Does voluntary wheel running exist in Neotropical wild mammals? Peter van Lunteren et al. bioRxiv, https://doi.org/10.1101/409409
Abstract: Running wheels are frequently used to improve the welfare of captive animals, increase environmental enrichment, and, by doing so, reduce stereotypic behaviors. It is, however, still debated whether or not wheel running itself is a stereotypy. New evidence emerged when Meijer and Robbers (2014, Proc. Royal Soc. B) reported voluntary wheel running of wild animals in the Netherlands. Since stereotypic behaviors are exclusively attributed to captive animals, the occurrence of wheel running in the wild suggests that this behavior is non-stereotypic. Our study explores that same line of investigation, examining whether wild animals will voluntarily use running wheels in a natural area in Paraguay in comparison to the urban and semi-urban settings in the Netherlands. Of the 1857 small mammal visits we recorded, only two occasions showed evidence of what could be considered as wheel running behavior; over hundredfold fewer than previously reported. The potential reasons for the observed difference in wheel running activity, such as different species pool or seasonality, are discussed. The difference, however, is likely to be due to the much lower probability of Neotropical mammals in a remote natural site encountering man-made objects and experiencing urbanization-related behavioral patterns. Additionally, in the light of our findings, we review the definition of wheel running as a stereotypic behavior.
Sunday, September 16, 2018
Saturday, September 15, 2018
Paraphilic thoughts & behaviors are not really a deviation from normalcy, rather they are quite widespread in the young population: Men report a higher prevalence of voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, & frotteurism; women a higher prevalence of fetishism and masochism
Castellini G, Rellini AH, Appignanesi C, et al. Deviance or Normalcy? The Relationship Among Paraphilic Thoughts and Behaviors, Hypersexuality, and Psychopathology in a Sample of University Students. The Journal of Sexual Medicine. Volume 15, Issue 9, September 2018, Pages 1322-1335. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2018.07.015
Abstract
Introduction: The actual definitions of paraphilic thoughts or behaviors and hypersexuality are still a matter of debate in the scientific community, and few studies have evaluated their psychopathological correlates in non-clinical samples of both men and women.
Aim: This study aimed at shedding light on the gender differences in terms of frequency of paraphilic fantasies and behaviors, and the relationship among paraphilias, hypersexuality, and general psychopathology.
Methods: A sample of 775 university students (243 men, 532 women) was recruited from 6 Italian universities using questionnaires posted in social networks. Paraphilic behaviors, fantasies, and masturbation during these fantasies were evaluated, as well as hypersexuality, psychopathological correlates, self-perceived gender identity, and a history of adverse childhood conditions.
Main Outcome Measures: Participants were assessed on the presence of paraphilic fantasies, behaviors, and masturbation related to paraphilic thoughts, and evaluated by means of the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised, the Hypersexual Disorder Screening Inventory, the International Index of Erectile Function, the Female Sexual Function Index, the Gender Identity/Gender Dysphoria Questionnaire, and the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire.
Results: In the present survey, 50.6% of the men and 41.5% of the women reported at least 1 behavior considered paraphilic. A gender difference in the prevalence of the main paraphilic interests and behaviors was observed, with men reporting a higher prevalence of voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, and frotteurism, and a higher prevalence of fetishism and masochism in women. Both general psychopathology and sexual dysfunctions were associated with hypersexuality, rather than with the content of sexual fantasies. Finally, an association between childhood adversities and hypersexuality was found in women but not in men.
Clinical Implications: Understanding the psychopathological correlates of paraphilic fantasies/behaviors and hypersexuality may allow clinicians to develop specific psychological and pharmacological interventions.
Strengths & Limitations: This is one of the few studies assessing paraphilic phenomenology and psychopathological correlates of hypersexuality in a non-clinical sample of both men and women.
Conclusion: The results seem to demonstrate that paraphilic thoughts and behaviors are not really a deviation from normalcy, rather they are quite widespread in the young population, and the distinction between healthy and pathological sexual interests may be better replaced by an all-encompassing approach considering ego-dystonic sexuality, hypersexuality, and their psychopathological correlates.
Abstract
Introduction: The actual definitions of paraphilic thoughts or behaviors and hypersexuality are still a matter of debate in the scientific community, and few studies have evaluated their psychopathological correlates in non-clinical samples of both men and women.
Aim: This study aimed at shedding light on the gender differences in terms of frequency of paraphilic fantasies and behaviors, and the relationship among paraphilias, hypersexuality, and general psychopathology.
Methods: A sample of 775 university students (243 men, 532 women) was recruited from 6 Italian universities using questionnaires posted in social networks. Paraphilic behaviors, fantasies, and masturbation during these fantasies were evaluated, as well as hypersexuality, psychopathological correlates, self-perceived gender identity, and a history of adverse childhood conditions.
Main Outcome Measures: Participants were assessed on the presence of paraphilic fantasies, behaviors, and masturbation related to paraphilic thoughts, and evaluated by means of the Symptom Checklist 90-Revised, the Hypersexual Disorder Screening Inventory, the International Index of Erectile Function, the Female Sexual Function Index, the Gender Identity/Gender Dysphoria Questionnaire, and the Childhood Experience of Care and Abuse Questionnaire.
Results: In the present survey, 50.6% of the men and 41.5% of the women reported at least 1 behavior considered paraphilic. A gender difference in the prevalence of the main paraphilic interests and behaviors was observed, with men reporting a higher prevalence of voyeurism, exhibitionism, sadism, and frotteurism, and a higher prevalence of fetishism and masochism in women. Both general psychopathology and sexual dysfunctions were associated with hypersexuality, rather than with the content of sexual fantasies. Finally, an association between childhood adversities and hypersexuality was found in women but not in men.
Clinical Implications: Understanding the psychopathological correlates of paraphilic fantasies/behaviors and hypersexuality may allow clinicians to develop specific psychological and pharmacological interventions.
Strengths & Limitations: This is one of the few studies assessing paraphilic phenomenology and psychopathological correlates of hypersexuality in a non-clinical sample of both men and women.
Conclusion: The results seem to demonstrate that paraphilic thoughts and behaviors are not really a deviation from normalcy, rather they are quite widespread in the young population, and the distinction between healthy and pathological sexual interests may be better replaced by an all-encompassing approach considering ego-dystonic sexuality, hypersexuality, and their psychopathological correlates.
The First-Daughter Effect: The Impact of Fathering Daughters on Men’s Preferences for Gender-Equality Policies
The First-Daughter Effect: The Impact of Fathering Daughters on Men’s Preferences for Gender-Equality Policies. Elizabeth A Sharrow, Jesse H Rhodes, Tatishe M Nteta, Jill S Greenlee. Public Opinion Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfy037
Abstract: An extensive literature on the politics of the family suggests that familial relationships play a central role in individuals’ political socialization and can ultimately shape one’s policy preferences. A current debate within this literature deals with the impact of daughters on fathers’ political attitudes. In this article, we address this debate in relation to a specific set of policy preferences and ask: Does the experience of fathering daughters affect men’s opinions toward gender-equality policies? In addressing this question, this study examines three theoretically motivated propositions: first, that having a daughter leads men to see the benefits of and support public policies that aim to reduce gender inequality; second, that fathers with a larger proportion of daughters express stronger support for these policies; and finally, that having a daughter as a man’s first child is a critical event in the political socialization of men, such that this experience of “first-daughterhood” will lead to higher levels of support for gender-equality policies. We use original representative survey data from a module on the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to test these three hypotheses. The results of our analyses suggest that the experience of having a daughter as a first child—but not the effect of having a daughter in general nor the experience of fathering a higher proportion of daughters—significantly increases fathers’ support for policies designed to increase gender equality.
Abstract: An extensive literature on the politics of the family suggests that familial relationships play a central role in individuals’ political socialization and can ultimately shape one’s policy preferences. A current debate within this literature deals with the impact of daughters on fathers’ political attitudes. In this article, we address this debate in relation to a specific set of policy preferences and ask: Does the experience of fathering daughters affect men’s opinions toward gender-equality policies? In addressing this question, this study examines three theoretically motivated propositions: first, that having a daughter leads men to see the benefits of and support public policies that aim to reduce gender inequality; second, that fathers with a larger proportion of daughters express stronger support for these policies; and finally, that having a daughter as a man’s first child is a critical event in the political socialization of men, such that this experience of “first-daughterhood” will lead to higher levels of support for gender-equality policies. We use original representative survey data from a module on the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) to test these three hypotheses. The results of our analyses suggest that the experience of having a daughter as a first child—but not the effect of having a daughter in general nor the experience of fathering a higher proportion of daughters—significantly increases fathers’ support for policies designed to increase gender equality.
Confirmation bias theory of salience: consumers tend to disregard information (like a tax) that does not align with their intention to purchase an item, and this lack of alignment increases in the size of the tax
Naomi Feldman, Jacob Goldin, and Tatiana Homonoff (2018), Raising the Stakes: Experimental Evidence on the Endogeneity of Taxpayer Mistakes, National Tax Journal, 71:2, pp. 201-230. DOI: doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2018.2.01
Abstract: Recent evidence suggests consumers fail to account for taxes that are excluded from a good's displayed price. What is less understood is whether and how such "salience effects" depend on the magnitude of the tax. We conduct a laboratory shopping experiment with real stakes to study the effect of tax size on salience. We find no evidence that salience effects decline as the tax rate increases; we document a statistically significant salience effect at a tax rate that is considerably larger than the tax rates at which such effects have been previously documented. In fact, our results are more consistent with the hypothesis that higher taxes make consumers less attentive (at least for the range of taxes we consider). This result can be explained by a confirmation bias theory of salience: consumers tend to disregard information (like a tax) that does not align with their intention to purchase an item, and this lack of alignment increases in the size of the tax
Abstract: Recent evidence suggests consumers fail to account for taxes that are excluded from a good's displayed price. What is less understood is whether and how such "salience effects" depend on the magnitude of the tax. We conduct a laboratory shopping experiment with real stakes to study the effect of tax size on salience. We find no evidence that salience effects decline as the tax rate increases; we document a statistically significant salience effect at a tax rate that is considerably larger than the tax rates at which such effects have been previously documented. In fact, our results are more consistent with the hypothesis that higher taxes make consumers less attentive (at least for the range of taxes we consider). This result can be explained by a confirmation bias theory of salience: consumers tend to disregard information (like a tax) that does not align with their intention to purchase an item, and this lack of alignment increases in the size of the tax
Gender-Based Occupational Segregation and Sex Differences in Sensory, Motor, and Spatial Aptitudes
Gender-Based Occupational Segregation and Sex Differences in Sensory, Motor, and Spatial Aptitudes. Michael Baker, Kirsten Cornelson. Demography, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-018-0706-3
Abstract: Research on sex differences in humans documents gender differences in sensory, motor, and spatial aptitudes. These aptitudes, as captured by Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) codes, predict the occupational choices of men and women in the directions indicated by this research. We simulate that eliminating selection on these skills reduces the Duncan index of gender-based occupational segregation by 20 % to 23 % in 1970 and 2012, respectively. Eliminating selection on DOT variables capturing other accounts of this segregation has a smaller impact.
Abstract: Research on sex differences in humans documents gender differences in sensory, motor, and spatial aptitudes. These aptitudes, as captured by Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) codes, predict the occupational choices of men and women in the directions indicated by this research. We simulate that eliminating selection on these skills reduces the Duncan index of gender-based occupational segregation by 20 % to 23 % in 1970 and 2012, respectively. Eliminating selection on DOT variables capturing other accounts of this segregation has a smaller impact.
The psychology of vegetarianism: Recent advances and future directions
The psychology of vegetarianism: Recent advances and future directions. Daniel L. Rosenfeld. Appetite, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2018.09.011
Abstract: Whereas vegetarianism has long garnered attention from nutritional science and philosophy, psychological research exploring this eating behavior has emerged only in the past few decades. Six years ago, Ruby (2012) reviewed the extant literature on the psychology of vegetarianism, showcasing its promise as “a blossoming field of study.” In the time since, this line of research truly has blossomed, as subsequent work has addressed prior knowledge gaps and initiated new lines of inquiry. While evidence on previously studied topics of dietary motivation, moral values, gender, differences between vegetarians and vegans, barriers to dietary change, and disordered eating has continued to expand, new lines of research on identity, social experiences, flexitarianism, culture, and prospective vegetarianism have emerged. Recent psychometric advancements, moreover, have constructed useful measures to assess relevant constructs. The current review synthesizes this amalgam of research, identifying emergent themes and highlighting promising directions for future inquiry.
Abstract: Whereas vegetarianism has long garnered attention from nutritional science and philosophy, psychological research exploring this eating behavior has emerged only in the past few decades. Six years ago, Ruby (2012) reviewed the extant literature on the psychology of vegetarianism, showcasing its promise as “a blossoming field of study.” In the time since, this line of research truly has blossomed, as subsequent work has addressed prior knowledge gaps and initiated new lines of inquiry. While evidence on previously studied topics of dietary motivation, moral values, gender, differences between vegetarians and vegans, barriers to dietary change, and disordered eating has continued to expand, new lines of research on identity, social experiences, flexitarianism, culture, and prospective vegetarianism have emerged. Recent psychometric advancements, moreover, have constructed useful measures to assess relevant constructs. The current review synthesizes this amalgam of research, identifying emergent themes and highlighting promising directions for future inquiry.
What people prefer and what they think they prefer in short- and long-term partners: The effects of the menstrual cycle phase, hormonal contraception, pregnancy, and the marital and the parenthood status on partner preferences
What people prefer and what they think they prefer in short- and long-term partners. The effects of the phase of the menstrual cycle, hormonal contraception, pregnancy, and the marital and the parenthood status on partner preferences. Jaroslav Flegr et al. Evolution and Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.09.003
Abstract: The issue with most studies concerned with mate selection preferences in humans is that they rely on declarations and rational actions of experimental subjects, which are affected by their pre-conceived opinions and prejudices. Moreover, current research suggests that subcortical structures and processes, rather than the neocortex, play the principal role in actual partner choice behaviour. Consequently, we have only limited information on how relevant our current knowledge is in relation to real-life human ethology. To address these issues, we surveyed 2718 women and 4073 men between the ages of 16–50 and compared their declared and observed preferences for various properties in short-term and long-term partners. We found differences between what the subjects declared to prefer and what they preferred in reality: for example, men declared that wealth was the second least desirable property out of eleven in short-term partners, but we observed that in reality, they considered wealth the third most important factor after charisma and sense of humour. Similarly, while women declared that dominance and masculinity were desirable properties in short-term partners, in the observational part of the study, they showed little preference for these traits. Furthermore, we investigated the effects of the phase of the menstrual cycle, hormonal contraception, pregnancy, and partnership and parenthood status on these preferences. We found some support for the good parents hypothesis and no support for the good genes and the immunocompetence handicap hypotheses when observed, rather than declared preferences were considered. We also detected that hormonal contraception, and parenthood and partnership status influenced declared preferences in considerable ways, but had only a small, if any, impact on observed preferences. We suggest interpreting the results of studies reliant on declarations and rational actions of experimental subjects with great caution.
Abstract: The issue with most studies concerned with mate selection preferences in humans is that they rely on declarations and rational actions of experimental subjects, which are affected by their pre-conceived opinions and prejudices. Moreover, current research suggests that subcortical structures and processes, rather than the neocortex, play the principal role in actual partner choice behaviour. Consequently, we have only limited information on how relevant our current knowledge is in relation to real-life human ethology. To address these issues, we surveyed 2718 women and 4073 men between the ages of 16–50 and compared their declared and observed preferences for various properties in short-term and long-term partners. We found differences between what the subjects declared to prefer and what they preferred in reality: for example, men declared that wealth was the second least desirable property out of eleven in short-term partners, but we observed that in reality, they considered wealth the third most important factor after charisma and sense of humour. Similarly, while women declared that dominance and masculinity were desirable properties in short-term partners, in the observational part of the study, they showed little preference for these traits. Furthermore, we investigated the effects of the phase of the menstrual cycle, hormonal contraception, pregnancy, and partnership and parenthood status on these preferences. We found some support for the good parents hypothesis and no support for the good genes and the immunocompetence handicap hypotheses when observed, rather than declared preferences were considered. We also detected that hormonal contraception, and parenthood and partnership status influenced declared preferences in considerable ways, but had only a small, if any, impact on observed preferences. We suggest interpreting the results of studies reliant on declarations and rational actions of experimental subjects with great caution.
First detect gender, then attractiveness: Attractiveness follows gender in terms of underlying neural processes; early face attractiveness assessment seems to rely on gender-stereotypes
First gender, then attractiveness: Indications of gender-specific attractiveness processing via ERP onsets. Claus-Christian Carbon e al. Neuroscience Letters
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2018.09.009
Highlights
• Facial gender and attractiveness: Key features to study face processes.
• Processing onsets estimated by LRP- and N200-effects.
• Attractiveness follows gender in terms of underlying neural processes.
• Early face attractiveness assessment seems to rely on gender-stereotypes.
• Used paradigm is promising to further uncover the time course of face perception.
