Recycle more, waste more? When recycling efforts increase resource consumption. Baolong Ma, Xiaofei Li, Zhongjun Jiang, Jiefan Jiang. Journal of Cleaner Production, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.09.063
Abstract: Governments spend significant amounts of money to promote recycling lifestyles to the public; however, they cannot maximize the beneficial effects of recycling without avoiding its potential negative consequences. In this research, we empirically examine the effects of recycling efforts on subsequent resource usage by analyzing the online survey data of 356 participants in China. Based on partial least squares-structural equation modeling, the results show that (1) recycling efforts have a positive effect on resource consumption, which suggests that engaging in recycling leads individuals to use significantly more resources in the future; (2) the positive effect of recycling efforts on resource consumption is mediated by environmental self-identity and feelings of pride; and (3) consideration of future consequences negatively moderates the effects of recycling efforts on environmental self-identity and on feelings of pride. That is, consideration of future consequences mitigates the positive effects of recycling efforts on resource consumption. The paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings.
Tuesday, October 2, 2018
Genetic factors contribute substantially to the variations of various types of narcissism, stability of narcissism as well as its associations with other personalities, & the distinctions between different types of narcissism; environments (mostly non-shared by family members) also play important roles
The Etiology of Narcissism: A Review of Behavioral Genetic Studies. Yu L. L. Luo. Huajian Cai. In Handbook of Trait Narcissism pp 149-156, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-92171-6_16
Abstract: A great deal of research has delved into the etiology of narcissism via behavioral genetic methodologies in recent years. These studies have established that genetic factors contribute substantially to (1) the variations of various types of narcissism, (2) the stability of narcissism as well as its associations with other personalities, and (3) the distinctions between different types of narcissism. In the meantime, environments (mostly non-shared by family members) also play important roles in these situations. Together, these findings shed light on the origins of narcissism. Future studies may further examine how genetic and environmental factors interplay with each other in influencing narcissism and even what gene(s) is associated with narcissism.
Abstract: A great deal of research has delved into the etiology of narcissism via behavioral genetic methodologies in recent years. These studies have established that genetic factors contribute substantially to (1) the variations of various types of narcissism, (2) the stability of narcissism as well as its associations with other personalities, and (3) the distinctions between different types of narcissism. In the meantime, environments (mostly non-shared by family members) also play important roles in these situations. Together, these findings shed light on the origins of narcissism. Future studies may further examine how genetic and environmental factors interplay with each other in influencing narcissism and even what gene(s) is associated with narcissism.
Cognitive reflection was positively correlated with rational (selfish) behavior in dictator games; reflective dictators)kept more money for themselves than those who achieved lower scores on the CRT (altruistic, impulsive dictators)
Cognitive Reflection Test in Predicting Rational Behavior in the Dictator Game. Monika Czerwonka, Aleksandra Staniszewska, Krzysztof Kompa. In International Conference on Computational Methods in Experimental Economics CMEE 2017: Problems, Methods and Tools in Experimental and Behavioral Economics pp 301-312, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-99187-0_22
Abstract: Altruism and behavioral impact on economic decisions became the center of the interest for experimental and behavioral economy. The literature widely reports the results of variety types of dictator games (DG) and cognitive reflection tests (CRT). There is a broad research on donated sum, anonymity of the receiver and dictators’ position (giving vs. taking) in dictator games. Separately research on the CRT evolves from 3 questions to 7 questions variant. However, there is an evident gap in the literature for data that combines these two tools (DG and CRT) in one setup. In this study, we extend existing research on the relationship between cognitive performance on the CRT and dictator decisions taking into account such factors as donated sum, anonymity of the receiver and dictators’ position (giving vs. taking). The main goal is to find out if the cognitive reflection test (CRT) helps to predict rational (or selfish) behavior in a DG. In our investigation, we asked 511 participants to respond to 6 types of dictator games and CRT test. For statistical analysis of the received results, we applied correlation, descriptive statistics, the t-student test and the Mann–Whitney test. Our results show that cognitive reflection was positively correlated with rational (selfish) behavior in DGs. Those dictators who scored high on the CRT (reflective dictators) kept more money for themselves than those who achieved lower scores on the CRT (altruistic, impulsive dictators). Our results confirm an inequity aversion attitude among altruistic, impulsive dictators and selfish, reflective dictators.
Abstract: Altruism and behavioral impact on economic decisions became the center of the interest for experimental and behavioral economy. The literature widely reports the results of variety types of dictator games (DG) and cognitive reflection tests (CRT). There is a broad research on donated sum, anonymity of the receiver and dictators’ position (giving vs. taking) in dictator games. Separately research on the CRT evolves from 3 questions to 7 questions variant. However, there is an evident gap in the literature for data that combines these two tools (DG and CRT) in one setup. In this study, we extend existing research on the relationship between cognitive performance on the CRT and dictator decisions taking into account such factors as donated sum, anonymity of the receiver and dictators’ position (giving vs. taking). The main goal is to find out if the cognitive reflection test (CRT) helps to predict rational (or selfish) behavior in a DG. In our investigation, we asked 511 participants to respond to 6 types of dictator games and CRT test. For statistical analysis of the received results, we applied correlation, descriptive statistics, the t-student test and the Mann–Whitney test. Our results show that cognitive reflection was positively correlated with rational (selfish) behavior in DGs. Those dictators who scored high on the CRT (reflective dictators) kept more money for themselves than those who achieved lower scores on the CRT (altruistic, impulsive dictators). Our results confirm an inequity aversion attitude among altruistic, impulsive dictators and selfish, reflective dictators.
Children Use Probability to Infer Other People’s Happiness; & they understand that our happiness with an outcome depends on whether a better or worse outcome was initially more likely
Children Use Probability to Infer Other People’s Happiness. Tiffany Doan, Ori Friedman, Stephanie Denison. CogSci 2018 Proceedings, https://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2018/papers/0314/0314.pdf
Abstract: The ability to infer other people’s emotions is an important aspect of children’s social cognition. Here, we examined whether 4- to 6-year-olds use probability to infer other people’s happiness. Children saw a scenario where a girl receives two desired and two undesired gumballs from a gumball machine and were asked to rate how the girl feel s about this outcome. Children either saw the gumballs come from a machine that had mostly desired gumballs or a machine that had mostly undesired gumballs. Five- and 6-year-olds rated the girl as being happier when the gumballs came from a machine that had mostly undesired gumballs. Four-year-olds, on the other hand, rated the girl’s happiness similarly regardless of whether the machine held mostly desired or undesired gumballs. These findings show that by the age of 5, children use probability to infer happiness. Further, they demonstrate that children understand that our happiness with an outcome depends on whether a better or worse outcome was initially more likely.
Keywords: emotion attribution; happiness; probability; social cognition; cognitive development
Abstract: The ability to infer other people’s emotions is an important aspect of children’s social cognition. Here, we examined whether 4- to 6-year-olds use probability to infer other people’s happiness. Children saw a scenario where a girl receives two desired and two undesired gumballs from a gumball machine and were asked to rate how the girl feel s about this outcome. Children either saw the gumballs come from a machine that had mostly desired gumballs or a machine that had mostly undesired gumballs. Five- and 6-year-olds rated the girl as being happier when the gumballs came from a machine that had mostly undesired gumballs. Four-year-olds, on the other hand, rated the girl’s happiness similarly regardless of whether the machine held mostly desired or undesired gumballs. These findings show that by the age of 5, children use probability to infer happiness. Further, they demonstrate that children understand that our happiness with an outcome depends on whether a better or worse outcome was initially more likely.
Keywords: emotion attribution; happiness; probability; social cognition; cognitive development
Followership evolved as a strategy to solve a range of cooperation and coordination problems in groups (e.g., collective movement, peacekeeping); individuals who lack the physical, psychological, or social capital to be leaders themselves are more likely to emerge as followers
The nature of followership: Evolutionary analysis and review. Nicolas astardoz, Mark Vugt. The Leadership Quarterly, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.09.004
Abstract: From an evolutionary perspective, followership is puzzling because it is not clear why individuals would relinquish their autonomy and set aside their personal goals to follow those of another individual, the leader. This paper analyzes followership from an evolutionary perspective and advances three main conclusions that are not yet part of the leadership literature. First, followership evolved as a strategy to solve a range of cooperation and coordination problems in groups (e.g., collective movement, peacekeeping). Second, individuals who lack the physical, psychological, or social capital to be leaders themselves are more likely to emerge as followers. Third, followership styles, behaviors, and engagement result from (a) variations in the relative pay-offs that accrue to followers vis-à-vis their leader, (b) the adaptive goals pursued by followers, (c) the adaptive challenges that select for different followership styles, and (d) the prevailing leadership style. Together, these conclusions have several implications for followership theory, research, and practice.
Abstract: From an evolutionary perspective, followership is puzzling because it is not clear why individuals would relinquish their autonomy and set aside their personal goals to follow those of another individual, the leader. This paper analyzes followership from an evolutionary perspective and advances three main conclusions that are not yet part of the leadership literature. First, followership evolved as a strategy to solve a range of cooperation and coordination problems in groups (e.g., collective movement, peacekeeping). Second, individuals who lack the physical, psychological, or social capital to be leaders themselves are more likely to emerge as followers. Third, followership styles, behaviors, and engagement result from (a) variations in the relative pay-offs that accrue to followers vis-à-vis their leader, (b) the adaptive goals pursued by followers, (c) the adaptive challenges that select for different followership styles, and (d) the prevailing leadership style. Together, these conclusions have several implications for followership theory, research, and practice.
Those who believe in heaven and those who believe in hell tend to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide; the fear of hell, more so than the reward of heaven, may lead people to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide
Heaven, hell, and attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide. Shane Sharp. Journal of Health Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105318800831
Abstract: Using data from the 2007 Baylor Religion Survey, I evaluate whether beliefs in heaven and hell are associated with attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide. I find that those who believe in heaven and those who believe in hell tend to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide, even when controlling for other religiosity and sociodemographic variables. I also find that the belief in hell mediates the effect of the belief in heaven on attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide, suggesting that the fear of hell, more so than the reward of heaven, may lead people to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide.
Keywords: afterlife, heaven, hell, physician-assisted suicide
Abstract: Using data from the 2007 Baylor Religion Survey, I evaluate whether beliefs in heaven and hell are associated with attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide. I find that those who believe in heaven and those who believe in hell tend to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide, even when controlling for other religiosity and sociodemographic variables. I also find that the belief in hell mediates the effect of the belief in heaven on attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide, suggesting that the fear of hell, more so than the reward of heaven, may lead people to have negative attitudes toward physician-assisted suicide.
Keywords: afterlife, heaven, hell, physician-assisted suicide
The dark triad of personality `predicts how eudaimonic narratives (stories dealing with purpose in life, the human condition, and human virtue) are perceived: inauthentic & corny
Repelled by Virtue? The Dark Triad and Eudaimonic Narratives. Markus Appel, Michael D Slater, Mary Beth Oliver. Media Psychology, accepted September 2018. DOI: 10.1080/15213269.2018.1523014
Abstract: We propose that the dark triad of personality predicts how recipients respond to eudaimonic narratives (stories dealing with purpose in life, the human condition, and human virtue). Matched eudaimonic or non-eudaimonic videos were presented via random assignment. The more individuals lack empathy and organize their world around self-promotion – reflected in the so-called dark triad of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy – the more they perceived the eudaimonic stories (vs. control) to be inauthentic and corny (perceived corniness). This effect translated to a more negative overall evaluation of the eudaimonic videos (moderated mediation). Self-reported feelings of being touched, moved, and inspired (meaningful affect) were largely unaffected by the dark triad, suggesting that these personality factors do not disable emotional responses to eudaimonic narratives.
Abstract: We propose that the dark triad of personality predicts how recipients respond to eudaimonic narratives (stories dealing with purpose in life, the human condition, and human virtue). Matched eudaimonic or non-eudaimonic videos were presented via random assignment. The more individuals lack empathy and organize their world around self-promotion – reflected in the so-called dark triad of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy – the more they perceived the eudaimonic stories (vs. control) to be inauthentic and corny (perceived corniness). This effect translated to a more negative overall evaluation of the eudaimonic videos (moderated mediation). Self-reported feelings of being touched, moved, and inspired (meaningful affect) were largely unaffected by the dark triad, suggesting that these personality factors do not disable emotional responses to eudaimonic narratives.
Over 4 years, substantial numbers of Americans change how they identify along the lines of national origin, sexual orientation, religion, & class
Identity as Dependent Variable: How Americans Shift Their Identities to Better Align With Their Politics. Patrick J. Egan, Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University, September 10, 2018, https://rubenson.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/egan-tpbw18.pdf
Political science generally treats demographic identities as “unmoved movers” in the chain of causality because these identities are conceptualized as being rooted in either ascriptive individual characteristics or hard-to-change aspects of individual experience. Here I hypothesize that the increasingly salient nature of partisanship and ideology as social identities leads liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans to shift their demo- graphic identities to better align with the prototypes of their political groups, and thus the identity groups that make up the left and right coalitions in U.S. politics. I explore the hypothesis with a panel dataset that tracks Americans’ identities and political affiliations over four years. The data show that substantial numbers of Americans change how they identify over this span along the lines of national origin, sexual orientation, religion, and class. Furthermore, identity switching with regard to Latino origin, religion, class, and sexual orientation is significantly predicted by Americans’ partisanship and ideology in their pasts. All of these shifts are in directions that bring Americans’ identities into better alignment with their politics. Politics plays a particularly important role in identification with two identity groups—lesbians, gays and bisexuals, and those identifying as having no religious affiliation—in that the impact of politics on identity is large for these groups relative to their prevalence in the population. In showing how the process of identification can be imbued with politics, these findings both enrich and complicate our efforts to un- derstand the relationship between identity and political behavior and indicate that caution must be taken in treating identities as firm, immovable political phenomena.
Political science generally treats demographic identities as “unmoved movers” in the chain of causality because these identities are conceptualized as being rooted in either ascriptive individual characteristics or hard-to-change aspects of individual experience. Here I hypothesize that the increasingly salient nature of partisanship and ideology as social identities leads liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans to shift their demo- graphic identities to better align with the prototypes of their political groups, and thus the identity groups that make up the left and right coalitions in U.S. politics. I explore the hypothesis with a panel dataset that tracks Americans’ identities and political affiliations over four years. The data show that substantial numbers of Americans change how they identify over this span along the lines of national origin, sexual orientation, religion, and class. Furthermore, identity switching with regard to Latino origin, religion, class, and sexual orientation is significantly predicted by Americans’ partisanship and ideology in their pasts. All of these shifts are in directions that bring Americans’ identities into better alignment with their politics. Politics plays a particularly important role in identification with two identity groups—lesbians, gays and bisexuals, and those identifying as having no religious affiliation—in that the impact of politics on identity is large for these groups relative to their prevalence in the population. In showing how the process of identification can be imbued with politics, these findings both enrich and complicate our efforts to un- derstand the relationship between identity and political behavior and indicate that caution must be taken in treating identities as firm, immovable political phenomena.
Acting on their fantasies was as good or better than expected & it improved relationships, especially those already in good relationships, people with a higher sex drive & thrill-seeking tendencies, & people who adapt to stress & uncertainty
Seven Fascinating Facts About Sexual Fantasies. Justin J Lehmiller. Psychology Today, Oct 01, 2018. https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/the-myths-sex/201810/seven-fascinating-facts-about-sexual-fantasies
3.) While threesomes were the most popular fantasy, they were also the fantasy that was least likely to turn out well when people acted on it. This is probably due, in part, to the fact that different people prefer different threesome scenarios, which may make it challenging for everyone to get what they want. However, it’s probably also due to the fact that most people don’t have a script for how a threesome should go, which means that many people end up in a multi-partner situation with a lot of uncertainty about who should be doing what with whom and when.
7.) For the most part, people who acted on their favorite sex fantasies reported that things turned out well. The numbers varied a bit depending on what it is that they did—and, as mentioned above, group sex was the least likely fantasy to turn out well. Overall, though, most people said that acting on their fantasies was at least as good or better than expected and that it improved their relationship. However, some people were more likely to have positive experiences than others, and that included people who were already in good relationships to start with, people with a higher sex drive and thrill-seeking tendencies, and people who are good at adapting to stress and uncertainty, meaning people who are low in the personality trait of neuroticism.
