Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Per political party: Americans' Attitudes on Individual or Racially Inflected Genetic Inheritance

Americans' Attitudes on Individual or Racially Inflected Genetic Inheritance. Jennifer Hochschild, Maya Sen. On Reconsidering Race: Social Science Perspectives on Racial Categories in the Age of Genomics. Edited by Kazuko Suzuki, Edited by Diego A. von Vacano. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/reconsidering-race-9780190465285

From the Nov 2013 paper, about Importance of individual, and of racial or ethnic, genetic inheritance, by partisan affiliation:

Democrats and Republicans hold roughly similar views, while the category of Independents, Undecided, and “Other” differ systematically from both sets of partisans. With regard to racial or ethnic genetic inheritance (shaded columns), Independents are less likely than the other two groups to see racial inheritance in six of the eight characteristics. That includes the three items that are generally assumed to be heritable (eye color, sickle cell anemia, and cystic fibrosis), for which the Independents are arguably mistaken. But it also includes the more ambiguous category of intelligence.

With regard to individual genetic inheritance, Democrats and Republicans again resemble one another, while Independents differ. Setting aside homosexuality, Independents are again  The least likely to make genetic attributions to the three genetically-linked traits, but they are most likely to make genetic attributions to the three ambiguous traits of heart disease, intelligence, and aggressiveness. Again, reassuringly we see no variation in the very low proportions attributing the flu to either type of inheritance.

We need further research to explain the anomaly of the Independents, and how or why partisanship relates to other possible associations (for example, education, gender, and race with views about genetic determinism. But these results conform to the general finding in the academic literature that “pure” Independents and nonpartisans (the Undecided or Others) are less knowledgeable about current events and political and social facts (Keith et al. 1992). The surprising and intriguing result is the lack of difference between Republicans and Democrats in the degree to which they concur with the social constructivist view, either with regard to racial or ethnic inheritance or individual ancestral inheritance. If the GKAP survey represents Americans in general, the question of biological or social causation is not polarized in the public in the way that it is among knowledgeable experts.

This similarity is reinforced by the overall average likelihood of making genetic attributions. As we have found in every previous analysis, for all items in all groups, there are fewer attributions to racial or ethnic inheritance than to individual ancestral inheritance. But within that framework, Republicans and Democrats closely resemble one another in accepting both types of genetic causes, while Independents are less likely to accept either individual genetic inheritance or, especially, racial or ethnic genetic inheritance. That is not what we expected, and it warrants further study.

The surprise deepens when we look only at the five items that are not generally understood as heritable. For those items, Independents are the most likely to make genetic attributions, both for individual ancestral inheritance and for group-based inheritance – but Democrats are more likely than Republicans to do so, again for both types of inheritance. Even setting aside the three items that are arguably not socially constructed, Republicans are closer to being social constructivists than are Democrats. In light of the normative valences with which this chapter started, that finding needs further exploration.

The Anomalous Case of Homosexuality: We have noted several times that responses to the item, “being gay or lesbian,” differ from responses to the other three traits (heart disease, intelligence, and a tendency toward violence) for which genetic and environmental or choice-based explanations are more ambiguous. We turn finally to a direct consideration of this item. Hypothesis H5.5 posits that views on homosexuality are an exception to our overall expectation about the link between partisanship (or ideology) and social constructivism, and that is indeed the case. As table 5 shows, Democrats are much more likely than Independents or Republicans to attribute being gay or lesbian to “genes,” and slightly more likely to attribute being gay or lesbian to “race or ethnicity.” Indeed, Democrats’ relatively high agreement with “genes” for that item helps to explain the fact that overall they are less socially constructivist than Republicans.10 [10 It does not fully explain that surprising result, however, since Democrats are also just as likely or slightly more likely than Republicans to explain heart disease, intelligence, and aggression through genetic causes]

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Participants compete individually or in teams, arbitrarily assigned, or based on their political party, Democrats against Republicans. People shirked on both teams: Participants exerted less effort in teams than in individual competition

Pulling for the team: Competition between political partisans. Lingbo Huang, Peter DeScioli, Zahra Murad. http://pdescioli.com/papers/huang.descioli.murad.political.tug.of.war.draft.2018.pdf

Abstract: At every level of politics, people form groups to compete for power and resources, including political parties, special interest groups, and international coalitions. Here we use economic experiments to investigate how people balance the desire for their group’s victory versus their own expenditure of effort. We design an economic tug of war in which the side that exerts greater effort wins a reward. In Experiment 1, participants compete individually or in teams, which were assigned arbitrarily. In Experiment 2, participants compete individually or in teams based on their political party, Democrats against Republicans. In both experiments, we find that people shirked on teams: Participants exerted less effort in teams than in individual competition. The results support theories about free-riding in groups, and they depart from theories about the automatic potency of partisan motives. We discuss why it is difficult for groups, including political partisans, to mobilize toward a common goal.

