Parliament immediately before the NATO Summit in December, French defense minister Hervé Morin also questioned the need for the "third site."[34] The French position was especially important since Paris was holding the EU presidency at that time, speaking with the added authority of that office.
This position contrasts sharply with two NATO endorsements of the planned deployment, including the alliance's foreign ministerial endorsement that came immediately after Mr. Morin's comments before the European Parliament.[35] Although France officially backed both NATO communiqués, its position within the EU was the polar opposite, demonstrating a frustrating inconsistency. It should give the U.S. Administration pause in supporting further EU foreign policy integration when it cannot expect to hear the same message from NATO as it does from the European Union.
France and Missile Defense: Taking One Position for NATO, a Different Position Elsewhere
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.
—NATO Heads of State Final Declaration, April 3, 2008
…[P]lease let's not have any more talk of deployment of missiles or deployment of antimissile systems. Deployment of a missile defense system would bring nothing to security in Europe.
—President Sarkozy at EU–Russia Summit in France, November 15, 2008
Who would hold the key to their [European-based United States missile defense assets] use? What threat would they tackle? There are risks, yes, but to say that there is a threat today would need to be checked.
—French Defense Minister, Hervé Morin, December 1, 2008
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. As tasked at the Bucharest Summit, we are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts… As all options include the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets, we note as a relevant development the signature of agreements by the Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland with the United States regarding those assets.
—NATO Foreign Ministers' Final Communiqué, December 3, 2008
War and Peace
The divisions among the powers of Europe over the war in Iraq in 2003 revealed the problem of imposing a single foreign policy on all EU member states. Faced with its members and acceding countries supporting one of two diametrically opposed positions, the EU descended into chaos trying to fashion a single policy out of pure contradiction.[36] Europe's countries were broadly split down the middle. France heightened tensions in Europe by telling largely pro-war accession countries that they had "missed a good opportunity to keep quiet."[37] France also sought to deny Turkey planning assistance within the NATO alliance, owing to Paris's vehement opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq.[38]
The Atlanticists responded with a letter of support to the U.S. Administration, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote to all EU capitals urging them to consider military action as a viable last resort.[39] Less than a week before the invasion, the leaders of the United States, the U.K., and Spain met in the Azores to build international momentum for action on Iraq in a summit that was quickly interpreted as a confrontation with the Franco–German led anti-war axis.
The president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, commented that "Whatever the outcome of the war, there can be no denying that this is a bad time for the common foreign and security policy for the European Union as a whole."[40] EU divisions over Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the fallacy of assuming the nations of Europe have a single foreign policy voice. Washington diplomatically engaged its European allies on a systematic bilateral basis, and, where necessary, on an ad hoc multilateral basis. The juggernaut of European integration, however, seeks to remove that option, making Brussels the only port of call for American foreign policy planners. It is inevitable that this will be to the detriment of American foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger has noted:
When the United States deals with the nations of Europe individually, it has the possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its view heard well before a decision is taken. In dealing with the European Union, by contrast, the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level.... Growing estrangement between America and Europe is thus being institutionally fostered.[41]
The Lisbon Treaty
Following the deep European divisions over whether to support or oppose the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU more determinedly wrestled with the question of how to fashion a supranational foreign policy, determined that such division should not happen again. Former Member of the European Parliament and current leader of Britain's Liberal Democratic Party, Nick Clegg, stated in 2003 at the height of EU tensions over Iraq:
The relish with which the anti-European British press has rushed to proclaim the last rites over the EU's fledgling common foreign and security policy is premature. The EU has a habit of rebounding strongly from internal crisis and strife.[42]
In 2004, EU leaders signed the European Constitution, which would have codified the supreme legal basis of the 25 member states at the time, marking a monumental departure from the previous, treaty-based approach to European integration.[43] The constitution was an audacious document, which proposed to significantly extend the EU's competency in foreign-policy making and introduce permanent high-ranking political positions, such as an EU president and a single EU foreign minister. It was subsequently rejected in referenda by the voters of France and Holland. The EU pressed on regardless of this stark popular opposition and "renegotiated" a virtually identical document, the Lisbon Treaty.[44]
The Lisbon Treaty is currently pending ratification by all EU member states, having already been rejected once by voters in Ireland. The Irish government has committed to holding a second referendum on the treaty later this year, since Lisbon cannot proceed without the ratification of all member states. Just like the European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty contains the building blocks of a United States of Europe and will shift power from the member states of the EU to Brussels in several areas of policymaking, including defense, national security, and foreign policy.[45] The treaty is a blueprint for restricting the sovereign right of EU member states to determine their own foreign policies; above all, the treaty underscores the EU's long-held ambitions to become a global power.