3.) While threesomes were the most popular fantasy, they were also the fantasy that was least likely to turn out well when people acted on it. This is probably due, in part, to the fact that different people prefer different threesome scenarios, which may make it challenging for everyone to get what they want. However, it’s probably also due to the fact that most people don’t have a script for how a threesome should go, which means that many people end up in a multi-partner situation with a lot of uncertainty about who should be doing what with whom and when.
7.) For the most part, people who acted on their favorite sex fantasies reported that things turned out well. The numbers varied a bit depending on what it is that they did—and, as mentioned above, group sex was the least likely fantasy to turn out well. Overall, though, most people said that acting on their fantasies was at least as good or better than expected and that it improved their relationship. However, some people were more likely to have positive experiences than others, and that included people who were already in good relationships to start with, people with a higher sex drive and thrill-seeking tendencies, and people who are good at adapting to stress and uncertainty, meaning people who are low in the personality trait of neuroticism.
Monday, October 1, 2018
Thoughts about the present and future are frequent, whereas thoughts about the past rare; about the present are common during social interaction, felt pleasant, but lacked to meaningfulness; about the past are relatively unpleasant & involuntary
Roy Baumeister et al. 2018. “Everyday Thoughts in Time: Experience Sampling Studies of Mental Time Travel.” PsyArXiv. October 2. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3cwre
Abstract: Time is an important yet mysterious aspects of human conscious experience. We investigated time in everyday thoughts. Two community samples, contacted at random points for three (Study 1; 6,686 reports) and 14 days (Study 2; 2,361 reports), reported on their most recent thought. Both studies found that thoughts about the present and future were frequent, whereas thoughts about the past were rare. Thoughts about the present were common during social interaction, felt pleasant, but lacked to meaningfulness. Thoughts about the future included desires to satisfy goals and usually involved planning. Thoughts about the past were relatively unpleasant and involuntary. Subjective experiences of past and future thoughts often were similar and differed from present focus, consistent with views that memory and prospection use similar mental structures. Taken together, the present work provides unique insights into the conscious experience of time highlights the pragmatic utility of future thought.
Abstract: Time is an important yet mysterious aspects of human conscious experience. We investigated time in everyday thoughts. Two community samples, contacted at random points for three (Study 1; 6,686 reports) and 14 days (Study 2; 2,361 reports), reported on their most recent thought. Both studies found that thoughts about the present and future were frequent, whereas thoughts about the past were rare. Thoughts about the present were common during social interaction, felt pleasant, but lacked to meaningfulness. Thoughts about the future included desires to satisfy goals and usually involved planning. Thoughts about the past were relatively unpleasant and involuntary. Subjective experiences of past and future thoughts often were similar and differed from present focus, consistent with views that memory and prospection use similar mental structures. Taken together, the present work provides unique insights into the conscious experience of time highlights the pragmatic utility of future thought.
The number of undocumented immigrants in the US, 1990-2016: Conservative estimate is 16.7 million, current estimate is 11.3 million, & mean estimate is 22.1 million, essentially double the current widely accepted estimate
The number of undocumented immigrants in the United States: Estimates based on demographic modeling with data from 1990 to 2016. Mohammad M. Fazel-Zarandi, Jonathan S. Feinstein, Edward H. Kaplan. PLOS One, September 21, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201193
Abstract: We apply standard demographic principles of inflows and outflows to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, using the best available data, including some that have only recently become available. Our analysis covers the years 1990 to 2016. We develop an estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on parameter values that tend to underestimate undocumented immigrant inflows and overstate outflows; we also show the probability distribution for the number of undocumented immigrants based on simulating our model over parameter value ranges. Our conservative estimate is 16.7 million for 2016, nearly fifty percent higher than the most prominent current estimate of 11.3 million, which is based on survey data and thus different sources and methods. The mean estimate based on our simulation analysis is 22.1 million, essentially double the current widely accepted estimate. Our model predicts a similar trajectory of growth in the number of undocumented immigrants over the years of our analysis, but at a higher level. While our analysis delivers different results, we note that it is based on many assumptions. The most critical of these concern border apprehension rates and voluntary emigration rates of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. These rates are uncertain, especially in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, which is when—both based on our modeling and the very different survey data approach—the number of undocumented immigrants increases most significantly. Our results, while based on a number of assumptions and uncertainties, could help frame debates about policies whose consequences depend on the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States.
Abstract: We apply standard demographic principles of inflows and outflows to estimate the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, using the best available data, including some that have only recently become available. Our analysis covers the years 1990 to 2016. We develop an estimate of the number of undocumented immigrants based on parameter values that tend to underestimate undocumented immigrant inflows and overstate outflows; we also show the probability distribution for the number of undocumented immigrants based on simulating our model over parameter value ranges. Our conservative estimate is 16.7 million for 2016, nearly fifty percent higher than the most prominent current estimate of 11.3 million, which is based on survey data and thus different sources and methods. The mean estimate based on our simulation analysis is 22.1 million, essentially double the current widely accepted estimate. Our model predicts a similar trajectory of growth in the number of undocumented immigrants over the years of our analysis, but at a higher level. While our analysis delivers different results, we note that it is based on many assumptions. The most critical of these concern border apprehension rates and voluntary emigration rates of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. These rates are uncertain, especially in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, which is when—both based on our modeling and the very different survey data approach—the number of undocumented immigrants increases most significantly. Our results, while based on a number of assumptions and uncertainties, could help frame debates about policies whose consequences depend on the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States.
Introverts overwhelmingly indicated that they lived in a society where extraversion was more socially desirable than introversion, & most participants held extraversion-deficit beliefs; introverts might be more authentic, & boost their overall well-being, if they could accept their introversion
Quiet Flourishing: The Authenticity and Well-Being of Trait Introverts Living in the West Depends on Extraversion-Deficit Beliefs. Rodney B. Lawn, Gavin R. Slemp, Dianne A. Vella-Brodrick. Journal of Happiness Studies, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-018-0037-5
Abstract: Introversion–extraversion is a particularly salient personality trait, whereby “extraverts” are known to be more outgoing, bold, assertive, active, and cheerful than “introverts”. These extraverted attributes are socially desirable in individualistic Western cultures, and some evidence suggests that extraverts experience better person-environment fit and greater well-being than introverts in these cultures. However, what remains unclear is how living in a context that values and emphasises extraversion may impact upon the well-being of introverts, and how introverts might improve their well-being. This study aimed to explore this question via a moderated mediation model. Adult participants in Australia (N = 349) completed scales of trait introversion–extraversion, dispositional authenticity, and well-being. The extent to which participants wanted to be more extraverted than they were currently—labelled an extraversion-deficit belief—was also measured. Participants overwhelmingly indicated that they lived in a society where extraversion was more socially desirable than introversion, and most participants held extraversion-deficit beliefs. Moderated mediation analysis showed that higher trait introversion–extraversion predicted well-being directly as well as indirectly via dispositional authenticity, but this indirect pathway depended on extraversion-deficit beliefs. Extraversion-deficit beliefs were more important for the authenticity and well-being of introverts than for extraverts. Overall, we interpret our findings to mean that introverts in the West might be more authentic, and hence boost their overall well-being, if they can change their beliefs to become more accepting of their introversion.
Keywords: Introversion Extraversion Well-being Authenticity Beliefs Self-discrepancy
Abstract: Introversion–extraversion is a particularly salient personality trait, whereby “extraverts” are known to be more outgoing, bold, assertive, active, and cheerful than “introverts”. These extraverted attributes are socially desirable in individualistic Western cultures, and some evidence suggests that extraverts experience better person-environment fit and greater well-being than introverts in these cultures. However, what remains unclear is how living in a context that values and emphasises extraversion may impact upon the well-being of introverts, and how introverts might improve their well-being. This study aimed to explore this question via a moderated mediation model. Adult participants in Australia (N = 349) completed scales of trait introversion–extraversion, dispositional authenticity, and well-being. The extent to which participants wanted to be more extraverted than they were currently—labelled an extraversion-deficit belief—was also measured. Participants overwhelmingly indicated that they lived in a society where extraversion was more socially desirable than introversion, and most participants held extraversion-deficit beliefs. Moderated mediation analysis showed that higher trait introversion–extraversion predicted well-being directly as well as indirectly via dispositional authenticity, but this indirect pathway depended on extraversion-deficit beliefs. Extraversion-deficit beliefs were more important for the authenticity and well-being of introverts than for extraverts. Overall, we interpret our findings to mean that introverts in the West might be more authentic, and hence boost their overall well-being, if they can change their beliefs to become more accepting of their introversion.
Keywords: Introversion Extraversion Well-being Authenticity Beliefs Self-discrepancy
High degree of symmetry between the political left & right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs; people on the cultural & economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left
Right‐ and Left‐wing Prejudice Toward Dissimilar Groups in Cultural and Economic Domains. Gabriela Czarnek, Paulina Szwed, Małgorzata Kossowska. European Journal of Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2548
Abstract: According to recent studies, people on both the political right and left show prejudice toward groups whose beliefs are in conflict with their own. This prediction applies both to cultural and economic dimensions of political beliefs. In three studies (N = 499) we demonstrate that people on both the cultural and economic right and left show negative attitudes toward groups on the other side of the given spectrum and that underlying this effect is the perception of value violation. In two out of three studies, we manipulated the extremity of target worldviews to further explore the causal chain between political beliefs, the perception of value violation and prejudice. Our results showed high degree of symmetry between the political left and right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs. However, although people on both sides of the political spectrum show prejudice toward each other, people on the cultural and economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left.
Abstract: According to recent studies, people on both the political right and left show prejudice toward groups whose beliefs are in conflict with their own. This prediction applies both to cultural and economic dimensions of political beliefs. In three studies (N = 499) we demonstrate that people on both the cultural and economic right and left show negative attitudes toward groups on the other side of the given spectrum and that underlying this effect is the perception of value violation. In two out of three studies, we manipulated the extremity of target worldviews to further explore the causal chain between political beliefs, the perception of value violation and prejudice. Our results showed high degree of symmetry between the political left and right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs. However, although people on both sides of the political spectrum show prejudice toward each other, people on the cultural and economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left.
On the genetic & environmental sources of social and political participation in adolescence & early adulthood: Individual environments not shared by family members were the major source of variance for all variables; genetic influences were also pronounced
On the genetic and environmental sources of social and political participation in adolescence and early adulthood. Anna E. Kornadt, Anke Hufer, Christian Kandler, Rainer Riemann. PLOS One, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202518
Abstract: Political participation (POP), social participation (SOP), and political interest (PI) are important indicators of social status and social inequality. Previous studies on related trait differences yielded genetic and environmental contributions. However, focusing on adult samples, classical twin designs, and convenience samples often restricts parameter estimation and generalizability, and limits the understanding of age differences. We investigated sources of variance in POP, SOP, and PI in late adolescence and early adulthood with an extended twin family design (ETFD). We analyzed data from over 2,000 representative German twin families. Individual environments not shared by family members reflected the major source of variance for all variables, but genetic influences were also pronounced. Genetic effects were mostly higher for young adults, whereas effects of twins’ shared environment were significant in adolescence. Our study deepens the understanding of the interplay between genetic and environmental factors in shaping differences in young persons’ integration in society.
Abstract: Political participation (POP), social participation (SOP), and political interest (PI) are important indicators of social status and social inequality. Previous studies on related trait differences yielded genetic and environmental contributions. However, focusing on adult samples, classical twin designs, and convenience samples often restricts parameter estimation and generalizability, and limits the understanding of age differences. We investigated sources of variance in POP, SOP, and PI in late adolescence and early adulthood with an extended twin family design (ETFD). We analyzed data from over 2,000 representative German twin families. Individual environments not shared by family members reflected the major source of variance for all variables, but genetic influences were also pronounced. Genetic effects were mostly higher for young adults, whereas effects of twins’ shared environment were significant in adolescence. Our study deepens the understanding of the interplay between genetic and environmental factors in shaping differences in young persons’ integration in society.
In medieval Europe, pets, farm animals, vermin, and insects could be held accountable for damage to persons and property; entitled to due process, they were represented, tried, and punished – sometimes in public executions
Assignment of culpability to animals as a form of abuse: Historical and cultural perspectives. Kenneth J. Weiss, Laurentine Fromm, Joel Glazer. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2372
Abstract: How the law regards animals reflects cultural trends that have varied widely from antiquity to the present. This article argues that cultural views of animals have shaped laws, attitudes, and practices worldwide. Whereas ancient (biblical and Mesopotamian) practices turned on economics, medieval concepts of animal culpability aligned with Christian beliefs of the primacy of humans. In medieval Europe, pets, farm animals, vermin, and insects could be held accountable for damage to persons and property. Considered entitled to due process, they were represented, tried, and punished – sometimes in public executions. Centuries of regarding animals as property subordinated to humans gave way to animal cruelty laws. It was not until the 19th century that respect for animal welfare, apart from economics, assumed legal significance. Presently, animals are not considered capable of criminal intent but can be “executed” for dangerousness. However, they may possess legal standing as civil complainants in animal rights cases. Contemporary trends include animal rights activism and courts conferring legal personhood to animals. The discussion concludes that there will be disparate approaches worldwide, based on prevailing views of animal sentience, spiritually based concepts and values, litigation arguing property and environmental law, and economics.
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Excerpts:
1 | INTRODUCTION
Unlawful treatment of animals is not acceptable under contemporary standards, whether in the form of gross
maltreatment, neglect, or inhumane food production. Even so, perpetrators are rarely brought before forensic mental
health professionals, as the acts in question typically do not require an analysis of intent (mens rea; Kukor, Davis, &
DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2372
Behav Sci Law. 2018;1–14. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bsl © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
Weiss, 2016). But, turning the kaleidoscope, what do we do when animals damage property or the health and safety
of humans? The obvious, but not too thoughtful, answer is to hold their human owners responsible or summarily –
and lawfully – to terminate the life of the offending animal, without reflecting on its degree of responsibility or
conferring on it due process.
There is a substantial literature documenting how humans have regarded animal rights (Stone, 1972), which has
largely escaped the notice of mental health specialists. This article is an attempt to repair that gap, describing past
cultural beliefs that considered misbehaving animals (and their owners) worthy of adjudication or even criminal
defense, and to note emerging cultural and legal trends in conferring legal status (personhood) on animals. The review
begins with a summary of biblical and polytheistic guidance on human–animal relations before turning to medieval
animal trials. The trials, persisting for centuries, mainly in Europe, raise questions about perceptions of animals' capacity
for “intent” as well as for suffering (sentience). The article recounts the evolution of anti‐cruelty laws and finally
turns to contemporary views of cultural differences in perceptions of humans' relationships with animals and the
nonhuman environment generally.
2 | ANCIENT ORIGINS
There has been intermittent scholarly attention to the adjudication of human–animal conflict in the ancient world, for
example, in the work of Jacob Finkelstein (1973, 1981) on Mesopotamian (ancient Near East) and Judeo‐Christian
cultures. The Western “cosmology” defining relationships between humans and the entirety of the nonhuman environment,
he argues, is established in the biblical Book of Genesis: “The visible universe is for man alone to conquer and
dominate. Man is to rule wisely and justly; he is God's steward, to be sure, but he is to rule and dominate all the same”
(Finkelstein, 1981, p. 8). The Mesopotamian polytheistic culture is not congruent with the Bible's hierarchical concept:
“Far from seeing man as its nucleus or focus, normative Mesopotamian thought perceived the universe as an
ordered entity, a cosmos, entirely apart from the presence of man” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 12). How did ancient laws
define justice in so‐called goring‐ox cases, in which an animal killed a person?
