Burri A, Buchmeier J, Porst H. The importance of male ejaculation for female sexual satisfaction and function. J Sex Med 2018;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2018.08.014
Abstract
Introduction: Although links between ejaculatory control or intravaginal ejaculatory latency time and female sexual functioning have frequently been reported in the past, no study has investigated the importance of other male ejaculatory characteristics, such as ejaculation volume and intensity, for women’s sexuality.
Aim: To assess the importance of subjectively perceived ejaculation intensity and ejaculation volume for female sexual function and satisfaction.
Methods:This was a cross-sectional online survey including 240 sexually active, heterosexual women (median age 27.4 years), using study-specific questions and validated questionnaires.
Main Outcome Measure: Results are presented as means, percentages, and age-controlled partial correlation coefficients of the main study variables.
Results: 50.43% of women considered it very important that the partner ejaculates during intercourse. 18.3% of women preferred that the partner ejaculates before they reach orgasm, whereas for 53.5% this did not matter. 22.6% of women stated that they experienced a more intense orgasm when their partner ejaculated during vaginal intercourse. 17.4% reported that they definitely experienced a more intensive orgasm depending on the intensity of their partner’s ejaculation, whereas for 17.8% this did not matter at all. 20.9% of women did not feel that their orgasm was more intense depending on the subjectively felt ejaculate quantity, whereas the majority (37.9%) stated that it did not matter. 13.1% of women regarded the quantity of expelled ejaculate as an expression of their own sexual attractiveness. Women stating that they experienced more intense orgasms when the partner ejaculated, when the partner experienced a more intense ejaculation, and when he expelled a greater ejaculate quantity also reported better lifelong orgasmic function (r = 0.24, r = 0.15, r = .26, respectively) and more lifelong sexual satisfaction (r = .29, r = .15, r = 26, respectively).
Clinical Implications: The perception of ejaculatory characteristics can be related to the female partner’s sexual satisfaction and overall sexual functioning.
Strength & Limitations: This is the very first study to explore the importance of male ejaculation volume and intensity for women’s sexual functioning. Data are of self-report nature and ejaculation characteristics were not objectively measured but by women’s self-report.
Conclusion: Although male ejaculation and its different aspects seem to play an important role for women, the study demonstrates a considerable variability of women’s attitudes toward ejaculatory characteristics. Further research is required to examine the sources of this variability.
Saturday, September 29, 2018
People with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases; also linked to illusion of viewing the partner as especially attractive
Carswell, K. L., Finkel, E. J., & Kumashiro, M. (in press). Creativity and romantic passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://eprints.goldsmiths.ac.uk/24388/1/Carswell%20et%20al%20Creativity%20and%20Passion%20in%20Presss%20JPSP.pdf
Abstract: Romantic passion typically declines over time, but a downward trajectory is not inevitable. Across three studies (one of which encompassed two sub-studies), we investigated whether creativity helps bolster romantic passion in established relationships. Studies 1A and 1B revealed that people with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases. Studies 2 and 3 explored positive illusions about the partner’s physical attractiveness as a possible mediator of the effect of creativity on passion. Cross-lagged panel analyses in Study 2 indicated that being creative is linked to a tendency to view the partner as especially attractive, even relative to the partner’s own self-assessment. Path analyses in Study 3 provided longitudinal evidence consistent with the hypothesis that positive illusions about the partner’s attractiveness (participant’s assessments, controlling for objective coding of the partner’s attractiveness) mediate the link between creativity and changes in passion over time. Study 3 also provided longitudinal evidence of the buffering effect of creativity on passion trajectories over time, an effect that emerged not only for self- reported passion, but also for objectively coded passion during a laboratory-based physical intimacy task nine months later. A meta-analytic summary across studies revealed a significant overall main effect of creativity on passion, as well as a significant moderation effect of creativity on risks of passion decline (e.g., relationship length).
Keywords: passion, creativity, positive illusions, physical attractiveness, close relationships
Abstract: Romantic passion typically declines over time, but a downward trajectory is not inevitable. Across three studies (one of which encompassed two sub-studies), we investigated whether creativity helps bolster romantic passion in established relationships. Studies 1A and 1B revealed that people with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases. Studies 2 and 3 explored positive illusions about the partner’s physical attractiveness as a possible mediator of the effect of creativity on passion. Cross-lagged panel analyses in Study 2 indicated that being creative is linked to a tendency to view the partner as especially attractive, even relative to the partner’s own self-assessment. Path analyses in Study 3 provided longitudinal evidence consistent with the hypothesis that positive illusions about the partner’s attractiveness (participant’s assessments, controlling for objective coding of the partner’s attractiveness) mediate the link between creativity and changes in passion over time. Study 3 also provided longitudinal evidence of the buffering effect of creativity on passion trajectories over time, an effect that emerged not only for self- reported passion, but also for objectively coded passion during a laboratory-based physical intimacy task nine months later. A meta-analytic summary across studies revealed a significant overall main effect of creativity on passion, as well as a significant moderation effect of creativity on risks of passion decline (e.g., relationship length).
Keywords: passion, creativity, positive illusions, physical attractiveness, close relationships
Why Doesn't Diversity Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia
Why Doesn't Diversity Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia. Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev. Anthropology Now, Volume 10, 2018 - Issue 2. https://doi.org/10.1080/19428200.2018.1493182
Starbucks’ decision to put 175,000 workers through diversity training on May 29, in the wake of the widely publicized arrest of two black men in a Philadelphia store, put diversity training back in the news. But corporations and universities have been doing diversity training for decades. Nearly all Fortune 500 companies do training, and two-thirds of colleges and universities have training for faculty according to our 2016 survey of 670 schools. Most also put freshmen through some sort of diversity session as part of orientation. Yet hundreds of studies dating back to the 1930s suggest that antibias training does not reduce bias, alter behavior or change the workplace.
We have been speaking to employers about this research for more than a decade, with the message that diversity training is likely the most expensive, and least effective, diversity program around. But they persist, worried about the optics of getting rid of training, concerned about litigation, unwilling to take more difficult but consequential steps or simply in the thrall of glossy training materials and their purveyors. That colleges and universities in the United States persist in offering training to faculty and students, and even mandate it (29% of all schools require faculty to undergo training), is particularly surprising given that the research on the poor performance of training comes out of academia. Imagine university health centers continuing to prescribe vitamin C for the common cold.
Corporate antibias training was stimulated by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and legal reforms that movement brought about. Federal agencies took the lead, and by the end of 1971, the Social Security Administration had put 50,000 staffers through racial bias training. By 1976, 60 percent of big companies offered equal-opportunity training. In the 1980s, as Reagan tried to tear down affirmative action regulations and appointed Clarence Thomas to run the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, trainers began to make a business case for what they called “diversity training.” They argued that women and minorities would soon be the backbone of the workforce and that employers needed to figure out how to better incorporate them. By 2005, 65 percent of large firms offered diversity training. Consultants have heralded training as essential for increasing diversity, corporate counsel have advised that it is vital for fending off lawsuits and plaintiffs have asked for it in most discrimination settlements.1
Yet two-thirds of human resources specialists report that diversity training does not have positive effects, and several field studies have found no effect of diversity training on women’s or minorities’ careers or on managerial diversity.2 These findings are not surprising. There is ample evidence that training alone does not change attitudes or behavior, or not by much and not for long. In their review of 985 studies of antibias interventions, Paluck and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31 organizational studies using pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik and Roberson identified 27 that documented improved knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of the items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn identified only five that examined long-term effects on bias, two showing positive effects, two negative, and one no effect.3
A number of recent studies of antibias training used the implicit association test (IAT) before and after to assess whether unconscious bias can be affected by training. A meta-analysis of 426 studies found weak immediate effects on unconscious bias and weaker effects on explicit bias. A side-byside test of 17 interventions to reduce white bias toward blacks found that eight reduced unconscious bias, but in a follow-up examining eight implicit bias interventions and one sham, all nine worked, suggesting that subjects may have learned how to game the bias test.4 Effects dissipated within a few days.
Most of these studies look at interventions that mirror corporate and university training in intensity and duration. One important study by Patricia Devine and colleagues suggests that a more extensive curriculum, based in strategies proven effective in the lab, can reduce measured bias.5 That 12-week intervention, which took the form of a college course and included a control group, worked best for people who were concerned about discrimination and who did the exercises — best when preaching to the converted. We do not see employers jumping on this costly bandwagon. Consider Starbucks, which closed 8,000 stores for half a day to train 175,000 workers, at an estimated cost of $12 million in lost business alone. Starbucks hires 100,000 new workers each year, and to match the Devine intervention they would need a dozen halfday sessions, every year, for more than half the workforce. Unlikely they would go that far, even if the logistics of scaling a classroom intervention to 100,000 people could be worked out.
Despite the poor showing of antibias training in academic studies, it remains the go-to solution for corporate executives and university administrators facing public relations crises, campus intolerance and slow progress on diversifying the executive and faculty ranks. Why is diversity training not more effective? If we can answer that question, perhaps we can fix it. Five different lines of research suggest why it may fail.
First, short-term educational interventions in general do not change people. This should come as no surprise to anthropologists. Decades of research on workplace training of all sorts suggests that by itself, training does not do much. Take workplace safety and health training which, it stands to reason, employees have an interest in paying attention to. Alone, it does little to change attitudes or behavior. If you cannot train workers to attach the straps on their hard hats, it may be wellnigh impossible to get them to give up biases that they have acquired over a lifetime of media exposure and real-world experience. Second, some have argued that antibias training activates stereotypes. Field and laboratory studies find that asking people to suppress stereotypes tends to reinforce them — making them more cognitively accessible to people.6 Try not thinking about elephants.
Diversity training typically encourages people to recognize and fight the stereotypes they hold, and this may simply be counterproductive. Third, recent research suggests that training inspires unrealistic confidence in antidiscrimination programs, making employees complacent about their own biases. In the lab, Castilla and Benard found that when experimenters described subjects’ employers as nondiscriminatory, subjects did not censor their own gender biases.7 Employees who go through diversity training may not, subsequently, take responsibility for avoiding discrimination. Kaiser and colleagues found that when subjects are told that their employers have prodiversity measures such as training, they presume that the workplace is free of bias and react harshly to claims of discrimination.8 More generally, in experiments, the presence of workplace diversity programs seems to blind employees to hard evidence of discrimination.9
Fourth, others find that training leaves whites feeling left out. Plaut and colleagues found the message of multiculturalism, which is common in training, makes whites feel excluded and reduces their support for diversity, relative to the message of colorblindness, which is rare these days. Whites generally feel they will not be treated fairly in workplaces with prodiversity messages.10
Perhaps this is why trainers frequently report hostility and resistance, and trainees often leave “confused, angry, or with more animosity toward” other groups.11 The trouble is, when African-Americans work with whites who take a color-blind stance (rather than a multicultural stance), it alienates them, reducing their psychological engagement at work and quite possibly reducing their likelihood of staying on.12 So perhaps trainers cannot win with a message of either multiculturalism or color-blindness.
Fifth, we know from a large body of organizational research that people react negatively to efforts to control them. Jobautonomy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy. Self-determination research shows that when organizations frame motivation for pursuing a goal as originating internally, commitment rises, but when they frame motivation as originating externally, rebellion increases. Legault, Gutsell and Inzlicht found this to be true in the case of antibias training. Kidder and colleagues showed that when diversity programs are introduced with an external rationale — avoiding lawsuit — participants were more resistant than when they were introduced with an organizational rationale — management needs. In experiments, whites resented external pressure to control prejudice against blacks, and when experimenters asked people to reduce bias, they responded by increasing bias unless they saw the desire to control prejudice as voluntary.13 Thus Robin Ely and David Thomas found that a discrimination/fairness framing of diversity efforts, which evokes legal motives, is less effective than an integration/ learning framing that evokes business motives.14
What is a university administrator or corporate executive to do? Some researchers suggest remedies. On the one hand, they have addressed problematic features of training. On the other, they address evidence that training tends not to change workplaces unless it is part of a broader effort, involving multiple components.
First, can we prevent antibias training from reinforcing stereotypes, rather than suppressing them? Devine and colleagues ask their trainees to practice behaviors that increase contact with members of other groups, and empathy for other groups — these behavioral changes appear to be part of the secret to avoiding the reinforcement of stereotypes. Second, can we prevent training from making managers complacent because they believe that the organization has handled the problem of discrimination?
One possibility would be to introduce the “moral licensing” literature as part of training. 15 It suggests that when people do something good (e.g., attend training) they are likely to feel licensed to do something bad afterward (e.g., discriminate in hiring). This might equip trainees to look out for the effect in their own behavior.
Third, can we prevent antibias training about multiculturalism from making whites and men feel excluded and eliciting backlash? Plaut and colleagues found that when multicultural curriculum was framed as inclusive of the majority culture, majority group members responded better.16 Perhaps the curriculum should emphasize multiculturalism but stress that the majority culture is an important part of that multiculturalism.
Fourth, can we prevent trainees from feeling that training is an effort to control their thoughts and actions, and from rebelling against the message? Legault and colleagues found that by manipulating the framing of training, trainers can influence whether trainees see it as externally imposed or voluntarily chosen.17 We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior. By mandating participation, employers send the message that employees need to change, and the employer will require it. By emphasizing the law, employers send the message that external government mandates are behind training. These features may lead employees to think that commitment to diversity is being coerced.18
We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior.
Our surveys show that 80% of corporations with diversity training make it mandatory, and 43% of colleges and universities with training for faculty make it mandatory. Employers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more harm than good.19 About 75 percent of company trainings cover regulations and procedures to comply with them — the legal case for diversity — as do about 40 percent of university trainings. Perhaps employers should cut the legal content and make training voluntary, or give employees a choice of different types of diversity training.
This begs a bigger question: if employers could design a diversity course that reduced bias, would it reduce workplace discrimination? There is reason to believe that it would not. A recent meta-analysis suggests that change in unconscious bias does not lead to change in discrimination. Discrimination may result from habits of mind and behavior, or organizational practices, that are not rooted in unconscious bias alone.20 This reinforces the view that employers cannot expect training to change the workplace without making other changes.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. That is what studies of workplace training in other domains, such as health and safety, have proven. In isolation, diversity training does not appear to be effective, and in many corporations, colleges and universities, training was for many years the only diversity program in place. But large corporations and big universities are developing multipronged diversity initiatives that tackle not only implicit biases, but structural discrimination. The trick is to couple diversity training with the right complementary measures.
Our research shows that companies most often couple it with the wrong complementary measures.21 The antidiscrimination measures that work best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves.
We find that special college recruitment programs to identify women and minorities — sending existing corporate managers out to find new recruits — increase managerial diversity markedly. So do formal mentoring programs, which pair existing managers with people a couple of rungs below them, in different departments, who seek mentoring and sponsorship. So do diversity task forces that bring together higher-ups in different departments to look at the data on hiring, retention, pay and promotion; identify problems; brainstorm for solutions and bring those back to their departments. So do management training programs that use existing managers to train aspiring managers. All of these programs put existing higher-ups in touch with people from different race/ethnic/ gender groups who hope to move up. All of them help existing managers to understand the contours of the problem. And all of them seem to turn existing managers into champions of diversity.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. By contrast, popular human resources policies thought to reduce discrimination and promote diversity by controlling managerial bias seem to backfire.22 Companies that establish formal hiring and promotion criteria — through job tests and performance rating systems — to limit managerial discrimination see reductions in managerial diversity. Formal civil rights grievance procedures, which give employees a means to pursue complaints of discrimination, also backfire because managers find them threatening. Our statistical analyses show that diversity training can improve the effects of certain diversity programs, but employers have to complement training with the right programs — those that engage rather than alienate managers.
Starbucks got mixed press coverage for its mass diversity training event, with some experts, such as University of Virginia psychologist Brian Nosek, expressing skepticism that that particular quick fix would fix anything.23 But Starbucks says that this is the first volley in what they expect to be a long game. To their credit, Starbucks has tried to address racial bias before, with its 2015 campaign encouraging baristas to write “Race Together” on customers’ coffee cups, as a conversation starter. Starbucks pulled the plug on that campaign after a couple of shots of media criticism and a dollop of ridicule. Starbucks faces much the same challenge that university administrators face: what to do in an age in which diversity in executive and faculty ranks has been at a standstill for decades? Social science research now gives us a pretty good idea of what does not work and what remains promising.
Starbucks’ decision to put 175,000 workers through diversity training on May 29, in the wake of the widely publicized arrest of two black men in a Philadelphia store, put diversity training back in the news. But corporations and universities have been doing diversity training for decades. Nearly all Fortune 500 companies do training, and two-thirds of colleges and universities have training for faculty according to our 2016 survey of 670 schools. Most also put freshmen through some sort of diversity session as part of orientation. Yet hundreds of studies dating back to the 1930s suggest that antibias training does not reduce bias, alter behavior or change the workplace.