Abstract: We followed an ERP-based approach to gain knowledge on the dependence and temporal order of two essential processes of face perception: attractiveness and gender. By combining a dual-choice task with a go/nogo-paradigm focusing on the LRP and N200-effect, we could estimate the processing times and onsets of both types of face processing. The analyses of the LRP revealed that gender aspects were processed much earlier than attractiveness. Whereas gender was already analysed 243.9 ms post-stimulus onset, attractiveness came into play 58.6 ms later, i.e. after a post-stimulus onset delay of 302.5 ms. This resulting pattern was mirrored by the analyses of the N200-effect, an effect available mainly frontally which is supposed to correlate with the inhibition of inappropriate responses. Taking the onset of the N200 effect as an estimator for the moment at which information has been processed sufficiently for task decision, we could trace the N200 effect at 152.0 ms for go/nogo-decision on gender, while not as early as 206.7 ms on attractiveness. In sum, processing of facial attractiveness seems to be based on gender-specific aesthetic pre-processing, for instance via activating gender-specific attractiveness prototypes which show focused processing of certain facial aspects.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2018.09.009
Highlights
• Facial gender and attractiveness: Key features to study face processes.
• Processing onsets estimated by LRP- and N200-effects.
• Attractiveness follows gender in terms of underlying neural processes.
• Early face attractiveness assessment seems to rely on gender-stereotypes.
• Used paradigm is promising to further uncover the time course of face perception.
Abstract: We followed an ERP-based approach to gain knowledge on the dependence and temporal order of two essential processes of face perception: attractiveness and gender. By combining a dual-choice task with a go/nogo-paradigm focusing on the LRP and N200-effect, we could estimate the processing times and onsets of both types of face processing. The analyses of the LRP revealed that gender aspects were processed much earlier than attractiveness. Whereas gender was already analysed 243.9 ms post-stimulus onset, attractiveness came into play 58.6 ms later, i.e. after a post-stimulus onset delay of 302.5 ms. This resulting pattern was mirrored by the analyses of the N200-effect, an effect available mainly frontally which is supposed to correlate with the inhibition of inappropriate responses. Taking the onset of the N200 effect as an estimator for the moment at which information has been processed sufficiently for task decision, we could trace the N200 effect at 152.0 ms for go/nogo-decision on gender, while not as early as 206.7 ms on attractiveness. In sum, processing of facial attractiveness seems to be based on gender-specific aesthetic pre-processing, for instance via activating gender-specific attractiveness prototypes which show focused processing of certain facial aspects.
From 2017: Female Waist-to-Hip Ratio (WHR) is correlated to divorce frequency
Chiappa, P., & Singh, S. (2017). Sexual dimorphism in waist-to-hip ratio and divorce frequency in human populations. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, 11(3), 221-241. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000100
Abstract: The current study tests a series of evolutionary predictions about the changing opportunities for human male mate choice and female Waist-to-Hip Ratio (WHR) across populations. We predicted that the divorce frequency (that we used as a reflection of the frequency of male mate choice) would be positively correlated with sexual dimorphism in WHRs across human populations. With published data, we built 2 samples, 1 at the international level and the other at the national level. The results showed that sexual dimorphism in WHR is positively correlated with the divorce-to-married ratio in 68 countries worldwide, as well as in the 32 Mexican states. Taken together, our results suggest that the opportunity for human male mate choice, based on female WHR, varies among human populations. We discuss the possibility of connecting this variation to human diversity in divorce practices. We conclude that human male mate choice is a circumstantially conditioned selective process responsible for such dimorphism and suggest that cultural and social aspects are potentially powerful in examining the factors capable of strengthening or weakening the selective process.
Abstract: The current study tests a series of evolutionary predictions about the changing opportunities for human male mate choice and female Waist-to-Hip Ratio (WHR) across populations. We predicted that the divorce frequency (that we used as a reflection of the frequency of male mate choice) would be positively correlated with sexual dimorphism in WHRs across human populations. With published data, we built 2 samples, 1 at the international level and the other at the national level. The results showed that sexual dimorphism in WHR is positively correlated with the divorce-to-married ratio in 68 countries worldwide, as well as in the 32 Mexican states. Taken together, our results suggest that the opportunity for human male mate choice, based on female WHR, varies among human populations. We discuss the possibility of connecting this variation to human diversity in divorce practices. We conclude that human male mate choice is a circumstantially conditioned selective process responsible for such dimorphism and suggest that cultural and social aspects are potentially powerful in examining the factors capable of strengthening or weakening the selective process.
Friday, September 14, 2018
Claim: Conversion To Buddhism Has Brought Literacy, Gender Equality And Well-Being To Dalits (2017)
Conversion To Buddhism Has Brought Literacy, Gender Equality And Well-Being To Dalits. Manu Moudgil, IndiaSpend, July 1, 2017. www.indiaspend.com/cover-story/conversion-to-buddhism-has-brought-literacy-gender-equality-and-well-being-to-dalits-18224
There are more than 8.4 million Buddhists in India and 87% of them are converts from other religions, mostly Dalits who changed religion to escape Hindu caste oppression. The remaining 13% of Buddhists belong to traditional communities of the north-east and northern Himalayan regions.
Today, these converts to Buddhism–also called neo-Buddhists–enjoy better literacy rates, greater work participation and sex ratio than Scheduled Caste Hindus, the group from which most converts emerge, according to an IndiaSpend analysis of 2011 Census data.
Given that converts make for 87% of the Buddhist population in India and most of them are Dalits, our analysis goes with the assumption that the benefits of growth in the community accrue mostly to the Dalits.
Buddhists have a literacy rate of 81.29%, higher than the national average of 72.98%, according to Census data [http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html]. The literacy rate among Hindus is 73.27% while Scheduled Castes have a lower literacy rate of 66.07%.
“Most Dalits at the senior levels of administration are Buddhists,” said Satpal Tanwar, a leader of Bhim Army, the activist organisation accused of the Saharanpur violence of May 5, 2017, and now mulling mass conversion of Dalits to Buddhism. “This is because Buddhism lends them self-confidence as compared to the caste system which tends to rationalise their low social status through vague concepts like bad karma.”
Better literacy rates
It is only in the traditional communities of the northeast, especially in Mizoram (48.11%) and Arunachal Pradesh (57.89%), that Buddhists have a lower literacy rate than the population average.
On the other hand, Chhattisgarh (87.34%), Maharashtra (83.17%) and Jharkhand (80.41%) have the most number of literate Buddhists. The conversion movement has been the strongest in Maharashtra, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh.
[full article with maps and links in the URL above]
h/ t: anonymous contributor
There are more than 8.4 million Buddhists in India and 87% of them are converts from other religions, mostly Dalits who changed religion to escape Hindu caste oppression. The remaining 13% of Buddhists belong to traditional communities of the north-east and northern Himalayan regions.
Today, these converts to Buddhism–also called neo-Buddhists–enjoy better literacy rates, greater work participation and sex ratio than Scheduled Caste Hindus, the group from which most converts emerge, according to an IndiaSpend analysis of 2011 Census data.
Given that converts make for 87% of the Buddhist population in India and most of them are Dalits, our analysis goes with the assumption that the benefits of growth in the community accrue mostly to the Dalits.
Buddhists have a literacy rate of 81.29%, higher than the national average of 72.98%, according to Census data [http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html]. The literacy rate among Hindus is 73.27% while Scheduled Castes have a lower literacy rate of 66.07%.
“Most Dalits at the senior levels of administration are Buddhists,” said Satpal Tanwar, a leader of Bhim Army, the activist organisation accused of the Saharanpur violence of May 5, 2017, and now mulling mass conversion of Dalits to Buddhism. “This is because Buddhism lends them self-confidence as compared to the caste system which tends to rationalise their low social status through vague concepts like bad karma.”
Better literacy rates
It is only in the traditional communities of the northeast, especially in Mizoram (48.11%) and Arunachal Pradesh (57.89%), that Buddhists have a lower literacy rate than the population average.
On the other hand, Chhattisgarh (87.34%), Maharashtra (83.17%) and Jharkhand (80.41%) have the most number of literate Buddhists. The conversion movement has been the strongest in Maharashtra, followed by Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh.
[full article with maps and links in the URL above]
h/ t: anonymous contributor
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning): Acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies)
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning), in Smart Is asStupid Does: Exploring bases of erroneous reasoning of smart people regarding learning and other disabilities. Elena L. Grigorenko & Donna Lockery, chp 8 in Why smart people can be so stupid, Robert J. Sternberg (ed.). Cambridge, MA: Yale University, 2002.
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning). Excerpt.
This fallacy refers to a type of reasoning, the structure and content of which changes depending on the position from which the arguing is done. The fallacy invokes the acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies). As an illustration of this fallacy, consider the following.
The City of Manchester Democratic Party Committee endorsed Peter Leonard, a fifty-three-year-old man with a specific reading disability who had an IQ of 80 and reading skills at a third-grade level (Good Morning America, Mar. 19, 1998). Mr. Leonard had won a seat on the Manchester school board. The city’s Republican leader, Marc Pappas, said that Leonard was a nice man who had the best intentions, but he questioned whether Leonard would be able to represent his constituents adequately. What is noteworthy, however, is that Pappas admitted that if Leonard had been a Republican with this same learning disability, the Republicans would have supported him (Union Leader, Nov. 12, 1999).
Here, while reasoning as a Republican opposing a Democratic Party candidate, Mr. Pappas questioned the quality of the candidate—the concern being not whether Mr. Leonard did or did not have a learning disability, but whether he could represent his constituents adequately. Mr. Pappas’s reasoning changed, however, when he was asked what he and his party colleagues would do were Mr. Leonard a Republican. Put in this conditional position, Mr. Pappas did not bring up the question of Mr. Leonard’s personal qualities but concentrated instead on his group membership. This kind of reasoning, which stresses the importance of being correctly a≈liated politically rather than of making justified and consistent inferences following common sense, is quite e√ective in creating the stereotype according to which people with learning disabilities will be given special considerations.
The fallacy of role substitution (the fallacy of differential reasoning). Excerpt.
This fallacy refers to a type of reasoning, the structure and content of which changes depending on the position from which the arguing is done. The fallacy invokes the acceptability of two different lines of reasoning (e.g., one for friends and one for enemies). As an illustration of this fallacy, consider the following.
The City of Manchester Democratic Party Committee endorsed Peter Leonard, a fifty-three-year-old man with a specific reading disability who had an IQ of 80 and reading skills at a third-grade level (Good Morning America, Mar. 19, 1998). Mr. Leonard had won a seat on the Manchester school board. The city’s Republican leader, Marc Pappas, said that Leonard was a nice man who had the best intentions, but he questioned whether Leonard would be able to represent his constituents adequately. What is noteworthy, however, is that Pappas admitted that if Leonard had been a Republican with this same learning disability, the Republicans would have supported him (Union Leader, Nov. 12, 1999).
Here, while reasoning as a Republican opposing a Democratic Party candidate, Mr. Pappas questioned the quality of the candidate—the concern being not whether Mr. Leonard did or did not have a learning disability, but whether he could represent his constituents adequately. Mr. Pappas’s reasoning changed, however, when he was asked what he and his party colleagues would do were Mr. Leonard a Republican. Put in this conditional position, Mr. Pappas did not bring up the question of Mr. Leonard’s personal qualities but concentrated instead on his group membership. This kind of reasoning, which stresses the importance of being correctly a≈liated politically rather than of making justified and consistent inferences following common sense, is quite e√ective in creating the stereotype according to which people with learning disabilities will be given special considerations.
How Does the World Google the Internet, Anxiety, and Happiness?
How Does the World Google the Internet, Anxiety, and Happiness? Snehasish Banerjee. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Vol. 21, No. 9, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2018.0206
Abstract: This article investigates how the world uses Google, the most popular search engine, to look for information about the “Internet” as well as two symptoms of emotional well-being, namely “anxiety” and “happiness.” Data corresponding to 202 countries were collected for a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2017 using Google Trends, a free surveillance tool that reports data from the search engine. The search volume of “Internet” was positively correlated with that of “anxiety” as well as “happiness.” Furthermore, the article analyzed if the search volumes correlated with actual emotional well-being measured using the World Happiness Index provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Life Satisfaction Index provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The search volume of “anxiety” showed positive correlations with both the indices. The results are discussed, and new directions for future research are identified.
Abstract: This article investigates how the world uses Google, the most popular search engine, to look for information about the “Internet” as well as two symptoms of emotional well-being, namely “anxiety” and “happiness.” Data corresponding to 202 countries were collected for a period of 5 years from 2013 to 2017 using Google Trends, a free surveillance tool that reports data from the search engine. The search volume of “Internet” was positively correlated with that of “anxiety” as well as “happiness.” Furthermore, the article analyzed if the search volumes correlated with actual emotional well-being measured using the World Happiness Index provided by the United Nations (UN) and the Life Satisfaction Index provided by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The search volume of “anxiety” showed positive correlations with both the indices. The results are discussed, and new directions for future research are identified.
Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares & unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer; diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions
Cognitions in Dreams. Patrick McNamara et al. Journal of Cognition and Culture, Volume 18, Issue 3-4, pages 428 – 450. DOI: 10.1163/15685373-12340038
Purpose: To test the hypothesis that supernatural agents (SAs) appear in nightmares and dreams in association with evidence of diminished agency within the dreamer/dream ego.
Methods: Content analyses of 120 nightmares and 71 unpleasant control dream narratives.
Results: We found that SAs overtly occur in about one quarter of unpleasant dreams and about half of nightmares. When SAs appear in a dream or nightmare they are reliably associated with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency within the dreamer occurs in over 90% of dreams (whether nightmares or unpleasant dreams) that have overt SAs. In about half of nightmare reports the SA appears suddenly with no clear emergence pattern. In some two thirds of unpleasant dreams, however, the SA emerged from a human character. The SA’s gender was indeterminate in most dreams with SAs but the SA communicated with the dreamer in 24% of nightmares and only 13% of unpleasant dreams. In most nightmares, the SA intended to harm the dreamer and in one third of nightmares the dreamer was the victim of physical agression by the SA. SA intentions in unpleasant dreams were more varied and actually benign in 13% of cases.
Conclusion: Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares and unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions.
Keywords: dreams; religious cognition; nightmares; supernatural agents; agency
Purpose: To test the hypothesis that supernatural agents (SAs) appear in nightmares and dreams in association with evidence of diminished agency within the dreamer/dream ego.
Methods: Content analyses of 120 nightmares and 71 unpleasant control dream narratives.
Results: We found that SAs overtly occur in about one quarter of unpleasant dreams and about half of nightmares. When SAs appear in a dream or nightmare they are reliably associated with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency within the dreamer occurs in over 90% of dreams (whether nightmares or unpleasant dreams) that have overt SAs. In about half of nightmare reports the SA appears suddenly with no clear emergence pattern. In some two thirds of unpleasant dreams, however, the SA emerged from a human character. The SA’s gender was indeterminate in most dreams with SAs but the SA communicated with the dreamer in 24% of nightmares and only 13% of unpleasant dreams. In most nightmares, the SA intended to harm the dreamer and in one third of nightmares the dreamer was the victim of physical agression by the SA. SA intentions in unpleasant dreams were more varied and actually benign in 13% of cases.
Conclusion: Supernatural agents reliably appear in nightmares and unpleasant dreams in association with diminished agency in the dreamer. Diminished agency in an individual may facilitate supernatural agent cognitions.
Keywords: dreams; religious cognition; nightmares; supernatural agents; agency
Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width: The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes
My true face: Unmasking one's own face representation. Laura Mora et al. Acta Psychologica, Volume 191, November 2018, Pages 63-68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2018.08.014
Highlights
• Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width.
• Self-face length perception is compartmentalised into upper and bottom regions.
• The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes.
• There is an asymmetrical representation of the face, with over representation of the right hemispace.
• Face representation relies on influences from visual experience, typical body posture, frequency of use and functionality.
Abstract: Face recognition has been the focus of multiple studies, but little is still known on how we represent the structure of one's own face. Most of the studies have focused on the topic of visual and haptic face recognition, but the metric representation of different features of one's own face is relatively unknown. We investigated the metric representation of the face in young adults by developing a proprioceptive pointing task to locate face landmarks in the first-person perspective. Our data revealed a large overestimation of width for all face features which resembles, in part, the size in somatosensory cortical representation. In contrast, face length was compartmentalised in two different regions: upper (underestimated) and bottom (overestimated); indicating size differences possibly due to functionality. We also identified shifts of the location judgments, with all face areas perceived closer to the body than they really were, due to a potential influence of the self-frame of reference. More importantly, the representation of the face appeared asymmetrical, with an overrepresentation of right side of the face, due to the influence of lateralization biases for strong right-handers. We suggest that these effects may be due to functionality influences and experience that affect the construction of face structural representation, going beyond the parallel of the somatosensory homunculus.
Highlights
• Size distortions are intrinsic to self-face representation, characterised for a tendency to overestimate its width.
• Self-face length perception is compartmentalised into upper and bottom regions.
• The metric map for self-face representation shows larger distortion for the nose, followed by the mouth and the eyes.
• There is an asymmetrical representation of the face, with over representation of the right hemispace.
• Face representation relies on influences from visual experience, typical body posture, frequency of use and functionality.
