Abstract: Much of what is considered bleeding edge theory in sociology today consists of articles propounding theories that cannot be falsified, that are grounded in confirmation bias, that are crafted in a strange and inaccessible argot, and that appeal to pathos in the creation of a Moloch upon which to hang blame for the world’s ills. Any one of these contentions about modern sociological writing could and probably should be the subject of expanded study – taken together, they constitute a tendency in sociology toward a New Metaphysics. This tendency represents a profound change in the modern zeitgeist – a reversal, in fact. We are experiencing a reversal of the ascendancy of science and scientific thinking and a resurgence of medievalist magical thinking about society – how we live, how we exchange with each other, how we are governed. This essay ranges far in this regard and charts a course for further exploration. It examines the rise of the New Metaphysics and its primary means of communicating its ideas. It draws parallels between today’s new metaphysicians and those schoolmen of the middle ages, whose embrace of magic thinking was so complete that its straitened medieval orthodoxy not only hindered scientific, economic, and commercial progress, but also often punished such progress as heretical. Finally, this essay suggests that in its embrace of its own truth and with its “praxis-oriented” posture, the New Metaphysics poses a growing threat to the scholarly traditions of the university and itself constitutes a barbarous pseudo-science that begs unmasking.
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According to Popper, the central problem with “theories” of a metaphysical bent was their apparent strength – their explanatory power. This type of theory excites and impresses those exposed to it, and this can lead to a suspension of the critical faculties in favor of what we call today confirmation bias [41; 51]. Popper’s discussion of the matter:
These theories appeared to be able to explain practically everything that happened within the fields to which they referred. The study of any of them seemed to have the effect of an intellectual conversion or revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full of verifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it. Thus its truth appeared manifest; and unbelievers were clearly people who did not want to see the manifest truth; who refused to see it, either because it was against their class interest, or because of their repressions which were still ‘un-analysed’ and crying aloud for treatment. The most characteristic element in this situation seemed to me the incessant stream of confirmations, of observations which ‘verified’ the theories in question; and this point was constantly emphasize by their adherents. A Marxist could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for his interpretation of history; not only in the news, but also in its presentation – which revealed the class bias of the paper – and especially of course in what the paper did not say.
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The rebellion against scientific theory-testing has continued and, if anything, has worsened. The main problem with the path that social science has taken with regard to theory – sociology, in particular – is that theory construction is hamstrung by what we may call the “Popper Problem.” In the archipelago of niche sociological speculation, scholars have all but abandoned the notion that their theories ought to withstand the scrutiny of testing. Rather than a willingness to test rigorously various popular theories that emerged from the heyday of critical theory, which spawned a cottage industry of various “critical” subfields, we find a sort of enshrinement of verification, if not outright confirmation bias. Some subfields, such as “critical race theory,” are founded almost exclusively on confirmation bias.8 Modern theories in sociology spun from critical theory are largely not falsifiable. They are faith-based. As a method of exploration, this is not wholly objectionable. [...]
Check also comments on Irving Louis Horowitz's The Decomposition of Sociology. Article in Academic Questions 5(2):32-40. September 1994, DOI: 10.1007/BF02683271. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225367690