Both biblical and Mesopotamian texts contain prescriptions for adjudicating wrongs: in Exodus, Chapters 21–23,
and in Mesopotamian laws (the Eshnunna rules and the Code of Hammurapi [Hammurabi]), respectively. Finkelstein
(1981) cautioned that only the biblical phrasing can be construed as “laws” in the modern sense. Both frameworks
describe adjudication of goring‐ox cases, considering the animal's prior behavior and its owner's knowledge of it,
the nature of the victim, and the calculus designed not to unduly burden any party. One difference appears to reside
in the biblical allowance for the death penalty for both ox and owner: “If an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox
shall be stoned to death, its flesh may not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is innocent, [but if the owner knew of the
ox's violent propensity], [he] shall be put to death as well” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 20). The Mesopotamian solutions,
emphasizing monetary fines, are closer to tort laws of “economic trespass” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 24), whereby the animal's
owner would pay restitution to the victim. In neither case does the law impute actual criminal intent to animals
or imply a principle of general deterrence.
Biblical accounts of wrongful death by animal (e.g., in Exodus 21:28) reflect the laws of negligent homicide. Culpability
eliminates the animal and deprives the owner of its value (a deodand, something “given to God,” since the
flesh cannot be consumed) (Finkelstein, 1973). Finkelstein's (1981) analysis of biblical law included a lengthy discussion
of the textual differences between the fate of the ox and that of the owner: whereas the ox is to be “stoned” to
death, the owner is “put to death,” suggesting “that the guilt or ‘crime’ of the ox is of a different order than the crime
of its owner” (p. 26). The ox is not executed for murder. The textual proof resides in that, in biblical murder cases, the
mode of execution was never specified. Yet death of the ox by stoning is carried out by the community, for punishment
of an offense against “the corporate community … [that] compromise[s] its most cherished values to the degree
that … [it] places the community in jeopardy” (p. 27). Stoning, a public spectacle reflecting outrage, served a social
function beyond mere pecuniary restitution: restoration of social order, not general deterrence.
Talmudic passages regard animals as capitally culpable for causing human death, except when the act was
inadvertent (Finkelstein, 1981). Finkelstein explained: “In addition to bespeaking the humane concerns of the
talmudical [sic] authorities, this view attests, perhaps even more eloquently than do those instances in which the
ox was to be condemned to stoning, the anthropocentric perspective upon all manner of experience” (p. 32).
Finkelstein (1981) viewed the Talmudic interpretation as “the earliest unambiguous indication that the actions of
an animal may be judged by human criteria to determine guilt or innocence” (p. 32). This is not a unique example
of attributing conscious agency to animals, but it is puzzling how thoughtful scholars reconciled “humane concerns”
with punishments analogous to human adjudications.
Given what, to the contemporary mind, seems a baffling practice, Berman (1994) recalled that, in ancient Greece,
inanimate objects (e.g., statues and pillars) were put on trial as were animals. Both object and animal transgressors
were treated as felons in Greece, as noted in Plato's Laws (Frazer, 1918, p. 422). In ancient Roman and European
times, when inanimate objects caused death, they were confiscated by the Crown (Finkelstein, 1973, p. 186). As
Finkelstein (1973) explained:
The sovereign was the beneficiary of such forefeitures [sic] because he was the incarnate personification of
the transcendent quality of the community, and by his receipt of the forfeiture, the divine wrath which
might have been provoked by the unrequited death of the human victim was thought presumably to
have been averted (pp. 249–250).
Forfeiture was of economic benefit to the crown, which acquired the value of the forfeited animal. Medieval
European law, by contrast, held the animal responsible, not just using its behavior as a pretext for confiscating
property from citizens: “The ox that gored a person to death was treated as a real felon … and was duly executed”
(Finkelstein, 1973, p. 252). Thus, we see a transition between the biblical negligent homicide and the medieval
felonious homicide analyses. This transition brings into focus, as Evans (1906) discussed, that animals came to be
viewed in early modern Europe as bearing “penal” if not “moral” responsibility for homicidal behavior. Forensic professionals
will recognize how this dichotomy is at odds with modern criminal law, which requires that a culpable act
(actus reus) be coupled with a culpable mind (mens rea). The next section recounts a long historical interlude in which
animals were treated as criminally responsible for acts against humans and property. Farm animals, and even insects,
were regarded as proper subjects for jurisprudence, including execution, apparently without the practice itself constituting
cruelty. The historical background is followed by interpretations of the underlying medieval worldview.
Despite the popular belief that primitive cultures were animistic and assessed no differences between humans and othercreatures, ancient cultures that based beliefs on the hierarchical scheme of the Bible tried and executed animals
(Finkelstein, 1981, p. 48). The idea of placing animals in court, as criminal defendants, may today seemfantastical, or even
comic to a degree (Grayshott, 2013). Yet the practice took place,mainly in Europe, over hundreds of years. Evans (1906),
in his now‐classic work on the subject, cataloged such prosecutions from the years 824 until 1906 (pp. 265–286),
predominantly in the 15th to 17th centuries. A partial list of defendants includes rodents, snakes, insects, pigs, cattle,
oxen, chickens, goats, horses, dogs, and snails. Since Evans's book, the fact of animal trials has been substantiated
(Finkelstein, 1981). Evans' findings were first published in a pair of articles in the Atlantic Monthly in 1884 (Evans,
1884a, 1884b). Domestic farm animals, for example, a pig that ate a human infant, were typically tried in secular court,
whereas pests,e.g., mice that ate grain, were often tried in ecclesiastical tribunals (Berman, 1994). It seemed of no concern
to medieval authorities that animals could be subjected to excommunication without first subscribing to Christian
fellowship. The practice was likely a show of power and an anodyne for the citizenry, that someone was taking action.
Animal trials decreased after the 17th century, but little interpretive scholarship existed until the 19th century,
appearing first in Paris and then in Boston (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829). Perhaps this was due to incredulity that the
phenomenon existed (Beirne, 2011). Both the French articles and the American re‐publication reflect doubt and confusion;
Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829, p. 223) began:
We doubted for a long time whether, in the middle ages, those prosecutions against animals, which have
been mentioned by some ancient chroniclers, were ever in fact instituted. Even the ignorance and
superstition of the times did not seem to us a sufficient reason to render their relations credible. How is
it possible to conceive, especially if it be admitted that brutes are mere machines, that any one should
ever have thought of bringing actions against them, since an action requires two parties, one that
attacks and the other that defends, at least by the intervention of attorneys and proctors, and assuredly
animals cannot have such representatives.
Both Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829) and Evans (1906) cited medieval attorney Bartholomew Chassenée (Evans's spelling)
as the principal chronicler or animal trials. Chassenée, the “defender of rats,” made his mark in the eastern French
town of Autun in about 1530. Evans (1906) provided the context:
[Chassenée] made his reputation at the bar as counsel for some rats, which had been put on trial before
the ecclesiastical court of Autun on the charge of having feloniously eaten up and wantonly destroyed
the barley‐crop of that province. On complaint formally presented by the magistracy, the official or
bishop's vicar, who exercised jurisdiction in such cases, cited the culprits to appear on a certain day and
appointed Chassenée to defend them (p. 18).
Evans (1906) lamented that Chassenée's case records have not been preserved, but reassured the reader that the
attorney compiled case summaries in a book published in Latin (Consilium Primum) between 1531 and 1588 (Evans,
1906, p. 21). In Evans's account, full of colorful language and unforgiving about the guilt of the “culprits,” there is
ambiguity as to whether jurisdiction was in civil or ecclesiastical court. Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829) recounted that grain
crops had been ravaged between 1522 and 1530 causing famine. When ordinary extermination was ineffective, the
religious court was asked to excommunicate the rodents, but this, too, failed. The matter reverted to civil authorities,
whereby the prosecutor drew up a bill summoning the rats. When the rats failed to appear, a judgment was brought
against them, but, before final judgment could be brought, “[t]he official, thinking that the accused ought at least to
be defended, appointed Chassenée as their advocate” (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 224). One could cite this as an
early iteration of animal advocacy, though the irony seems to have been lost amid the colorful accounts, mostly
ending in ritual slaughter.
Chassenée employed a series of stall tactics (“dilatory exceptions”): first, that a single summons was inadequate
to inform rats dispersed over many villages. Accordingly, Chassenée had a second summons distributed in a public
location in each parish. When this failed to produce the vermin, he argued that the journey was long and dangerous
(the rats could be preyed upon by cats). When that delay was exhausted, he used an emotional appeal: “What can be
more unjust than these general proscriptions, which overwhelm whole families in one common ruin, which visit the
crime of parents on the children, which destroy indiscriminately those whom tender years or infirmity render equally
incapable of offending?” (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 224).
Ecclesiastical proceedings used threats of excommunication against pests. In 1585, great rainfall produced a
plague of caterpillars in Valence, France: “The walls, the windows, and the chimneys of the houses were covered
with them, even in the cities: it was a lively and hideous representation of the plague of Egypt by locusts”
(Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 225). The grand vicar accused the caterpillars of this affront and appointed a
defender. The prosecution won and the pests were sentenced to quit the diocese. When the caterpillars did
not obey, jurists and theologians consulted, agreeing that excommunication and exile were not indicated; only
strong words, prayer, and holy water. Berriat‐Saint‐Prix's (1829) source noted: “The life of these animals is short,
and these ceremonies having continued several months, received the credit of having miraculously exterminated
them” (p. 225).
A sow was accused of blasphemy in 1394, in Mortaign, France (Bondeson, 1999). It had roamed into a churchand eaten a wafer from the floor. This action led to a legal‐theological crisis. Bondeson (1999) explained:
The priests debated whether this act had transubstantiated the sow's flesh into that of Christ: should it be
slaughtered or revered, and should the wafer be honored even inside the pig's stomach? Finally, they
decided to execute the pig: there was general relief among the curés that when no trace of the wafer
was found within the swine's intestinal canal; in that case, they would have had to eat it to show the
Savior due respect (pp. 140–141).
The early medieval trials took place in or near Switzerland, and later in other European countries, Canada, and
Brazil (Cohen, 1986); they were uncommon in Britain (Beirne, 2011). For wild animals, “the penalty they suffered
was banishment or death by exorcism and excommunication. Nor was that penalty by any means a light one, if it
be true that St Patrick exorcized the reptiles of Ireland into the sea or turned them into stones, and that St Bernard,
by excommunicating the flies that buzzed about him, laid them all out dead on the floor of the church” (Frazer, 1918,
p. 424). One reason ecclesiastical courts handled vermin cases was convenience. Frazer (1918) explained:
It was physically impossible for a common executioner, however zealous, active and robust, to hang,
decapitate, or otherwise execute all the rats, mice, ants, flies, mosquitoes, caterpillars, and other vermin of
a whole district; but what is impossible with man is possible and indeed easy with God … In [tame animal]
cases … justice took its usual course; there was no difficulty at all in arresting the criminals and in
bringing them, after a fair trial, to the gallows, the block, or the stake. That is why in those days vermin
enjoyed the benefit of clergy, while tame animals had to submit to all the rigour of the secular arm (p. 438).
Cohen (1986) disagreed with a sharp distinction between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, suggesting that
church‐based remedies were employed when civil remedies failed.
In a Burgundian town near Switzerland, in 1457, a sow, along with her six piglets, were charged with murdering
and partially consuming a 5‐year‐old child (Chambers, 1883; Cohen, 1986). All seven were imprisoned and, a month
later, tried before a judge. In court were a lawyer, two prosecutors, and many witnesses. The owner (and nominal
defendant) was charged only with negligence (Cohen, 1986). Chambers (1883) included a drawing (Figure 1) with
the following account:
The sow was found guilty and condemned to death; but the pigs were acquitted on account of their youth,
the bad example of their mother, and the absence of direct proof as to their having been concerned in the
eating of the child (pp. 128–129).
The owner did not dispute the execution of the sow, for which a professional hangman was engaged. However, he
would not vouch for the piglets' future behavior, and they were forfeited to “the local lord's justice” (Cohen, 1986, p.
11). What is striking about these proceedings is their “painstaking insistence upon the observance of legal custom
and proper judicial procedure” (Cohen, 1986, p. 11), including paying lawyers and executioners.
Whereas it is straightforward to regard the execution of a sow, for tearing the face off a child, as standard
retributive justice, other transgressions involved beliefs in witchcraft and Satan. An example of this theme is the
oft‐repeated story of the cock that laid an egg, in Bâle (Basel), Switzerland, in 1474 (Chambers, 1883). Chambers
(1883) laid out the case:
The counsel for the prosecution proved that cock's eggs were of priceless value for mixing in certain
magical preparations; that a sorcerer would rather possess a cock's egg than be master of the
philosopher's stone; and that in heathen lands Satan employs witches to hatch such eggs, from which
proceed animals most injurious to Christians (p. 129).
Defense counsel, admitting the act in question, argued that the cock harmed no one and that, since the act was
involuntary, it was not culpable. When counsel challenged the prosecutor to find a precedent for Satan making a deal
with an animal, the prosecutor cited the tale of Jesus and the Gadarene swine, proving that the devil could enteranimals (Chambers, 1883, p. 129). Impressed, the court sentenced the cock to death. The bird was executed as a
sorcerer: burned at the stake along with the egg “with all the solemnity of a regular execution” (Frazer, 1918,
pp. 441–442).
Animals could also serve as witnesses in criminal cases, as Chambers (1883) reported on another Swiss case, possibly
from the 19th century. If a homeowner killed an intruder, there could be a lingering question as to whether the
homeowner enticed the victim and later claimed a burglary attempt. Chambers (1883) explained the solution:
So when a person was killed under such circumstances, the solitary householder was not held innocent,
unless he produced a dog, a cat, or a cock that had been an inmate of the house, and witnessed the
death of the person killed. The owner of the house was compelled to make his declaration of innocence
on oath before one of those animals, and if it did not contradict him, he was considered guiltless; the
law taking for granted, that the Deity would cause a miraculous manifestation, by a dumb animal,
rather than allow a murderer to escape from justice (p. 129).
These permutations of “justice” call for explanations: Did medieval citizens perceive animal trials purely to preserve
the dignity of nonhumans, and was any consideration given to the possibility that the events themselves were
cruel? Humphrey (2013), puzzled by medieval animal trials, listed several possibilities for the human mentality behind
them: mere cruelty (he claimed no evidence for it); primitive mistakes (lack moral development); elimination of social
danger (harm prevention); deterrence; and education (pp. 30–40). There was also a social element involved in the
public events. The execution of a sow in Falaise, in 1386, has been recorded as an example of a public spectacle
(Evans, 1906; Friedland, 2003). The animal had been found guilty of killing a child; the victim was wounded in the
face and arms. Friedland (2003) regarded the execution as a symbolic re‐enactment of a crime:
As punishment it was sentenced to be maimed in the head and forelegs prior to hanging. We might assume
this a simple case of an eye for an eye, rather than an attempt to re‐enact the crime, but several details
FIGURE 1 Trial of a sow and pigs at Lavegny (Chambers, 1883, p 128)
suggest something else: The executioner cut off the sow's snout and affixed in its place the mask of ahuman face; moreover, the sow was dressed in human clothing‐a jacket, breeches, haut‐de‐chausses
(trunk hose worn by boys and men) and gloves (p. 313).
Friedland (2003) suggested that such a ritual not only eliminated the offender but re‐enacted the offense
symbolically to remove the crime. Evans (1906), on the other hand, saw the execution as retaliation (lex talionis).
Having said that, he described the executioner, who was paid and supplied with a new pair of gloves, as “no common
pig‐killer, but a public functionary, a ‘master of high works’” (p. 140). Metaphorically, Evans concluded, the
gloves indicated the executioner's ability to leave the situation with clean hands, guilt‐free, having duly fulfilled his
public role.
Cohen (1986) offered a straightforward explanation for the meaning of medieval animal trials, used in 16th‐century
arguments: that, following Christian teachings, God created humans to have jurisdiction over animals:
[P]laintiffs argued that animals existed solely for the utility of man and should be punished if they acted
contrary to his interests, while the defence countered that God had granted animals the enjoyment of
nature even before the very creation of man … A court that saw itself as possessing the God‐given right
to try all creatures, human and otherwise, had to grant all of them justice (p. 14).
