Thursday, November 16, 2017
Dominance, phylogenetically ancient, and prestige, unique to humans, are ways to gain or maintain high rank
Dominance and Prestige: A Tale of Two Hierarchies. Jon K. Maner. Current Directions in Psychological Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721417714323
Abstract: Dominance and prestige represent evolved strategies used to navigate social hierarchies. Dominance is a strategy through which people gain and maintain social rank by using coercion, intimidation, and power. Prestige is a strategy through which people gain and maintain social rank by displaying valued knowledge and skills and earning respect. The current article synthesizes recent lines of research documenting differences between dominance- versus prestige-oriented individuals, including personality traits and emotions, strategic behaviors deployed in social interactions, leadership strategies, and physiological correlates of both behaviors. The article also reviews effects that dominance versus prestige have on the functioning and well-being of social groups. The article also presents opportunities for future research and discusses links between dominance and prestige and the social psychological literature on power and status.
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Although both dominance and prestige serve as viable routes to high social rank, the propensity to use one strategy over the other varies across individuals. Some work indicates no correlation between people’s use of dominance and prestige (Cheng et al., 2013), suggesting that use of one strategy is not contingent on use of the other. Other work suggests a positive correlation, as both strategies share in common the motivation for high rank (Maner & Mead, 2010).
The two strategies have different implications for groups and the individuals who comprise them. For example, the two strategies are characterized by different personality traits. Whereas people who use dominance are relatively aggressive, disagreeable, manipulative, and high in dark-triad traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy), people who use prestige instead are
high in self-esteem, agreeableness, need for affiliation, social monitoring, fear of negative evaluation, and conscientiousness (Case & Maner, 2017; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; Semenya & Honey, 2015).
Dominance and prestige are also marked by different types of emotion. Dominance is associated with feelings of arrogance, superiority, and conceit (hubristic pride; Cheng et al., 2010), whereas prestige is associated with feelings of achievement, but without a sense of superiority or arrogance (authentic pride; Cheng et al., 2010; see also Liu, Yuan, Chen, & Yu, 2016). Another emotion that distinguishes dominance from prestige is humility (Weidman, Cheng, & Tracy, 2016). Prestige, but not dominance, is associated with appreciative humility, which results from a sense of personal success and leads people to celebrate others. Given these distinct profiles of personality and emotion, it comes as no surprise that people adopting a prestige strategy tend to be more well-liked than people adopting a dominance strategy (Cheng et al., 2013).
Clear evidence for physiological correlates of dominance and prestige is limited. Many findings have linked dominance to high levels of testosterone (Mazur & Booth, 1998), yet studies in humans have tended not to differentiate between dominance and prestige. One study that did so found no correlation between dominance and testosterone; instead, the study documented a negative relation between testosterone and prestige (Johnson, Burk, & Kirkpatrick, 2007), consistent with the hypothesis that prestige is associated with an active downplaying of aggression and competitiveness. Another found that testosterone was linked with use of dominance but not with one’s actual rank in the hierarchy (van der Meij, Schaveling, & Van Vugt, 2016). Dominance (but not prestige) has been linked with wider facial width-to-height ratio (Mileva, Cowan, Cobey, Knowles, & Little, 2014)—a morphological cue associated with greater testosterone, aggressiveness, and unethical behavior (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Lefevre, Lewis, Perrett, & Penke, 2013; but see Bird et al., 2016). The literature on physiological aspects of dominance and prestige would benefit from further development.
Assessments of twins’ general homophobia targeting gay men
Genetic Variance in Homophobia: Evidence from Self-and Peer Reports. Alexandra Zapko-Willmes and Christian Kandler. Behavior Genetics, accepted, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320963054_Genetic_Variance_in_Homophobia_Evidence_from_Self-and_Peer_Reports
Abstract: The present twin study combined self- and peer assessments of twins’ general homophobia targeting gay men in order to replicate previous behavior genetic findings across different rater perspectives and to disentangle self-rater-specific variance from common variance in self- and peer-reported homophobia (i.e., rater-consistent variance). We hypothesized rater-consistent variance in homophobia to be attributable to genetic and nonshared environmental effects, and self-rater-specific variance to be partially accounted for by genetic influences. A sample of 869 twins and 1329 peer raters completed a seven item scale containing cognitive, affective, and discriminatory homophobic tendencies. After correction for age and sex differences, we found most of the genetic contributions (62%) and significant nonshared environmental contributions (16%) to individual differences in self-reports on homophobia to be also reflected in peer-reported homophobia. A significant genetic component, however, was self-report-specific (38%), suggesting that self-assessments alone produce inflated heritability estimates to some degree. Different explanations are discussed.
