Support for redistribution is shaped by compassion, envy, and self-interest, but not a taste for fairness. Daniel Sznycer et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 31, 8420–8425. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/31/8420.abstract
Significance: Markets have lifted millions out of poverty, but considerable inequality remains and there is a large worldwide demand for redistribution. Although economists, philosophers, and public policy analysts debate the merits and demerits of various redistributive programs, a parallel debate has focused on voters’ motives for supporting redistribution. Understanding these motives is crucial, for the performance of a policy cannot be meaningfully evaluated except in the light of intended ends. Unfortunately, existing approaches pose ill-specified motives. Chief among them is fairness, a notion that feels intuitive but often rests on multiple inconsistent principles. We show that evolved motives for navigating interpersonal interactions clearly predict attitudes about redistribution, but a taste for procedural fairness or distributional fairness does not.
Abstract: Why do people support economic redistribution? Hypotheses include inequity aversion, a moral sense that inequality is intrinsically unfair, and cultural explanations such as exposure to and assimilation of culturally transmitted ideologies. However, humans have been interacting with worse-off and better-off individuals over evolutionary time, and our motivational systems may have been naturally selected to navigate the opportunities and challenges posed by such recurrent interactions. We hypothesize that modern redistribution is perceived as an ancestral scene involving three notional players: the needy other, the better-off other, and the actor herself. We explore how three motivational systems—compassion, self-interest, and envy—guide responses to the needy other and the better-off other, and how they pattern responses to redistribution. Data from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Israel support this model. Endorsement of redistribution is independently predicted by dispositional compassion, dispositional envy, and the expectation of personal gain from redistribution. By contrast, a taste for fairness, in the sense of (i) universality in the application of laws and standards, or (ii) low variance in group-level payoffs, fails to predict attitudes about redistribution.
Wednesday, August 9, 2017
Felt Age, Desired, and Expected Lifetime in the Context of Health, Well-Being, and Successful Aging
Felt Age, Desired, and Expected Lifetime in the Context of Health, Well-Being, and Successful Aging. Neala Ambrosi-Randić, Marina Nekić, Ivana Tucak Junaković. The International Journal of Aging and Human Development, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0091415017720888
Abstract: This study examines the interrelations of three different aspects of the subjective age: felt, desired and expected, as well as their relations with the chronological age (CA), health, and psychological well-being variables. Four hundred and twenty-three community-dwelling Croatian adults, aged 60–95 years, participated in the study. All three subjective age measures significantly correlated with the CA. Self-rated health were better predictors of the subjective age compared to the psychological variables. Among psychological variables, successful aging was the only significant predictor of the felt and expected age, while optimism showed to be the only significant predictor of the desired age. Results indicate the importance of some sociodemographic, psychological, and health variables for understanding older persons' subjective age identity and their desires and expectations regarding length of life. Besides the CA, it is very useful to include subjective age measures in research with elderly people.
Summary: Old adults see themselves as 10 years younger than their chronological age. Desires about lifetime are rather modest (wanted avg 88 and expected avg 84 yo).
Abstract: This study examines the interrelations of three different aspects of the subjective age: felt, desired and expected, as well as their relations with the chronological age (CA), health, and psychological well-being variables. Four hundred and twenty-three community-dwelling Croatian adults, aged 60–95 years, participated in the study. All three subjective age measures significantly correlated with the CA. Self-rated health were better predictors of the subjective age compared to the psychological variables. Among psychological variables, successful aging was the only significant predictor of the felt and expected age, while optimism showed to be the only significant predictor of the desired age. Results indicate the importance of some sociodemographic, psychological, and health variables for understanding older persons' subjective age identity and their desires and expectations regarding length of life. Besides the CA, it is very useful to include subjective age measures in research with elderly people.
Summary: Old adults see themselves as 10 years younger than their chronological age. Desires about lifetime are rather modest (wanted avg 88 and expected avg 84 yo).
Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s
Consumption and Income Inequality in the U.S. Since the 1960s. Bruce D. Meyer, James X. Sullivan. NBER Working Paper No. 23655, http://www.nber.org/papers/w23655
Official income inequality statistics indicate a sharp rise in inequality over the past five decades. These statistics do not accurately reflect inequality because income is poorly measured, particularly in the tails of the distribution, and current income differs from permanent income, failing to capture the consumption paid for through borrowing and dissaving and the consumption of durables such as houses and cars. We examine income inequality between 1963 and 2014 using the Current Population Survey and consumption inequality between 1960 and 2014 using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We construct improved measures of consumption, focusing on its well-measured components that are reported at a high and stable rate relative to national accounts. While overall income inequality (as measured by the 90/10 ratio) rose over the past five decades, the rise in overall consumption inequality was small. The patterns for the two measures differ by decade, and they moved in opposite directions after 2006. Income inequality rose in both the top and bottom halves of the distribution, but increases in consumption inequality are only evident in the top half. The differences are also concentrated in single parent families and single individuals. Although changing demographics can account for some of the changes in consumption inequality, they account for little of the changes in income inequality. Consumption smoothing cannot explain the differences between income and consumption at the very bottom, but the declining quality of income data can. Asset price changes likely account for some of the differences between the measures in recent years for the top half of the distribution.
Official income inequality statistics indicate a sharp rise in inequality over the past five decades. These statistics do not accurately reflect inequality because income is poorly measured, particularly in the tails of the distribution, and current income differs from permanent income, failing to capture the consumption paid for through borrowing and dissaving and the consumption of durables such as houses and cars. We examine income inequality between 1963 and 2014 using the Current Population Survey and consumption inequality between 1960 and 2014 using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. We construct improved measures of consumption, focusing on its well-measured components that are reported at a high and stable rate relative to national accounts. While overall income inequality (as measured by the 90/10 ratio) rose over the past five decades, the rise in overall consumption inequality was small. The patterns for the two measures differ by decade, and they moved in opposite directions after 2006. Income inequality rose in both the top and bottom halves of the distribution, but increases in consumption inequality are only evident in the top half. The differences are also concentrated in single parent families and single individuals. Although changing demographics can account for some of the changes in consumption inequality, they account for little of the changes in income inequality. Consumption smoothing cannot explain the differences between income and consumption at the very bottom, but the declining quality of income data can. Asset price changes likely account for some of the differences between the measures in recent years for the top half of the distribution.
Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism
Authoritarianism and Affective Polarization: A New View on the Origins of Partisan Extremism. Matthew D. Luttig. Public Opinion Quarterly, August 02, 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx023
Abstract: What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different—motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation—authoritarianism—is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews.
Abstract: What drives affective polarization in American politics? One common argument is that Democrats and Republicans are deeply polarized today because they are psychologically different—motivated by diametrically opposed and clashing worldviews. This paper argues that the same psychological motivation—authoritarianism—is positively related to partisan extremism among both Republicans and Democrats. Across four studies, this paper shows that authoritarianism is associated with strong partisanship and heightened affective polarization among both Republicans and Democrats. Thus, strong Republicans and Democrats are psychologically similar, at least with respect to authoritarianism. As authoritarianism provides an indicator of underlying needs to belong, these findings support a view of mass polarization as nonsubstantive and group-centric, not driven by competing ideological values or clashing psychological worldviews.
Persistent effect of sex ratios on relationship quality and life satisfaction
Persistent effect of sex ratios on relationship quality and life satisfaction. Pauline Grosjean, Robert C. Brooks. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. Volume 372, issue 1729, September 19, 2017. http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/372/1729/20160315
Abstract: Convict transportation to Australia imposed heavily male-biased sex ratios in some areas, altering the convict-era mating market and generating long-running cultural effects that persist to the present day. We test whether convict-era sex ratios have altered marital and overall life satisfaction today, through their persistent effects on gender norms and household bargaining. We find that both women and men are happier, and the happiness gap within married couples is smaller in areas where convict-era sex ratios were heavily male-biased than in areas where sex ratios were historically more even. We discuss our results in light of household bargaining theory, evolutionary sexual conflict theory and the well-documented relationship between conservative attitudes and self-reported happiness.
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A male-biased sex ratio, which implies a lower supply of women on the marriage market, results in a generally favourable price for women on the mating market, and better bargaining positions for women within the marital household. As a result, under such conditions, mating market models predict that women are more likely to marry, are less likely to participate in the labour force, and consume more leisure [6–10]. Evidence from traditional [11], historic [12] and industrialized [13] societies suggests that behavioural responses to imbalanced adult sex ratios can be both facultative and highly sensitive to ecological, economic and cultural context.
Abstract: Convict transportation to Australia imposed heavily male-biased sex ratios in some areas, altering the convict-era mating market and generating long-running cultural effects that persist to the present day. We test whether convict-era sex ratios have altered marital and overall life satisfaction today, through their persistent effects on gender norms and household bargaining. We find that both women and men are happier, and the happiness gap within married couples is smaller in areas where convict-era sex ratios were heavily male-biased than in areas where sex ratios were historically more even. We discuss our results in light of household bargaining theory, evolutionary sexual conflict theory and the well-documented relationship between conservative attitudes and self-reported happiness.
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A male-biased sex ratio, which implies a lower supply of women on the marriage market, results in a generally favourable price for women on the mating market, and better bargaining positions for women within the marital household. As a result, under such conditions, mating market models predict that women are more likely to marry, are less likely to participate in the labour force, and consume more leisure [6–10]. Evidence from traditional [11], historic [12] and industrialized [13] societies suggests that behavioural responses to imbalanced adult sex ratios can be both facultative and highly sensitive to ecological, economic and cultural context.
Wild Voices: Mimicry, Reversal, Metaphor, and the Emergence of Language
Wild Voices: Mimicry, Reversal, Metaphor, and the Emergence of Language. Chris Knight and Jerome Lewis. Current Anthropologym v 58, Number 4 | August 2017, www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/692905
Abstract: Why is it that, out of 220 primate species, we are the only one that talks? The relative inflexibility of primate vocal signaling reflects audience pressure for reliability. Where interests conflict, listeners’ resistance to being deceived drives signalers to limit their vocal repertoire to signals that cannot be faked. This constraint was lifted in the human case, we argue, because the original victims of our species’ first deceptive vocalizations were nonhuman animals. When our ancestors were vulnerable hominins equipped with limited weaponry, they kept predators away by increasing the range and diversity of their vocal calls. This led to choral singing, primarily by females, and deceptive mimicry of animal calls, primarily by scavenging and hunting males. A critical feature of our model is the core principle of reversal, whereby deceptive signals aimed originally by a coalition against an external target are subsequently redeployed for honest communicative purposes within the group. We argue that this dynamic culminated ultimately in gestural, vocal, and ritual metaphor, opening the way to word formation and the rapid emergence of grammar.
Abstract: Why is it that, out of 220 primate species, we are the only one that talks? The relative inflexibility of primate vocal signaling reflects audience pressure for reliability. Where interests conflict, listeners’ resistance to being deceived drives signalers to limit their vocal repertoire to signals that cannot be faked. This constraint was lifted in the human case, we argue, because the original victims of our species’ first deceptive vocalizations were nonhuman animals. When our ancestors were vulnerable hominins equipped with limited weaponry, they kept predators away by increasing the range and diversity of their vocal calls. This led to choral singing, primarily by females, and deceptive mimicry of animal calls, primarily by scavenging and hunting males. A critical feature of our model is the core principle of reversal, whereby deceptive signals aimed originally by a coalition against an external target are subsequently redeployed for honest communicative purposes within the group. We argue that this dynamic culminated ultimately in gestural, vocal, and ritual metaphor, opening the way to word formation and the rapid emergence of grammar.
The Good, the Bad, and the Male: Men, But Not Women, Avoid Own-Gender Stereotypical Judgments of Affective Valence
The Good, the Bad, and the Male: Men, But Not Women, Avoid Own-Gender Stereotypical Judgments of Affective Valence. Markus Conrad and Christian von Scheve. Gender Issues, September 2017, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 223–239, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12147-016-9177-2
Abstract: We examine gender differences in the endorsement of gender-stereotypical judgments of the affective valence of social concepts. Sociological as well as social psychological theories indicate that individuals are inclined to behave in ways concordant with prevailing roles and corresponding stereotypes. Recent debates suggest gender biases in the social desirability of gender-stereotype endorsement. We use words with apparent gender differences in perceived affective valence and ask participants to (a) individually rate the valence of each word, (b) estimate how, in general, same-sex individuals would rate the word, and (c) estimate how, in general, opposite-sex individuals would rate the word. Results show that female participants’ self-ratings align with their estimated ratings of the majority of women, whereas male participants’ self-ratings notably deviate from their estimated male majority ratings. We interpret these results as a consequence of a declining esteem of stereotypically male attributes in society.
Abstract: We examine gender differences in the endorsement of gender-stereotypical judgments of the affective valence of social concepts. Sociological as well as social psychological theories indicate that individuals are inclined to behave in ways concordant with prevailing roles and corresponding stereotypes. Recent debates suggest gender biases in the social desirability of gender-stereotype endorsement. We use words with apparent gender differences in perceived affective valence and ask participants to (a) individually rate the valence of each word, (b) estimate how, in general, same-sex individuals would rate the word, and (c) estimate how, in general, opposite-sex individuals would rate the word. Results show that female participants’ self-ratings align with their estimated ratings of the majority of women, whereas male participants’ self-ratings notably deviate from their estimated male majority ratings. We interpret these results as a consequence of a declining esteem of stereotypically male attributes in society.
Survival of the Fittest and the Sexiest: Evolutionary Origins of Adolescent Bullying
Survival of the Fittest and the Sexiest: Evolutionary Origins of Adolescent Bullying. Jun-Bin Koh, and Jennifer S. Wong. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0886260515593546
Abstract: The central idea of evolutionary psychology theory (EPT) is that species evolve to carry or exhibit certain traits/behaviors because these characteristics increase their ability to survive and reproduce. Proponents of EPT propose that bullying emerges from evolutionary development, providing an adaptive edge for gaining better sexual opportunities and physical protection, and promoting mental health. This study examines adolescent bullying behaviors via the lens of EPT. Questionnaires were administered to 135 adolescents, ages 13 to 16, from one secondary school in metro Vancouver, British Columbia. Participants were categorized into one of four groups (bullies, victims, bully/victims, or bystanders) according to their involvement in bullying interactions as measured by the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire. Four dependent variables were examined: depression, self-esteem, social status, and social anxiety. Results indicate that bullies had the most positive scores on mental health measures and held the highest social rank in the school environment, with significant differences limited to comparisons between bullies and bully/victims. These results lend support to the hypothesis that youth bullying is derived from evolutionary development. Implications for approaching anti-bullying strategies in schools and directions for future studies are discussed.
Abstract: The central idea of evolutionary psychology theory (EPT) is that species evolve to carry or exhibit certain traits/behaviors because these characteristics increase their ability to survive and reproduce. Proponents of EPT propose that bullying emerges from evolutionary development, providing an adaptive edge for gaining better sexual opportunities and physical protection, and promoting mental health. This study examines adolescent bullying behaviors via the lens of EPT. Questionnaires were administered to 135 adolescents, ages 13 to 16, from one secondary school in metro Vancouver, British Columbia. Participants were categorized into one of four groups (bullies, victims, bully/victims, or bystanders) according to their involvement in bullying interactions as measured by the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire. Four dependent variables were examined: depression, self-esteem, social status, and social anxiety. Results indicate that bullies had the most positive scores on mental health measures and held the highest social rank in the school environment, with significant differences limited to comparisons between bullies and bully/victims. These results lend support to the hypothesis that youth bullying is derived from evolutionary development. Implications for approaching anti-bullying strategies in schools and directions for future studies are discussed.