Abstract: Face recognition has been the focus of multiple studies, but little is still known on how we represent the structure of one's own face. Most of the studies have focused on the topic of visual and haptic face recognition, but the metric representation of different features of one's own face is relatively unknown. We investigated the metric representation of the face in young adults by developing a proprioceptive pointing task to locate face landmarks in the first-person perspective. Our data revealed a large overestimation of width for all face features which resembles, in part, the size in somatosensory cortical representation. In contrast, face length was compartmentalised in two different regions: upper (underestimated) and bottom (overestimated); indicating size differences possibly due to functionality. We also identified shifts of the location judgments, with all face areas perceived closer to the body than they really were, due to a potential influence of the self-frame of reference. More importantly, the representation of the face appeared asymmetrical, with an overrepresentation of right side of the face, due to the influence of lateralization biases for strong right-handers. We suggest that these effects may be due to functionality influences and experience that affect the construction of face structural representation, going beyond the parallel of the somatosensory homunculus.
People’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of the event: They were more upset about events that were unexpected (a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (a robbery at a convenience store)
Powell, Derek, and Zachary Horne. 2018. “Expectations Bias Moral Evaluations.” PsyArXiv. September 13. doi:10.31234/osf.io/s7fu2
Abstract: People’s expectations play an important role in their reactions to events. There is often disappointment when events fail to meet expectations and a special thrill to having one’s expectations exceeded. We propose that expectations influence evaluations through information-theoretic principles: less expected events do more to inform us about the state of the world than do more expected events. An implication of this proposal is that people may have inappropriately muted responses to morally significant but expected events. In two preregistered experiments, we found that people’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of that event. People were more upset about events that were unexpected (e.g., a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (e.g., a robbery at a convenience store). We argue that this bias has pernicious moral consequences, including leading to reduced concern for victims in most need of help.
Abstract: People’s expectations play an important role in their reactions to events. There is often disappointment when events fail to meet expectations and a special thrill to having one’s expectations exceeded. We propose that expectations influence evaluations through information-theoretic principles: less expected events do more to inform us about the state of the world than do more expected events. An implication of this proposal is that people may have inappropriately muted responses to morally significant but expected events. In two preregistered experiments, we found that people’s judgments of morally-significant events were affected by the likelihood of that event. People were more upset about events that were unexpected (e.g., a robbery at a clothing store) than events that were more expected (e.g., a robbery at a convenience store). We argue that this bias has pernicious moral consequences, including leading to reduced concern for victims in most need of help.
Cross-national gender differences in the enrollment in & completion of science, technology, engineering, & mathematics M. Open Online Courses: Females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, but were equally likely to complete them
Cross-national comparison of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics Massive Open Online Courses. Suhang Jiang et al. PLOS One, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202463
Abstract: Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have the potential to democratize education by providing learners with access to high-quality free online courses. However, evidence supporting this democratization across countries is limited. We explored the question of MOOC democratization by conducting cross-national comparisons of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) MOOCs. We found that while females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, they were equally likely to complete them. Further, a higher probability to enroll in STEM MOOCs and smaller gender gaps in STEM MOOC enrollment and completion were found in less gender-equal and less economically developed countries.
Abstract: Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have the potential to democratize education by providing learners with access to high-quality free online courses. However, evidence supporting this democratization across countries is limited. We explored the question of MOOC democratization by conducting cross-national comparisons of gender differences in the enrollment in and completion of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) MOOCs. We found that while females were less likely than males to enroll in STEM MOOCs, they were equally likely to complete them. Further, a higher probability to enroll in STEM MOOCs and smaller gender gaps in STEM MOOC enrollment and completion were found in less gender-equal and less economically developed countries.
Thursday, September 13, 2018
Refutation: Some say that too many arguments might lead to counterproductive skepticism & reactance; but a larger number of counterarguments (4-6) led to as much or more belief reduction compared to a smaller number
Refutations of Equivocal Claims: No Evidence for an Ironic Effect of Counterargument Number. K.H.Ecker et al. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2018.07.005
Abstract: This study investigated the refutation of equivocal claims using counterarguments. Common sense suggests that more counterarguments should be more effective at inducing belief change. However, some researchers have argued that in persuasive reasoning, using too many arguments might lead to counterproductive skepticism and reactance. Thus, there have been calls to actively curtail the number of counterarguments used in refutations to avoid risking an “overkill backfire effect”—an ironic strengthening of beliefs from too many counterarguments. In three experiments, we tested whether calls to limit the number of counterarguments are justified. We found that a larger number of counterarguments (between four and six) led to as much or more belief reduction compared to a smaller number of (two) counterarguments. This was not merely an effect arising from a simple numerosity heuristic, as counterarguments had to be relevant to affect beliefs: irrelevant counterarguments failed to reduce beliefs even though perceived as moderately persuasive.
Refutations of Equivocal Claims: No Evidence for an Ironic Effect of Counterargument Number.
Abstract: This study investigated the refutation of equivocal claims using counterarguments. Common sense suggests that more counterarguments should be more effective at inducing belief change. However, some researchers have argued that in persuasive reasoning, using too many arguments might lead to counterproductive skepticism and reactance. Thus, there have been calls to actively curtail the number of counterarguments used in refutations to avoid risking an “overkill backfire effect”—an ironic strengthening of beliefs from too many counterarguments. In three experiments, we tested whether calls to limit the number of counterarguments are justified. We found that a larger number of counterarguments (between four and six) led to as much or more belief reduction compared to a smaller number of (two) counterarguments. This was not merely an effect arising from a simple numerosity heuristic, as counterarguments had to be relevant to affect beliefs: irrelevant counterarguments failed to reduce beliefs even though perceived as moderately persuasive.
Refutations of Equivocal Claims: No Evidence for an Ironic Effect of Counterargument Number.
People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices (confirmation bias); choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention
Confirmation Bias through Selective Overweighting of Choice-Consistent Evidence. Bharath Chandra Talluri et al. Current Biology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2018.07.052
Highlights
• People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices
• Talluri, Urai et al. developed a new task for probing the underlying mechanisms
• Evidence consistent with an observer’s initial choice is processed more efficiently
• This “choice-induced gain change” affects both perceptual and numerical decisions
Summary: People’s assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people’s own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5, 6, 7, 8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants’ sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.
Highlights
• People’s interpretation of new evidence is often biased by their previous choices
• Talluri, Urai et al. developed a new task for probing the underlying mechanisms
• Evidence consistent with an observer’s initial choice is processed more efficiently
• This “choice-induced gain change” affects both perceptual and numerical decisions
Summary: People’s assessments of the state of the world often deviate systematically from the information available to them [1]. Such biases can originate from people’s own decisions: committing to a categorical proposition, or a course of action, biases subsequent judgment and decision-making. This phenomenon, called confirmation bias [2], has been explained as suppression of post-decisional dissonance [3, 4]. Here, we provide insights into the underlying mechanism. It is commonly held that decisions result from the accumulation of samples of evidence informing about the state of the world [5, 6, 7, 8]. We hypothesized that choices bias the accumulation process by selectively altering the weighting (gain) of subsequent evidence, akin to selective attention. We developed a novel psychophysical task to test this idea. Participants viewed two successive random dot motion stimuli and made two motion-direction judgments: a categorical discrimination after the first stimulus and a continuous estimation of the overall direction across both stimuli after the second stimulus. Participants’ sensitivity for the second stimulus was selectively enhanced when that stimulus was consistent with the initial choice (compared to both, first stimuli and choice-inconsistent second stimuli). A model entailing choice-dependent selective gain modulation explained this effect better than several alternative mechanisms. Choice-dependent gain modulation was also established in another task entailing averaging of numerical values instead of motion directions. We conclude that intermittent choices direct selective attention during the evaluation of subsequent evidence, possibly due to decision-related feedback in the brain [9]. Our results point to a recurrent interplay between decision-making and selective attention.
People with higher IQs not only being unable to solve problems unresolved, but are in some cases unwilling to address them; higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems
Why Real-World Problems Go Unresolved and What We Can Do about It: Inferences from a Limited-Resource Model of Successful Intelligence. Robert J. Sternberg. J. Intell. 2018, 6(3), 44; https://doi.org/10.3390/jintelligence6030044
Abstract: In this article I suggest why a symposium is desirable on the topic of why, despite worldwide increases in IQ since the beginning of the 20th century, there are so many unresolved and dramatic problems in the world. I briefly discuss what some of these problems are, and the paradox of people with higher IQs not only being unable to solve them, but in some cases people being unwilling to address them. I suggest that higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems. I present a limited-resource model as an adjunct to the augmented theory of successful intelligence. The model suggests that increasing societal emphases on analytical abilities have displaced development and utilization of other skills, especially creative, practical, and wisdom-based ones, that better could be applied to serious world problems. I also discuss the importance of cognitive inoculation against unscrupulous and sometimes malevolent attempts to change belief systems.
Keywords: components; creativity; inoculation; intelligence; limited-resource model; wisdom
Abstract: In this article I suggest why a symposium is desirable on the topic of why, despite worldwide increases in IQ since the beginning of the 20th century, there are so many unresolved and dramatic problems in the world. I briefly discuss what some of these problems are, and the paradox of people with higher IQs not only being unable to solve them, but in some cases people being unwilling to address them. I suggest that higher IQ is not always highly relevant to the problems, and in some cases, may displace other skills that better would apply to the solution of the problems. I present a limited-resource model as an adjunct to the augmented theory of successful intelligence. The model suggests that increasing societal emphases on analytical abilities have displaced development and utilization of other skills, especially creative, practical, and wisdom-based ones, that better could be applied to serious world problems. I also discuss the importance of cognitive inoculation against unscrupulous and sometimes malevolent attempts to change belief systems.
Keywords: components; creativity; inoculation; intelligence; limited-resource model; wisdom
Deception detection advances: From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; from differences in levels of arousal to detection of cognitive processes or strategies adopted to be convincing; & from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them
Deception and truth detection when analyzing nonverbal and verbal cues. Aldert Vrij. Applied Cognitive Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3457
Summary: In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.
Summary: In this article, I present my view on the significant developments and theoretical/empirical tipping points in nonverbal and verbal deception and lie detection from the last 30 years and on prospects for future research in this domain. I discuss three major shifts in deception detection research: (a) From observing target persons' nonverbal behavior to analyzing their speech; (b) from lie detection based on differences between truth tellers and liars' levels of arousal to lie detection based on the different cognitive processes or strategies adopted to appear convincing; and (c) from passively observing target persons to actively interviewing them to elicit or enhance verbal cues to deceit. Finally, I discuss my ideas for future research, focusing on initiatives from my own lab. Hopefully, this will stimulate other researchers to explore innovative ideas in the verbal deception research domain, which already has seen so much progress in the last decade.
Brain and psychological determinants of placebo pill response in chronic pain patients
Brain and psychological determinants of placebo pill response in chronic pain patients. Etienne Vachon-Presseau, Sara E. Berger, Taha B. Abdullah, Lejian Huang, Guillermo A. Cecchi, James W. Griffith, Thomas J. Schnitzer & A. Vania Apkarian. Nature Communications, volume 9, Article number: 3397 (2018). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05859-1
Abstract: The placebo response is universally observed in clinical trials of pain treatments, yet the individual characteristics rendering a patient a ‘placebo responder’ remain unclear. Here, in chronic back pain patients, we demonstrate using MRI and fMRI that the response to placebo ‘analgesic’ pills depends on brain structure and function. Subcortical limbic volume asymmetry, sensorimotor cortical thickness, and functional coupling of prefrontal regions, anterior cingulate, and periaqueductal gray were predictive of response. These neural traits were present before exposure to the pill and most remained stable across treatment and washout periods. Further, psychological traits, including interoceptive awareness and openness, were also predictive of the magnitude of response. These results shed light on psychological, neuroanatomical, and neurophysiological principles determining placebo response in RCTs in chronic pain patients, and they suggest that the long-term beneficial effects of placebo, as observed in clinical settings, are partially predictable.
Abstract: The placebo response is universally observed in clinical trials of pain treatments, yet the individual characteristics rendering a patient a ‘placebo responder’ remain unclear. Here, in chronic back pain patients, we demonstrate using MRI and fMRI that the response to placebo ‘analgesic’ pills depends on brain structure and function. Subcortical limbic volume asymmetry, sensorimotor cortical thickness, and functional coupling of prefrontal regions, anterior cingulate, and periaqueductal gray were predictive of response. These neural traits were present before exposure to the pill and most remained stable across treatment and washout periods. Further, psychological traits, including interoceptive awareness and openness, were also predictive of the magnitude of response. These results shed light on psychological, neuroanatomical, and neurophysiological principles determining placebo response in RCTs in chronic pain patients, and they suggest that the long-term beneficial effects of placebo, as observed in clinical settings, are partially predictable.
Social conformity: Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private; acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public; the magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases
Quantifying compliance and acceptance through public and private social conformity. Sophie Sowden et al. Consciousness and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.08.009
Highlights
• Most measures of social conformity conflate compliance and acceptance.
• Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private.
• Acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public.
• Our task reveals the presence of compliance and acceptance on a within-subject basis.
• The magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases.
Abstract: Social conformity is a class of social influence whereby exposure to the attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and beliefs towards those of the group. Compliance and acceptance are varieties of social influence distinguished on the basis of the attitude change brought about. Compliance involves public, but not private conformity, while acceptance occurs when group norms are internalised and conformity is demonstrated both in public and in private. Most contemporary paradigms measuring conformity conflate compliance and acceptance, while the few studies to have addressed this issue have done so using between-subjects designs, decreasing their sensitivity. Here we present a novel task which measures compliance and acceptance on a within-subjects basis. Data from a small sample reveal that compliance and acceptance can co-occur, that compliance is increased with an increasing majority, and demonstrate the usefulness of the task for future studies of conformity.
Highlights
• Most measures of social conformity conflate compliance and acceptance.
• Compliance occurs when individuals conform in public, but not in private.
• Acceptance occurs when group influence is internalised, in private and in public.
• Our task reveals the presence of compliance and acceptance on a within-subject basis.
• The magnitude of compliance increases as the size of the majority increases.
Abstract: Social conformity is a class of social influence whereby exposure to the attitudes and beliefs of a group causes an individual to alter their own attitudes and beliefs towards those of the group. Compliance and acceptance are varieties of social influence distinguished on the basis of the attitude change brought about. Compliance involves public, but not private conformity, while acceptance occurs when group norms are internalised and conformity is demonstrated both in public and in private. Most contemporary paradigms measuring conformity conflate compliance and acceptance, while the few studies to have addressed this issue have done so using between-subjects designs, decreasing their sensitivity. Here we present a novel task which measures compliance and acceptance on a within-subjects basis. Data from a small sample reveal that compliance and acceptance can co-occur, that compliance is increased with an increasing majority, and demonstrate the usefulness of the task for future studies of conformity.
The truth about tattoos: The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks
The truth about tattoos. Bradley J. Ruffle, Anne E. Wilson. Economics Letters, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.024
Highlights
• The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks.
• Results are robust to controls for socio-demo and number and placement of tattoos.
• Few subjects cheat maximally in either the low-or high-stakes task.
• Strategic cheating is limited to a small minority of subjects.
Abstract: Despite their ubiquity, tattoos continue to be associated with dishonesty. Notwithstanding, we find few differences in the reporting behavior of tattooed and non-tattooed individuals in either a low-stakes or a high-stakes honesty-detection task.
Highlights
• The tattooed and non-tattooed are similarly honest in low-and high-stakes tasks.
• Results are robust to controls for socio-demo and number and placement of tattoos.
• Few subjects cheat maximally in either the low-or high-stakes task.
• Strategic cheating is limited to a small minority of subjects.
Abstract: Despite their ubiquity, tattoos continue to be associated with dishonesty. Notwithstanding, we find few differences in the reporting behavior of tattooed and non-tattooed individuals in either a low-stakes or a high-stakes honesty-detection task.
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
Deceiving participants about the goals or content of a study is permitted in psychological research but is banned in economics journals and subject pools; experiments show that this ban is not necessary
Krasnow, Max, Rhea M. Howard, and Adar Eisenbruch. 2018. “The Importance of Being Honest?.” PsyArXiv. September 12. doi:10.31234/osf.io/9rsth
Abstract: Deceiving participants about the goals or content of a study is permitted in psychological research but is banned in economics journals and subject pools. This ban is intended to protect a public good: if experiencing deception causes participants to be suspicious in future studies, and suspicion influences their behavior, then the entire field suffers. We report a survey on psychologists and economists’ attitudes towards deception (N=568), and a large, non-deceptive multi-site study in which we measured participants’ histories, suspicion levels, and behavior in four common economic tasks (N=636). Economists reported wide ranging negative attitudes towards deceptive methods and support for the deception ban. However, the results of the behavioral study undercut the rationale of the deception ban: participants’ present suspicion unrelated to past experiences of deception, and suspicious participants behaved identically to credulous participants. We conclude that banning deceptive methods cannot be justified as the protection of a public good.
Abstract: Deceiving participants about the goals or content of a study is permitted in psychological research but is banned in economics journals and subject pools. This ban is intended to protect a public good: if experiencing deception causes participants to be suspicious in future studies, and suspicion influences their behavior, then the entire field suffers. We report a survey on psychologists and economists’ attitudes towards deception (N=568), and a large, non-deceptive multi-site study in which we measured participants’ histories, suspicion levels, and behavior in four common economic tasks (N=636). Economists reported wide ranging negative attitudes towards deceptive methods and support for the deception ban. However, the results of the behavioral study undercut the rationale of the deception ban: participants’ present suspicion unrelated to past experiences of deception, and suspicious participants behaved identically to credulous participants. We conclude that banning deceptive methods cannot be justified as the protection of a public good.