As with the EU Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty will create a permanent EU president, and extend the roles of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the EU's powerful diplomatic corps. With a single legal personality, Brussels would sign international agreements on behalf of all member states. Critically, unanimous voting has been removed in several key areas and majority voting introduced for 12 different areas of foreign policy, including the election of the EU foreign minister and proposals emanating from the foreign minister.[46]
The treaty will restrict the ability of member states to operate on the international stage on an independent basis. Should the EU decide on a common foreign policy position, the EU will automatically speak for the U.K. and France in the United Nations Security Council.[47] This should be particularly worrisome to the United States since the U.K. and U.S. have proved to be valuable partners in this body in the past. The treaty further asserts the value and importance of the European Union over members' sovereign rights and national interests. It states:
Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.[48]
A Threat to the Anglo–American-Led Operation in Afghanistan
The Lisbon Treaty represents a major threat to the NATO alliance. Rather than creating additional military resources, Lisbon will lead to the replication of NATO and duplicate many of its functions. The long-term goal of creating a European army and duplicating NATO's Article V commitment—that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all members—illustrates these dangers.
In 2000, the EU announced proposals for an army of 100,000 (60,000 of whom could be deployed at 60 days' notice for up to a year at a time). Britain's Conservative Party commented at the time that this would effectively destroy NATO.[49] The British government rejected this criticism, claiming that the EU was not taking on collective defense, which was purely NATO's responsibility.[50] The Treaty of Lisbon however, proposes an EU mutual defense clause:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.[51]
In addition to duplicating NATO's Article V, the EU remains intent on creating its own military. In the absence of additional defense spending, these resources will have to come at NATO's expense. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU would have "Permanent Structured Cooperation"—an inner group of EU nations (currently proposed to consist of France, the U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland) pooling military resources and manpower to form an army of 60,000 to undertake EU missions.[52] The reality is that frontline British troops would have to be mandated for EU availability at NATO's expense, probably from Afghanistan. As Open Europe, a British policy institute, warns:
In simple terms, the UK would have to earmark 10,000 frontline troops for service on EU missions. For the EU force to be viable UK troops would need to be constantly available for EU operations. The fact that the UK is one of the few EU countries to have modern combat forces is likely to mean that the UK would have to keep its 10,000 in the UK/EU. Given the UK's current military overstretch, the plans would almost certainly divert vital resources away from the British mission in Afghanistan.[53]
A cross-party group of former senior British ministers commented in 2000 that the creation of an EU army was "an openly political project,"[54] a point confirmed by then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: "This is part of the European integration process."[55] Now, as then, no additional troops are available for this paper army. Either troops already committed to NATO will be counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops will be withdrawn from existing NATO missions.
In 2000, Lady Thatcher described the creation of an EU army as "a piece of monumental folly that puts our security at risk in order to satisfy political vanity."[56] Rather than representing a genuine attempt to increase Europe's military contribution to vital missions, such as Afghanistan, the EU is merely seeking to advance its own political ambitions.