Tuesday, August 8, 2017
Prof lets students choose own grades for 'stress reduction,' allows computers and books in exams
Prof lets students choose own grades for 'stress reduction,' allows computers and books in exams, etc.
By Anthony Gockowski.
Campus Reform, Aug 07, 2017
http://www.campusreform.org/?ID=9551
Do you see me the way I see myself? Narcissists are less prone to illusion of transparency than other people
Do you see me the way I see myself? Narcissists are less prone to illusion of transparency than other people. Laetitia Renier, Claudia Toma, and Olivier Corneille.
Abstract: People tend to believe that their internal states are transparent to others (e.g. illusion of transparency), and even more when they are self-centred. Would it be the case for narcissistic individuals who are highly self-centred? Three studies investigated whether narcissists feel more transparent because they are egocentric, or whether they feel less transparent because they are socially skilled. Using a vignette method, Study 1 showed that the more participants were narcissists, the less they felt transparent with regard to their emotions, values and behaviour. Study 2 further showed that this association was stronger when narcissistic characteristics were valorised. In addition, the negative link between narcissism and felt transparency was mediated by self-monitoring. Using a face-to-face interaction, Study 3 provided evidence that participants high on narcissism were less prone to illusion of transparency. Overall our studies suggest that narcissists’ meta-perception is more accurate, less egocentric because they are socially skilled.
Abstract: People tend to believe that their internal states are transparent to others (e.g. illusion of transparency), and even more when they are self-centred. Would it be the case for narcissistic individuals who are highly self-centred? Three studies investigated whether narcissists feel more transparent because they are egocentric, or whether they feel less transparent because they are socially skilled. Using a vignette method, Study 1 showed that the more participants were narcissists, the less they felt transparent with regard to their emotions, values and behaviour. Study 2 further showed that this association was stronger when narcissistic characteristics were valorised. In addition, the negative link between narcissism and felt transparency was mediated by self-monitoring. Using a face-to-face interaction, Study 3 provided evidence that participants high on narcissism were less prone to illusion of transparency. Overall our studies suggest that narcissists’ meta-perception is more accurate, less egocentric because they are socially skilled.
Death Before Dishonor: Incurring Costs to Protect Moral Reputation
Death Before Dishonor: Incurring Costs to Protect Moral Reputation. Andrew J. Vonasch et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550617720271
Abstract: Predicated on the notion that people’s survival depends greatly on participation in cooperative society, and that reputation damage may preclude such participation, four studies with diverse methods tested the hypothesis that people would make substantial sacrifices to protect their reputations. A “big data” study found that maintaining a moral reputation is one of people’s most important values. In making hypothetical choices, ***high percentages of “normal” people reported preferring jail time, amputation of limbs, and death to various forms of reputation damage (i.e., becoming known as a criminal, Nazi, or child molester)***. Two lab studies found that 30% of people fully submerged their hands in a pile of disgusting live worms, and 63% endured physical pain to prevent dissemination of information suggesting that they were racist. We discuss the implications of reputation protection for theories about altruism and motivation.
Abstract: Predicated on the notion that people’s survival depends greatly on participation in cooperative society, and that reputation damage may preclude such participation, four studies with diverse methods tested the hypothesis that people would make substantial sacrifices to protect their reputations. A “big data” study found that maintaining a moral reputation is one of people’s most important values. In making hypothetical choices, ***high percentages of “normal” people reported preferring jail time, amputation of limbs, and death to various forms of reputation damage (i.e., becoming known as a criminal, Nazi, or child molester)***. Two lab studies found that 30% of people fully submerged their hands in a pile of disgusting live worms, and 63% endured physical pain to prevent dissemination of information suggesting that they were racist. We discuss the implications of reputation protection for theories about altruism and motivation.
Harm to self outweighs benefit to others in moral decision making
Harm to self outweighs benefit to others in moral decision making. Lukas J Volz et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 30, 7963–7968. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/30/7963.abstract
Significance: Principles guiding decisions that affect both ourselves and others are of prominent importance for human societies. Previous accounts in economics and psychological science have often described decision making as either categorically egoistic or altruistic. Instead, the present work shows that genuine altruism is embedded in context-specific egoistic bias. Participants were willing to both forgo monetary reward to spare the other from painful electric shocks and also to suffer painful electric shocks to secure monetary reward for the other. However, across all trials and conditions, participants accrued more reward and less harm for the self than for the other person. These results characterize human decision makers as egoistically biased altruists, with important implications for psychology, economics, and public policy.
Abstract: How we make decisions that have direct consequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society. Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximizing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful electric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants’ unwillingness to harm themselves for others’ benefit. The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understanding of economic and social interactions in our society.
Significance: Principles guiding decisions that affect both ourselves and others are of prominent importance for human societies. Previous accounts in economics and psychological science have often described decision making as either categorically egoistic or altruistic. Instead, the present work shows that genuine altruism is embedded in context-specific egoistic bias. Participants were willing to both forgo monetary reward to spare the other from painful electric shocks and also to suffer painful electric shocks to secure monetary reward for the other. However, across all trials and conditions, participants accrued more reward and less harm for the self than for the other person. These results characterize human decision makers as egoistically biased altruists, with important implications for psychology, economics, and public policy.
Abstract: How we make decisions that have direct consequences for ourselves and others forms the moral foundation of our society. Whereas economic theory contends that humans aim at maximizing their own gains, recent seminal psychological work suggests that our behavior is instead hyperaltruistic: We are more willing to sacrifice gains to spare others from harm than to spare ourselves from harm. To investigate how such egoistic and hyperaltruistic tendencies influence moral decision making, we investigated trade-off decisions combining monetary rewards and painful electric shocks, administered to the participants themselves or an anonymous other. Whereas we replicated the notion of hyperaltruism (i.e., the willingness to forego reward to spare others from harm), we observed strongly egoistic tendencies in participants’ unwillingness to harm themselves for others’ benefit. The moral principle guiding intersubject trade-off decision making observed in our study is best described as egoistically biased altruism, with important implications for our understanding of economic and social interactions in our society.
The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making
The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making. Klajdi Bregu et al. Southern Economic Association Journal, Volume 83, Issue 4, April 2017. Pages 886–902, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/soej.12179/full
Abstract: In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects.
Summary: Under alcohol influence, the subjects acted more cooperatively and showed more altruistic giving in economic games.
Abstract: In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects.
Summary: Under alcohol influence, the subjects acted more cooperatively and showed more altruistic giving in economic games.
Individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution
Individual risk preferences and the demand for redistribution. Manja Gärtner, Johanna Mollerstrom and David Seim. Journal of Public Economics, v 153, September 2017, Pages 49-55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.06.009
Highlights
• There is a positive relation between risk aversion and demand for redistribution.
• This relation is robust to controlling for past and current income and wealth.
• Risk aversion partly explains why e.g. women and older people favor redistribution.
Abstract: Redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks. This, in turn, implies that an individual's demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion. To test this prediction, we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well-established set of measures in a representative sample of the Swedish population. We document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redistribution that is also economically important. We show that previously used proxies for risk aversion (such as being an entrepreneur or having a history of unemployment) do not capture the effect of our measure of risk aversion but have distinctly different effects on the demand for redistribution. We also show evidence indicating that risk aversion can explain significant parts of the well-studied relations between age and gender on the one hand and demand for redistribution on the other.
JEL classification: C83 C91 C93 D63 D81 H23
Keywords: Risk aversion, Redistribution, Inequality, Survey, Experiment
Highlights
• There is a positive relation between risk aversion and demand for redistribution.
• This relation is robust to controlling for past and current income and wealth.
• Risk aversion partly explains why e.g. women and older people favor redistribution.
Abstract: Redistributive policies can provide an insurance against future negative economic shocks. This, in turn, implies that an individual's demand for redistribution is expected to increase with her risk aversion. To test this prediction, we elicit risk aversion and demand for redistribution through a well-established set of measures in a representative sample of the Swedish population. We document a statistically significant and robust positive relation between risk aversion and the demand for redistribution that is also economically important. We show that previously used proxies for risk aversion (such as being an entrepreneur or having a history of unemployment) do not capture the effect of our measure of risk aversion but have distinctly different effects on the demand for redistribution. We also show evidence indicating that risk aversion can explain significant parts of the well-studied relations between age and gender on the one hand and demand for redistribution on the other.
JEL classification: C83 C91 C93 D63 D81 H23
Keywords: Risk aversion, Redistribution, Inequality, Survey, Experiment
Fake News, Fake Problem? An Analysis of the Fake News Audience in the Lead Up to the 2016 Presidential Election
Fake News, Fake Problem? An Analysis of the Fake News Audience in the Lead Up to the 2016 Presidential Election. Jacob L. Nelson. Conference Paper, September 2017. Conference: TPRC, At Arlington, VA. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318470831_Fake_News_Fake_Problem_An_Analysis_of_the_Fake_News_Audience_in_the_Lead_Up_to_the_2016_Presidential_Election
Abstract: In light of the recent U.S. election, many fear that “fake news” has become a powerful and sinister force in the news media environment. These fears stem from the idea that as news consumption increasingly takes place via social media sites, news audiences are more likely to find themselves drawn in by sensational headlines to sources that lack accuracy or legitimacy, with troubling consequences for democracy. However, we know little about the extent to which online audiences are exposed to fake news, and how these outlets factor into the average digital news diet. In this paper, I argue that fears about fake news consumption echo fears about partisan selective exposure, in that both stem from concerns that more media choice leads audiences to consume news that align with their beliefs, and to ignore news that does not. Yet recent studies have concluded that the partisan media audience (1) is small and (2) also consumes news from popular, centrist outlets. I use online news audience data to show a similar phenomenon plays out when it comes to fake news. Findings reveal that social media does indeed play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news sites; however, the actual fake news audience is small, and a large portion of it also visits more popular, “real” news sites. I conclude by discussing the implications of a news media landscape where the audience is exposed to contradictory sources of public affairs information.
Abstract: In light of the recent U.S. election, many fear that “fake news” has become a powerful and sinister force in the news media environment. These fears stem from the idea that as news consumption increasingly takes place via social media sites, news audiences are more likely to find themselves drawn in by sensational headlines to sources that lack accuracy or legitimacy, with troubling consequences for democracy. However, we know little about the extent to which online audiences are exposed to fake news, and how these outlets factor into the average digital news diet. In this paper, I argue that fears about fake news consumption echo fears about partisan selective exposure, in that both stem from concerns that more media choice leads audiences to consume news that align with their beliefs, and to ignore news that does not. Yet recent studies have concluded that the partisan media audience (1) is small and (2) also consumes news from popular, centrist outlets. I use online news audience data to show a similar phenomenon plays out when it comes to fake news. Findings reveal that social media does indeed play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news sites; however, the actual fake news audience is small, and a large portion of it also visits more popular, “real” news sites. I conclude by discussing the implications of a news media landscape where the audience is exposed to contradictory sources of public affairs information.
Dehumanization increases instrumental violence, but not moral violence
Dehumanization increases instrumental violence, but not moral violence. Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo Valdesolo, and Jesse Graham. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 32, 8511–8516, http://www.pnas.org/content/114/32/8511.abstract
Significance: To eliminate violence, we must understand the motives that drive it. Most theories assume that violence is motivated by instrumental gain or impulsiveness, and is restrained by moral inhibitions. In these frameworks, dehumanization breaks down moral inhibitions by reducing perceptions of victims as fellow human beings worthy of concern. However, we argue that much violence is actually motivated by moral sentiments, and that morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm fellow human beings. Across five experiments, we show that dehumanizing victims increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. This distinction, between instrumental violence enabled by dehumanization, and moral violence directed toward human victims, has important implications for understanding how morality and dehumanization interact with violence, and for informing violence reduction efforts worldwide.
Abstract: Across five experiments, we show that dehumanization—the act of perceiving victims as not completely human—increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. In attitude surveys, ascribing reduced capacities for cognitive, experiential, and emotional states to victims predicted support for practices where victims are harmed to achieve instrumental goals, including sweatshop labor, animal experimentation, and drone strikes that result in civilian casualties, but not practices where harm is perceived as morally righteous, including capital punishment, killing in war, and drone strikes that kill terrorists. In vignette experiments, using dehumanizing compared with humanizing language increased participants’ willingness to harm strangers for money, but not participants’ willingness to harm strangers for their immoral behavior. Participants also spontaneously dehumanized strangers when they imagined harming them for money, but not when they imagined harming them for their immoral behavior. Finally, participants humanized strangers who were low in humanity if they imagined harming them for immoral behavior, but not money, suggesting that morally motivated perpetrators may humanize victims to justify violence against them. Our findings indicate that dehumanization enables violence that perpetrators see as unethical, but instrumentally beneficial. In contrast, dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence because morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm complete human beings who are capable of deserving blame, experiencing suffering, and understanding its meaning.
Significance: To eliminate violence, we must understand the motives that drive it. Most theories assume that violence is motivated by instrumental gain or impulsiveness, and is restrained by moral inhibitions. In these frameworks, dehumanization breaks down moral inhibitions by reducing perceptions of victims as fellow human beings worthy of concern. However, we argue that much violence is actually motivated by moral sentiments, and that morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm fellow human beings. Across five experiments, we show that dehumanizing victims increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. This distinction, between instrumental violence enabled by dehumanization, and moral violence directed toward human victims, has important implications for understanding how morality and dehumanization interact with violence, and for informing violence reduction efforts worldwide.
Abstract: Across five experiments, we show that dehumanization—the act of perceiving victims as not completely human—increases instrumental, but not moral, violence. In attitude surveys, ascribing reduced capacities for cognitive, experiential, and emotional states to victims predicted support for practices where victims are harmed to achieve instrumental goals, including sweatshop labor, animal experimentation, and drone strikes that result in civilian casualties, but not practices where harm is perceived as morally righteous, including capital punishment, killing in war, and drone strikes that kill terrorists. In vignette experiments, using dehumanizing compared with humanizing language increased participants’ willingness to harm strangers for money, but not participants’ willingness to harm strangers for their immoral behavior. Participants also spontaneously dehumanized strangers when they imagined harming them for money, but not when they imagined harming them for their immoral behavior. Finally, participants humanized strangers who were low in humanity if they imagined harming them for immoral behavior, but not money, suggesting that morally motivated perpetrators may humanize victims to justify violence against them. Our findings indicate that dehumanization enables violence that perpetrators see as unethical, but instrumentally beneficial. In contrast, dehumanization does not contribute to moral violence because morally motivated perpetrators wish to harm complete human beings who are capable of deserving blame, experiencing suffering, and understanding its meaning.
Pornography consumption and its association with sexual concerns and expectations among young men and women
Pornography consumption and its association with sexual concerns and expectations among young men and women. Kaitlyn Goldsmith et al. The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, https://doi.org/10.3138/cjhs.262-a2
Abstract: The often narrow representations of sexual performance and physical attractiveness in pornography may be linked to sexual concerns and sexual expectations among young men and women (e.g., body- and performance-related sexual distractions, negative genital self-image, expectations of one's partner). Investigation of the relations between these constructs is needed to assess the potential impact of pornography on young adult's sexual lives. Undergraduate men (n=333) and women (n=668) completed an online survey assessing pornography viewership, body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, and pornography-based partner expectations. Multivariate regression analyses revealed that visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with higher partner performance expectations among women. Among men, visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity. Literary pornography use was not uniquely associated with these variables among men or women. The results of this investigation suggest that individuals who consume visual pornography may experience some forms of sexual insecurity and sexual expectations related to their pornography use. Importantly, many sexual concerns were unrelated to pornography consumption, which is consistent with research in favour of pornography consumption as a healthy sexual outlet for young adults.
