Wednesday, December 12, 2018
The Simon Abundance Index, A New Way to Measure Availability of Resources: People as the “ultimate resource,” making other resources more plentiful
The Simon Abundance Index: A New Way to Measure Availability of Resources. Gale L. Pooley and Marian L. Tupy. Cato Policy Analysis No. 857, Dec 4, 2018. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/simon-abundance-index-new-way-measure-availability-resources
Are we running out of resources? That’s been a hotly debated question since the publication of Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb in 1968. The Stanford University biologist warned that population growth would result in the exhaustion of resources and a global catastrophe. University of Maryland economist Julian Simon, in contrast, argued that humans would innovate their way out of resource shortages. He believed that people were the “ultimate resource” that would make other resources more plentiful.
[...] Using the latest price data for 50 foundational commodities covering energy, food, materials, and metals, we propose a new way of measuring resource availability based on four concepts.
First, the time-price of commodities allows us to measure the cost of resources in terms of human labor. We find that, in terms of global average hourly income, commodity prices fell by 64.7 percent between 1980 and 2017. Second, the price elasticity of population (PEP) allows us to measure sensitivity of resource availability to population growth. We find that the time-price of commodities declined by 0.934 percent for every 1 percent increase in the world’s population over the same time period. Third, we develop the Simon Abundance Framework, which uses the PEP values to distinguish between different degrees of resource abundance, from decreasing abundance at one end to superabundance at the other end. Considering that the time-price of commodities decreased at a faster proportional rate than population increased, we find that humanity is experiencing superabundance. Fourth, we create the Simon Abundance Index, which uses the timeprice of commodities and change in global population to estimate overall resource abundance. We find that the planet’s resources became 379.6 percent more abundant between 1980 and 2017.
On the basis of our analysis of the relationship between resource availability and population growth, we forecast that the time-price of commodities could fall by a further 29 percent over the next 37 years. Much will depend on policies and institutions that nations pursue. For the time-price of commodities to decline and resource abundance to increase, it is necessary for market incentives and the price mechanism to endure. When prices of commodities temporarily increase, people have an incentive to use resources more efficiently, increase their supply, and develop cheaper substitutes.
The perceptions of sexual orientation are based on acoustic cues shared by speakers of the same group; & the belief that members of the same sexual orientation group share similar acoustic patterns is accurate to some degree
Investigating the common set of acoustic parameters in sexual orientation groups: A voice averaging approach. Sven Kachel et al. PLOS, Dec 10, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208686
Abstract: While the perception of sexual orientation in voices often relies on stereotypes, it is unclear whether speech stereotypes and accurate perceptions of sexual orientation are each based on acoustic cues common to speakers of a given group. We ask if the stereotypical belief, that members of the same sexual orientation group share similar acoustic patterns, is accurate to some degree. To address this issue, we are the first to use a novel voice morphing technique to create voice averages from voices that represent extremes of a given sexual orientation group either in terms of actual or perceived sexual orientation. Importantly, averaging preserves only those acoustic cues shared by the original speakers. 144 German listeners judged the sexual orientation of twelve natural-sounding sentence stimuli, each representing an average of five original utterances. Half of the averages were based on targets’ self-ratings of sexual orientation: On a 7-point Kinsey-like scale, we selected targets who were most typical for a certain sexual orientation group according to their self-identifications. The other half were based on extreme ratings by others (i.e., on speech-related sexual-orientation stereotypes). Listeners judged sexual orientation from the voice averages with above-chance accuracy suggesting 1) that the perception of actual and stereotypical sexual orientation, respectively, are based on acoustic cues shared by speakers of the same group, and 2) that the stereotypical belief that members of the same sexual orientation group share similar acoustic patterns is accurate to some degree. Mean fundamental frequency and other common acoustic parameters showed systematic variation depending on speaker gender and sexual orientation. Effects of sexual orientation were more pronounced for stereotypical voice averages than for those based on speakers’ self-ratings, suggesting that sexual-orientation stereotypes exaggerate even those differences present in the most salient groups of speakers. Implications of our findings for stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.
Abstract: While the perception of sexual orientation in voices often relies on stereotypes, it is unclear whether speech stereotypes and accurate perceptions of sexual orientation are each based on acoustic cues common to speakers of a given group. We ask if the stereotypical belief, that members of the same sexual orientation group share similar acoustic patterns, is accurate to some degree. To address this issue, we are the first to use a novel voice morphing technique to create voice averages from voices that represent extremes of a given sexual orientation group either in terms of actual or perceived sexual orientation. Importantly, averaging preserves only those acoustic cues shared by the original speakers. 144 German listeners judged the sexual orientation of twelve natural-sounding sentence stimuli, each representing an average of five original utterances. Half of the averages were based on targets’ self-ratings of sexual orientation: On a 7-point Kinsey-like scale, we selected targets who were most typical for a certain sexual orientation group according to their self-identifications. The other half were based on extreme ratings by others (i.e., on speech-related sexual-orientation stereotypes). Listeners judged sexual orientation from the voice averages with above-chance accuracy suggesting 1) that the perception of actual and stereotypical sexual orientation, respectively, are based on acoustic cues shared by speakers of the same group, and 2) that the stereotypical belief that members of the same sexual orientation group share similar acoustic patterns is accurate to some degree. Mean fundamental frequency and other common acoustic parameters showed systematic variation depending on speaker gender and sexual orientation. Effects of sexual orientation were more pronounced for stereotypical voice averages than for those based on speakers’ self-ratings, suggesting that sexual-orientation stereotypes exaggerate even those differences present in the most salient groups of speakers. Implications of our findings for stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.
Tuesday, December 11, 2018
A 10% increase in the income of relevant others is associated with 6-8 minutes decrease in a person's weekly amount of sleep on average; this effect is strong among the relatively deprived, i.e., upward comparers
Relative Concerns and Sleep Behavior. Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, Hilda Ralsmark. Economics & Human Biology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2018.12.002
Highlights
• There is a negative association between relative concerns and quantity and quality of sleep
• The sleep loss associated to relative concerns is about 6-8 minutes/week on average
• The loss is stronger among relatively deprived, i.e., upward comparers, with 10-12 minutes/week
• The relationship is heterogenous among people with different working hours and leisure activities
• The association is also stronger among unhealthy individuals with higher stress
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between relative concerns with respect to income and the quantity and quality of sleep using a 6-year panel dataset on the sleep behavior of people in Germany. We find a substantial negative association between relative income and number of hours of sleep and satisfaction with sleep, i.e., sleep quality, whereas there is no particular association between absolute level of income and sleep quantity and quality. A 10-percent increase in the income of relevant others is associated with 6-8 minutes decrease in a person's weekly amount of sleep on average, yet this effect is particularly strong among the relatively deprived, i.e., upward comparers, as this group shows a corresponding decrease in sleeping time of 10-12 minutes/week. These findings are highly robust to several specification checks, including measures of relative concerns, reference group, income inequality, and local price differences. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the relationship is mainly driven by people with relatively fewer working hours, a higher demand for household production and leisure activities, and lower physical health and well-being.
Highlights
• There is a negative association between relative concerns and quantity and quality of sleep
• The sleep loss associated to relative concerns is about 6-8 minutes/week on average
• The loss is stronger among relatively deprived, i.e., upward comparers, with 10-12 minutes/week
• The relationship is heterogenous among people with different working hours and leisure activities
• The association is also stronger among unhealthy individuals with higher stress
Abstract: We investigate the relationship between relative concerns with respect to income and the quantity and quality of sleep using a 6-year panel dataset on the sleep behavior of people in Germany. We find a substantial negative association between relative income and number of hours of sleep and satisfaction with sleep, i.e., sleep quality, whereas there is no particular association between absolute level of income and sleep quantity and quality. A 10-percent increase in the income of relevant others is associated with 6-8 minutes decrease in a person's weekly amount of sleep on average, yet this effect is particularly strong among the relatively deprived, i.e., upward comparers, as this group shows a corresponding decrease in sleeping time of 10-12 minutes/week. These findings are highly robust to several specification checks, including measures of relative concerns, reference group, income inequality, and local price differences. The heterogeneity analysis reveals that the relationship is mainly driven by people with relatively fewer working hours, a higher demand for household production and leisure activities, and lower physical health and well-being.
Evaluations of Sexually Active Friends and Acquaintances: Women were evaluated more negatively as their number of sexual partners increased, whereas number of partners was not related to evaluations of men
The Sexual Double Standard in the Real World: Evaluations of Sexually Active Friends and Acquaintances. Michael J. Marks, Tara M. Young & Yuliana Zaikman. Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000362
Abstract. The sexual double standard (SDS) has traditionally been studied by examining evaluations of hypothetical targets. Although much knowledge has been gained regarding the SDS by using this methodology, the literature thus far has suffered from a lack of ecological validity. The goal of the present study was to determine whether the SDS emerged in evaluations of participants’ real-life friends and acquaintances. Participants (n = 4,455) evaluated a single, randomly assigned male or female friend or acquaintance whose sexual history they were familiar with. Women were evaluated more negatively as their number of sexual partners increased, whereas number of partners was not related to evaluations of men. The SDS was not moderated by the closeness of the relationship between the participant and the target person.
