America's Pacific Century. By Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton
November Issue of Foreign Policy Magazine
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/10/175216.htm
The
future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq,
and the United States will be right at the center of the action.
October 11, 2011
As the war in Iraq winds down and America begins to withdraw its
forces from Afghanistan, the United States stands at a pivot point. Over
the last 10 years, we have allocated immense resources to those two
theaters. In the next 10 years, we need to be smart and systematic about
where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best
position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance
our values. One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over
the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased
investment -- diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise -- in the
Asia-Pacific region.
The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching
from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the
region spans two oceans -- the Pacific and the Indian -- that are
increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the
world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global
economy, as well as the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. It is home
to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China,
India, and Indonesia.
At a time when the region is building a more mature security and
economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, U.S.
commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and
pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century,
just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and
lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has
paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come
for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a
strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his
administration and one that is already yielding benefits.
With Iraq and Afghanistan still in transition and serious economic
challenges in our own country, there are those on the American political
scene who are calling for us not to reposition, but to come home. They
seek a downsizing of our foreign engagement in favor of our pressing
domestic priorities. These impulses are understandable, but they are
misguided. Those who say that we can no longer afford to engage with the
world have it exactly backward -- we cannot afford not to. From opening
new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to
keeping the sea lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad
holds the key to our prosperity and security at home. For more than six
decades, the United States has resisted the gravitational pull of these
"come home" debates and the implicit zero-sum logic of these arguments.
We must do so again.
Beyond our borders, people are also wondering about America's intentions
-- our willingness to remain engaged and to lead. In Asia, they ask
whether we are really there to stay, whether we are likely to be
distracted again by events elsewhere, whether we can make -- and keep --
credible economic and strategic commitments, and whether we can back
those commitments with action. The answer is: We can, and we will.
Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic
and strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama. Open
markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented
opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge
technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the
ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer
base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the
Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through
defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the
proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the
military activities of the region's key players.
Just as Asia is critical to America's future, an engaged America is
vital to Asia's future. The region is eager for our leadership and our
business -- perhaps more so than at any time in modern history. We are
the only power with a network of strong alliances in the region, no
territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common
good. Along with our allies, we have underwritten regional security for
decades -- patrolling Asia's sea lanes and preserving stability -- and
that in turn has helped create the conditions for growth. We have helped
integrate billions of people across the region into the global economy
by spurring economic productivity, social empowerment, and greater
people-to-people links. We are a major trade and investment partner, a
source of innovation that benefits workers and businesses on both sides
of the Pacific, a host to 350,000 Asian students every year, a champion
of open markets, and an advocate for universal human rights.
President Obama has led a multifaceted and persistent effort to embrace
fully our irreplaceable role in the Pacific, spanning the entire U.S.
government. It has often been a quiet effort. A lot of our work has not
been on the front pages, both because of its nature -- long-term
investment is less exciting than immediate crises -- and because of
competing headlines in other parts of the world.
As secretary of state, I broke with tradition and embarked on my first
official overseas trip to Asia. In my seven trips since, I have had the
privilege to see firsthand the rapid transformations taking place in the
region, underscoring how much the future of the United States is
intimately intertwined with the future of the Asia-Pacific. A strategic
turn to the region fits logically into our overall global effort to
secure and sustain America's global leadership. The success of this turn
requires maintaining and advancing a bipartisan consensus on the
importance of the Asia-Pacific to our national interests; we seek to
build upon a strong tradition of engagement by presidents and
secretaries of state of both parties across many decades. It also
requires smart execution of a coherent regional strategy that accounts
for the global implications of our choices.
WHAT DOES THAT regional strategy look like? For starters, it calls for a
sustained commitment to what I have called "forward-deployed"
diplomacy. That means continuing to dispatch the full range of our
diplomatic assets -- including our highest-ranking officials, our
development experts, our interagency teams, and our permanent assets --
to every country and corner of the Asia-Pacific region. Our strategy
will have to keep accounting for and adapting to the rapid and dramatic
shifts playing out across Asia. With this in mind, our work will proceed
along six key lines of action: strengthening bilateral security
alliances; deepening our working relationships with emerging powers,
including with China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions;
expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence;
and advancing democracy and human rights.