Understanding Changes in Attitudes Toward Suicide Between 1980s and 2010s in the US: largely unaccepting of suicide, except in the case of incurable disease, a greater percentage found suicide to be acceptable in the 2010s
Understanding Changes in Attitudes Toward Suicide Between 1980s and 2010s in the United States. Yi Tong, Julie A. Phillips. Social Science Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12522
Objectives: This study examines individual characteristics associated with suicide acceptability in the United States and how (1) effects of these characteristics on attitudes have changed over time and (2) the degree to which shifts in attitudes are explained by changes in population characteristics.
Methods: We use General Social Survey (GSS) data from the 1980s (n = 4,840) and 2010s (n = 5,607) and conduct an Oaxaca decomposition.
Results: Although Americans remain largely unaccepting of suicide, except in the case of incurable disease, a greater percentage found suicide to be acceptable in 2010s than in 1980s. Individuals who are male, white, more educated, less religious, and more politically liberal find suicide more acceptable. Changes over time in population composition (e.g., rising education levels and declines in religion) account for about 50 percent of the rise in suicide acceptability between 1980s and 2010s.
Conclusions: Results hint at shifting societal patterns, but the causal direction between attitudes and behavior cannot be determined.
Objectives: This study examines individual characteristics associated with suicide acceptability in the United States and how (1) effects of these characteristics on attitudes have changed over time and (2) the degree to which shifts in attitudes are explained by changes in population characteristics.
Methods: We use General Social Survey (GSS) data from the 1980s (n = 4,840) and 2010s (n = 5,607) and conduct an Oaxaca decomposition.
Results: Although Americans remain largely unaccepting of suicide, except in the case of incurable disease, a greater percentage found suicide to be acceptable in 2010s than in 1980s. Individuals who are male, white, more educated, less religious, and more politically liberal find suicide more acceptable. Changes over time in population composition (e.g., rising education levels and declines in religion) account for about 50 percent of the rise in suicide acceptability between 1980s and 2010s.
Conclusions: Results hint at shifting societal patterns, but the causal direction between attitudes and behavior cannot be determined.
Bonobos voluntarily hand food to others but not toys or tools
Bonobos voluntarily hand food to others but not toys or tools. Christopher Krupenye, Jingzhi Tan, Brian Hare. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1536
Abstract: A key feature of human prosociality is direct transfers, the most active form of sharing in which donors voluntarily hand over resources in their possession. Direct transfers buffer hunter-gatherers against foraging shortfalls. The emergence and elaboration of this behaviour thus likely played a key role in human evolution by promoting cooperative interdependence and ensuring that humans' growing energetic needs (e.g. for increasing brain size) were more reliably met. According to the strong prosociality hypothesis, among great apes only humans exhibit sufficiently strong prosocial motivations to directly transfer food. The versatile prosociality hypothesis suggests instead that while other apes may make transfers in constrained settings, only humans share flexibly across food and non-food contexts. In controlled experiments, chimpanzees typically transfer objects but not food, supporting both hypotheses. In this paper, we show in two experiments that bonobos directly transfer food but not non-food items. These findings show that, in some contexts, bonobos exhibit a human-like motivation for direct food transfer. However, humans share across a far wider range of contexts, lending support to the versatile prosociality hypothesis. Our species' unusual prosocial flexibility is likely built on a prosocial foundation we share through common descent with the other apes.
Abstract: A key feature of human prosociality is direct transfers, the most active form of sharing in which donors voluntarily hand over resources in their possession. Direct transfers buffer hunter-gatherers against foraging shortfalls. The emergence and elaboration of this behaviour thus likely played a key role in human evolution by promoting cooperative interdependence and ensuring that humans' growing energetic needs (e.g. for increasing brain size) were more reliably met. According to the strong prosociality hypothesis, among great apes only humans exhibit sufficiently strong prosocial motivations to directly transfer food. The versatile prosociality hypothesis suggests instead that while other apes may make transfers in constrained settings, only humans share flexibly across food and non-food contexts. In controlled experiments, chimpanzees typically transfer objects but not food, supporting both hypotheses. In this paper, we show in two experiments that bonobos directly transfer food but not non-food items. These findings show that, in some contexts, bonobos exhibit a human-like motivation for direct food transfer. However, humans share across a far wider range of contexts, lending support to the versatile prosociality hypothesis. Our species' unusual prosocial flexibility is likely built on a prosocial foundation we share through common descent with the other apes.
The scent of attractiveness: levels of reproductive hormones explain individual differences in women's body odour
The scent of attractiveness: levels of reproductive hormones explain individual differences in women's body odour. Janek S. Lobmaier, Urs Fischbacher, Urs Wirthmüller, Daria Knoch. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2018.1520
Abstract: Individuals are thought to have their own distinctive body odour which reportedly plays an important role in mate choice. In the present study we investigated individual differences in body odours of women and examined whether some women generally smell more attractive than others or whether odour preferences are a matter of individual taste. We then explored whether levels of reproductive hormones explain women's body odour attractiveness, to test the idea that body odour attractiveness may act as a chemosensory marker of reproductive fitness. Fifty-seven men rated body odours of 28 healthy, naturally cycling women of reproductive age. We collected all odours at peak fertility to control for menstrual cycle effects on body odour attractiveness. Women's salivary oestradiol, progesterone, testosterone and cortisol levels were assessed at the time of odour collection to test whether hormone levels explain body odour attractiveness. We found that the men highly agreed on how attractive they found women's body odours. Interestingly, women's body odour attractiveness was predicted by their oestradiol and progesterone levels: the higher a woman's levels of oestradiol and the lower her levels of progesterone, the more attractive her body odour was rated. In showing that women's body odour attractiveness is explained by levels of female reproductive hormones, but not by levels of cortisol or testosterone, we provide evidence that body odour acts as a valid cue to potential fertility.
Abstract: Individuals are thought to have their own distinctive body odour which reportedly plays an important role in mate choice. In the present study we investigated individual differences in body odours of women and examined whether some women generally smell more attractive than others or whether odour preferences are a matter of individual taste. We then explored whether levels of reproductive hormones explain women's body odour attractiveness, to test the idea that body odour attractiveness may act as a chemosensory marker of reproductive fitness. Fifty-seven men rated body odours of 28 healthy, naturally cycling women of reproductive age. We collected all odours at peak fertility to control for menstrual cycle effects on body odour attractiveness. Women's salivary oestradiol, progesterone, testosterone and cortisol levels were assessed at the time of odour collection to test whether hormone levels explain body odour attractiveness. We found that the men highly agreed on how attractive they found women's body odours. Interestingly, women's body odour attractiveness was predicted by their oestradiol and progesterone levels: the higher a woman's levels of oestradiol and the lower her levels of progesterone, the more attractive her body odour was rated. In showing that women's body odour attractiveness is explained by levels of female reproductive hormones, but not by levels of cortisol or testosterone, we provide evidence that body odour acts as a valid cue to potential fertility.
Sex differences in personality are larger in gender equal countries: Replicating and extending this effect
Sex differences in personality are larger in gender equal countries: Replicating and extending a surprising finding. Erik Mac Giolla, Petri J. Kajonius. International Journal of Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12529
Abstract: Sex differences in personality have been shown to be larger in more gender equal countries. We advance this research by using an extensive personality measure, the IPIP‐NEO‐120, with large country samples (N > 1000), from 22 countries. Furthermore, to capture the multidimensionality of personality we measure sex differences with a multivariate effect size (Mahalanobis distance D). Results indicate that past research, using univariate measures of effect size, have underestimated the size of between‐country sex differences in personality. Confirming past research, there was a strong correlation (r = .69) between a country's sex differences in personality and their Gender Equality Index. Additional analyses showed that women typically score higher than men on all five trait factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness), and that these relative differences are larger in more gender equal countries. We speculate that as gender equality increases both men and women gravitate towards their traditional gender roles.
Abstract: Sex differences in personality have been shown to be larger in more gender equal countries. We advance this research by using an extensive personality measure, the IPIP‐NEO‐120, with large country samples (N > 1000), from 22 countries. Furthermore, to capture the multidimensionality of personality we measure sex differences with a multivariate effect size (Mahalanobis distance D). Results indicate that past research, using univariate measures of effect size, have underestimated the size of between‐country sex differences in personality. Confirming past research, there was a strong correlation (r = .69) between a country's sex differences in personality and their Gender Equality Index. Additional analyses showed that women typically score higher than men on all five trait factors (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness), and that these relative differences are larger in more gender equal countries. We speculate that as gender equality increases both men and women gravitate towards their traditional gender roles.
Factors of women’s political ambition, affected by the gendered expectations of those around them and the challenges they face balancing life without the resources of elite women, are almost entirely distinct from those shaping men's
Baker, Bus Driver, Babysitter, Candidate? Revealing the Gendered Development of Political Ambition Among Ordinary Americans. Melody Crowder-Meyer. Political Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-018-9498-9
Abstract: Americans without prestigious educational or professional backgrounds hold offices throughout the American government. Yet we know little about how these ordinary Americans developed political ambition or whether gender differences in ambition are present among this population. This paper uses a national sample of 1240 Americans to fill these gaps, identifying how political ambition develops differently for ordinary men and women, and drawing on this knowledge to help explain the surge in female candidates following the 2016 election. In contrast with elite samples, I show that the factors determining men’s political ambition are almost entirely distinct from those shaping women’s ambition among the mass public. I theorize that ordinary women’s ambition is particularly affected by the gendered expectations of those around them and the challenges they face balancing caregiving, work, and political engagement without the experience and resources possessed by elite women. I find support for this theory; ordinary women’s ambition is particularly dependent on the support of personal and political sources who can help them manage the demands of candidacy. In contrast, ordinary men’s ambition depends far less on encouragement from others, and instead increases with levels of education, political participation, and marriage. These results, and the distribution of the factors shaping ambition among Americans, help explain women’s low descriptive representation among American candidates and elected officials. They also provide a potential explanation for the unusual increase in women’s candidacies in 2017 and 2018.
Abstract: Americans without prestigious educational or professional backgrounds hold offices throughout the American government. Yet we know little about how these ordinary Americans developed political ambition or whether gender differences in ambition are present among this population. This paper uses a national sample of 1240 Americans to fill these gaps, identifying how political ambition develops differently for ordinary men and women, and drawing on this knowledge to help explain the surge in female candidates following the 2016 election. In contrast with elite samples, I show that the factors determining men’s political ambition are almost entirely distinct from those shaping women’s ambition among the mass public. I theorize that ordinary women’s ambition is particularly affected by the gendered expectations of those around them and the challenges they face balancing caregiving, work, and political engagement without the experience and resources possessed by elite women. I find support for this theory; ordinary women’s ambition is particularly dependent on the support of personal and political sources who can help them manage the demands of candidacy. In contrast, ordinary men’s ambition depends far less on encouragement from others, and instead increases with levels of education, political participation, and marriage. These results, and the distribution of the factors shaping ambition among Americans, help explain women’s low descriptive representation among American candidates and elected officials. They also provide a potential explanation for the unusual increase in women’s candidacies in 2017 and 2018.
How innocent defendants become suspects in criminal investigations: Defendant’s race, age, criminal history, relationship to the victim, cognitive/mental status, & whether the victim survived
Origin of Implication: How Do Innocent Individuals Enter the Criminal Justice System? Belen Lowrey-Kinberg et al. Crime & Delinquency, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128718793618
Abstract: Drawing from the investigative policing literature, we develop a typology for how innocent defendants become suspects in criminal investigations. We use the Preventing Wrongful Convictions Project (PWCP) dataset and multivariate modeling to examine the case and defendant characteristics that predict how an innocent defendant became a suspect. We found that investigators identify suspects in eight primary ways. The most common in the PWCP dataset were victim/eyewitness identification, citizen identification, and intentional misidentification. Defendant’s race, age, criminal history, relationship to the victim, cognitive/mental status, and whether the victim survived were strongly associated with an innocent defendant’s origin of implication. These results illuminate how tunnel vision begins in cases with innocent defendants, and how police practices may prevent innocent individuals from becoming suspects.
Keywords: police investigations, origin of implication, wrongful convictions
Abstract: Drawing from the investigative policing literature, we develop a typology for how innocent defendants become suspects in criminal investigations. We use the Preventing Wrongful Convictions Project (PWCP) dataset and multivariate modeling to examine the case and defendant characteristics that predict how an innocent defendant became a suspect. We found that investigators identify suspects in eight primary ways. The most common in the PWCP dataset were victim/eyewitness identification, citizen identification, and intentional misidentification. Defendant’s race, age, criminal history, relationship to the victim, cognitive/mental status, and whether the victim survived were strongly associated with an innocent defendant’s origin of implication. These results illuminate how tunnel vision begins in cases with innocent defendants, and how police practices may prevent innocent individuals from becoming suspects.
Keywords: police investigations, origin of implication, wrongful convictions
Tuesday, September 11, 2018
Long Term Impacts of Grants on Poverty & 9-Year Evidence from Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program: Lasting impacts on assets, skilled work, & possibly child health, but had little effect on mortality, fertility, health or education
Blattman, Christopher and Fiala, Nathan and Martinez, Sebastian, The Long Term Impacts of Grants on Poverty: 9-Year Evidence from Uganda's Youth Opportunities Program (July 30, 2018). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3223028
Abstract: In 2008, Uganda granted hundreds of small groups $400/person to help members start individual skilled trades. Four years on, an experimental evaluation found grants raised earnings by 38% (Blattman, Fiala, Martinez 2014). We return after 9 years to find these start-up grants acted more as a kick-start than a lift out of poverty. Grantees' investment leveled off; controls eventually increased their incomes through business and casual labor; and so both groups converged in employment, earnings, and consumption. Grants had lasting impacts on assets, skilled work, and possibly child health, but had little effect on mortality, fertility, health or education.
Keywords: Employment, Poverty, Entrepreneurship, Cash Transfers, Occupational Choice, Uganda, Field Experiment, Labor Market Programs, Health, Education, Uganda
JEL Classification: J24, O12, D13, C93
Abstract: In 2008, Uganda granted hundreds of small groups $400/person to help members start individual skilled trades. Four years on, an experimental evaluation found grants raised earnings by 38% (Blattman, Fiala, Martinez 2014). We return after 9 years to find these start-up grants acted more as a kick-start than a lift out of poverty. Grantees' investment leveled off; controls eventually increased their incomes through business and casual labor; and so both groups converged in employment, earnings, and consumption. Grants had lasting impacts on assets, skilled work, and possibly child health, but had little effect on mortality, fertility, health or education.
Keywords: Employment, Poverty, Entrepreneurship, Cash Transfers, Occupational Choice, Uganda, Field Experiment, Labor Market Programs, Health, Education, Uganda
JEL Classification: J24, O12, D13, C93
China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: ‘Transformation.’ / Surveillance State With Modern Technologies and Old Tricks
China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: ‘Transformation.’ Chris Buckley. The New York Times, Sep 8, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html
HOTAN, China — On the edge of a desert in far western China, an imposing building sits behind a fence topped with barbed wire. Large red characters on the facade urge people to learn Chinese, study law and acquire job skills. Guards make clear that visitors are not welcome.
Inside, hundreds of ethnic Uighur Muslims spend their days in a high-pressure indoctrination program, where they are forced to listen to lectures, sing hymns praising the Chinese Communist Party and write “self-criticism” essays, according to detainees who have been released.
The goal is to remove any devotion to Islam.
Abdusalam Muhemet, 41, said the police detained him for reciting a verse of the Quran at a funeral. After two months in a nearby camp, he and more than 30 others were ordered to renounce their past lives. Mr. Muhemet said he went along but quietly seethed.
“That was not a place for getting rid of extremism,” he recalled. “That was a place that will breed vengeful feelings and erase Uighur identity.”
This camp outside Hotan, an ancient oasis town in the Taklamakan Desert, is one of hundreds that China has built in the past few years. It is part of a campaign of breathtaking scale and ferocity that has swept up hundreds of thousands of Chinese Muslims for weeks or months of what critics describe as brainwashing, usually without criminal charges.
Though limited to China’s western region of Xinjiang, it is the country’s most sweeping internment program since the Mao era — and the focus of a growing chorus of international criticism.
China has sought for decades to restrict the practice of Islam and maintain an iron grip in Xinjiang, a region almost as big as Alaska where more than half the population of 24 million belongs to Muslim ethnic minority groups. Most are Uighurs, whose religion, language and culture, along with a history of independence movements and resistance to Chinese rule, have long unnerved Beijing.
After a succession of violent antigovernment attacks reached a peak in 2014, the Communist Party chief, Xi Jinping, sharply escalated the crackdown, orchestrating an unforgiving drive to turn ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities into loyal citizens and supporters of the party.
“Xinjiang is in an active period of terrorist activities, intense struggle against separatism and painful intervention to treat this,” Mr. Xi told officials, according to reports in the state news media last year.