This is of particular importance to the United Kingdom, whose relationship with the United States has been underpinned by shared military commitments over the years. President Barack Obama has already stated that the war in Afghanistan is America's top foreign policy priority; a deterioration of Britain's commitment to Afghanistan at this time would be unacceptable to the United States. [57]
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton argues that the Lisbon Treaty poses a threat to both the Anglo–American Special Relationship and to NATO.[58] By reducing the ability of member states to set their own foreign policies and work with America outside of the EU's purview, the Treaty of Lisbon represents a profound threat to the Obama Administration's pledge to renew positive relations with European countries.[59]
What the Administration and Congress Should Do
The transatlantic relationship is vital to European and international security. European countries and the United States must nurture their relationships in order to achieve and maintain global peace and security. Specifically:
Conclusion
Foreign policy is an attribute of statehood that must remain at the nation-state level if it is to be meaningful or effective. If the United States wishes to continue enjoying the benefits of its long-standing relationships with the countries of Europe, it must oppose the creation of a supranational EU foreign policy and the duplication of NATO resources by the European Union. U.S. support for a single European foreign and military policy has been misplaced. While successive U.S. Administrations have believed their desire for Europe to undertake a greater share of the global security burden to be achievable through further European integration, evidence suggests the exact opposite to be the case.
The U.S. government should instead pursue a policy under which its bilateral engagements with European nations are prioritized, and engagement with the EU is based purely on where Brussels can add value to a specific policy area. The United States and Europe should engage on critical foreign policy issues, such as military planning and counterterrorism, both bilaterally and through NATO. The usurpation of power by Brussels jeopardizes these types of engagements—and ultimately threatens the security of the United States.
Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author is grateful to Morgan L. Roach, Research Assistant in the Thatcher Center, and Parker Broaddus, Thatcher Center intern, for their assistance in preparing this paper.
Heritage Backgrounder #2250
March 17, 2009
[Full article w/notes at the link above]
A series of international events over the past year have pushed the European Union to the front of the international stage. When Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, it was the EU that took the reins of leadership. When Russia turned off the gas taps to Ukraine in December, the EU again assumed the position of negotiator in chief.
Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, the European Union has sought to forge a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) precisely to take the lead in times of global crises. When Europe's collective weaknesses were cruelly exposed by Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, EU leaders tried to expedite the EU's foreign policy integration. Institutionally and politically, the EU has centralized elements of foreign-policy making in Brussels so that all EU members may "speak with one voice" on international issues.[1] Under proposals in the Lisbon Treaty (successor to the European Constitution) this centralization process would receive its most significant boost to date—removing foreign policy from the intergovernmental sphere and making it a supranational EU competence.
The EU sent a six-page letter to President Obama in early February, seeking to play a greater role on the international stage.[2] When Vice President Joe Biden outlined the Obama Administration's foreign policy vision at the Munich Security Conference that same month, he presented enthusiastic agreement.
But the United States should be wary of relinquishing its transatlantic leadership role to the European Union. Rather than realizing America's need for Europe to take on more of its own security burden, a common EU foreign policy is more likely to drain the already limited military capabilities of the member countries and potentially serve as a tool for those in Europe who believe that American global power must be "counterbalanced." The United States should not seek a single phone line to Europe: It will undermine America's fruitful bilateral relationships, such as the Anglo–American Special Relationship, which have served American interests well since the end of World War II.
The Creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans.[3]
—Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos on the EU's mediation efforts in Yugoslavia, June 1991
When the Yugoslav state started to disintegrate in 1991 and the prospect of widespread regional conflict loomed, the EU claimed leadership of the crisis, epitomized by Jacques Poos's infamous proclamation that the hour of Europe had arrived.[4] Taking place at the same time as the negotiations for the Treaty of Maastricht, which proposed huge centralizing initiatives, such as the Single Currency, the EU immediately sought a unified line on Yugoslavia as a vehicle for proving its foreign policy credentials.
The United States was relieved to see Europe step up to the plate and happily deferred leadership. Achieving a successful resolution of the Yugoslavia crisis presented the EU with an opportunity to both prove itself on the international stage, and to disentangle America from European security arrangements.