By virtue of our unique geography, the United States is both an Atlantic
and a Pacific power. We are proud of our European partnerships and all
that they deliver. Our challenge now is to build a web of partnerships
and institutions across the Pacific that is as durable and as consistent
with American interests and values as the web we have built across the
Atlantic. That is the touchstone of our efforts in all these areas.
Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the
Philippines, and Thailand are the fulcrum for our strategic turn to the
Asia-Pacific. They have underwritten regional peace and security for
more than half a century, shaping the environment for the region's
remarkable economic ascent. They leverage our regional presence and
enhance our regional leadership at a time of evolving security
challenges.
As successful as these alliances have been, we can't afford simply to
sustain them -- we need to update them for a changing world. In this
effort, the Obama administration is guided by three core principles.
First, we have to maintain political consensus on the core objectives of
our alliances. Second, we have to ensure that our alliances are nimble
and adaptive so that they can successfully address new challenges and
seize new opportunities. Third, we have to guarantee that the defense
capabilities and communications infrastructure of our alliances are
operationally and materially capable of deterring provocation from the
full spectrum of state and nonstate actors.
The alliance with Japan, the cornerstone of peace and stability in the
region, demonstrates how the Obama administration is giving these
principles life. We share a common vision of a stable regional order
with clear rules of the road -- from freedom of navigation to open
markets and fair competition. We have agreed to a new arrangement,
including a contribution from the Japanese government of more than $5
billion, to ensure the continued enduring presence of American forces in
Japan, while expanding joint intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance activities to deter and react quickly to regional
security challenges, as well as information sharing to address
cyberthreats. We have concluded an Open Skies agreement that will
enhance access for businesses and people-to-people ties, launched a
strategic dialogue on the Asia-Pacific, and been working hand in hand as
the two largest donor countries in Afghanistan.
Similarly, our alliance with South Korea has become stronger and more
operationally integrated, and we continue to develop our combined
capabilities to deter and respond to North Korean provocations. We have
agreed on a plan to ensure successful transition of operational control
during wartime and anticipate successful passage of the Korea-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement. And our alliance has gone global, through our work
together in the G-20 and the Nuclear Security Summit and through our
common efforts in Haiti and Afghanistan.
We are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific
partnership to an Indo-Pacific one, and indeed a global partnership.
From cybersecurity to Afghanistan to the Arab Awakening to strengthening
regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific, Australia's counsel and
commitment have been indispensable. And in Southeast Asia, we are
renewing and strengthening our alliances with the Philippines and
Thailand, increasing, for example, the number of ship visits to the
Philippines and working to ensure the successful training of Filipino
counterterrorism forces through our Joint Special Operations Task Force
in Mindanao. In Thailand -- our oldest treaty partner in Asia -- we are
working to establish a hub of regional humanitarian and disaster relief
efforts in the region.
AS WE UPDATE our alliances for new demands, we are also building new
partnerships to help solve shared problems. Our outreach to China,
India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam,
Brunei, and the Pacific Island countries is all part of a broader effort
to ensure a more comprehensive approach to American strategy and
engagement in the region. We are asking these emerging partners to join
us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global
order.
One of the most prominent of these emerging partners is, of course,
China. Like so many other countries before it, China has prospered as
part of the open and rules-based system that the United States helped to
build and works to sustain. And today, China represents one of the most
challenging and consequential bilateral relationships the United States
has ever had to manage. This calls for careful, steady, dynamic
stewardship, an approach to China on our part that is grounded in
reality, focused on results, and true to our principles and interests.