KEY WORDS: Body image, cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, partner expectations, pornography, sexual body esteem, sexual insecurities, sexually explicit material
Abstract: The often narrow representations of sexual performance and physical attractiveness in pornography may be linked to sexual concerns and sexual expectations among young men and women (e.g., body- and performance-related sexual distractions, negative genital self-image, expectations of one's partner). Investigation of the relations between these constructs is needed to assess the potential impact of pornography on young adult's sexual lives. Undergraduate men (n=333) and women (n=668) completed an online survey assessing pornography viewership, body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, and pornography-based partner expectations. Multivariate regression analyses revealed that visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with higher partner performance expectations among women. Among men, visual pornography viewership was uniquely associated with body- and performance-related cognitive distractions during sexual activity. Literary pornography use was not uniquely associated with these variables among men or women. The results of this investigation suggest that individuals who consume visual pornography may experience some forms of sexual insecurity and sexual expectations related to their pornography use. Importantly, many sexual concerns were unrelated to pornography consumption, which is consistent with research in favour of pornography consumption as a healthy sexual outlet for young adults.
KEY WORDS: Body image, cognitive distractions during sexual activity, genital self-image, partner expectations, pornography, sexual body esteem, sexual insecurities, sexually explicit material
Health, Anticipated Partner Infidelity, and Jealousy in Men and Women
Health, Anticipated Partner Infidelity, and Jealousy in Men and Women. Steven Arnocky, Marlena Pearson, Tracy Vaillancourt. Evolutionary Psychology, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1474704915593666
Abstract: Health has been identified as an important variable involved in mate choice. Unhealthy organisms are generally less able to provide reproductively important resources to partners and offspring and are more likely to pass on communicable disease. Research on human mate preferences has shown that both men and women prefer healthy mates. Yet to date, little research has examined how health relates to one’s own mating experiences. In the present study, 164 participants (87 women) who were currently in heterosexual romantic relationships completed measures of frequency and severity of health problems, anticipated partner infidelity, and intensity of jealousy felt in their current relationship. Mediation analyses showed that health problems predicted greater anticipated partner infidelity and jealousy scores and that anticipated partner infidelity mediated the links between health and jealousy for both frequency and severity of health problems, controlling for both sex and relationship duration. These findings suggest that unhealthy people perceive themselves to be at a mating disadvantage, experiencing associated differences in perceptions and emotions surrounding their romantic partners’ fidelity.
Abstract: Health has been identified as an important variable involved in mate choice. Unhealthy organisms are generally less able to provide reproductively important resources to partners and offspring and are more likely to pass on communicable disease. Research on human mate preferences has shown that both men and women prefer healthy mates. Yet to date, little research has examined how health relates to one’s own mating experiences. In the present study, 164 participants (87 women) who were currently in heterosexual romantic relationships completed measures of frequency and severity of health problems, anticipated partner infidelity, and intensity of jealousy felt in their current relationship. Mediation analyses showed that health problems predicted greater anticipated partner infidelity and jealousy scores and that anticipated partner infidelity mediated the links between health and jealousy for both frequency and severity of health problems, controlling for both sex and relationship duration. These findings suggest that unhealthy people perceive themselves to be at a mating disadvantage, experiencing associated differences in perceptions and emotions surrounding their romantic partners’ fidelity.
Competing for Love: Applying Sexual Economics Theory to Mating Contests
Competing for Love: Applying Sexual Economics Theory to Mating Contests. Roy F. Baumeister et al. Journal of Economic Psychology, July 29 2017, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016748701630277X
Highlights
• Sexual economics theory analyzes onset of heterosexual relationships in marketplace and economic terms, with women as sellers and men as buyers who exchange nonsexual, often material resources for sex.
• Women compete on sex appeal, offering sex to get material resources from men. Other women are rivals.
• Female competition includes display of charms, physical improvement (e.g., dieting to attain thin ideal), offering sex at slightly lower price than rivals, plus informational warfare (e.g., gossip) to destroy rivals’ reputation while upholding her own.
• The female community often uses pressure and punishment to prevent women from offering sex too freely, following the cartel tactic of restricting the supply to increase the price.
• Men compete to amass resources in order to get sex. Much competition is in groups, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but primarily as potential coalition partners.
Abstract: Sexual economics theory analyzes the onset of heterosexual sex as a marketplace deal in which the woman is the seller and the man is the buyer, with the price paid in nonsexual resources. We extend that theory to analyze same-gender contests in that marketplace, and to elaborate the idea that what the woman sells is not just sex but exclusive access to her sexual charms. Women compete on sex appeal and on the promise of exclusiveness (faithfulness), with the goal of getting a man who will provide material resources. Men compete to amass material resources, with the goal of getting a good sex partner. Female competition includes showing off her sexual charms, offering sex at a lower price than rivals, seeking to improve her physical assets (e.g., by dieting), and use of informational warfare to sully rivals’ reputations while defending her own reputation against malicious gossip. We review evidence of these patterns, including evidence that female body dissatisfaction and pathological eating patterns increase when women perceive an unfavorable sex ratio (i.e., shortage of eligible men). Men compete in groups to amass resources, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but also as coalition partners. Male homophobia is often not about sex but rather invokes the stereotype that a homosexual man will not be an effective coalition partner. Misunderstandings about whether sex or exclusivity is the central commitment can complicate marital adjustment for couples.
Keywords: sex; sexuality; mating; gender; competition; sexual economics; contest
Highlights
• Sexual economics theory analyzes onset of heterosexual relationships in marketplace and economic terms, with women as sellers and men as buyers who exchange nonsexual, often material resources for sex.
• Women compete on sex appeal, offering sex to get material resources from men. Other women are rivals.
• Female competition includes display of charms, physical improvement (e.g., dieting to attain thin ideal), offering sex at slightly lower price than rivals, plus informational warfare (e.g., gossip) to destroy rivals’ reputation while upholding her own.
• The female community often uses pressure and punishment to prevent women from offering sex too freely, following the cartel tactic of restricting the supply to increase the price.
• Men compete to amass resources in order to get sex. Much competition is in groups, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but primarily as potential coalition partners.
Abstract: Sexual economics theory analyzes the onset of heterosexual sex as a marketplace deal in which the woman is the seller and the man is the buyer, with the price paid in nonsexual resources. We extend that theory to analyze same-gender contests in that marketplace, and to elaborate the idea that what the woman sells is not just sex but exclusive access to her sexual charms. Women compete on sex appeal and on the promise of exclusiveness (faithfulness), with the goal of getting a man who will provide material resources. Men compete to amass material resources, with the goal of getting a good sex partner. Female competition includes showing off her sexual charms, offering sex at a lower price than rivals, seeking to improve her physical assets (e.g., by dieting), and use of informational warfare to sully rivals’ reputations while defending her own reputation against malicious gossip. We review evidence of these patterns, including evidence that female body dissatisfaction and pathological eating patterns increase when women perceive an unfavorable sex ratio (i.e., shortage of eligible men). Men compete in groups to amass resources, so men see other men not just as sexual rivals but also as coalition partners. Male homophobia is often not about sex but rather invokes the stereotype that a homosexual man will not be an effective coalition partner. Misunderstandings about whether sex or exclusivity is the central commitment can complicate marital adjustment for couples.
Keywords: sex; sexuality; mating; gender; competition; sexual economics; contest
Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating
Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating. Li Zhao et al. Developmental Science, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/desc.12585/abstract
Abstract: The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.
Abstract: The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3- and 5-year-old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.
The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children
The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children. Libertad González and Tarja Viitanen. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12200/abstract
Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of children, by exploiting the different timing of divorce legalization across Europe. We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts raised when divorce was banned with those of cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have ‘control’ countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to legal divorce as children. We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.
Abstract: We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being of children, by exploiting the different timing of divorce legalization across Europe. We compare the adult outcomes of cohorts raised when divorce was banned with those of cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the same country. We also have ‘control’ countries where all cohorts were exposed (or not exposed) to legal divorce as children. We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.
Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field
Immaterial and monetary gifts in economic transactions: evidence from the field.Michael Kirchler, Stefan Palan. Experimental Economics, Aug 02 2017, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-017-9536-1
Abstract: Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.
Abstract: Reciprocation of monetary gifts is well-understood in economics. In contrast, there is little research on reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts like compliments. We narrow this gap and investigate how employees reciprocate after receiving immaterial gifts and material gifts over time. We purchase (1) ice cream from fast food restaurants, and (2) durum doner, a common lunch snack, from independent vendors. Prior to the food’s preparation, we either compliment or tip the salesperson. We find that salespersons reciprocate compliments with higher product weight than in a control treatment. Importantly, this reciprocal behavior following immaterial gifts grows over repeated transactions. Tips, in contrast, have a stronger level effect which does not change over time.
Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization
Political Differences in Free Will Belief are Driven by Differences in Moralization. Cory J. Clark et al. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011597
Abstract: Five studies tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives’ higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology
Abstract: Five studies tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by their broader view of morality, and thus a broader motivation to assign responsibility. On an individual difference level, Study 1 found that political conservatives’ higher moral wrongness judgments accounted for their higher belief in free will. In Study 2, conservatives ascribed more free will for negative events than liberals, while no differences emerged for positive events. For actions ideologically equivalent in perceived moral wrongness, free will judgments also did not differ (Study 3), and actions that liberals perceived as more wrong, liberals judged as more free (Study 4). Finally, higher wrongness judgments mediated the effect of conservatism on free will beliefs (Study 5). Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
Keywords: free will, morality, blame, motivated cognition, political psychology
Not having schadenfreude can be a signal of Huntington's
Corticostriatal signatures of schadenfreude: evidence from Huntington's disease. Sandra Baez et al. Journal of NeuroIogy, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, on-line Aug 01 2017. http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/early/2017/07/31/jnnp-2017-316055
Abstract: Schadenfreude—pleasure at others’ misfortunes—is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.
Abstract: Schadenfreude—pleasure at others’ misfortunes—is a multidetermined social emotion which involves reward processing, mentalising and perspective-taking abilities. Patients with Huntington's disease (HD) exhibit reductions of this experience, suggesting a role of striatal degeneration in such impairment. However, no study has directly assessed the relationship between regional brain atrophy in HD and reduced schadenfreude. Here, we assessed whether grey matter (GM) atrophy in patients with HD correlates with ratings of schadenfreude. First, we compared the performance of 20 patients with HD and 23 controls on an experimental task designed to trigger schadenfreude and envy (another social emotion acting as a control condition). Second, we compared GM volume between groups. Third, we examined brain regions where atrophy might be associated with specific impairments in the patients. While both groups showed similar ratings of envy, patients with HD reported lower schadenfreude. The latter pattern was related to atrophy in regions of the reward system (ventral striatum) and the mentalising network (precuneus and superior parietal lobule). Our results shed light on the intertwining of reward and socioemotional processes in schadenfreude, while offering novel evidence about their neural correlates.
Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships
Once a Cheater, Always a Cheater? Serial Infidelity Across Subsequent Relationships. Kayla Knopp, Shelby Scott, Lane Ritchie, Galena K. Rhoades, Howard J. Markman, Scott M. Stanley. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-017-1018-1
Abstract: Although there is a large body of research addressing predictors of relationship infidelity, no study to our knowledge has specifically addressed infidelity in a previous relationship as a risk factor for infidelity in a subsequent relationship. The current study addressed risk for serial infidelity by following adult participants (N = 484) longitudinally through two mixed-gender romantic relationships. Participants reported their own extra-dyadic sexual involvement (ESI) (i.e., having sexual relations with someone other than their partner) as well as both known and suspected ESI on the part of their partners in each romantic relationship. Findings from logistic regressions showed that those who reported engaging in ESI in the first relationship were three times more likely to report engaging in ESI in their next relationship compared to those who did not report engaging in ESI in the first relationship. Similarly, compared to those who reported that their first-relationship partners did not engage in ESI, those who knew that their partners in the first relationships had engaged in ESI were twice as likely to report the same behavior from their next relationship partners. Those who suspected their first-relationship partners of ESI were four times more likely to report suspicion of partner ESI again in their next relationships. These findings controlled for demographic risk factors for infidelity and held regardless of respondent gender or marital status. Thus, prior infidelity emerged as an important risk factor for infidelity in next relationships. Implications for novel intervention targets for prevention of serial relationship infidelity are discussed.
Keywords: Dating relationships, Extra-dyadic sexual involvement, Infidelity
Abstract: Although there is a large body of research addressing predictors of relationship infidelity, no study to our knowledge has specifically addressed infidelity in a previous relationship as a risk factor for infidelity in a subsequent relationship. The current study addressed risk for serial infidelity by following adult participants (N = 484) longitudinally through two mixed-gender romantic relationships. Participants reported their own extra-dyadic sexual involvement (ESI) (i.e., having sexual relations with someone other than their partner) as well as both known and suspected ESI on the part of their partners in each romantic relationship. Findings from logistic regressions showed that those who reported engaging in ESI in the first relationship were three times more likely to report engaging in ESI in their next relationship compared to those who did not report engaging in ESI in the first relationship. Similarly, compared to those who reported that their first-relationship partners did not engage in ESI, those who knew that their partners in the first relationships had engaged in ESI were twice as likely to report the same behavior from their next relationship partners. Those who suspected their first-relationship partners of ESI were four times more likely to report suspicion of partner ESI again in their next relationships. These findings controlled for demographic risk factors for infidelity and held regardless of respondent gender or marital status. Thus, prior infidelity emerged as an important risk factor for infidelity in next relationships. Implications for novel intervention targets for prevention of serial relationship infidelity are discussed.
Keywords: Dating relationships, Extra-dyadic sexual involvement, Infidelity
The limitations of Nyhan and Reifler's backfire effect
The limitations of the backfire effect. Kathryn Haglin. Research & Politics, July 3, 2017. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053168017716547
Abstract: Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) document a “backfire effect,” wherein attempts to correct factual misperceptions increase the prevalence of false beliefs. These results are widely cited both in and outside of political science. In this research note, I report the results of a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccine study that was embedded in a larger study about flu vaccines. The backfire effect was not replicated in my experiment. The main replication result suggests the need for additional studies to verify the backfire effect and identify conditions under which it occurs.
Introduction
Political scientists are increasingly aware of the effect of misperceptions on behavioral intentions and attitudes. While Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) famously note that most citizens do not have much factual knowledge about politics, Kuklinski et al. (2000) point out the differences between being uninformed and misinformed. When a person is misinformed, false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information can create the basis for their policy preferences. Further, the sources used to obtain the misinformation are often directly related to a person’s political preferences.
While there is some evidence that providing relevant facts has the ability to change people’s issue opinions (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000), information is often received in a much noisier environment. Other studies have found that individuals are often resistant to evidence that contradicts their opinions (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). The literature, however, remains unsettled as to exactly when and how misperceptions can be corrected. In addition, the role of the “backfire effect,” where corrective information can actually make false beliefs more prevalent, in these processes remains unclear. For example, Weeks and Garrett (2014) do not find evidence for the backfire effect in a study about correcting rumors in the 2008 presidential campaign. Similarly, Ecker et al.’s (2014) study of racial attitudes finds those attitudes do not change the effectiveness of discounting information. Looking at similar attitudes, Garrett et al. (2013) find no evidence of these backfire effects in a study about a proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City. By contrast, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) find evidence for a backfire effect in a vaccines context as well as in the case of being correctly informed about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
This research note reports a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccines study embedded within a larger experimental study of flu vaccine intentions and attitudes. Data generated in the experiment do not replicate the backfire effect or the finding that corrections reduce misperceptions about vaccine safety. This suggests that more work is needed to validate the backfire effect, establishing the conditions under which it occurs and the size of its effect.