Keywords: sexual double standard, interpersonal relationship type, friends vs. acquaintances, gender roles, gender norms
Abstract. The sexual double standard (SDS) has traditionally been studied by examining evaluations of hypothetical targets. Although much knowledge has been gained regarding the SDS by using this methodology, the literature thus far has suffered from a lack of ecological validity. The goal of the present study was to determine whether the SDS emerged in evaluations of participants’ real-life friends and acquaintances. Participants (n = 4,455) evaluated a single, randomly assigned male or female friend or acquaintance whose sexual history they were familiar with. Women were evaluated more negatively as their number of sexual partners increased, whereas number of partners was not related to evaluations of men. The SDS was not moderated by the closeness of the relationship between the participant and the target person.
Keywords: sexual double standard, interpersonal relationship type, friends vs. acquaintances, gender roles, gender norms
The impact of immersion on the perception of pornography with virtual reality > Viewing pornographic videos via VR technology had a stronger effect on psychophysiological reactions as well as subjective experience than using the conventional display
The impact of immersion on the perception of pornography: A virtual reality study. Sofia Simon, Tobias Greitemeyer. Computers in Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.12.018
Highlights
• Immersion influenced the perception of pornographic video material
• Virtual Reality technology (VR) increased presence and arousal
• Presence in part accounted for the impact of VR on arousal
Abstract: The present study investigated the effects of varying degrees of immersion on the perception of pornographic video material. Concretely, we compared conventional desktop with Virtual Reality (VR) technology, with the latter embedding the observer in a virtual environment. Differences in the participant’s reaction and evaluation between both display modes were explored. Sixty male participants were alternately shown sexually explicit video material on a two-dimensional desktop monitor and a three-dimensional, high-immersive VR head-mounted display (HMD). During the two video sequences, physical arousal was continuously measured as skin conductance response, whereas subjective sexual arousal was measured using a slider. Questionnaire measures of subjective sexual arousal, presence, and sexual presence were also employed. Results showed that viewing pornographic video material via VR technology had a stronger effect on psychophysiological reactions as well as subjective experience than using the conventional desktop display. It thus appears that experiencing pornographic video stimuli in high-immersive virtual environments increases the experience of presence as well as sexual-related perception.
Highlights
• Immersion influenced the perception of pornographic video material
• Virtual Reality technology (VR) increased presence and arousal
• Presence in part accounted for the impact of VR on arousal
Abstract: The present study investigated the effects of varying degrees of immersion on the perception of pornographic video material. Concretely, we compared conventional desktop with Virtual Reality (VR) technology, with the latter embedding the observer in a virtual environment. Differences in the participant’s reaction and evaluation between both display modes were explored. Sixty male participants were alternately shown sexually explicit video material on a two-dimensional desktop monitor and a three-dimensional, high-immersive VR head-mounted display (HMD). During the two video sequences, physical arousal was continuously measured as skin conductance response, whereas subjective sexual arousal was measured using a slider. Questionnaire measures of subjective sexual arousal, presence, and sexual presence were also employed. Results showed that viewing pornographic video material via VR technology had a stronger effect on psychophysiological reactions as well as subjective experience than using the conventional desktop display. It thus appears that experiencing pornographic video stimuli in high-immersive virtual environments increases the experience of presence as well as sexual-related perception.
James Bond outnumbers the British men at least fivefold when it comes to the number of sexual partners over a lifetime; nevertheless, over time casual sex is becoming less frequent for 007
(Un)safe sex in James Bond films: what chance for sex education? Lara DA Zegers, Richard HC Zegers. Scottish Medical Journal, https://doi.org/10.1177/0036933018809601
Abstract
Background and aims: Many women in Bond films make love to James Bond (alias 007). Our objective was to quantify the practice of (un)safe sex in Bond films.
Methods and results: All 24 Bond films were watched together by the authors and the following data were recorded: if the women had sex with 007, whether the women consumed any alcohol before they had sex, whether contraceptives were mentioned and/or used by 007 or the women and whether the women survived the film. Bond had sexual relations with a total of 58 different women. Twenty-two percent of the women had consumed alcohol. In none of the films was any type of contraception mentioned or used. A total of 28% women did not survive the film.
Conclusion: If he were real, Bond outnumbers the British men at least fivefold when it comes to the number of sexual partners over a lifetime. Nevertheless, over time casual sex is becoming less frequent for 007. Sexually transmitted diseases, safe sex and (unwanted) pregnancies seem not to exist in the films. Some suggestions were made to promote safe sex in future Bond films as movies can play an important role in sex education.
Keywords: 007, Bond (James), condom, safe sex, sexually transmitted disease
Abstract
Background and aims: Many women in Bond films make love to James Bond (alias 007). Our objective was to quantify the practice of (un)safe sex in Bond films.
Methods and results: All 24 Bond films were watched together by the authors and the following data were recorded: if the women had sex with 007, whether the women consumed any alcohol before they had sex, whether contraceptives were mentioned and/or used by 007 or the women and whether the women survived the film. Bond had sexual relations with a total of 58 different women. Twenty-two percent of the women had consumed alcohol. In none of the films was any type of contraception mentioned or used. A total of 28% women did not survive the film.
Conclusion: If he were real, Bond outnumbers the British men at least fivefold when it comes to the number of sexual partners over a lifetime. Nevertheless, over time casual sex is becoming less frequent for 007. Sexually transmitted diseases, safe sex and (unwanted) pregnancies seem not to exist in the films. Some suggestions were made to promote safe sex in future Bond films as movies can play an important role in sex education.
Keywords: 007, Bond (James), condom, safe sex, sexually transmitted disease
Women found the men with the low financial status more attractive, & were only more likely to consider him for a one-night stand (with no behavior showing a dating preference for wealthy men)
Hunter, Hannah & Reid, Geneva & Bourgeois, Catherine & Fisher, Maryanne & Benoit, Taylor. (2018). Hi, my name is wealthy: Women's dating behaviors in regards to perceived mate's wealth.
Abstract: It has been cross-culturally documented that women exhibit a preference for mates who possess resources or traits that signal resource accrual. The present experiment tests whether women’s willingness to date men is influenced by their perceived wealth. Online dating profiles were created to present photographs of men and information about their current bank account status. Across two versions of the study, the male faces were presented with alternating high and low bank account balances. It was hypothesized that women who viewed men with high bank account values would evaluate them as more desirable than women who viewed men with low bank account values. That is, they would be more likely to engage with him in an online conversation, meet with him for a casual coffee, accept an invitation of a date, consider him for a one-night stand, consider him for a short-term relationship, or consider him for a long-term relationship as is the criteria of being more desirable. It was also hypothesized that women would rate the men with high bank account balances as more physically attractive than the men with the low bank account balances. The results do not support the hypotheses. Women found the men with the low financial status more attractive, and were only more likely to consider him for a one-night stand (with no behavior showing a dating preference for wealthy men). They also showed more interest in having a one-night stand with men with low financial status, as compared to forming a long-term relationship.
Keywords: dating, wealth, physical attractiveness, mate preferences, men
Abstract: It has been cross-culturally documented that women exhibit a preference for mates who possess resources or traits that signal resource accrual. The present experiment tests whether women’s willingness to date men is influenced by their perceived wealth. Online dating profiles were created to present photographs of men and information about their current bank account status. Across two versions of the study, the male faces were presented with alternating high and low bank account balances. It was hypothesized that women who viewed men with high bank account values would evaluate them as more desirable than women who viewed men with low bank account values. That is, they would be more likely to engage with him in an online conversation, meet with him for a casual coffee, accept an invitation of a date, consider him for a one-night stand, consider him for a short-term relationship, or consider him for a long-term relationship as is the criteria of being more desirable. It was also hypothesized that women would rate the men with high bank account balances as more physically attractive than the men with the low bank account balances. The results do not support the hypotheses. Women found the men with the low financial status more attractive, and were only more likely to consider him for a one-night stand (with no behavior showing a dating preference for wealthy men). They also showed more interest in having a one-night stand with men with low financial status, as compared to forming a long-term relationship.
Keywords: dating, wealth, physical attractiveness, mate preferences, men
Attractiveness of Primate Faces as Seen by Human Respondents: The least human-like prosimians were scored as the most attractive group; seems related to “uncanny valley” empirical rule
Judging Others by Your Own Standards: Attractiveness of Primate Faces as Seen by Human Respondents. Silvie Rádlová, Eva Landová and Daniel Frynta. Front Psychol Dec 11 2018, https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02439
Abstract: The aspects of facial attractiveness have been widely studied, especially within the context of evolutionary psychology, which proposes that aesthetic judgements of human faces are shaped by biologically based standards of beauty reflecting the mate quality. However, the faces of primates, who are very similar to us yet still considered non-human, remain neglected. In this paper, we aimed to study the facial attractiveness of non-human primates as judged by human respondents. We asked 286 Czech respondents to score photos of 107 primate species according to their perceived “beauty.” Then, we analyzed factors affecting the scores including morphology, colors, and human-likeness. We found that the three main primate groups were each scored using different cues. The proportions of inner facial features and distinctiveness are cues widely reported to affect human facial attractiveness. Interestingly, we found that these factors also affected the attractiveness scores of primate faces, but only within the Catarrhines, i.e., the primate group most similar to humans. Within this group, human-likeness positively affected the attractiveness scores, and facial extremities such as a prolonged nose or exaggerated cheeks were considered the least attractive. On the contrary, the least human-like prosimians were scored as the most attractive group. The results are discussed in the context of the “uncanny valley,” the widely discussed empirical rule.