We all know that fears and misperceptions linger on both sides of the
Pacific. Some in our country see China's progress as a threat to the
United States; some in China worry that America seeks to constrain
China's growth. We reject both those views. The fact is that a thriving
America is good for China and a thriving China is good for America. We
both have much more to gain from cooperation than from conflict. But you
cannot build a relationship on aspirations alone. It is up to both of
us to more consistently translate positive words into effective
cooperation -- and, crucially, to meet our respective global
responsibilities and obligations. These are the things that will
determine whether our relationship delivers on its potential in the
years to come. We also have to be honest about our differences. We will
address them firmly and decisively as we pursue the urgent work we have
to do together. And we have to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Over the last two-and-a-half years, one of my top priorities has been to
identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to
build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global
problem-solving. This is why Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and I
launched the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the most intensive and
expansive talks ever between our governments, bringing together dozens
of agencies from both sides to discuss our most pressing bilateral
issues, from security to energy to human rights.
We are also working to increase transparency and reduce the risk of
miscalculation or miscues between our militaries. The United States and
the international community have watched China's efforts to modernize
and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its
intentions. Both sides would benefit from sustained and substantive
military-to-military engagement that increases transparency. So we look
to Beijing to overcome its reluctance at times and join us in forging a
durable military-to-military dialogue. And we need to work together to
strengthen the Strategic Security Dialogue, which brings together
military and civilian leaders to discuss sensitive issues like maritime
security and cybersecurity.
As we build trust together, we are committed to working with China to
address critical regional and global security issues. This is why I have
met so frequently -- often in informal settings -- with my Chinese
counterparts, State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Foreign Minister Yang
Jiechi, for candid discussions about important challenges like North
Korea, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and developments in the South China
Sea.
On the economic front, the United States and China need to work together
to ensure strong, sustained, and balanced future global growth. In the
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the United States and China
worked effectively through the G-20 to help pull the global economy back
from the brink. We have to build on that cooperation. U.S. firms want
fair opportunities to export to China's growing markets, which can be
important sources of jobs here in the United States, as well as
assurances that the $50 billion of American capital invested in China
will create a strong foundation for new market and investment
opportunities that will support global competitiveness. At the same
time, Chinese firms want to be able to buy more high-tech products from
the United States, make more investments here, and be accorded the same
terms of access that market economies enjoy. We can work together on
these objectives, but China still needs to take important steps toward
reform. In particular, we are working with China to end unfair
discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their
innovative technologies, remove preferences for domestic firms, and end
measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual
property. And we look to China to take steps to allow its currency to
appreciate more rapidly, both against the dollar and against the
currencies of its other major trading partners. Such reforms, we
believe, would not only benefit both our countries (indeed, they would
support the goals of China's own five-year plan, which calls for more
domestic-led growth), but also contribute to global economic balance,
predictability, and broader prosperity.
Of course, we have made very clear, publicly and privately, our serious
concerns about human rights. And when we see reports of public-interest
lawyers, writers, artists, and others who are detained or disappeared,
the United States speaks up, both publicly and privately, with our
concerns about human rights. We make the case to our Chinese colleagues
that a deep respect for international law and a more open political
system would provide China with a foundation for far greater stability
and growth -- and increase the confidence of China's partners. Without
them, China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development.
At the end of the day, there is no handbook for the evolving U.S.-China
relationship. But the stakes are much too high for us to fail. As we
proceed, we will continue to embed our relationship with China in a
broader regional framework of security alliances, economic networks, and
social connections.
Among key emerging powers with which we will work closely are India and
Indonesia, two of the most dynamic and significant democratic powers of
Asia, and both countries with which the Obama administration has pursued
broader, deeper, and more purposeful relationships. The stretch of sea
from the Indian Ocean through the Strait of Malacca to the Pacific
contains the world's most vibrant trade and energy routes. Together,
India and Indonesia already account for almost a quarter of the world's
population. They are key drivers of the global economy, important
partners for the United States, and increasingly central contributors to
peace and security in the region. And their importance is likely to
grow in the years ahead.
President Obama told the Indian parliament last year that the
relationship between India and America will be one of the defining
partnerships of the 21st century, rooted in common values and interests.