Keywords Vaccine, replication, backfire effect, misperception
Abstract: Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) document a “backfire effect,” wherein attempts to correct factual misperceptions increase the prevalence of false beliefs. These results are widely cited both in and outside of political science. In this research note, I report the results of a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccine study that was embedded in a larger study about flu vaccines. The backfire effect was not replicated in my experiment. The main replication result suggests the need for additional studies to verify the backfire effect and identify conditions under which it occurs.
Introduction
Political scientists are increasingly aware of the effect of misperceptions on behavioral intentions and attitudes. While Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) famously note that most citizens do not have much factual knowledge about politics, Kuklinski et al. (2000) point out the differences between being uninformed and misinformed. When a person is misinformed, false, misleading, or unsubstantiated information can create the basis for their policy preferences. Further, the sources used to obtain the misinformation are often directly related to a person’s political preferences.
While there is some evidence that providing relevant facts has the ability to change people’s issue opinions (Gilens, 2001; Kuklinski et al., 2000), information is often received in a much noisier environment. Other studies have found that individuals are often resistant to evidence that contradicts their opinions (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006). The literature, however, remains unsettled as to exactly when and how misperceptions can be corrected. In addition, the role of the “backfire effect,” where corrective information can actually make false beliefs more prevalent, in these processes remains unclear. For example, Weeks and Garrett (2014) do not find evidence for the backfire effect in a study about correcting rumors in the 2008 presidential campaign. Similarly, Ecker et al.’s (2014) study of racial attitudes finds those attitudes do not change the effectiveness of discounting information. Looking at similar attitudes, Garrett et al. (2013) find no evidence of these backfire effects in a study about a proposed Islamic cultural center in New York City. By contrast, Nyhan and Reifler (2010, 2015) find evidence for a backfire effect in a vaccines context as well as in the case of being correctly informed about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
This research note reports a replication of Nyhan and Reifler’s (2015) flu vaccines study embedded within a larger experimental study of flu vaccine intentions and attitudes. Data generated in the experiment do not replicate the backfire effect or the finding that corrections reduce misperceptions about vaccine safety. This suggests that more work is needed to validate the backfire effect, establishing the conditions under which it occurs and the size of its effect.
Keywords Vaccine, replication, backfire effect, misperception
In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior
In the Red: The Effects of Color on Investment Behavior. William Bazley, Henrik Cronqvist & Milica Mormann. University of Miami Working Paper, June 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992812
Abstract: Financial decisions in today's society are made in environments that involve color stimuli. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the effects of color on investment behavior. First, we find that when investors are displayed potential losses in red, risk taking is reduced. Second, when investors are shown past negative stock price paths in red, expectations about future stock returns are reduced. Consistent with red causing "avoidance behavior," red color reduces investors' propensity to purchase stocks. The findings are robust to a series of checks involving colorblind investors and alternative colors to control for salience effects. Finally, the effects are muted in a cultural setting, e.g., China, where red is not used to visualize financial losses. A contribution of this study is to introduce hypotheses from color psychology and visual science to enhance our understanding of the behavior of individual investors.
Keywords: Investment behavior; Color psychology
JEL Classification: G02, G11
Abstract: Financial decisions in today's society are made in environments that involve color stimuli. In this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the effects of color on investment behavior. First, we find that when investors are displayed potential losses in red, risk taking is reduced. Second, when investors are shown past negative stock price paths in red, expectations about future stock returns are reduced. Consistent with red causing "avoidance behavior," red color reduces investors' propensity to purchase stocks. The findings are robust to a series of checks involving colorblind investors and alternative colors to control for salience effects. Finally, the effects are muted in a cultural setting, e.g., China, where red is not used to visualize financial losses. A contribution of this study is to introduce hypotheses from color psychology and visual science to enhance our understanding of the behavior of individual investors.
Keywords: Investment behavior; Color psychology
JEL Classification: G02, G11
Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016)
Does Subjective SES Moderate the Effect of Money Priming on System Support? A Replication of Schuler and Wänke (2016). Jarret Crawford & Allison Fournier, https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/c43bk/
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) reported that subtle money cues impacted a range of behaviors, including working independently without asking for assistance, contributing less to charity, and providing less assistance to experimenters and confederates. Other research found that money priming effects decreased empathy, compassion, and people’s willingness to volunteer and donate time and money (Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009).
Further, Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) reasoned that because money is a symbol of American free-market capitalism, subtle money reminders would make people more accepting of free-market and other belief systems that justify existing structural inequality. They reported five studies suggesting that money priming increased support for such beliefs systems (i.e., System Justification, Belief in a Just World [BJW], Social Dominance Orientation, and Fair Market Ideology).
These findings have been called into question by notable failed replication attempts.
[...]
We conclude that the original findings may have been the result of sampling error, and the findings of “small telescopes” analyses are consistent with this conclusion. We discuss implications for money priming effects, and replication attempts in general.
Keywords: money priming; system justification; BJW; priming effects; replication
My Spanish commentary: many who I know are supportive of free markets and do not contribute less to charities or help less coworkers (being very, very competitive at the same time)... They just re-orient my contributions from organizations perceived as failures or corrupt ones (an example is any European Red Cross society, which brags about their universal, impartial, neutral, etc., character, but does not deliver) to others perceived as less crooked in their conduct codes and actual behavior (American Red Cross). Or don't give to child cancer research, which produces very scant results in disorganized societies, but contribute to medical organizations that are the best in their city and are in the first position in the place they live in (Mount Sinai Hospital, Barcelona Clinic Hospital, La Paz Hospital). Or do not contribute to museums or libraries in disorganized societies, but contribute to others perceived as with top-notch credentials (Library of Congress). Or do not volunteer for traditional parties, but help and contribute to other parties and organizations (e.g., Libertarian ones). This is just a bunch of anecdotes, but many people with lots of money and assets contribute a lot. Obviously those non-replicable studies are quite defective... too many exceptions.
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) reported that subtle money cues impacted a range of behaviors, including working independently without asking for assistance, contributing less to charity, and providing less assistance to experimenters and confederates. Other research found that money priming effects decreased empathy, compassion, and people’s willingness to volunteer and donate time and money (Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Molinsky, Grant, & Margolis, 2012; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009).
Further, Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) reasoned that because money is a symbol of American free-market capitalism, subtle money reminders would make people more accepting of free-market and other belief systems that justify existing structural inequality. They reported five studies suggesting that money priming increased support for such beliefs systems (i.e., System Justification, Belief in a Just World [BJW], Social Dominance Orientation, and Fair Market Ideology).
These findings have been called into question by notable failed replication attempts.
[...]
We conclude that the original findings may have been the result of sampling error, and the findings of “small telescopes” analyses are consistent with this conclusion. We discuss implications for money priming effects, and replication attempts in general.
Keywords: money priming; system justification; BJW; priming effects; replication
My Spanish commentary: many who I know are supportive of free markets and do not contribute less to charities or help less coworkers (being very, very competitive at the same time)... They just re-orient my contributions from organizations perceived as failures or corrupt ones (an example is any European Red Cross society, which brags about their universal, impartial, neutral, etc., character, but does not deliver) to others perceived as less crooked in their conduct codes and actual behavior (American Red Cross). Or don't give to child cancer research, which produces very scant results in disorganized societies, but contribute to medical organizations that are the best in their city and are in the first position in the place they live in (Mount Sinai Hospital, Barcelona Clinic Hospital, La Paz Hospital). Or do not contribute to museums or libraries in disorganized societies, but contribute to others perceived as with top-notch credentials (Library of Congress). Or do not volunteer for traditional parties, but help and contribute to other parties and organizations (e.g., Libertarian ones). This is just a bunch of anecdotes, but many people with lots of money and assets contribute a lot. Obviously those non-replicable studies are quite defective... too many exceptions.
Monday, August 7, 2017
How Linguistic Metaphor Scaffolds Reasoning
How Linguistic Metaphor Scaffolds Reasoning. Paul H. Thibodeau, Rose K. Hendricks, Lera Boroditsky. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Aug 05 2017, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2017.07.001
Abstract: Language helps people communicate and think. Precise and accurate language would seem best suited to achieve these goals. But a close look at the way people actually talk reveals an abundance of apparent imprecision in the form of metaphor: ideas are ‘light bulbs’, crime is a ‘virus’, and cancer is an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’. In this article, we review recent evidence that metaphoric language can facilitate communication and shape thinking even though it is literally false. We first discuss recent experiments showing that linguistic metaphor can guide thought and behavior. Then we explore the conditions under which metaphors are most influential. Throughout, we highlight theoretical and practical implications, as well as key challenges and opportunities for future research.
Keywords: analogy; decision making; framing; language and thought; metaphor; reasoning
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Linguistic metaphors describe a topic of discussion in terms of a semantically unrelated domain [1–8]. Recent work in cognitive science has demonstrated that metaphors can shape the way people think (Table1). For instance, in one study, Alan Turing was seen as more of a genius with more exceptional inventions when his ideas were described as lightbulbs rather than as seeds [9]. In an other study, people were more likely to support reform, rather than enforcement-oriented, approaches to crime reduction when crime was described as a virus than as a beast. Experiments have also shown that personifying changes in stock prices (‘climbing’ and ‘slipping’), rather than objectifying them (‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ in value), makes people more likely to think recent price trajectories will continue into the future. And framing cancer as an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’ has been found to reduce people’s intentions to engage in self-limiting preventative behaviors (e.g., eating less red meat, smoking less; [14]) and to think that it would be harder for cancer patients to come to terms with their situation [15]. Metaphors have also beens hown to affect behavior [16–20]. For instance, metaphor-based interventions – describing the brain as a ‘muscle’ that ‘grows’ with practice – can encourage students to adopt an incremental, rather than fixed, theory of intelligence [21]. In turn, an incremental theory of intelligence leads students to be more committed to their learning goals and persistent in the face of adversity.
[...] Neuroimaging studies have shown that vivid sensorimotor metaphors engage neural networks that represent the corresponding sensation or action. For example, hearing 'she grasped the idea' activates [the] motor cortex; hearing 'she is sweet' activates gustatory areas...
[...] One meta-analysis estimated that metaphorical language is about 6 percent more persuasive than comparable literal language...
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My Spanish commentary: demagogues know about this and use it constantly. And I detect the use of these techniques in daily newspapers, like the NY Times, Financial Times and the Washington Post, or non-daily publications like The Economist, Nature/Science (especially regarding climate) or Scientific American. I guess that advertising uses this too, like images of tasty steaks in a grill, etc.
Abstract: Language helps people communicate and think. Precise and accurate language would seem best suited to achieve these goals. But a close look at the way people actually talk reveals an abundance of apparent imprecision in the form of metaphor: ideas are ‘light bulbs’, crime is a ‘virus’, and cancer is an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’. In this article, we review recent evidence that metaphoric language can facilitate communication and shape thinking even though it is literally false. We first discuss recent experiments showing that linguistic metaphor can guide thought and behavior. Then we explore the conditions under which metaphors are most influential. Throughout, we highlight theoretical and practical implications, as well as key challenges and opportunities for future research.
Keywords: analogy; decision making; framing; language and thought; metaphor; reasoning
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Linguistic metaphors describe a topic of discussion in terms of a semantically unrelated domain [1–8]. Recent work in cognitive science has demonstrated that metaphors can shape the way people think (Table1). For instance, in one study, Alan Turing was seen as more of a genius with more exceptional inventions when his ideas were described as lightbulbs rather than as seeds [9]. In an other study, people were more likely to support reform, rather than enforcement-oriented, approaches to crime reduction when crime was described as a virus than as a beast. Experiments have also shown that personifying changes in stock prices (‘climbing’ and ‘slipping’), rather than objectifying them (‘increasing’ and ‘decreasing’ in value), makes people more likely to think recent price trajectories will continue into the future. And framing cancer as an ‘enemy’ in a ‘war’ has been found to reduce people’s intentions to engage in self-limiting preventative behaviors (e.g., eating less red meat, smoking less; [14]) and to think that it would be harder for cancer patients to come to terms with their situation [15]. Metaphors have also beens hown to affect behavior [16–20]. For instance, metaphor-based interventions – describing the brain as a ‘muscle’ that ‘grows’ with practice – can encourage students to adopt an incremental, rather than fixed, theory of intelligence [21]. In turn, an incremental theory of intelligence leads students to be more committed to their learning goals and persistent in the face of adversity.
[...] Neuroimaging studies have shown that vivid sensorimotor metaphors engage neural networks that represent the corresponding sensation or action. For example, hearing 'she grasped the idea' activates [the] motor cortex; hearing 'she is sweet' activates gustatory areas...
[...] One meta-analysis estimated that metaphorical language is about 6 percent more persuasive than comparable literal language...
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My Spanish commentary: demagogues know about this and use it constantly. And I detect the use of these techniques in daily newspapers, like the NY Times, Financial Times and the Washington Post, or non-daily publications like The Economist, Nature/Science (especially regarding climate) or Scientific American. I guess that advertising uses this too, like images of tasty steaks in a grill, etc.
Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists
Global evidence of extreme intuitive moral prejudice against atheists. Will M. Gervais et al. Nature Human Behavior, 1, Article number: 0151 (2017). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0151
Mounting evidence supports long-standing claims that religions can extend cooperative networks. However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component. Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a given religious group, promoting regional violence, intergroup conflict and tacit prejudice against non-believers. Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in increasingly secular societies —affects employment, elections, family life and broader social inclusion. Preliminary work in the United States suggests that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N = 3,256; 13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and morality, people in most—but not all— of these countries viewed extreme moral violations as representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist participants around the world. The results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries, and imply that the recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful influence on moral judgements persists, even among non-believers in secular societies.
Mounting evidence supports long-standing claims that religions can extend cooperative networks. However, religious prosociality may have a strongly parochial component. Moreover, aspects of religion may promote or exacerbate conflict with those outside a given religious group, promoting regional violence, intergroup conflict and tacit prejudice against non-believers. Anti-atheist prejudice—a growing concern in increasingly secular societies —affects employment, elections, family life and broader social inclusion. Preliminary work in the United States suggests that anti-atheist prejudice stems, in part, from deeply rooted intuitions about religion’s putatively necessary role in morality. However, the cross-cultural prevalence and magnitude—as well as intracultural demographic stability—of such intuitions, as manifested in intuitive associations of immorality with atheists, remain unclear. Here, we quantify moral distrust of atheists by applying well-tested measures in a large global sample (N = 3,256; 13 diverse countries). Consistent with cultural evolutionary theories of religion and morality, people in most—but not all— of these countries viewed extreme moral violations as representative of atheists. Notably, anti-atheist prejudice was even evident among atheist participants around the world. The results contrast with recent polls that do not find self-reported moral prejudice against atheists in highly secular countries, and imply that the recent rise in secularism in Western countries has not overwritten intuitive anti-atheist prejudice. Entrenched moral suspicion of atheists suggests that religion’s powerful influence on moral judgements persists, even among non-believers in secular societies.