Abstract: The aspects of facial attractiveness have been widely studied, especially within the context of evolutionary psychology, which proposes that aesthetic judgements of human faces are shaped by biologically based standards of beauty reflecting the mate quality. However, the faces of primates, who are very similar to us yet still considered non-human, remain neglected. In this paper, we aimed to study the facial attractiveness of non-human primates as judged by human respondents. We asked 286 Czech respondents to score photos of 107 primate species according to their perceived “beauty.” Then, we analyzed factors affecting the scores including morphology, colors, and human-likeness. We found that the three main primate groups were each scored using different cues. The proportions of inner facial features and distinctiveness are cues widely reported to affect human facial attractiveness. Interestingly, we found that these factors also affected the attractiveness scores of primate faces, but only within the Catarrhines, i.e., the primate group most similar to humans. Within this group, human-likeness positively affected the attractiveness scores, and facial extremities such as a prolonged nose or exaggerated cheeks were considered the least attractive. On the contrary, the least human-like prosimians were scored as the most attractive group. The results are discussed in the context of the “uncanny valley,” the widely discussed empirical rule.
Monday, December 10, 2018
No Evidence That Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth: Two Failures to Replicate Williams and Bargh (2008)
Chabris, Christopher, Patrick R. Heck, Jaclyn Mandart, Daniel J. Benjamin, and Daniel J. Simons. 2018. “No Evidence That Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth: Two Failures to Replicate Williams and Bargh (2008).” PsyArXiv. December 10. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000361
Abstract: Williams and Bargh (2008) reported that holding a hot cup of coffee caused participants to judge a person’s personality as warmer, and that holding a therapeutic heat pad caused participants to choose rewards for other people rather than for themselves. These experiments featured large effects (r = .28 and .31), small sample sizes (41 and 53 participants), and barely statistically significant results. We attempted to replicate both experiments in field settings with more than triple the sample sizes (128 and 177) and double-blind procedures, but found near-zero effects (r = –.03 and .02). In both cases, Bayesian analyses suggest there is substantially more evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect than for the original physical warmth priming hypothesis
Abstract: Williams and Bargh (2008) reported that holding a hot cup of coffee caused participants to judge a person’s personality as warmer, and that holding a therapeutic heat pad caused participants to choose rewards for other people rather than for themselves. These experiments featured large effects (r = .28 and .31), small sample sizes (41 and 53 participants), and barely statistically significant results. We attempted to replicate both experiments in field settings with more than triple the sample sizes (128 and 177) and double-blind procedures, but found near-zero effects (r = –.03 and .02). In both cases, Bayesian analyses suggest there is substantially more evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect than for the original physical warmth priming hypothesis
Female violence was more often directed towards their close environment (i.e. their children) & driven by relational frustration; also received lower punishments compared to males & were more often considered to be diminished accountable for their offenses due to a mental illness
Gender differences in violent offending: results from a multicentre comparison study in Dutch forensic psychiatry. Vivienne de Vogel, Eva de Spa. Psychology, Crime & Law, https://doi.org/10.1080/1068316X.2018.1556267
ABSTRACT: The past two decades, a disproportionate growth of females entering the criminal justice system and forensic mental health services has been observed worldwide. However, there is a lack of knowledge on the background of women who are convicted for violent offenses. What is their criminal history, what are their motives for offending and in which way do they differ from men convicted for violent offenses? In this study, criminal histories and the offenses for which they were admitted to forensic care were analyzed of 218 women and 218 men who have been treated between 1984 and 2014 with a mandatory treatment order in one of four Dutch forensic psychiatric settings admitting both men and women. It is concluded that there are important differences in violent offending between male and female patients. Most importantly, female violence was more often directed towards their close environment, like their children, and driven by relational frustration. Furthermore, female patients received lower punishments compared to male patients and were more often considered to be diminished accountable for their offenses due to a mental illness.
KEYWORDS: Gender, violence, forensic, criminal history
ABSTRACT: The past two decades, a disproportionate growth of females entering the criminal justice system and forensic mental health services has been observed worldwide. However, there is a lack of knowledge on the background of women who are convicted for violent offenses. What is their criminal history, what are their motives for offending and in which way do they differ from men convicted for violent offenses? In this study, criminal histories and the offenses for which they were admitted to forensic care were analyzed of 218 women and 218 men who have been treated between 1984 and 2014 with a mandatory treatment order in one of four Dutch forensic psychiatric settings admitting both men and women. It is concluded that there are important differences in violent offending between male and female patients. Most importantly, female violence was more often directed towards their close environment, like their children, and driven by relational frustration. Furthermore, female patients received lower punishments compared to male patients and were more often considered to be diminished accountable for their offenses due to a mental illness.
KEYWORDS: Gender, violence, forensic, criminal history
Big relaxation of views about cannabis: Decrease in religious affiliation, a decline in punitiveness, and a shift in media framing all contributed to changing attitudes
How and why have attitudes about cannabis legalization changed so much? Jacob Felson, Amy Adamczyk, Christopher Thomas. Social Science Research, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2018.12.011
Abstract: Since the late 1990s public opinion about cannabis legalization has become drastically more liberal, and some states have begun to legalize cannabis for recreational use. Why have attitudes changed so much? Prior research has considered a few of the reasons for this change, but this is the first comprehensive and empirically-based study to consider the wide range of potential causes for how and why this happened. We use data from the General Social Survey, National Study of Drug Use and Health, and word searches from the New York Times. We find that attitudes largely liberalized via intracohort changes. Most Americans developed more liberal views, regardless of their race and ethnicity, gender, education, religious or political affiliation, or religious engagement. Changes in cannabis use have had minimal effects on attitudes, and legalization of cannabis has not prompted attitude change in neighboring states. As to root causes, evidence suggests that a decrease in religious affiliation, a decline in punitiveness, and a shift in media framing all contributed to changing attitudes.
Abstract: Since the late 1990s public opinion about cannabis legalization has become drastically more liberal, and some states have begun to legalize cannabis for recreational use. Why have attitudes changed so much? Prior research has considered a few of the reasons for this change, but this is the first comprehensive and empirically-based study to consider the wide range of potential causes for how and why this happened. We use data from the General Social Survey, National Study of Drug Use and Health, and word searches from the New York Times. We find that attitudes largely liberalized via intracohort changes. Most Americans developed more liberal views, regardless of their race and ethnicity, gender, education, religious or political affiliation, or religious engagement. Changes in cannabis use have had minimal effects on attitudes, and legalization of cannabis has not prompted attitude change in neighboring states. As to root causes, evidence suggests that a decrease in religious affiliation, a decline in punitiveness, and a shift in media framing all contributed to changing attitudes.
Bavarian data: Women earn less in majority groups when their supervisor is of the same sex
Same-Sex Employees and Supervisors: The Effect of Homophily and Group Composition on Wage Differences. Christina Klug. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Volume 47, Issue 4, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/zfsoz-2018-0116
Abstract: This article analyzes wage differences according to whether or not employees and their supervisors are of the same sex. The mechanism of homophily predicts that having supervisors of the same sex has a positive effect on wages. Additionally, we introduce four conflicting theories that consider group composition as a moderating factor. The hypotheses are tested with data from the Bavarian Graduate Panel via fixed-effect panel regressions. Results show that relative group sizes must be considered in order to see wage differences. These wage benefits emerge in minority and majority groups for male academics, but women earn less in majority groups when their supervisor is of the same sex.
Keywords: Homophily; Group Composition; Wage Differences; Supervisors; Employees
Abstract: This article analyzes wage differences according to whether or not employees and their supervisors are of the same sex. The mechanism of homophily predicts that having supervisors of the same sex has a positive effect on wages. Additionally, we introduce four conflicting theories that consider group composition as a moderating factor. The hypotheses are tested with data from the Bavarian Graduate Panel via fixed-effect panel regressions. Results show that relative group sizes must be considered in order to see wage differences. These wage benefits emerge in minority and majority groups for male academics, but women earn less in majority groups when their supervisor is of the same sex.
Keywords: Homophily; Group Composition; Wage Differences; Supervisors; Employees
Sunday, December 9, 2018
Rolf Degen summarizing: People were willing to sell football tickets at a lower price to those who shared their political leanings, with partisanship beating team preference
Grand Old (Tailgate) Party? Partisan Discrimination in Apolitical Settings. Andrew M. Engelhardt, Stephen M. Utych. Political Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-018-09519-4
Abstract: Recent work in political science demonstrates that the American public is strongly divided on partisan lines. Levels of affective polarization are so great, it seems, that partisanship even shapes behavior in apolitical settings. However, this literature does not account for other salient identity dimensions on which people make decisions in apolitical settings, potentially stacking the deck in favor of partisanship. We address this limitation with a pair of experiments studying price discrimination among college football fans. We find that partisan discrimination exists, even when the decision context explicitly calls attention to another social identity. But, importantly, this appears to function mostly as in-group favoritism rather than out-group hostility.
Keywords: Polarization Partisanship Social identity theory Experiments
Abstract: Recent work in political science demonstrates that the American public is strongly divided on partisan lines. Levels of affective polarization are so great, it seems, that partisanship even shapes behavior in apolitical settings. However, this literature does not account for other salient identity dimensions on which people make decisions in apolitical settings, potentially stacking the deck in favor of partisanship. We address this limitation with a pair of experiments studying price discrimination among college football fans. We find that partisan discrimination exists, even when the decision context explicitly calls attention to another social identity. But, importantly, this appears to function mostly as in-group favoritism rather than out-group hostility.