At the very outset, however, the EU failed to comprehend the sheer complexity of the problem, its own institutional and military limitations, and the very different historical perspectives and policies of its 12 constituent members. The tragedies that followed laid rest to the claim that Europe's time had come or that the EU was even unified. Having failed to secure peace through diplomacy and unable to agree on the deployment of a European peacekeeping "interposition force" in September 1991, Germany pushed the EU to reverse its previous policy and recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.[5] The EU's initial strategy of maintaining the territorial unity of the Yugoslav Federation at all costs was left in tatters.[6]
Breaking with the EU position and disregarding strong British and French objections, Germany forced Europe's hand by unilaterally recognizing Croatia and Slovenia as sovereign states on December 23, 1991.[7] The other members of the European Community followed suit on January 15, 1992, in an attempt to reconcile Europe's growing divisions, and thereafter proceeded to steadily hand off leadership of the growing Balkan crisis to NATO and the United States. As European analyst Mario Zucconi notes, "The Western Europeans used Yugoslavia to gratify their vanity."[8] "In the end," he concludes, "the Yugoslav conflict dealt a serious blow to the image and credibility of the organization, to its perceived weight as a major unitary actor, and to its aspiration to anchor the emerging political order on the European continent."[9]
EU Treaties: The Juggernaut of Integration
In the midst of its early failures over Yugoslavia, the EU signed the Treaty of Maastricht which included institutional and political mechanisms to advance a Common Foreign and Security Policy.[10] The EU quickly drew the conclusion that if Europe had had better decision-making procedures and centralized institutions, its performance in Yugoslavia would have been better. The driving ethos behind the CFSP's creation was the idea that the nations of Europe could be stronger collectively than they are separately. Despite the gaping holes in European unity over Yugoslavia, it was assumed that new institutional arrangements would create unity by themselves.
Since its formulation in the Treaty of Maastricht, the backbone of a common EU foreign policy has been that Europe should seek a common position that no EU member state should break, regardless of evolving circumstances. The Maastricht treaty states:
The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with."[11]
As stated in Maastricht, the goal of a common defense policy is to reinforce, "the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world."[12] The treaty also called on member states to coordinate positions at international institutions and to "uphold the common positions in such fora."[13] Maastricht specifically called on the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (France and Britain) to defend EU positions at the U.N.[14]
The EU argued that the CFSP was an attempt to address its foreign policy shortcomings and to improve its military capabilities, which were nakedly displayed over Yugoslavia. The EU's credibility gap, however, was once again exposed when America was forced to supply the vast majority of equipment used during NATO's air campaign against Milosevic's ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.[15] In addition to revealing a massive chasm between Europe and America in terms of military capability, Kosovo also demonstrated the vital role of American leadership in the Balkans. After years of failed EU negotiations with Milosevic, using lucrative carrots but less credible sticks, only America was able to legitimately threaten action, which was ultimately taken through NATO without an explicit authorizing resolution from the U.N. Security Council (in part due to French opposition to a further resolution authorizing military action).[16]
Resentment festered in many European quarters that NATO, and more specifically the United States, had once again been called in to resolve a European conflict.[17] Having failed to play the lead role, or even a meaningful part in resolving the Kosovo conflict, the EU decided once more that further centralization of power was the answer. It is significant that after every foreign policy failure the EU's analysis led to the conclusion that ever more concentration of power and more institution-building in Brussels could remedy the problem. The EU's failures in Kosovo, combined with the impetus for European military integration after the St. Malo summit between British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in 1998, gave EU planners a green light to propose ever bolder initiatives to supra-nationalize European foreign policy.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997 and implemented in 1999, created the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy—effectively an EU Foreign Minister. Amsterdam also reformed decision making for the CFSP, introducing the concept of "constructive abstention," and extended qualified majority voting to some areas of foreign policy.[18]
The ensuing Treaty of Nice, signed in 2001 and implemented in 2003, provided for the development of autonomous EU military arrangements, including the creation of permanent political and military structures and commitment to an EU-level rapid reaction force. Nice established defense policy as a formal EU competence for the first time and spearheaded the development of the EU's military policy.[19] Through the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice, foreign policy was centralized in Brussels step by step.
Components of Failure
The creation of new institutional mechanisms and the centralization of foreign-policy making in Brussels have not created a stronger Europe capable of handling global, or even European, security. Instead, the CFSP has resulted in inaction, or been subject to domination by France and Germany. It has also frequently been used as a platform from which to confront America and frustrate U.S. policy, particularly the war on terrorism. In fact, three characteristics can be drawn from looking at the performance of the CFSP to date.