How short is too short? An ultra-brief measure of the big-five personality domains implicates “agreeableness” as a risk for all-cause mortality
How short is too short? An ultra-brief measure of the big-five personality domains implicates “agreeableness” as a risk for all-cause mortality. Benjamin P Chapman, Ari J Elliot
Journal of Health Psychology, Aug 03 2017, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1359105317720819
Abstract: Controversy exists over the use of brief Big Five scales in health studies. We investigated links between an ultra-brief measure, the Big Five Inventory-10, and mortality in the General Social Survey. The Agreeableness scale was associated with elevated mortality risk (hazard ratio = 1.26, p = .017). This effect was attributable to the reversed-scored item “Tends to find fault with others,” so that greater fault-finding predicted lower mortality risk. The Conscientiousness scale approached meta-analytic estimates, which were not precise enough for significance. Those seeking Big Five measurement in health studies should be aware that the Big Five Inventory-10 may yield unusual results.
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"Those reporting that they often criticized others lived longer."
Journal of Health Psychology, Aug 03 2017, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1359105317720819
Abstract: Controversy exists over the use of brief Big Five scales in health studies. We investigated links between an ultra-brief measure, the Big Five Inventory-10, and mortality in the General Social Survey. The Agreeableness scale was associated with elevated mortality risk (hazard ratio = 1.26, p = .017). This effect was attributable to the reversed-scored item “Tends to find fault with others,” so that greater fault-finding predicted lower mortality risk. The Conscientiousness scale approached meta-analytic estimates, which were not precise enough for significance. Those seeking Big Five measurement in health studies should be aware that the Big Five Inventory-10 may yield unusual results.
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"Those reporting that they often criticized others lived longer."
Third-person self-talk facilitates emotion regulation without engaging cognitive control: Converging evidence from ERP and fMRI
Third-person self-talk facilitates emotion regulation without engaging cognitive control: Converging evidence from ERP and fMRI. Jason Moser et al. Scientific Reports, July 2017, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-04047-3
Abstract: Does silently talking to yourself in the third-person constitute a relatively effortless form of self control? We hypothesized that it does under the premise that third-person self-talk leads people to think about the self similar to how they think about others, which provides them with the psychological distance needed to facilitate self control. We tested this prediction by asking participants to reflect on feelings elicited by viewing aversive images (Study 1) and recalling negative autobiographical memories (Study 2) using either “I” or their name while measuring neural activity via ERPs (Study 1) and fMRI (Study 2). Study 1 demonstrated that third-person self-talk reduced an ERP marker of self-referential emotional reactivity (i.e., late positive potential) within the first second of viewing aversive images without enhancing an ERP marker of cognitive control (i.e., stimulus preceding negativity). Conceptually replicating these results, Study 2 demonstrated that third-person self-talk was linked with reduced levels of activation in an a priori defined fMRI marker of self-referential processing (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex) when participants reflected on negative memories without eliciting increased levels of activity in a priori defined fMRI markers of cognitive control. Together, these results suggest that third-person self-talk may constitute a relatively effortless form of self-control.
Abstract: Does silently talking to yourself in the third-person constitute a relatively effortless form of self control? We hypothesized that it does under the premise that third-person self-talk leads people to think about the self similar to how they think about others, which provides them with the psychological distance needed to facilitate self control. We tested this prediction by asking participants to reflect on feelings elicited by viewing aversive images (Study 1) and recalling negative autobiographical memories (Study 2) using either “I” or their name while measuring neural activity via ERPs (Study 1) and fMRI (Study 2). Study 1 demonstrated that third-person self-talk reduced an ERP marker of self-referential emotional reactivity (i.e., late positive potential) within the first second of viewing aversive images without enhancing an ERP marker of cognitive control (i.e., stimulus preceding negativity). Conceptually replicating these results, Study 2 demonstrated that third-person self-talk was linked with reduced levels of activation in an a priori defined fMRI marker of self-referential processing (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex) when participants reflected on negative memories without eliciting increased levels of activity in a priori defined fMRI markers of cognitive control. Together, these results suggest that third-person self-talk may constitute a relatively effortless form of self-control.
Buying time promotes happiness
Buying time promotes happiness. Ashley V. Whillans et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/07/18/1706541114.full
Significance: Despite rising incomes, people around the world are feeling increasingly pressed for time, undermining well-being. We show that the time famine of modern life can be reduced by using money to buy time. Surveys of large, diverse samples from four countries reveal that spending money on time-saving services is linked to greater life satisfaction. To establish causality, we show that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. This research reveals a previously unexamined route from wealth to well-being: spending money to buy free time.
Abstract: Around the world, increases in wealth have produced an unintended consequence: a rising sense of time scarcity. We provide evidence that using money to buy time can provide a buffer against this time famine, thereby promoting happiness. Using large, diverse samples from the United States, Canada, Denmark, and The Netherlands (n = 6,271), we show that individuals who spend money on time-saving services report greater life satisfaction. A field experiment provides causal evidence that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. Together, these results suggest that using money to buy time can protect people from the detrimental effects of time pressure on life satisfaction.
Significance: Despite rising incomes, people around the world are feeling increasingly pressed for time, undermining well-being. We show that the time famine of modern life can be reduced by using money to buy time. Surveys of large, diverse samples from four countries reveal that spending money on time-saving services is linked to greater life satisfaction. To establish causality, we show that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. This research reveals a previously unexamined route from wealth to well-being: spending money to buy free time.
Abstract: Around the world, increases in wealth have produced an unintended consequence: a rising sense of time scarcity. We provide evidence that using money to buy time can provide a buffer against this time famine, thereby promoting happiness. Using large, diverse samples from the United States, Canada, Denmark, and The Netherlands (n = 6,271), we show that individuals who spend money on time-saving services report greater life satisfaction. A field experiment provides causal evidence that working adults report greater happiness after spending money on a time-saving purchase than on a material purchase. Together, these results suggest that using money to buy time can protect people from the detrimental effects of time pressure on life satisfaction.
The Psychological Health Benefits of Accepting Negative Emotions and Thoughts: Laboratory, Diary, and Longitudinal Evidence
The Psychological Health Benefits of Accepting Negative Emotions and Thoughts: Laboratory, Diary, and Longitudinal Evidence. Brett Ford et al. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28703602
Abstract: Individuals differ in the degree to which they tend to habitually accept their emotions and thoughts without judging them — a process here referred to as habitual acceptance. Acceptance has been linked with greater psychological health, which we propose may be due to the role acceptance plays in negative emotional responses to stressors: acceptance helps keep individuals from reacting to — and thus exacerbating — their negative mental experiences. Over time, experiencing lower negative emotion should promote psychological health. To test these hypotheses, Study 1 (N = 1,003) verified that habitually accepting mental experiences broadly predicted psychological health (psychological well-being, life satisfaction, and depressive and anxiety symptoms), even when controlling for potentially related constructs (reappraisal, rumination, and other mindfulness facets including observing, describing, acting with awareness, and nonreactivity). Next, in a laboratory study (Study 2, N = 156), habitual acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotional responses to a standardized stressor. Finally, in a longitudinal design (Study 3, N = 222), acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotion experienced during daily stressors that, in turn, accounted for the link between acceptance and psychological health 6 months later. This link between acceptance and psychological health was unique to accepting mental experiences and was not observed for accepting situations. Additionally, we ruled out potential confounding effects of gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and life stress severity. Overall, these results suggest that individuals who accept rather than judge their mental experiences may attain better psychological health, in part because acceptance helps them experience less negative emotion in response to stressors.
Abstract: Individuals differ in the degree to which they tend to habitually accept their emotions and thoughts without judging them — a process here referred to as habitual acceptance. Acceptance has been linked with greater psychological health, which we propose may be due to the role acceptance plays in negative emotional responses to stressors: acceptance helps keep individuals from reacting to — and thus exacerbating — their negative mental experiences. Over time, experiencing lower negative emotion should promote psychological health. To test these hypotheses, Study 1 (N = 1,003) verified that habitually accepting mental experiences broadly predicted psychological health (psychological well-being, life satisfaction, and depressive and anxiety symptoms), even when controlling for potentially related constructs (reappraisal, rumination, and other mindfulness facets including observing, describing, acting with awareness, and nonreactivity). Next, in a laboratory study (Study 2, N = 156), habitual acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotional responses to a standardized stressor. Finally, in a longitudinal design (Study 3, N = 222), acceptance predicted lower negative (but not positive) emotion experienced during daily stressors that, in turn, accounted for the link between acceptance and psychological health 6 months later. This link between acceptance and psychological health was unique to accepting mental experiences and was not observed for accepting situations. Additionally, we ruled out potential confounding effects of gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and life stress severity. Overall, these results suggest that individuals who accept rather than judge their mental experiences may attain better psychological health, in part because acceptance helps them experience less negative emotion in response to stressors.
Does a Culture of Happiness Increase Rumination Over Failure? It does.
Does a Culture of Happiness Increase Rumination Over Failure? Lucy McGuirk et al. Emotion, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28714701
Abstract: Promoting happiness within society is good for health, but could the overpromotion of happiness have a downside? Across 2 studies, we investigate 2 emotion norms associated with an emphasis on happiness — the importance of (a) seeking positive emotion, and (b) avoiding negative emotion — and whether these norms have implications for how people respond to, and seek to regulate, their negative emotional experiences. In Study 1, we used an experimental design to show that emphasizing the importance of happiness increased rumination in response to failure. In Study 2, we drew on cross-sectional evidence to investigate the other side of this equation, finding that emphasizing the importance of not experiencing negative emotional states (e.g., depression and anxiety) was also associated with increased rumination, and that this had downstream consequences for well-being. Together, the findings suggest that the overpromotion of happiness, and, in turn, the felt social pressure not to experience negative emotional states, has implications for maladaptive responses to negative emotional experiences.
Abstract: Promoting happiness within society is good for health, but could the overpromotion of happiness have a downside? Across 2 studies, we investigate 2 emotion norms associated with an emphasis on happiness — the importance of (a) seeking positive emotion, and (b) avoiding negative emotion — and whether these norms have implications for how people respond to, and seek to regulate, their negative emotional experiences. In Study 1, we used an experimental design to show that emphasizing the importance of happiness increased rumination in response to failure. In Study 2, we drew on cross-sectional evidence to investigate the other side of this equation, finding that emphasizing the importance of not experiencing negative emotional states (e.g., depression and anxiety) was also associated with increased rumination, and that this had downstream consequences for well-being. Together, the findings suggest that the overpromotion of happiness, and, in turn, the felt social pressure not to experience negative emotional states, has implications for maladaptive responses to negative emotional experiences.
To Err Is Robot: How Humans Assess and Act toward an Erroneous Social Robot
To Err Is Robot: How Humans Assess and Act toward an Erroneous Social Robot. Nicole Mirnig et al. Front. Robot. AI, 31 May 2017. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2017.00021
We conducted a user study for which we purposefully programmed faulty behavior into a robot’s routine. It was our aim to explore if participants rate the faulty robot different from an error-free robot and which reactions people show in interaction with a faulty robot. The study was based on our previous research on robot errors where we detected typical error situations and the resulting social signals of our participants during social human–robot interaction. In contrast to our previous work, where we studied video material in which robot errors occurred unintentionally, in the herein reported user study, we purposefully elicited robot errors to further explore the human interaction partners’ social signals following a robot error. Our participants interacted with a human-like NAO, and the robot either performed faulty or free from error. First, the robot asked the participants a set of predefined questions and then it asked them to complete a couple of LEGO building tasks. After the interaction, we asked the participants to rate the robot’s anthropomorphism, likability, and perceived intelligence. We also interviewed the participants on their opinion about the interaction. Additionally, we video-coded the social signals the participants showed during their interaction with the robot as well as the answers they provided the robot with. ***Our results show that participants liked the faulty robot significantly better than the robot that interacted flawlessly***. We did not find significant differences in people’s ratings of the robot’s anthropomorphism and perceived intelligence. The qualitative data confirmed the questionnaire results in showing that although the participants recognized the robot’s mistakes, they did not necessarily reject the erroneous robot. The annotations of the video data further showed that gaze shifts (e.g., from an object to the robot or vice versa) and laughter are typical reactions to unexpected robot behavior. In contrast to existing research, we assess dimensions of user experience that have not been considered so far and we analyze the reactions users express when a robot makes a mistake. Our results show that decoding a human’s social signals can help the robot understand that there is an error and subsequently react accordingly.
We conducted a user study for which we purposefully programmed faulty behavior into a robot’s routine. It was our aim to explore if participants rate the faulty robot different from an error-free robot and which reactions people show in interaction with a faulty robot. The study was based on our previous research on robot errors where we detected typical error situations and the resulting social signals of our participants during social human–robot interaction. In contrast to our previous work, where we studied video material in which robot errors occurred unintentionally, in the herein reported user study, we purposefully elicited robot errors to further explore the human interaction partners’ social signals following a robot error. Our participants interacted with a human-like NAO, and the robot either performed faulty or free from error. First, the robot asked the participants a set of predefined questions and then it asked them to complete a couple of LEGO building tasks. After the interaction, we asked the participants to rate the robot’s anthropomorphism, likability, and perceived intelligence. We also interviewed the participants on their opinion about the interaction. Additionally, we video-coded the social signals the participants showed during their interaction with the robot as well as the answers they provided the robot with. ***Our results show that participants liked the faulty robot significantly better than the robot that interacted flawlessly***. We did not find significant differences in people’s ratings of the robot’s anthropomorphism and perceived intelligence. The qualitative data confirmed the questionnaire results in showing that although the participants recognized the robot’s mistakes, they did not necessarily reject the erroneous robot. The annotations of the video data further showed that gaze shifts (e.g., from an object to the robot or vice versa) and laughter are typical reactions to unexpected robot behavior. In contrast to existing research, we assess dimensions of user experience that have not been considered so far and we analyze the reactions users express when a robot makes a mistake. Our results show that decoding a human’s social signals can help the robot understand that there is an error and subsequently react accordingly.
Prenatal Exposure to Progesterone Affects Sexual Orientation in Humans
Prenatal Exposure to Progesterone Affects Sexual Orientation in Humans. June Reinisch, Erik Lykke Mortensen & Stephanie Sanders. Archives of Sexual Behavior, July 2017, Pages 1239-1249, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28374065
Abstract: Prenatal sex hormone levels affect physical and behavioral sexual differentiation in animals and humans. Although prenatal hormones are theorized to influence sexual orientation in humans, evidence is sparse. Sexual orientation variables for 34 prenatally progesterone-exposed subjects (17 males and 17 females) were compared to matched controls (M age = 23.2 years). A case-control double-blind design was used drawing on existing data from the US/Denmark Prenatal Development Project. Index cases were exposed to lutocyclin (bioidentical progesterone = C21H30O2; MW: 314.46) and no other hormonal preparation. Controls were matched on 14 physical, medical, and socioeconomic variables. A structured interview conducted by a psychologist and self-administered questionnaires were used to collect data on sexual orientation, self-identification, attraction to the same and other sex, and history of sexual behavior with each sex. Compared to the unexposed, fewer exposed males and females identified as heterosexual and more of them reported histories of same-sex sexual behavior, attraction to the same or both sexes, and scored higher on attraction to males. Measures of heterosexual behavior and scores on attraction to females did not differ significantly by exposure. We conclude that, regardless of sex, exposure appeared to be associated with higher rates of bisexuality. Prenatal progesterone may be an underappreciated epigenetic factor in human sexual and psychosexual development and, in light of the current prevalence of progesterone treatment during pregnancy for a variety of pregnancy complications, warrants further investigation. These data on the effects of prenatal exposure to exogenous progesterone also suggest a potential role for natural early perturbations in progesterone levels in the development of sexual orientation.