Keywords: Polarization Partisanship Social identity theory Experiments
Fear of death: Nature, development and moderating factors
Menzies, Ross G and Menzies, Rachel E. Fear of death: Nature, development and moderating factors [online]. In: Menzies, RE (Editor); Menzies, RG (Editor); Iverach, L (Editor). Curing the Dread of Death Theory, Research and Practice. Samford Valley, QLD: Australian Academic Press, 2018: 21-39. https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=911350014779621;res=IELHSS
Abstract: How do we come to a mature view of death? Does it emerge in stages and, if so, what do these involve? Does anxiety arise as soon as a child can conceptualise death, or does it only appear with a fully developed, adult understanding of the concept? And what do we regard as an adult conception of death? Slaughter (2005) argues that the defining characteristic is to recognise death as a biological event caused by the failure of body systems. In contrast, young children may claim that the 'bogey man' or some other punishing agent is the cause of death. But would all adults pass Slaughter's (2005) test of death comprehension? After all, as Hoffman, Johnson, Foster, and Wright (2010) point out, adults can't agree on when life begins let alone why we take our last breath. Some will maintain that God has called a person home, and that God is the ultimate cause of death (and its creator, punishing us for the sins in the Garden of Eden). Clearly, death is a complex notion and religious and spiritual positions complicate the matter considerably.
Abstract: How do we come to a mature view of death? Does it emerge in stages and, if so, what do these involve? Does anxiety arise as soon as a child can conceptualise death, or does it only appear with a fully developed, adult understanding of the concept? And what do we regard as an adult conception of death? Slaughter (2005) argues that the defining characteristic is to recognise death as a biological event caused by the failure of body systems. In contrast, young children may claim that the 'bogey man' or some other punishing agent is the cause of death. But would all adults pass Slaughter's (2005) test of death comprehension? After all, as Hoffman, Johnson, Foster, and Wright (2010) point out, adults can't agree on when life begins let alone why we take our last breath. Some will maintain that God has called a person home, and that God is the ultimate cause of death (and its creator, punishing us for the sins in the Garden of Eden). Clearly, death is a complex notion and religious and spiritual positions complicate the matter considerably.
Moralizing of Income Inequality: More liberal ideology was associated with less tolerance for diverging opinions on the issue in one’s social circle
O'Donnell, Michael and Chen, Serena, Political Ideology, the Moralizing of Income Inequality, and Its Social Consequences (September 22, 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3253666
Abstract: Income inequality is at its highest level in decades and is a key political and social issue in the U.S. today. However, there is a stark partisan divide on whether and how to address income inequality. We propose one reason for this: ideological differences in viewing the issue of income inequality in moral terms. Across five studies, involving more than 3,000 participants, conservative relative to liberal ideology was associated with a disinclination to see inequality as a moral issue and a dampened tendency to see it as morally wrong. Moreover, more liberal ideology was associated with less tolerance for diverging opinions on the issue in one’s social circle. Finally, although conservatives were reliably disinclined to moralize inequality, we found that they can be induced to view it as a more serious issue and express support for inequality-reducing political policies.
Keywords: Income Inequality, Morality, Political Ideology, Social Class
Abstract: Income inequality is at its highest level in decades and is a key political and social issue in the U.S. today. However, there is a stark partisan divide on whether and how to address income inequality. We propose one reason for this: ideological differences in viewing the issue of income inequality in moral terms. Across five studies, involving more than 3,000 participants, conservative relative to liberal ideology was associated with a disinclination to see inequality as a moral issue and a dampened tendency to see it as morally wrong. Moreover, more liberal ideology was associated with less tolerance for diverging opinions on the issue in one’s social circle. Finally, although conservatives were reliably disinclined to moralize inequality, we found that they can be induced to view it as a more serious issue and express support for inequality-reducing political policies.
Keywords: Income Inequality, Morality, Political Ideology, Social Class
Women lowered both voice pitch parameters toward men who were most desired by other women & whom they also personally preferred
Voice pitch modulation in human mate choice. Katarzyna Pisanski et al. REBY Proceedings, http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/80518/1/__smbhome.uscs.susx.ac.uk_sc328_Desktop_Papers%20for%20SRO_REBY_Proceedings_B_NOV_2018_accepted_version.pdf
Abstract: Inter-individual differences in human fundamental frequency (F0, perceived as voice pitch) predict mate quality, reproductive success, and affect listeners’ social attributions. Although humans can readily and volitionally manipulate their vocal apparatus and resultant voice pitch, for instance in the production of speech sounds and singing, little is known about whether humans exploit this capacity to adjust the nonverbal dimensions of their voices during social (including sexual) interactions. Here, we recorded full-length conversations of thirty adult men and women taking part in real speed dating events, and tested whether their voice pitch (mean, range, and variability) changed with their personal mate choice preferences and the overall desirability of each dating partner. Within-individual analyses indicated that men lowered the minimum pitch of their voices when interacting with women who were overall highly desired by other men. Men also lowered their mean voice pitch on dates with women they selected as potential mates, particularly those who indicated a mutual preference (matches). Interestingly, although women spoke with a higher and more variable voice pitch toward men they selected as potential mates, women lowered both voice pitch parameters toward men who were most desired by other women and whom they also personally preferred. Between-individual analyses indicated that men in turn preferred women with lower-pitched voices, wherein women’s minimum voice pitch explained up to 55% of the variance in men’s mate preferences. These results, derived in an ecologically valid setting, show that individual and group-level mate preferences can interact to affect vocal behaviour, and support the hypothesis that human voice modulation functions in nonverbal communication to elicit favourable judgments and behaviours from others, including potential mates.
Keywords: mate choice, sexual selection , speed dating, nonverbal communication, fundamental frequency, vocal control
Abstract: Inter-individual differences in human fundamental frequency (F0, perceived as voice pitch) predict mate quality, reproductive success, and affect listeners’ social attributions. Although humans can readily and volitionally manipulate their vocal apparatus and resultant voice pitch, for instance in the production of speech sounds and singing, little is known about whether humans exploit this capacity to adjust the nonverbal dimensions of their voices during social (including sexual) interactions. Here, we recorded full-length conversations of thirty adult men and women taking part in real speed dating events, and tested whether their voice pitch (mean, range, and variability) changed with their personal mate choice preferences and the overall desirability of each dating partner. Within-individual analyses indicated that men lowered the minimum pitch of their voices when interacting with women who were overall highly desired by other men. Men also lowered their mean voice pitch on dates with women they selected as potential mates, particularly those who indicated a mutual preference (matches). Interestingly, although women spoke with a higher and more variable voice pitch toward men they selected as potential mates, women lowered both voice pitch parameters toward men who were most desired by other women and whom they also personally preferred. Between-individual analyses indicated that men in turn preferred women with lower-pitched voices, wherein women’s minimum voice pitch explained up to 55% of the variance in men’s mate preferences. These results, derived in an ecologically valid setting, show that individual and group-level mate preferences can interact to affect vocal behaviour, and support the hypothesis that human voice modulation functions in nonverbal communication to elicit favourable judgments and behaviours from others, including potential mates.
Keywords: mate choice, sexual selection , speed dating, nonverbal communication, fundamental frequency, vocal control
Saturday, December 8, 2018
Life satisfaction favors reproduction. The universal positive effect of life satisfaction on childbearing in contemporary low fertility countries
Life satisfaction favors reproduction. The universal positive effect of life satisfaction on childbearing in contemporary low fertility countries. Letizia Mencarini, Daniele Vignoli, Tugba Zeydanli, Jungho Kim. PLOS Dec 05, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206202
Abstract: Do people with higher life satisfaction have more children? Having children requires considerable energy and investment on the part of parents. However, even in countries where contraceptives are easily available and widely used, where having children is optional and most of time the result of an intended action, parenthood has not gone “out of fashion”. This paper tests the hypothesis that higher life satisfaction fosters reproductive behavior. We argue that people satisfied with their overall life feel better prepared to start the monumental task of childrearing. If, it is suggested, life satisfaction facilitates fertility, then this positive link should be observable in contemporary low fertility societies. The hypothesis is tested by taking overall life satisfaction as a determinant of fertility behavior using long longitudinal data available for developed countries: namely for Australia, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that higher levels of subjective well-being are, indeed, associated with a higher probability of having children in all the countries considered. We, therefore, conclude that life satisfaction favors reproduction, at least in low fertility societies.
Abstract: Do people with higher life satisfaction have more children? Having children requires considerable energy and investment on the part of parents. However, even in countries where contraceptives are easily available and widely used, where having children is optional and most of time the result of an intended action, parenthood has not gone “out of fashion”. This paper tests the hypothesis that higher life satisfaction fosters reproductive behavior. We argue that people satisfied with their overall life feel better prepared to start the monumental task of childrearing. If, it is suggested, life satisfaction facilitates fertility, then this positive link should be observable in contemporary low fertility societies. The hypothesis is tested by taking overall life satisfaction as a determinant of fertility behavior using long longitudinal data available for developed countries: namely for Australia, Germany, Russia, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that higher levels of subjective well-being are, indeed, associated with a higher probability of having children in all the countries considered. We, therefore, conclude that life satisfaction favors reproduction, at least in low fertility societies.