1. Inaction. Many Europeans have argued that the members of the European Union can exert greater influence in the world if they act together rather than separately; and that following the decline of Europe's major powers, individual states' power can collectively create a more powerful and credible European voice on the world stage. Elements of this philosophy are also to be found in the Obama Administration's theory that when acting within a multilateral alliance, the legitimacy and effectiveness of a specific action is enhanced. During the presidential election campaign, Barack Obama called for America and Europe to embrace new forms of multilateralism for the 21st century, to jointly confront "dangerous currents," such as climate change, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.[20]
Sovereignty, however, cannot be traded for influence. The ability to project power, whether regionally or globally, depends on several factors, including leadership, credibility, military capability, popular support, and dependable allies. The EU lacks all of these qualities and in assembling its constituent parts, it, therefore, tends to adopt the position of its slowest actors. Or, as The Times opined in 1996 as the EU stood impotent before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, "It looks impressive but the increase in size has been bought by losing punch."[21]
In order for 27 member states to agree on a united foreign policy, almost all the meat will have to be taken off the bones of that policy in order to build a consensus. However, that consensus, no matter how weak, may then restrict member states from taking stronger actions outside its parameters. As EU academic analyst Professor Simon Hix explains:
The reforms contained in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties may have reduced the institutional constraints on the capacity for common action, but the rival historical and political interests of the member states prevent the definition of a common European security identity, and undermine any possibility of acting upon this identity in a united front.[22]
The EU's policy on Zimbabwe illustrates the fallacy of this approach. In 2003, the EU failed to renew travel sanctions against brutal dictator Robert Mugabe after French President Jacques Chirac invited him to attend a Franco–African summit in Paris.[23] Despite indisputable proof of Mugabe's systematic violation of human rights and political freedoms, he was once again given the red-carpet treatment in 2007 when Portugal officially broke with an EU travel ban (with Brussels' political blessing) to allow Mugabe and his senior aides to travel to Lisbon for an EU–Africa Summit.[24] Despite British protestations and a boycott by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Mugabe attended the Summit, and Britain sent a low-level government representative in order to conform to the EU's consensus decision that Mugabe should be welcomed by the EU.[25]
Considering Mugabe's tyrannical and oppressive leadership, with routine politically motivated violence and economic collapse, a united policy sanctioning the dictator's travel would seem an obvious one. Yet the EU was incapable of forming any substantial policy, while simultaneously preventing other members from meaningful dissention.
2. Franco–German Dominance. While the EU rarely manages to speak with one voice in any meaningful way, there have been certain instances where the EU has taken the lead role on an international issue. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 is one such instance where French President Nicolas Sarkozy, as the EU's biggest political figure and then-president of the European Council, assumed the role of world spokesman.
Unfortunately, Sarkozy's handling of the crisis was a disaster and represented a barely concealed Franco–German agenda to restore EU–Russian relations as quickly as possible. From the very outset of the crisis, Sarkozy focused exclusively on achieving a six-point ceasefire—a ceasefire that was thrust upon Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and which Moscow had no intention of observing. With no enforcement mechanisms, Sarkozy failed to compel Russia to fulfill the conditions of the ceasefire and also failed to prevent Russia's subsequent de facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Further, despite German Chancellor Angela Merkel's trip to Tbilisi during the height of the conflict where she publicly affirmed Germany's support for Georgia's membership in NATO, she soon reversed position to veto it during NATO's Foreign Ministerial summit in Brussels in December 2008.[26]
Despite the failure of his ceasefire and Russia's redrawing of Europe's borders by force, Sarkozy went on to engineer a return to "business as usual" between Russia and the EU. This was done without any formal negotiation with the Secretary General of NATO, who had suspended all high-level diplomatic contact with Russia in support of the EU-led ceasefire negotiations. In a bid to protect Europe's relationship with Moscow, especially Russian–German energy projects and a deal for Russian helicopters for the EU's mission to Chad, Sarkozy sidelined NATO and used the European Union as a cosmetic cover for Franco–German interests.[27]
3. Limiting American Power. Successive American Administrations have argued that a stronger Europe means greater help for realizing American goals of international peace and stability. President George W. Bush spent much of his second term trying to repair ties in Europe, hoping to engage Europe in supporting a transatlantic agenda on issues such as free trade, energy security, and stabilizing Afghanistan. But the EU chose to obstruct American policies instead of engaging on areas of mutual concern. In areas such as the rendition of terrorists, visa waiver policy, and data sharing, the European Union purposefully obstructed American policy.[28]
Some European leaders also describe the EU as a check on American global power. Former French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin described America as an "unchecked hyper-power."[29] Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt talked about EU integration in terms of its "emancipation" from the United States.[30] Current Spanish Prime Minister José Zapatero openly talked about deconstructing American global influence within two decades.[31]
A report published by the U.K. House of Lords in July 2003 found that the EU tended to oppose U.S. policy "simply to make its voice heard."[32] This explains why, standing next to Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in November 2008, EU president Sarkozy called for a temporary moratorium on the planned U.S. missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic.[33] Speaking to the European Parliament immediately before the NATO Summit in December, French defense minister Hervé Morin also questioned the need for the "third site."[34] The French position was especially important since Paris was holding the EU presidency at that time, speaking with the added authority of that office.