Abstract: Prenatal sex hormone levels affect physical and behavioral sexual differentiation in animals and humans. Although prenatal hormones are theorized to influence sexual orientation in humans, evidence is sparse. Sexual orientation variables for 34 prenatally progesterone-exposed subjects (17 males and 17 females) were compared to matched controls (M age = 23.2 years). A case-control double-blind design was used drawing on existing data from the US/Denmark Prenatal Development Project. Index cases were exposed to lutocyclin (bioidentical progesterone = C21H30O2; MW: 314.46) and no other hormonal preparation. Controls were matched on 14 physical, medical, and socioeconomic variables. A structured interview conducted by a psychologist and self-administered questionnaires were used to collect data on sexual orientation, self-identification, attraction to the same and other sex, and history of sexual behavior with each sex. Compared to the unexposed, fewer exposed males and females identified as heterosexual and more of them reported histories of same-sex sexual behavior, attraction to the same or both sexes, and scored higher on attraction to males. Measures of heterosexual behavior and scores on attraction to females did not differ significantly by exposure. We conclude that, regardless of sex, exposure appeared to be associated with higher rates of bisexuality. Prenatal progesterone may be an underappreciated epigenetic factor in human sexual and psychosexual development and, in light of the current prevalence of progesterone treatment during pregnancy for a variety of pregnancy complications, warrants further investigation. These data on the effects of prenatal exposure to exogenous progesterone also suggest a potential role for natural early perturbations in progesterone levels in the development of sexual orientation.
Is the Lone Scientist an American Dream? Perceived Communal Opportunities in STEM Offer a Pathway to Closing U.S.–Asia Gaps in Interest and Positivity
Is the Lone Scientist an American Dream? Perceived Communal Opportunities in STEM Offer a Pathway to Closing U.S.–Asia Gaps in Interest and Positivity. Elizabeth Brown et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550617703173
Abstract: The United States lags behind many Asian countries in engagement in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). An unexplored factor in these country-level differences may be U.S.–Asia gaps in perceptions of the goal opportunities provided by STEM. Across four studies, U.S. students perceived fewer communal opportunities (working with/helping/relationships with others) in STEM than Asian students; this differential perception contributed to U.S.–Asia gaps in STEM interest. Perceptions of communal opportunities in STEM did not follow from a general orientation to perceive that all careers provided communal opportunities but from communal engagement in STEM. Perceptions about communal opportunities in STEM predicted STEM interest, and communal experience in STEM predicted STEM interest beyond quantity of STEM exposure. Experimentally highlighting the perceived communal opportunities in science closed the cultural gap in positivity toward a scientist career (Study 5). Perceptions of communal opportunities in STEM provide a new vantage point to improve U.S. engagement in STEM.
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at "the private California Institute of Technology, which by choice does not consider race as a factor, more than 40% of students were Asian-American in 2013, up from 26% in 1993"†)
"the share at University of California campuses at Berkeley and Los Angeles tops 30%."†
"In 1993 about 20% of Harvard students were Asian-American [...] now it is 22% Asian-American," approx. the same "at Princeton, Yale and other Ivy League schools."†
† What Is Harvard Hiding? Wall Street Journal Editorial, Aug. 6, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-harvard-hiding-1501888626
‡ From official data: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_racial_and_ethnic_demographics_of_the_United_States#Asian_and_Pacific_Islander_.28including_of_Hispanic_origin.29: from approx 11 million people in 2000 to approx 20 million en 2015.
Non-official: www-personal.umich.edu/~yuxie/Research/brief/Tables.pdf > year 1990: 6 908 638; year 2000: 11 070 913.
Abstract: The United States lags behind many Asian countries in engagement in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). An unexplored factor in these country-level differences may be U.S.–Asia gaps in perceptions of the goal opportunities provided by STEM. Across four studies, U.S. students perceived fewer communal opportunities (working with/helping/relationships with others) in STEM than Asian students; this differential perception contributed to U.S.–Asia gaps in STEM interest. Perceptions of communal opportunities in STEM did not follow from a general orientation to perceive that all careers provided communal opportunities but from communal engagement in STEM. Perceptions about communal opportunities in STEM predicted STEM interest, and communal experience in STEM predicted STEM interest beyond quantity of STEM exposure. Experimentally highlighting the perceived communal opportunities in science closed the cultural gap in positivity toward a scientist career (Study 5). Perceptions of communal opportunities in STEM provide a new vantage point to improve U.S. engagement in STEM.
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at "the private California Institute of Technology, which by choice does not consider race as a factor, more than 40% of students were Asian-American in 2013, up from 26% in 1993"†)
"the share at University of California campuses at Berkeley and Los Angeles tops 30%."†
"In 1993 about 20% of Harvard students were Asian-American [...] now it is 22% Asian-American," approx. the same "at Princeton, Yale and other Ivy League schools."†
† What Is Harvard Hiding? Wall Street Journal Editorial, Aug. 6, 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-harvard-hiding-1501888626
‡ From official data: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_racial_and_ethnic_demographics_of_the_United_States#Asian_and_Pacific_Islander_.28including_of_Hispanic_origin.29: from approx 11 million people in 2000 to approx 20 million en 2015.
Non-official: www-personal.umich.edu/~yuxie/Research/brief/Tables.pdf > year 1990: 6 908 638; year 2000: 11 070 913.
Are Individualistic Societies Less Equal? Evidence from the Parasite Stress Theory of Values
Are Individualistic Societies Less Equal? Evidence from the Parasite Stress Theory of Values. Boris Nikolaev, Rauf Salahodjaev and Christopher Boudreaux. March 23, 2017. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78557/
Abstract: It is widely believed that individualistic societies, which emphasize personal freedom, award social status for accomplishment, and favor minimal government intervention, are more prone to higher levels of income inequality compared to more collectivist societies, which value conformity, loyalty, and tradition and favor more interventionist policies. The results in this paper, however, challenge this conventional view. Drawing on a rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology, we test the provocative Parasite Stress Theory of Values, which suggests a possible link between the historical prevalence of infectious diseases, the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism and differences in income inequality across countries. Specifically, in a two-stage least squares analysis, we use the historical prevalence of infectious diseases as an instrument for individualistic values, which, in the next stage, predict the level of income inequality, measured by the net GINI coe cient from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Our findings suggest that societies with more individualistic values have significantly lower net income inequality. The results are robust even after controlling for a number of confounding factors such as economic development, legal origins, religion, human capital, other cultural values, economic institutions, and geographical controls.
Abstract: It is widely believed that individualistic societies, which emphasize personal freedom, award social status for accomplishment, and favor minimal government intervention, are more prone to higher levels of income inequality compared to more collectivist societies, which value conformity, loyalty, and tradition and favor more interventionist policies. The results in this paper, however, challenge this conventional view. Drawing on a rich literature in biology and evolutionary psychology, we test the provocative Parasite Stress Theory of Values, which suggests a possible link between the historical prevalence of infectious diseases, the cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism and differences in income inequality across countries. Specifically, in a two-stage least squares analysis, we use the historical prevalence of infectious diseases as an instrument for individualistic values, which, in the next stage, predict the level of income inequality, measured by the net GINI coe cient from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Our findings suggest that societies with more individualistic values have significantly lower net income inequality. The results are robust even after controlling for a number of confounding factors such as economic development, legal origins, religion, human capital, other cultural values, economic institutions, and geographical controls.
In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict
In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Brideprice and Violent Conflict. Valerie M. Hudson and Hilary Matfess. August 02, 2017. International Security, v 42 | Issue 1 | Summer 2017, p.7-40
doi: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00289
Abstract: Approximately seventy-five percent of the world's population lives in countries where asset exchange upon marriage is obligatory. Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman's family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict. In patrilineal (and some matrilineal) societies where brideprice is practiced, a man's social status is directly connected to his marital status. Brideprice acts as a flat tax that is prone to sudden and swift increases. As a result, rising brideprice can create serious marriage market distortions that prevent young men, especially those who are poor or otherwise marginalized, from marrying. This phenomenon is especially evident in polygamous societies, where wealthy men can afford more than one bride. These distortions incentivize extra-legal asset accumulation, whether through ad hoc raiding or organized violence. In such situations, rebel and terror groups may offer to pay brideprice—or even provide brides—to recruit new members. Descriptive case studies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and various armed groups in South Sudan demonstrate these linkages, while an examination of Saudi Arabia's cap on brideprice and its efforts to arrange low-cost mass weddings illustrates the ways in which governments can intervene in marriage markets to help prevent brideprice-related instability. The trajectory of brideprice is an important but neglected early indicator of societal instability and violent conflict, underscoring that the situation and security of women tangibly affect national security.
doi: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00289
Abstract: Approximately seventy-five percent of the world's population lives in countries where asset exchange upon marriage is obligatory. Rising brideprice—money or gifts provided to a woman's family by the groom and his family as part of marriage arrangements—is a common if overlooked catalyst of violent conflict. In patrilineal (and some matrilineal) societies where brideprice is practiced, a man's social status is directly connected to his marital status. Brideprice acts as a flat tax that is prone to sudden and swift increases. As a result, rising brideprice can create serious marriage market distortions that prevent young men, especially those who are poor or otherwise marginalized, from marrying. This phenomenon is especially evident in polygamous societies, where wealthy men can afford more than one bride. These distortions incentivize extra-legal asset accumulation, whether through ad hoc raiding or organized violence. In such situations, rebel and terror groups may offer to pay brideprice—or even provide brides—to recruit new members. Descriptive case studies of Boko Haram in Nigeria and various armed groups in South Sudan demonstrate these linkages, while an examination of Saudi Arabia's cap on brideprice and its efforts to arrange low-cost mass weddings illustrates the ways in which governments can intervene in marriage markets to help prevent brideprice-related instability. The trajectory of brideprice is an important but neglected early indicator of societal instability and violent conflict, underscoring that the situation and security of women tangibly affect national security.
Saturday, August 5, 2017
Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence From an African Border Region
Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence From an African Border Region. Amanda Lea Robinson. Comparative Political Studies, Feb 2016. journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414016628269
In diverse societies, individuals tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. I argue that identification with a territorially defined nation, common to all ethnic groups, reduces the degree to which trust is ethnically bounded. I conduct a “lab-in-the-field” experiment at the intersection of national and ethnic boundaries in Malawi, which measures strength of national identification, experimentally manipulates national identity salience, and measures trust behaviorally. I find that shared nationality is a robust predictor of trust, equal in magnitude to the impact of shared ethnicity. Furthermore, national identification moderates the degree to which trust is limited to coethnics: While weak national identifiers trust coethnics more than non-coethnics, strong national identifiers are blind to ethnicity. Experimentally increasing national identity salience also eliminates the coethnic trust advantage among weak nationalists. These results offer micro-level evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.
In diverse societies, individuals tend to trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. I argue that identification with a territorially defined nation, common to all ethnic groups, reduces the degree to which trust is ethnically bounded. I conduct a “lab-in-the-field” experiment at the intersection of national and ethnic boundaries in Malawi, which measures strength of national identification, experimentally manipulates national identity salience, and measures trust behaviorally. I find that shared nationality is a robust predictor of trust, equal in magnitude to the impact of shared ethnicity. Furthermore, national identification moderates the degree to which trust is limited to coethnics: While weak national identifiers trust coethnics more than non-coethnics, strong national identifiers are blind to ethnicity. Experimentally increasing national identity salience also eliminates the coethnic trust advantage among weak nationalists. These results offer micro-level evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.
Social Desirability Bias and Polling Errors in the 2016 Presidential Election
Social Desirability Bias and Polling Errors in the 2016 Presidential Election. Andy Brownback and Aaron Novotny. University of Arkansas Working Paper, July 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3001360
Abstract: Social scientists have observed that socially desirable responding (SDR) often biases unincentivized surveys. During the 2016 presidential campaign, we conducted three list experiments to test the effect SDR has on polls of agreement with presidential candidates. We elicit a subject's agreement with either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump using explicit questioning or an implicit elicitation that allows subjects to conceal their individual responses. We find evidence that explicit polling overstates agreement with Clinton relative to Trump. Dividing subjects by party identification, we find that SDR significantly diminishes explicit statements of agreement with the opposing party's candidate. Democrats are significantly less likely to explicitly state agreement with Trump. This threatens the predictive validity of polling, negatively impacts the ability of markets to accurately price assets, and exaggerates disagreements between Democrats and Republicans. We measure economic policy preferences and find no evidence that ideological agreement drives SDR. We find suggestive evidence that SDR correlates with county-level voting patterns.
Keywords: Polling, Politics, Social Desirability, List Experiment, Behavioral Economics
JEL Classification: D02, D72
Abstract: Social scientists have observed that socially desirable responding (SDR) often biases unincentivized surveys. During the 2016 presidential campaign, we conducted three list experiments to test the effect SDR has on polls of agreement with presidential candidates. We elicit a subject's agreement with either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump using explicit questioning or an implicit elicitation that allows subjects to conceal their individual responses. We find evidence that explicit polling overstates agreement with Clinton relative to Trump. Dividing subjects by party identification, we find that SDR significantly diminishes explicit statements of agreement with the opposing party's candidate. Democrats are significantly less likely to explicitly state agreement with Trump. This threatens the predictive validity of polling, negatively impacts the ability of markets to accurately price assets, and exaggerates disagreements between Democrats and Republicans. We measure economic policy preferences and find no evidence that ideological agreement drives SDR. We find suggestive evidence that SDR correlates with county-level voting patterns.
Keywords: Polling, Politics, Social Desirability, List Experiment, Behavioral Economics
JEL Classification: D02, D72
Thursday, August 3, 2017
A Cross-Cultural Study of Risky Online Self-Presentation
White Claire M., Cutello Clara A., Gummerum Michaela, and Hanoch Yaniv: A Cross-Cultural Study of Risky Online Self-Presentation. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking. June 2017, https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2016.0660
Abstract: The use of social media is pervasive among young adults. However, not all posted content is beneficial to their self-presentation, but can have negative and damaging consequences. This study investigated how individual differences in self-monitoring and impulsiveness influence risky online self-presentation in British and Italian samples. British participants (n = 88) were more likely to post comments and images related to their alcohol and drug use, whereas Italian (n = 90) participants posted more offensive content and personal information. High self-monitoring and high impulsiveness was positively predictive of risky self-presentation online regardless of nationality, highlighting the normative influence of social media culture, and the influence of both spontaneous and deliberative behavior on posting inappropriate content online. These novel insights regarding the way young adults present themselves on social network sites could help explain differences in self-presentation.
Abstract: The use of social media is pervasive among young adults. However, not all posted content is beneficial to their self-presentation, but can have negative and damaging consequences. This study investigated how individual differences in self-monitoring and impulsiveness influence risky online self-presentation in British and Italian samples. British participants (n = 88) were more likely to post comments and images related to their alcohol and drug use, whereas Italian (n = 90) participants posted more offensive content and personal information. High self-monitoring and high impulsiveness was positively predictive of risky self-presentation online regardless of nationality, highlighting the normative influence of social media culture, and the influence of both spontaneous and deliberative behavior on posting inappropriate content online. These novel insights regarding the way young adults present themselves on social network sites could help explain differences in self-presentation.
