Asset Price Bubbles: A Selective Survey. By Anna Scherbina
IMF Working Paper No. 13/45
Feb 21, 2013
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40327.0
Summary: Why do asset price bubbles continue to appear in various markets? This paper provides an overview of recent literature on bubbles, with significant attention given to behavioral models and rational models with frictions. Unlike the standard rational models, the new literature is able to model the common characteristics of historical bubble episodes and offer insights for how bubbles are initiated and sustained, the reasons they burst, and why arbitrage forces do not routinely step in to squash them. The latest U.S. real estate bubble is described in the context of this literature.
Introduction excerpts:
The persistent failure of present-value models to explain asset price levels led academic research to introduce the concept of bubbles as a tool to model price deviations from presentvalue relations. The early literature was dominated by models in which all agents were assumed to be rational and yet a bubble could exist. In many of the more recent papers, the perfect rationality assumption was relaxed, allowing the models to shift the focus to explaining how a bubble may be initiated, under which conditions it would burst, and why arbitrage forces may fail to ensure that prices reflect fundamentals at all times. In light of the recent U.S. real estate bubble, the question of why bubbles are so prevalent is once again a matter of concern of academics and policy makers. This paper surveys the recent literature on asset price bubbles, with significant attention given to behavioral models as well as rational models with incentive problems, market frictions, and non-traditional preferences. For surveys of the earlier literature, see, e.g., Camerer (1989) and Stiglitz (1990).
There are a number of ways to define a bubble. A very straightforward definition is that a bubble is a deviation of the market price from the asset’s fundamental value. Value investors specialize in finding and investing in undervalued assets. In contrast, short sellers, who search the market for overvalued assets in order to sell them short, are routinely vilified by governments, the popular press, and, not surprisingly, by the overvalued firms themselves.1 Trading against an overvaluation involves the additional costs and risks of maintaining a short position, such as the potentially unlimited loss, the risk that the borrowed asset will be called back prematurely, and a commonly charged fee that manifests itself as a low interest rate paid on the margin account; for this reason, a persistent overvaluation is more common than a persistent undervaluation.
A positive or negative mispricing may arise when initial news about a firm’s fundamentals moves the stock price up or down and feedback traders buy or sell additional shares in response to past price movement without regard for current valuation, thus continuing the price trend beyond the value justified by fundamentals.2 However, because of the potentially nontrivial costs of short selling an overvaluation will be less readily eliminated, making positive bubbles more common. The paper will, therefore, focus predominately on positive price bubbles. We can define a positive bubble occurring when an asset’s trading price exceeds the discounted value of expected future cash flows (CF):
[traditional formula],
where r is the appropriate discount rate.3 Since it may be difficult to estimate the required compensation for risk, an alternative definition may be used that replaces the discount rate with the risk-free rate, r sub f:
[same formula with r sub f instead of r].
When the asset’s cash flows are positively correlated with market risk, as is the case for most firms, the required rate of return is strictly greater than the risk-free rate and the discountedcash- flow formula represents an upper limit of the justifiable range of fair values. Likewise, when it is difficult to forecast future cash flows for a particular asset or firm, an upper bound of forecasted cash flows for other firms in the same industry or asset class may be used.
Over the years, the academic study of bubbles has expanded to explore the effects of perverse incentives and of bounded rationality. The new generation of rational models identifies the incentive to herd and the limited liability compensation structure as pervasive problems that encourage professional money managers to invest in bubbles. Another problem contributing to bubbles is that information intermediaries are not paid directly by investors, and their incentives are not always compatible with reporting negative information. And rather than merely trying to answer under what conditions bubbles may exist in asset prices, behavioral models offer new insights for how a bubble may be initiated, under which conditions it would burst, and why arbitrage forces may fail to ensure that prices reflect fundamentals at all times. Moreover, some models offer the explanation for why many bubble episodes are accompanied by high trading volume. The behavioral view of bubbles finds support in experimental studies.
The global financial crisis has highlighted the destructive impact of misaligned incentives in the financial sector. This includes bank managers’ incentives to boost short-term profits and create banks that are “too big to fail”, regulators’ incentives to forebear and withhold information from other regulators in stressful times, credit rating agencies’ incentives to keep issuing high ratings for subprime assets, and so on. Of course, incentives play an important role in many economic activities, not just the financial ones. But nowhere are they as prominent, and nowhere can their impact get as damaging as in the financial sector, due to its leverage, interconnectedness, and systemic importance. A large body of recent literature examines these issues in depth. For example, Caprio, Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2008) show that incentive conflicts explain how securitization went wrong and why credit ratings proved so inaccurate; Barth, Caprio and Levine (2012) highlight incentive failures in regulatory authorities. Incentives were not the only factor – they were accentuated by problems of insufficient information, herd behavior, and so on – but breakdowns in incentives had clearly a central role in the run-up to the crisis.
Despite the broad agreement among economists, the focus of financial sector regulation and supervision has often been on other things, leaving incentives to be addressed indirectly at best. At the global level, substantial efforts have been devoted to issues such as calibrating risk weights to calculate banks’ minimum capital requirements. Numerous outside observers have called for more concerted efforts to address the incentive breakdowns that led to the crisis (e.g., LSE 2010; Squam Lake Working Group 2010; and Beck 2010). At the individual country level, regulatory changes have taken place in recent years, but in-depth analyses show a major scope to better address incentive problems (see ÄŒihák, Demirgüç-Kunt, MartÃnez PerÃa, and Mohseni 2012, based on data from the World Bank’s 2011–12 Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey). The World Bank’s 2013 Global Financial Development Report also called for more vigorous steps to address incentive issues, rather than leaving them as an afterthought.