In addition to the mass detentions, the authorities have intensified the use of informers and expanded police surveillance, even installing cameras in some people’s homes. Human rights activists and experts say the campaign has traumatized Uighur society, leaving behind fractured communities and families.
“Penetration of everyday life is almost really total now,” said Michael Clarke, an expert on Xinjiang at Australian National University in Canberra. “You have ethnic identity, Uighur identity in particular, being singled out as this kind of pathology.”
China has categorically denied reports of abuses in Xinjiang. At a meeting of a United Nations panel in Geneva last month, it said it does not operate re-education camps and described the facilities in question as mild corrective institutions that provide job training.
“There is no arbitrary detention,” Hu Lianhe, an official with a role in Xinjiang policy, told the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. “There is no such thing as re-education centers.”
The committee pressed Beijing to disclose how many people have been detained and free them, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the demand as having “no factual basis” and said China’s security measures were comparable to those of other countries.
The government’s business-as-usual defense, however, is contradicted by overwhelming evidence, including official directives, studies, news reports and construction plans that have surfaced online, as well as the eyewitness accounts of a growing number of former detainees who have fled to countries such as Turkey and Kazakhstan.
The government’s own documents describe a vast network of camps — usually called “transformation through education” centers — that has expanded without public debate, specific legislative authority or any system of appeal for those detained.
The New York Times interviewed four recent camp inmates from Xinjiang who described physical and verbal abuse by guards; grinding routines of singing, lectures and self-criticism meetings; and the gnawing anxiety of not knowing when they would be released. Their accounts were echoed in interviews with more than a dozen Uighurs with relatives who were in the camps or had disappeared, many of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid government retaliation.
The Times also discovered reports online written by teams of Chinese officials who were assigned to monitor families with detained relatives, and a study published last year that said officials in some places were indiscriminately sending ethnic Uighurs to the camps to meet numerical quotas.
The study, by Qiu Yuanyuan, a scholar at the Xinjiang Party School, where officials are trained, warned that the detentions could backfire and fan radicalism. “Recklessly setting quantitative goals for transformation through education has been erroneously used” in some areas, she wrote. “The targeting is imprecise, and the scope has been expanding.”
Eradicating a ‘Virus’
The long days in the re-education camp usually began with a jog.
Nearly every morning, Mr. Muhemet recalled, he and dozens of others — college graduates, businessmen, farmers — were told to run around an assembly ground. Impatient guards sometimes slapped and shoved the older, slower inmates, he said.
Then they were made to sing rousing patriotic hymns in Chinese, such as “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” Those who could not remember the words were denied breakfast, and they all learned the words quickly.
Mr. Muhemet, a stocky man who ran a restaurant in Hotan before fleeing China this year, said he spent seven months in a police cell and more than two months in the camp in 2015 without ever being charged with a crime. Most days, he said, the camp inmates assembled to hear long lectures by officials who warned them not to embrace Islamic radicalism, support Uighur independence or defy the Communist Party.
The officials did not ban Islam but dictated very narrow limits for how it should be practiced, including a prohibition against praying at home if there were friends or guests present, he said. In other sessions, the inmates were forced to memorize laws and write essays criticizing themselves.
“In the end, all the officials had one key point,” he said. “The greatness of the Chinese Communist Party, the backwardness of Uighur culture and the advanced nature of Chinese culture.”
After two months, Mr. Muhemet’s family was finally allowed to visit the camp, located near “New Harmony Village,” a settlement built as a symbol of friendship between ethnic Uighurs and the majority Han Chinese. “I couldn’t say anything,” he recalled. “I just held my two sons and wife, and cried and cried.”
The Xinjiang government issued “deradicalization” rules last year that gave vague authorization for the camps, and many counties now run several of them, according to government documents, including requests for bids from construction companies to build them.
Some facilities are designed for inmates who are allowed to go home at night. Others can house thousands around the clock. One camp outside Hotan has grown in the past two years from a few small buildings to facilities on at least 36 acres, larger than Alcatraz Island, and work appears to be underway to expand it further, according to satellite photos.
In government documents, local officials sometimes liken inmates to patients requiring isolation and emergency intervention.
“Anyone infected with an ideological ‘virus’ must be swiftly sent for the ‘residential care’ of transformation-through-education classes before illness arises,” a document issued by party authorities in Hotan said.
The number of Uighurs, as well as Kazakhs and other Muslim minorities, who have been detained in the camps is unclear. Estimates range from several hundred thousand to perhaps a million, with exile Uighur groups saying the number is even higher.
About 1.5 percent of China’s total population lives in Xinjiang. But the region accounted for more than 20 percent of arrests nationwide last year, according to official data compiled by Chinese Human Rights Defenders, an advocacy group. Those figures do not include people in the re-education camps.
Residents said people have been sent to the camps for visiting relatives abroad; for possessing books about religion and Uighur culture; and even for wearing a T-shirt with a Muslim crescent. Women are sometimes detained because of transgressions by their husbands or sons.
One official directive warns people to look for 75 signs of “religious extremism,” including behavior that would be considered unremarkable in other countries: growing a beard as a young man, praying in public places outside mosques or even abruptly trying to give up smoking or drinking.
‘We Are in Trouble’
Hotan feels as if under siege by an invisible enemy. Fortified police outposts and checkpoints dot the streets every few hundred yards. Schools, kindergartens, gas stations and hospitals are garlanded in barbed wire. Surveillance cameras sprout from shops, apartment entrances and metal poles.
“It’s very tense here,” a police officer said. “We haven’t rested for three years.”
This city of 390,000 underwent a Muslim revival about a decade ago. Most Uighurs have adhered to relatively relaxed forms of Sunni Islam, and a significant number are secular. But budding prosperity and growing interaction with the Middle East fueled interest in stricter Islamic traditions. Men grew long beards, while women wore hijabs that were not a part of traditional Uighur dress.
Now the beards and hijabs are gone, and posters warn against them. Mosques appear poorly attended; people must register to enter and worship under the watch of surveillance cameras.
The government shifted to harsher policies in 2009 after protests in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, spiraled into rioting and left nearly 200 people dead. Mr. Xi and his regional functionaries went further, adopting methods reminiscent of Mao’s draconian rule — mass rallies, public confessions and “work teams” assigned to ferret out dissent.
They have also wired dusty towns across Xinjiang with an array of technology that has put the region on the cutting edge of programs for surveillance cameras as well as facial and voice recognition. Spending on security in Xinjiang has soared, with nearly $8.5 billion allocated for the police, courts and other law enforcement agencies last year, nearly double the previous year’s amount.
The campaign has polarized Uighur society. Many of the ground-level enforcers are Uighurs themselves, including police officers and officials who staff the camps and security checkpoints.
Ordinary Uighurs moving about Hotan sometimes shuffle on and off buses several times to pass through metal detectors, swipe their identity cards or hand over and unlock their mobile phones for inspection.
A resident or local cadre is assigned to monitor every 10 families in Xinjiang, reporting on comings and goings and activities deemed suspicious, including praying and visits to mosques, according to residents and government reports. Residents said the police sometimes search homes for forbidden books and suspect items such as prayer mats, using special equipment to check walls and floors for hidden caches.
The authorities are also gathering biometric data and DNA. Two Uighurs, a former official and a student, said they were ordered to show up at police buildings where officers recorded their voices, took pictures of their heads at different angles and collected hair and blood samples.
The pressure on Uighur villages intensifies when party “work teams” arrive and take up residence, sometimes living in local homes. The teams ask villagers to inform on relatives, friends and neighbors, and they investigate residents’ attitudes and activities, according to government reports published online.
One account published last year described how the authorities in one village arranged for detainees accused of “religious extremism” to be denounced by their relatives at a public rally, and encouraged other families to report similar activities.
“More and more people are coming forward with information,” Cao Lihai, an editor for a party journal, wrote in the report. “Some parents have personally brought in their children to give themselves up.”
A Uighur woman in her 20s who asked to be identified only by her surname, Gul, said she came under scrutiny after wearing an Islamic head wrap and reading books about religion and Uighur history. Local officials installed cameras at her family’s door — and inside their living room.
“We would always have to be careful what we said and what we did and what we read,” she said.
Every week, Ms. Gul added, a neighborhood official visited and spent at least two hours interrogating her. Eventually, the authorities sent her to a full-time re-education camp.
Ms. Gul, who fled China after being released, later tried to contact her brother to find out if he was in trouble. He sent a wordless reply, an emoticon face in tears.
Afterward, Ms. Gul’s mother sent her another message: “Please don’t call us again. We are in trouble.”
The Chinese government says it is winning a war against Islamic extremism and separatism, which it blames for attacks that have killed hundreds in recent years. Information about such violence is censored and incomplete, but incidents appear to have fallen off sharply since 2014, when the “deradicalization” push began.
Still, many who have emerged from the indoctrination program say it has hardened public attitudes against Beijing.
“It was of absolutely no use,” said Omurbek Eli, a Kazakh businessman, of his time held in a camp in 2017. “The outcome will be the opposite. They will become even more resistant to Chinese influence.”
For many families, the disappearance of a loved one into the camps can be devastating, both emotionally and economically — a point reflected in reports posted online by the party’s “work teams.”
Some of these reports describe Uighur families unable to harvest crops on their own because so many members have been taken away, and one mentioned a mother left to care for five children. In another report, an official near Hotan described holding a village meeting to calm distraught relatives of those sent to the camps.
The mass internments also break Uighur families by forcing members to disown their kin or by separating small children from their parents. So many parents have been detained in Kashgar, a city in western Xinjiang, that it has expanded boarding schools to take custody of older, “troubled” children.
“Whether consciously or unconsciously, authorities in Xinjiang have recognized the power of families as an alternative source of authority,” said Rian Thum, a professor at Loyola University in New Orleans who has followed the detentions. “The kind of extreme party loyalty they want has no room for that.”
Ms. Gul said the camp she was in was ramshackle enough that children who lived nearby sometimes crept up to a window late at night and called out to their mothers inside. “Their children would come and say, ‘Mother, I miss you,’” she said.
“We didn’t say anything,” she added, “because there was a camera inside the cell.”
Austin Ramzy contributed reporting from Hong Kong.
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 9, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Anti-Islam Detention Camps in China.
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What It’s Like to Live in a Surveillance State. James A. Millward. TNYT, Feb 3 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-uighurs.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-detention-camp.html
HOTAN, China — On the edge of a desert in far western China, an imposing building sits behind a fence topped with barbed wire. Large red characters on the facade urge people to learn Chinese, study law and acquire job skills. Guards make clear that visitors are not welcome.
Inside, hundreds of ethnic Uighur Muslims spend their days in a high-pressure indoctrination program, where they are forced to listen to lectures, sing hymns praising the Chinese Communist Party and write “self-criticism” essays, according to detainees who have been released.
The goal is to remove any devotion to Islam.
Abdusalam Muhemet, 41, said the police detained him for reciting a verse of the Quran at a funeral. After two months in a nearby camp, he and more than 30 others were ordered to renounce their past lives. Mr. Muhemet said he went along but quietly seethed.
“That was not a place for getting rid of extremism,” he recalled. “That was a place that will breed vengeful feelings and erase Uighur identity.”
This camp outside Hotan, an ancient oasis town in the Taklamakan Desert, is one of hundreds that China has built in the past few years. It is part of a campaign of breathtaking scale and ferocity that has swept up hundreds of thousands of Chinese Muslims for weeks or months of what critics describe as brainwashing, usually without criminal charges.
Though limited to China’s western region of Xinjiang, it is the country’s most sweeping internment program since the Mao era — and the focus of a growing chorus of international criticism.
China has sought for decades to restrict the practice of Islam and maintain an iron grip in Xinjiang, a region almost as big as Alaska where more than half the population of 24 million belongs to Muslim ethnic minority groups. Most are Uighurs, whose religion, language and culture, along with a history of independence movements and resistance to Chinese rule, have long unnerved Beijing.
After a succession of violent antigovernment attacks reached a peak in 2014, the Communist Party chief, Xi Jinping, sharply escalated the crackdown, orchestrating an unforgiving drive to turn ethnic Uighurs and other Muslim minorities into loyal citizens and supporters of the party.
“Xinjiang is in an active period of terrorist activities, intense struggle against separatism and painful intervention to treat this,” Mr. Xi told officials, according to reports in the state news media last year.
In addition to the mass detentions, the authorities have intensified the use of informers and expanded police surveillance, even installing cameras in some people’s homes. Human rights activists and experts say the campaign has traumatized Uighur society, leaving behind fractured communities and families.
“Penetration of everyday life is almost really total now,” said Michael Clarke, an expert on Xinjiang at Australian National University in Canberra. “You have ethnic identity, Uighur identity in particular, being singled out as this kind of pathology.”
China has categorically denied reports of abuses in Xinjiang. At a meeting of a United Nations panel in Geneva last month, it said it does not operate re-education camps and described the facilities in question as mild corrective institutions that provide job training.
“There is no arbitrary detention,” Hu Lianhe, an official with a role in Xinjiang policy, told the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. “There is no such thing as re-education centers.”
The committee pressed Beijing to disclose how many people have been detained and free them, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed the demand as having “no factual basis” and said China’s security measures were comparable to those of other countries.
The government’s business-as-usual defense, however, is contradicted by overwhelming evidence, including official directives, studies, news reports and construction plans that have surfaced online, as well as the eyewitness accounts of a growing number of former detainees who have fled to countries such as Turkey and Kazakhstan.
The government’s own documents describe a vast network of camps — usually called “transformation through education” centers — that has expanded without public debate, specific legislative authority or any system of appeal for those detained.
The New York Times interviewed four recent camp inmates from Xinjiang who described physical and verbal abuse by guards; grinding routines of singing, lectures and self-criticism meetings; and the gnawing anxiety of not knowing when they would be released. Their accounts were echoed in interviews with more than a dozen Uighurs with relatives who were in the camps or had disappeared, many of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to avoid government retaliation.
The Times also discovered reports online written by teams of Chinese officials who were assigned to monitor families with detained relatives, and a study published last year that said officials in some places were indiscriminately sending ethnic Uighurs to the camps to meet numerical quotas.
The study, by Qiu Yuanyuan, a scholar at the Xinjiang Party School, where officials are trained, warned that the detentions could backfire and fan radicalism. “Recklessly setting quantitative goals for transformation through education has been erroneously used” in some areas, she wrote. “The targeting is imprecise, and the scope has been expanding.”
Eradicating a ‘Virus’
The long days in the re-education camp usually began with a jog.
Nearly every morning, Mr. Muhemet recalled, he and dozens of others — college graduates, businessmen, farmers — were told to run around an assembly ground. Impatient guards sometimes slapped and shoved the older, slower inmates, he said.
Then they were made to sing rousing patriotic hymns in Chinese, such as “Without the Communist Party, There Would Be No New China.” Those who could not remember the words were denied breakfast, and they all learned the words quickly.
Mr. Muhemet, a stocky man who ran a restaurant in Hotan before fleeing China this year, said he spent seven months in a police cell and more than two months in the camp in 2015 without ever being charged with a crime. Most days, he said, the camp inmates assembled to hear long lectures by officials who warned them not to embrace Islamic radicalism, support Uighur independence or defy the Communist Party.
The officials did not ban Islam but dictated very narrow limits for how it should be practiced, including a prohibition against praying at home if there were friends or guests present, he said. In other sessions, the inmates were forced to memorize laws and write essays criticizing themselves.
“In the end, all the officials had one key point,” he said. “The greatness of the Chinese Communist Party, the backwardness of Uighur culture and the advanced nature of Chinese culture.”
After two months, Mr. Muhemet’s family was finally allowed to visit the camp, located near “New Harmony Village,” a settlement built as a symbol of friendship between ethnic Uighurs and the majority Han Chinese. “I couldn’t say anything,” he recalled. “I just held my two sons and wife, and cried and cried.”
The Xinjiang government issued “deradicalization” rules last year that gave vague authorization for the camps, and many counties now run several of them, according to government documents, including requests for bids from construction companies to build them.
Some facilities are designed for inmates who are allowed to go home at night. Others can house thousands around the clock. One camp outside Hotan has grown in the past two years from a few small buildings to facilities on at least 36 acres, larger than Alcatraz Island, and work appears to be underway to expand it further, according to satellite photos.
In government documents, local officials sometimes liken inmates to patients requiring isolation and emergency intervention.
“Anyone infected with an ideological ‘virus’ must be swiftly sent for the ‘residential care’ of transformation-through-education classes before illness arises,” a document issued by party authorities in Hotan said.
The number of Uighurs, as well as Kazakhs and other Muslim minorities, who have been detained in the camps is unclear. Estimates range from several hundred thousand to perhaps a million, with exile Uighur groups saying the number is even higher.
About 1.5 percent of China’s total population lives in Xinjiang. But the region accounted for more than 20 percent of arrests nationwide last year, according to official data compiled by Chinese Human Rights Defenders, an advocacy group. Those figures do not include people in the re-education camps.
Residents said people have been sent to the camps for visiting relatives abroad; for possessing books about religion and Uighur culture; and even for wearing a T-shirt with a Muslim crescent. Women are sometimes detained because of transgressions by their husbands or sons.
One official directive warns people to look for 75 signs of “religious extremism,” including behavior that would be considered unremarkable in other countries: growing a beard as a young man, praying in public places outside mosques or even abruptly trying to give up smoking or drinking.