This position contrasts sharply with two NATO endorsements of the planned deployment, including the alliance's foreign ministerial endorsement that came immediately after Mr. Morin's comments before the European Parliament.[35] Although France officially backed both NATO communiqués, its position within the EU was the polar opposite, demonstrating a frustrating inconsistency. It should give the U.S. Administration pause in supporting further EU foreign policy integration when it cannot expect to hear the same message from NATO as it does from the European Union.
France and Missile Defense: Taking One Position for NATO, a Different Position Elsewhere
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets.
—NATO Heads of State Final Declaration, April 3, 2008
…[P]lease let's not have any more talk of deployment of missiles or deployment of antimissile systems. Deployment of a missile defense system would bring nothing to security in Europe.
—President Sarkozy at EU–Russia Summit in France, November 15, 2008
Who would hold the key to their [European-based United States missile defense assets] use? What threat would they tackle? There are risks, yes, but to say that there is a threat today would need to be checked.
—French Defense Minister, Hervé Morin, December 1, 2008
Ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory, and populations. Missile defence forms part of a broader response to counter this threat. We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets. As tasked at the Bucharest Summit, we are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts… As all options include the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets, we note as a relevant development the signature of agreements by the Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland with the United States regarding those assets.
—NATO Foreign Ministers' Final Communiqué, December 3, 2008
War and Peace
The divisions among the powers of Europe over the war in Iraq in 2003 revealed the problem of imposing a single foreign policy on all EU member states. Faced with its members and acceding countries supporting one of two diametrically opposed positions, the EU descended into chaos trying to fashion a single policy out of pure contradiction.[36] Europe's countries were broadly split down the middle. France heightened tensions in Europe by telling largely pro-war accession countries that they had "missed a good opportunity to keep quiet."[37] France also sought to deny Turkey planning assistance within the NATO alliance, owing to Paris's vehement opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq.[38]
The Atlanticists responded with a letter of support to the U.S. Administration, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote to all EU capitals urging them to consider military action as a viable last resort.[39] Less than a week before the invasion, the leaders of the United States, the U.K., and Spain met in the Azores to build international momentum for action on Iraq in a summit that was quickly interpreted as a confrontation with the Franco–German led anti-war axis.