There are still obstacles to overcome and questions to answer on both
sides, but the United States is making a strategic bet on India's future
-- that India's greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and
security, that opening India's markets to the world will pave the way to
greater regional and global prosperity, that Indian advances in science
and technology will improve lives and advance human knowledge
everywhere, and that India's vibrant, pluralistic democracy will produce
measurable results and improvements for its citizens and inspire others
to follow a similar path of openness and tolerance. So the Obama
administration has expanded our bilateral partnership; actively
supported India's Look East efforts, including through a new trilateral
dialogue with India and Japan; and outlined a new vision for a more
economically integrated and politically stable South and Central Asia,
with India as a linchpin.
We are also forging a new partnership with Indonesia, the world's
third-largest democracy, the world's most populous Muslim nation, and a
member of the G-20. We have resumed joint training of Indonesian special
forces units and signed a number of agreements on health, educational
exchanges, science and technology, and defense. And this year, at the
invitation of the Indonesian government, President Obama will inaugurate
American participation in the East Asia Summit. But there is still some
distance to travel -- we have to work together to overcome bureaucratic
impediments, lingering historical suspicions, and some gaps in
understanding each other's perspectives and interests.
EVEN AS WE strengthen these bilateral relationships, we have emphasized
the importance of multilateral cooperation, for we believe that
addressing complex transnational challenges of the sort now faced by
Asia requires a set of institutions capable of mustering collective
action. And a more robust and coherent regional architecture in Asia
would reinforce the system of rules and responsibilities, from
protecting intellectual property to ensuring freedom of navigation, that
form the basis of an effective international order. In multilateral
settings, responsible behavior is rewarded with legitimacy and respect,
and we can work together to hold accountable those who undermine peace,
stability, and prosperity.
So the United States has moved to fully engage the region's multilateral
institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, mindful
that our work with regional institutions supplements and does not
supplant our bilateral ties. There is a demand from the region that
America play an active role in the agenda-setting of these institutions
-- and it is in our interests as well that they be effective and
responsive.
That is why President Obama will participate in the East Asia Summit for
the first time in November. To pave the way, the United States has
opened a new U.S. Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and signed the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN. Our focus on developing a more
results-oriented agenda has been instrumental in efforts to address
disputes in the South China Sea. In 2010, at the ASEAN Regional Forum in
Hanoi, the United States helped shape a regionwide effort to protect
unfettered access to and passage through the South China Sea, and to
uphold the key international rules for defining territorial claims in
the South China Sea's waters. Given that half the world's merchant
tonnage flows through this body of water, this was a consequential
undertaking. And over the past year, we have made strides in protecting
our vital interests in stability and freedom of navigation and have
paved the way for sustained multilateral diplomacy among the many
parties with claims in the South China Sea, seeking to ensure disputes
are settled peacefully and in accordance with established principles of
international law.
We have also worked to strengthen APEC as a serious leaders-level
institution focused on advancing economic integration and trade linkages
across the Pacific. After last year's bold call by the group for a free
trade area of the Asia-Pacific, President Obama will host the 2011 APEC
Leaders' Meeting in Hawaii this November. We are committed to cementing
APEC as the Asia-Pacific's premier regional economic institution,
setting the economic agenda in a way that brings together advanced and
emerging economies to promote open trade and investment, as well as to
build capacity and enhance regulatory regimes. APEC and its work help
expand U.S. exports and create and support high-quality jobs in the
United States, while fostering growth throughout the region. APEC also
provides a key vehicle to drive a broad agenda to unlock the economic
growth potential that women represent. In this regard, the United States
is committed to working with our partners on ambitious steps to
accelerate the arrival of the Participation Age, where every individual,
regardless of gender or other characteristics, is a contributing and
valued member of the global marketplace.