In a recent paper, joint with Barry Johnston, we propose a pragmatic approach to re-orienting financial regulation to have at its core addressing incentives on an ongoing basis. The paper, which of course represents our views and not necessarily those of the World Bank, proposes “incentive audits” as a tool to help in identifying incentive misalignments in the financial sector. The paper is an extended version of an earlier piece recognized by the International Centre for Financial Regulation and the Financial Times among top essays on “what good regulation should look like“.
The incentive audit approach aims to address systemic risk buildup directly at its source. While traditional, regulation-based approaches focus on building up capital and liquidity buffers in financial institutions, the incentive-based approach seeks to identify and correct distortions and frictions that contribute to the buildup of excessive risk. It goes beyond the symptoms to their source. For example, the buildup of massive risk concentrations before the crisis could be attributed to information gaps that prevented the assessment of exposures and network risks, to incentive failures in the monitoring of the risks due to conflicts of interest and moral hazard, and to regulatory incentives that encouraged risk transfers. Building up buffers can help, but to address systemic risk effectively, it is crucial to tackle the underlying incentives that give rise to it. Focusing on increasingly complex capital and liquidity charges has the danger of creating incentives for circumvention, and can run into limited capacity for implementation and enforcement. In the incentive-based approach, more emphasis is given on methods for identifying incentive failures resulting in systemic risk. The remedies go beyond narrowly defined prudential tools and include also other measures, such as elimination of tax incentives that encourage excessive borrowing.
What would an incentive audit involve? It would entail an analysis of structural and organizational features that affect incentives to conduct and monitor financial transactions. It would comprise a sequenced set of analyses proceeding from higher level questions on market structure, government safety nets and legal and regulatory framework, to progressively more detailed questions aimed at identifying the incentives that motivate and guide financial decisions (Figure 1). This sequenced approach enables drilling down and identifying factors leading to market failures and excessive risk taking.
The incentive audit is a novel concept,
but analysis of incentives has been done. One example is the report of a
parliamentary commission examining the roots of the Icelandic financial
crisis. The report (Special Investigation Commission 2010)
notes the rapid growth of Icelandic banks as a major contributor of the
crisis. It documents the underlying “strong incentives for growth”,
which included the banks’ incentive schemes and the high leverage of
their owners. It maps out the network of conflicting interests of the
key owners, who were also the largest debtors of these banks. Another
example of work that is close to an incentive audit is the analysis by
Calomiris (2011). He examines incentive failures in the U.S. financial
market, and identifies a subset of reforms that are “incentive-robust,”
that is, they improve market incentives, market discipline, and
incentives of regulators and supervisors by making rules and their
enforcement more transparent, increasing credibility and accountability.
These examples illustrate that an incentive audit is doable and useful.
Who would perform incentive audits? Our paper offers some suggestions. The governance of the institution performing the audits is important--its own incentives to act need to be appropriately aligned. Also, to be effective, incentive audits would have to be performed regularly, and their outcomes would have to be used to address incentive issues by adapting regulation, supervision, and other measures. In Iceland, the analysis of incentives was a part of a “post mortem” on the crisis, but it is feasible to do such analysis ex-ante. Indeed, much of the information used in the above mentioned report was available even before the crisis. The Commission had modest resources, illustrating that incentive audits need not be very costly or overly complicated to perform. As the Commission’s report points out, “it should have been clear to the supervisory authorities that such incentives existed and that there was reason for concern,” but supervisors “did not keep up with the rapid changes in the banks’ practices”. Instead of examining the reasons for the changes, the supervisors took comfort in banks’ capital ratios exceeding a statutory minimum and appearing robust in narrowly-defined stress tests (ÄŒihák and Ong 2010).
An incentive audit needs to be complemented by other tools. It needs to be combined with quantitative risk assessment and with assessments of the regulatory, supervisory, and crisis preparedness frameworks. The audit provides an organizing framework, putting the identification and correction of incentive misalignments front and center.
Incentive audits are not a panacea, of course. Financial markets suffer from issues that go beyond misaligned incentives, such as limited rationality, herd behavior and so on. But better identifying and addressing incentive misalignments is a key practical step, and the incentive audits can help.
References
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine. 2012. Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us, MIT Press.
Beck, Thorsten (ed). 2010. Future of Banking. Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Published by vox.eu.
Caprio, Gerard, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Edward J. Kane. 2010. “The 2007 Meltdown in Structured Securitization: Searching for Lessons, not Scapegoats.” World Bank Research Observer 25 (1): 125-55.
Calomiris, Charles. 2011. Incentive‐Robust Financial Reform, Cato Journal 31 (3): 561–589.
ÄŒihák, Martin, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Maria Soledad MartÃnez PerÃa, and Amin Mohseni. 2012. “Banking Regulation and Supervision around the World: Crisis Update.” Policy Research Working Paper 6286, World Bank, Washington, DC.
ÄŒihák, Martin, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and R. Barry Johnston. 2013. “Incentive Audits: A New Approach to Financial Regulation.” Policy Research Working Paper 6308, World Bank, Washington, DC.
ÄŒihák, Martin, and Li Lian Ong. 2010. “Of Runes and Sagas: Perspectives on Liquidity Stress Testing Using an Iceland Example.” Working Paper 10/156, IMF, Washington, DC.
London School of Economics. 2010. The Future of Finance: The LSE Report. London: London School of Economics.
Special Investigation Commission. 2010. Report on the collapse of the three main banks in Iceland. Icelandic Parliament, April 12.
Squam Lake Working Group. 2010. Regulation of Executive Compensation in Financial Services. Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation
World Bank. 2012. Global Financial Development Report 2013: Rethinking the Role of the State in Finance, World Bank, Washington DC.