The president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, commented that "Whatever the outcome of the war, there can be no denying that this is a bad time for the common foreign and security policy for the European Union as a whole."[40] EU divisions over Operation Iraqi Freedom illustrate the fallacy of assuming the nations of Europe have a single foreign policy voice. Washington diplomatically engaged its European allies on a systematic bilateral basis, and, where necessary, on an ad hoc multilateral basis. The juggernaut of European integration, however, seeks to remove that option, making Brussels the only port of call for American foreign policy planners. It is inevitable that this will be to the detriment of American foreign policy. As Henry Kissinger has noted:
When the United States deals with the nations of Europe individually, it has the possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its view heard well before a decision is taken. In dealing with the European Union, by contrast, the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level.... Growing estrangement between America and Europe is thus being institutionally fostered.[41]
The Lisbon Treaty
Following the deep European divisions over whether to support or oppose the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the EU more determinedly wrestled with the question of how to fashion a supranational foreign policy, determined that such division should not happen again. Former Member of the European Parliament and current leader of Britain's Liberal Democratic Party, Nick Clegg, stated in 2003 at the height of EU tensions over Iraq:
The relish with which the anti-European British press has rushed to proclaim the last rites over the EU's fledgling common foreign and security policy is premature. The EU has a habit of rebounding strongly from internal crisis and strife.[42]
In 2004, EU leaders signed the European Constitution, which would have codified the supreme legal basis of the 25 member states at the time, marking a monumental departure from the previous, treaty-based approach to European integration.[43] The constitution was an audacious document, which proposed to significantly extend the EU's competency in foreign-policy making and introduce permanent high-ranking political positions, such as an EU president and a single EU foreign minister. It was subsequently rejected in referenda by the voters of France and Holland. The EU pressed on regardless of this stark popular opposition and "renegotiated" a virtually identical document, the Lisbon Treaty.[44]
The Lisbon Treaty is currently pending ratification by all EU member states, having already been rejected once by voters in Ireland. The Irish government has committed to holding a second referendum on the treaty later this year, since Lisbon cannot proceed without the ratification of all member states. Just like the European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty contains the building blocks of a United States of Europe and will shift power from the member states of the EU to Brussels in several areas of policymaking, including defense, national security, and foreign policy.[45] The treaty is a blueprint for restricting the sovereign right of EU member states to determine their own foreign policies; above all, the treaty underscores the EU's long-held ambitions to become a global power.
As with the EU Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty will create a permanent EU president, and extend the roles of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the EU's powerful diplomatic corps. With a single legal personality, Brussels would sign international agreements on behalf of all member states. Critically, unanimous voting has been removed in several key areas and majority voting introduced for 12 different areas of foreign policy, including the election of the EU foreign minister and proposals emanating from the foreign minister.[46]
The treaty will restrict the ability of member states to operate on the international stage on an independent basis. Should the EU decide on a common foreign policy position, the EU will automatically speak for the U.K. and France in the United Nations Security Council.[47] This should be particularly worrisome to the United States since the U.K. and U.S. have proved to be valuable partners in this body in the past. The treaty further asserts the value and importance of the European Union over members' sovereign rights and national interests. It states:
Before undertaking any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment which could affect the Union's interests, each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member States shall show mutual solidarity.[48]
A Threat to the Anglo–American-Led Operation in Afghanistan
The Lisbon Treaty represents a major threat to the NATO alliance. Rather than creating additional military resources, Lisbon will lead to the replication of NATO and duplicate many of its functions. The long-term goal of creating a European army and duplicating NATO's Article V commitment—that an attack against one member constitutes an attack against all members—illustrates these dangers.
In 2000, the EU announced proposals for an army of 100,000 (60,000 of whom could be deployed at 60 days' notice for up to a year at a time). Britain's Conservative Party commented at the time that this would effectively destroy NATO.[49] The British government rejected this criticism, claiming that the EU was not taking on collective defense, which was purely NATO's responsibility.[50] The Treaty of Lisbon however, proposes an EU mutual defense clause:
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.[51]
In addition to duplicating NATO's Article V, the EU remains intent on creating its own military. In the absence of additional defense spending, these resources will have to come at NATO's expense. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU would have "Permanent Structured Cooperation"—an inner group of EU nations (currently proposed to consist of France, the U.K., Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland) pooling military resources and manpower to form an army of 60,000 to undertake EU missions.[52] The reality is that frontline British troops would have to be mandated for EU availability at NATO's expense, probably from Afghanistan. As Open Europe, a British policy institute, warns:
In simple terms, the UK would have to earmark 10,000 frontline troops for service on EU missions. For the EU force to be viable UK troops would need to be constantly available for EU operations. The fact that the UK is one of the few EU countries to have modern combat forces is likely to mean that the UK would have to keep its 10,000 in the UK/EU. Given the UK's current military overstretch, the plans would almost certainly divert vital resources away from the British mission in Afghanistan.[53]
A cross-party group of former senior British ministers commented in 2000 that the creation of an EU army was "an openly political project,"[54] a point confirmed by then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: "This is part of the European integration process."[55] Now, as then, no additional troops are available for this paper army. Either troops already committed to NATO will be counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops will be withdrawn from existing NATO missions.