Abstract: The present twin study combined self- and peer assessments of twins’ general homophobia targeting gay men in order to replicate previous behavior genetic findings across different rater perspectives and to disentangle self-rater-specific variance from common variance in self- and peer-reported homophobia (i.e., rater-consistent variance). We hypothesized rater-consistent variance in homophobia to be attributable to genetic and nonshared environmental effects, and self-rater-specific variance to be partially accounted for by genetic influences. A sample of 869 twins and 1329 peer raters completed a seven item scale containing cognitive, affective, and discriminatory homophobic tendencies. After correction for age and sex differences, we found most of the genetic contributions (62%) and significant nonshared environmental contributions (16%) to individual differences in self-reports on homophobia to be also reflected in peer-reported homophobia. A significant genetic component, however, was self-report-specific (38%), suggesting that self-assessments alone produce inflated heritability estimates to some degree. Different explanations are discussed.
Listeners can reliably determine a speaker's sincerity through prosodic cues, since sincere compliments are spoken faster and with a higher pitch
The sound of (in)sincerity. Karyn Fish, Kathrin Rothermich, Marc D.Pella. Journal of Pragmatics, Volume 121, November 2017, Pages 147-161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2017.10.008
Highlights
• Sincere compliments and prosocial lies occur frequently in communication.
• Listeners can reliably determine a speaker's sincerity through prosodic cues.
• Sincere compliments are spoken faster and with a higher pitch.
• Social context biases impressions of sincerity in compliments.
• Prosody and speaker attitude are both important for understanding speaker intentions.
Abstract: In social life, humans do not always communicate their sincere feelings, and speakers often tell ‘prosocial lies’ to prevent others from being hurt by negative truths. Data illuminating how a speaker's voice carries sincere or insincere attitudes in speech, and how social context shapes the expression and perception of (in)sincere utterances, are scarce. Here, we studied the communication of social, other-oriented lies occurring in short dialogues. We recorded paired questions (So, what do you think of my new hairdo?) and responses (I think it looks really amazing!) using a paradigm that elicited compliments which reflected the true positive opinion of the speaker (sincere) or were meant to hide their negative opinion (insincere/prosocial lie). These Question–Response pairs were then presented to 30 listeners, who rated the sincerity of the person uttering the compliment on a 5-point scale. Results showed that participants could successfully differentiate sincere compliments from prosocial lies based largely on vocal speech cues. Moreover, sincerity impressions were biased by how the preceding question was phrased (confident or uncertain). Acoustic analyses on a subset of utterances that promoted strong impressions of sincerity versus insincerity revealed that compliments perceived as being sincere were spoken faster and began with a higher pitch than those that sounded insincere, while compliments rated as insincere tended to get louder as the utterance unfolded. These data supply new evidence of the importance of vocal cues in evaluating sincerity, while emphasizing that motivations of both the speaker and hearer contribute to impressions of speaker sincerity.
Highlights
• Sincere compliments and prosocial lies occur frequently in communication.
• Listeners can reliably determine a speaker's sincerity through prosodic cues.
• Sincere compliments are spoken faster and with a higher pitch.
• Social context biases impressions of sincerity in compliments.
• Prosody and speaker attitude are both important for understanding speaker intentions.
Abstract: In social life, humans do not always communicate their sincere feelings, and speakers often tell ‘prosocial lies’ to prevent others from being hurt by negative truths. Data illuminating how a speaker's voice carries sincere or insincere attitudes in speech, and how social context shapes the expression and perception of (in)sincere utterances, are scarce. Here, we studied the communication of social, other-oriented lies occurring in short dialogues. We recorded paired questions (So, what do you think of my new hairdo?) and responses (I think it looks really amazing!) using a paradigm that elicited compliments which reflected the true positive opinion of the speaker (sincere) or were meant to hide their negative opinion (insincere/prosocial lie). These Question–Response pairs were then presented to 30 listeners, who rated the sincerity of the person uttering the compliment on a 5-point scale. Results showed that participants could successfully differentiate sincere compliments from prosocial lies based largely on vocal speech cues. Moreover, sincerity impressions were biased by how the preceding question was phrased (confident or uncertain). Acoustic analyses on a subset of utterances that promoted strong impressions of sincerity versus insincerity revealed that compliments perceived as being sincere were spoken faster and began with a higher pitch than those that sounded insincere, while compliments rated as insincere tended to get louder as the utterance unfolded. These data supply new evidence of the importance of vocal cues in evaluating sincerity, while emphasizing that motivations of both the speaker and hearer contribute to impressions of speaker sincerity.
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