‘We Are in Trouble’
Hotan feels as if under siege by an invisible enemy. Fortified police outposts and checkpoints dot the streets every few hundred yards. Schools, kindergartens, gas stations and hospitals are garlanded in barbed wire. Surveillance cameras sprout from shops, apartment entrances and metal poles.
“It’s very tense here,” a police officer said. “We haven’t rested for three years.”
This city of 390,000 underwent a Muslim revival about a decade ago. Most Uighurs have adhered to relatively relaxed forms of Sunni Islam, and a significant number are secular. But budding prosperity and growing interaction with the Middle East fueled interest in stricter Islamic traditions. Men grew long beards, while women wore hijabs that were not a part of traditional Uighur dress.
Now the beards and hijabs are gone, and posters warn against them. Mosques appear poorly attended; people must register to enter and worship under the watch of surveillance cameras.
The government shifted to harsher policies in 2009 after protests in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, spiraled into rioting and left nearly 200 people dead. Mr. Xi and his regional functionaries went further, adopting methods reminiscent of Mao’s draconian rule — mass rallies, public confessions and “work teams” assigned to ferret out dissent.
They have also wired dusty towns across Xinjiang with an array of technology that has put the region on the cutting edge of programs for surveillance cameras as well as facial and voice recognition. Spending on security in Xinjiang has soared, with nearly $8.5 billion allocated for the police, courts and other law enforcement agencies last year, nearly double the previous year’s amount.
The campaign has polarized Uighur society. Many of the ground-level enforcers are Uighurs themselves, including police officers and officials who staff the camps and security checkpoints.
Ordinary Uighurs moving about Hotan sometimes shuffle on and off buses several times to pass through metal detectors, swipe their identity cards or hand over and unlock their mobile phones for inspection.
A resident or local cadre is assigned to monitor every 10 families in Xinjiang, reporting on comings and goings and activities deemed suspicious, including praying and visits to mosques, according to residents and government reports. Residents said the police sometimes search homes for forbidden books and suspect items such as prayer mats, using special equipment to check walls and floors for hidden caches.
The authorities are also gathering biometric data and DNA. Two Uighurs, a former official and a student, said they were ordered to show up at police buildings where officers recorded their voices, took pictures of their heads at different angles and collected hair and blood samples.
The pressure on Uighur villages intensifies when party “work teams” arrive and take up residence, sometimes living in local homes. The teams ask villagers to inform on relatives, friends and neighbors, and they investigate residents’ attitudes and activities, according to government reports published online.
One account published last year described how the authorities in one village arranged for detainees accused of “religious extremism” to be denounced by their relatives at a public rally, and encouraged other families to report similar activities.
“More and more people are coming forward with information,” Cao Lihai, an editor for a party journal, wrote in the report. “Some parents have personally brought in their children to give themselves up.”
A Uighur woman in her 20s who asked to be identified only by her surname, Gul, said she came under scrutiny after wearing an Islamic head wrap and reading books about religion and Uighur history. Local officials installed cameras at her family’s door — and inside their living room.
“We would always have to be careful what we said and what we did and what we read,” she said.
Every week, Ms. Gul added, a neighborhood official visited and spent at least two hours interrogating her. Eventually, the authorities sent her to a full-time re-education camp.
Ms. Gul, who fled China after being released, later tried to contact her brother to find out if he was in trouble. He sent a wordless reply, an emoticon face in tears.
Afterward, Ms. Gul’s mother sent her another message: “Please don’t call us again. We are in trouble.”
The Chinese government says it is winning a war against Islamic extremism and separatism, which it blames for attacks that have killed hundreds in recent years. Information about such violence is censored and incomplete, but incidents appear to have fallen off sharply since 2014, when the “deradicalization” push began.
Still, many who have emerged from the indoctrination program say it has hardened public attitudes against Beijing.
“It was of absolutely no use,” said Omurbek Eli, a Kazakh businessman, of his time held in a camp in 2017. “The outcome will be the opposite. They will become even more resistant to Chinese influence.”
For many families, the disappearance of a loved one into the camps can be devastating, both emotionally and economically — a point reflected in reports posted online by the party’s “work teams.”
Some of these reports describe Uighur families unable to harvest crops on their own because so many members have been taken away, and one mentioned a mother left to care for five children. In another report, an official near Hotan described holding a village meeting to calm distraught relatives of those sent to the camps.
The mass internments also break Uighur families by forcing members to disown their kin or by separating small children from their parents. So many parents have been detained in Kashgar, a city in western Xinjiang, that it has expanded boarding schools to take custody of older, “troubled” children.
“Whether consciously or unconsciously, authorities in Xinjiang have recognized the power of families as an alternative source of authority,” said Rian Thum, a professor at Loyola University in New Orleans who has followed the detentions. “The kind of extreme party loyalty they want has no room for that.”
Ms. Gul said the camp she was in was ramshackle enough that children who lived nearby sometimes crept up to a window late at night and called out to their mothers inside. “Their children would come and say, ‘Mother, I miss you,’” she said.
“We didn’t say anything,” she added, “because there was a camera inside the cell.”
Austin Ramzy contributed reporting from Hong Kong.
A version of this article appears in print on Sept. 9, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Anti-Islam Detention Camps in China.
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What It’s Like to Live in a Surveillance State. James A. Millward. TNYT, Feb 3 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/opinion/sunday/china-surveillance-state-uighurs.html
No evidence of a general increase in the public’s affective polarization in 2014-2017; despite a campaign with elevated elite hostility & rampant discord after the 2016 election, the limits on partisan prejudice identified in prior research remain in place
Are There Still Limits on Partisan Prejudice? Sean J. Westwood, Erik
Peterson and Yphtach Lelkes. Dartmouth College & University of
Pennsylvania.
https://www.dartmouth.edu/~seanjwestwood/papers/stillLimits.pdf
Abstract: Partisan affective polarization is believed, by some, to result from hostility in elite political discourse. We explore this account by replicating a 2014 study that examines partisan prejudice. This extensive replication offers no evidence of a general increase in the public’s affective polarization between 2014 and 2017. Divides in feeling thermometer ratings of the two political parties remained stable and there was no overall increase in measures of partisan prejudice between periods. We document this in our original data and using the 2012 and 2016 ANES. Moreover, the most affectively polarized members of the public became no more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes towards the other party. Despite an intervening campaign with elevated elite hostility and rampant discord after the 2016 election, the limits on partisan prejudice identified in prior research remain in place. This stability is important for understanding the nature and malleability of partisan affect.
Abstract: Partisan affective polarization is believed, by some, to result from hostility in elite political discourse. We explore this account by replicating a 2014 study that examines partisan prejudice. This extensive replication offers no evidence of a general increase in the public’s affective polarization between 2014 and 2017. Divides in feeling thermometer ratings of the two political parties remained stable and there was no overall increase in measures of partisan prejudice between periods. We document this in our original data and using the 2012 and 2016 ANES. Moreover, the most affectively polarized members of the public became no more likely to hold prejudicial attitudes towards the other party. Despite an intervening campaign with elevated elite hostility and rampant discord after the 2016 election, the limits on partisan prejudice identified in prior research remain in place. This stability is important for understanding the nature and malleability of partisan affect.
Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news
Pereira, Andrea, and Jay Van Bavel. 2018. “Identity Concerns Drive Belief in Fake News.” PsyArXiv. September 11. psyarxiv.com/7vc5d
Abstract: Political misinformation, often called “fake news”, represents a threat to our democracies because it impedes citizens from being appropriately informed. Evidence suggests that fake news spreads more rapidly than real news—especially when it contains political content. The present article tests three competing theoretical accounts that have been proposed to explain the rise and spread of political (fake) news: (1) the ideology hypothesis— people prefer news that bolsters their values and worldviews; (2) the confirmation bias hypothesis—people prefer news that fits their pre-existing stereotypical knowledge; and (3) the political identity hypothesis—people prefer news that allows their political in-group to fulfill certain social goals. We conducted three experiments in which American participants read news that concerned behaviors perpetrated by their political in-group or out-group and measured the extent to which they believed the news (Exp. 1, Exp. 2, Exp. 3), and were willing to share the news on social media (Exp. 2 and 3). Results revealed that Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group, supporting a political identity hypothesis. However, although belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, we also found that Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake new. We discuss the implications for theoretical explanations of political beliefs and application of these concepts in in polarized political system.
Abstract: Political misinformation, often called “fake news”, represents a threat to our democracies because it impedes citizens from being appropriately informed. Evidence suggests that fake news spreads more rapidly than real news—especially when it contains political content. The present article tests three competing theoretical accounts that have been proposed to explain the rise and spread of political (fake) news: (1) the ideology hypothesis— people prefer news that bolsters their values and worldviews; (2) the confirmation bias hypothesis—people prefer news that fits their pre-existing stereotypical knowledge; and (3) the political identity hypothesis—people prefer news that allows their political in-group to fulfill certain social goals. We conducted three experiments in which American participants read news that concerned behaviors perpetrated by their political in-group or out-group and measured the extent to which they believed the news (Exp. 1, Exp. 2, Exp. 3), and were willing to share the news on social media (Exp. 2 and 3). Results revealed that Democrats and Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group, supporting a political identity hypothesis. However, although belief was positively correlated with willingness to share on social media in all conditions, we also found that Republicans were more likely to believe and want to share apolitical fake new. We discuss the implications for theoretical explanations of political beliefs and application of these concepts in in polarized political system.
Age differences in implicit theories about willpower: Why older people endorse a nonlimited theory
Job, V., Sieber, V., Rothermund, K., & Nikitin, J. (2018). Age differences in implicit theories about willpower: Why older people endorse a nonlimited theory. Psychology and Aging, 33(6), 940-952. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pag0000285
Abstract: What people believe about their capacity to exert self-control (willpower), whether it is a limited or a nonlimited resource, affects their self-regulation and well-being. The present research investigated age-related differences in people’s beliefs—called implicit theories—about willpower. Study 1 (n = 802, age range 18–83 years) showed that with higher age people are more likely to believe that willpower is a nonlimited resource. Study 2 (n = 423) with younger (age 18–35 years) and older adults (age 60–98 years) replicated this finding and showed that age and a nonlimited willpower theory are related to perceived autonomy on demanding tasks (i.e., sense of self-determination), which might explain the age-related differences in willpower theories. Finally, experimental Studies 3a (n = 302) and 3b (n = 497) manipulated an autonomous mindset in younger (age 18–35 years) and older adults (age 60–87 years) and provided evidence for a causal effect of perceived autonomy on self-control-beliefs, supporting the proposed developmental mechanism
Abstract: What people believe about their capacity to exert self-control (willpower), whether it is a limited or a nonlimited resource, affects their self-regulation and well-being. The present research investigated age-related differences in people’s beliefs—called implicit theories—about willpower. Study 1 (n = 802, age range 18–83 years) showed that with higher age people are more likely to believe that willpower is a nonlimited resource. Study 2 (n = 423) with younger (age 18–35 years) and older adults (age 60–98 years) replicated this finding and showed that age and a nonlimited willpower theory are related to perceived autonomy on demanding tasks (i.e., sense of self-determination), which might explain the age-related differences in willpower theories. Finally, experimental Studies 3a (n = 302) and 3b (n = 497) manipulated an autonomous mindset in younger (age 18–35 years) and older adults (age 60–87 years) and provided evidence for a causal effect of perceived autonomy on self-control-beliefs, supporting the proposed developmental mechanism
Moderate intake of beer (traditional and alcohol-free) does not exert vascular detrimental effects nor increases body weight in obese healthy individuals; it increases the anti-oxidative properties of HDL & facilitates cholesterol efflux
Moderate Beer Intake and Cardiovascular Health in Overweight Individuals. Teresa Padro et al. Nutrients 2018, 10(9), 1237; https://doi.org/10.3390/nu10091237
Abstract: Consistent epidemiological evidence indicates that low-to-moderate alcohol consumption is inversely associated with cardiovascular event presentation, while high levels of alcohol intake are associated to increased cardiovascular risk. Little is known on the effects of moderate beer intake in the metabolic syndrome. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of moderate and regular daily intake of beer with meals in overweight (body mass index (BMI) of 28–29.9 kg/m2) or obese class 1 (BMI of 30–35 kg/m2) individuals without other cardiovascular risk factors (dyslipidemia, type 2-diabetes, hypertension) focusing on the effects related to changes in weight, in lipoproteins and vascular endothelial function. We have performed an open, prospective two-arms longitudinal crossover study to investigate the effects associated with regular consumption (four week) of alcohol-free-beer (0 g alcohol/day) or traditional-beer (30 g alcohol/day in men and 15 g alcohol/day in women) on anthropometrical and biochemical parameters, liver and kidney function biomarkers, and vascular endothelial function. After four-week intervention with traditional and/or alcohol-free beer, BMI did not show any significant change and values for liver and kidney functions were within the normal levels. Moderate traditional beer intake did not affect lipid levels—however it significantly increased the antioxidant capacity of high density lipoprotein (HDL). In addition, apoB-depleted serum (after the four-week intervention period) showed a higher potential to promote cholesterol efflux from macrophages. Beer consumption did not induce vascular endothelial dysfunction or stiffness. In summary, our results based on a 12-week prospective study provide evidence that moderate intake of beer (traditional and alcohol-free) does not exert vascular detrimental effects nor increases body weight in obese healthy individuals. In contrast, moderate intake of beer increases the anti-oxidative properties of HDL and facilitates cholesterol efflux, which may prevent lipid deposition in the vessel wall.
Keywords: cardiovascular-risk-factors; overweight; obesity; fermented-beverage; lipoprotein-oxidation; HDL-antioxidant-capacity; cholesterol-efflux; endothelial-function
Abstract: Consistent epidemiological evidence indicates that low-to-moderate alcohol consumption is inversely associated with cardiovascular event presentation, while high levels of alcohol intake are associated to increased cardiovascular risk. Little is known on the effects of moderate beer intake in the metabolic syndrome. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of moderate and regular daily intake of beer with meals in overweight (body mass index (BMI) of 28–29.9 kg/m2) or obese class 1 (BMI of 30–35 kg/m2) individuals without other cardiovascular risk factors (dyslipidemia, type 2-diabetes, hypertension) focusing on the effects related to changes in weight, in lipoproteins and vascular endothelial function. We have performed an open, prospective two-arms longitudinal crossover study to investigate the effects associated with regular consumption (four week) of alcohol-free-beer (0 g alcohol/day) or traditional-beer (30 g alcohol/day in men and 15 g alcohol/day in women) on anthropometrical and biochemical parameters, liver and kidney function biomarkers, and vascular endothelial function. After four-week intervention with traditional and/or alcohol-free beer, BMI did not show any significant change and values for liver and kidney functions were within the normal levels. Moderate traditional beer intake did not affect lipid levels—however it significantly increased the antioxidant capacity of high density lipoprotein (HDL). In addition, apoB-depleted serum (after the four-week intervention period) showed a higher potential to promote cholesterol efflux from macrophages. Beer consumption did not induce vascular endothelial dysfunction or stiffness. In summary, our results based on a 12-week prospective study provide evidence that moderate intake of beer (traditional and alcohol-free) does not exert vascular detrimental effects nor increases body weight in obese healthy individuals. In contrast, moderate intake of beer increases the anti-oxidative properties of HDL and facilitates cholesterol efflux, which may prevent lipid deposition in the vessel wall.
Keywords: cardiovascular-risk-factors; overweight; obesity; fermented-beverage; lipoprotein-oxidation; HDL-antioxidant-capacity; cholesterol-efflux; endothelial-function
Why are conversations limited to about four people? A theoretical exploration of the conversation size constraint
Why are conversations limited to about four people? A theoretical exploration of the conversation size constraint. Jaimie Aron, Kremsa Jason Wilkes. Evolution and Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.09.004
Abstract: It is genuinely difficult to sustain a casual conversation that includes more than four speakers. Add a fifth speaker, and the conversation often quickly fissions into smaller groups. Termed ‘the dinner party problem,’ this four-person conversation size limit is believed to be caused by evolved cognitive constraints on human mentalizing capacities. In this view, people can mentally manage three other minds at any one time, leading to four-person conversations. But whereas existing work has posited and empirically tested alternative accounts of what drives the conversation size constraint, to our knowledge, no work has explored the question of why this capacity is specifically four? In this theoretical paper, we (a) review research demonstrating this cognitive constraint in sociality, (b) review the relevant working memory literature, which has explored the “why four” question at some length, and (c) we begin to pose possible answers to our specific social “why four” question. Using simple mathematical models of small-scale sociality, which we imbue with evolutionarily-relevant content, we present one novel possible explanation for the four-person conversation size constraint.
Abstract: It is genuinely difficult to sustain a casual conversation that includes more than four speakers. Add a fifth speaker, and the conversation often quickly fissions into smaller groups. Termed ‘the dinner party problem,’ this four-person conversation size limit is believed to be caused by evolved cognitive constraints on human mentalizing capacities. In this view, people can mentally manage three other minds at any one time, leading to four-person conversations. But whereas existing work has posited and empirically tested alternative accounts of what drives the conversation size constraint, to our knowledge, no work has explored the question of why this capacity is specifically four? In this theoretical paper, we (a) review research demonstrating this cognitive constraint in sociality, (b) review the relevant working memory literature, which has explored the “why four” question at some length, and (c) we begin to pose possible answers to our specific social “why four” question. Using simple mathematical models of small-scale sociality, which we imbue with evolutionarily-relevant content, we present one novel possible explanation for the four-person conversation size constraint.