"Those who use Twitter are more likely to believe they have an understanding of the political issues facing our country"
Siegel, Ruby. 2017. “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Social Media: Understanding the Relationship Between Facebook, Twitter, and Political Understanding.” SocArXiv. December 15. doi:10.31235/osf.io/y4xts
Abstract: Social media is ubiquitous and holds a significant place in modern society. Social media feeds are inundated with political content and are used by politicians and citizens alike to post political commentary. Neither mass media nor politics are new areas of study in sociology, but the entanglement of the two is proving to be of interest, as some scholarship argues that social media is driving changes in how politics works in the United States. We must consider how the citizenry consumes and processes political information in the modern era in view of the interplay between social media and current events. This study examines how membership and/or regular use of Facebook, and membership and/or regular use of Twitter affects perceived political understanding. I propose that, respectively, Facebook and Twitter use will increase perception of political understanding. Analysis of data from the 2016 General Social Survey reveals that Twitter membership and/or regular use is correlated with political understanding; meaning that those who use Twitter are more likely to believe they have an understanding of the political issues facing our country. The data confirms that the relationship between social media and political understanding must be taken seriously, and warrants deeper exploration. There is a need for future research that explores the kinds of content individuals consume on social media and the time they spend on these sites in order to develop a more robust understanding of exactly how social media use affects political understanding.
Abstract: Social media is ubiquitous and holds a significant place in modern society. Social media feeds are inundated with political content and are used by politicians and citizens alike to post political commentary. Neither mass media nor politics are new areas of study in sociology, but the entanglement of the two is proving to be of interest, as some scholarship argues that social media is driving changes in how politics works in the United States. We must consider how the citizenry consumes and processes political information in the modern era in view of the interplay between social media and current events. This study examines how membership and/or regular use of Facebook, and membership and/or regular use of Twitter affects perceived political understanding. I propose that, respectively, Facebook and Twitter use will increase perception of political understanding. Analysis of data from the 2016 General Social Survey reveals that Twitter membership and/or regular use is correlated with political understanding; meaning that those who use Twitter are more likely to believe they have an understanding of the political issues facing our country. The data confirms that the relationship between social media and political understanding must be taken seriously, and warrants deeper exploration. There is a need for future research that explores the kinds of content individuals consume on social media and the time they spend on these sites in order to develop a more robust understanding of exactly how social media use affects political understanding.
Facial attractiveness has been linked to the averageness of a face, & more tentatively to a speaker’s vocal attractiveness, via the “honest signal” hypothesis, holding that attractiveness signals good genes; no link
Zäske, Romi, Stefan R. Schweinberger, and Verena G. Skuk. 2018.
“Attractiveness and Distinctiveness in Voices and Faces of Young
Adults.” PsyArXiv. July 9. doi:10.31234/osf.io/2avu3
Abstract: Facial attractiveness has been linked to the averageness (or typicality) of a face. More tentatively, it has also been linked to a speaker’s vocal attractiveness, via the “honest signal” hypothesis, holding that attractiveness signals good genes. In four experiments, we assessed ratings for attractiveness and two common measures of distinctiveness (“distinctiveness-in-the-crowd”- DITC and “deviation-based distinctiveness”-DEV) for faces and voices (vowels or sentences) from 64 young adult speakers (32 female). Consistent and strong negative correlations between attractiveness and DEV generally supported the averageness account of attractiveness for both voices and faces. By contrast, indicating that both measures of distinctiveness reflect different constructs, correlations between attractiveness and DITC were numerically positive for faces (though small and non-significant), and significant for voices in sentence stimuli. As the only exception, voice ratings based on vowels exhibited a moderate but significant negative correlation between attractiveness and DITC. Between faces and voices, distinctiveness ratings were uncorrelated. Remarkably, and at variance with the honest signal hypothesis, vocal and facial attractiveness were uncorrelated, with the exception of a moderate positive correlation for vowels. Overall, while our findings strongly support an averageness account of attractiveness for both domains, they provide little evidence for an honest signal account of facial and vocal attractiveness in complex naturalistic speech. Although our findings for vowels do not rule out the tentative notion that more primitive vocalizations can provide relevant clues to genetic fitness, researchers should carefully consider the nature of voice samples, and the degree to which these are representative of human vocal communication.
Abstract: Facial attractiveness has been linked to the averageness (or typicality) of a face. More tentatively, it has also been linked to a speaker’s vocal attractiveness, via the “honest signal” hypothesis, holding that attractiveness signals good genes. In four experiments, we assessed ratings for attractiveness and two common measures of distinctiveness (“distinctiveness-in-the-crowd”- DITC and “deviation-based distinctiveness”-DEV) for faces and voices (vowels or sentences) from 64 young adult speakers (32 female). Consistent and strong negative correlations between attractiveness and DEV generally supported the averageness account of attractiveness for both voices and faces. By contrast, indicating that both measures of distinctiveness reflect different constructs, correlations between attractiveness and DITC were numerically positive for faces (though small and non-significant), and significant for voices in sentence stimuli. As the only exception, voice ratings based on vowels exhibited a moderate but significant negative correlation between attractiveness and DITC. Between faces and voices, distinctiveness ratings were uncorrelated. Remarkably, and at variance with the honest signal hypothesis, vocal and facial attractiveness were uncorrelated, with the exception of a moderate positive correlation for vowels. Overall, while our findings strongly support an averageness account of attractiveness for both domains, they provide little evidence for an honest signal account of facial and vocal attractiveness in complex naturalistic speech. Although our findings for vowels do not rule out the tentative notion that more primitive vocalizations can provide relevant clues to genetic fitness, researchers should carefully consider the nature of voice samples, and the degree to which these are representative of human vocal communication.
Friday, December 7, 2018
The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the United States
The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the United States. Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Lee Ohanian. Cato Institute, Dec 05 2018, https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economic-policy/lack-european-productivity-growth-causes-lessons-united
[...]
The European economic slowdown began in the late 1970s and continues today. We make this comparison because the United States and Europe are similar in many respects and because the two episodes share many similar economic features. The post-World War II history of Western and Northern Europe provides insights into why the United States remains depressed relative to its past recovery trends. We also argue that the European experience offers guidance in terms of constructive economic policy changes for today’s U.S. economy.
[...]
From 1950 to 1980, most of Western Europe experienced unprecedented prosperity and structural transformation. The post-World War II Western European economic miracles demonstrate that economic recovery and very rapid per capita GDP growth occur even after the most devastating shocks. This is important, as it is often argued that the financial crisis and the resulting loss of wealth necessarily mean that recovery following the Great Recession will be delayed for a long time. The systematic and rapid growth of these European economies, all of which had lost enormous wealth during the war, provides a very strong counterexample of this view and is an important reason why we focus on policies and institutional factors that may be impeding the normal market process of economic recovery.
Indeed, transitional dynamics of post-World War II capital stocks being below their steady-state levels does not plausibly account for these growth miracles. While capital stock dynamics did play some role, productivity growth was the primary factor driving Western European economic growth. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain all experienced rapid yearly total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 2.6 and 3.2 percent over this period.
However, the convergence of Western European countries regarding GDP per capita relative to the United States stagnated after 1980. At the time, this long-run slowdown was challenging to identify. One reason was that the global economic slowdown that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s masked the underlying long-run shift in Western European economies. A second reason was the slowdown in U.S. TFP growth, which began in the 1970s. This led some observers to believe that the European slowdown was merely the natural consequence of global factors.
However, this view omits the important forces for continued catch-up in Europe. TFP levels in France, Germany, Italy, and other Western European countries remained about 40 percent below the U.S. level. This indicates that there was additional room for European catch-up and, more broadly, an opportunity for Europe to become more competitive with the United States in its export markets. Moreover, even if the European catch-up was slowing down, theory suggests this should have been a much more gradual process, in which we should observe a very slowly declining rate of TFP growth over time, rather than the discrete and sudden slowdown in TFP growth that occurred.
The change in performance in Western Europe became much starker after 1990. Since then, GDP per capita relative to the United States in Western European countries has experienced no catch-up (in Germany and the United Kingdom) or regressed (mildly in Spain and more strikingly in France and Italy).
TFP growth comes from the innovation and adoption of new technologies, business models, and managerial practices. Europe has been failing on all three fronts for the last several decades: the continent develops less economically useful technologies than other comparable economic regions, it is reluctant to allow the introduction of new business models, and it lags in the adoption of new managerial practices.
This unfortunate state of affairs is unrelated to cultural traits or idiosyncratic preferences. For centuries, Europe was at the forefront of technological innovation and adoption. Moreover, in the decades following World War II, Europeans showed a more than considerable skill in catching up with the technological frontier, innovating in relevant fields, and working more extended hours than North Americans.
The reason, instead, for the European lack of TFP growth is the pervasive dominance of what economists Stephen Parente and Edward Prescott have called “barriers to riches.” The most salient of these are widespread barriers to entry; the lack of competition in many industries and the lax enforcement of competition law; surrealistic regulations and pervasive unjustified licensing requirements across Europe; inefficient capital markets; an absence of top universities and lower research and development spending; and an aging population.
Fast European economic growth after World War II was fostered by institutions and governance that offered incentives and opportunities to adopt U.S. technologies and managerial organization, that invested heavily in public infrastructure, that favored the accumulation of physical and human capital, and that exploited the very close economic openness of the continent. But since the mid-1970s, Europe has changed course and run an unfortunate experiment that shows how institutions and policies negatively affect economic performance.
The European experiment offers a number of lessons for the United States today. European economic weakness began once institutions and policies changed. Institutional change resulted in higher taxes, much less competition (which depressed the entry of new businesses), and increased regulation of capital and labor markets. The timing of changes in European TFP growth and hours worked—the two determinants of economic growth—largely coincides with the timing of changes in European institutions and governance.