Thus, it can be seen that in the medieval animal trial, citizens debated the question of the relationship of the human
and animal worlds. With humans regarding themselves to be atop the power pyramid, Judeo‐Christian concepts provided
a rationale for ritualized subordination of the rest of the tangible universe. In Cohen's (1986) analysis, it is not
possible to reconcile the civil and ecclesiastical courts existing under a single anthropomorphic view of the world. She
also faulted Finkelstein (1981) for locating medieval animal trials exclusively within the Judeo‐Christian tradition,
citing Western thought, e.g., in Plato's writings: “Finkelstein's explanation fits the context of antiquity, not of the
middle ages” (Cohen, 1986, p. 18).
If animals can be murderers, criminal defendants, and witnesses, what can be inferred about the medieval view of
their mental capacities? It may seem ironic, for example, that the owner of a murderous sow was charged only with
negligence while the porcine defendant was ascribed intent and faced capital sentencing. Srivastava (2007) reflected
on the possible meaning:
I view the animal trials as remarkable not so much because they rendered justiciable a limited range of
delinquent animal conduct (for example, domestic animals were not put on trial for killing each other;
nor were wild animals put on trial for killing humans), but because they did so by attributing partial
legal personhood to those animals (p. 136).
Indeed, as Srivastava (2007) suggested, review of medieval animal trials and their cultural context reveals attitudes
and beliefs which in some ways presaged current trends toward recognition of animal “personhood” in the
law, as well as current controversies in physiologic determinism and assignment of criminal responsibility for humans
(Morse, 2011). As Evans (1906) noted,
A point of practical importance … is relation of moral to penal responsibility. If there is not freedom
of the will and the commission of crime is the necessary result of physiologic idiosyncrasies … over
which the individual has no control … then he is certainly not morally responsible for his conduct.
But is he on this account to be exempted from punishment? [Or is it the case that] punishment
is proper and imperative so far as it is essential to the protection and preservation of society[?]
(p. 210).
These considerations have continued to vex philosophers and jurists. The next section reviews cross‐cultural
variations in regarding the human–animal relations through a system of laws. The significance of the variability is that
culture and spiritual beliefs have an impact on legal practices, resulting in diverse outcomes.
4 | WORLD CULTURESStudying legal customs across time and cultures presents serious methodological issues (Cohen, 1986). Law and custom
exist side by side, but, as Cohen (1986) noted, “Society may create custom, but legislation was the ruler's province”
(p. 7). The culpability of animals has been regarded seriously worldwide, despite differences in approach. In Folk‐Lore in
the Old Testament, Frazer (1918) surveyed approaches to adjudicating offending objects and animals. Citing the goringox
passages in Exodus and the admonition to Noah in Genesis (“Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed”), Frazier noted that blood‐revenge is common among “savage tribes” (p. 415). In Chittagong, India, if a tiger kills a
villager, the entire tribe pursues it, kills it, and eats it. In Indonesia, Frazer (1918) reported, animals and humans differ
only externally but “the inmost nature of the animal is the same as that of a man” (p. 418). Accordingly, killing can take
place on a one‐for‐one basis. Retributive justice can also be found in ancient Persia: “[If] the mad dog, or the dog that
bites without barking, smite a sheep or wound a man, the dog shall pay for it as for wilful murder” (Frazer, 1918, p. 419).
Frazer (1918) inferred, from his research, that primitive cultures, through personification, lost sight of the distinctions
between humans and animals and between humans and objects. He concluded:
In that hazy state of the human mind it was easy and almost inevitable to confound the motives which
actuate a rational man with the impulses which direct a beast, and even with the forces which propel a
stone or a tree in falling. It was in some such mental confusion that savages took deliberate vengeance
on animals and things that had hurt or offended them; and the intellectual fog in which such actions
were possible still obscured the eyes of the primitive legislators who, in various ages and countries, have
consecrated the same barbarous system of retaliation under the solemn forms of law and justice (p. 445).
Western European life was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church in the Medieval Era: “Above all, the Church
had unique access to God and so to eternal life” (Bragg, 2003, p. 100). The rule of law was also a potent cultural influence.
These two institutions were not completely separate, although each had its own bureaucracy and enforcement
system. It is understandable that both proceedings reflected the belief that animals were God's creatures, as much as
humans. Since, as the Bible renders it, animals were created before humans, they were just as deserving of justice.
Both types of proceedings fulfilled social as well as “punitive” purposes. The public spectacle of hanging the pig that
killed demonstrated that the perpetratorwas destroyed, and that the arm of the lawwas long. Ecclesiastical trials were scrupulously
fair, illuminating God'smercy and justice. The excommunication and exile of pests demonstrated that the power of
the Church was great, especially in that it implemented the will of God. If the sentence of the Church was not effective, it
demonstrated that the people were sinful, and therefore that God's plague of pests would continue to afflict them.
The prominent roles of each of these institutions in the trials demonstrate the power of each of them in medieval
society, in accord with the observation of Alexis de Tocqueville (1904): “He who punishes infractions of the law is
therefore the real master of society” (p. 303). In both secular and ecclesiastical trials, the ritual and seriousness of
the proceedings represented the majesty and power of the law and the Church. As the power of faith‐based enforcement
receded, civil legislation brought human–animal relations to a new level: anti‐cruelty laws.
5 | ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
Generally, as a population's ethics and values change, the legislation governing the population changes accordingly.
The development of animal welfare and animal rights laws reflects the changing attitude toward animals since the
19th century. Merz‐Perez and Heide (2004) pointed out that, in 18th‐century Britain, Reverend Humphrey Primatt
called for compassion for animals; his plea went unheeded. The first serious attempts to enact animal welfare laws
began in England in 1809. On 15 May 1809, Lord Erskine introduced before Parliament a bill for the protection of
animals. In support of his bill, Lord Erskine stated, “They [animals] are created, indeed, for our use, but not for our
abuse” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 4). Accordingly, the bill was based on a theory of ownership over animals and
protection of personal property, rather than on an animal's ability to feel pain. Ultimately the bill failed, but the anticruelty
movement gained momentum.
Richard Martin introduced a bill before Parliament on 10 June 1822, known as “Dick Martin's Act … An Act to
Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 4).
[...]
Abstract: How the law regards animals reflects cultural trends that have varied widely from antiquity to the present. This article argues that cultural views of animals have shaped laws, attitudes, and practices worldwide. Whereas ancient (biblical and Mesopotamian) practices turned on economics, medieval concepts of animal culpability aligned with Christian beliefs of the primacy of humans. In medieval Europe, pets, farm animals, vermin, and insects could be held accountable for damage to persons and property. Considered entitled to due process, they were represented, tried, and punished – sometimes in public executions. Centuries of regarding animals as property subordinated to humans gave way to animal cruelty laws. It was not until the 19th century that respect for animal welfare, apart from economics, assumed legal significance. Presently, animals are not considered capable of criminal intent but can be “executed” for dangerousness. However, they may possess legal standing as civil complainants in animal rights cases. Contemporary trends include animal rights activism and courts conferring legal personhood to animals. The discussion concludes that there will be disparate approaches worldwide, based on prevailing views of animal sentience, spiritually based concepts and values, litigation arguing property and environmental law, and economics.
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Excerpts:
1 | INTRODUCTION
Unlawful treatment of animals is not acceptable under contemporary standards, whether in the form of gross
maltreatment, neglect, or inhumane food production. Even so, perpetrators are rarely brought before forensic mental
health professionals, as the acts in question typically do not require an analysis of intent (mens rea; Kukor, Davis, &
DOI: 10.1002/bsl.2372
Behav Sci Law. 2018;1–14. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bsl © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1
Weiss, 2016). But, turning the kaleidoscope, what do we do when animals damage property or the health and safety
of humans? The obvious, but not too thoughtful, answer is to hold their human owners responsible or summarily –
and lawfully – to terminate the life of the offending animal, without reflecting on its degree of responsibility or
conferring on it due process.
There is a substantial literature documenting how humans have regarded animal rights (Stone, 1972), which has
largely escaped the notice of mental health specialists. This article is an attempt to repair that gap, describing past
cultural beliefs that considered misbehaving animals (and their owners) worthy of adjudication or even criminal
defense, and to note emerging cultural and legal trends in conferring legal status (personhood) on animals. The review
begins with a summary of biblical and polytheistic guidance on human–animal relations before turning to medieval
animal trials. The trials, persisting for centuries, mainly in Europe, raise questions about perceptions of animals' capacity
for “intent” as well as for suffering (sentience). The article recounts the evolution of anti‐cruelty laws and finally
turns to contemporary views of cultural differences in perceptions of humans' relationships with animals and the
nonhuman environment generally.
2 | ANCIENT ORIGINS
There has been intermittent scholarly attention to the adjudication of human–animal conflict in the ancient world, for
example, in the work of Jacob Finkelstein (1973, 1981) on Mesopotamian (ancient Near East) and Judeo‐Christian
cultures. The Western “cosmology” defining relationships between humans and the entirety of the nonhuman environment,
he argues, is established in the biblical Book of Genesis: “The visible universe is for man alone to conquer and
dominate. Man is to rule wisely and justly; he is God's steward, to be sure, but he is to rule and dominate all the same”
(Finkelstein, 1981, p. 8). The Mesopotamian polytheistic culture is not congruent with the Bible's hierarchical concept:
“Far from seeing man as its nucleus or focus, normative Mesopotamian thought perceived the universe as an
ordered entity, a cosmos, entirely apart from the presence of man” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 12). How did ancient laws
define justice in so‐called goring‐ox cases, in which an animal killed a person?
Both biblical and Mesopotamian texts contain prescriptions for adjudicating wrongs: in Exodus, Chapters 21–23,
and in Mesopotamian laws (the Eshnunna rules and the Code of Hammurapi [Hammurabi]), respectively. Finkelstein
(1981) cautioned that only the biblical phrasing can be construed as “laws” in the modern sense. Both frameworks
describe adjudication of goring‐ox cases, considering the animal's prior behavior and its owner's knowledge of it,
the nature of the victim, and the calculus designed not to unduly burden any party. One difference appears to reside
in the biblical allowance for the death penalty for both ox and owner: “If an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox
shall be stoned to death, its flesh may not be eaten, but the owner of the ox is innocent, [but if the owner knew of the
ox's violent propensity], [he] shall be put to death as well” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 20). The Mesopotamian solutions,
emphasizing monetary fines, are closer to tort laws of “economic trespass” (Finkelstein, 1981, p. 24), whereby the animal's
owner would pay restitution to the victim. In neither case does the law impute actual criminal intent to animals
or imply a principle of general deterrence.
Biblical accounts of wrongful death by animal (e.g., in Exodus 21:28) reflect the laws of negligent homicide. Culpability
eliminates the animal and deprives the owner of its value (a deodand, something “given to God,” since the
flesh cannot be consumed) (Finkelstein, 1973). Finkelstein's (1981) analysis of biblical law included a lengthy discussion
of the textual differences between the fate of the ox and that of the owner: whereas the ox is to be “stoned” to
death, the owner is “put to death,” suggesting “that the guilt or ‘crime’ of the ox is of a different order than the crime
of its owner” (p. 26). The ox is not executed for murder. The textual proof resides in that, in biblical murder cases, the
mode of execution was never specified. Yet death of the ox by stoning is carried out by the community, for punishment
of an offense against “the corporate community … [that] compromise[s] its most cherished values to the degree
that … [it] places the community in jeopardy” (p. 27). Stoning, a public spectacle reflecting outrage, served a social
function beyond mere pecuniary restitution: restoration of social order, not general deterrence.
Talmudic passages regard animals as capitally culpable for causing human death, except when the act was
inadvertent (Finkelstein, 1981). Finkelstein explained: “In addition to bespeaking the humane concerns of the
talmudical [sic] authorities, this view attests, perhaps even more eloquently than do those instances in which the
ox was to be condemned to stoning, the anthropocentric perspective upon all manner of experience” (p. 32).
Finkelstein (1981) viewed the Talmudic interpretation as “the earliest unambiguous indication that the actions of
an animal may be judged by human criteria to determine guilt or innocence” (p. 32). This is not a unique example
of attributing conscious agency to animals, but it is puzzling how thoughtful scholars reconciled “humane concerns”
with punishments analogous to human adjudications.
Given what, to the contemporary mind, seems a baffling practice, Berman (1994) recalled that, in ancient Greece,
inanimate objects (e.g., statues and pillars) were put on trial as were animals. Both object and animal transgressors
were treated as felons in Greece, as noted in Plato's Laws (Frazer, 1918, p. 422). In ancient Roman and European
times, when inanimate objects caused death, they were confiscated by the Crown (Finkelstein, 1973, p. 186). As
Finkelstein (1973) explained:
The sovereign was the beneficiary of such forefeitures [sic] because he was the incarnate personification of
the transcendent quality of the community, and by his receipt of the forfeiture, the divine wrath which
might have been provoked by the unrequited death of the human victim was thought presumably to
have been averted (pp. 249–250).
Forfeiture was of economic benefit to the crown, which acquired the value of the forfeited animal. Medieval
European law, by contrast, held the animal responsible, not just using its behavior as a pretext for confiscating
property from citizens: “The ox that gored a person to death was treated as a real felon … and was duly executed”
(Finkelstein, 1973, p. 252). Thus, we see a transition between the biblical negligent homicide and the medieval
felonious homicide analyses. This transition brings into focus, as Evans (1906) discussed, that animals came to be
viewed in early modern Europe as bearing “penal” if not “moral” responsibility for homicidal behavior. Forensic professionals
will recognize how this dichotomy is at odds with modern criminal law, which requires that a culpable act
(actus reus) be coupled with a culpable mind (mens rea). The next section recounts a long historical interlude in which
animals were treated as criminally responsible for acts against humans and property. Farm animals, and even insects,
were regarded as proper subjects for jurisprudence, including execution, apparently without the practice itself constituting
cruelty. The historical background is followed by interpretations of the underlying medieval worldview.
Despite the popular belief that primitive cultures were animistic and assessed no differences between humans and othercreatures, ancient cultures that based beliefs on the hierarchical scheme of the Bible tried and executed animals
(Finkelstein, 1981, p. 48). The idea of placing animals in court, as criminal defendants, may today seemfantastical, or even
comic to a degree (Grayshott, 2013). Yet the practice took place,mainly in Europe, over hundreds of years. Evans (1906),
in his now‐classic work on the subject, cataloged such prosecutions from the years 824 until 1906 (pp. 265–286),
predominantly in the 15th to 17th centuries. A partial list of defendants includes rodents, snakes, insects, pigs, cattle,
oxen, chickens, goats, horses, dogs, and snails. Since Evans's book, the fact of animal trials has been substantiated
(Finkelstein, 1981). Evans' findings were first published in a pair of articles in the Atlantic Monthly in 1884 (Evans,
1884a, 1884b). Domestic farm animals, for example, a pig that ate a human infant, were typically tried in secular court,
whereas pests,e.g., mice that ate grain, were often tried in ecclesiastical tribunals (Berman, 1994). It seemed of no concern
to medieval authorities that animals could be subjected to excommunication without first subscribing to Christian
fellowship. The practice was likely a show of power and an anodyne for the citizenry, that someone was taking action.
Animal trials decreased after the 17th century, but little interpretive scholarship existed until the 19th century,
appearing first in Paris and then in Boston (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829). Perhaps this was due to incredulity that the
phenomenon existed (Beirne, 2011). Both the French articles and the American re‐publication reflect doubt and confusion;
Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829, p. 223) began:
We doubted for a long time whether, in the middle ages, those prosecutions against animals, which have
been mentioned by some ancient chroniclers, were ever in fact instituted. Even the ignorance and
superstition of the times did not seem to us a sufficient reason to render their relations credible. How is
it possible to conceive, especially if it be admitted that brutes are mere machines, that any one should
ever have thought of bringing actions against them, since an action requires two parties, one that
attacks and the other that defends, at least by the intervention of attorneys and proctors, and assuredly
animals cannot have such representatives.
Both Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829) and Evans (1906) cited medieval attorney Bartholomew Chassenée (Evans's spelling)
as the principal chronicler or animal trials. Chassenée, the “defender of rats,” made his mark in the eastern French
town of Autun in about 1530. Evans (1906) provided the context:
[Chassenée] made his reputation at the bar as counsel for some rats, which had been put on trial before
the ecclesiastical court of Autun on the charge of having feloniously eaten up and wantonly destroyed
the barley‐crop of that province. On complaint formally presented by the magistracy, the official or
bishop's vicar, who exercised jurisdiction in such cases, cited the culprits to appear on a certain day and
appointed Chassenée to defend them (p. 18).