The Myth of the Tech-Savvy Teen and the Clueless Senior Citizen: Revisiting Technology-Based Victimization Over the Life Course
The Myth of the Tech-Savvy Teen and the Clueless Senior Citizen: Revisiting Technology-Based Victimization Over the Life Course. Travis C. Pratt. Criminal Justice Review, https://doi.org/10.1177/0734016818763245
Abstract: It is a popular idea that younger people are more technology-savvy than their older counterparts. It is an equally popular idea that our oldest generation—senior citizens—is so clueless about new technological developments that they are the most vulnerable to technology-based forms of victimization. The present article, however, demonstrates that these ideas are myths and that it is the young—not the old—who are most at risk of victimization when technology is involved. This should come as no surprise since the age–victimization curve mirrors rather closely the age–crime curve, where the risk of victimization typically peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood and follows a steady decline thereafter. The risks associated with technologically based forms of victimization—at least in general—are no different. The implications of dispelling these myths for criminological research as we move forward are discussed in the context of the nature of “risky” behaviors at different stages of the life course.
Keywords: technology, victimization, life course
Abstract: It is a popular idea that younger people are more technology-savvy than their older counterparts. It is an equally popular idea that our oldest generation—senior citizens—is so clueless about new technological developments that they are the most vulnerable to technology-based forms of victimization. The present article, however, demonstrates that these ideas are myths and that it is the young—not the old—who are most at risk of victimization when technology is involved. This should come as no surprise since the age–victimization curve mirrors rather closely the age–crime curve, where the risk of victimization typically peaks in late adolescence and early adulthood and follows a steady decline thereafter. The risks associated with technologically based forms of victimization—at least in general—are no different. The implications of dispelling these myths for criminological research as we move forward are discussed in the context of the nature of “risky” behaviors at different stages of the life course.
Keywords: technology, victimization, life course
Why Too Many Political Science Findings Cannot Be Trusted and What We Can Do About It: Assessing, Explaining and Improving the Credibility of Our Discipline’s Evidence Base
Wuttke, Alexander. 2018. “Why Too Many Political Science Findings Cannot Be Trusted and What We Can Do About It: Assessing, Explaining and Improving the Credibility of Our Discipline’s Evidence Base.” SocArXiv. September 11. doi:10.31235/osf.io/dq87w
Abstract
While other scientific disciplines are currently undergoing “credibility revolutions”, political science should also face the uncomfortable question of how much we can trust the findings published in the discipline’s journals and presses. Theoretically, this commentary uses the concept of social dilemmas to show how scientists ¬in academia’s current incentive system work against their self-interest if they prioritize research credibility. Empirically, this article conducts a comprehensive review of meta-scientific research with a focus on quantitative political science, demonstrating that threats to the credibility of political science findings are systematic and real. Building on a framework to assess the credibility of scientific literatures, the review shows that a large fraction of the published literature makes itself inaccessible for intersubjective credibility assessments, fails tests of analytical robustness or shows patterns of systematic deviation from true population estimates. Still, the review also highlights the notable progress the discipline has made in recent years to secure research credibility. This commentary urges further steps toward this direction and proposes concrete institutional measures to better align individual researcher rationality with the collective good of verifiable, robust and valid scientific results, such as dedicated verification procedures and the implementation of pre-registration and results-blind peer reviewing.
Abstract
While other scientific disciplines are currently undergoing “credibility revolutions”, political science should also face the uncomfortable question of how much we can trust the findings published in the discipline’s journals and presses. Theoretically, this commentary uses the concept of social dilemmas to show how scientists ¬in academia’s current incentive system work against their self-interest if they prioritize research credibility. Empirically, this article conducts a comprehensive review of meta-scientific research with a focus on quantitative political science, demonstrating that threats to the credibility of political science findings are systematic and real. Building on a framework to assess the credibility of scientific literatures, the review shows that a large fraction of the published literature makes itself inaccessible for intersubjective credibility assessments, fails tests of analytical robustness or shows patterns of systematic deviation from true population estimates. Still, the review also highlights the notable progress the discipline has made in recent years to secure research credibility. This commentary urges further steps toward this direction and proposes concrete institutional measures to better align individual researcher rationality with the collective good of verifiable, robust and valid scientific results, such as dedicated verification procedures and the implementation of pre-registration and results-blind peer reviewing.
Monday, September 10, 2018
Found that taxpayers’ attitudes toward evasion are not predictive of behavior & that tax compliance is not related to trust in government or one’s fellow citizens; Danes are more likely to evade tax than Italians; at the same time, Danes are less tolerant of tax evasion by others
Willing to Evade: An Experimental Study of Italy and Denmark. Alice Guerra and Brooke Harrington. Copenhagen Business School, Department of Business and Politics. ttps://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/62eb/759a0b5079486771fa960ca140de6de783c4.pdf
Abstract: Tax evasion varies widely across countries and follows a geographical pattern: Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, are plagued by higher evasion rates than Northern European countries. This suggests a testable research question: Can national identity explain North-South discrepancies in European tax compliance? We address this issue by conducting identical laboratory experiments in Denmark and Italy, two countries that lie not only at the opposite ends of the spectrum on tax compliance but also at the extremes of cultural differences and citizen trust in the government. We adopt a double-hurdle model to separate the decision of whether to evade or not (extensive margin), from the decision of how much to evade (intensive margin). This study innovates both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it contributes in two ways to the literature on tax compliance: 1) by showing that taxpayers’ attitudes toward evasion are not predictive of behavior; and 2) by showing that tax compliance is not related to trust in government or one’s fellow citizens. Methodologically, the paper innovates by being the first to examine tax compliance in Denmark, and by testing the effects of an extended vector of covariates on both the intensive and extensive margins of tax behavior. Empirically, we find that--contrary to expectations--Danes are more likely to evade tax than Italians; at the same time, Danes are less tolerant of tax evasion by others. We find that individual evasion choices are strongly affected by risk aversion and individual perception about others' compliance behavior. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for tax policies and future research.
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Another, related interpretation is that discrepancies in tax behavior s are driven by differences in circumstances. Italians face the same circumstances as Dane s in the lab, but the circumstances Italians and Danes face outside the lab are very different. Danes can be highly motivated to evade taxes (even more than Italians) in situations where they have the possibility to do so (as in our experiment), but in mos t cases they are unable to cheat (e.g., because of the third-party reporting system and high tax enforcement they generally face). There is a crucial difference between being willing to evade taxes and being able to do so, and this depends upon the level o f tax enforcement and the reporting system in place. This explanation is coherent with the findings from the field experiment conducted by Kleven et al. (2011) in Denmark. The authors found that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to t hird-party reporting but substantial for self-reported income. Since most income in Denmark is subject to third-party reporting, the overall evasion rate is modest. In this respect, it would be interesting to ru n a similar field experiments with taxpayers in Italy to evaluate to extent to which compliance choices change under alternative reporting systems.
Overall, our experiment together with the recent cross-national laboratory experiments on tax behavior seem to reveal a common finding: that national identity, alone, cannot explain the North-South divergences in tax compliance. This result, which deserves further replication analyses, is encouraging because it suggests that tax policies and institutions play a crucial role in tax compliance. Indeed, fa ctors such as the traditional tax enforcement measures, redistribution policies, the threat of public disclosure of tax evasion, perception about others' compliance behavior, affect individual intrinsic motivation to fulfill fiscal obligations and should be used to mitigate evasion issues.
Abstract: Tax evasion varies widely across countries and follows a geographical pattern: Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece, are plagued by higher evasion rates than Northern European countries. This suggests a testable research question: Can national identity explain North-South discrepancies in European tax compliance? We address this issue by conducting identical laboratory experiments in Denmark and Italy, two countries that lie not only at the opposite ends of the spectrum on tax compliance but also at the extremes of cultural differences and citizen trust in the government. We adopt a double-hurdle model to separate the decision of whether to evade or not (extensive margin), from the decision of how much to evade (intensive margin). This study innovates both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, it contributes in two ways to the literature on tax compliance: 1) by showing that taxpayers’ attitudes toward evasion are not predictive of behavior; and 2) by showing that tax compliance is not related to trust in government or one’s fellow citizens. Methodologically, the paper innovates by being the first to examine tax compliance in Denmark, and by testing the effects of an extended vector of covariates on both the intensive and extensive margins of tax behavior. Empirically, we find that--contrary to expectations--Danes are more likely to evade tax than Italians; at the same time, Danes are less tolerant of tax evasion by others. We find that individual evasion choices are strongly affected by risk aversion and individual perception about others' compliance behavior. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for tax policies and future research.
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Another, related interpretation is that discrepancies in tax behavior s are driven by differences in circumstances. Italians face the same circumstances as Dane s in the lab, but the circumstances Italians and Danes face outside the lab are very different. Danes can be highly motivated to evade taxes (even more than Italians) in situations where they have the possibility to do so (as in our experiment), but in mos t cases they are unable to cheat (e.g., because of the third-party reporting system and high tax enforcement they generally face). There is a crucial difference between being willing to evade taxes and being able to do so, and this depends upon the level o f tax enforcement and the reporting system in place. This explanation is coherent with the findings from the field experiment conducted by Kleven et al. (2011) in Denmark. The authors found that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to t hird-party reporting but substantial for self-reported income. Since most income in Denmark is subject to third-party reporting, the overall evasion rate is modest. In this respect, it would be interesting to ru n a similar field experiments with taxpayers in Italy to evaluate to extent to which compliance choices change under alternative reporting systems.
Overall, our experiment together with the recent cross-national laboratory experiments on tax behavior seem to reveal a common finding: that national identity, alone, cannot explain the North-South divergences in tax compliance. This result, which deserves further replication analyses, is encouraging because it suggests that tax policies and institutions play a crucial role in tax compliance. Indeed, fa ctors such as the traditional tax enforcement measures, redistribution policies, the threat of public disclosure of tax evasion, perception about others' compliance behavior, affect individual intrinsic motivation to fulfill fiscal obligations and should be used to mitigate evasion issues.
Rolf Degen summarizing: The negative beats the positive in terms of retweetability
Retweet: A popular information diffusion mechanism – A survey paper. Syeda Nadia Firdaus, Chen Ding, Alireza Sadeghian. Online Social Networks and Media, Volume 6, June 2018, Pages 26-40. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.osnem.2018.04.001
Abstract: Retweeting or reposting a message is considered as an easily available information diffusion mechanism provided by Twitter or any other social network sites. By finding out why a user retweets a tweet, or predicting whether a tweet will be retweeted by a user, we can not only understand user's behavior or interest better, but also understand how information is diffused on the online social network. In this survey paper, we have explored various research works related to retweet prediction and retweeting behavior analysis, investigated the underlying reasons for spreading information in forms of retweets, and discussed the challenges of retweet related research. The purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of researches in retweet prediction area, which can be used as an introductory guide for future researchers in this field.
Abstract: Retweeting or reposting a message is considered as an easily available information diffusion mechanism provided by Twitter or any other social network sites. By finding out why a user retweets a tweet, or predicting whether a tweet will be retweeted by a user, we can not only understand user's behavior or interest better, but also understand how information is diffused on the online social network. In this survey paper, we have explored various research works related to retweet prediction and retweeting behavior analysis, investigated the underlying reasons for spreading information in forms of retweets, and discussed the challenges of retweet related research. The purpose of the paper is to provide an overview of researches in retweet prediction area, which can be used as an introductory guide for future researchers in this field.
The current institutional success/gov't quality of former colonies can be traced back to the extent of successful historical taxation
Colonial Revenue Extraction and Modern Day Government Quality in the British Empire. Rasmus Broms. World Development, Volume 90, February 2017, Pages 269-280. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.10.003
Highlights
• Colonial revenue level is linked to modern day government quality in British colonies.
• The association is stronger when neo-European colonies are excluded.
• These findings call the extractive institutions hypothesis into question.
Summary: The relationship between the extent of government revenue a government collects, primarily in the form of taxation, and its overall quality has increasingly been identified as a key factor for successful state building, good institutions, and—by extension—general development. Initially deriving from historical research on Western Europe, this process is expected to unfold slowly over time. This study tests the claim that more extensive revenue collection has long-lasting and positive consequences for government quality in a developmental setting. Using fiscal records from British colonies, results from cross-colony/country regression analyses reveal that higher colonial income-adjusted revenue levels during the early twentieth century can be linked to higher government quality today. This relationship is substantial and robust to several specifications of both colonial revenue and modern day government quality, and remains significant under control for a range of rivaling explanations. The results support the notion that the current institutional success of former colonies can be traced back to the extent of historical revenue extraction.
Highlights
• Colonial revenue level is linked to modern day government quality in British colonies.
• The association is stronger when neo-European colonies are excluded.
• These findings call the extractive institutions hypothesis into question.
Summary: The relationship between the extent of government revenue a government collects, primarily in the form of taxation, and its overall quality has increasingly been identified as a key factor for successful state building, good institutions, and—by extension—general development. Initially deriving from historical research on Western Europe, this process is expected to unfold slowly over time. This study tests the claim that more extensive revenue collection has long-lasting and positive consequences for government quality in a developmental setting. Using fiscal records from British colonies, results from cross-colony/country regression analyses reveal that higher colonial income-adjusted revenue levels during the early twentieth century can be linked to higher government quality today. This relationship is substantial and robust to several specifications of both colonial revenue and modern day government quality, and remains significant under control for a range of rivaling explanations. The results support the notion that the current institutional success of former colonies can be traced back to the extent of historical revenue extraction.
People had self-insight into their momentary extraversion, conscientiousness, & likely neuroticism, suggesting that people can accurately detect fluctuations in some aspects of their personality; but not so much for agreeableness
Sun, Jessie, and Simine Vazire. 2018. “Do People Know What They’re Like in the Moment?.” PsyArXiv. September 9. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sg5aw
Abstract: Knowing yourself requires knowing not just what you are like in general (trait self-knowledge), but also how your personality fluctuates from moment to moment (state self-knowledge). We examined this latter form of self-knowledge. Participants (248 people; 2,938 observations) wore the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), an unobtrusive audio recorder, and completed experience sampling (ESM) self-reports of their personality states four times each day for one week. We estimated state self-knowledge by comparing self-reported personality states to consensual observer ratings of personality states coded from the EAR files, which formed the criterion for what participants were “actually” like in the moment. People had self-insight into their momentary extraversion, conscientiousness, and likely neuroticism, suggesting that people can accurately detect fluctuations in some aspects of their personality. However, the evidence for self-insight was weaker for agreeableness. This apparent self-ignorance may be partly responsible for interpersonal problems and for blind spots in trait self-knowledge.
Abstract: Knowing yourself requires knowing not just what you are like in general (trait self-knowledge), but also how your personality fluctuates from moment to moment (state self-knowledge). We examined this latter form of self-knowledge. Participants (248 people; 2,938 observations) wore the Electronically Activated Recorder (EAR), an unobtrusive audio recorder, and completed experience sampling (ESM) self-reports of their personality states four times each day for one week. We estimated state self-knowledge by comparing self-reported personality states to consensual observer ratings of personality states coded from the EAR files, which formed the criterion for what participants were “actually” like in the moment. People had self-insight into their momentary extraversion, conscientiousness, and likely neuroticism, suggesting that people can accurately detect fluctuations in some aspects of their personality. However, the evidence for self-insight was weaker for agreeableness. This apparent self-ignorance may be partly responsible for interpersonal problems and for blind spots in trait self-knowledge.
Sunday, September 9, 2018
Significant correlations between the numerous variables and a main effect of sexual disgust, extraversion, and sensation seeking on enjoyment of horror films
So Disgusting, But You Can't Take Your Eyes Off the Screen: Can Personality Traits and Disgust Sensitivity Influence People's Love for Horror Movies? Ashley Marie Dillard. Western Carolina University, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2018. 10788427. https://search.proquest.com/openview/1ed112229e7f7dc302084b163680e811/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y
Abstract: Personality traits have been found to be associated with disgust sensitivity. For example, sexual and moral disgust have been found to be strongly correlated with the honesty-humility factor in the HEXACO model (Tybur & de Vries, 2013). However, questions have been raised as to what makes some individuals find disgusting horror movies enjoyable, while others are left mortified. To better understand these differences, participants were assessed using the HEXACO-PI-R-60, the Three-Domain Disgust Scale, the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale, and an adapted Enjoyment of Frightening Films measure within the current study. Ultimately, the present study explored if there were any individual differences among people on personality and disgust sensitivity measures in regard to preference for horror movies. Nine out of sixteen of my hypotheses were supported within this study. The results revealed significant correlations between the numerous variables and a main effect of sexual disgust, extraversion, and sensation seeking on enjoyment of frightening films.