Until recently, U.S. institutional quality has changed in ways similar to that of Europe. Through 2016, tax rates increased, and in some states, they have increased considerably for the most productive earners. Regulation also rose significantly, especially in financial markets through DoddFrank legislation. This new financial regulation raised the cost of making loans, particularly small business loans. This is because there is a significant fixed-cost component in dealing with compliance and record-keeping issues that make smaller loans less profitable. This becomes even more challenging for small banks (community banks), which have a lower revenue base over which to spread the fixed costs.
On a more positive note, the slowdown in TFP triggered by so-called Baumol’s disease (i.e., the move toward services with stagnant productivity such as education) may be nearly complete, and in the future we may observe a substitution of demand toward services with higher productivity growth as their relative prices fall. Also, a large cut in the corporate tax rate is making U.S. companies more competitive with those in Europe, and a substantial decrease in business regulation, including a partial rollback of Dodd-Frank, has increased business efficiency and has reduced compliance and recordkeeping costs. U.S. labor input and investment’s share of output are growing, and GDP growth has increased. In our view, the continuation of these favorable recent developments will depend on whether the United States continues to adopt more pro-market economic policies.
NOTE:
This research brief is based on Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Lee Ohanian, “The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the United States,” Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 18-024, September 2018, https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/18-024.html.
[...]
The European economic slowdown began in the late 1970s and continues today. We make this comparison because the United States and Europe are similar in many respects and because the two episodes share many similar economic features. The post-World War II history of Western and Northern Europe provides insights into why the United States remains depressed relative to its past recovery trends. We also argue that the European experience offers guidance in terms of constructive economic policy changes for today’s U.S. economy.
[...]
From 1950 to 1980, most of Western Europe experienced unprecedented prosperity and structural transformation. The post-World War II Western European economic miracles demonstrate that economic recovery and very rapid per capita GDP growth occur even after the most devastating shocks. This is important, as it is often argued that the financial crisis and the resulting loss of wealth necessarily mean that recovery following the Great Recession will be delayed for a long time. The systematic and rapid growth of these European economies, all of which had lost enormous wealth during the war, provides a very strong counterexample of this view and is an important reason why we focus on policies and institutional factors that may be impeding the normal market process of economic recovery.
Indeed, transitional dynamics of post-World War II capital stocks being below their steady-state levels does not plausibly account for these growth miracles. While capital stock dynamics did play some role, productivity growth was the primary factor driving Western European economic growth. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain all experienced rapid yearly total factor productivity (TFP) growth between 2.6 and 3.2 percent over this period.
However, the convergence of Western European countries regarding GDP per capita relative to the United States stagnated after 1980. At the time, this long-run slowdown was challenging to identify. One reason was that the global economic slowdown that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s masked the underlying long-run shift in Western European economies. A second reason was the slowdown in U.S. TFP growth, which began in the 1970s. This led some observers to believe that the European slowdown was merely the natural consequence of global factors.
However, this view omits the important forces for continued catch-up in Europe. TFP levels in France, Germany, Italy, and other Western European countries remained about 40 percent below the U.S. level. This indicates that there was additional room for European catch-up and, more broadly, an opportunity for Europe to become more competitive with the United States in its export markets. Moreover, even if the European catch-up was slowing down, theory suggests this should have been a much more gradual process, in which we should observe a very slowly declining rate of TFP growth over time, rather than the discrete and sudden slowdown in TFP growth that occurred.
The change in performance in Western Europe became much starker after 1990. Since then, GDP per capita relative to the United States in Western European countries has experienced no catch-up (in Germany and the United Kingdom) or regressed (mildly in Spain and more strikingly in France and Italy).
TFP growth comes from the innovation and adoption of new technologies, business models, and managerial practices. Europe has been failing on all three fronts for the last several decades: the continent develops less economically useful technologies than other comparable economic regions, it is reluctant to allow the introduction of new business models, and it lags in the adoption of new managerial practices.
This unfortunate state of affairs is unrelated to cultural traits or idiosyncratic preferences. For centuries, Europe was at the forefront of technological innovation and adoption. Moreover, in the decades following World War II, Europeans showed a more than considerable skill in catching up with the technological frontier, innovating in relevant fields, and working more extended hours than North Americans.
The reason, instead, for the European lack of TFP growth is the pervasive dominance of what economists Stephen Parente and Edward Prescott have called “barriers to riches.” The most salient of these are widespread barriers to entry; the lack of competition in many industries and the lax enforcement of competition law; surrealistic regulations and pervasive unjustified licensing requirements across Europe; inefficient capital markets; an absence of top universities and lower research and development spending; and an aging population.
Fast European economic growth after World War II was fostered by institutions and governance that offered incentives and opportunities to adopt U.S. technologies and managerial organization, that invested heavily in public infrastructure, that favored the accumulation of physical and human capital, and that exploited the very close economic openness of the continent. But since the mid-1970s, Europe has changed course and run an unfortunate experiment that shows how institutions and policies negatively affect economic performance.
The European experiment offers a number of lessons for the United States today. European economic weakness began once institutions and policies changed. Institutional change resulted in higher taxes, much less competition (which depressed the entry of new businesses), and increased regulation of capital and labor markets. The timing of changes in European TFP growth and hours worked—the two determinants of economic growth—largely coincides with the timing of changes in European institutions and governance.
Until recently, U.S. institutional quality has changed in ways similar to that of Europe. Through 2016, tax rates increased, and in some states, they have increased considerably for the most productive earners. Regulation also rose significantly, especially in financial markets through DoddFrank legislation. This new financial regulation raised the cost of making loans, particularly small business loans. This is because there is a significant fixed-cost component in dealing with compliance and record-keeping issues that make smaller loans less profitable. This becomes even more challenging for small banks (community banks), which have a lower revenue base over which to spread the fixed costs.
On a more positive note, the slowdown in TFP triggered by so-called Baumol’s disease (i.e., the move toward services with stagnant productivity such as education) may be nearly complete, and in the future we may observe a substitution of demand toward services with higher productivity growth as their relative prices fall. Also, a large cut in the corporate tax rate is making U.S. companies more competitive with those in Europe, and a substantial decrease in business regulation, including a partial rollback of Dodd-Frank, has increased business efficiency and has reduced compliance and recordkeeping costs. U.S. labor input and investment’s share of output are growing, and GDP growth has increased. In our view, the continuation of these favorable recent developments will depend on whether the United States continues to adopt more pro-market economic policies.
NOTE:
This research brief is based on Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Lee Ohanian, “The Lack of European Productivity Growth: Causes and Lessons for the United States,” Penn Institute for Economic Research Working Paper No. 18-024, September 2018, https://ideas.repec.org/p/pen/papers/18-024.html.
Whole number bias in humans: Seems intrinsic to the way humans solve quotient comparisons rather than a compensatory strategy
Intrinsic whole number bias in humans. Alonso-Díaz, Santiago, Piantadosi, Steven T., Hayden, Benjamin Y., Cantlon, Jessica F. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, Vol 44(9), Sep 2018, 1472-1481. http://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fxhp0000544
Humans have great difficulty comparing quotients including fractions, proportions, and probabilities and often erroneously isolate the whole numbers of the numerators and denominators to compare them. Some have argued that the whole number bias is a compensatory strategy to deal with difficult comparisons. We examined adult humans’ preferences for gambles that differed only in numerosity, and not in factors that influence their expected value (probabilities and stakes). Subjects consistently preferred gambles with more winning balls to ones with fewer, even though the probabilities were mathematically identical, replicating prior results. In a second experiment, we found that subjects accurately represented the relative probabilities of the choice options during rapid nonverbal probability judgments but nonetheless showed biases based on whole numbers. We mathematically formalized and quantitatively evaluated cognitive rules based on existing hypotheses that attempt to explain subjects’ whole number biases during quotient comparisons. The results show that the whole number bias is intrinsic to the way humans solve quotient comparisons rather than a compensatory strategy.
Humans have great difficulty comparing quotients including fractions, proportions, and probabilities and often erroneously isolate the whole numbers of the numerators and denominators to compare them. Some have argued that the whole number bias is a compensatory strategy to deal with difficult comparisons. We examined adult humans’ preferences for gambles that differed only in numerosity, and not in factors that influence their expected value (probabilities and stakes). Subjects consistently preferred gambles with more winning balls to ones with fewer, even though the probabilities were mathematically identical, replicating prior results. In a second experiment, we found that subjects accurately represented the relative probabilities of the choice options during rapid nonverbal probability judgments but nonetheless showed biases based on whole numbers. We mathematically formalized and quantitatively evaluated cognitive rules based on existing hypotheses that attempt to explain subjects’ whole number biases during quotient comparisons. The results show that the whole number bias is intrinsic to the way humans solve quotient comparisons rather than a compensatory strategy.
How Much of Barrier to Entry is Occupational Licensing? It reduces equilibrium labor supply by an average of 17%-27%
How Much of Barrier to Entry is Occupational Licensing? Peter Q. Blair, Bobby W. Chung. NBER Working Paper No. 25262, November 2018. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25262
Abstract: We exploit state variation in licensing laws to study the effect of licensing on occupational choice using a boundary discontinuity design. We find that licensing reduces equilibrium labor supply by an average of 17%-27%. The negative labor supply effects of licensing appear to be strongest for white workers and comparatively weaker for black workers.