Evans (1906) lamented that Chassenée's case records have not been preserved, but reassured the reader that the
attorney compiled case summaries in a book published in Latin (Consilium Primum) between 1531 and 1588 (Evans,
1906, p. 21). In Evans's account, full of colorful language and unforgiving about the guilt of the “culprits,” there is
ambiguity as to whether jurisdiction was in civil or ecclesiastical court. Berriat‐Saint‐Prix (1829) recounted that grain
crops had been ravaged between 1522 and 1530 causing famine. When ordinary extermination was ineffective, the
religious court was asked to excommunicate the rodents, but this, too, failed. The matter reverted to civil authorities,
whereby the prosecutor drew up a bill summoning the rats. When the rats failed to appear, a judgment was brought
against them, but, before final judgment could be brought, “[t]he official, thinking that the accused ought at least to
be defended, appointed Chassenée as their advocate” (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 224). One could cite this as an
early iteration of animal advocacy, though the irony seems to have been lost amid the colorful accounts, mostly
ending in ritual slaughter.
Chassenée employed a series of stall tactics (“dilatory exceptions”): first, that a single summons was inadequate
to inform rats dispersed over many villages. Accordingly, Chassenée had a second summons distributed in a public
location in each parish. When this failed to produce the vermin, he argued that the journey was long and dangerous
(the rats could be preyed upon by cats). When that delay was exhausted, he used an emotional appeal: “What can be
more unjust than these general proscriptions, which overwhelm whole families in one common ruin, which visit the
crime of parents on the children, which destroy indiscriminately those whom tender years or infirmity render equally
incapable of offending?” (Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 224).
Ecclesiastical proceedings used threats of excommunication against pests. In 1585, great rainfall produced a
plague of caterpillars in Valence, France: “The walls, the windows, and the chimneys of the houses were covered
with them, even in the cities: it was a lively and hideous representation of the plague of Egypt by locusts”
(Berriat‐Saint‐Prix, 1829, p. 225). The grand vicar accused the caterpillars of this affront and appointed a
defender. The prosecution won and the pests were sentenced to quit the diocese. When the caterpillars did
not obey, jurists and theologians consulted, agreeing that excommunication and exile were not indicated; only
strong words, prayer, and holy water. Berriat‐Saint‐Prix's (1829) source noted: “The life of these animals is short,
and these ceremonies having continued several months, received the credit of having miraculously exterminated
them” (p. 225).
A sow was accused of blasphemy in 1394, in Mortaign, France (Bondeson, 1999). It had roamed into a churchand eaten a wafer from the floor. This action led to a legal‐theological crisis. Bondeson (1999) explained:
The priests debated whether this act had transubstantiated the sow's flesh into that of Christ: should it be
slaughtered or revered, and should the wafer be honored even inside the pig's stomach? Finally, they
decided to execute the pig: there was general relief among the curés that when no trace of the wafer
was found within the swine's intestinal canal; in that case, they would have had to eat it to show the
Savior due respect (pp. 140–141).
The early medieval trials took place in or near Switzerland, and later in other European countries, Canada, and
Brazil (Cohen, 1986); they were uncommon in Britain (Beirne, 2011). For wild animals, “the penalty they suffered
was banishment or death by exorcism and excommunication. Nor was that penalty by any means a light one, if it
be true that St Patrick exorcized the reptiles of Ireland into the sea or turned them into stones, and that St Bernard,
by excommunicating the flies that buzzed about him, laid them all out dead on the floor of the church” (Frazer, 1918,
p. 424). One reason ecclesiastical courts handled vermin cases was convenience. Frazer (1918) explained:
It was physically impossible for a common executioner, however zealous, active and robust, to hang,
decapitate, or otherwise execute all the rats, mice, ants, flies, mosquitoes, caterpillars, and other vermin of
a whole district; but what is impossible with man is possible and indeed easy with God … In [tame animal]
cases … justice took its usual course; there was no difficulty at all in arresting the criminals and in
bringing them, after a fair trial, to the gallows, the block, or the stake. That is why in those days vermin
enjoyed the benefit of clergy, while tame animals had to submit to all the rigour of the secular arm (p. 438).
Cohen (1986) disagreed with a sharp distinction between civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions, suggesting that
church‐based remedies were employed when civil remedies failed.
In a Burgundian town near Switzerland, in 1457, a sow, along with her six piglets, were charged with murdering
and partially consuming a 5‐year‐old child (Chambers, 1883; Cohen, 1986). All seven were imprisoned and, a month
later, tried before a judge. In court were a lawyer, two prosecutors, and many witnesses. The owner (and nominal
defendant) was charged only with negligence (Cohen, 1986). Chambers (1883) included a drawing (Figure 1) with
the following account:
The sow was found guilty and condemned to death; but the pigs were acquitted on account of their youth,
the bad example of their mother, and the absence of direct proof as to their having been concerned in the
eating of the child (pp. 128–129).
The owner did not dispute the execution of the sow, for which a professional hangman was engaged. However, he
would not vouch for the piglets' future behavior, and they were forfeited to “the local lord's justice” (Cohen, 1986, p.
11). What is striking about these proceedings is their “painstaking insistence upon the observance of legal custom
and proper judicial procedure” (Cohen, 1986, p. 11), including paying lawyers and executioners.
Whereas it is straightforward to regard the execution of a sow, for tearing the face off a child, as standard
retributive justice, other transgressions involved beliefs in witchcraft and Satan. An example of this theme is the
oft‐repeated story of the cock that laid an egg, in Bâle (Basel), Switzerland, in 1474 (Chambers, 1883). Chambers
(1883) laid out the case:
The counsel for the prosecution proved that cock's eggs were of priceless value for mixing in certain
magical preparations; that a sorcerer would rather possess a cock's egg than be master of the
philosopher's stone; and that in heathen lands Satan employs witches to hatch such eggs, from which
proceed animals most injurious to Christians (p. 129).
Defense counsel, admitting the act in question, argued that the cock harmed no one and that, since the act was
involuntary, it was not culpable. When counsel challenged the prosecutor to find a precedent for Satan making a deal
with an animal, the prosecutor cited the tale of Jesus and the Gadarene swine, proving that the devil could enteranimals (Chambers, 1883, p. 129). Impressed, the court sentenced the cock to death. The bird was executed as a
sorcerer: burned at the stake along with the egg “with all the solemnity of a regular execution” (Frazer, 1918,
pp. 441–442).
Animals could also serve as witnesses in criminal cases, as Chambers (1883) reported on another Swiss case, possibly
from the 19th century. If a homeowner killed an intruder, there could be a lingering question as to whether the
homeowner enticed the victim and later claimed a burglary attempt. Chambers (1883) explained the solution:
So when a person was killed under such circumstances, the solitary householder was not held innocent,
unless he produced a dog, a cat, or a cock that had been an inmate of the house, and witnessed the
death of the person killed. The owner of the house was compelled to make his declaration of innocence
on oath before one of those animals, and if it did not contradict him, he was considered guiltless; the
law taking for granted, that the Deity would cause a miraculous manifestation, by a dumb animal,
rather than allow a murderer to escape from justice (p. 129).
These permutations of “justice” call for explanations: Did medieval citizens perceive animal trials purely to preserve
the dignity of nonhumans, and was any consideration given to the possibility that the events themselves were
cruel? Humphrey (2013), puzzled by medieval animal trials, listed several possibilities for the human mentality behind
them: mere cruelty (he claimed no evidence for it); primitive mistakes (lack moral development); elimination of social
danger (harm prevention); deterrence; and education (pp. 30–40). There was also a social element involved in the
public events. The execution of a sow in Falaise, in 1386, has been recorded as an example of a public spectacle
(Evans, 1906; Friedland, 2003). The animal had been found guilty of killing a child; the victim was wounded in the
face and arms. Friedland (2003) regarded the execution as a symbolic re‐enactment of a crime:
As punishment it was sentenced to be maimed in the head and forelegs prior to hanging. We might assume
this a simple case of an eye for an eye, rather than an attempt to re‐enact the crime, but several details
FIGURE 1 Trial of a sow and pigs at Lavegny (Chambers, 1883, p 128)
suggest something else: The executioner cut off the sow's snout and affixed in its place the mask of ahuman face; moreover, the sow was dressed in human clothing‐a jacket, breeches, haut‐de‐chausses
(trunk hose worn by boys and men) and gloves (p. 313).
Friedland (2003) suggested that such a ritual not only eliminated the offender but re‐enacted the offense
symbolically to remove the crime. Evans (1906), on the other hand, saw the execution as retaliation (lex talionis).
Having said that, he described the executioner, who was paid and supplied with a new pair of gloves, as “no common
pig‐killer, but a public functionary, a ‘master of high works’” (p. 140). Metaphorically, Evans concluded, the
gloves indicated the executioner's ability to leave the situation with clean hands, guilt‐free, having duly fulfilled his
public role.
Cohen (1986) offered a straightforward explanation for the meaning of medieval animal trials, used in 16th‐century
arguments: that, following Christian teachings, God created humans to have jurisdiction over animals:
[P]laintiffs argued that animals existed solely for the utility of man and should be punished if they acted
contrary to his interests, while the defence countered that God had granted animals the enjoyment of
nature even before the very creation of man … A court that saw itself as possessing the God‐given right
to try all creatures, human and otherwise, had to grant all of them justice (p. 14).
Thus, it can be seen that in the medieval animal trial, citizens debated the question of the relationship of the human
and animal worlds. With humans regarding themselves to be atop the power pyramid, Judeo‐Christian concepts provided
a rationale for ritualized subordination of the rest of the tangible universe. In Cohen's (1986) analysis, it is not
possible to reconcile the civil and ecclesiastical courts existing under a single anthropomorphic view of the world. She
also faulted Finkelstein (1981) for locating medieval animal trials exclusively within the Judeo‐Christian tradition,
citing Western thought, e.g., in Plato's writings: “Finkelstein's explanation fits the context of antiquity, not of the
middle ages” (Cohen, 1986, p. 18).
If animals can be murderers, criminal defendants, and witnesses, what can be inferred about the medieval view of
their mental capacities? It may seem ironic, for example, that the owner of a murderous sow was charged only with
negligence while the porcine defendant was ascribed intent and faced capital sentencing. Srivastava (2007) reflected
on the possible meaning:
I view the animal trials as remarkable not so much because they rendered justiciable a limited range of
delinquent animal conduct (for example, domestic animals were not put on trial for killing each other;
nor were wild animals put on trial for killing humans), but because they did so by attributing partial
legal personhood to those animals (p. 136).
Indeed, as Srivastava (2007) suggested, review of medieval animal trials and their cultural context reveals attitudes
and beliefs which in some ways presaged current trends toward recognition of animal “personhood” in the
law, as well as current controversies in physiologic determinism and assignment of criminal responsibility for humans
(Morse, 2011). As Evans (1906) noted,
A point of practical importance … is relation of moral to penal responsibility. If there is not freedom
of the will and the commission of crime is the necessary result of physiologic idiosyncrasies … over
which the individual has no control … then he is certainly not morally responsible for his conduct.
But is he on this account to be exempted from punishment? [Or is it the case that] punishment
is proper and imperative so far as it is essential to the protection and preservation of society[?]
(p. 210).
These considerations have continued to vex philosophers and jurists. The next section reviews cross‐cultural
variations in regarding the human–animal relations through a system of laws. The significance of the variability is that
culture and spiritual beliefs have an impact on legal practices, resulting in diverse outcomes.
4 | WORLD CULTURESStudying legal customs across time and cultures presents serious methodological issues (Cohen, 1986). Law and custom
exist side by side, but, as Cohen (1986) noted, “Society may create custom, but legislation was the ruler's province”
(p. 7). The culpability of animals has been regarded seriously worldwide, despite differences in approach. In Folk‐Lore in
the Old Testament, Frazer (1918) surveyed approaches to adjudicating offending objects and animals. Citing the goringox
passages in Exodus and the admonition to Noah in Genesis (“Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed”), Frazier noted that blood‐revenge is common among “savage tribes” (p. 415). In Chittagong, India, if a tiger kills a
villager, the entire tribe pursues it, kills it, and eats it. In Indonesia, Frazer (1918) reported, animals and humans differ
only externally but “the inmost nature of the animal is the same as that of a man” (p. 418). Accordingly, killing can take
place on a one‐for‐one basis. Retributive justice can also be found in ancient Persia: “[If] the mad dog, or the dog that
bites without barking, smite a sheep or wound a man, the dog shall pay for it as for wilful murder” (Frazer, 1918, p. 419).
Frazer (1918) inferred, from his research, that primitive cultures, through personification, lost sight of the distinctions
between humans and animals and between humans and objects. He concluded:
In that hazy state of the human mind it was easy and almost inevitable to confound the motives which
actuate a rational man with the impulses which direct a beast, and even with the forces which propel a
stone or a tree in falling. It was in some such mental confusion that savages took deliberate vengeance
on animals and things that had hurt or offended them; and the intellectual fog in which such actions
were possible still obscured the eyes of the primitive legislators who, in various ages and countries, have
consecrated the same barbarous system of retaliation under the solemn forms of law and justice (p. 445).
Western European life was dominated by the Roman Catholic Church in the Medieval Era: “Above all, the Church
had unique access to God and so to eternal life” (Bragg, 2003, p. 100). The rule of law was also a potent cultural influence.
These two institutions were not completely separate, although each had its own bureaucracy and enforcement
system. It is understandable that both proceedings reflected the belief that animals were God's creatures, as much as
humans. Since, as the Bible renders it, animals were created before humans, they were just as deserving of justice.
Both types of proceedings fulfilled social as well as “punitive” purposes. The public spectacle of hanging the pig that
killed demonstrated that the perpetratorwas destroyed, and that the arm of the lawwas long. Ecclesiastical trials were scrupulously
fair, illuminating God'smercy and justice. The excommunication and exile of pests demonstrated that the power of
the Church was great, especially in that it implemented the will of God. If the sentence of the Church was not effective, it
demonstrated that the people were sinful, and therefore that God's plague of pests would continue to afflict them.
The prominent roles of each of these institutions in the trials demonstrate the power of each of them in medieval
society, in accord with the observation of Alexis de Tocqueville (1904): “He who punishes infractions of the law is
therefore the real master of society” (p. 303). In both secular and ecclesiastical trials, the ritual and seriousness of
the proceedings represented the majesty and power of the law and the Church. As the power of faith‐based enforcement
receded, civil legislation brought human–animal relations to a new level: anti‐cruelty laws.
5 | ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS
Generally, as a population's ethics and values change, the legislation governing the population changes accordingly.
The development of animal welfare and animal rights laws reflects the changing attitude toward animals since the
19th century. Merz‐Perez and Heide (2004) pointed out that, in 18th‐century Britain, Reverend Humphrey Primatt
called for compassion for animals; his plea went unheeded. The first serious attempts to enact animal welfare laws
began in England in 1809. On 15 May 1809, Lord Erskine introduced before Parliament a bill for the protection of
animals. In support of his bill, Lord Erskine stated, “They [animals] are created, indeed, for our use, but not for our
abuse” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 4). Accordingly, the bill was based on a theory of ownership over animals and
protection of personal property, rather than on an animal's ability to feel pain. Ultimately the bill failed, but the anticruelty
movement gained momentum.
Richard Martin introduced a bill before Parliament on 10 June 1822, known as “Dick Martin's Act … An Act to
Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 4).
[...]