Keywords: group competition, political partisanship, contest theory, shirking, free-riding

How a smiley protects health for a while: Improving hand hygiene in hospitals by activating injunctive norms through emoticon

How a smiley protects health: A pilot intervention to improve hand hygiene in hospitals by activating injunctive norms through emoticons. Susanne Gaube et al. PLOS, May 21 2018,  https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0197465

Abstract: Hand hygiene practice in hospitals is unfortunately still widely insufficient, even though it is known that transmitting pathogens via hands is the leading cause of healthcare-associated infections. Previous research has shown that improving knowledge, providing feedback on past behaviour and targeting social norms are promising approaches to improve hand hygiene practices. The present field experiment was designed to direct people on when to perform hand hygiene and prevent forgetfulness. This intervention is the first to examine the effect of inducing injunctive social norms via an emoticon-based feedback system on hand hygiene behaviour. Electronic monitoring and feedback devices were installed in hospital patient rooms on top of hand-rub dispensers, next to the doorway, for a period of 17 weeks. In the emoticon condition, screens at the devices activated whenever a person entered or exited the room. Before using the alcohol-based hand-rub dispenser, a frowny face was displayed, indicating that hand hygiene should be performed. If the dispenser was subsequently used, this picture changed to a smiley face to positively reinforce the correct behaviour. Hand hygiene behaviour in the emoticon rooms significantly outperformed the behaviour in three other tested conditions. The strong effect in this field experiment indicates that activating injunctive norms may be a promising approach to improve hand hygiene behaviour. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

Monday, May 21, 2018

Relative to nonbelievers, Christians self-enhanced strongly in domains central to the Christian self-concept. The results also generalized across countries with differing levels of religiosity. Christianity does not quiet the ego

From February 2017: Christian Self-Enhancement. Jochen E Gebauer, Constantine Sedikides, Alexandra Schrade. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 113(5), 10.1037/pspp0000140

Abstract> People overestimate themselves in domains that are central to their self-concept. Critically, the psychological status of this “self-centrality principle” remains unclear. One view regards the principle as an inextricable part of human nature and, thus, as universal and resistant to normative pressure. A contrasting view regards the principle as liable to pressure (and subsequent modification) from self-effacement norms, thus questioning its universality. Advocates of the latter view point to Christianity’s robust self-effacement norms, which they consider particularly effective in curbing self-enhancement, and ascribe Christianity an ego-quieting function. Three sets of studies examined the self-centrality principle among Christians. Studies 1A and 1B (N = 2,118) operationalized self-enhancement as better-than-average perceptions on the domains of commandments of faith (self-centrality: Christians ≫ nonbelievers) and commandments of communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers). Studies 2A–2H (N = 1,779) operationalized self-enhancement as knowledge overclaiming on the domains of Christianity (self-centrality: Christians ≫ nonbelievers), communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers), and agency (self-centrality: Christians ≈ nonbelievers). Studies 3A–3J (N = 1,956) operationalized self-enhancement as grandiose narcissism on the domains of communion (self-centrality: Christians > nonbelievers) and agency (self-centrality: Christians ≈ nonbelievers). The results converged across studies, yielding consistent evidence for Christian self-enhancement. Relative to nonbelievers, Christians self-enhanced strongly in domains central to the Christian self-concept. The results also generalized across countries with differing levels of religiosity. Christianity does not quiet the ego. The self-centrality principle is resistant to normative pressure, universal, and rooted in human nature.

Rational Learners or Biased Believers: How do children form beliefs in a motivated reasoning context?

Rational Learners or Biased Believers: How do children form beliefs in a motivated reasoning context? Prachi Solanki, Zachary Horne. https://www.cognitionasu.org/s/Evidence-Assimilation-CogSci2018.pdf

Abstract: We often believe what we want, regardless of the available evidence. When evidence confirms our beliefs, we are ready to accept it, but we are skeptical of new evidence when it impugns our beliefs. Researchers have examined the factors that influence how people integrate evidence into their existing beliefs; however, it is unclear what the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation is. This may be particularly true in situations in which evidence runs contrary to a child’s motivations. In this study, we examined the developmental trajectory of evidence assimilation with children between the ages of 4 and 12 years old. Using a simple judgment task, we tested how children responded to different distributions of evidence for a proposition when they were motivated to believe that proposition was not true. Our results suggest that children accurately tracked the available evidence, even when it was incongruent with what they were motivated to believe.

Keywords: evidence assimilation; motivated reasoning, development, cognition