We have been speaking to employers about this research for more than a decade, with the message that diversity training is likely the most expensive, and least effective, diversity program around. But they persist, worried about the optics of getting rid of training, concerned about litigation, unwilling to take more difficult but consequential steps or simply in the thrall of glossy training materials and their purveyors. That colleges and universities in the United States persist in offering training to faculty and students, and even mandate it (29% of all schools require faculty to undergo training), is particularly surprising given that the research on the poor performance of training comes out of academia. Imagine university health centers continuing to prescribe vitamin C for the common cold.
Corporate antibias training was stimulated by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and legal reforms that movement brought about. Federal agencies took the lead, and by the end of 1971, the Social Security Administration had put 50,000 staffers through racial bias training. By 1976, 60 percent of big companies offered equal-opportunity training. In the 1980s, as Reagan tried to tear down affirmative action regulations and appointed Clarence Thomas to run the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, trainers began to make a business case for what they called “diversity training.” They argued that women and minorities would soon be the backbone of the workforce and that employers needed to figure out how to better incorporate them. By 2005, 65 percent of large firms offered diversity training. Consultants have heralded training as essential for increasing diversity, corporate counsel have advised that it is vital for fending off lawsuits and plaintiffs have asked for it in most discrimination settlements.1
Yet two-thirds of human resources specialists report that diversity training does not have positive effects, and several field studies have found no effect of diversity training on women’s or minorities’ careers or on managerial diversity.2 These findings are not surprising. There is ample evidence that training alone does not change attitudes or behavior, or not by much and not for long. In their review of 985 studies of antibias interventions, Paluck and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31 organizational studies using pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik and Roberson identified 27 that documented improved knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of the items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn identified only five that examined long-term effects on bias, two showing positive effects, two negative, and one no effect.3
A number of recent studies of antibias training used the implicit association test (IAT) before and after to assess whether unconscious bias can be affected by training. A meta-analysis of 426 studies found weak immediate effects on unconscious bias and weaker effects on explicit bias. A side-byside test of 17 interventions to reduce white bias toward blacks found that eight reduced unconscious bias, but in a follow-up examining eight implicit bias interventions and one sham, all nine worked, suggesting that subjects may have learned how to game the bias test.4 Effects dissipated within a few days.
Most of these studies look at interventions that mirror corporate and university training in intensity and duration. One important study by Patricia Devine and colleagues suggests that a more extensive curriculum, based in strategies proven effective in the lab, can reduce measured bias.5 That 12-week intervention, which took the form of a college course and included a control group, worked best for people who were concerned about discrimination and who did the exercises — best when preaching to the converted. We do not see employers jumping on this costly bandwagon. Consider Starbucks, which closed 8,000 stores for half a day to train 175,000 workers, at an estimated cost of $12 million in lost business alone. Starbucks hires 100,000 new workers each year, and to match the Devine intervention they would need a dozen halfday sessions, every year, for more than half the workforce. Unlikely they would go that far, even if the logistics of scaling a classroom intervention to 100,000 people could be worked out.
Despite the poor showing of antibias training in academic studies, it remains the go-to solution for corporate executives and university administrators facing public relations crises, campus intolerance and slow progress on diversifying the executive and faculty ranks. Why is diversity training not more effective? If we can answer that question, perhaps we can fix it. Five different lines of research suggest why it may fail.
First, short-term educational interventions in general do not change people. This should come as no surprise to anthropologists. Decades of research on workplace training of all sorts suggests that by itself, training does not do much. Take workplace safety and health training which, it stands to reason, employees have an interest in paying attention to. Alone, it does little to change attitudes or behavior. If you cannot train workers to attach the straps on their hard hats, it may be wellnigh impossible to get them to give up biases that they have acquired over a lifetime of media exposure and real-world experience. Second, some have argued that antibias training activates stereotypes. Field and laboratory studies find that asking people to suppress stereotypes tends to reinforce them — making them more cognitively accessible to people.6 Try not thinking about elephants.
Diversity training typically encourages people to recognize and fight the stereotypes they hold, and this may simply be counterproductive. Third, recent research suggests that training inspires unrealistic confidence in antidiscrimination programs, making employees complacent about their own biases. In the lab, Castilla and Benard found that when experimenters described subjects’ employers as nondiscriminatory, subjects did not censor their own gender biases.7 Employees who go through diversity training may not, subsequently, take responsibility for avoiding discrimination. Kaiser and colleagues found that when subjects are told that their employers have prodiversity measures such as training, they presume that the workplace is free of bias and react harshly to claims of discrimination.8 More generally, in experiments, the presence of workplace diversity programs seems to blind employees to hard evidence of discrimination.9
Fourth, others find that training leaves whites feeling left out. Plaut and colleagues found the message of multiculturalism, which is common in training, makes whites feel excluded and reduces their support for diversity, relative to the message of colorblindness, which is rare these days. Whites generally feel they will not be treated fairly in workplaces with prodiversity messages.10
Perhaps this is why trainers frequently report hostility and resistance, and trainees often leave “confused, angry, or with more animosity toward” other groups.11 The trouble is, when African-Americans work with whites who take a color-blind stance (rather than a multicultural stance), it alienates them, reducing their psychological engagement at work and quite possibly reducing their likelihood of staying on.12 So perhaps trainers cannot win with a message of either multiculturalism or color-blindness.
Fifth, we know from a large body of organizational research that people react negatively to efforts to control them. Jobautonomy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy. Self-determination research shows that when organizations frame motivation for pursuing a goal as originating internally, commitment rises, but when they frame motivation as originating externally, rebellion increases. Legault, Gutsell and Inzlicht found this to be true in the case of antibias training. Kidder and colleagues showed that when diversity programs are introduced with an external rationale — avoiding lawsuit — participants were more resistant than when they were introduced with an organizational rationale — management needs. In experiments, whites resented external pressure to control prejudice against blacks, and when experimenters asked people to reduce bias, they responded by increasing bias unless they saw the desire to control prejudice as voluntary.13 Thus Robin Ely and David Thomas found that a discrimination/fairness framing of diversity efforts, which evokes legal motives, is less effective than an integration/ learning framing that evokes business motives.14
What is a university administrator or corporate executive to do? Some researchers suggest remedies. On the one hand, they have addressed problematic features of training. On the other, they address evidence that training tends not to change workplaces unless it is part of a broader effort, involving multiple components.
First, can we prevent antibias training from reinforcing stereotypes, rather than suppressing them? Devine and colleagues ask their trainees to practice behaviors that increase contact with members of other groups, and empathy for other groups — these behavioral changes appear to be part of the secret to avoiding the reinforcement of stereotypes. Second, can we prevent training from making managers complacent because they believe that the organization has handled the problem of discrimination?
One possibility would be to introduce the “moral licensing” literature as part of training. 15 It suggests that when people do something good (e.g., attend training) they are likely to feel licensed to do something bad afterward (e.g., discriminate in hiring). This might equip trainees to look out for the effect in their own behavior.
Third, can we prevent antibias training about multiculturalism from making whites and men feel excluded and eliciting backlash? Plaut and colleagues found that when multicultural curriculum was framed as inclusive of the majority culture, majority group members responded better.16 Perhaps the curriculum should emphasize multiculturalism but stress that the majority culture is an important part of that multiculturalism.
Fourth, can we prevent trainees from feeling that training is an effort to control their thoughts and actions, and from rebelling against the message? Legault and colleagues found that by manipulating the framing of training, trainers can influence whether trainees see it as externally imposed or voluntarily chosen.17 We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior. By mandating participation, employers send the message that employees need to change, and the employer will require it. By emphasizing the law, employers send the message that external government mandates are behind training. These features may lead employees to think that commitment to diversity is being coerced.18
We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior.
Our surveys show that 80% of corporations with diversity training make it mandatory, and 43% of colleges and universities with training for faculty make it mandatory. Employers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more harm than good.19 About 75 percent of company trainings cover regulations and procedures to comply with them — the legal case for diversity — as do about 40 percent of university trainings. Perhaps employers should cut the legal content and make training voluntary, or give employees a choice of different types of diversity training.
This begs a bigger question: if employers could design a diversity course that reduced bias, would it reduce workplace discrimination? There is reason to believe that it would not. A recent meta-analysis suggests that change in unconscious bias does not lead to change in discrimination. Discrimination may result from habits of mind and behavior, or organizational practices, that are not rooted in unconscious bias alone.20 This reinforces the view that employers cannot expect training to change the workplace without making other changes.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. That is what studies of workplace training in other domains, such as health and safety, have proven. In isolation, diversity training does not appear to be effective, and in many corporations, colleges and universities, training was for many years the only diversity program in place. But large corporations and big universities are developing multipronged diversity initiatives that tackle not only implicit biases, but structural discrimination. The trick is to couple diversity training with the right complementary measures.
Our research shows that companies most often couple it with the wrong complementary measures.21 The antidiscrimination measures that work best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves.
We find that special college recruitment programs to identify women and minorities — sending existing corporate managers out to find new recruits — increase managerial diversity markedly. So do formal mentoring programs, which pair existing managers with people a couple of rungs below them, in different departments, who seek mentoring and sponsorship. So do diversity task forces that bring together higher-ups in different departments to look at the data on hiring, retention, pay and promotion; identify problems; brainstorm for solutions and bring those back to their departments. So do management training programs that use existing managers to train aspiring managers. All of these programs put existing higher-ups in touch with people from different race/ethnic/ gender groups who hope to move up. All of them help existing managers to understand the contours of the problem. And all of them seem to turn existing managers into champions of diversity.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. By contrast, popular human resources policies thought to reduce discrimination and promote diversity by controlling managerial bias seem to backfire.22 Companies that establish formal hiring and promotion criteria — through job tests and performance rating systems — to limit managerial discrimination see reductions in managerial diversity. Formal civil rights grievance procedures, which give employees a means to pursue complaints of discrimination, also backfire because managers find them threatening. Our statistical analyses show that diversity training can improve the effects of certain diversity programs, but employers have to complement training with the right programs — those that engage rather than alienate managers.
Starbucks got mixed press coverage for its mass diversity training event, with some experts, such as University of Virginia psychologist Brian Nosek, expressing skepticism that that particular quick fix would fix anything.23 But Starbucks says that this is the first volley in what they expect to be a long game. To their credit, Starbucks has tried to address racial bias before, with its 2015 campaign encouraging baristas to write “Race Together” on customers’ coffee cups, as a conversation starter. Starbucks pulled the plug on that campaign after a couple of shots of media criticism and a dollop of ridicule. Starbucks faces much the same challenge that university administrators face: what to do in an age in which diversity in executive and faculty ranks has been at a standstill for decades? Social science research now gives us a pretty good idea of what does not work and what remains promising.
Women: No relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem; most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile)
The role of physical satisfaction in women's sexual self-esteem. S. Hannier, A. Baltus, P. De Sutter. Sexologies, Volume 27, Issue 4, October–December 2018, Pages e85-e95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sexol.2017.09.010
Summary: Up until today, with the exception of the Wiederman and Hurst study in 1998, no research has been done with regard to the relationship between women's sexual self-esteem, body mass index, physical satisfaction and body image. Through two studies done on adult women, our objective was to better understand the impact of physical satisfaction on women's sexual self-esteem as well as investigate the elements on which the latter is founded. Data from the first study seem to indicate that BMI would be correlated in a negative and moderate manner to women's sexual self-esteem. A clearer relationship, however, is observed between sexual self-esteem and body/physical satisfaction. Results from the second study indicate no relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem but they do, however, indicate a relationship between sexual self-esteem and body image/esteem. Furthermore, the most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile). Altogether, research results seem to suggest that “relationship to the body” may be central to women's conceptualization of sexual self-esteem.
Summary: Up until today, with the exception of the Wiederman and Hurst study in 1998, no research has been done with regard to the relationship between women's sexual self-esteem, body mass index, physical satisfaction and body image. Through two studies done on adult women, our objective was to better understand the impact of physical satisfaction on women's sexual self-esteem as well as investigate the elements on which the latter is founded. Data from the first study seem to indicate that BMI would be correlated in a negative and moderate manner to women's sexual self-esteem. A clearer relationship, however, is observed between sexual self-esteem and body/physical satisfaction. Results from the second study indicate no relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem but they do, however, indicate a relationship between sexual self-esteem and body image/esteem. Furthermore, the most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile). Altogether, research results seem to suggest that “relationship to the body” may be central to women's conceptualization of sexual self-esteem.
Friday, September 28, 2018
Participants recognized more studied items & more critical lures from gender-congruent categories than from gender-incongruent categories; gender expertise also has a “dark side” of increasing false memories
Positive and negative effects of gender expertise on episodic memory. Ainat Pansky et al. Memory & Cognition, https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13421-018-0863-z
Abstract: In two experiments, we examined the role of differential levels of knowledge between the genders in different domains, which we term gender expertise, in accounting for differences in episodic memory performance. In Experiment 1, we validated the assumption of differential gender expertise among men and women and selected the categories for the subsequent experiments. In Experiment 2, participants from both genders studied exemplars from these female-oriented, male-oriented, and gender-neutral categories and were tested after 24 hours on studied items, critical lures, and unrelated lures. A gender-congruity effect was found in terms of the recognition rates of both studied items and critical lures: Participants from each gender recognized more studied items and more critical lures from gender-congruent categories than from gender-incongruent categories. A parallel pattern of results was found for subjective confidence, supporting the notion that gender congruity enhanced the phenomenological experience that an item was studied. Our findings highlight the unique role of gender expertise in accounting for gender-congruity effects in episodic memory performance, using a well-defined operationalization of gender expertise. These findings show that in addition to benefits in terms of enhancing true memory, gender expertise also has a “dark side” of increasing false memories.
Abstract: In two experiments, we examined the role of differential levels of knowledge between the genders in different domains, which we term gender expertise, in accounting for differences in episodic memory performance. In Experiment 1, we validated the assumption of differential gender expertise among men and women and selected the categories for the subsequent experiments. In Experiment 2, participants from both genders studied exemplars from these female-oriented, male-oriented, and gender-neutral categories and were tested after 24 hours on studied items, critical lures, and unrelated lures. A gender-congruity effect was found in terms of the recognition rates of both studied items and critical lures: Participants from each gender recognized more studied items and more critical lures from gender-congruent categories than from gender-incongruent categories. A parallel pattern of results was found for subjective confidence, supporting the notion that gender congruity enhanced the phenomenological experience that an item was studied. Our findings highlight the unique role of gender expertise in accounting for gender-congruity effects in episodic memory performance, using a well-defined operationalization of gender expertise. These findings show that in addition to benefits in terms of enhancing true memory, gender expertise also has a “dark side” of increasing false memories.
Measuring human capital: a systematic analysis of 195 countries and territories, 1990-2016
Measuring human capital: a systematic analysis of 195 countries and territories, 1990-2016. Stephen S Lim, Rachel L Updike, Alexander S Kaldjian, Ryan M Barber, Krycia Cowling, Hunter York, Joseph Friedman, R Xu, Joanna L Whisnant, Heather J Taylor, Andrew T Leever, Yesenia Roman, Miranda F Bryant, Joseph Dieleman, Emmanuela Gakidou, Christopher J L Murray. The Lancet, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(18)31941-X
Summary
Background: Human capital is recognised as the level of education and health in a population and is considered an important determinant of economic growth. The World Bank has called for measurement and annual reporting of human capital to track and motivate investments in health and education and enhance productivity. We aim to provide a new comprehensive measure of human capital across countries globally.
Methods: We generated a period measure of expected human capital, defined for each birth cohort as the expected years lived from age 20 to 64 years and adjusted for educational attainment, learning or education quality, and functional health status using rates specific to each time period, age, and sex for 195 countries from 1990 to 2016. We estimated educational attainment using 2522 censuses and household surveys; we based learning estimates on 1894 tests among school-aged children; and we based functional health status on the prevalence of seven health conditions, which were taken from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 (GBD 2016). Mortality rates specific to location, age, and sex were also taken from GBD 2016.
Findings: In 2016, Finland had the highest level of expected human capital of 28·4 health, education, and learning- adjusted expected years lived between age 20 and 64 years (95% uncertainty interval 27·5-29·2); Niger had the lowest expected human capital of less than 1·6 years (0·98-2·6). In 2016, 44 countries had already achieved more than 20 years of expected human capital; 68 countries had expected human capital of less than 10 years. Of 195 countries, the ten most populous countries in 2016 for expected human capital were ranked: China at 44, India at 158, USA at 27, Indonesia at 131, Brazil at 71, Pakistan at 164, Nigeria at 171, Bangladesh at 161, Russia at 49, and Mexico at 104. Assessment of change in expected human capital from 1990 to 2016 shows marked variation from less than 2 years of progress in 18 countries to more than 5 years of progress in 35 countries. Larger improvements in expected human capital appear to be associated with faster economic growth. The top quartile of countries in terms of absolute change in human capital from 1990 to 2016 had a median annualised growth in gross domestic product of 2·60% (IQR 1·85.3·69) compared with 1·45% (0·18.2·19) for countries in the bottom quartile.