Abstract: We exploit state variation in licensing laws to study the effect of licensing on occupational choice using a boundary discontinuity design. We find that licensing reduces equilibrium labor supply by an average of 17%-27%. The negative labor supply effects of licensing appear to be strongest for white workers and comparatively weaker for black workers.
The Myth of the Philandering Man and the Crafty Woman: The expectations (or predictions) from the extended sexual infidelity hypothesis are not met , most human mating behavior is dominated by ‘caring and faithful’ women and men
The Myth of the Philandering Man and the Crafty Woman. Diego Lopez. Psychol Behav Sci Int J 4(3): PBSIJ.MS.ID.555637 (2017) 001.
Abstract: The monogamous human mating system arises from a unique psychological experience (i.e. falling in love), in which both partners make a conscious decision to choose a mate and establish a long-term relationship (a pair bond); this provides both intensive and extensive care for their offspring through most of their life. It is a trait particular to humans and one that generates both wonder and incredulity. A number of scholars, however, support a converse view where monogamy is merely an appearance - they argue that sexual infidelity is rampant with both partners. Nevertheless, on reviewing the evidence, it is clear that the expectations (or predictions) from the extended sexual infidelity hypothesis are not met; instead, the results are compatible with the sexually faithful human pair bond. It is concluded that most human mating behavior is dominated by ‘caring and faithful’ women and men. A host of other sexual behaviors are present in humans but these are secondary and elicited by infrequent or rare circumstances.
Keywords: Human mating system; Marriage; Monogamy; Sexual differentiation; Sexual infidelity; Sperm competition
Abstract: The monogamous human mating system arises from a unique psychological experience (i.e. falling in love), in which both partners make a conscious decision to choose a mate and establish a long-term relationship (a pair bond); this provides both intensive and extensive care for their offspring through most of their life. It is a trait particular to humans and one that generates both wonder and incredulity. A number of scholars, however, support a converse view where monogamy is merely an appearance - they argue that sexual infidelity is rampant with both partners. Nevertheless, on reviewing the evidence, it is clear that the expectations (or predictions) from the extended sexual infidelity hypothesis are not met; instead, the results are compatible with the sexually faithful human pair bond. It is concluded that most human mating behavior is dominated by ‘caring and faithful’ women and men. A host of other sexual behaviors are present in humans but these are secondary and elicited by infrequent or rare circumstances.
Keywords: Human mating system; Marriage; Monogamy; Sexual differentiation; Sexual infidelity; Sperm competition
Hysterical recollection of data about gorillas "talking" in some way to children, others
Advent of selfhood. Sue Savage-Rumbaugh, Itai Roffman. Journal of Veterinary Medicine and Animal Sciences, https://meddocsonline.org/journal-of-veterinary-medicine-and-animal-sciences/advent-of-selfhood.pdf
Hysterical recollection of data:
1 Do gorillas per chance want to know something about we humans? Could they possibly hope to communicate something to us, just by their presence and demeanor? Observe the video on u-tube of a young adult gorilla communicating with human children, who are using the photos on their cell phones to communicate with the gorilla (https://youtu.be/vr8eMrnLLJo). This is clearly two-way communication between the gorilla and the children. There is no food reward for either species and no one trained the children to interpret the gorilla’s gesture and no one trained the gorilla to gesture to the children.
Zoo’s sometimes do not approve of this kind of behavior amongst gorillas in their collection, because it causes them to appear “too human” and they tend to discourage it. But there are many u-tube videos of gorillas looking at the photos on the iPhones and iPads of guests. They especially appreciate seeing videos of other gorillas [1]. It is wrong for two closely related species to desire to communicate? It may be that the gorillas interested in photographs.
2 The oral histories of many indigenous groups in Congo and in Mali, speak of time in the past when apes and humans communicated linguistically on a regular basis and even shared words in overlapping languages [2]. Maybe [3] the children in this video, who don’t yet know that it is politically incorrect to do anything with apes that is not part of their “natural behavior,” are starting to break down the human/ape barrier. They may be [3] harkening back to an earlier time when communication between us and them was part of the “natural behavior” of both species. Of course it would be possible for zoos to set up an electronic means for apes and visitors to begin to learn how to talk to and another and for gorillas to communicate by video with gorillas in other zoos and even in the wild.
---
[1] Why is this so special? A killer whale watches other cetaceans in TV: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/a-killer-whale-watches-other-cetaceans.html
[2] Great source! She proceeds to comparing the indigenous groups to children.
[3] Maybe, maybe, maybe, lots of possibilities, multiverses, etc. Amazing.
Hysterical recollection of data:
1 Do gorillas per chance want to know something about we humans? Could they possibly hope to communicate something to us, just by their presence and demeanor? Observe the video on u-tube of a young adult gorilla communicating with human children, who are using the photos on their cell phones to communicate with the gorilla (https://youtu.be/vr8eMrnLLJo). This is clearly two-way communication between the gorilla and the children. There is no food reward for either species and no one trained the children to interpret the gorilla’s gesture and no one trained the gorilla to gesture to the children.
Zoo’s sometimes do not approve of this kind of behavior amongst gorillas in their collection, because it causes them to appear “too human” and they tend to discourage it. But there are many u-tube videos of gorillas looking at the photos on the iPhones and iPads of guests. They especially appreciate seeing videos of other gorillas [1]. It is wrong for two closely related species to desire to communicate? It may be that the gorillas interested in photographs.
2 The oral histories of many indigenous groups in Congo and in Mali, speak of time in the past when apes and humans communicated linguistically on a regular basis and even shared words in overlapping languages [2]. Maybe [3] the children in this video, who don’t yet know that it is politically incorrect to do anything with apes that is not part of their “natural behavior,” are starting to break down the human/ape barrier. They may be [3] harkening back to an earlier time when communication between us and them was part of the “natural behavior” of both species. Of course it would be possible for zoos to set up an electronic means for apes and visitors to begin to learn how to talk to and another and for gorillas to communicate by video with gorillas in other zoos and even in the wild.
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[1] Why is this so special? A killer whale watches other cetaceans in TV: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/a-killer-whale-watches-other-cetaceans.html
[2] Great source! She proceeds to comparing the indigenous groups to children.
[3] Maybe, maybe, maybe, lots of possibilities, multiverses, etc. Amazing.
Landscapes preferences in the human species could be influenced by the evolutionary past; no universal preference for images of savanna landscape; the rainforest landscape was the preferred one
The Influence of the Evolutionary Past on the Mind: An Analysis of the Preference for Landscapes in the Human Species. Joelson M. B. Moura et al. Front Psychol, Dec 07 2018. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02485
Abstract: According to some evolutionary psychologists, landscapes preferences in the human species are influenced by their evolutionary past. Because the Pleistocene savanna is the least inhospitable landscape, it was the most suitable environment for survival and influenced the evolution of hominids in such a way that even today the human being has a universal preference for these environments. However, there is controversy regarding this statement, because in some studies it was evidenced that people prefer images of landscapes that are similar to those of the environment where they live. In this sense, we want to test whether there is indeed a preference for images of the savanna landscape and how the current environmental context may influence this preference. We performed a study in three environmental contexts with different landscapes in order to be able to observe the influence of the familiar landscape on landscape preference, of which two rural communities — one presenting a landscape similar to the deciduous seasonal forest and another presenting a savanna-like landscape — that totaled 132 participants and one urban community with 189 participants. The stimulus consisted of 12 images representing the six major terrestrial biomes and two images of urban landscapes. The variables analyzed were the emotional responses and the preference of the participants in relation to the images of landscapes. We analyzed the data using the Kruskal–Wallis test. The obtained result did not corroborate the idea of universal preference for images of savanna landscape. The image of Rainforest landscape was the preferred one among all the three environmental contexts studied. In this way, the preference for landscape may have been shaped at different periods of human evolutionary history, and not just during the period when hominids lived on the savannah. As much as selective pressures of the Pleistocene savanna have shaped the human mind during the evolutionary history, other factors and different types of environments may have influenced human preferences for landscapes. Thus, evolutionary psychologists who analyze human preferences for images of landscapes, guided by the idea of the past influencing the present, must be cautious before generalizing their results, especially if other variables such as the cultural ones are not controlled.
Abstract: According to some evolutionary psychologists, landscapes preferences in the human species are influenced by their evolutionary past. Because the Pleistocene savanna is the least inhospitable landscape, it was the most suitable environment for survival and influenced the evolution of hominids in such a way that even today the human being has a universal preference for these environments. However, there is controversy regarding this statement, because in some studies it was evidenced that people prefer images of landscapes that are similar to those of the environment where they live. In this sense, we want to test whether there is indeed a preference for images of the savanna landscape and how the current environmental context may influence this preference. We performed a study in three environmental contexts with different landscapes in order to be able to observe the influence of the familiar landscape on landscape preference, of which two rural communities — one presenting a landscape similar to the deciduous seasonal forest and another presenting a savanna-like landscape — that totaled 132 participants and one urban community with 189 participants. The stimulus consisted of 12 images representing the six major terrestrial biomes and two images of urban landscapes. The variables analyzed were the emotional responses and the preference of the participants in relation to the images of landscapes. We analyzed the data using the Kruskal–Wallis test. The obtained result did not corroborate the idea of universal preference for images of savanna landscape. The image of Rainforest landscape was the preferred one among all the three environmental contexts studied. In this way, the preference for landscape may have been shaped at different periods of human evolutionary history, and not just during the period when hominids lived on the savannah. As much as selective pressures of the Pleistocene savanna have shaped the human mind during the evolutionary history, other factors and different types of environments may have influenced human preferences for landscapes. Thus, evolutionary psychologists who analyze human preferences for images of landscapes, guided by the idea of the past influencing the present, must be cautious before generalizing their results, especially if other variables such as the cultural ones are not controlled.