Free will beliefs predict attitudes toward unethical behavior and criminal punishment
Free will beliefs predict attitudes toward unethical behavior and criminal punishment. Nathan Martin, Davide Rigoni & Kathleen Vohs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 11 July 2017, Pages 7325–7330, http://www.pnas.org/content/114/28/7325.abstract
Significance: Understanding the bases of moral judgment has been a longstanding goal of social science. Factors undergirding morality are argued to be both globally uniform and regionally variable. The current study found evidence of both. For residents of countries with low levels of corruption and transparent systems of governance, free will beliefs predicted greater support for harsh criminal punishment and an intolerance of unethical behavior. For residents of countries beset with corruption and obfuscation, free will beliefs predicted greater support for criminal punishment but were decoupled from judgments of unethical behavior. These findings confirm causal conclusions from experimental research about the influence of free will beliefs on moral judgments and demonstrate variation by sociopolitical context.
Abstract: Do free will beliefs influence moral judgments? Answers to this question from theoretical and empirical perspectives are controversial. This study attempted to replicate past research and offer theoretical insights by analyzing World Values Survey data from residents of 46 countries (n = 65,111 persons). Corroborating experimental findings, free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors and support for severe criminal punishment. Further, the link between free will beliefs and intolerance of unethical behavior was moderated by variations in countries’ institutional integrity, defined as the degree to which countries had accountable, corruption-free public sectors. Free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors for residents of countries with high and moderate institutional integrity, but this correlation was not seen for countries with low institutional integrity. Free will beliefs predicted support for criminal punishment regardless of countries’ institutional integrity. Results were robust across different operationalizations of institutional integrity and with or without statistical control variables.
Keywords: free will, beliefs, morality, criminal punishment, transparent governance, corruption
Significance: Understanding the bases of moral judgment has been a longstanding goal of social science. Factors undergirding morality are argued to be both globally uniform and regionally variable. The current study found evidence of both. For residents of countries with low levels of corruption and transparent systems of governance, free will beliefs predicted greater support for harsh criminal punishment and an intolerance of unethical behavior. For residents of countries beset with corruption and obfuscation, free will beliefs predicted greater support for criminal punishment but were decoupled from judgments of unethical behavior. These findings confirm causal conclusions from experimental research about the influence of free will beliefs on moral judgments and demonstrate variation by sociopolitical context.
Abstract: Do free will beliefs influence moral judgments? Answers to this question from theoretical and empirical perspectives are controversial. This study attempted to replicate past research and offer theoretical insights by analyzing World Values Survey data from residents of 46 countries (n = 65,111 persons). Corroborating experimental findings, free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors and support for severe criminal punishment. Further, the link between free will beliefs and intolerance of unethical behavior was moderated by variations in countries’ institutional integrity, defined as the degree to which countries had accountable, corruption-free public sectors. Free will beliefs predicted intolerance of unethical behaviors for residents of countries with high and moderate institutional integrity, but this correlation was not seen for countries with low institutional integrity. Free will beliefs predicted support for criminal punishment regardless of countries’ institutional integrity. Results were robust across different operationalizations of institutional integrity and with or without statistical control variables.
Keywords: free will, beliefs, morality, criminal punishment, transparent governance, corruption
Natural Disaster Risk and Collectivism
Natural Disaster Risk and Collectivism. Shigehiro Oishi and Asuka Komiya. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022022117719496
Abstract: Previous research found that low levels of national wealth and high levels of historical pathogen prevalence are associated with collectivism. The main idea is that harsh economic and physical environments present a psychological threat, which evokes collectivism or the priority of protecting in-group members. To the extent that natural disasters pose a major threat, we hypothesized that natural disaster risk is also associated with collectivism. Consistent with our hypothesis, nations with higher levels of natural disaster risk were more collectivistic than those with lower risk using both Hofstede’s individualism–collectivism scores and Taras, Steel, and Kirkman’s meta-analytic individualism–collectivism scores from 1970 to 2010, and Taras et al.’s meta-analytic individualism–collectivism scores from the 2000s. This association remained significant when controlling for other climatic factors such as historical pathogen prevalence, climatic harshness, and distance from the equator, respectively, when Hofstede’s individualism–collectivism scores and Taras et al.’s scores from 1970 to 2010 were used. The association became marginal when Taras et al.’s scores from the 2000s were used. A multiple regression analysis showed that natural disaster risk was not a predictor of collectivism, above and beyond gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, pathogen prevalence, climatic harshness, and distance from the equator simultaneously. Finally, we found the interaction between GDP per capita and natural disaster such that the link between natural disaster risk and collectivism was present among wealthy but not among poorer nations.
Abstract: Previous research found that low levels of national wealth and high levels of historical pathogen prevalence are associated with collectivism. The main idea is that harsh economic and physical environments present a psychological threat, which evokes collectivism or the priority of protecting in-group members. To the extent that natural disasters pose a major threat, we hypothesized that natural disaster risk is also associated with collectivism. Consistent with our hypothesis, nations with higher levels of natural disaster risk were more collectivistic than those with lower risk using both Hofstede’s individualism–collectivism scores and Taras, Steel, and Kirkman’s meta-analytic individualism–collectivism scores from 1970 to 2010, and Taras et al.’s meta-analytic individualism–collectivism scores from the 2000s. This association remained significant when controlling for other climatic factors such as historical pathogen prevalence, climatic harshness, and distance from the equator, respectively, when Hofstede’s individualism–collectivism scores and Taras et al.’s scores from 1970 to 2010 were used. The association became marginal when Taras et al.’s scores from the 2000s were used. A multiple regression analysis showed that natural disaster risk was not a predictor of collectivism, above and beyond gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, pathogen prevalence, climatic harshness, and distance from the equator simultaneously. Finally, we found the interaction between GDP per capita and natural disaster such that the link between natural disaster risk and collectivism was present among wealthy but not among poorer nations.
Frogs, Ponds, and Culture: Variations in Entry Decisions
Frogs, Ponds, and Culture: Variations in Entry Decisions. Kaidi Wu, Stephen Garcia & Shirli Kopelman. Social Psychological and Personality Science, journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550617706731
Abstract: Would you rather be the big frog in a small pond or the small frog in a big pond? In three studies, we demonstrate that the entry preference depends on culture. Study 1 found a higher big pond preference for East Asian, versus European American, students. Studies 2A and 2B replicated this big pond preference in behavioral intent across educational and organizational settings for Chinese, as compared to United States, working adults. Study 3 demonstrated cultural variation in frog–pond decisions was not explained by comparison processes that characterize postentry self-regard but rather by concerns for prestige. Together, findings highlight how a cultural lens informs psychological processes that shape entry decision-making.
Abstract: Would you rather be the big frog in a small pond or the small frog in a big pond? In three studies, we demonstrate that the entry preference depends on culture. Study 1 found a higher big pond preference for East Asian, versus European American, students. Studies 2A and 2B replicated this big pond preference in behavioral intent across educational and organizational settings for Chinese, as compared to United States, working adults. Study 3 demonstrated cultural variation in frog–pond decisions was not explained by comparison processes that characterize postentry self-regard but rather by concerns for prestige. Together, findings highlight how a cultural lens informs psychological processes that shape entry decision-making.
Egg White or Sun-Kissed: A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Skin Color and Women’s Leisure Behavior
Egg White or Sun-Kissed: A Cross-Cultural Exploration of Skin Color and Women’s Leisure Behavior. Hsin-Yu Chen et al. Sex Roles, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11199-017-0785-4
Abstract: The present study explores how culture-based meanings and values toward skin color, which are associated with women’s body image ideals and gender-role expectations, profoundly influence women’s leisure behaviors. Using in-depth interviews with East Asian, Asian American, and Euro-American women (n = 43), results revealed how leisure behaviors are tied to cultural perceptions of skin color. People from different cultural backgrounds construct meanings and values pertaining to skin color, including beauty-related standards, social class, gender roles, and lifestyles. Culture-based values, such as the preference for tanned skin among Euro-Americans and for lighter skin among East Asians, affect a wide range of daily behaviors. These behaviors include conscious as well as subtle daily decision-making regarding sun-seeking, sun-avoidance, and sun-protection behaviors; indoor versus outdoor leisure participation; and appearance modifications. The study’s results add knowledge to how perceptions and attitudes toward skin color and appearance manifest in women's daily behavior in general and leisure behavior in particular. In addition, the current study shows how individual behaviors reflect cultural meanings and values toward body image, specifically skin color, by emphasizing the links between cultural values and women’s day-to-day lives.
Keywords: Colorism, Body image, Cultural perceptions and values, Skin color, Daily behaviors, Leisure
Abstract: The present study explores how culture-based meanings and values toward skin color, which are associated with women’s body image ideals and gender-role expectations, profoundly influence women’s leisure behaviors. Using in-depth interviews with East Asian, Asian American, and Euro-American women (n = 43), results revealed how leisure behaviors are tied to cultural perceptions of skin color. People from different cultural backgrounds construct meanings and values pertaining to skin color, including beauty-related standards, social class, gender roles, and lifestyles. Culture-based values, such as the preference for tanned skin among Euro-Americans and for lighter skin among East Asians, affect a wide range of daily behaviors. These behaviors include conscious as well as subtle daily decision-making regarding sun-seeking, sun-avoidance, and sun-protection behaviors; indoor versus outdoor leisure participation; and appearance modifications. The study’s results add knowledge to how perceptions and attitudes toward skin color and appearance manifest in women's daily behavior in general and leisure behavior in particular. In addition, the current study shows how individual behaviors reflect cultural meanings and values toward body image, specifically skin color, by emphasizing the links between cultural values and women’s day-to-day lives.
Keywords: Colorism, Body image, Cultural perceptions and values, Skin color, Daily behaviors, Leisure
Neurocultural evidence that ideal affect match promotes giving
Neurocultural evidence that ideal affect match promotes giving. BoKyung Park et al. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, July 2017, Pages 1083-1096, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28379542
Abstract: Why do people give to strangers? We propose that people trust and give more to those whose emotional expressions match how they ideally want to feel (“ideal affect match”). European Americans and Koreans played multiple trials of the Dictator Game with recipients who varied in emotional expression (excited, calm), race (White, Asian) and sex (male, female). Consistent with their culture’s valued affect, European Americans trusted and gave more to excited than calm recipients, whereas Koreans trusted and gave more to calm than excited recipients. These findings held regardless of recipient race and sex. We then used fMRI to probe potential affective and mentalizing mechanisms. Increased activity in the nucleus accumbens (associated with reward anticipation) predicted giving, as did decreased activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ; associated with reduced belief prediction error). Ideal affect match decreased rTPJ activity, suggesting that people may trust and give more to strangers whom they perceive to share their affective values.
Keywords: Culture; Dictator Game; Emotion; Giving; fMRI
Abstract: Why do people give to strangers? We propose that people trust and give more to those whose emotional expressions match how they ideally want to feel (“ideal affect match”). European Americans and Koreans played multiple trials of the Dictator Game with recipients who varied in emotional expression (excited, calm), race (White, Asian) and sex (male, female). Consistent with their culture’s valued affect, European Americans trusted and gave more to excited than calm recipients, whereas Koreans trusted and gave more to calm than excited recipients. These findings held regardless of recipient race and sex. We then used fMRI to probe potential affective and mentalizing mechanisms. Increased activity in the nucleus accumbens (associated with reward anticipation) predicted giving, as did decreased activity in the right temporo-parietal junction (rTPJ; associated with reduced belief prediction error). Ideal affect match decreased rTPJ activity, suggesting that people may trust and give more to strangers whom they perceive to share their affective values.
Keywords: Culture; Dictator Game; Emotion; Giving; fMRI
Mere Gifting: Liking a Gift More Because It Is Shared
Mere Gifting: Liking a Gift More Because It Is Shared. Evan Polman and Sam Maglio. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0146167217718525
Abstract: We investigated a type of mere similarity that describes owning the same item as someone else. Moreover, we examined this mere similarity in a gift-giving context, whereby givers gift something that they also buy for themselves (a behavior we call “companionizing”). Using a Heiderian account of balancing unit-sentiment relations, we tested whether gift recipients like gifts more when gifts are companionized. Akin to mere ownership, which describes people liking their possessions more merely because they own them, we tested a complementary prediction: whether people like their possessions more merely because others own them too. Thus, in a departure from previous work, we examined a type of similarity based on two people sharing the same material item. We find that this type of sharing causes gift recipients to like their gifts more, and feel closer to gift givers.
Abstract: We investigated a type of mere similarity that describes owning the same item as someone else. Moreover, we examined this mere similarity in a gift-giving context, whereby givers gift something that they also buy for themselves (a behavior we call “companionizing”). Using a Heiderian account of balancing unit-sentiment relations, we tested whether gift recipients like gifts more when gifts are companionized. Akin to mere ownership, which describes people liking their possessions more merely because they own them, we tested a complementary prediction: whether people like their possessions more merely because others own them too. Thus, in a departure from previous work, we examined a type of similarity based on two people sharing the same material item. We find that this type of sharing causes gift recipients to like their gifts more, and feel closer to gift givers.
Asian Americans Respond Less Favorably to Excitement (vs. Calm)-Focused Physicians Compared to European Americans
Asian Americans Respond Less Favorably to Excitement (vs. Calm)-Focused Physicians Compared to European Americans. Tamara Sims et al. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28714709
OBJECTIVES: Despite being considered a "model minority," Asian Americans report worse health care encounters than do European Americans. This may be due to affective mismatches between Asian American patients and their European American physicians. We predicted that because Asian Americans value excitement (vs. calm) less than European Americans, they will respond less favorably to excitement-focused (vs. calm) physicians.
METHOD: In Study 1, 198 European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong Chinese community adults read a medical scenario and indicated their preference for an excitement-focused versus calm-focused physician. In Study 2, 81 European American and Asian American community college students listened to recommendations made by an excitement-focused or calm-focused physician in a video, and later attempted to recall the recommendations. In Study 3, 101 European American and Asian American middle-aged and older adults had multiple online encounters with an excitement-focused or calm-focused physician and then evaluated their physicians' trustworthiness, competence, and knowledge.
RESULTS: As predicted, Hong Kong Chinese preferred excitement-focused physicians less than European Americans, with Chinese Americans falling in the middle (Study 1). Similarly, Asian Americans remembered health information delivered by an excitement-focused physician less well than did European Americans (Study 2). Finally, Asian Americans evaluated an excitement-focused physician less positively than did European Americans (Study 3).
CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest that while physicians who promote and emphasize excitement states may be effective with European Americans, they may be less so with Asian Americans and other ethnic minorities who value different affective states.
OBJECTIVES: Despite being considered a "model minority," Asian Americans report worse health care encounters than do European Americans. This may be due to affective mismatches between Asian American patients and their European American physicians. We predicted that because Asian Americans value excitement (vs. calm) less than European Americans, they will respond less favorably to excitement-focused (vs. calm) physicians.
METHOD: In Study 1, 198 European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong Chinese community adults read a medical scenario and indicated their preference for an excitement-focused versus calm-focused physician. In Study 2, 81 European American and Asian American community college students listened to recommendations made by an excitement-focused or calm-focused physician in a video, and later attempted to recall the recommendations. In Study 3, 101 European American and Asian American middle-aged and older adults had multiple online encounters with an excitement-focused or calm-focused physician and then evaluated their physicians' trustworthiness, competence, and knowledge.
RESULTS: As predicted, Hong Kong Chinese preferred excitement-focused physicians less than European Americans, with Chinese Americans falling in the middle (Study 1). Similarly, Asian Americans remembered health information delivered by an excitement-focused physician less well than did European Americans (Study 2). Finally, Asian Americans evaluated an excitement-focused physician less positively than did European Americans (Study 3).
CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest that while physicians who promote and emphasize excitement states may be effective with European Americans, they may be less so with Asian Americans and other ethnic minorities who value different affective states.
The Cultural Origin of CEOs’ Attitudes Towards Uncertainty: Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions
The Cultural Origin of CEOs’ Attitudes Towards Uncertainty: Evidence from Corporate Acquisitions. Yihui Pan, Stephan Siegel & Tracy Yue Wang. University of Utah Working Paper, June 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2987623
Abstract: We examine how U.S. CEOs’ attitudes towards uncertainty as well as their corporate investment decisions are shaped by their cultural heritage – a potentially important aspect of their upbringing and early life environment. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in corporate acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, more uncertainty avoiding CEOs prefer targets in industries that they are familiar with and targets that can be integrated more easily. The impact of culturally transmitted uncertainty attitudes on M&A decisions is stronger when CEOs’ parents put more emphasis on the family’s cultural heritage. Finally, cultural differences with respect to uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time. Overall, our results highlight an important role of cultural heritage in shaping decisions under uncertainty by U.S. CEOs as well as of parents in transmitting cultural values, in particular attitudes towards uncertainty, to their children.
Keywords: culture, cultural heritage, uncertainty avoidance, uncertainty aversion, Hofstede, CEO, corporate acquisition, social transmission of preference
Abstract: We examine how U.S. CEOs’ attitudes towards uncertainty as well as their corporate investment decisions are shaped by their cultural heritage – a potentially important aspect of their upbringing and early life environment. We find that CEOs with a more uncertainty avoiding cultural heritage are less likely to engage in corporate acquisitions. Conditional on making an acquisition, more uncertainty avoiding CEOs prefer targets in industries that they are familiar with and targets that can be integrated more easily. The impact of culturally transmitted uncertainty attitudes on M&A decisions is stronger when CEOs’ parents put more emphasis on the family’s cultural heritage. Finally, cultural differences with respect to uncertainty attitudes persist over multiple generations, but become less pronounced over time. Overall, our results highlight an important role of cultural heritage in shaping decisions under uncertainty by U.S. CEOs as well as of parents in transmitting cultural values, in particular attitudes towards uncertainty, to their children.
Keywords: culture, cultural heritage, uncertainty avoidance, uncertainty aversion, Hofstede, CEO, corporate acquisition, social transmission of preference
Does culture create craving? Evidence from the case of menstrual chocolate craving
Does culture create craving? Evidence from the case of menstrual chocolate craving. Julia Hormes & Martha Niemiec. PLoS One, July 2017, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28723930
Abstract: Craving is considered a key characteristic of diverse pathologies, but evidence suggests it may be a culture-bound construct. Almost 50% of American women crave chocolate specifically around the onset of menstruation. Research does not support popular accounts implicating physiological factors in menstrual chocolate craving etiology. We tested the novel hypothesis that greater menstrual craving prevalence in the U.S. is the product of internalized cultural norms. Women of diverse backgrounds (n = 275) reported on craving frequency and triggers and completed validated measures of acculturation. Foreign-born women were significantly less likely to endorse menstrual chocolate craving (17.3%), compared to women born to U.S.-born parents (32.7%, p = .03) and second generation immigrants (40.9%, p = .001). Second generation immigrant and foreign-born women endorsing menstrual chocolate craving reported significantly greater U.S. acculturation and lower identification with their native culture than non-menstrual cravers (all p < .001). Findings inform our understanding of food cravings, with important implications for the study of cravings in other domains.
Abstract: Craving is considered a key characteristic of diverse pathologies, but evidence suggests it may be a culture-bound construct. Almost 50% of American women crave chocolate specifically around the onset of menstruation. Research does not support popular accounts implicating physiological factors in menstrual chocolate craving etiology. We tested the novel hypothesis that greater menstrual craving prevalence in the U.S. is the product of internalized cultural norms. Women of diverse backgrounds (n = 275) reported on craving frequency and triggers and completed validated measures of acculturation. Foreign-born women were significantly less likely to endorse menstrual chocolate craving (17.3%), compared to women born to U.S.-born parents (32.7%, p = .03) and second generation immigrants (40.9%, p = .001). Second generation immigrant and foreign-born women endorsing menstrual chocolate craving reported significantly greater U.S. acculturation and lower identification with their native culture than non-menstrual cravers (all p < .001). Findings inform our understanding of food cravings, with important implications for the study of cravings in other domains.
Corruption, Social Judgment and Culture: An Experiment
Corruption, Social Judgment and Culture: An Experiment. Timothy Salmon & Danila Serra. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, October 2017, Pages 64-78, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268117301622
Highlights
• We examine the ability of social observability to limit bad behavior.
• We use a sample with a diverse background to investigate the interaction with culture.
• We find social observability can limit bad behavior.
• The effect is stronger for individuals who culturally identify with Low Corruption countries.
Abstract: Modern societies rely on both formal and social mechanisms to enforce social norms of behavior. Formal enforcement mechanisms rely on monetary or other tangible incentives while social enforcement mechanisms rely on some form of social judgment involving informal sanctions. We experimentally investigate the extent to which social observability and the possibility of social judgment affect individuals’ decisions to engage in corruption at the expense of others. We are also interested in the degree to which culture matters. We use a laboratory experiment with a sample of individuals who live in the U.S. but is also characterized by cultural heterogeneity due to the immigration of their ancestors to the U.S. We find that the possibility of social judgment reduces corruption only among individuals who identify culturally with countries characterized by low levels of corruption. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of social enforcement mechanisms is at least partly dependent on the sociocultural norms prevailing in the target population.
JEL classification: C90 D73 K42 Z10
Keywords: Corruption, Social enforcement, Culture, Experiments
Highlights
• We examine the ability of social observability to limit bad behavior.
• We use a sample with a diverse background to investigate the interaction with culture.
• We find social observability can limit bad behavior.
• The effect is stronger for individuals who culturally identify with Low Corruption countries.
Abstract: Modern societies rely on both formal and social mechanisms to enforce social norms of behavior. Formal enforcement mechanisms rely on monetary or other tangible incentives while social enforcement mechanisms rely on some form of social judgment involving informal sanctions. We experimentally investigate the extent to which social observability and the possibility of social judgment affect individuals’ decisions to engage in corruption at the expense of others. We are also interested in the degree to which culture matters. We use a laboratory experiment with a sample of individuals who live in the U.S. but is also characterized by cultural heterogeneity due to the immigration of their ancestors to the U.S. We find that the possibility of social judgment reduces corruption only among individuals who identify culturally with countries characterized by low levels of corruption. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of social enforcement mechanisms is at least partly dependent on the sociocultural norms prevailing in the target population.
JEL classification: C90 D73 K42 Z10
Keywords: Corruption, Social enforcement, Culture, Experiments
Global Increases in Individualism
Global Increases in Individualism. Henri Santos, Michael Varnum & Igor Grossmann. Psychological Science, https://www.academia.edu/31723600/Global_Increases_in_Individualism
Abstract: Individualism appears to have increased over the past several decades, yet most research documenting this shift has been limited to the study of a handful of highly developed countries. Is the world becoming more individualist as a whole? If so, why? To answer these questions, we examined 51 years of data on individualist practices and values across 78 countries. Our findings suggest that individualism is indeed rising in most of the societies we tested. Despite dramatic shifts toward greater individualism around the world, however, cultural differences remain sizable. Moreover, cultural differences are primarily linked to changes in socioeconomic development, and to a lesser extent to shifts in pathogen prevalence and disaster frequency.
Abstract: Individualism appears to have increased over the past several decades, yet most research documenting this shift has been limited to the study of a handful of highly developed countries. Is the world becoming more individualist as a whole? If so, why? To answer these questions, we examined 51 years of data on individualist practices and values across 78 countries. Our findings suggest that individualism is indeed rising in most of the societies we tested. Despite dramatic shifts toward greater individualism around the world, however, cultural differences remain sizable. Moreover, cultural differences are primarily linked to changes in socioeconomic development, and to a lesser extent to shifts in pathogen prevalence and disaster frequency.
Did Strategic Bombing in the Second World War Lead to ‘German Angst’? A Large-scale Empirical Test Across 89 German Cities
Did Strategic Bombing in the Second World War Lead to ‘German Angst’? A Large-scale Empirical Test Across 89 German Cities. Martin Obschonka et al. European Journal of Personality, May/June 2017, Pages 234–257, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/per.2104/full
Abstract: A widespread stereotype holds that the Germans are notorious worriers, an idea captured by the term German angst. An analysis of country-level neurotic personality traits (trait anxiety, trait depression, and trait neuroticism; N = 7 210 276) across 109 countries provided mixed support for this idea; Germany ranked 20th, 31st, and 53rd for depression, anxiety, and neuroticism, respectively, suggesting, at best, the national stereotype is only partly valid. Theories put forward to explain the stereotypical characterization of Germany focus on the collective traumatic events experienced by Germany during World War II (WWII), such as the massive strategic bombing of German cities. We thus examined the link between strategic bombing of 89 German cities and today's regional levels in neurotic traits (N = 33 534) and related mental health problems. Contrary to the WWII bombing hypothesis, we found negative effects of strategic bombing on regional trait depression and mental health problems. This finding was robust when controlling for a host of economic factors and social structure. We also found Resilience × Stressor interactions: Cities with more severe bombings show more resilience today (lower levels of neurotic traits and mental health problems in the face of a current major stressor—economic hardship).
Abstract: A widespread stereotype holds that the Germans are notorious worriers, an idea captured by the term German angst. An analysis of country-level neurotic personality traits (trait anxiety, trait depression, and trait neuroticism; N = 7 210 276) across 109 countries provided mixed support for this idea; Germany ranked 20th, 31st, and 53rd for depression, anxiety, and neuroticism, respectively, suggesting, at best, the national stereotype is only partly valid. Theories put forward to explain the stereotypical characterization of Germany focus on the collective traumatic events experienced by Germany during World War II (WWII), such as the massive strategic bombing of German cities. We thus examined the link between strategic bombing of 89 German cities and today's regional levels in neurotic traits (N = 33 534) and related mental health problems. Contrary to the WWII bombing hypothesis, we found negative effects of strategic bombing on regional trait depression and mental health problems. This finding was robust when controlling for a host of economic factors and social structure. We also found Resilience × Stressor interactions: Cities with more severe bombings show more resilience today (lower levels of neurotic traits and mental health problems in the face of a current major stressor—economic hardship).
Understanding Cultural Persistence and Change
Understanding Cultural Persistence and Change. Paola Giuliano & Nathan Nunn. NBER Working Paper, July 2017. https://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/publications/understanding-cultural-persistence-and-change
Abstract: When does culture persist and when does it change? We examine a determinant that has been put forth in the anthropology literature: the variability of the environment from one generation to the next. A prediction, which emerges from a class of existing models from evolutionary anthropology, is that following the customs of the previous generation is relatively more beneficial in stable environments where the culture that has evolved up to the previous generation is more likely to be relevant for the subsequent generation. We test this hypothesis by measuring the variability of average temperature across 20-year generations from 500–1900. Looking across countries, ethnic groups, and the descendants of immigrants, we find that populations with ancestors who lived in environments with more stability from one generation to the next place a greater importance in maintaining tradition today. These populations also exhibit more persistence in their traditions over time.
Abstract: When does culture persist and when does it change? We examine a determinant that has been put forth in the anthropology literature: the variability of the environment from one generation to the next. A prediction, which emerges from a class of existing models from evolutionary anthropology, is that following the customs of the previous generation is relatively more beneficial in stable environments where the culture that has evolved up to the previous generation is more likely to be relevant for the subsequent generation. We test this hypothesis by measuring the variability of average temperature across 20-year generations from 500–1900. Looking across countries, ethnic groups, and the descendants of immigrants, we find that populations with ancestors who lived in environments with more stability from one generation to the next place a greater importance in maintaining tradition today. These populations also exhibit more persistence in their traditions over time.
Cultures differ in the ability to enhance affective neural responses
Cultures differ in the ability to enhance affective neural responses. Michael Varnum & Ryan Hampton. Social Neuroscience, September/October 2017, Pages 594-603, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470919.2016.1209239
Abstract: The present study (N = 55) used an event-related potential paradigm to investigate whether cultures differ in the ability to upregulate affective responses. Using stimuli selected from the International Affective Picture System, we found that European-Americans (N = 29) enhanced central-parietal late positive potential (LPP) (400–800 ms post-stimulus) responses to affective stimuli when instructed to do so, whereas East Asians (N = 26) did not. We observed cultural differences in the ability to enhance central-parietal LPP responses for both positively and negatively valenced stimuli, and the ability to enhance these two types of responses was positively correlated for Americans but negatively for East Asians. These results are consistent with the notion that cultural variations in norms and values regarding affective expression and experiences shape how the brain regulates emotions.
KEYWORDS: Culture, emotion regulation, cultural neuroscience, ERP, LPP
Abstract: The present study (N = 55) used an event-related potential paradigm to investigate whether cultures differ in the ability to upregulate affective responses. Using stimuli selected from the International Affective Picture System, we found that European-Americans (N = 29) enhanced central-parietal late positive potential (LPP) (400–800 ms post-stimulus) responses to affective stimuli when instructed to do so, whereas East Asians (N = 26) did not. We observed cultural differences in the ability to enhance central-parietal LPP responses for both positively and negatively valenced stimuli, and the ability to enhance these two types of responses was positively correlated for Americans but negatively for East Asians. These results are consistent with the notion that cultural variations in norms and values regarding affective expression and experiences shape how the brain regulates emotions.
KEYWORDS: Culture, emotion regulation, cultural neuroscience, ERP, LPP
Gender: An Historical Perspective
Gender: An Historical Perspective. Paola Giuliano. NBER Working Paper No. 23635
NBER Program: POL. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23635
To explore this hypothesis, Giuliano (2015) looks at the correlation between historical plough use and whether the dowry is the most prevalent mode of marriage, whether the inheritance rule in a society is matrilineal, and if polygamy is prevalent5. She finds that in societies that used the plough, (a) inheritance rules appear to be less favorable to women—as indicated by the fact that matrilineality is less common, (b) there is less polygamy, and (c) a dowry is paid by the bride’s family. After establishing a correlation for the past, the author shows that differences in agricultural technology have a persistent effect on social norms, lasting until today. [...] she finds that societies that historically used the plough are characterized by higher parental authority granted to the father, by inheritance rules that favor male heirs, and by less freedom for women to move outside the house. She also finds that, in these societies, women are more likely to wear a veil in public.
NBER Program: POL. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23635
To explore this hypothesis, Giuliano (2015) looks at the correlation between historical plough use and whether the dowry is the most prevalent mode of marriage, whether the inheritance rule in a society is matrilineal, and if polygamy is prevalent5. She finds that in societies that used the plough, (a) inheritance rules appear to be less favorable to women—as indicated by the fact that matrilineality is less common, (b) there is less polygamy, and (c) a dowry is paid by the bride’s family. After establishing a correlation for the past, the author shows that differences in agricultural technology have a persistent effect on social norms, lasting until today. [...] she finds that societies that historically used the plough are characterized by higher parental authority granted to the father, by inheritance rules that favor male heirs, and by less freedom for women to move outside the house. She also finds that, in these societies, women are more likely to wear a veil in public.
Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving
Giving, Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving. Kellen Mrkva. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bdm.2023/abstract
Abstract: Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2016), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4)
Abstract: Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson-Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016; Tinghög et al., 2016), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4)
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