Interpretation: Countries vary widely in the rate of human capital formation. Monitoring the production of human capital can facilitate a mechanism to hold governments and donors accountable for investments in health and education.
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Human capital refers to the attributes of a population that, along with physical capital such as buildings, equipment, and other tangible assets, contribute to economic productivity. Human capital is characterised as the aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population, affecting the rate at which technologies can be developed, adopted, and employed to increase productivity.
My comment: In the background, first sentence, "Human capital is recognised as the level of education and health in a population," but in the second sentence in the paper, body, "Human capital is characterised as the aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population." It is much more complex to measure "aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population" than to measure just "the level of education and health in a population."
How this came to be? If you say that HC is education, training, skills, and health, is Cuba above Russia in human capital? Really? And North Korea above Egypt? Palestine above Iran? And Brunei above the UK, New Zealand, Italy and Israel? And Malta above China and Russia? What the reviewers say about these strange results?
Summary
Background: Human capital is recognised as the level of education and health in a population and is considered an important determinant of economic growth. The World Bank has called for measurement and annual reporting of human capital to track and motivate investments in health and education and enhance productivity. We aim to provide a new comprehensive measure of human capital across countries globally.
Methods: We generated a period measure of expected human capital, defined for each birth cohort as the expected years lived from age 20 to 64 years and adjusted for educational attainment, learning or education quality, and functional health status using rates specific to each time period, age, and sex for 195 countries from 1990 to 2016. We estimated educational attainment using 2522 censuses and household surveys; we based learning estimates on 1894 tests among school-aged children; and we based functional health status on the prevalence of seven health conditions, which were taken from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 (GBD 2016). Mortality rates specific to location, age, and sex were also taken from GBD 2016.
Findings: In 2016, Finland had the highest level of expected human capital of 28·4 health, education, and learning- adjusted expected years lived between age 20 and 64 years (95% uncertainty interval 27·5-29·2); Niger had the lowest expected human capital of less than 1·6 years (0·98-2·6). In 2016, 44 countries had already achieved more than 20 years of expected human capital; 68 countries had expected human capital of less than 10 years. Of 195 countries, the ten most populous countries in 2016 for expected human capital were ranked: China at 44, India at 158, USA at 27, Indonesia at 131, Brazil at 71, Pakistan at 164, Nigeria at 171, Bangladesh at 161, Russia at 49, and Mexico at 104. Assessment of change in expected human capital from 1990 to 2016 shows marked variation from less than 2 years of progress in 18 countries to more than 5 years of progress in 35 countries. Larger improvements in expected human capital appear to be associated with faster economic growth. The top quartile of countries in terms of absolute change in human capital from 1990 to 2016 had a median annualised growth in gross domestic product of 2·60% (IQR 1·85.3·69) compared with 1·45% (0·18.2·19) for countries in the bottom quartile.
Interpretation: Countries vary widely in the rate of human capital formation. Monitoring the production of human capital can facilitate a mechanism to hold governments and donors accountable for investments in health and education.
---
Human capital refers to the attributes of a population that, along with physical capital such as buildings, equipment, and other tangible assets, contribute to economic productivity. Human capital is characterised as the aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population, affecting the rate at which technologies can be developed, adopted, and employed to increase productivity.
My comment: In the background, first sentence, "Human capital is recognised as the level of education and health in a population," but in the second sentence in the paper, body, "Human capital is characterised as the aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population." It is much more complex to measure "aggregate levels of education, training, skills, and health in a population" than to measure just "the level of education and health in a population."
How this came to be? If you say that HC is education, training, skills, and health, is Cuba above Russia in human capital? Really? And North Korea above Egypt? Palestine above Iran? And Brunei above the UK, New Zealand, Italy and Israel? And Malta above China and Russia? What the reviewers say about these strange results?
Imagination inflation occurs when participants increase their certainty that they have experienced an event after they imagine the event occurring
Imagining Experiencing an Event in the Future Inflates Certainty That It Occurred in the Past. Dustin P. Calvillo et al. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, https://doi.org/10.1177/0276236618803308
Abstract: Imagination inflation occurs when participants increase their certainty that they have experienced an event after they imagine the event occurring. Two experiments (with a total of 291 participants) examined the effects of imagining events in the future on participants’ certainty they had experienced those events in the past. Participants rated their certainty in having experienced events and then imagined experiencing some of those events either in the future or in the past. One or two weeks later, participants completed certainty ratings a second time and completed some individual difference measures. In both imagination conditions (future and past), certainty ratings increased more for imagined events than for control events. Autobiographical memory specificity and self-concept clarity did not significantly predict this effect. These findings suggest that imagining events in the future makes people more certain that they have happened in the past.
Keywords: imagination inflation, episodic future thinking, autobiographical memory specificity, self-concept clarity
Abstract: Imagination inflation occurs when participants increase their certainty that they have experienced an event after they imagine the event occurring. Two experiments (with a total of 291 participants) examined the effects of imagining events in the future on participants’ certainty they had experienced those events in the past. Participants rated their certainty in having experienced events and then imagined experiencing some of those events either in the future or in the past. One or two weeks later, participants completed certainty ratings a second time and completed some individual difference measures. In both imagination conditions (future and past), certainty ratings increased more for imagined events than for control events. Autobiographical memory specificity and self-concept clarity did not significantly predict this effect. These findings suggest that imagining events in the future makes people more certain that they have happened in the past.
Keywords: imagination inflation, episodic future thinking, autobiographical memory specificity, self-concept clarity
Are People Attracted to Others Who Resemble Their Opposite-Sex Parents? An Examination of Mate Preferences and Parental Ethnicity Among Biracial Individuals
Are People Attracted to Others Who Resemble Their Opposite-Sex Parents? An Examination of Mate Preferences and Parental Ethnicity Among Biracial Individuals. Marie E. Heffernan, Jia Y. Chong, R. Chris Fraley. Social Psychological and Personality Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618794679
Abstract: It is generally believed that people tend to be attracted to and pair with others who resemble their opposite-sex parents. Studies 1A (n = 1,025) and 1B (n = 3,105) tested this assumption by examining whether biracial adults were more likely to be paired with partners who matched their opposite-sex parent’s ethnicity. Study 2 (n = 516) examined whether biracial adults were more likely to be attracted to targets whose ethnicity matched that of their opposite-sex parent. Although biracial adults were more likely to pair with and be attracted to others who resembled their parents compared to those who did not, the sex of the parent was largely inconsequential. These findings have implications for models of mate preferences, including the traditional perspectives (which assume that the opposite-sex parent has greater influence on adult mating preferences) and ethological models (which assume that the sex of the parent is irrelevant with regard to influence on mating preferences).
Keywords: romantic attraction, biracial individuals, mate preferences, close relationships
Abstract: It is generally believed that people tend to be attracted to and pair with others who resemble their opposite-sex parents. Studies 1A (n = 1,025) and 1B (n = 3,105) tested this assumption by examining whether biracial adults were more likely to be paired with partners who matched their opposite-sex parent’s ethnicity. Study 2 (n = 516) examined whether biracial adults were more likely to be attracted to targets whose ethnicity matched that of their opposite-sex parent. Although biracial adults were more likely to pair with and be attracted to others who resembled their parents compared to those who did not, the sex of the parent was largely inconsequential. These findings have implications for models of mate preferences, including the traditional perspectives (which assume that the opposite-sex parent has greater influence on adult mating preferences) and ethological models (which assume that the sex of the parent is irrelevant with regard to influence on mating preferences).
Keywords: romantic attraction, biracial individuals, mate preferences, close relationships
Indices of comparative cognition: assessing animal models of human brain function; learning algorithms can help to identify the most relevant species to model human brain function and dysfunction
Indices of comparative cognition: assessing animal models of human brain function. Sebastian D. McBride, A. Jennifer Morton. Experimental Brain Research, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00221-018-5370-8
Abstract: Understanding the cognitive capacities of animals is important, because (a) several animal models of human neurodegenerative disease are considered poor representatives of the human equivalent and (b) cognitive capacities may provide insight into alternative animal models. We used a three-stage process of cognitive and neuroanatomical comparison (using sheep as an example) to assess the appropriateness of a species to model human brain function. First, a cognitive task was defined via a reinforcement-learning algorithm where values/constants in the algorithm were taken as indirect measures of neurophysiological attributes. Second, cognitive data (values/constants) were generated for the example species (sheep) and compared to other species. Third, cognitive data were compared with neuroanatomical metrics for each species (endocranial volume, gyrification index, encephalisation quotient, and number of cortical neurons). Four breeds of sheep (n = 15/sheep) were tested using the two-choice discrimination-reversal task. The ‘reversal index’ was used as a measure of constants within the learning algorithm. Reversal index data ranked sheep as third in a table of species that included primates, dogs, and pigs. Across all species, number of cortical neurons correlated strongest against the reversal index (r2 = 0.66, p = 0.0075) followed by encephalization quotient (r2 = 0.42, p = 0.03), endocranial volume (r2 = 0.30, p = 0.08), and gyrification index (r2 = 0.16, p = 0.23). Sheep have a high predicted level of cognitive capacity and are thus a valid alternative model for neurodegenerative research. Using learning algorithms within cognitive tasks increases the resolution of methods of comparative cognition and can help to identify the most relevant species to model human brain function and dysfunction.
Keywords: Cognition Sheep Animal model Brain
Abstract: Understanding the cognitive capacities of animals is important, because (a) several animal models of human neurodegenerative disease are considered poor representatives of the human equivalent and (b) cognitive capacities may provide insight into alternative animal models. We used a three-stage process of cognitive and neuroanatomical comparison (using sheep as an example) to assess the appropriateness of a species to model human brain function. First, a cognitive task was defined via a reinforcement-learning algorithm where values/constants in the algorithm were taken as indirect measures of neurophysiological attributes. Second, cognitive data (values/constants) were generated for the example species (sheep) and compared to other species. Third, cognitive data were compared with neuroanatomical metrics for each species (endocranial volume, gyrification index, encephalisation quotient, and number of cortical neurons). Four breeds of sheep (n = 15/sheep) were tested using the two-choice discrimination-reversal task. The ‘reversal index’ was used as a measure of constants within the learning algorithm. Reversal index data ranked sheep as third in a table of species that included primates, dogs, and pigs. Across all species, number of cortical neurons correlated strongest against the reversal index (r2 = 0.66, p = 0.0075) followed by encephalization quotient (r2 = 0.42, p = 0.03), endocranial volume (r2 = 0.30, p = 0.08), and gyrification index (r2 = 0.16, p = 0.23). Sheep have a high predicted level of cognitive capacity and are thus a valid alternative model for neurodegenerative research. Using learning algorithms within cognitive tasks increases the resolution of methods of comparative cognition and can help to identify the most relevant species to model human brain function and dysfunction.
Keywords: Cognition Sheep Animal model Brain
Thursday, September 27, 2018
Monopolistic power alarm! Antidote: "Our findings, therefore, reconcile the increasing national role of large firms with falling local concentration, and a likely more competitive local environment"
Diverging Trends in National and Local Concentration. Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Pierre-Daniel Sarte, Nicholas Trachter. NBER Working Paper No. 25066, http://www.nber.org/papers/w25066.pdf
Abstract: Using U.S. NETS data, we present evidence that the positive trend observed in national product-market concentration between 1990 and 2014 becomes a negative trend when we focus on measures of local concentration. We document diverging trends for several geographic definitions of local markets. SIC 8 industries with diverging trends are pervasive across sectors. In these industries, top firms have contributed to the amplification of both trends. When a top firm opens a plant, local concentration declines and remains lower for at least 7 years. Our findings, therefore, reconcile the increasing national role of large firms with falling local concentration, and a likely more competitive local environment.
Abstract: Using U.S. NETS data, we present evidence that the positive trend observed in national product-market concentration between 1990 and 2014 becomes a negative trend when we focus on measures of local concentration. We document diverging trends for several geographic definitions of local markets. SIC 8 industries with diverging trends are pervasive across sectors. In these industries, top firms have contributed to the amplification of both trends. When a top firm opens a plant, local concentration declines and remains lower for at least 7 years. Our findings, therefore, reconcile the increasing national role of large firms with falling local concentration, and a likely more competitive local environment.
Psychotherapy: Rigorous training, supervision, trying the different methods, yield no improvement in more than forty years
The question of expertise in psychotherapy. Daryl Chow, Scott D. Miller, Mark A. Hubble. Journal of Expertise 2018. Vol. 1(2), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327572958
Abstract: Although it is well established that, on average, psychotherapy is effective, outcomes have remained flat for more than five decades. Since the 1990s, the effort to identify "empirically supported treatment" approaches has done little to alter this fact. Even more sobering, studies either fail to show therapists improve with specialized training or their outcomes steadily decline with time and experience. The aim of this paper is to illuminate how findings from the literature on expertise and expert performance illuminate new paths for the field of psychotherapy. Results to date point to new possibilities for helping practitioners realize improvements in the quality and outcome of their work.
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Excerpts:
In particular, the belief that “rigorous training” currently required for entering the field makes a difference in the quality and outcome of care practitioners provide. In the United States, doctoral training programs in psychology take between four and six years to complete [...] And yet, study after study reveals degreed professionals perform no better than students (Boswell, Castonguay, & Wasserman, 2010; Christensen & Jacobson,1994; Lambert & Ogles, 2004; Miller, Hubble, & Chow, in press). Millions are also spent annually on continuing education, including workshops, books, journals, instructional videos, and the like. Although mandatory for maintaining a license to practice, no evidence exists of any effect on results (Neimeyer, Taylor, & Wear, 2009; Webb, DeRubies, & Barber, 2010).
Another requirement for entering the field is working under the supervision of a senior clinician. While varying somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and discipline to discipline, approximately 3,000 hours of supervision is the norm (Caldwell, 2015). Nevertheless, after reviewing research spanning a century, Watkins (2011) writes: “We do not seem any more able to say now (as opposed to 30-years ago) that psychotherapy supervision contributes to patient outcome”
In hundreds of randomized controlled trials pitting one method against another, none proves superior [...] cognitive behavior therapy is compared with other bona fide approaches, such as interpersonal therapy, emotion-focused therapy, psychodynamic therapy, etc. Bona fide psychotherapies are treatments that are designed to be therapeutic, delivered by a trained therapists based on psychological principles, considered to be a viable form of treatment that has been presented to the psychotherapy community (i.e., via dedicated treatment manuals or books [Wampold et al., 1997]). Yet, training clinicians to use these approaches makes no difference in client outcomes (Rousmaniere, Goodyear, Miller, & Wampold, 2017).
As so much of conventional wisdom regarding what matters most for a good result has been shown to be immaterial, irrelevant, and inconsequential, it should come as no surprise that the overall outcome of psychotherapy has not improved in more than 40 years (Miller, Hubble, Chow, & Seidel, 2013). In their comprehensive review of the literature, Wampold and Imel (2015) report, “From the various meta‐analyses conducted . . . the aggregate effect size related to absolute efficacy is remarkably consistent” (p. 94).
Abstract: Although it is well established that, on average, psychotherapy is effective, outcomes have remained flat for more than five decades. Since the 1990s, the effort to identify "empirically supported treatment" approaches has done little to alter this fact. Even more sobering, studies either fail to show therapists improve with specialized training or their outcomes steadily decline with time and experience. The aim of this paper is to illuminate how findings from the literature on expertise and expert performance illuminate new paths for the field of psychotherapy. Results to date point to new possibilities for helping practitioners realize improvements in the quality and outcome of their work.
---
Excerpts:
In particular, the belief that “rigorous training” currently required for entering the field makes a difference in the quality and outcome of care practitioners provide. In the United States, doctoral training programs in psychology take between four and six years to complete [...] And yet, study after study reveals degreed professionals perform no better than students (Boswell, Castonguay, & Wasserman, 2010; Christensen & Jacobson,1994; Lambert & Ogles, 2004; Miller, Hubble, & Chow, in press). Millions are also spent annually on continuing education, including workshops, books, journals, instructional videos, and the like. Although mandatory for maintaining a license to practice, no evidence exists of any effect on results (Neimeyer, Taylor, & Wear, 2009; Webb, DeRubies, & Barber, 2010).
