The Strengths of Wisdom Provide Unique Contributions to Improved Leadership, Sustainability, Inequality, Gross National Happiness, and Civic Discourse in the Face of Contemporary World Problems

The Strengths of Wisdom Provide Unique Contributions to Improved Leadership, Sustainability, Inequality, Gross National Happiness, and Civic Discourse in the Face of Contemporary World Problems. Igor Grossmann and Justin P. Brienza. J. Intell. 2018, 6(2), 22; doi:10.3390/jintelligence6020022

Abstract: We present evidence for the strengths of the intellectual virtues that philosophers and behavioral scientists characterize as key cognitive elements of wisdom. Wisdom has been of centuries-long interest for philosophical scholarship, but relative to intelligence largely neglected in public discourse on educational science, public policy, and societal well-being. Wise reasoning characteristics include intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty, consideration of diverse viewpoints, and an attempt to integrate these viewpoints. Emerging scholarship on these features of wisdom suggest that they uniquely contribute to societal well-being, improve leadership, shed light on societal inequality, promote cooperation in Public Goods Games and reduce political polarization and intergroup-hostility. We review empirical evidence about macro-cultural, ecological, situational, and person-level processes facilitating and inhibiting wisdom in daily life. Based on this evidence, we speculate about ways to foster wisdom in education, organizations, and institutions.

Keywords: wisdom; reasoning; virtues; well-being; political polarization; culture; social class; egocentrism; leadership

Check also Grossmann, Igor, and Harrison Oakes. 2017. “Wisdom of Yoda and Mr. Spock: The Role of Emotions and the Self”. PsyArXiv. December 21. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/12/wiser-reasoning-appeared-in-conjunction.html

wiser reasoning appeared in conjunction with greater (vs. lower) emotionality, especially the recognition of a greater number of present emotions and greater balance of intensity across experienced emotions.

And: Wisdom and how to cultivate it: Review of emerging evidence for a constructivist model of wise thinking. Igor Grossmann. European Psychologist, in press. Pre-print: http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/wisdom-and-how-to-cultivate-it-review.html

Study in Norway: Increasing family wealth was associated with easier family communication, clearer family communication, and higher family support

Study in Norway: Family wealth and parent–child relationships. Mai Emilie Ramdahl et al. Journal of Child and Family Studies, May 2018, Volume 27, Issue 5, pp 1534–1543. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10826-017-1003-2

Abstract: This study examined associations between self-reported family wealth and parent–child relationships, by contrasting three theoretical perspectives on the shape of the association. The study utilized data from the Norwegian part of the “Health behaviour in school-aged children study (HBSC) 2013/2014”, with a sample of 3383 children aged 11–15 years old. The shape of associations between family wealth and parent–child communication were tested using regression spline models with knots at 1 SD below mean family wealth and at 1 SD above mean family wealth. The regression spline models showed that increasing family wealth was associated with easier family communication, clearer family communication, and higher family support. Results revealed that for boys, the association between family wealth and outcomes was stronger for the lower segment of family wealth, than in medium and high segments of family wealth. For girls, the gradient across level of wealth was monotone, with higher parent–child communication and higher family support at higher family wealth. To conclude, the results from this study suggest a nonlinear pattern of inequality in parent–child relationships across the range of family wealth.

What is usual, not just what is objectively permissible, drives moral judgment, even when holding behavior constant and varying descriptive norms

It's not what you do, but what everyone else does: On the role of descriptive norms and subjectivism in moral judgment. Andrew E. Monroe et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 77, July 2018, Pages 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.010

Highlights
•    Five studies tested the impact of descriptive norms on judgments of blame and praise.
•    What is usual, not just what is objectively permissible, drives moral judgments.
•    Effects replicate even when holding behavior constant and varying descriptive norms.
•    Agents had to be aware of a norm for it to impact perceivers' moral judgments.
•    Effects generalize to explain decisions of trust for real monetary stakes.

Abstract: How do people evaluate moral actions, by referencing objective rules or by appealing to subjective, descriptive norms of behavior? Five studies examined whether and how people incorporate subjective, descriptive norms of behavior into their moral evaluations and mental state inferences of an agent's actions. We used experimental norm manipulations (Studies 1–2, 4), cultural differences in tipping norms (Study 3), and behavioral economic games (Study 5). Across studies, people increased the magnitude of their moral judgments when an agent exceeded a descriptive norm and decreased the magnitude when an agent fell below a norm (Studies 1–4). Moreover, this differentiation was partially explained via perceptions of agents' desires (Studies 1–2); it emerged only when the agent was aware of the norm (Study 4); and it generalized to explain decisions of trust for real monetary stakes (Study 5). Together, these findings indicate that moral actions are evaluated in relation to what most other people do rather than solely in relation to morally objective rules.

Keywords: Moral judgment; Norms; Mental state inference; Social cognition; Blame-praise asymmetries

Time in social activities has diminishing returns for subjective well-being: In the US, socializing more than 2.5 hours a day did not predict higher happiness

The Declining Marginal Utility of Social Time for Subjective Well-Being. Kostadin Kushlev et al. Journal of Research in Personality, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2018.04.004

Highlights
•    Time in social activities has diminishing returns for subjective well-being (SWB).
•    Across 166 nations, spending over 3 hours a day with others predicts no higher SWB.
•    In the US, socializing more than 2.5 hours a day did not predict higher happiness.
•    Quadratic effects explain substantial variance over linear effects alone.
•    These diminishing returns are explained by inter- and intra-domain processes.

Abstract: Are people who spend more time with others always happier than those who spend less time in social activities? Across four studies with more than 250,000 participants, we show that social time has declining marginal utility for subjective well-being. In Study 1 (N=243,075), we use the Gallup World Poll with people from 166 countries, and in Study 2 (N=10,387) the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), to show that social time has declining returns for well-being. In Study 3a (N=168) and Study 3b (N=174), we employ the Experience Sampling Method (ESM) to provide initial evidence for both intra-domain (principle of diminishing satisfaction) and inter-domain mechanisms (principle of satisfaction limits). We discuss implications for theory, research methodology, and practice.

Keywords: subjective well-being; social interaction; social relationships; psychological needs; life balance; principle of diminishing satisfaction; principle of satisfaction limits; marginal utility

Examining aggressive play with toy weapons and its relation with crime

Learning to blast a way into crime, or just good clean fun? Examining aggressive play with toy weapons and its relation with crime. Sven Smith, Christopher J Ferguson and Kevin M Beaver. Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health (2018), 10.1002/cbm.2070

Abstract
Background: Researchers, such as Bandura, have proposed that children’s mere exposure to the use of play weapons encourages deviant displays of aggression, but there is very little research to support this hypothesis of 20 years.

Aim: To examine the relationship between amount of weapon play and concurrent aggression as well as later violent juvenile crime, while controlling for other variables possibly influencing criminal pathways.

Method; Using longitudinal survey data collected from mothers and children (n = 2019) from age 5, with follow-up at age 15, correlations between children’s play with toy weapons and juvenile criminality were examined. Multivariate regression analyses were employed to determine to what extent early childhood aggression, symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and symptoms of depression were antecedents of juvenile crime.

Results: For bivariate analysis between toy weapon play and juvenile criminality, the effect size was small and not significant. The relationship remained not significant once control variables were introduced into the model.

Conclusions and implications: The act of pretending to be aggressive in childhood thus plays little role in predicting later criminality after other factors, such as gender, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or depression, have been taken into account. Involvement in imaginative play with toy gun use in early childhood is unlikely to be useful as a risk marker for later criminal behaviour. Play fighting and war toy games may even be considered necessary components within the frame of normal development.