In addition to our commitment to these broader multilateral
institutions, we have worked hard to create and launch a number of
"minilateral" meetings, small groupings of interested states to tackle
specific challenges, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative we launched to
support education, health, and environmental programs in Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, and Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands Forum, where we are
working to support its members as they confront challenges from climate
change to overfishing to freedom of navigation. We are also starting to
pursue new trilateral opportunities with countries as diverse as
Mongolia, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and South Korea. And we are
setting our sights as well on enhancing coordination and engagement
among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United
States.
In all these different ways, we are seeking to shape and participate in a
responsive, flexible, and effective regional architecture -- and ensure
it connects to a broader global architecture that not only protects
international stability and commerce but also advances our values.
OUR EMPHASIS ON the economic work of APEC is in keeping with our broader
commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American
foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong
diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic
ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a
greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. The
region already generates more than half of global output and nearly half
of global trade. As we strive to meet President Obama's goal of
doubling exports by 2015, we are looking for opportunities to do even
more business in Asia. Last year, American exports to the Pacific Rim
totaled $320 billion, supporting 850,000 American jobs. So there is much
that favors us as we think through this repositioning.
When I talk to my Asian counterparts, one theme consistently stands out:
They still want America to be an engaged and creative partner in the
region's flourishing trade and financial interactions. And as I talk
with business leaders across our own nation, I hear how important it is
for the United States to expand our exports and our investment
opportunities in Asia's dynamic markets.
Last March in APEC meetings in Washington, and again in Hong Kong in
July, I laid out four attributes that I believe characterize healthy
economic competition: open, free, transparent, and fair. Through our
engagement in the Asia-Pacific, we are helping to give shape to these
principles and showing the world their value.
We are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards
for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of
U.S. consumer and industrial exports within five years and support an
estimated 70,000 American jobs. Its tariff reductions alone could
increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help
South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. It will level the playing field
for U.S. auto companies and workers. So, whether you are an American
manufacturer of machinery or a South Korean chemicals exporter, this
deal lowers the barriers that keep you from reaching new customers.
We are also making progress on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which will bring together economies from across the Pacific -- developed
and developing alike -- into a single trading community. Our goal is to
create not just more growth, but better growth. We believe trade
agreements need to include strong protections for workers, the
environment, intellectual property, and innovation. They should also
promote the free flow of information technology and the spread of green
technology, as well as the coherence of our regulatory system and the
efficiency of supply chains. Ultimately, our progress will be measured
by the quality of people's lives -- whether men and women can work in
dignity, earn a decent wage, raise healthy families, educate their
children, and take hold of the opportunities to improve their own and
the next generation's fortunes. Our hope is that a TPP agreement with
high standards can serve as a benchmark for future agreements -- and
grow to serve as a platform for broader regional interaction and
eventually a free trade area of the Asia-Pacific.
Achieving balance in our trade relationships requires a two-way
commitment. That's the nature of balance -- it can't be unilaterally
imposed. So we are working through APEC, the G-20, and our bilateral
relationships to advocate for more open markets, fewer restrictions on
exports, more transparency, and an overall commitment to fairness.
American businesses and workers need to have confidence that they are
operating on a level playing field, with predictable rules on everything
from intellectual property to indigenous innovation.
ASIA'S REMARKABLE ECONOMIC growth over the past decade and its potential
for continued growth in the future depend on the security and stability
that has long been guaranteed by the U.S. military, including more than
50,000 American servicemen and servicewomen serving in Japan and South
Korea. The challenges of today's rapidly changing region -- from
territorial and maritime disputes to new threats to freedom of
navigation to the heightened impact of natural disasters -- require that
the United States pursue a more geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture.
We are modernizing our basing arrangements with traditional allies in
Northeast Asia -- and our commitment on this is rock solid -- while
enhancing our presence in Southeast Asia and into the Indian Ocean. For
example, the United States will be deploying littoral combat ships to
Singapore, and we are examining other ways to increase opportunities for
our two militaries to train and operate together. And the United States
and Australia agreed this year to explore a greater American military
presence in Australia to enhance opportunities for more joint training
and exercises. We are also looking at how we can increase our
operational access in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region and
deepen our contacts with allies and partners.