Another requirement for entering the field is working under the supervision of a senior clinician. While varying somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and discipline to discipline, approximately 3,000 hours of supervision is the norm (Caldwell, 2015). Nevertheless, after reviewing research spanning a century, Watkins (2011) writes: “We do not seem any more able to say now (as opposed to 30-years ago) that psychotherapy supervision contributes to patient outcome”
In hundreds of randomized controlled trials pitting one method against another, none proves superior [...] cognitive behavior therapy is compared with other bona fide approaches, such as interpersonal therapy, emotion-focused therapy, psychodynamic therapy, etc. Bona fide psychotherapies are treatments that are designed to be therapeutic, delivered by a trained therapists based on psychological principles, considered to be a viable form of treatment that has been presented to the psychotherapy community (i.e., via dedicated treatment manuals or books [Wampold et al., 1997]). Yet, training clinicians to use these approaches makes no difference in client outcomes (Rousmaniere, Goodyear, Miller, & Wampold, 2017).
As so much of conventional wisdom regarding what matters most for a good result has been shown to be immaterial, irrelevant, and inconsequential, it should come as no surprise that the overall outcome of psychotherapy has not improved in more than 40 years (Miller, Hubble, Chow, & Seidel, 2013). In their comprehensive review of the literature, Wampold and Imel (2015) report, “From the various meta‐analyses conducted . . . the aggregate effect size related to absolute efficacy is remarkably consistent” (p. 94).
Gender differences in climate change concern vary widely across countries; more affluent countries tend to have larger gender gaps in climate change concern; gender equality was not significant but vulnerability reduced the gap in some models
Explaining cross-national variation in the climate change concern gender gap: A research note. Kyle W. Knight. The Social Science Journal, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2018.08.013
Highlights
• Gender differences in climate change concern vary widely across countries.
• More affluent countries tend to have larger gender gaps in climate change concern.
• Gender equality was not significant but vulnerability reduced the gap in some models.
Abstract: Previous research has documented and investigated the gender gap in climate change concern (and environmental concern more generally) in the USA to understand why women tend to be more concerned about this issue than men. However, a largely missing element of the existing research on this topic is the role of macro-level context. The consideration of contextual factors is important because, as shown in this study, aggregate gender differences in climate change concern vary widely across countries. Drawing on prior research and using data from three international surveys, this cross-national study examines the influence of gender equality, climate change vulnerability, and national affluence on gender gaps in concern for climate change. Results from OLS and robust regression analyses indicate that national affluence is consistently associated with a larger gap (with women more concerned) and there is some evidence showing that climate change vulnerability is associated with a smaller gap in concern; however, gender equality was not found to be a consistent significant predictor of the gender gap in climate change concern (although in bivariate correlations it was significant and positive). The finding that the USA pattern of substantially higher concern among women is not universal across countries, but rather is context-specific, opens up new directions for theorizing about how gender shapes concern for climate change and, more broadly, risk perception and environmental attitudes. Future research should build on this study to examine potential pathways linking macro-level context to gender differences in climate change concern at the individual level.
Highlights
• Gender differences in climate change concern vary widely across countries.
• More affluent countries tend to have larger gender gaps in climate change concern.
• Gender equality was not significant but vulnerability reduced the gap in some models.
Abstract: Previous research has documented and investigated the gender gap in climate change concern (and environmental concern more generally) in the USA to understand why women tend to be more concerned about this issue than men. However, a largely missing element of the existing research on this topic is the role of macro-level context. The consideration of contextual factors is important because, as shown in this study, aggregate gender differences in climate change concern vary widely across countries. Drawing on prior research and using data from three international surveys, this cross-national study examines the influence of gender equality, climate change vulnerability, and national affluence on gender gaps in concern for climate change. Results from OLS and robust regression analyses indicate that national affluence is consistently associated with a larger gap (with women more concerned) and there is some evidence showing that climate change vulnerability is associated with a smaller gap in concern; however, gender equality was not found to be a consistent significant predictor of the gender gap in climate change concern (although in bivariate correlations it was significant and positive). The finding that the USA pattern of substantially higher concern among women is not universal across countries, but rather is context-specific, opens up new directions for theorizing about how gender shapes concern for climate change and, more broadly, risk perception and environmental attitudes. Future research should build on this study to examine potential pathways linking macro-level context to gender differences in climate change concern at the individual level.
People Believe and Behave as if Consumers of Natural Foods Are Especially Virtuous
People Believe and Behave as if Consumers of Natural Foods Are Especially Virtuous. Zoe Taylor and Richard J. Stevenson. Front. Psychol., 27 September 2018 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01823
Abstract: We examined here whether people believe consumers of natural foods are more virtuous than consumers of unnatural foods. In Study 1, we asked student participants (n = 84; 77 female, M age = 19.5) to form an impression of another person based solely upon whether they ate natural or unnatural foods, these being determined in a pilot survey. On an open-response format, participants reported more positive moral and health traits in consumers of natural foods. These findings were further confirmed using rating-based evaluations. In Study 2, we determined if this belief in the virtuousness of natural food consumers translated into behavior. Student participants (n = 40; 25 female, M age = 20.2) played a trust game, exchanging tokens with a fictitious player. Incidental diet information about the fictitious player was provided, with participants in one group playing against a natural food consumer and those in another against an unnatural food consumer. Participants who played against a natural food consumer behaved as if they trusted this person more, and their performance on the game was predicted by how moral they felt the fictitious player was, but not by other attributes such as health. These findings suggest that people believe consumers of natural food are more virtuous, and we suggest this is driven by the altruistic attitudes that people believe to be associated with natural food consumption.
Abstract: We examined here whether people believe consumers of natural foods are more virtuous than consumers of unnatural foods. In Study 1, we asked student participants (n = 84; 77 female, M age = 19.5) to form an impression of another person based solely upon whether they ate natural or unnatural foods, these being determined in a pilot survey. On an open-response format, participants reported more positive moral and health traits in consumers of natural foods. These findings were further confirmed using rating-based evaluations. In Study 2, we determined if this belief in the virtuousness of natural food consumers translated into behavior. Student participants (n = 40; 25 female, M age = 20.2) played a trust game, exchanging tokens with a fictitious player. Incidental diet information about the fictitious player was provided, with participants in one group playing against a natural food consumer and those in another against an unnatural food consumer. Participants who played against a natural food consumer behaved as if they trusted this person more, and their performance on the game was predicted by how moral they felt the fictitious player was, but not by other attributes such as health. These findings suggest that people believe consumers of natural food are more virtuous, and we suggest this is driven by the altruistic attitudes that people believe to be associated with natural food consumption.
Wednesday, September 26, 2018
In Sweden’s Preschools, Boys Learn to Dance and Girls Learn to Yell
In Sweden’s Preschools, Boys Learn to Dance and Girls Learn to Yell. Ellen Barry. The New York Times, Mar 24 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/world/europe/sweden-gender-neutral-preschools.html
STOCKHOLM — Something was wrong with the Penguins, the incoming class of toddlers at the Seafarer’s Preschool, in a wooded suburb south of Stockholm.
The boys were clamorous and physical. They shouted and hit. The girls held up their arms and whimpered to be picked up. The group of 1- and 2-year-olds had, in other words, split along traditional gender lines. And at this school, that is not O.K.
Their teachers cleared the room of cars and dolls. They put the boys in charge of the play kitchen. They made the girls practice shouting “No!” Then they decided to open a proper investigation, erecting video cameras in the classroom.
Science may still be divided over whether gender differences are rooted in biology or culture, but many of Sweden’s government-funded preschools are doing what they can to deconstruct them. State curriculum urges teachers and principals to embrace their role as social engineers, requiring them to “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns.”
It is normal, in many Swedish preschools, for teachers to avoid referring to their students’ gender — instead of “boys and girls,” they say “friends,” or call children by name. Play is organized to prevent children from sorting themselves by gender. A gender-neutral pronoun, “hen,” was introduced in 2012 and was swiftly absorbed into mainstream Swedish culture, something that, linguists say, has never happened in another country.
One of the few peer-reviewed efforts to examine the method’s effects, published last year in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, concluded that some behaviors do go away when students attend what the study called “gender-neutral” preschools.
For instance, the children at these schools do not show a strong preference for playmates of the same gender, and are less likely to make assumptions based on stereotypes. Yet, the scientists found no difference at all in the children’s tendency to notice gender, suggesting that may be under a genetic influence.
At the Seafarer’s Preschool, the effort sometimes has the feeling of a venture into uncharted territory.
On a recent Friday in Hammarbyhojden, south of Stockholm, Elis Storesund, the school’s in-house gender expert, sat bent over a work sheet with two teachers of the 4- and 5-year-old Seagulls, reviewing their progress on gender objectives.
“When we are drawing,” said Melisa Esteka, 31, one of the teachers, “we see that the girls — they draw a lot — they draw girls with lots of makeup and long eyelashes. It’s very clear that they are girls. We ask, ‘Don’t boys have eyelashes?’ And they say, ‘We know it is not like that in real life.’”
Ms. Storesund, 54, nodded thoughtfully. “They are trying to understand what it is to be a girl,” she said.
Ms. Esteka looked frustrated. She had set a goal for herself: To stop the children from identifying things as “for girls” or “for boys.” But lately, her students were absorbing stereotypes from billboards and cartoons, and sometimes it seemed like all the slow, systematic work of the Seafarer’s Preschool was flying away overnight.
“There is so much they bring with them,” she said. “They bring the whole world with them. We can’t stop that from happening.”
Sweden’s experiment in gender-neutral preschools began in 1996 in Trodje, a small town near the edge of the Baltic Sea. The man who started it, Ingemar Gens, was not an educator but a journalist who dabbled in anthropology and gender theory, having studied Swedish men seeking mail-order brides in Thailand. Newly appointed as a district “equal opportunity expert,” Mr. Gens wanted to break down the norm of stoic, unemotional Swedish masculinity.
Preschool struck him as the right place to do this. Swedish children spend much of their early life in government-funded preschools, which offer care at nominal cost for up to 12 hours a day starting at the age of 1.
Two schools rolled out what was called a compensatory gender strategy. Boys and girls at the preschools were separated for part of the day and coached in traits associated with the other gender. Boys massaged each other’s feet. Girls were led in barefoot walks in the snow, and told to throw open the window and scream.
“We tried to do that — to educate boys in what girls already knew, and vice versa,” said Mr. Gens, now 68. A wave of criticism broke over him, but that was expected.
“They said we were indoctrinating the kids,” he said. “I say we’re always indoctrinating kids. Bringing them up is indoctrination.”
Teachers were required to review videotapes of themselves with the children, to identify subtle differences in the way they interacted with boys and girls. Many found that they used more words, and more complex sentences, with girls.
Helena Baggstrom, who taught at one of the schools, recalled watching footage of herself in a cloakroom, attending to children as they bundled up to go outside. She saw, to her shock, that she had helped one boy after another get dressed and run out the door. The girls, she realized, were expected to dress themselves.
“It was hard at first to see patterns,” she said. “We saw more and more, and we were horrified at what we saw.”
The strategy of separating boys and girls was later set aside in favor of a “gender neutral” approach intent on muting differences. Still, the spirit of Mr. Gens’s experiment had percolated through the government. In 1998, Sweden added new language to its national curriculum requiring that all preschools “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns” and encourage children to explore “outside the limitations of stereotyped gender roles.”
Traditionalists have raised occasional protests, complaining of liberal brainwashing. The far-right Sweden Democrats party, which won about 13 percent of the vote in 2014, has promised to roll back teaching that “seeks to change all children and young people’s behavior and gender identity.”
But in a political environment deeply split over immigration, gender-equality policies enjoy the support of Sweden’s largest parties, the center-left Social Democrats and the center-right Moderates.
A columnist and mathematician named Tanja Bergkvist, one of the few figures who routinely attacks what she calls “Sweden’s gender madness,” says many Swedes are uncomfortable with the practice but are afraid to criticize it in public.
“They don’t want to be regarded as against equality,” she said. “Nobody wants to be against equality.”
In Trodje, the first wave of preschoolers to attend gender-neutral preschools are now 20-somethings.
Elin Gerdin, 26, part of that first wave, is studying to be a teacher. In appearance she is conventionally feminine, her long dark hair coaxed into spirals with a curling iron. This is something she points out — that in appearance she is conventionally feminine. It is the first sign that she views gender as something you could put on or take off, like a raincoat.
“This is a choice I have made because this is me,” she said of her appearance. “And this is me because I am a product of society.”
There are moments when her early education comes back to her in flashes.
Ms. Gerdin’s friends have begun to have babies, and they post pictures of them on Facebook, swathed in blue or pink, in society’s first act of sorting. Ms. Gerdin gets upset when this happens. She feels sorry for the children. She makes it a point to seek her friends out and tell them, earnestly, that they are making a mistake. This feels to her like a responsibility.
“We are a group of children who will grow up, and we will have children, and we will talk to them about this,” she said. “It is not easy to change a whole society.”
That process was just beginning at the Seafarer’s Preschool on a recent morning, when the children scrambled out of voluminous snowsuits. Underneath his, Otto, a sturdy 3-year-old, was wearing a dress.
Otto prefers to wear dresses because he likes the way they fan out when he spins around, and it does not make him unusual here. Up until now, no one in Otto’s life — not his grandparents, or babysitters, or fellow 3-year-olds — has told him that boys do not wear dresses, said his mother, Lena Christiansson, 36, matter-of-factly. She would like this to continue as long as possible.
This expectation has become increasingly common, said Ms. Storesund, the Seafarer’s gender specialist.
“Now, parents ask us, ‘What are you doing about gender?’” she said.
Ms. Storesund is on hand to confront classroom dilemmas: When boys in the group for 3-year-olds refused to paint, or dance, and the group threatened to split along gender lines, she was brought in to unpack the problem, tinkering with the activities until she coaxed the boys back to equal participation.
Preserving a gender-neutral environment is not simple. Carina Sevebjork Saur, 57, who has been teaching at the school for a year and a half, said she often catches herself saying the wrong thing, like an offhand compliment on a child’s appearance.
“You are on your way to saying something, as a reflex, but you have to hold it back,” she said. “You can comment on clothes in other ways: ‘Oh, my goodness, how many polka dots!’”
The effort is compensated, teachers said, by the impression that they are unraveling mysteries, and as spring approached, some changes could be observed among the Penguins.
One of the group’s teachers, Izabell Sandberg, 26, noticed a shift in a 2-year-old girl whose parents dropped her off wearing tights and pale-pink dresses. The girl focused intently on staying clean. If another child took her toys, she would whimper.
“She accepted everything,” Ms. Sandberg said. “And I thought this was very girlie. It was like she was apologizing for taking up space.”
Until, that is, a recent morning, when the girl had put a hat on and carefully arranged bags around herself, preparing to set off on an imaginary expedition. When a classmate tried to walk off with one of her bags, the girl held out the palm of her hand and shouted “No” at such a high volume that Ms. Sandberg’s head swiveled around.
It was something they had been practicing.
By the time March rolled round, the girl had gotten so loud that she drowned out the boys in the class, Ms. Sandberg said. At the end of the day, she was messy. The girl’s parents were less than delighted, she said, and reported that she had become cheeky and defiant at home.
But Ms. Sandberg has plenty of experience explaining the mission to parents.
“This is what we do here, and we are not going to stop it,” she said.
Christina Anderson contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on March 25, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: In Sweden, Preschools Teach Boys to Dance, and Girls to Yell.
STOCKHOLM — Something was wrong with the Penguins, the incoming class of toddlers at the Seafarer’s Preschool, in a wooded suburb south of Stockholm.
The boys were clamorous and physical. They shouted and hit. The girls held up their arms and whimpered to be picked up. The group of 1- and 2-year-olds had, in other words, split along traditional gender lines. And at this school, that is not O.K.
Their teachers cleared the room of cars and dolls. They put the boys in charge of the play kitchen. They made the girls practice shouting “No!” Then they decided to open a proper investigation, erecting video cameras in the classroom.
Science may still be divided over whether gender differences are rooted in biology or culture, but many of Sweden’s government-funded preschools are doing what they can to deconstruct them. State curriculum urges teachers and principals to embrace their role as social engineers, requiring them to “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns.”
It is normal, in many Swedish preschools, for teachers to avoid referring to their students’ gender — instead of “boys and girls,” they say “friends,” or call children by name. Play is organized to prevent children from sorting themselves by gender. A gender-neutral pronoun, “hen,” was introduced in 2012 and was swiftly absorbed into mainstream Swedish culture, something that, linguists say, has never happened in another country.
One of the few peer-reviewed efforts to examine the method’s effects, published last year in the Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, concluded that some behaviors do go away when students attend what the study called “gender-neutral” preschools.
For instance, the children at these schools do not show a strong preference for playmates of the same gender, and are less likely to make assumptions based on stereotypes. Yet, the scientists found no difference at all in the children’s tendency to notice gender, suggesting that may be under a genetic influence.