Abstract: Personality traits have been found to be associated with disgust sensitivity. For example, sexual and moral disgust have been found to be strongly correlated with the honesty-humility factor in the HEXACO model (Tybur & de Vries, 2013). However, questions have been raised as to what makes some individuals find disgusting horror movies enjoyable, while others are left mortified. To better understand these differences, participants were assessed using the HEXACO-PI-R-60, the Three-Domain Disgust Scale, the Brief Sensation Seeking Scale, and an adapted Enjoyment of Frightening Films measure within the current study. Ultimately, the present study explored if there were any individual differences among people on personality and disgust sensitivity measures in regard to preference for horror movies. Nine out of sixteen of my hypotheses were supported within this study. The results revealed significant correlations between the numerous variables and a main effect of sexual disgust, extraversion, and sensation seeking on enjoyment of frightening films.
In the four-cycle period 2006-2012, 89% of Americans were in a highly competitive jurisdiction for at least one office; more Americans witness competition than citizens of Canada or the UK, other nations with SMSP-based systems
Bernard L. Fraga and Eitan D. Hersh (2018), "Are Americans Stuck in Uncompetitive Enclaves? An Appraisal of U.S. Electoral Competition", Quarterly Journal of Political Science: Vol. 13: No. 3, pp 291-311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00017161
Abstract: Most elections in the United States are not close, which has raised concerns among social scientists and reform advocates about the vibrancy of American democracy. In this paper, we demonstrate that while individual elections are often uncompetitive, hierarchical, temporal, and geographic variation in the locus of competition results in most of the country regularly experiencing close elections. In the four-cycle period between 2006 and 2012, 89% of Americans were in a highly competitive jurisdiction for at least one office. Since 1914, about half the states have never gone more than four election cycles without a close statewide contest. More Americans witness competition than citizens of Canada or the UK, other nations with SMSP-based systems. The dispersed competition we find also results in nearly all Americans being represented by both political parties for different offices.
Subjects: Competitive Marketing Strategy, Elections:Electoral behavior, Elections:Electoral institutions, Elections:Voting behavior, Elections:Voting theory, Elections, Electoral behavior, Electoral institutions, Federalism, Political participation, Political parties, Representation, Voting behavior, Voting theory
Keywords: Elections, competition, political geography
Abstract: Most elections in the United States are not close, which has raised concerns among social scientists and reform advocates about the vibrancy of American democracy. In this paper, we demonstrate that while individual elections are often uncompetitive, hierarchical, temporal, and geographic variation in the locus of competition results in most of the country regularly experiencing close elections. In the four-cycle period between 2006 and 2012, 89% of Americans were in a highly competitive jurisdiction for at least one office. Since 1914, about half the states have never gone more than four election cycles without a close statewide contest. More Americans witness competition than citizens of Canada or the UK, other nations with SMSP-based systems. The dispersed competition we find also results in nearly all Americans being represented by both political parties for different offices.
Subjects: Competitive Marketing Strategy, Elections:Electoral behavior, Elections:Electoral institutions, Elections:Voting behavior, Elections:Voting theory, Elections, Electoral behavior, Electoral institutions, Federalism, Political participation, Political parties, Representation, Voting behavior, Voting theory
Keywords: Elections, competition, political geography
Is it time to kill the detection wizard? Emotional intelligence does not facilitate deception detection
Is it time to kill the detection wizard? Emotional intelligence does not facilitate deception detection. Nicolas Roulin, Marguerite Ternes. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 137, 15 January 2019, Pages 131-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.08.020
Highlights
• Individuals high on emotional intelligence (EI) rely more on non-verbal information when attempting to detect deception.
• EI and reliance on non-verbal information are unrelated to detection accuracy.
• The popular notion that some people are naturally better at deception detection, or “detection wizards,” should be revisited.
Abstract: Being able to identify if someone is telling the truth or lying is essential in many social situations, for instance in police interrogations or employment interviews. Unfortunately, people are generally poor at lie detection. Some researchers have argued that a small category of individuals are detection wizards who can achieve substantially higher detection accuracy because they have high levels of emotional intelligence (EI) and are better able to identify non-verbal cues to deceit. These propositions have been popularized in the media and are appealing to some practitioners, but are based on very limited empirical evidence. We conducted three experimental studies to test these propositions, relying on different samples and using both trait and ability measures of EI. We measured deception detection using different approaches (in-person and video-based) and contexts (social interaction and job interview). One study measured skepticism, and another used eye-tracking technology to capture participants' reliance on non-verbal information. Results showed that high-EI individuals indeed rely more on non-verbal information. However, EI, skepticism, and the use of non-verbal cues are unrelated to deception detection. We thus argue that detection wizards are likely a myth, and it would be more productive to focus on evidence-based methods to improve deception detection.
Highlights
• Individuals high on emotional intelligence (EI) rely more on non-verbal information when attempting to detect deception.
• EI and reliance on non-verbal information are unrelated to detection accuracy.
• The popular notion that some people are naturally better at deception detection, or “detection wizards,” should be revisited.
Abstract: Being able to identify if someone is telling the truth or lying is essential in many social situations, for instance in police interrogations or employment interviews. Unfortunately, people are generally poor at lie detection. Some researchers have argued that a small category of individuals are detection wizards who can achieve substantially higher detection accuracy because they have high levels of emotional intelligence (EI) and are better able to identify non-verbal cues to deceit. These propositions have been popularized in the media and are appealing to some practitioners, but are based on very limited empirical evidence. We conducted three experimental studies to test these propositions, relying on different samples and using both trait and ability measures of EI. We measured deception detection using different approaches (in-person and video-based) and contexts (social interaction and job interview). One study measured skepticism, and another used eye-tracking technology to capture participants' reliance on non-verbal information. Results showed that high-EI individuals indeed rely more on non-verbal information. However, EI, skepticism, and the use of non-verbal cues are unrelated to deception detection. We thus argue that detection wizards are likely a myth, and it would be more productive to focus on evidence-based methods to improve deception detection.
Chivalry and attractiveness bias in police officer forensic judgments in Israel: Female offenders were treated more forgivingly than male offenders
Chivalry and attractiveness bias in police officer forensic judgments in Israel. Mally Shechory Bitton & Liza Zvi. The Journal of Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2018.1509043
ABSTRACT: The chivalry hypothesis and attractiveness bias were evaluated among 323 police officers and 364 students, serving as a control group. The participants were asked to read a description of a swindle, where the offender was either physically attractive or unattractive. They then had to assign a punishment to the offender and judge the blame ascribed to both offender and victim. The findings showed that the offender’s sex, more than his or her external appearance, affects differences in punishment severity. Female offenders were treated more forgivingly than male offenders. Nonetheless, analysis of blame attributions shows that attractive offenders are blamed more than unattractive offenders. Women were also found to dispense severe punishments more than men.
KEYWORDS: Attractiveness bias, chivalry hypothesis, judgments offenders, police officers
ABSTRACT: The chivalry hypothesis and attractiveness bias were evaluated among 323 police officers and 364 students, serving as a control group. The participants were asked to read a description of a swindle, where the offender was either physically attractive or unattractive. They then had to assign a punishment to the offender and judge the blame ascribed to both offender and victim. The findings showed that the offender’s sex, more than his or her external appearance, affects differences in punishment severity. Female offenders were treated more forgivingly than male offenders. Nonetheless, analysis of blame attributions shows that attractive offenders are blamed more than unattractive offenders. Women were also found to dispense severe punishments more than men.
KEYWORDS: Attractiveness bias, chivalry hypothesis, judgments offenders, police officers
Saturday, September 8, 2018
Even on “unfavorable” facts that are inconvenient to the respondent’s political party, more-certain respondents are more likely to answer correctly; where misperceptions exist, Democrats & Republicans perform poorly on the same questions
Self-Awareness of Political Knowledge. Matthew H. Graham. Political Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-018-9499-8
Abstract: Despite widespread concern over false beliefs about politically-relevant facts, little is known about how strongly Americans believe their answers to poll questions. I propose a conceptual framework for characterizing survey responses about facts: self-awareness, or how well people can assess their own knowledge. I measure self-awareness of political knowledge by eliciting respondent certainty about answers to 24 factual questions about politics. Even on “unfavorable” facts that are inconvenient to the respondent’s political party, more-certain respondents are more likely to answer correctly. Because people are somewhat aware of their ignorance, respondents usually describe their incorrect responses as low-certainty guesses, not high-certainty beliefs. Where misperceptions exist, they tend to be bipartisan: Democrats and Republicans perform poorly on the same questions and explain their answers using similar points of reference.
Abstract: Despite widespread concern over false beliefs about politically-relevant facts, little is known about how strongly Americans believe their answers to poll questions. I propose a conceptual framework for characterizing survey responses about facts: self-awareness, or how well people can assess their own knowledge. I measure self-awareness of political knowledge by eliciting respondent certainty about answers to 24 factual questions about politics. Even on “unfavorable” facts that are inconvenient to the respondent’s political party, more-certain respondents are more likely to answer correctly. Because people are somewhat aware of their ignorance, respondents usually describe their incorrect responses as low-certainty guesses, not high-certainty beliefs. Where misperceptions exist, they tend to be bipartisan: Democrats and Republicans perform poorly on the same questions and explain their answers using similar points of reference.
Overall, the overwhelming majority of incarcerated women reported negative emotional experiences of crime; men have more complex, mixed responses
Women offenders' emotional experience of crime. Kayley Ciesla, Maria Ioannou, Laura Hammond. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1512
Abstract: The main aim of the study was to examine the emotional experiences of crime amongst women offenders. With a mean age of 36.40 years (SD = 11.12), 128 women offenders completed a questionnaire exploring emotions they had experienced whilst committing a crime. Participants included incarcerated individuals as well as those in community‐based projects. Smallest space analysis of the emotions highlighted four key themes; depression, distress, elation, and calm. Results reflected the circumplex model of emotions but highlighted strong distinction between pleasure and displeasure. Overall, the majority of women reported negative emotional experiences of crime. Understanding how individuals felt during their crime commission offers alternative perspectives of criminal behaviour and a framework for future explorations. Results offer crucial insights for policy makers, criminal investigations, and therapeutic treatment options.
Abstract: The main aim of the study was to examine the emotional experiences of crime amongst women offenders. With a mean age of 36.40 years (SD = 11.12), 128 women offenders completed a questionnaire exploring emotions they had experienced whilst committing a crime. Participants included incarcerated individuals as well as those in community‐based projects. Smallest space analysis of the emotions highlighted four key themes; depression, distress, elation, and calm. Results reflected the circumplex model of emotions but highlighted strong distinction between pleasure and displeasure. Overall, the majority of women reported negative emotional experiences of crime. Understanding how individuals felt during their crime commission offers alternative perspectives of criminal behaviour and a framework for future explorations. Results offer crucial insights for policy makers, criminal investigations, and therapeutic treatment options.
Compared with heterosexuals, lesbians/gays had higher odds of reporting suicide acceptability if one goes bankrupt, dishonors family, or is tired of living
Suicide Acceptability and Sexual Orientation: Results from the General Social Survey 2008–2014. John R. Blosnich, Megan C. Lytle, Robert W. S. Coulter & Darren L. Whitfield. Archives of Suicide Research, Volume 22, 2018 - Issue 4, Pages 542-554. https://doi.org/10.1080/13811118.2017.1377132
Abstract: Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals have higher prevalence of lifetime suicide ideation and attempt than their heterosexual peers, but less is known about differences in suicide acceptability (i.e., believing suicide is a viable answer to a problem). The purpose of this study was to examine if LGB adults had greater suicide acceptability than heterosexual adults. A total of 4 items in the General Social Surveys from 2008 to 2014 assessed whether a nationally representative sample of U.S. adult respondents (n = 5,037) thought it acceptable for individuals to kill themselves if one: goes bankrupt, dishonors their family, is tired of living, or has an incurable disease. Multiple logistic regression analyses were used to assess the association of sexual orientation with suicide acceptability items after adjusting for confounding factors. Compared with heterosexuals, lesbians/gays had higher odds of reporting suicide acceptability if one goes bankrupt (OR = 1.92; 95% CI: 1.06, 3.46), dishonors family (OR = 1.83; 95% CI: 1.01, 3.28), or is tired of living (OR = 2.25; 95% CI: 1.30, 3.90). Bisexual and heterosexual groups were largely similar across the 4 suicide acceptability items. No sexual orientation differences were observed for reporting acceptability of suicide in the instance of an incurable disease. Post hoc analyses revealed significant interactions between sex and sexual orientation, such that differences in suicide acceptability seemed to be driven by sexual minority women rather than by sexual minority men. Suicide acceptability differs by sexual orientation, and community-level interventions around changing norms about suicide may be a prevention strategy for sexual minority individuals.
Abstract: Lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals have higher prevalence of lifetime suicide ideation and attempt than their heterosexual peers, but less is known about differences in suicide acceptability (i.e., believing suicide is a viable answer to a problem). The purpose of this study was to examine if LGB adults had greater suicide acceptability than heterosexual adults. A total of 4 items in the General Social Surveys from 2008 to 2014 assessed whether a nationally representative sample of U.S. adult respondents (n = 5,037) thought it acceptable for individuals to kill themselves if one: goes bankrupt, dishonors their family, is tired of living, or has an incurable disease. Multiple logistic regression analyses were used to assess the association of sexual orientation with suicide acceptability items after adjusting for confounding factors. Compared with heterosexuals, lesbians/gays had higher odds of reporting suicide acceptability if one goes bankrupt (OR = 1.92; 95% CI: 1.06, 3.46), dishonors family (OR = 1.83; 95% CI: 1.01, 3.28), or is tired of living (OR = 2.25; 95% CI: 1.30, 3.90). Bisexual and heterosexual groups were largely similar across the 4 suicide acceptability items. No sexual orientation differences were observed for reporting acceptability of suicide in the instance of an incurable disease. Post hoc analyses revealed significant interactions between sex and sexual orientation, such that differences in suicide acceptability seemed to be driven by sexual minority women rather than by sexual minority men. Suicide acceptability differs by sexual orientation, and community-level interventions around changing norms about suicide may be a prevention strategy for sexual minority individuals.
Friday, September 7, 2018
Liberals—but not conservatives—presented less competence to Black interaction partners than to White ones in sophistication of vocabulary selected for assignment, competence-related traits selected for introduction, & competence-related content of open-ended introductions
Dupree, Cydney H., and Susan Fiske. 2018. “Self-presentation in Interracial Settings: The Competence Downshift by White Liberals.” PsyArXiv. September 7. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pv2ab
Abstract: Most Whites, particularly socio-political liberals, now endorse racial equality. Archival and experimental research reveals a subtle but reliable ironic consequence: White liberals self-present less competence to minorities than to other Whites—that is, they patronize minorities stereotyped as lower status and less competent. In an initial archival demonstration of the competence downshift, Study 1 examined the content of White Republican and Democratic presidential candidates’ campaign speeches. Although Republican candidates did not significantly shift language based on audience racial composition, Democratic candidates used less competence-related language to minority audiences than to White audiences. Across five experiments (total N = 2,157), White participants responded to a Black or White hypothetical (Studies 2, 3, 4, S1) or ostensibly real (Study 5) interaction partner. Three indicators of self-presentation converged: sophistication of vocabulary selected for an assignment, competence-related traits selected for an introduction, and competence-related content of brief, open-ended introductions. Conservatism indicators included: self-reported political affiliation (liberal-conservative), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (values-based conservatism) and Social Dominance Orientation (hierarchy-based conservatism). Internal meta-analyses revealed that liberals—but not conservatives—presented less competence to Black interaction partners than to White ones. The simple effect was small but significant across studies, and most reliable for the self-reported measure of conservatism. This possibly unintentional but ultimately patronizing competence-downshift suggests that well-intentioned liberal Whites may draw on low-status/competence stereotypes to affiliate with minorities.
Abstract: Most Whites, particularly socio-political liberals, now endorse racial equality. Archival and experimental research reveals a subtle but reliable ironic consequence: White liberals self-present less competence to minorities than to other Whites—that is, they patronize minorities stereotyped as lower status and less competent. In an initial archival demonstration of the competence downshift, Study 1 examined the content of White Republican and Democratic presidential candidates’ campaign speeches. Although Republican candidates did not significantly shift language based on audience racial composition, Democratic candidates used less competence-related language to minority audiences than to White audiences. Across five experiments (total N = 2,157), White participants responded to a Black or White hypothetical (Studies 2, 3, 4, S1) or ostensibly real (Study 5) interaction partner. Three indicators of self-presentation converged: sophistication of vocabulary selected for an assignment, competence-related traits selected for an introduction, and competence-related content of brief, open-ended introductions. Conservatism indicators included: self-reported political affiliation (liberal-conservative), Right-Wing Authoritarianism (values-based conservatism) and Social Dominance Orientation (hierarchy-based conservatism). Internal meta-analyses revealed that liberals—but not conservatives—presented less competence to Black interaction partners than to White ones. The simple effect was small but significant across studies, and most reliable for the self-reported measure of conservatism. This possibly unintentional but ultimately patronizing competence-downshift suggests that well-intentioned liberal Whites may draw on low-status/competence stereotypes to affiliate with minorities.
Too much meritocracy (accuracy of performance ranking in contests), can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient; with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement & complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy
Morgan, John and Tumlinson, Justin and Várdy, Felix, The Limits of Meritocracy (July 20, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3216950
Abstract: We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.
Keywords: Contest Theory; Mechanism Design; Auctions
JEL Classification: D82; D44
Abstract: We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking in contests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.
Keywords: Contest Theory; Mechanism Design; Auctions
JEL Classification: D82; D44
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