How we translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific
oceans into an operational concept is a question that we need to answer
if we are to adapt to new challenges in the region. Against this
backdrop, a more broadly distributed military presence across the region
will provide vital advantages. The United States will be better
positioned to support humanitarian missions; equally important, working
with more allies and partners will provide a more robust bulwark against
threats or efforts to undermine regional peace and stability.
But even more than our military might or the size of our economy, our
most potent asset as a nation is the power of our values -- in
particular, our steadfast support for democracy and human rights. This
speaks to our deepest national character and is at the heart of our
foreign policy, including our strategic turn to the Asia-Pacific region.
As we deepen our engagement with partners with whom we disagree on these
issues, we will continue to urge them to embrace reforms that would
improve governance, protect human rights, and advance political
freedoms. We have made it clear, for example, to Vietnam that our
ambition to develop a strategic partnership requires that it take steps
to further protect human rights and advance political freedoms. Or
consider Burma, where we are determined to seek accountability for human
rights violations. We are closely following developments in Nay Pyi Taw
and the increasing interactions between Aung San Suu Kyi and the
government leadership. We have underscored to the government that it
must release political prisoners, advance political freedoms and human
rights, and break from the policies of the past. As for North Korea, the
regime in Pyongyang has shown persistent disregard for the rights of
its people, and we continue to speak out forcefully against the threats
it poses to the region and beyond.
We cannot and do not aspire to impose our system on other countries, but
we do believe that certain values are universal -- that people in every
nation in the world, including in Asia, cherish them -- and that they
are intrinsic to stable, peaceful, and prosperous countries. Ultimately,
it is up to the people of Asia to pursue their own rights and
aspirations, just as we have seen people do all over the world.
IN THE LAST decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing
with the post-Cold War peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan. As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate
efforts to pivot to new global realities.
We know that these new realities require us to innovate, to compete, and
to lead in new ways. Rather than pull back from the world, we need to
press forward and renew our leadership. In a time of scarce resources,
there's no question that we need to invest them wisely where they will
yield the biggest returns, which is why the Asia-Pacific represents such
a real 21st-century opportunity for us.
Other regions remain vitally important, of course. Europe, home to most
of our traditional allies, is still a partner of first resort, working
alongside the United States on nearly every urgent global challenge, and
we are investing in updating the structures of our alliance. The people
of the Middle East and North Africa are charting a new path that is
already having profound global consequences, and the United States is
committed to active and sustained partnerships as the region transforms.
Africa holds enormous untapped potential for economic and political
development in the years ahead. And our neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere are not just our biggest export partners; they are also
playing a growing role in global political and economic affairs. Each of
these regions demands American engagement and leadership.
And we are prepared to lead. Now, I'm well aware that there are those
who question our staying power around the world. We've heard this talk
before. At the end of the Vietnam War, there was a thriving industry of
global commentators promoting the idea that America was in retreat, and
it is a theme that repeats itself every few decades. But whenever the
United States has experienced setbacks, we've overcome them through
reinvention and innovation. Our capacity to come back stronger is
unmatched in modern history. It flows from our model of free democracy
and free enterprise, a model that remains the most powerful source of
prosperity and progress known to humankind. I hear everywhere I go that
the world still looks to the United States for leadership. Our military
is by far the strongest, and our economy is by far the largest in the
world. Our workers are the most productive. Our universities are
renowned the world over. So there should be no doubt that America has
the capacity to secure and sustain our global leadership in this century
as we did in the last.
As we move forward to set the stage for engagement in the Asia-Pacific
over the next 60 years, we are mindful of the bipartisan legacy that has
shaped our engagement for the past 60. And we are focused on the steps
we have to take at home -- increasing our savings, reforming our
financial systems, relying less on borrowing, overcoming partisan
division -- to secure and sustain our leadership abroad.
This kind of pivot is not easy, but we have paved the way for it over
the past two-and-a-half years, and we are committed to seeing it through
as among the most important diplomatic efforts of our time.
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