At the Seafarer’s Preschool, the effort sometimes has the feeling of a venture into uncharted territory.
On a recent Friday in Hammarbyhojden, south of Stockholm, Elis Storesund, the school’s in-house gender expert, sat bent over a work sheet with two teachers of the 4- and 5-year-old Seagulls, reviewing their progress on gender objectives.
“When we are drawing,” said Melisa Esteka, 31, one of the teachers, “we see that the girls — they draw a lot — they draw girls with lots of makeup and long eyelashes. It’s very clear that they are girls. We ask, ‘Don’t boys have eyelashes?’ And they say, ‘We know it is not like that in real life.’”
Ms. Storesund, 54, nodded thoughtfully. “They are trying to understand what it is to be a girl,” she said.
Ms. Esteka looked frustrated. She had set a goal for herself: To stop the children from identifying things as “for girls” or “for boys.” But lately, her students were absorbing stereotypes from billboards and cartoons, and sometimes it seemed like all the slow, systematic work of the Seafarer’s Preschool was flying away overnight.
“There is so much they bring with them,” she said. “They bring the whole world with them. We can’t stop that from happening.”
Sweden’s experiment in gender-neutral preschools began in 1996 in Trodje, a small town near the edge of the Baltic Sea. The man who started it, Ingemar Gens, was not an educator but a journalist who dabbled in anthropology and gender theory, having studied Swedish men seeking mail-order brides in Thailand. Newly appointed as a district “equal opportunity expert,” Mr. Gens wanted to break down the norm of stoic, unemotional Swedish masculinity.
Preschool struck him as the right place to do this. Swedish children spend much of their early life in government-funded preschools, which offer care at nominal cost for up to 12 hours a day starting at the age of 1.
Two schools rolled out what was called a compensatory gender strategy. Boys and girls at the preschools were separated for part of the day and coached in traits associated with the other gender. Boys massaged each other’s feet. Girls were led in barefoot walks in the snow, and told to throw open the window and scream.
“We tried to do that — to educate boys in what girls already knew, and vice versa,” said Mr. Gens, now 68. A wave of criticism broke over him, but that was expected.
“They said we were indoctrinating the kids,” he said. “I say we’re always indoctrinating kids. Bringing them up is indoctrination.”
Teachers were required to review videotapes of themselves with the children, to identify subtle differences in the way they interacted with boys and girls. Many found that they used more words, and more complex sentences, with girls.
Helena Baggstrom, who taught at one of the schools, recalled watching footage of herself in a cloakroom, attending to children as they bundled up to go outside. She saw, to her shock, that she had helped one boy after another get dressed and run out the door. The girls, she realized, were expected to dress themselves.
“It was hard at first to see patterns,” she said. “We saw more and more, and we were horrified at what we saw.”
The strategy of separating boys and girls was later set aside in favor of a “gender neutral” approach intent on muting differences. Still, the spirit of Mr. Gens’s experiment had percolated through the government. In 1998, Sweden added new language to its national curriculum requiring that all preschools “counteract traditional gender roles and gender patterns” and encourage children to explore “outside the limitations of stereotyped gender roles.”
Traditionalists have raised occasional protests, complaining of liberal brainwashing. The far-right Sweden Democrats party, which won about 13 percent of the vote in 2014, has promised to roll back teaching that “seeks to change all children and young people’s behavior and gender identity.”
But in a political environment deeply split over immigration, gender-equality policies enjoy the support of Sweden’s largest parties, the center-left Social Democrats and the center-right Moderates.
A columnist and mathematician named Tanja Bergkvist, one of the few figures who routinely attacks what she calls “Sweden’s gender madness,” says many Swedes are uncomfortable with the practice but are afraid to criticize it in public.
“They don’t want to be regarded as against equality,” she said. “Nobody wants to be against equality.”
In Trodje, the first wave of preschoolers to attend gender-neutral preschools are now 20-somethings.
Elin Gerdin, 26, part of that first wave, is studying to be a teacher. In appearance she is conventionally feminine, her long dark hair coaxed into spirals with a curling iron. This is something she points out — that in appearance she is conventionally feminine. It is the first sign that she views gender as something you could put on or take off, like a raincoat.
“This is a choice I have made because this is me,” she said of her appearance. “And this is me because I am a product of society.”
There are moments when her early education comes back to her in flashes.
Ms. Gerdin’s friends have begun to have babies, and they post pictures of them on Facebook, swathed in blue or pink, in society’s first act of sorting. Ms. Gerdin gets upset when this happens. She feels sorry for the children. She makes it a point to seek her friends out and tell them, earnestly, that they are making a mistake. This feels to her like a responsibility.
“We are a group of children who will grow up, and we will have children, and we will talk to them about this,” she said. “It is not easy to change a whole society.”
That process was just beginning at the Seafarer’s Preschool on a recent morning, when the children scrambled out of voluminous snowsuits. Underneath his, Otto, a sturdy 3-year-old, was wearing a dress.
Otto prefers to wear dresses because he likes the way they fan out when he spins around, and it does not make him unusual here. Up until now, no one in Otto’s life — not his grandparents, or babysitters, or fellow 3-year-olds — has told him that boys do not wear dresses, said his mother, Lena Christiansson, 36, matter-of-factly. She would like this to continue as long as possible.
This expectation has become increasingly common, said Ms. Storesund, the Seafarer’s gender specialist.
“Now, parents ask us, ‘What are you doing about gender?’” she said.
Ms. Storesund is on hand to confront classroom dilemmas: When boys in the group for 3-year-olds refused to paint, or dance, and the group threatened to split along gender lines, she was brought in to unpack the problem, tinkering with the activities until she coaxed the boys back to equal participation.
Preserving a gender-neutral environment is not simple. Carina Sevebjork Saur, 57, who has been teaching at the school for a year and a half, said she often catches herself saying the wrong thing, like an offhand compliment on a child’s appearance.
“You are on your way to saying something, as a reflex, but you have to hold it back,” she said. “You can comment on clothes in other ways: ‘Oh, my goodness, how many polka dots!’”
The effort is compensated, teachers said, by the impression that they are unraveling mysteries, and as spring approached, some changes could be observed among the Penguins.
One of the group’s teachers, Izabell Sandberg, 26, noticed a shift in a 2-year-old girl whose parents dropped her off wearing tights and pale-pink dresses. The girl focused intently on staying clean. If another child took her toys, she would whimper.
“She accepted everything,” Ms. Sandberg said. “And I thought this was very girlie. It was like she was apologizing for taking up space.”
Until, that is, a recent morning, when the girl had put a hat on and carefully arranged bags around herself, preparing to set off on an imaginary expedition. When a classmate tried to walk off with one of her bags, the girl held out the palm of her hand and shouted “No” at such a high volume that Ms. Sandberg’s head swiveled around.
It was something they had been practicing.
By the time March rolled round, the girl had gotten so loud that she drowned out the boys in the class, Ms. Sandberg said. At the end of the day, she was messy. The girl’s parents were less than delighted, she said, and reported that she had become cheeky and defiant at home.
But Ms. Sandberg has plenty of experience explaining the mission to parents.
“This is what we do here, and we are not going to stop it,” she said.
Christina Anderson contributed reporting.
A version of this article appears in print on March 25, 2018, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: In Sweden, Preschools Teach Boys to Dance, and Girls to Yell.
Moral reasoning / In S Thompson-Schill (Ed.), Language & Thought. Volume 3 of Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Moral reasoning. Lily Tsoi and Liane Young. In S Thompson-Schill (Ed.), Language & Thought. Volume 3 of Stevens' Handbook of Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience (4th ed.). http://moralitylab.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Tsoi_2018_Stevens_moral_reasoning.pdf
Abstract: Understanding people’s minds is essential for effectively navigating our social world. This chapter focuses on the capacity to attribute and reason about minds (theory of mind; ToM) and its role in moral cognition. The section on moral judgment focuses on the circumstances in which people rely on mental states for moral judgments and how ToM may differ depending on the moral domain. We provide a functional explanation for these patterns of mental state reasoning that contrasts the need to regulate interpersonal relations with the need to protect the self. The section on moral behavior focuses on interactions with moral agents (e.g., friends, foes, ingroups, outgroups). We examine how ToM is deployed during two fundamental social contexts (i.e., cooperation and competition) and elaborate on the circumstances in which people fail to consider the minds of others. We end by providing some evidence that ToM can improve interpersonal and intergroup relations.
Key Terms: morality, theory of mind, mentalizing, cooperation, competition, dehumanization, social cognition
Check also: The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions. James A. Dungan, Alek Chakroff, and Liane Young. PLoS One. 2017; 12(3): e0173405. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5344389/
Abstract: Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.
Abstract: Understanding people’s minds is essential for effectively navigating our social world. This chapter focuses on the capacity to attribute and reason about minds (theory of mind; ToM) and its role in moral cognition. The section on moral judgment focuses on the circumstances in which people rely on mental states for moral judgments and how ToM may differ depending on the moral domain. We provide a functional explanation for these patterns of mental state reasoning that contrasts the need to regulate interpersonal relations with the need to protect the self. The section on moral behavior focuses on interactions with moral agents (e.g., friends, foes, ingroups, outgroups). We examine how ToM is deployed during two fundamental social contexts (i.e., cooperation and competition) and elaborate on the circumstances in which people fail to consider the minds of others. We end by providing some evidence that ToM can improve interpersonal and intergroup relations.
Key Terms: morality, theory of mind, mentalizing, cooperation, competition, dehumanization, social cognition
Check also: The relevance of moral norms in distinct relational contexts: Purity versus harm norms regulate self-directed actions. James A. Dungan, Alek Chakroff, and Liane Young. PLoS One. 2017; 12(3): e0173405. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5344389/
Abstract: Recent efforts to partition the space of morality have focused on the descriptive content of distinct moral domains (e.g., harm versus purity), or alternatively, the relationship between the perpetrator and victim of moral violations. Across three studies, we demonstrate that harm and purity norms are relevant in distinct relational contexts. Moral judgments of purity violations, compared to harm violations, are relatively more sensitive to the negative impact perpetrators have on themselves versus other victims (Study 1). This pattern replicates across a wide array of harm and purity violations varying in severity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, while perceptions of harm predict moral judgment consistently across relational contexts, perceptions of purity predict moral judgment more for self-directed actions, where perpetrators violate themselves, compared to dyadic actions, where perpetrators violate other victims (Study 3). Together, these studies reveal how an action’s content and its relational context interact to influence moral judgment, providing novel insights into the adaptive functions of harm and purity norms.
In order to be loved, you also have to be feared; the idea that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism
Bruno Maçães on the Spirit of Adventure (Ep. 50). Tyler Cowen, Sep 2018, https://medium.com/conversations-with-tyler/bruno-ma%C3%A7%C3%A3es-tyler-cowen-eurasia-adventure-liberalism-81e4d51340d0
Bruno Maçães, senior advisor at Flint Global is author of The Dawn of Eurasia — On the Trail of the New World Order [https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/305712/the-dawn-of-eurasia/9780241309254.html]
MAÇÃES: This raises deep philosophical questions and political questions. If you want Turkey to become like Europe, then you have to project European power across Turkey. If Europe no longer has that ability, then you shouldn’t be surprised that Turkey looks elsewhere.
It’s very simple. I think I say in the book that in order to be loved, you also have to be feared. This idea that you find in Europe now, that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism. I just cannot see that happen.
COWEN: So Europe lacks the spirit of adventure.
MAÇÃES: That is certainly the case. I think you see that. One of the areas where the spirit of adventure today is more relevant and important is technology. You see in Europe the idea that technology’s against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit, which I think is a good example of how adventure has disappeared from the European psyche.
Bruno Maçães, senior advisor at Flint Global is author of The Dawn of Eurasia — On the Trail of the New World Order [https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/305712/the-dawn-of-eurasia/9780241309254.html]
MAÇÃES: This raises deep philosophical questions and political questions. If you want Turkey to become like Europe, then you have to project European power across Turkey. If Europe no longer has that ability, then you shouldn’t be surprised that Turkey looks elsewhere.
It’s very simple. I think I say in the book that in order to be loved, you also have to be feared. This idea that you find in Europe now, that without projecting any kind of power, other countries will be attracted to the European model, that’s a form of utopianism. I just cannot see that happen.
COWEN: So Europe lacks the spirit of adventure.
MAÇÃES: That is certainly the case. I think you see that. One of the areas where the spirit of adventure today is more relevant and important is technology. You see in Europe the idea that technology’s against us, and we should resist this rather than embrace it. A very negative spirit, which I think is a good example of how adventure has disappeared from the European psyche.
A higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk; this holds for both men & women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education
Higher divorce risk when mates are plentiful? Evidence from Denmark. Caroline Uggla, Gunnar Andersson. Royal Society Biology Letters, DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2018.0475
Abstract: Work from social and biological sciences has shown that adult sex ratios are associated with relationship behaviours. When partners are abundant, opportunities for mate switching may increase and relationship stability decrease. To date, most of the human literature has used regional areas at various levels of aggregation to define partner markets. But, in developed countries, many individuals of reproductive age spend a considerable amount of time outside their residential areas, and other measures may better capture the opportunities to meet a (new) partner. Here, we use Danish register data to test whether the sex ratio of the occupational sector is linked to divorce. Our data cover individuals in Denmark who married during 1981–2002 and we control for age at and duration of marriage, education and parity. Results support the prediction that a higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk. This holds for both men and women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education. Our results highlight the need to study demographic behaviours of men and women simultaneously, and to consider partner markets beyond geographical areas so that differing strategies for males and females may be examined.
Abstract: Work from social and biological sciences has shown that adult sex ratios are associated with relationship behaviours. When partners are abundant, opportunities for mate switching may increase and relationship stability decrease. To date, most of the human literature has used regional areas at various levels of aggregation to define partner markets. But, in developed countries, many individuals of reproductive age spend a considerable amount of time outside their residential areas, and other measures may better capture the opportunities to meet a (new) partner. Here, we use Danish register data to test whether the sex ratio of the occupational sector is linked to divorce. Our data cover individuals in Denmark who married during 1981–2002 and we control for age at and duration of marriage, education and parity. Results support the prediction that a higher proportion of opposite-sex individuals in one's occupational sector is associated with higher divorce risk. This holds for both men and women, but associations are somewhat stronger for men and vary by education. Our results highlight the need to study demographic behaviours of men and women simultaneously, and to consider partner markets beyond geographical areas so that differing strategies for males and females may be examined.
The environmental costs and benefits of high-yield farming
The environmental costs and benefits of high-yield farming. Andrew Balmford et al. Nature Sustainability, volume 1, pages477–485 (2018). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41893-018-0138-5
Abstract: How we manage farming and food systems to meet rising demand is pivotal to the future of biodiversity. Extensive field data suggest that impacts on wild populations would be greatly reduced through boosting yields on existing farmland so as to spare remaining natural habitats. High-yield farming raises other concerns because expressed per unit area it can generate high levels of externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient losses. However, such metrics underestimate the overall impacts of lower-yield systems. Here we develop a framework that instead compares externality and land costs per unit production. We apply this framework to diverse data sets that describe the externalities of four major farm sectors and reveal that, rather than involving trade-offs, the externality and land costs of alternative production systems can covary positively: per unit production, land-efficient systems often produce lower externalities. For greenhouse gas emissions, these associations become more strongly positive once forgone sequestration is included. Our conclusions are limited: remarkably few studies report externalities alongside yields; many important externalities and farming systems are inadequately measured; and realizing the environmental benefits of high-yield systems typically requires additional measures to limit farmland expansion. Nevertheless, our results suggest that trade-offs among key cost metrics are not as ubiquitous as sometimes perceived.
Abstract: How we manage farming and food systems to meet rising demand is pivotal to the future of biodiversity. Extensive field data suggest that impacts on wild populations would be greatly reduced through boosting yields on existing farmland so as to spare remaining natural habitats. High-yield farming raises other concerns because expressed per unit area it can generate high levels of externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient losses. However, such metrics underestimate the overall impacts of lower-yield systems. Here we develop a framework that instead compares externality and land costs per unit production. We apply this framework to diverse data sets that describe the externalities of four major farm sectors and reveal that, rather than involving trade-offs, the externality and land costs of alternative production systems can covary positively: per unit production, land-efficient systems often produce lower externalities. For greenhouse gas emissions, these associations become more strongly positive once forgone sequestration is included. Our conclusions are limited: remarkably few studies report externalities alongside yields; many important externalities and farming systems are inadequately measured; and realizing the environmental benefits of high-yield systems typically requires additional measures to limit farmland expansion. Nevertheless, our results suggest that trade-offs among key cost metrics are not as ubiquitous as sometimes perceived.
A Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor
Explaining Differing Tastes in the Humor of Liberals and Conservatives. Todd L. Belt, Hawaii Univ. https://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/papers/docs/belt2018.pdf
Abstract: This paper explains how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a theory that explains these differences by matching psychological theories of humor to political science theories that explain personality traits of liberalism and conservatism. The secondary contribution involves the empirical testing of hypotheses are then drawn from this theory using data from 400 humorous still images collected by the author and the Library of Congress during the 2016 election cycle. The results indicate that a Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of differing tastes in political humor for future political discourse and civility.
Abstract: This paper explains how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a theory that explains these differences by matching psychological theories of humor to political science theories that explain personality traits of liberalism and conservatism. The secondary contribution involves the empirical testing of hypotheses are then drawn from this theory using data from 400 humorous still images collected by the author and the Library of Congress during the 2016 election cycle. The results indicate that a Freudian explanation of the development of superego structures that prioritize law/crime, security, tradition, and progress, distinguish how liberals and conservatives differ in their tastes in humor. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of differing tastes in political humor for future political discourse and civility.
Sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter; sexism played a role in Clinton's electoral loss, & she correctly characterized sexism as endemic (especially on the left)
Why Pillory Hillary? Testing the endemic sexism hypothesis regarding the 2016 U.S. election. Valerie Rothwell, Gordon Hodson, Elvira Prusaczyk. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 138, 1 February 2019, Pages 106-108. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.09.034
Abstract: The present study used nationally representative American National Election Studies (ANES) data to examine the potential role of sexism in the 2016 presidential election. We hypothesized not only that sexism would predict voting for Trump (vs. Clinton), but that its role would be stronger on the political left (vs. right). The sample consisted of 1916 Clinton or Trump voters (51.41% women; Mage = 51.78, SD = 17.16; 79.5% White) who completed measures of political ideology and hostile sexism. Greater conservatism or sexism significantly predicted voting for Trump (vs. Clinton). As expected, sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter. Not only was Clinton correct that sexism played a role in her electoral loss, but she correctly characterized sexism as endemic, an influence especially perceptible on the left.
Abstract: The present study used nationally representative American National Election Studies (ANES) data to examine the potential role of sexism in the 2016 presidential election. We hypothesized not only that sexism would predict voting for Trump (vs. Clinton), but that its role would be stronger on the political left (vs. right). The sample consisted of 1916 Clinton or Trump voters (51.41% women; Mage = 51.78, SD = 17.16; 79.5% White) who completed measures of political ideology and hostile sexism. Greater conservatism or sexism significantly predicted voting for Trump (vs. Clinton). As expected, sexism was a significantly stronger predictor of voting for Trump the more left-leaning (vs. right-leaning) the voter. Not only was Clinton correct that sexism played a role in her electoral loss, but she correctly characterized sexism as endemic, an influence especially perceptible on the left.
There is a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, & greater same-sex attraction (female–female) vs a negative effect of lower income levels & more offspring
Man, Woman, “Other”: Factors Associated with Nonbinary Gender Identification. Stephen Whyte, Robert C. Brooks, Benno Torgler. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1307-3
Abstract: Using a unique dataset of 7479 respondents to the online Australian Sex Survey (July–September 2016), we explored factors relevant for individuals who self-identify as one of the many possible nonbinary gender options (i.e., not man or woman). Our results identified significant sex differences in such factors; in particular, a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, and greater same-sex attraction (female–female) versus a negative effect of lower income levels and more offspring. With respect to sex similarities, older males and females, heterosexuals, those with lower educational levels, and those living outside capital cities were all more likely to identify as the historically dichotomous gender options. These factors associated with nonbinary gender identification were also more multifaceted for females than for males, although our interaction terms demonstrated that younger females (relative to younger males) and nonheterosexuals (relative to heterosexuals) were more likely to identify as nonbinary. These effects were reversed, however, in the older cohort. Because gender can have such significant lifetime impacts for both the individual and society as a whole, our findings strongly suggest the need for further research into factors that impact gender diversity.
Abstract: Using a unique dataset of 7479 respondents to the online Australian Sex Survey (July–September 2016), we explored factors relevant for individuals who self-identify as one of the many possible nonbinary gender options (i.e., not man or woman). Our results identified significant sex differences in such factors; in particular, a positive association between female height, higher educational levels, and greater same-sex attraction (female–female) versus a negative effect of lower income levels and more offspring. With respect to sex similarities, older males and females, heterosexuals, those with lower educational levels, and those living outside capital cities were all more likely to identify as the historically dichotomous gender options. These factors associated with nonbinary gender identification were also more multifaceted for females than for males, although our interaction terms demonstrated that younger females (relative to younger males) and nonheterosexuals (relative to heterosexuals) were more likely to identify as nonbinary. These effects were reversed, however, in the older cohort. Because gender can have such significant lifetime impacts for both the individual and society as a whole, our findings strongly suggest the need for further research into factors that impact gender diversity.
Tuesday, September 25, 2018
The threat of punishment lowered the average quality & quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no incentive at all; also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward
Ballard, Timothy, and Daniel Cosgrove. 2018. “Information processing in the face of reward versus punishment.” PsyArXiv. September 26. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zvpcr
Abstract: Much is known about the effects of reward and punishment on behavior, yet little research has considered how these incentives influence the information processing dynamics that underlie decision making. We fit the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to data from a perceptual judgment task to examine the impacts of reward- and punishment-based incentives on three distinct components of information processing: the quality of the information processed, the quantity of that information, and the decision threshold. The threat of punishment lowered the average quality and quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no performance incentive at all. The threat of punishment also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward. These findings suggest that information processing dynamics are not wholly determined by objective properties of the decision environment, but also by the higher order goals of the system.
Abstract: Much is known about the effects of reward and punishment on behavior, yet little research has considered how these incentives influence the information processing dynamics that underlie decision making. We fit the Linear Ballistic Accumulator model to data from a perceptual judgment task to examine the impacts of reward- and punishment-based incentives on three distinct components of information processing: the quality of the information processed, the quantity of that information, and the decision threshold. The threat of punishment lowered the average quality and quantity of information processed compared to the prospect of reward or no performance incentive at all. The threat of punishment also induced less cautious decision making by lowering people’s decision thresholds relative to the prospect of reward. These findings suggest that information processing dynamics are not wholly determined by objective properties of the decision environment, but also by the higher order goals of the system.
People with a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent; there is a moderating effect of power & conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches
Powerful Pharma and Its Marginalized Alternatives? Effects of Individual Differences in Conspiracy Mentality on Attitudes Toward Medical Approaches. Pia Lamberty and Roland Imhoff. Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000347
Abstract: Only little is known about the underpinning psychological processes that determine medical choices. Across four studies, we establish that conspiracy mentality predicts a preference for alternative over biomedical therapies. Study 1a (N = 392) and 1b (N = 204) provide correlational support, Study 2 (N = 185) experimentally tested the role of power: People who endorsed a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent. Study 3 (N = 239) again showed a moderating effect of power and conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches. These findings point to the consequences of conspiracy mentality for health behavior and prevention programs.
Keywords: conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, health behavior, health-related cognitions, illness beliefs
Abstract: Only little is known about the underpinning psychological processes that determine medical choices. Across four studies, we establish that conspiracy mentality predicts a preference for alternative over biomedical therapies. Study 1a (N = 392) and 1b (N = 204) provide correlational support, Study 2 (N = 185) experimentally tested the role of power: People who endorsed a conspiracy mentality perceived a drug more positively if its approval was supported by a powerless (vs. powerful) agent. Study 3 (N = 239) again showed a moderating effect of power and conspiracy mentality on drug evaluation by comparing analytic versus holistic approaches. These findings point to the consequences of conspiracy mentality for health behavior and prevention programs.
Keywords: conspiracy mentality, generalized political attitudes, health behavior, health-related cognitions, illness beliefs
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor, those with bonding difficulties did not; the degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties; the ones with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor
Mother-child bonding is associated with body odor perception. Ilona Croy et al. Physiology & Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physbeh.2018.09.014
Highlights
• Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties did not
• The degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor.
Abstract: Mothers can recognize the odor of their baby and typically like this odor very much. In line with this observation, infant body odors activate reward-related brain areas in the mothers. In some mother-child-dyads however, the mutual bond is impaired and mothers have trouble engaging in interaction with their child. We aimed to examine how mothers with bonding difficulties perceive their child's body odor.
In total 75 mothers and their babies (aged 0–12 months) were examined: Twenty-five of those were recruited in a psychosomatic day hospital ward, which is specialized for mother-child bonding disorders. Fifty age-matched healthy women and their babies served as controls. Body odor samples of each baby were collected from bodysuits in a highly standardized procedure. Thereafter, each mother rated the samples of her own and of two stranger's infants in a blindfolded and randomized design. In addition, general olfactory function in terms of threshold and identification ability was tested and the mother reported the bonding to her baby in a standardized questionnaire.
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own compared to odors of strange infant's, while mothers with bonding difficulties did not. Furthermore, the degree of preference was negatively correlated to self-reported bonding difficulties. Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor above chance, while control mothers could (p = 0.02). Both groups did not differ in general olfactory function.
We assume that reduced close body contact and interaction time in bonding difficulties may lead to reduced olfactory stimulation and hinder the recognition of the infantile body odor. Within a vicious cycle, a reduced hedonic experience smelling the own baby may prevent women from deliberately approaching the baby. Thus the positive and bond-building consequences of bodily and sensory interaction cannot unfold. As the baby's odor is normally perceived as very pleasant and rewarding, the conscious perception of the infantile body odor may be an additive therapeutic approach for mothers with bonding difficulties.
Highlights
• Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own infant's body odor.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties did not
• The degree of odor preference was negatively correlated to bonding difficulties.
• Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor.
Abstract: Mothers can recognize the odor of their baby and typically like this odor very much. In line with this observation, infant body odors activate reward-related brain areas in the mothers. In some mother-child-dyads however, the mutual bond is impaired and mothers have trouble engaging in interaction with their child. We aimed to examine how mothers with bonding difficulties perceive their child's body odor.
In total 75 mothers and their babies (aged 0–12 months) were examined: Twenty-five of those were recruited in a psychosomatic day hospital ward, which is specialized for mother-child bonding disorders. Fifty age-matched healthy women and their babies served as controls. Body odor samples of each baby were collected from bodysuits in a highly standardized procedure. Thereafter, each mother rated the samples of her own and of two stranger's infants in a blindfolded and randomized design. In addition, general olfactory function in terms of threshold and identification ability was tested and the mother reported the bonding to her baby in a standardized questionnaire.
Healthy mothers showed a clear preference of the own compared to odors of strange infant's, while mothers with bonding difficulties did not. Furthermore, the degree of preference was negatively correlated to self-reported bonding difficulties. Mothers with bonding difficulties could not identify their own infant's odor above chance, while control mothers could (p = 0.02). Both groups did not differ in general olfactory function.
We assume that reduced close body contact and interaction time in bonding difficulties may lead to reduced olfactory stimulation and hinder the recognition of the infantile body odor. Within a vicious cycle, a reduced hedonic experience smelling the own baby may prevent women from deliberately approaching the baby. Thus the positive and bond-building consequences of bodily and sensory interaction cannot unfold. As the baby's odor is normally perceived as very pleasant and rewarding, the conscious perception of the infantile body odor may be an additive therapeutic approach for mothers with bonding difficulties.
A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, & social attraction; appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity & social relatedness
Further Tests of Personality Similarity and Social Affiliation. Nancy L. Segal, Brittney A. Hernandez, Jamie L. Graham, Ulrich Ettinger. Human Nature, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12110-018-9326-2
Abstract: Relationships of physical resemblance to personality similarity and social affiliation have generated considerable discussion among behavioral science researchers. A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes, U-LAs) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, and social attraction within an evolutionary framework. The Personality for Professionals Inventory (PfPI), NEO/NEO-FFI-3, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and a Social Relationship Survey were variously completed by 45 U-LA pairs, identified from the “I’m Not a Look-Alike” project, Mentorn Media, and personal referrals. The mean U-LA intraclass correlations were negligible for all Big Five personality traits on the PfPI and NEO/NEO-FFI-3 (ri = −.02 and − .04, respectively). In contrast, mean ri values of .53 and .15 for monozygotic (MZA) and dizygotic (DZA) reared-apart twins, respectively, have been reported for these personality measures. The U-LA self-esteem correlation (ri = −.18) was also below the correlations reported for MZ and DZ reared-together twins (ri = .31 and .13, respectively). Finally, far fewer U-LAs expressed close social relationships (20%) than MZA (80%) and DZA (65%) twins. The present study extends earlier findings indicating that appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity and social relatedness. The criticism that MZ twins are alike in personality because their matched looks invite similar treatment by others is refuted. A more judicious interpretation is reactive genotype-environment correlation, namely that MZ twins’ similar personalities evoke similar reactions from others. MZ twins’ close social relations most likely derive from their perceptions of genetically based within-pair similarities that are lacking in U-LAs.
Keywords: Twins Look-alikes Monozygotic Dizygotic Personality Self-esteem
Abstract: Relationships of physical resemblance to personality similarity and social affiliation have generated considerable discussion among behavioral science researchers. A “twin-like” experimental design (involving genetically unrelated look-alikes, U-LAs) explores associations among resemblance in appearance, the Big Five personality traits, self-esteem, and social attraction within an evolutionary framework. The Personality for Professionals Inventory (PfPI), NEO/NEO-FFI-3, Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, and a Social Relationship Survey were variously completed by 45 U-LA pairs, identified from the “I’m Not a Look-Alike” project, Mentorn Media, and personal referrals. The mean U-LA intraclass correlations were negligible for all Big Five personality traits on the PfPI and NEO/NEO-FFI-3 (ri = −.02 and − .04, respectively). In contrast, mean ri values of .53 and .15 for monozygotic (MZA) and dizygotic (DZA) reared-apart twins, respectively, have been reported for these personality measures. The U-LA self-esteem correlation (ri = −.18) was also below the correlations reported for MZ and DZ reared-together twins (ri = .31 and .13, respectively). Finally, far fewer U-LAs expressed close social relationships (20%) than MZA (80%) and DZA (65%) twins. The present study extends earlier findings indicating that appearance is not meaningfully related to personality similarity and social relatedness. The criticism that MZ twins are alike in personality because their matched looks invite similar treatment by others is refuted. A more judicious interpretation is reactive genotype-environment correlation, namely that MZ twins’ similar personalities evoke similar reactions from others. MZ twins’ close social relations most likely derive from their perceptions of genetically based within-pair similarities that are lacking in U-LAs.
Keywords: Twins Look-alikes Monozygotic Dizygotic Personality Self-esteem
An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist; we conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants; the effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data
The entitlement effect in the ultimatum game – does it even exist? Elif E. Demiral, Johanna Mollerstrom. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.08.022
Highlights
• We study the Ultimatum Game with proposers either earning their role or not.
• An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist.
• We conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants.
• The entitlement effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data.
Abstract: Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement effect is at the core of experimental Public Choice – not just because it concerns the topics of bargaining and negotiations, but also because it relates to the question about under which circumstances actors behave more rational. We conduct three experiments, two in the laboratory and one online, with more than 1,250 participants. Our original motivation was to study gender differences, but ultimately we could not replicate the entitlement effect in the Ultimatum Game in any of our three experiments. Potential reasons for why the replication attempts fail are discussed.
Highlights
• We study the Ultimatum Game with proposers either earning their role or not.
• An entitlement effect – proposers earning the role being less generous – is believed to exist.
• We conduct three experiments with 1,254 participants.
• The entitlement effect fails to replicate in all three experiments, and in the pooled data.
Abstract: Since the seminal paper of Hoffman et al. (1994), an entitlement effect is believed to exist in the Ultimatum Game, in the sense that proposers who have earned their role (as opposed to having it randomly allocated) offer a smaller share of the pie to their matched responder. The entitlement effect is at the core of experimental Public Choice – not just because it concerns the topics of bargaining and negotiations, but also because it relates to the question about under which circumstances actors behave more rational. We conduct three experiments, two in the laboratory and one online, with more than 1,250 participants. Our original motivation was to study gender differences, but ultimately we could not replicate the entitlement effect in the Ultimatum Game in any of our three experiments. Potential reasons for why the replication attempts fail are discussed.
Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy: Parenting, stigmatization, and children’s psychological adjustment
Carone, N., Lingiardi, V., Chirumbolo, A., & Baiocco, R. (2018). Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy: Parenting, stigmatization, and children’s psychological adjustment. Developmental Psychology, 54(10), 1904-1916. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/dev0000571
Abstract: Forty Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy were compared with 40 Italian lesbian mother families formed by donor insemination, all with a child aged 3 to 9 years. Standardized interview, observational, and questionnaire measures of parenting quality, parent–child relationships, stigmatization, and children’s adjustment were administered to parents, children, teachers, and a child psychiatrist. The only differences across family types indicated higher levels of stigmatization as reported by gay fathers. Externalizing and internalizing problems in both groups scored within the normal range. When family structure and processes were entered together as predictors of child adjustment, a hierarchical linear model analysis showed that factors associated with children’s externalizing problems were the child’s male gender, high stigmatization, and negative parenting; children’s internalizing problems were higher in lesbian mother families and were predicted by stigmatization. Of note, neither gay fathers nor lesbian mothers tended to underestimate their children’s adjustment problems relative to teachers. Finally, for children of gay fathers, comparison between teacher SDQ ratings and teacher SDQ normative data on Italian children in a similar age range showed that teachers reported children of gay fathers to show significantly fewer internalizing problems than the normative sample. No differences in children’s externalizing problems emerged. A bootstrapping simulation confirmed all results, except the effect of stigmatization on child internalizing problems. Findings suggest that the practice of surrogacy by gay men has no adverse effects on child health outcomes. Implications for our theoretical understanding of child socialization and development, and law and social policy, are discussed.
Abstract: Forty Italian gay father families formed by surrogacy were compared with 40 Italian lesbian mother families formed by donor insemination, all with a child aged 3 to 9 years. Standardized interview, observational, and questionnaire measures of parenting quality, parent–child relationships, stigmatization, and children’s adjustment were administered to parents, children, teachers, and a child psychiatrist. The only differences across family types indicated higher levels of stigmatization as reported by gay fathers. Externalizing and internalizing problems in both groups scored within the normal range. When family structure and processes were entered together as predictors of child adjustment, a hierarchical linear model analysis showed that factors associated with children’s externalizing problems were the child’s male gender, high stigmatization, and negative parenting; children’s internalizing problems were higher in lesbian mother families and were predicted by stigmatization. Of note, neither gay fathers nor lesbian mothers tended to underestimate their children’s adjustment problems relative to teachers. Finally, for children of gay fathers, comparison between teacher SDQ ratings and teacher SDQ normative data on Italian children in a similar age range showed that teachers reported children of gay fathers to show significantly fewer internalizing problems than the normative sample. No differences in children’s externalizing problems emerged. A bootstrapping simulation confirmed all results, except the effect of stigmatization on child internalizing problems. Findings suggest that the practice of surrogacy by gay men has no adverse effects on child health outcomes. Implications for our theoretical understanding of child socialization and development, and law and social policy, are discussed.
Are Whites and minorities more similar than different? Testing the cultural similarities hypothesis on psychopathology with a second-order meta-analysis // Seems that closely alike
Are Whites and minorities more similar than different? Testing the cultural similarities hypothesis on psychopathology with a second-order meta-analysis. José M. Causadias, Kevin M. Korous & Karina M. Cahill. Development and Psychopathology, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0954579418000895
Abstract: The cultural differences hypothesis is the assertion that there are large differences between Whites and racial/ethnic minorities in the United States, while there are small differences between- (e.g., African Americans and Latinos) and within- (e.g., Latinos: Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans) minority groups. Conversely, the cultural similarities hypothesis argues that there are small differences between Whites and minorities, and these differences are equal or smaller in magnitude than differences between and within minorities. In this study, we conducted a second-order meta-analysis focused on psychopathology, to (a) test these hypotheses by estimating the absolute average difference between Whites and minorities, as well as between and within minorities, on levels of psychopathology, and (b) determine if general and meta-analytic method moderators account for these differences. A systematic search in PsycINFO, Web of Science, and ProQuest Dissertations identified 16 meta-analyses (13% unpublished) on 493 primary studies (N = 3,036,749). Differences between Whites and minorities (d+ = 0.23, 95% confidence interval [0.18, 0.28]), and between minorities (d+ = 0.30, 95% confidence interval [0.12, 0.48]) were small in magnitude. White–minority differences remained small across moderators. These findings support the cultural similarities hypothesis. We discuss their implications and future research directions.
Abstract: The cultural differences hypothesis is the assertion that there are large differences between Whites and racial/ethnic minorities in the United States, while there are small differences between- (e.g., African Americans and Latinos) and within- (e.g., Latinos: Mexican Americans and Cuban Americans) minority groups. Conversely, the cultural similarities hypothesis argues that there are small differences between Whites and minorities, and these differences are equal or smaller in magnitude than differences between and within minorities. In this study, we conducted a second-order meta-analysis focused on psychopathology, to (a) test these hypotheses by estimating the absolute average difference between Whites and minorities, as well as between and within minorities, on levels of psychopathology, and (b) determine if general and meta-analytic method moderators account for these differences. A systematic search in PsycINFO, Web of Science, and ProQuest Dissertations identified 16 meta-analyses (13% unpublished) on 493 primary studies (N = 3,036,749). Differences between Whites and minorities (d+ = 0.23, 95% confidence interval [0.18, 0.28]), and between minorities (d+ = 0.30, 95% confidence interval [0.12, 0.48]) were small in magnitude. White–minority differences remained small across moderators. These findings support the cultural similarities hypothesis. We discuss their implications and future research directions.
Confirmed there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery; people with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts
Differences in Spatial Visualization Ability and Vividness of Spatial Imagery Between People With and Without Aphantasia. Anita Crowder. PhD dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6685&context=etd
Summary: Mathematics education researchers have examined the relation ship between visualization and mathematics for decades (e.g., Arcavi, 2003; Bishop, 1991; Duval, 1999; Fennema & Tartre, 1985; Presmeg, 1986; Rösken & Rolka, 2006). Studies have linked spatial visualization ability, such as measured in mental rotation tasks, directly to mathematics self-efficacy (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Weckbacher & Okamoto, 2014), which in turn influences mathematics achievement (Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 1997). With the important role that spatial visualization plays in learning math ematics, the recent identification of congenital aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), which is the lack of mental imagery ability, has raised new questions for mathematics education researchers. This study investigated the differences in mental rotation test performance and vividness of spatial imagery between people who have aphantasia and people who do not as a first step toward examining how aphantasia may affect mathematics learning and education. Results confirmed prior aphantasia research showing that there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance between people with aphantasia and those without aphantasia, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery. Results also showed that there was less difference in mental rotation test performance between the genders for people with aphantasia, while gender played a significant role in mental rotation test performance for people without aphantasia. People with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts than people without aphantasia. Implications of these results will be discussed within the context of current research, and possible directions for future research will be offered.
Keywords: mathematics, aphantasia, mental imagery, visualization, spatial imagery
Summary: Mathematics education researchers have examined the relation ship between visualization and mathematics for decades (e.g., Arcavi, 2003; Bishop, 1991; Duval, 1999; Fennema & Tartre, 1985; Presmeg, 1986; Rösken & Rolka, 2006). Studies have linked spatial visualization ability, such as measured in mental rotation tasks, directly to mathematics self-efficacy (Pajares & Kranzler, 1995; Weckbacher & Okamoto, 2014), which in turn influences mathematics achievement (Casey, Nuttall, & Pezaris, 1997). With the important role that spatial visualization plays in learning math ematics, the recent identification of congenital aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015), which is the lack of mental imagery ability, has raised new questions for mathematics education researchers. This study investigated the differences in mental rotation test performance and vividness of spatial imagery between people who have aphantasia and people who do not as a first step toward examining how aphantasia may affect mathematics learning and education. Results confirmed prior aphantasia research showing that there was no significant difference in mental rotation test performance between people with aphantasia and those without aphantasia, despite people with aphantasia reporting significantly lower vividness of spatial imagery. Results also showed that there was less difference in mental rotation test performance between the genders for people with aphantasia, while gender played a significant role in mental rotation test performance for people without aphantasia. People with aphantasia also reported lower self-efficacy in the arts than people without aphantasia. Implications of these results will be discussed within the context of current research, and possible directions for future research will be offered.
Keywords: mathematics, aphantasia, mental imagery, visualization, spatial imagery
Monday, September 24, 2018
Moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of erectile disfunction, whereas regular and high consumption did not
Alcohol intake and risk of erectile dysfunction: a dose–response meta-analysis of observational studies. Xiao-Ming Wang, Yun-Jin Bai, Yu-Bo Yang, Jin-Hong Li, Yin Tang & Ping Han. International Journal of Impotence Research, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41443-018-0022-x
Abstract: The purpose of the present study was to conduct a meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies assessing the relationship between alcohol consumption and the risk of erectile dysfunction (ED). To identify relevant studies, databases such as Pubmed, Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Library were searched from the inception of the present study to March 2016. Finally, 24 studies (154,295 patients) were included. We combined a study-specific odds ratio (OR) estimated by using a random effects meta-analysis. The results of our meta-analysis indicated that light to moderate alcohol consumption ( < 21 drinks/week) was correlated with a decreased risk of erectile dysfunction (OR = 0.71; 95% CI: 0.59–0.86; P = 0.000). However, regular (ever vs. never) and high alcohol consumption ( > 21 drinks/week) had no significant influence on the prevalence of ED (regular: OR = 0.87; 95% CI: 0.75–1.07; P = 0.062; high: OR = 0.99; 95% CI: 0.80–1.22; P = 0.893). In a dose–response meta-analysis, a non-linear relationship was observed between alcohol consumption and risk of ED (P for non-linearity = 0.0000). In conclusion, moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of ED, whereas regular and high consumption did not.
Abstract: The purpose of the present study was to conduct a meta-analysis of cross-sectional studies assessing the relationship between alcohol consumption and the risk of erectile dysfunction (ED). To identify relevant studies, databases such as Pubmed, Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Library were searched from the inception of the present study to March 2016. Finally, 24 studies (154,295 patients) were included. We combined a study-specific odds ratio (OR) estimated by using a random effects meta-analysis. The results of our meta-analysis indicated that light to moderate alcohol consumption ( < 21 drinks/week) was correlated with a decreased risk of erectile dysfunction (OR = 0.71; 95% CI: 0.59–0.86; P = 0.000). However, regular (ever vs. never) and high alcohol consumption ( > 21 drinks/week) had no significant influence on the prevalence of ED (regular: OR = 0.87; 95% CI: 0.75–1.07; P = 0.062; high: OR = 0.99; 95% CI: 0.80–1.22; P = 0.893). In a dose–response meta-analysis, a non-linear relationship was observed between alcohol consumption and risk of ED (P for non-linearity = 0.0000). In conclusion, moderate intake of alcohol exhibited a beneficial effect on the risk of ED, whereas regular and high consumption did not.
Krugman: Trump’s tariffs really are a big, bad deal. Their direct economic impact ***will be modest*** (?!), although hardly trivial
Now, to put Krugman's words in perspective, see the first results of Google search "nytimes.com trump tariffs will damage," the very constructive way to report and pour opinions that most journalists have:
But he, one the high priests of the anti-Trumpian church, the man who on election night 2016 "gave in temporarily to a temptation" he warns others about, to let his "political feelings distort" his "economic judgment," although "quickly retracted the claim," and "issued a mea culpa" (because being "an old-fashioned guy," he tries "to admit and learn from" his mistakes), says what you see above as title.
See his article:
Companies Warn More China Tariffs Will Cripple Them and Hurt ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/china-tariffs-businesses.html
Aug 20, 2018 - The Trump administration, which will hold trade talks with the Chinese this week, began six days of hearings on its proposal to tax another $200 ...
Tariffs to Raise Cost of Rebuilding After Hurricane Florence - The New ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/21/.../tariffs-rebuilding-hurricane-florence.html
3 days ago - The Trump administration imposed a 20 percent tariff on Canadian softwood ... It will take months to repair the damage from the floods, he said.
Rebuffed by Trump on Tariffs, Businesses Mount Coordinated Pushback
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/us/.../trump-tariffs-businesses-pushback.html
Sep 12, 2018 - The Tariffs Hurt the Heartland campaign focuses heavily on the economic ... September for The New York Times by the online polling firm SurveyMonkey. ... have all publicly warned Mr. Trump that his tariffs will hurt the very ...
Opinion | How China Wins the Trade War - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/.../trump-tariffs-china-trade-war-who-will-win.ht...
Aug 8, 2018 - President Trump exhorts his supporters that tariffs “mean jobs and great ... Reduced American demand for Chinese products does hurt China.
If the Trade War Starts to Damage the Economy, Here's How You'll Be ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/.../trade-war-damage-to-us-economy-how-to-tell.html
Jul 24, 2018 - “Still, tariffs hurt, and we're starting to see some precursors of an impact already.” ... By the time there would be solid evidence that the trade war was doing damage, the damage would already ....
Opinion | Getting Hurt by Trump's Tariffs - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/opinion/trump-tariffs.html
Jul 15, 2018 - They will, we hope, understand that a man's conduct, knowledge, ... of the New York edition with the headline: Getting Hurt by Trump's Tariffs.
Opinion | Trump Has No Idea What His Tariffs Have Unleashed for ...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/.../trump-tariffs-trade-war-rural-america.html
Jul 26, 2018 - His trade war will hurt business at a time when the rural population is aging, and it will probably hollow out farm communities.
But he, one the high priests of the anti-Trumpian church, the man who on election night 2016 "gave in temporarily to a temptation" he warns others about, to let his "political feelings distort" his "economic judgment," although "quickly retracted the claim," and "issued a mea culpa" (because being "an old-fashioned guy," he tries "to admit and learn from" his mistakes), says what you see above as title.
See his article:
Making Tariffs Corrupt Again. Paul Krugman. TNYT, Sept. 20, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/tariffs-trump-corrupt.html
Syverson on productivity mismeasurement and slowdown, plus effect of AI on the slowdown
Interview with Chad Syverson. Aaron Steelman. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, June 2018, https://www.blogger.com/blogger.g?blogID=2852546339326384272#editor/target=post;postID=3293709683462798846
EF: Some have argued that the productivity slowdown since the mid-2000s is due to mismeasurement issues — that some productivity growth hasn't been or isn't being captured. What does your work tell us about that?
Syverson: It tells us that the mismeasurement story, while plausible on its face, falls apart when examined. If productivity growth had actually been 1.5 percent greater than it has been measured since the mid-2000s, U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) would be conservatively $4 trillion higher than it is, or about $12,000 more per capita. So if you go with the mismeasurement story, that's the sort of number you're talking about and there are several reasons to believe you can't account for it.
First, the productivity slowdown has happened all over world. When you look at the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries we have data for, there's no relationship between the size of the measured slowdown and how important IT-related goods — which most people think are the primary source of mismeasurement — are to a country's economy.
Second, people have tried to measure the value of IT-related goods. The largest estimate is about $900 billion in the United States. That doesn't get you even a quarter of the way toward that $4 trillion.
Third, the value added of the IT-related sector has grown by about $750 billion, adjusting for inflation, since the mid-2000s. The mismeasurement hypothesis says that there are $4 trillion missing on top of that. So the question is: Do we think we're only getting $1 out of every $6 of activity there? That's a lot of mismeasurement.
Finally, there's the difference between gross domestic income (GDI) and GDP. GDI has been higher than GDP on average since the slowdown started, which would suggest that there's income, about $1 trillion cumulatively, that is not showing up in expenditures. But the problem is that was also true before the slowdown started. GDI was higher than GDP from 1998 through 2004, a period of relatively high-productivity growth. Moreover, the growth in income is coming from capital income, not wage income. That doesn't comport with the story some people are trying to tell, which is that companies are making stuff, they're paying their workers to produce it, but then they're effectively giving it away for free instead of selling it. But we know that they're actually making profits. We might not pay directly for a lot of IT services every time we use them, but we are paying for them indirectly.
As sensible as the mismeasurement hypothesis might sound on its face, when you add up everything, it just doesn't pass the stricter test you would want it to survive.
EF: Would you consider artificial intelligence (AI) a general-purpose technology? If so, how do you assess the view that the returns on investment in AI have been disappointing?
Syverson: It's way too early. There are two things creating this lag for AI. First, aggregate AI capital right now is essentially zero. This stuff is really just starting to be used in production. A lot of it is simply experimental at this point. Second, a lot of it has to do with complementarity. People have to figure out what sorts of things AI can augment, and we're not anywhere down that road yet.
Erik, Daniel, and I are going out on a limb a little bit by saying this, but we think AI checks the boxes for a general-purpose technology. And it seems that with some fairly modest applications of AI, the productivity slowdown goes away. Two applications that we look at in our paper are autonomous vehicles and call centers.
About 3.5 million people in the United States make their living as motor vehicle operators. We think maybe 2 million of those could be replaced by autonomous vehicles. There are 122 million people in private employment now, so just a quick calculation says that's an additional boost of 1.7 percent in labor productivity. But that's not going to happen overnight. If it happens over a decade, that's 0.17 percent per year.