The frequency of aggressive dreams was predicted by Machiavellianism & psychopathy & of sexual dreams by psychopathy & narcissism; individuals high in psychopahy may simulate evolutionarily relevant actions in their dreams
Dark Dreams Are Made of This: Aggressive and Sexual Dream Content and the Dark Triad of Personality. Minna Lyons et al. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, https://doi.org/10.1177/0276236618803316
Abstract: The Dark Triad (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) of personality has been associated with behaviors that facilitate a fast life history strategy, such as aggressiveness and increased interest in sex. In the present on-line study (N = 265), we investigated the possibility that these personality traits have an association with dream content, namely, increased frequency of sexual and aggressive dreams. In regression analyses, we found that the frequency of aggressive dreams was predicted by Machiavellianism and psychopathy. The frequency of sexual dreams was predicted by psychopathy and narcissism. The results support a number of previous studies, suggesting that especially psychopathy is a manifestation of a fast life history strategy. Further, individuals high in this trait may simulate evolutionarily relevant actions in their dreams.
Keywords: psychopathy, Machiavellianism, narcissism, dreaming, sexual and aggressive dreams, life history strategy
Abstract: The Dark Triad (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) of personality has been associated with behaviors that facilitate a fast life history strategy, such as aggressiveness and increased interest in sex. In the present on-line study (N = 265), we investigated the possibility that these personality traits have an association with dream content, namely, increased frequency of sexual and aggressive dreams. In regression analyses, we found that the frequency of aggressive dreams was predicted by Machiavellianism and psychopathy. The frequency of sexual dreams was predicted by psychopathy and narcissism. The results support a number of previous studies, suggesting that especially psychopathy is a manifestation of a fast life history strategy. Further, individuals high in this trait may simulate evolutionarily relevant actions in their dreams.
Keywords: psychopathy, Machiavellianism, narcissism, dreaming, sexual and aggressive dreams, life history strategy
Sunday, September 30, 2018
Is Something Neurologically Wrong With Donald Trump? James Hamblin. The Atlantic, Jan 3 2018
Is Something Neurologically Wrong With Donald Trump? James Hamblin. The Atlantic, Jan 3 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/01/trump-cog-decline/548759/
Excerpts:
The downplaying of a president’s compromised neurologic status would not be without precedent. Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously disguised his paralysis from polio to avoid appearing “weak or helpless.” He staged public appearances to give the impression that he could walk, leaning on aides and concealing a crutch. Instead of a traditional wheelchair, he used an inconspicuous dining chair with wheels attached. According to the FDR Presidential Library, “The Secret Service was assigned to purposely interfere with anyone who tried to snap a photo of FDR in a ‘disabled or weak’ state.”
Documenting the reality of Roosevelt’s health status fell to journalists, who had been reporting on his polio before his first term. A 1931 analysis in Liberty magazine asked “Is Franklin D. Roosevelt Physically Fit to Be President?” and reported on his paralysis: “It is an amazing possibility that the next president of the United States may be a cripple.” Once he was elected, Time described the preparation of the White House: “Because of the president-elect’s lameness, short ramps will replace steps at the side door of the executive offices leading to the White House.”
Today much more can be known about a person’s neurological status, though little of it is as observable as paraplegia. Unfortunately, the public medical record available to assuage global concerns about the current president’s neurologic status is the attestation of Harold Bornstein, America’s most famous Upper Manhattan gastroenterologist, whose initial doctor’s note described the 71-year-old Trump as “the healthiest individual ever elected to the presidency.”
The phrasing was so peculiar for a medical record that some suggested that Trump had written or dictated the letter himself. Indeed, as a key indicator of neurologic status, Trump’s distinctive diction has not gone without scrutiny. Trump was once a more articulate person who sometimes told stories that had beginnings, middles, and ends, whereas he now leaps from thought to thought. He has come to rely on a small stable of adjectives, often involving superlatives. An improbably high proportion of what he describes is either the greatest or the worst he’s ever seen; absolutely terrible or the best; tiny or huge.
The frontal lobes also control speech, and over the years, Donald Trump’s fluency has regressed and his vocabulary contracted. In May of last year, the journalist Sharon Begley at Stat analyzed changes in his speech patterns during interviews over the years. She noted that in the 1980s and 1990s, Trump used phrases like “a certain innate intelligence” and “These are the only casinos in the United States that are so rated.” I would add, “I think Jesse Jackson has done himself very proud.”
[...]
Ben Michaelis, a psychologist who analyzes speech as part of cognitive assessments in court cases, told Begley that although some decline in cognitive functioning would be expected, Trump has exhibited a “clear reduction in linguistic sophistication over time” with “simpler word choices and sentence structure.”
Excerpts:
The downplaying of a president’s compromised neurologic status would not be without precedent. Franklin Delano Roosevelt famously disguised his paralysis from polio to avoid appearing “weak or helpless.” He staged public appearances to give the impression that he could walk, leaning on aides and concealing a crutch. Instead of a traditional wheelchair, he used an inconspicuous dining chair with wheels attached. According to the FDR Presidential Library, “The Secret Service was assigned to purposely interfere with anyone who tried to snap a photo of FDR in a ‘disabled or weak’ state.”
Documenting the reality of Roosevelt’s health status fell to journalists, who had been reporting on his polio before his first term. A 1931 analysis in Liberty magazine asked “Is Franklin D. Roosevelt Physically Fit to Be President?” and reported on his paralysis: “It is an amazing possibility that the next president of the United States may be a cripple.” Once he was elected, Time described the preparation of the White House: “Because of the president-elect’s lameness, short ramps will replace steps at the side door of the executive offices leading to the White House.”
Today much more can be known about a person’s neurological status, though little of it is as observable as paraplegia. Unfortunately, the public medical record available to assuage global concerns about the current president’s neurologic status is the attestation of Harold Bornstein, America’s most famous Upper Manhattan gastroenterologist, whose initial doctor’s note described the 71-year-old Trump as “the healthiest individual ever elected to the presidency.”
The phrasing was so peculiar for a medical record that some suggested that Trump had written or dictated the letter himself. Indeed, as a key indicator of neurologic status, Trump’s distinctive diction has not gone without scrutiny. Trump was once a more articulate person who sometimes told stories that had beginnings, middles, and ends, whereas he now leaps from thought to thought. He has come to rely on a small stable of adjectives, often involving superlatives. An improbably high proportion of what he describes is either the greatest or the worst he’s ever seen; absolutely terrible or the best; tiny or huge.
The frontal lobes also control speech, and over the years, Donald Trump’s fluency has regressed and his vocabulary contracted. In May of last year, the journalist Sharon Begley at Stat analyzed changes in his speech patterns during interviews over the years. She noted that in the 1980s and 1990s, Trump used phrases like “a certain innate intelligence” and “These are the only casinos in the United States that are so rated.” I would add, “I think Jesse Jackson has done himself very proud.”
[...]
Ben Michaelis, a psychologist who analyzes speech as part of cognitive assessments in court cases, told Begley that although some decline in cognitive functioning would be expected, Trump has exhibited a “clear reduction in linguistic sophistication over time” with “simpler word choices and sentence structure.”
What determines how couples feel after a conflict: The negative & positive peaks, but not the end emotion, predicted immediate & partly extended post‐conflict affect in individuals
A Test of the Peak‐End Rule in Couples’ Conflict Discussions. Laura Sels, Eva Ceulemans, Peter Kuppens. European Journal of Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2547
Abstract: Despite its importance for well‐being, surprisingly little is known about what determines how couples feel after a conflict. Based on the peak‐end rule, we examined whether partners’ post‐conflict affect was mainly predicted by their most aversive or pleasant emotional experience (peaks) during the conflict, or by the emotional tone at the end of the interaction. 101 couples engaged in a conflict interaction and afterwards evaluated their momentary affect during the interaction. Post‐conflict affect (in terms of positive and negative feelings, and perceived partner responsiveness) was assessed immediately after the conflict, after a subsequent positive discussion, and upon returning to daily life (here, rumination about the relationship was assessed as well). Our results showed that the negative and positive peaks, but not the end emotion, predicted immediate and partly extended post‐conflict affect in individuals. This finding has clinical implications for the remediation of couple conflict.
Abstract: Despite its importance for well‐being, surprisingly little is known about what determines how couples feel after a conflict. Based on the peak‐end rule, we examined whether partners’ post‐conflict affect was mainly predicted by their most aversive or pleasant emotional experience (peaks) during the conflict, or by the emotional tone at the end of the interaction. 101 couples engaged in a conflict interaction and afterwards evaluated their momentary affect during the interaction. Post‐conflict affect (in terms of positive and negative feelings, and perceived partner responsiveness) was assessed immediately after the conflict, after a subsequent positive discussion, and upon returning to daily life (here, rumination about the relationship was assessed as well). Our results showed that the negative and positive peaks, but not the end emotion, predicted immediate and partly extended post‐conflict affect in individuals. This finding has clinical implications for the remediation of couple conflict.
The role of audience availability in fake news consumption: The fake news audience comprises a small, disloyal group of heavy Internet users; social network sites play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news
The small, disloyal fake news audience: The role of audience availability in fake news consumption. Jacob L Nelson, Harsh Taneja. New Media & Society, https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444818758715
Abstract: In light of the recent US election, many fear that “fake news” has become a force of enormous reach and influence within the news media environment. We draw on well-established theories of audience behavior to argue that the online fake news audience, like most niche content, would be a small subset of the total news audience, especially those with high availability. By examining online visitation data across mobile and desktop platforms in the months leading up to and following the 2016 presidential election, we indeed find the fake news audience comprises a small, disloyal group of heavy Internet users. We also find that social network sites play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news. With this revised understanding, we revisit the democratic implications of the fake news crisis.
Keywords: 2016 Elections, Fake News, News Audience, Audience Availability, Double Jeopardy, Social Media, Audience Fragmentation, Elections, Mobile Internet
Check also
All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:
Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:
In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Abstract: In light of the recent US election, many fear that “fake news” has become a force of enormous reach and influence within the news media environment. We draw on well-established theories of audience behavior to argue that the online fake news audience, like most niche content, would be a small subset of the total news audience, especially those with high availability. By examining online visitation data across mobile and desktop platforms in the months leading up to and following the 2016 presidential election, we indeed find the fake news audience comprises a small, disloyal group of heavy Internet users. We also find that social network sites play an outsized role in generating traffic to fake news. With this revised understanding, we revisit the democratic implications of the fake news crisis.
Keywords: 2016 Elections, Fake News, News Audience, Audience Availability, Double Jeopardy, Social Media, Audience Fragmentation, Elections, Mobile Internet
Check also
All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:
Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias. Harold Pashler, Gail Heriot. Royal Society Open Science, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/all-interactions-took-form-of-subjects.htmlWhen do we care about political neutrality? The hypocritical nature of reaction to political bias. Omer Yair, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. PLOS, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/when-do-we-care-about-political.html
Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:
Pereira, Andrea, and Jay Van Bavel. 2018. “Identity Concerns Drive Belief in Fake News.” PsyArXiv. September 11. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/democrats-republicans-were-both-more.html
In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
Summary: A simple test taken by millions of people reveals that virtually everybody has implicit biases that they are unaware of and that may clash with their explicit beliefs. From policing to scientific publishing, all activities that deal with people are at risk of making wrong decisions due to bias. Raising awareness is the first step towards improving the outcomes.
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.html
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.
Keywords: politically motivated reasoning, curiosity, science communication, risk perception
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Saturday, September 29, 2018
Democracy Does Cause Growth by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving the provision of public goods, & reducing social unrest
Democracy Does Cause Growth. Daron Acemoglu, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, James A. Robinson. Apr 2017, accepted Sep 2018. Journal of Political Economy, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/700936
Abstract: We provide evidence that democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP percapita. Our empirical strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy on economic growth. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new dichotomous measure of democracy that consolidates the information from several sources. Our baseline results use a dynamic panel model for GDP, and show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run. We find similar effects of democratizations on annual GDP when we control for the estimated propensity of a country to democratize based on past GDP dynamics. We obtain comparable estimates when we instrument democracy using regional waves of democratizations and reversals. Our results suggest that democracy increases GDP by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving the provision of public goods, and reducing social unrest. We find little support for the view that democracy is a constraint on economic growth for less developed economies.
Keywords: Democracy, Growth, Political Development.
JEL Classification: P16, O10.
Abstract: We provide evidence that democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP percapita. Our empirical strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy on economic growth. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new dichotomous measure of democracy that consolidates the information from several sources. Our baseline results use a dynamic panel model for GDP, and show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run. We find similar effects of democratizations on annual GDP when we control for the estimated propensity of a country to democratize based on past GDP dynamics. We obtain comparable estimates when we instrument democracy using regional waves of democratizations and reversals. Our results suggest that democracy increases GDP by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving the provision of public goods, and reducing social unrest. We find little support for the view that democracy is a constraint on economic growth for less developed economies.
Keywords: Democracy, Growth, Political Development.
JEL Classification: P16, O10.
Grandparenting, education and subjective well-being of older Europeans: Grandparental childcare (either intensive or not) is generally associated with higher SWB
Grandparenting, education and subjective well-being of older Europeans. Bruno Arpino, Valeria Bordone, Nicoletta Balbo. European Journal of Ageing, September 2018, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 251–263. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10433-018-0467-2
Abstract: We study whether grandparenthood is associated with older people’s subjective well-being (SWB), considering the association with life satisfaction of having grandchildren per se, their number, and of the provision of grandchild care. Older people’s education may not only be an important confounder to control for, but also a moderator in the relation between grandparenthood-related variables and SWB. We investigate these issues by adopting a cross-country comparative perspective and using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe covering 20 countries. Our results show that grandparenthood has a stronger positive association with SWB in countries where intensive grandparental childcare is not common and less socially expected. Yet, this result is driven by a negative association between grandparenthood without grandparental childcare and SWB that we only found in countries where intensive grandparental childcare is widespread. Therefore, in accordance with the structural ambivalence theory, we argue that in countries where it is socially expected for grandparents to have a role as providers of childcare, not taking on such a role may negatively influence SWB. However, our results show that grandparental childcare (either intensive or not) is generally associated with higher SWB. Overall, we do not find support for a moderating effect of education. We also do not find striking differences by gender in the association between grandparenthood and SWB. The only noteworthy discrepancy refers to grandmothers being often more satisfied when they provide grandchild care.
Abstract: We study whether grandparenthood is associated with older people’s subjective well-being (SWB), considering the association with life satisfaction of having grandchildren per se, their number, and of the provision of grandchild care. Older people’s education may not only be an important confounder to control for, but also a moderator in the relation between grandparenthood-related variables and SWB. We investigate these issues by adopting a cross-country comparative perspective and using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe covering 20 countries. Our results show that grandparenthood has a stronger positive association with SWB in countries where intensive grandparental childcare is not common and less socially expected. Yet, this result is driven by a negative association between grandparenthood without grandparental childcare and SWB that we only found in countries where intensive grandparental childcare is widespread. Therefore, in accordance with the structural ambivalence theory, we argue that in countries where it is socially expected for grandparents to have a role as providers of childcare, not taking on such a role may negatively influence SWB. However, our results show that grandparental childcare (either intensive or not) is generally associated with higher SWB. Overall, we do not find support for a moderating effect of education. We also do not find striking differences by gender in the association between grandparenthood and SWB. The only noteworthy discrepancy refers to grandmothers being often more satisfied when they provide grandchild care.
Obituary notices will be less direct/less emotional in the language used for females than for males: Males tend to die, females tend to pass away
Males tend to die, females tend to pass away. F. Richard Ferraro. Death Studies, https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2018.1515127
Abstract: The hypothesis that obituary notices will be less direct/less emotional in the language used for females than for males was tested. A total of 703 consecutive obituaries were examined in a local newspaper and instances of whether the person died or passed away was noted for males and females. A 2 (gender) × 2 (died, passed away) Chi-Square analysis supported the hypothesis: X2 (1) = 8.87, p < .01. Thus, males are more likely to die, whereas females are more likely to pass away.
Abstract: The hypothesis that obituary notices will be less direct/less emotional in the language used for females than for males was tested. A total of 703 consecutive obituaries were examined in a local newspaper and instances of whether the person died or passed away was noted for males and females. A 2 (gender) × 2 (died, passed away) Chi-Square analysis supported the hypothesis: X2 (1) = 8.87, p < .01. Thus, males are more likely to die, whereas females are more likely to pass away.