In 2000, Lady Thatcher described the creation of an EU army as "a piece of monumental folly that puts our security at risk in order to satisfy political vanity."[56] Rather than representing a genuine attempt to increase Europe's military contribution to vital missions, such as Afghanistan, the EU is merely seeking to advance its own political ambitions.
This is of particular importance to the United Kingdom, whose relationship with the United States has been underpinned by shared military commitments over the years. President Barack Obama has already stated that the war in Afghanistan is America's top foreign policy priority; a deterioration of Britain's commitment to Afghanistan at this time would be unacceptable to the United States. [57]
Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton argues that the Lisbon Treaty poses a threat to both the Anglo–American Special Relationship and to NATO.[58] By reducing the ability of member states to set their own foreign policies and work with America outside of the EU's purview, the Treaty of Lisbon represents a profound threat to the Obama Administration's pledge to renew positive relations with European countries.[59]
What the Administration and Congress Should Do
The transatlantic relationship is vital to European and international security. European countries and the United States must nurture their relationships in order to achieve and maintain global peace and security. Specifically:
- The Obama Administration must make clear that building enduring bilateral alliances is a top U.S. foreign policy priority. The Administration should engage with the European Union on issues such as trade and international commerce. On issues of high foreign policy importance, especially defense and counterterrorism, the Administration must invest its diplomatic efforts in European capitals.
- Congress should hold hearings to analyze the implications of the Lisbon Treaty for the transatlantic alliance. The full range of policies advanced in the Lisbon Treaty must be analyzed, particularly the implications for foreign-policy making and alliance-building. The results of these hearings must be considered by the Administration before any tacit or public endorsement of the treaty.
- The Administration must challenge NATO's European members to support reform and revitalization within the alliance. The Administration should reaffirm NATO as the cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance, and invite European members to strongly back key reform measures, including the formulation of a new threat assessment and a pro-enlargement agenda.
- The Administration should take the lead in promoting missile defense in Europe. The Administration should support deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Central and Eastern Europe and dispatch high-level members to Warsaw and Prague to reaffirm the Administration's support for the "third site" installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. It should call on the NATO alliance to build on the U.S. system with complementary missile defenses.
- The Administration and Congress should withdraw support for a European army and a separate EU defense identity. French-led plans to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy through the European Security and Defense Policy and the development of European military arrangements, separate from NATO, were significantly advanced under the French EU presidency. The United States must stress the primacy of NATO in Europe's security architecture—and the unacceptability of duplicating NATO or placing additional stress on its considerably overstretched resources.
Conclusion
Foreign policy is an attribute of statehood that must remain at the nation-state level if it is to be meaningful or effective. If the United States wishes to continue enjoying the benefits of its long-standing relationships with the countries of Europe, it must oppose the creation of a supranational EU foreign policy and the duplication of NATO resources by the European Union. U.S. support for a single European foreign and military policy has been misplaced. While successive U.S. Administrations have believed their desire for Europe to undertake a greater share of the global security burden to be achievable through further European integration, evidence suggests the exact opposite to be the case.
The U.S. government should instead pursue a policy under which its bilateral engagements with European nations are prioritized, and engagement with the EU is based purely on where Brussels can add value to a specific policy area. The United States and Europe should engage on critical foreign policy issues, such as military planning and counterterrorism, both bilaterally and through NATO. The usurpation of power by Brussels jeopardizes these types of engagements—and ultimately threatens the security of the United States.
Sally McNamara is Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author is grateful to Morgan L. Roach, Research Assistant in the Thatcher Center, and Parker Broaddus, Thatcher Center intern, for their assistance in preparing this paper.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