About 2 million people work in call centers. Plausibly, 60 percent of those jobs could be replaced by AI. So when you do the same kind of calculation, that's an additional 1 percent increase in labor productivity; spread out over a decade, it's 0.1 percent per year. So, from those two applications alone, that's about a quarter of a percent annual acceleration for a decade. So you only need maybe six to eight more applications of that size and the slowdown is gone.
EF: Some have argued that the productivity slowdown since the mid-2000s is due to mismeasurement issues — that some productivity growth hasn't been or isn't being captured. What does your work tell us about that?
Syverson: It tells us that the mismeasurement story, while plausible on its face, falls apart when examined. If productivity growth had actually been 1.5 percent greater than it has been measured since the mid-2000s, U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) would be conservatively $4 trillion higher than it is, or about $12,000 more per capita. So if you go with the mismeasurement story, that's the sort of number you're talking about and there are several reasons to believe you can't account for it.
First, the productivity slowdown has happened all over world. When you look at the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries we have data for, there's no relationship between the size of the measured slowdown and how important IT-related goods — which most people think are the primary source of mismeasurement — are to a country's economy.
Second, people have tried to measure the value of IT-related goods. The largest estimate is about $900 billion in the United States. That doesn't get you even a quarter of the way toward that $4 trillion.
Third, the value added of the IT-related sector has grown by about $750 billion, adjusting for inflation, since the mid-2000s. The mismeasurement hypothesis says that there are $4 trillion missing on top of that. So the question is: Do we think we're only getting $1 out of every $6 of activity there? That's a lot of mismeasurement.
Finally, there's the difference between gross domestic income (GDI) and GDP. GDI has been higher than GDP on average since the slowdown started, which would suggest that there's income, about $1 trillion cumulatively, that is not showing up in expenditures. But the problem is that was also true before the slowdown started. GDI was higher than GDP from 1998 through 2004, a period of relatively high-productivity growth. Moreover, the growth in income is coming from capital income, not wage income. That doesn't comport with the story some people are trying to tell, which is that companies are making stuff, they're paying their workers to produce it, but then they're effectively giving it away for free instead of selling it. But we know that they're actually making profits. We might not pay directly for a lot of IT services every time we use them, but we are paying for them indirectly.
As sensible as the mismeasurement hypothesis might sound on its face, when you add up everything, it just doesn't pass the stricter test you would want it to survive.
EF: Would you consider artificial intelligence (AI) a general-purpose technology? If so, how do you assess the view that the returns on investment in AI have been disappointing?
Syverson: It's way too early. There are two things creating this lag for AI. First, aggregate AI capital right now is essentially zero. This stuff is really just starting to be used in production. A lot of it is simply experimental at this point. Second, a lot of it has to do with complementarity. People have to figure out what sorts of things AI can augment, and we're not anywhere down that road yet.
Erik, Daniel, and I are going out on a limb a little bit by saying this, but we think AI checks the boxes for a general-purpose technology. And it seems that with some fairly modest applications of AI, the productivity slowdown goes away. Two applications that we look at in our paper are autonomous vehicles and call centers.
About 3.5 million people in the United States make their living as motor vehicle operators. We think maybe 2 million of those could be replaced by autonomous vehicles. There are 122 million people in private employment now, so just a quick calculation says that's an additional boost of 1.7 percent in labor productivity. But that's not going to happen overnight. If it happens over a decade, that's 0.17 percent per year.
About 2 million people work in call centers. Plausibly, 60 percent of those jobs could be replaced by AI. So when you do the same kind of calculation, that's an additional 1 percent increase in labor productivity; spread out over a decade, it's 0.1 percent per year. So, from those two applications alone, that's about a quarter of a percent annual acceleration for a decade. So you only need maybe six to eight more applications of that size and the slowdown is gone.
The unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII
World War II and African American Socioeconomic Progress. Andreas Ferrara. Warwick Univ, Sept 2018, Working Paper No. 387. https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/manage/publications/387a-2018_ferrara.pdf
Abstract: This paper argues that the unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII. Results from combining novel military and Census data in a difference-in-differences setting show that counties with an average casualty rate among semi-skilled whites experienced a 13 to 16% increase in the share of blacks in semi-skilled jobs. The casualty rate also has a significant reduced form effect on cross-state migration, wages, home ownership, house value, and education for blacks. Using survey data from 1961, IV regression results indicate that the economic upgrade, which is instrumented with the semi-skilled white casualty rate, is also associated with an increase in social status. Both black and white individuals living in treated counties are more likely to have an interracial friendship, live in mixed-race neighborhoods, and to have reduced preferences for segregation.
JEL codes: J15, J24, N42
Keywords: African-Americans; Inequality; Race-Relations; World War II
Abstract: This paper argues that the unprecedented socioeconomic rise of African Americans at mid-century is causally related to the labor shortages induced by WWII. Results from combining novel military and Census data in a difference-in-differences setting show that counties with an average casualty rate among semi-skilled whites experienced a 13 to 16% increase in the share of blacks in semi-skilled jobs. The casualty rate also has a significant reduced form effect on cross-state migration, wages, home ownership, house value, and education for blacks. Using survey data from 1961, IV regression results indicate that the economic upgrade, which is instrumented with the semi-skilled white casualty rate, is also associated with an increase in social status. Both black and white individuals living in treated counties are more likely to have an interracial friendship, live in mixed-race neighborhoods, and to have reduced preferences for segregation.
JEL codes: J15, J24, N42
Keywords: African-Americans; Inequality; Race-Relations; World War II
Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks”
Treatment of phantom shocks: A case report. Danielle R Hairston et al. The International Journal of Psychiatry in Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1177/0091217418802153
Abstract: Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators have become standard preventive treatment for patients with ventricular arrhythmias and other life-threatening cardiac conditions. The advantages and efficiency of the device are supported by multiple clinical trials and outcome studies, leading to its popularity among cardiologists. Implantation of the device is not without adverse outcomes. Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to negative psychological and psychosocial sequelae such as apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks.” Defined as patient-reported shocks in the absence of evidence that the implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device has discharged, phantom shocks could impact the mental health of those affected. This article reviews the case of Mr. L, a 47-year-old man with ischemic cardiomyopathy who was seen by the psychiatry consultation team while under cardiologic care because he reported that his implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device had been shocking him despite no objective evidence after interrogating the device. A literature review of phantom shocks, their associated symptomatology, and psychological consequences are outlined and discussed.
Keywords: implantable cardioverter-defibrillators, shock, phantom shocks, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
Abstract: Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators have become standard preventive treatment for patients with ventricular arrhythmias and other life-threatening cardiac conditions. The advantages and efficiency of the device are supported by multiple clinical trials and outcome studies, leading to its popularity among cardiologists. Implantation of the device is not without adverse outcomes. Implantable cardioverter-defibrillator placement has been found to lead to negative psychological and psychosocial sequelae such as apprehension to engage in physical activity, chronic anxiety, decreased physical and social functioning, a nagging fear of being shocked by the device, and the development of “phantom shocks.” Defined as patient-reported shocks in the absence of evidence that the implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device has discharged, phantom shocks could impact the mental health of those affected. This article reviews the case of Mr. L, a 47-year-old man with ischemic cardiomyopathy who was seen by the psychiatry consultation team while under cardiologic care because he reported that his implantable cardioverter-defibrillator device had been shocking him despite no objective evidence after interrogating the device. A literature review of phantom shocks, their associated symptomatology, and psychological consequences are outlined and discussed.
Keywords: implantable cardioverter-defibrillators, shock, phantom shocks, anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder
Sexism, Rape Myths and Feminist Identification Explain Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward the #metoo Social Media Campaign in Two Countries
Kunst, Jonas R., April Bailey, Claire Prendergast, and Aleksander Gundersen. 2018. “Sexism, Rape Myths and Feminist Identification Explain Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward the #metoo Social Media Campaign in Two Countries.” PsyArXiv. September 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jysw8
Abstract: On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano popularized the #metoo campaign, which sought to expose the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in public domains by encouraging victims to share their experiences on social media using the hashtag ‘metoo.’ The online campaign rapidly grew to a global phenomenon, which was generally well supported. However, some criticized the campaign online as a “battle of the sexes,” which pits men against women. The present cross-cultural research investigated whether gender differences in attitudes and feelings toward #metoo are due to underlying differences in ideologies and experiences that only partly overlap with gender. We surveyed respondents in the United States, where the campaign began, and in Norway, a highly gender-egalitarian country. In both countries, men expressed less positivity toward #metoo than women and perceived it as substantially more harmful and less beneficial. These gender differences were largely accounted for by men being higher than women in hostile sexism, higher in rape myth acceptance, and lower in feminist identification. The results, hence, suggest that gender differences in attitudes to social media campaigns such as #metoo might be best characterized as dimensional ideological differences rather than fundamental group differences.
Abstract: On October 15, 2017, actress Alyssa Milano popularized the #metoo campaign, which sought to expose the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault in public domains by encouraging victims to share their experiences on social media using the hashtag ‘metoo.’ The online campaign rapidly grew to a global phenomenon, which was generally well supported. However, some criticized the campaign online as a “battle of the sexes,” which pits men against women. The present cross-cultural research investigated whether gender differences in attitudes and feelings toward #metoo are due to underlying differences in ideologies and experiences that only partly overlap with gender. We surveyed respondents in the United States, where the campaign began, and in Norway, a highly gender-egalitarian country. In both countries, men expressed less positivity toward #metoo than women and perceived it as substantially more harmful and less beneficial. These gender differences were largely accounted for by men being higher than women in hostile sexism, higher in rape myth acceptance, and lower in feminist identification. The results, hence, suggest that gender differences in attitudes to social media campaigns such as #metoo might be best characterized as dimensional ideological differences rather than fundamental group differences.
Do People Have Reproductive Goals? Constructive Preferences and the Discovery of Desired Family Size: Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal
Do People Have Reproductive Goals? Constructive Preferences and the Discovery of Desired Family Size. Máire Nà Bhrolcháin, Éva Beaujouan. In: Schoen R. (eds) Analytical Family Demography. The Springer Series on Demographic Methods and Population Analysis, vol 47, pp 27-56
Abstract
The frequency of uncertainty in response to survey questions on fertility expectations is relatively high. This is inconsistent with the classical rational choice model implicit in much demographic research. Whether for this or other reasons, the phenomenon is by and large overlooked. Uncertainty in relation to fertility is, we suggest, genuine rather than the result of faulty measurement or poorly motivated responses. Its relatively high frequency requires that it is accounted for in any theory of fertility decision making.
Adapting ideas from behavioral economics, psychology, and political science we propose an alternative theoretical approach in which fertility intentions and preferences are thought of as constructed. Preferences are constructed when they are not drawn from a stored memory but assembled on the spot from information accessible at the time; reports of such preferences can be very sensitive to context. In this approach, uncertainty is not anomalous and some enduring apparent contradictions in survey findings on fertility intentions, expectations and preferences are explicable. Ideas in political science have the potential to enhance our understanding of responses to survey questions on preferences and intentions. Preference construction theory could provide an avenue to a better understanding of fertility preferences. Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Establishing the nature, origin and operation of fertility preferences is essential to answering the question whether fertility differentials and trends reflect choice or constraint or some mixture of the two.
Abstract
The frequency of uncertainty in response to survey questions on fertility expectations is relatively high. This is inconsistent with the classical rational choice model implicit in much demographic research. Whether for this or other reasons, the phenomenon is by and large overlooked. Uncertainty in relation to fertility is, we suggest, genuine rather than the result of faulty measurement or poorly motivated responses. Its relatively high frequency requires that it is accounted for in any theory of fertility decision making.
Adapting ideas from behavioral economics, psychology, and political science we propose an alternative theoretical approach in which fertility intentions and preferences are thought of as constructed. Preferences are constructed when they are not drawn from a stored memory but assembled on the spot from information accessible at the time; reports of such preferences can be very sensitive to context. In this approach, uncertainty is not anomalous and some enduring apparent contradictions in survey findings on fertility intentions, expectations and preferences are explicable. Ideas in political science have the potential to enhance our understanding of responses to survey questions on preferences and intentions. Preference construction theory could provide an avenue to a better understanding of fertility preferences. Desired family size may, we suggest, be a discovery rather than a goal. Establishing the nature, origin and operation of fertility preferences is essential to answering the question whether fertility differentials and trends reflect choice or constraint or some mixture of the two.
They played a task to be probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay; during this, they could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately; and did
Cabrero, Jose A. M. R., Jian-Qiao Zhu, and Elliot A. Ludvig. 2018. “Costly Curiosity: People Pay a Price to Resolve an Uncertain Gamble Early.” PsyArXiv. September 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/9hws7
Abstract: Humans are inherently curious creatures, continuously seeking out information about future outcomes. Such advance information is often valuable, potentially allowing people to select better courses of action. In non-human animals, this drive for information can be so strong that they forego food or water to find out a few seconds earlier whether an uncertain option will provide a reward. Here, we assess whether people will exhibit a similar sub-optimal preference for advance information. Participants played a card-flipping task where they were probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay. During this delay, participants could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately. This choice to find out early did not influence the eventual outcome. Participants preferred to find out early about 80% of the time when the information was free; they were even willing to incur an expense to get advance information about the eventual outcome. The expected magnitude of the outcome, however, did not impact the likelihood of finding out early. These results suggest that humans, like animals, value non-instrumental information and will pay a price for such information, independent of its utility.
Abstract: Humans are inherently curious creatures, continuously seeking out information about future outcomes. Such advance information is often valuable, potentially allowing people to select better courses of action. In non-human animals, this drive for information can be so strong that they forego food or water to find out a few seconds earlier whether an uncertain option will provide a reward. Here, we assess whether people will exhibit a similar sub-optimal preference for advance information. Participants played a card-flipping task where they were probabilistically rewarded based on the pattern of 3 cards that were revealed after a 5-s delay. During this delay, participants could instead pay a cost to find out the next card’s identity immediately. This choice to find out early did not influence the eventual outcome. Participants preferred to find out early about 80% of the time when the information was free; they were even willing to incur an expense to get advance information about the eventual outcome. The expected magnitude of the outcome, however, did not impact the likelihood of finding out early. These results suggest that humans, like animals, value non-instrumental information and will pay a price for such information, independent of its utility.
Intergenerational Mobility at the Top of the Educational Distribution: A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins
Intergenerational Mobility at the Top of the Educational Distribution. Florencia Torche. Sociology of Education, https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040718801812
Abstract: Research has shown that intergenerational mobility is higher among individuals with a college degree than those with lower levels of schooling. However, mobility declines among graduate degree holders. This finding questions the meritocratic power of higher education. Prior research has been hampered, however, by the small samples of advanced degree holders in representative surveys. Drawing on a large longitudinal data set of PhD holders—the Survey of Doctorate Recipients—this study examines intergenerational mobility among the American educational elite, separately for men and women and different racial/ethnic groups. Results show substantial mobility among PhD holders. The association between parents’ education and adult children’s earnings is moderate among men and nonexistent among women with doctoral degrees. However, women’s earnings converge to an average level that is much lower than men’s, signaling ‘‘perverse openness’’ for women even at the top of the educational distribution. Among men, there is variation in mobility by race and ethnicity. The intergenerational socioeconomic association is null for Asian men, small for white and black men, and more pronounced for Hispanics. Educational and occupational mediators account for intergenerational association among blacks and whites but not Hispanic men. A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins in the United States, but it does not eliminate all sources of inequality.
Keywords: class inequality, higher education, meritocracy, intergenerational mobility, graduate education
Abstract: Research has shown that intergenerational mobility is higher among individuals with a college degree than those with lower levels of schooling. However, mobility declines among graduate degree holders. This finding questions the meritocratic power of higher education. Prior research has been hampered, however, by the small samples of advanced degree holders in representative surveys. Drawing on a large longitudinal data set of PhD holders—the Survey of Doctorate Recipients—this study examines intergenerational mobility among the American educational elite, separately for men and women and different racial/ethnic groups. Results show substantial mobility among PhD holders. The association between parents’ education and adult children’s earnings is moderate among men and nonexistent among women with doctoral degrees. However, women’s earnings converge to an average level that is much lower than men’s, signaling ‘‘perverse openness’’ for women even at the top of the educational distribution. Among men, there is variation in mobility by race and ethnicity. The intergenerational socioeconomic association is null for Asian men, small for white and black men, and more pronounced for Hispanics. Educational and occupational mediators account for intergenerational association among blacks and whites but not Hispanic men. A doctoral degree largely detaches individuals from their social origins in the United States, but it does not eliminate all sources of inequality.
Keywords: class inequality, higher education, meritocracy, intergenerational mobility, graduate education
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