50.43% considered it very important that he ejaculates during intercourse; 18.3% preferred before they reach orgasm, whereas for 53.5% this did not matter; 22.6% experienced a more intense orgasm when he ejaculated during vaginal intercourse
Burri A, Buchmeier J, Porst H. The importance of male ejaculation for female sexual satisfaction and function. J Sex Med 2018;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2018.08.014
Abstract
Introduction: Although links between ejaculatory control or intravaginal ejaculatory latency time and female sexual functioning have frequently been reported in the past, no study has investigated the importance of other male ejaculatory characteristics, such as ejaculation volume and intensity, for women’s sexuality.
Aim: To assess the importance of subjectively perceived ejaculation intensity and ejaculation volume for female sexual function and satisfaction.
Methods:This was a cross-sectional online survey including 240 sexually active, heterosexual women (median age 27.4 years), using study-specific questions and validated questionnaires.
Main Outcome Measure: Results are presented as means, percentages, and age-controlled partial correlation coefficients of the main study variables.
Results: 50.43% of women considered it very important that the partner ejaculates during intercourse. 18.3% of women preferred that the partner ejaculates before they reach orgasm, whereas for 53.5% this did not matter. 22.6% of women stated that they experienced a more intense orgasm when their partner ejaculated during vaginal intercourse. 17.4% reported that they definitely experienced a more intensive orgasm depending on the intensity of their partner’s ejaculation, whereas for 17.8% this did not matter at all. 20.9% of women did not feel that their orgasm was more intense depending on the subjectively felt ejaculate quantity, whereas the majority (37.9%) stated that it did not matter. 13.1% of women regarded the quantity of expelled ejaculate as an expression of their own sexual attractiveness. Women stating that they experienced more intense orgasms when the partner ejaculated, when the partner experienced a more intense ejaculation, and when he expelled a greater ejaculate quantity also reported better lifelong orgasmic function (r = 0.24, r = 0.15, r = .26, respectively) and more lifelong sexual satisfaction (r = .29, r = .15, r = 26, respectively).
Clinical Implications: The perception of ejaculatory characteristics can be related to the female partner’s sexual satisfaction and overall sexual functioning.
Strength & Limitations: This is the very first study to explore the importance of male ejaculation volume and intensity for women’s sexual functioning. Data are of self-report nature and ejaculation characteristics were not objectively measured but by women’s self-report.
Conclusion: Although male ejaculation and its different aspects seem to play an important role for women, the study demonstrates a considerable variability of women’s attitudes toward ejaculatory characteristics. Further research is required to examine the sources of this variability.
Abstract
Introduction: Although links between ejaculatory control or intravaginal ejaculatory latency time and female sexual functioning have frequently been reported in the past, no study has investigated the importance of other male ejaculatory characteristics, such as ejaculation volume and intensity, for women’s sexuality.
Aim: To assess the importance of subjectively perceived ejaculation intensity and ejaculation volume for female sexual function and satisfaction.
Methods:This was a cross-sectional online survey including 240 sexually active, heterosexual women (median age 27.4 years), using study-specific questions and validated questionnaires.
Main Outcome Measure: Results are presented as means, percentages, and age-controlled partial correlation coefficients of the main study variables.
Results: 50.43% of women considered it very important that the partner ejaculates during intercourse. 18.3% of women preferred that the partner ejaculates before they reach orgasm, whereas for 53.5% this did not matter. 22.6% of women stated that they experienced a more intense orgasm when their partner ejaculated during vaginal intercourse. 17.4% reported that they definitely experienced a more intensive orgasm depending on the intensity of their partner’s ejaculation, whereas for 17.8% this did not matter at all. 20.9% of women did not feel that their orgasm was more intense depending on the subjectively felt ejaculate quantity, whereas the majority (37.9%) stated that it did not matter. 13.1% of women regarded the quantity of expelled ejaculate as an expression of their own sexual attractiveness. Women stating that they experienced more intense orgasms when the partner ejaculated, when the partner experienced a more intense ejaculation, and when he expelled a greater ejaculate quantity also reported better lifelong orgasmic function (r = 0.24, r = 0.15, r = .26, respectively) and more lifelong sexual satisfaction (r = .29, r = .15, r = 26, respectively).
Clinical Implications: The perception of ejaculatory characteristics can be related to the female partner’s sexual satisfaction and overall sexual functioning.
Strength & Limitations: This is the very first study to explore the importance of male ejaculation volume and intensity for women’s sexual functioning. Data are of self-report nature and ejaculation characteristics were not objectively measured but by women’s self-report.
Conclusion: Although male ejaculation and its different aspects seem to play an important role for women, the study demonstrates a considerable variability of women’s attitudes toward ejaculatory characteristics. Further research is required to examine the sources of this variability.
People with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases; also linked to illusion of viewing the partner as especially attractive
Carswell, K. L., Finkel, E. J., & Kumashiro, M. (in press). Creativity and romantic passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://eprints.goldsmiths.ac.uk/24388/1/Carswell%20et%20al%20Creativity%20and%20Passion%20in%20Presss%20JPSP.pdf
Abstract: Romantic passion typically declines over time, but a downward trajectory is not inevitable. Across three studies (one of which encompassed two sub-studies), we investigated whether creativity helps bolster romantic passion in established relationships. Studies 1A and 1B revealed that people with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases. Studies 2 and 3 explored positive illusions about the partner’s physical attractiveness as a possible mediator of the effect of creativity on passion. Cross-lagged panel analyses in Study 2 indicated that being creative is linked to a tendency to view the partner as especially attractive, even relative to the partner’s own self-assessment. Path analyses in Study 3 provided longitudinal evidence consistent with the hypothesis that positive illusions about the partner’s attractiveness (participant’s assessments, controlling for objective coding of the partner’s attractiveness) mediate the link between creativity and changes in passion over time. Study 3 also provided longitudinal evidence of the buffering effect of creativity on passion trajectories over time, an effect that emerged not only for self- reported passion, but also for objectively coded passion during a laboratory-based physical intimacy task nine months later. A meta-analytic summary across studies revealed a significant overall main effect of creativity on passion, as well as a significant moderation effect of creativity on risks of passion decline (e.g., relationship length).
Keywords: passion, creativity, positive illusions, physical attractiveness, close relationships
Abstract: Romantic passion typically declines over time, but a downward trajectory is not inevitable. Across three studies (one of which encompassed two sub-studies), we investigated whether creativity helps bolster romantic passion in established relationships. Studies 1A and 1B revealed that people with highly creative personalities report not only greater overall passion, but also an attenuation in the tendency for passion to decline as relationship duration increases. Studies 2 and 3 explored positive illusions about the partner’s physical attractiveness as a possible mediator of the effect of creativity on passion. Cross-lagged panel analyses in Study 2 indicated that being creative is linked to a tendency to view the partner as especially attractive, even relative to the partner’s own self-assessment. Path analyses in Study 3 provided longitudinal evidence consistent with the hypothesis that positive illusions about the partner’s attractiveness (participant’s assessments, controlling for objective coding of the partner’s attractiveness) mediate the link between creativity and changes in passion over time. Study 3 also provided longitudinal evidence of the buffering effect of creativity on passion trajectories over time, an effect that emerged not only for self- reported passion, but also for objectively coded passion during a laboratory-based physical intimacy task nine months later. A meta-analytic summary across studies revealed a significant overall main effect of creativity on passion, as well as a significant moderation effect of creativity on risks of passion decline (e.g., relationship length).
Keywords: passion, creativity, positive illusions, physical attractiveness, close relationships
Why Doesn't Diversity Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia
Why Doesn't Diversity Training Work? The Challenge for Industry and Academia. Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev. Anthropology Now, Volume 10, 2018 - Issue 2. https://doi.org/10.1080/19428200.2018.1493182
Starbucks’ decision to put 175,000 workers through diversity training on May 29, in the wake of the widely publicized arrest of two black men in a Philadelphia store, put diversity training back in the news. But corporations and universities have been doing diversity training for decades. Nearly all Fortune 500 companies do training, and two-thirds of colleges and universities have training for faculty according to our 2016 survey of 670 schools. Most also put freshmen through some sort of diversity session as part of orientation. Yet hundreds of studies dating back to the 1930s suggest that antibias training does not reduce bias, alter behavior or change the workplace.
We have been speaking to employers about this research for more than a decade, with the message that diversity training is likely the most expensive, and least effective, diversity program around. But they persist, worried about the optics of getting rid of training, concerned about litigation, unwilling to take more difficult but consequential steps or simply in the thrall of glossy training materials and their purveyors. That colleges and universities in the United States persist in offering training to faculty and students, and even mandate it (29% of all schools require faculty to undergo training), is particularly surprising given that the research on the poor performance of training comes out of academia. Imagine university health centers continuing to prescribe vitamin C for the common cold.
Corporate antibias training was stimulated by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and legal reforms that movement brought about. Federal agencies took the lead, and by the end of 1971, the Social Security Administration had put 50,000 staffers through racial bias training. By 1976, 60 percent of big companies offered equal-opportunity training. In the 1980s, as Reagan tried to tear down affirmative action regulations and appointed Clarence Thomas to run the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, trainers began to make a business case for what they called “diversity training.” They argued that women and minorities would soon be the backbone of the workforce and that employers needed to figure out how to better incorporate them. By 2005, 65 percent of large firms offered diversity training. Consultants have heralded training as essential for increasing diversity, corporate counsel have advised that it is vital for fending off lawsuits and plaintiffs have asked for it in most discrimination settlements.1
Yet two-thirds of human resources specialists report that diversity training does not have positive effects, and several field studies have found no effect of diversity training on women’s or minorities’ careers or on managerial diversity.2 These findings are not surprising. There is ample evidence that training alone does not change attitudes or behavior, or not by much and not for long. In their review of 985 studies of antibias interventions, Paluck and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31 organizational studies using pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik and Roberson identified 27 that documented improved knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of the items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn identified only five that examined long-term effects on bias, two showing positive effects, two negative, and one no effect.3
A number of recent studies of antibias training used the implicit association test (IAT) before and after to assess whether unconscious bias can be affected by training. A meta-analysis of 426 studies found weak immediate effects on unconscious bias and weaker effects on explicit bias. A side-byside test of 17 interventions to reduce white bias toward blacks found that eight reduced unconscious bias, but in a follow-up examining eight implicit bias interventions and one sham, all nine worked, suggesting that subjects may have learned how to game the bias test.4 Effects dissipated within a few days.
Most of these studies look at interventions that mirror corporate and university training in intensity and duration. One important study by Patricia Devine and colleagues suggests that a more extensive curriculum, based in strategies proven effective in the lab, can reduce measured bias.5 That 12-week intervention, which took the form of a college course and included a control group, worked best for people who were concerned about discrimination and who did the exercises — best when preaching to the converted. We do not see employers jumping on this costly bandwagon. Consider Starbucks, which closed 8,000 stores for half a day to train 175,000 workers, at an estimated cost of $12 million in lost business alone. Starbucks hires 100,000 new workers each year, and to match the Devine intervention they would need a dozen halfday sessions, every year, for more than half the workforce. Unlikely they would go that far, even if the logistics of scaling a classroom intervention to 100,000 people could be worked out.
Despite the poor showing of antibias training in academic studies, it remains the go-to solution for corporate executives and university administrators facing public relations crises, campus intolerance and slow progress on diversifying the executive and faculty ranks. Why is diversity training not more effective? If we can answer that question, perhaps we can fix it. Five different lines of research suggest why it may fail.
First, short-term educational interventions in general do not change people. This should come as no surprise to anthropologists. Decades of research on workplace training of all sorts suggests that by itself, training does not do much. Take workplace safety and health training which, it stands to reason, employees have an interest in paying attention to. Alone, it does little to change attitudes or behavior. If you cannot train workers to attach the straps on their hard hats, it may be wellnigh impossible to get them to give up biases that they have acquired over a lifetime of media exposure and real-world experience. Second, some have argued that antibias training activates stereotypes. Field and laboratory studies find that asking people to suppress stereotypes tends to reinforce them — making them more cognitively accessible to people.6 Try not thinking about elephants.
Diversity training typically encourages people to recognize and fight the stereotypes they hold, and this may simply be counterproductive. Third, recent research suggests that training inspires unrealistic confidence in antidiscrimination programs, making employees complacent about their own biases. In the lab, Castilla and Benard found that when experimenters described subjects’ employers as nondiscriminatory, subjects did not censor their own gender biases.7 Employees who go through diversity training may not, subsequently, take responsibility for avoiding discrimination. Kaiser and colleagues found that when subjects are told that their employers have prodiversity measures such as training, they presume that the workplace is free of bias and react harshly to claims of discrimination.8 More generally, in experiments, the presence of workplace diversity programs seems to blind employees to hard evidence of discrimination.9
Fourth, others find that training leaves whites feeling left out. Plaut and colleagues found the message of multiculturalism, which is common in training, makes whites feel excluded and reduces their support for diversity, relative to the message of colorblindness, which is rare these days. Whites generally feel they will not be treated fairly in workplaces with prodiversity messages.10
Perhaps this is why trainers frequently report hostility and resistance, and trainees often leave “confused, angry, or with more animosity toward” other groups.11 The trouble is, when African-Americans work with whites who take a color-blind stance (rather than a multicultural stance), it alienates them, reducing their psychological engagement at work and quite possibly reducing their likelihood of staying on.12 So perhaps trainers cannot win with a message of either multiculturalism or color-blindness.
Fifth, we know from a large body of organizational research that people react negatively to efforts to control them. Jobautonomy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy. Self-determination research shows that when organizations frame motivation for pursuing a goal as originating internally, commitment rises, but when they frame motivation as originating externally, rebellion increases. Legault, Gutsell and Inzlicht found this to be true in the case of antibias training. Kidder and colleagues showed that when diversity programs are introduced with an external rationale — avoiding lawsuit — participants were more resistant than when they were introduced with an organizational rationale — management needs. In experiments, whites resented external pressure to control prejudice against blacks, and when experimenters asked people to reduce bias, they responded by increasing bias unless they saw the desire to control prejudice as voluntary.13 Thus Robin Ely and David Thomas found that a discrimination/fairness framing of diversity efforts, which evokes legal motives, is less effective than an integration/ learning framing that evokes business motives.14
What is a university administrator or corporate executive to do? Some researchers suggest remedies. On the one hand, they have addressed problematic features of training. On the other, they address evidence that training tends not to change workplaces unless it is part of a broader effort, involving multiple components.
First, can we prevent antibias training from reinforcing stereotypes, rather than suppressing them? Devine and colleagues ask their trainees to practice behaviors that increase contact with members of other groups, and empathy for other groups — these behavioral changes appear to be part of the secret to avoiding the reinforcement of stereotypes. Second, can we prevent training from making managers complacent because they believe that the organization has handled the problem of discrimination?
One possibility would be to introduce the “moral licensing” literature as part of training. 15 It suggests that when people do something good (e.g., attend training) they are likely to feel licensed to do something bad afterward (e.g., discriminate in hiring). This might equip trainees to look out for the effect in their own behavior.
Third, can we prevent antibias training about multiculturalism from making whites and men feel excluded and eliciting backlash? Plaut and colleagues found that when multicultural curriculum was framed as inclusive of the majority culture, majority group members responded better.16 Perhaps the curriculum should emphasize multiculturalism but stress that the majority culture is an important part of that multiculturalism.
Fourth, can we prevent trainees from feeling that training is an effort to control their thoughts and actions, and from rebelling against the message? Legault and colleagues found that by manipulating the framing of training, trainers can influence whether trainees see it as externally imposed or voluntarily chosen.17 We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior. By mandating participation, employers send the message that employees need to change, and the employer will require it. By emphasizing the law, employers send the message that external government mandates are behind training. These features may lead employees to think that commitment to diversity is being coerced.18
We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior.
Our surveys show that 80% of corporations with diversity training make it mandatory, and 43% of colleges and universities with training for faculty make it mandatory. Employers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more harm than good.19 About 75 percent of company trainings cover regulations and procedures to comply with them — the legal case for diversity — as do about 40 percent of university trainings. Perhaps employers should cut the legal content and make training voluntary, or give employees a choice of different types of diversity training.
This begs a bigger question: if employers could design a diversity course that reduced bias, would it reduce workplace discrimination? There is reason to believe that it would not. A recent meta-analysis suggests that change in unconscious bias does not lead to change in discrimination. Discrimination may result from habits of mind and behavior, or organizational practices, that are not rooted in unconscious bias alone.20 This reinforces the view that employers cannot expect training to change the workplace without making other changes.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. That is what studies of workplace training in other domains, such as health and safety, have proven. In isolation, diversity training does not appear to be effective, and in many corporations, colleges and universities, training was for many years the only diversity program in place. But large corporations and big universities are developing multipronged diversity initiatives that tackle not only implicit biases, but structural discrimination. The trick is to couple diversity training with the right complementary measures.
Our research shows that companies most often couple it with the wrong complementary measures.21 The antidiscrimination measures that work best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves.
We find that special college recruitment programs to identify women and minorities — sending existing corporate managers out to find new recruits — increase managerial diversity markedly. So do formal mentoring programs, which pair existing managers with people a couple of rungs below them, in different departments, who seek mentoring and sponsorship. So do diversity task forces that bring together higher-ups in different departments to look at the data on hiring, retention, pay and promotion; identify problems; brainstorm for solutions and bring those back to their departments. So do management training programs that use existing managers to train aspiring managers. All of these programs put existing higher-ups in touch with people from different race/ethnic/ gender groups who hope to move up. All of them help existing managers to understand the contours of the problem. And all of them seem to turn existing managers into champions of diversity.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. By contrast, popular human resources policies thought to reduce discrimination and promote diversity by controlling managerial bias seem to backfire.22 Companies that establish formal hiring and promotion criteria — through job tests and performance rating systems — to limit managerial discrimination see reductions in managerial diversity. Formal civil rights grievance procedures, which give employees a means to pursue complaints of discrimination, also backfire because managers find them threatening. Our statistical analyses show that diversity training can improve the effects of certain diversity programs, but employers have to complement training with the right programs — those that engage rather than alienate managers.
Starbucks got mixed press coverage for its mass diversity training event, with some experts, such as University of Virginia psychologist Brian Nosek, expressing skepticism that that particular quick fix would fix anything.23 But Starbucks says that this is the first volley in what they expect to be a long game. To their credit, Starbucks has tried to address racial bias before, with its 2015 campaign encouraging baristas to write “Race Together” on customers’ coffee cups, as a conversation starter. Starbucks pulled the plug on that campaign after a couple of shots of media criticism and a dollop of ridicule. Starbucks faces much the same challenge that university administrators face: what to do in an age in which diversity in executive and faculty ranks has been at a standstill for decades? Social science research now gives us a pretty good idea of what does not work and what remains promising.
Starbucks’ decision to put 175,000 workers through diversity training on May 29, in the wake of the widely publicized arrest of two black men in a Philadelphia store, put diversity training back in the news. But corporations and universities have been doing diversity training for decades. Nearly all Fortune 500 companies do training, and two-thirds of colleges and universities have training for faculty according to our 2016 survey of 670 schools. Most also put freshmen through some sort of diversity session as part of orientation. Yet hundreds of studies dating back to the 1930s suggest that antibias training does not reduce bias, alter behavior or change the workplace.
We have been speaking to employers about this research for more than a decade, with the message that diversity training is likely the most expensive, and least effective, diversity program around. But they persist, worried about the optics of getting rid of training, concerned about litigation, unwilling to take more difficult but consequential steps or simply in the thrall of glossy training materials and their purveyors. That colleges and universities in the United States persist in offering training to faculty and students, and even mandate it (29% of all schools require faculty to undergo training), is particularly surprising given that the research on the poor performance of training comes out of academia. Imagine university health centers continuing to prescribe vitamin C for the common cold.
Corporate antibias training was stimulated by the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s and legal reforms that movement brought about. Federal agencies took the lead, and by the end of 1971, the Social Security Administration had put 50,000 staffers through racial bias training. By 1976, 60 percent of big companies offered equal-opportunity training. In the 1980s, as Reagan tried to tear down affirmative action regulations and appointed Clarence Thomas to run the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, trainers began to make a business case for what they called “diversity training.” They argued that women and minorities would soon be the backbone of the workforce and that employers needed to figure out how to better incorporate them. By 2005, 65 percent of large firms offered diversity training. Consultants have heralded training as essential for increasing diversity, corporate counsel have advised that it is vital for fending off lawsuits and plaintiffs have asked for it in most discrimination settlements.1
Yet two-thirds of human resources specialists report that diversity training does not have positive effects, and several field studies have found no effect of diversity training on women’s or minorities’ careers or on managerial diversity.2 These findings are not surprising. There is ample evidence that training alone does not change attitudes or behavior, or not by much and not for long. In their review of 985 studies of antibias interventions, Paluck and Green found little evidence that training reduces bias. In their review of 31 organizational studies using pretest/posttest assessments or a control group, Kulik and Roberson identified 27 that documented improved knowledge of, or attitudes toward, diversity, but most found small, short-term improvements on one or two of the items measured. In their review of 39 similar studies, Bezrukova, Joshi and Jehn identified only five that examined long-term effects on bias, two showing positive effects, two negative, and one no effect.3
A number of recent studies of antibias training used the implicit association test (IAT) before and after to assess whether unconscious bias can be affected by training. A meta-analysis of 426 studies found weak immediate effects on unconscious bias and weaker effects on explicit bias. A side-byside test of 17 interventions to reduce white bias toward blacks found that eight reduced unconscious bias, but in a follow-up examining eight implicit bias interventions and one sham, all nine worked, suggesting that subjects may have learned how to game the bias test.4 Effects dissipated within a few days.
Most of these studies look at interventions that mirror corporate and university training in intensity and duration. One important study by Patricia Devine and colleagues suggests that a more extensive curriculum, based in strategies proven effective in the lab, can reduce measured bias.5 That 12-week intervention, which took the form of a college course and included a control group, worked best for people who were concerned about discrimination and who did the exercises — best when preaching to the converted. We do not see employers jumping on this costly bandwagon. Consider Starbucks, which closed 8,000 stores for half a day to train 175,000 workers, at an estimated cost of $12 million in lost business alone. Starbucks hires 100,000 new workers each year, and to match the Devine intervention they would need a dozen halfday sessions, every year, for more than half the workforce. Unlikely they would go that far, even if the logistics of scaling a classroom intervention to 100,000 people could be worked out.
Despite the poor showing of antibias training in academic studies, it remains the go-to solution for corporate executives and university administrators facing public relations crises, campus intolerance and slow progress on diversifying the executive and faculty ranks. Why is diversity training not more effective? If we can answer that question, perhaps we can fix it. Five different lines of research suggest why it may fail.
First, short-term educational interventions in general do not change people. This should come as no surprise to anthropologists. Decades of research on workplace training of all sorts suggests that by itself, training does not do much. Take workplace safety and health training which, it stands to reason, employees have an interest in paying attention to. Alone, it does little to change attitudes or behavior. If you cannot train workers to attach the straps on their hard hats, it may be wellnigh impossible to get them to give up biases that they have acquired over a lifetime of media exposure and real-world experience. Second, some have argued that antibias training activates stereotypes. Field and laboratory studies find that asking people to suppress stereotypes tends to reinforce them — making them more cognitively accessible to people.6 Try not thinking about elephants.
Diversity training typically encourages people to recognize and fight the stereotypes they hold, and this may simply be counterproductive. Third, recent research suggests that training inspires unrealistic confidence in antidiscrimination programs, making employees complacent about their own biases. In the lab, Castilla and Benard found that when experimenters described subjects’ employers as nondiscriminatory, subjects did not censor their own gender biases.7 Employees who go through diversity training may not, subsequently, take responsibility for avoiding discrimination. Kaiser and colleagues found that when subjects are told that their employers have prodiversity measures such as training, they presume that the workplace is free of bias and react harshly to claims of discrimination.8 More generally, in experiments, the presence of workplace diversity programs seems to blind employees to hard evidence of discrimination.9
Fourth, others find that training leaves whites feeling left out. Plaut and colleagues found the message of multiculturalism, which is common in training, makes whites feel excluded and reduces their support for diversity, relative to the message of colorblindness, which is rare these days. Whites generally feel they will not be treated fairly in workplaces with prodiversity messages.10
Perhaps this is why trainers frequently report hostility and resistance, and trainees often leave “confused, angry, or with more animosity toward” other groups.11 The trouble is, when African-Americans work with whites who take a color-blind stance (rather than a multicultural stance), it alienates them, reducing their psychological engagement at work and quite possibly reducing their likelihood of staying on.12 So perhaps trainers cannot win with a message of either multiculturalism or color-blindness.
Fifth, we know from a large body of organizational research that people react negatively to efforts to control them. Jobautonomy research finds that people resist external controls on their thoughts and behavior and perform poorly in their jobs when they lack autonomy. Self-determination research shows that when organizations frame motivation for pursuing a goal as originating internally, commitment rises, but when they frame motivation as originating externally, rebellion increases. Legault, Gutsell and Inzlicht found this to be true in the case of antibias training. Kidder and colleagues showed that when diversity programs are introduced with an external rationale — avoiding lawsuit — participants were more resistant than when they were introduced with an organizational rationale — management needs. In experiments, whites resented external pressure to control prejudice against blacks, and when experimenters asked people to reduce bias, they responded by increasing bias unless they saw the desire to control prejudice as voluntary.13 Thus Robin Ely and David Thomas found that a discrimination/fairness framing of diversity efforts, which evokes legal motives, is less effective than an integration/ learning framing that evokes business motives.14
What is a university administrator or corporate executive to do? Some researchers suggest remedies. On the one hand, they have addressed problematic features of training. On the other, they address evidence that training tends not to change workplaces unless it is part of a broader effort, involving multiple components.
First, can we prevent antibias training from reinforcing stereotypes, rather than suppressing them? Devine and colleagues ask their trainees to practice behaviors that increase contact with members of other groups, and empathy for other groups — these behavioral changes appear to be part of the secret to avoiding the reinforcement of stereotypes. Second, can we prevent training from making managers complacent because they believe that the organization has handled the problem of discrimination?
One possibility would be to introduce the “moral licensing” literature as part of training. 15 It suggests that when people do something good (e.g., attend training) they are likely to feel licensed to do something bad afterward (e.g., discriminate in hiring). This might equip trainees to look out for the effect in their own behavior.
Third, can we prevent antibias training about multiculturalism from making whites and men feel excluded and eliciting backlash? Plaut and colleagues found that when multicultural curriculum was framed as inclusive of the majority culture, majority group members responded better.16 Perhaps the curriculum should emphasize multiculturalism but stress that the majority culture is an important part of that multiculturalism.
Fourth, can we prevent trainees from feeling that training is an effort to control their thoughts and actions, and from rebelling against the message? Legault and colleagues found that by manipulating the framing of training, trainers can influence whether trainees see it as externally imposed or voluntarily chosen.17 We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior. By mandating participation, employers send the message that employees need to change, and the employer will require it. By emphasizing the law, employers send the message that external government mandates are behind training. These features may lead employees to think that commitment to diversity is being coerced.18
We expect that two common features of diversity training — mandatory participation and legal curriculum — will make participants feel that an external power is trying to control their behavior.
Our surveys show that 80% of corporations with diversity training make it mandatory, and 43% of colleges and universities with training for faculty make it mandatory. Employers mandate training in the belief that people hostile to the message will not attend voluntarily, but if we are right, forcing them to come will do more harm than good.19 About 75 percent of company trainings cover regulations and procedures to comply with them — the legal case for diversity — as do about 40 percent of university trainings. Perhaps employers should cut the legal content and make training voluntary, or give employees a choice of different types of diversity training.
This begs a bigger question: if employers could design a diversity course that reduced bias, would it reduce workplace discrimination? There is reason to believe that it would not. A recent meta-analysis suggests that change in unconscious bias does not lead to change in discrimination. Discrimination may result from habits of mind and behavior, or organizational practices, that are not rooted in unconscious bias alone.20 This reinforces the view that employers cannot expect training to change the workplace without making other changes.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. That is what studies of workplace training in other domains, such as health and safety, have proven. In isolation, diversity training does not appear to be effective, and in many corporations, colleges and universities, training was for many years the only diversity program in place. But large corporations and big universities are developing multipronged diversity initiatives that tackle not only implicit biases, but structural discrimination. The trick is to couple diversity training with the right complementary measures.
Our research shows that companies most often couple it with the wrong complementary measures.21 The antidiscrimination measures that work best are those that engage decision makers in solving the problem themselves.
We find that special college recruitment programs to identify women and minorities — sending existing corporate managers out to find new recruits — increase managerial diversity markedly. So do formal mentoring programs, which pair existing managers with people a couple of rungs below them, in different departments, who seek mentoring and sponsorship. So do diversity task forces that bring together higher-ups in different departments to look at the data on hiring, retention, pay and promotion; identify problems; brainstorm for solutions and bring those back to their departments. So do management training programs that use existing managers to train aspiring managers. All of these programs put existing higher-ups in touch with people from different race/ethnic/ gender groups who hope to move up. All of them help existing managers to understand the contours of the problem. And all of them seem to turn existing managers into champions of diversity.
The key to improving the effects of training is to make it part of a wider program of change. By contrast, popular human resources policies thought to reduce discrimination and promote diversity by controlling managerial bias seem to backfire.22 Companies that establish formal hiring and promotion criteria — through job tests and performance rating systems — to limit managerial discrimination see reductions in managerial diversity. Formal civil rights grievance procedures, which give employees a means to pursue complaints of discrimination, also backfire because managers find them threatening. Our statistical analyses show that diversity training can improve the effects of certain diversity programs, but employers have to complement training with the right programs — those that engage rather than alienate managers.
Starbucks got mixed press coverage for its mass diversity training event, with some experts, such as University of Virginia psychologist Brian Nosek, expressing skepticism that that particular quick fix would fix anything.23 But Starbucks says that this is the first volley in what they expect to be a long game. To their credit, Starbucks has tried to address racial bias before, with its 2015 campaign encouraging baristas to write “Race Together” on customers’ coffee cups, as a conversation starter. Starbucks pulled the plug on that campaign after a couple of shots of media criticism and a dollop of ridicule. Starbucks faces much the same challenge that university administrators face: what to do in an age in which diversity in executive and faculty ranks has been at a standstill for decades? Social science research now gives us a pretty good idea of what does not work and what remains promising.
Women: No relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem; most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile)
The role of physical satisfaction in women's sexual self-esteem. S. Hannier, A. Baltus, P. De Sutter. Sexologies, Volume 27, Issue 4, October–December 2018, Pages e85-e95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sexol.2017.09.010
Summary: Up until today, with the exception of the Wiederman and Hurst study in 1998, no research has been done with regard to the relationship between women's sexual self-esteem, body mass index, physical satisfaction and body image. Through two studies done on adult women, our objective was to better understand the impact of physical satisfaction on women's sexual self-esteem as well as investigate the elements on which the latter is founded. Data from the first study seem to indicate that BMI would be correlated in a negative and moderate manner to women's sexual self-esteem. A clearer relationship, however, is observed between sexual self-esteem and body/physical satisfaction. Results from the second study indicate no relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem but they do, however, indicate a relationship between sexual self-esteem and body image/esteem. Furthermore, the most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile). Altogether, research results seem to suggest that “relationship to the body” may be central to women's conceptualization of sexual self-esteem.
Summary: Up until today, with the exception of the Wiederman and Hurst study in 1998, no research has been done with regard to the relationship between women's sexual self-esteem, body mass index, physical satisfaction and body image. Through two studies done on adult women, our objective was to better understand the impact of physical satisfaction on women's sexual self-esteem as well as investigate the elements on which the latter is founded. Data from the first study seem to indicate that BMI would be correlated in a negative and moderate manner to women's sexual self-esteem. A clearer relationship, however, is observed between sexual self-esteem and body/physical satisfaction. Results from the second study indicate no relationship between BMI and sexual self-esteem but they do, however, indicate a relationship between sexual self-esteem and body image/esteem. Furthermore, the most salient traits of attractiveness/seduction were found to be related to the face (eyes, lips, smile). Altogether, research results seem to suggest that “relationship to the body” may be central to women's conceptualization of sexual self-esteem.
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