The belief that honesty is effortful predicts subsequent dishonest behavior because it facilitates one’s ability to justify such actions
Lee, J. J., Ong, M., Parmar, B., & Amit, E. (2018). Lay theories of effortful honesty: Does the honesty–effort association justify making a dishonest decision? Journal of Applied Psychology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0000364
Abstract: Are our moral decisions and actions influenced by our beliefs about how much effort it takes to do the right thing? We hypothesized that the belief that honesty is effortful predicts subsequent dishonest behavior because it facilitates one’s ability to justify such actions. In Study 1 (N = 210), we developed an implicit measure of people’s beliefs about whether honesty is effortful, and we found that this lay theory predicts dishonesty. In Study 2 (N = 339), we experimentally manipulated individuals’ lay theories about honesty and effort and found that an individual’s lay theory that honesty is effortful increased subsequent dishonesty. In Study 3, we manipulated (Study 3a; N = 294) and measured (Study 3b; N = 153) lay theories, and then manipulated the strength of situational force that encourages dishonesty, and found that an individual’s lay theory influences subsequent dishonesty only in a weak situation, where individuals have more agency to interpret the situation. This research provides novel insights into how our lay theories linking honesty and effort can help us rationalize our dishonesty, independent of whether a particular moral decision requires effort or not.
Abstract: Are our moral decisions and actions influenced by our beliefs about how much effort it takes to do the right thing? We hypothesized that the belief that honesty is effortful predicts subsequent dishonest behavior because it facilitates one’s ability to justify such actions. In Study 1 (N = 210), we developed an implicit measure of people’s beliefs about whether honesty is effortful, and we found that this lay theory predicts dishonesty. In Study 2 (N = 339), we experimentally manipulated individuals’ lay theories about honesty and effort and found that an individual’s lay theory that honesty is effortful increased subsequent dishonesty. In Study 3, we manipulated (Study 3a; N = 294) and measured (Study 3b; N = 153) lay theories, and then manipulated the strength of situational force that encourages dishonesty, and found that an individual’s lay theory influences subsequent dishonesty only in a weak situation, where individuals have more agency to interpret the situation. This research provides novel insights into how our lay theories linking honesty and effort can help us rationalize our dishonesty, independent of whether a particular moral decision requires effort or not.
Thursday, December 6, 2018
Relationships Among Sexual Identity, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Behavior: Results from a Nationally Representative Probability Sample of Adults in the US
Relationships Among Sexual Identity, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Behavior: Results from a Nationally Representative Probability Sample of Adults in the US. Tsung-chieh Fu et al. Archives of Sexual Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1319-z
Abstract: Sexual orientation is a multi-dimensional concept, at a minimum comprised of sexual identity, sexual attraction, and sexual behavior. Our study aimed to assess relationships among self-identified sexual identity, sexual attraction, and sexual behaviors in a probability sample of adults in the U.S. and to identify associated factors with diverse patterns. We collected data from adults in the 2015 National Survey of Sexual Health and Behavior, an Internet-based nationally representative probability survey of the general U.S. population. Concordance between sexual identity versus sexual attraction and sexual behaviors was assessed using percent agreement. We identified correlates of discordance using logistic regression. Concordance between sexual identity versus sexual attraction and past-year sexual behaviors was 94% and 96%, respectively, though our sample was predominately composed of heterosexual individuals. Women and sexual minority individuals reported greater discordance across sexuality-related measures than men and heterosexual individuals. Younger adults (aged 18–24 years) were more likely to report sexual behaviors discordant with sexual identity compared with older adults (including those ages 25–34 years). Higher levels of educational attainment were significantly associated with less discordance of reported recent sexual activity and sexual identity. Measures of sexual identity, attraction, and behaviors are not interchangeable. Future research should consider multiple sexuality-related measures in order to capture the complexity and variability of sexualities.
Keywords: Sexual identity Sexual attraction Sexual behavior Probability sample Sexual orientation
Abstract: Sexual orientation is a multi-dimensional concept, at a minimum comprised of sexual identity, sexual attraction, and sexual behavior. Our study aimed to assess relationships among self-identified sexual identity, sexual attraction, and sexual behaviors in a probability sample of adults in the U.S. and to identify associated factors with diverse patterns. We collected data from adults in the 2015 National Survey of Sexual Health and Behavior, an Internet-based nationally representative probability survey of the general U.S. population. Concordance between sexual identity versus sexual attraction and sexual behaviors was assessed using percent agreement. We identified correlates of discordance using logistic regression. Concordance between sexual identity versus sexual attraction and past-year sexual behaviors was 94% and 96%, respectively, though our sample was predominately composed of heterosexual individuals. Women and sexual minority individuals reported greater discordance across sexuality-related measures than men and heterosexual individuals. Younger adults (aged 18–24 years) were more likely to report sexual behaviors discordant with sexual identity compared with older adults (including those ages 25–34 years). Higher levels of educational attainment were significantly associated with less discordance of reported recent sexual activity and sexual identity. Measures of sexual identity, attraction, and behaviors are not interchangeable. Future research should consider multiple sexuality-related measures in order to capture the complexity and variability of sexualities.
Keywords: Sexual identity Sexual attraction Sexual behavior Probability sample Sexual orientation
Measuring Cognitive Reflection Without Maths: Developing and Validating the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test
Sirota, Miroslav, Lenka Kostovičová, Marie Juanchich, Chris Dewberry, and Amanda C. Marshall. 2018. “Measuring Cognitive Reflection Without Maths: Developing and Validating the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test.” PsyArXiv. December 6. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pfe79
Abstract: The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures the ability to suppress an initial (incorrect) intuition and to reflect when solving three mathematical problems. It rapidly became popular for its impressive power to predict how well people reason and make decisions. Despite the popularity of the CRT, a major issue complicates its interpretation: the numerical nature of the CRT confounds reflection ability with mathematical ability. In addition, the statistical and psychometric properties of the CRT are suboptimal and an increasing proportion of participants have become familiar with it. We have addressed these issues by developing the Verbal CRT (CRT-V), a novel 10-item measure of cognitive reflection, using non-mathematical problems with good statistical and psychometric properties and with low familiarity. First, we selected suitable items with relatively low familiarity and optimal difficulty as identified in two different populations (Studies 1 and 2) and with high content validity as judged by an expert panel (Study 3). Second, we demonstrated a good criterion and construct validity for the test in different populations with a wide range of variables (Studies 4-6) and a good internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Study 7). The Verbal CRT was less associated with numeracy than the original CRT and was not biased against women as was the case with the original CRT. The Verbal CRT can complement existing tests of cognitive reflection; it will be especially appropriate for use in general adult populations and in populations that are less educated and mathematically anxious.
Abstract: The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures the ability to suppress an initial (incorrect) intuition and to reflect when solving three mathematical problems. It rapidly became popular for its impressive power to predict how well people reason and make decisions. Despite the popularity of the CRT, a major issue complicates its interpretation: the numerical nature of the CRT confounds reflection ability with mathematical ability. In addition, the statistical and psychometric properties of the CRT are suboptimal and an increasing proportion of participants have become familiar with it. We have addressed these issues by developing the Verbal CRT (CRT-V), a novel 10-item measure of cognitive reflection, using non-mathematical problems with good statistical and psychometric properties and with low familiarity. First, we selected suitable items with relatively low familiarity and optimal difficulty as identified in two different populations (Studies 1 and 2) and with high content validity as judged by an expert panel (Study 3). Second, we demonstrated a good criterion and construct validity for the test in different populations with a wide range of variables (Studies 4-6) and a good internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Study 7). The Verbal CRT was less associated with numeracy than the original CRT and was not biased against women as was the case with the original CRT. The Verbal CRT can complement existing tests of cognitive reflection; it will be especially appropriate for use in general adult populations and in populations that are less educated and mathematically anxious.
Sleep talking: A viable access to mental processes during sleep
Sleep talking: A viable access to mental processes during sleep. Valentina Alfonsi et al. Sleep Medicine Reviews, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.smrv.2018.12.001
Summary
Sleep talking is one of the most common altered nocturnal behaviours in the whole population. It does not represent a pathological condition and consists in the unaware production of vocalisations during sleep.
Although in the last few decades we have experienced a remarkable increase in knowledge about cognitive processes and behavioural manifestations during sleep, the literature regarding sleep talking remains dated and fragmentary. We first provide an overview of historical and recent findings regarding sleep talking, and we then discuss the phenomenon in the context of mental activity during sleep. It is shown that verbal utterances, reflecting the ongoing dream content, may represent the unique possibility to access the dreamlike mental experience directly. Furthermore, we discuss such phenomena within a cognitive theoretical framework, considering both the atypical activation of psycholinguistic circuits during sleep and the implications of verbal ‘replay’ of recent learning in memory consolidation.
Despite current knowledge on such a common experience being far from complete, an in-depth analysis of sleep talking episodes could offer interesting opportunities to address fundamental questions on dreaming or information processing during sleep. Further systematic polysomnographic and neuroimaging investigations are expected to shed new light on the manifestation of the phenomenon and related aspects.
Summary
Sleep talking is one of the most common altered nocturnal behaviours in the whole population. It does not represent a pathological condition and consists in the unaware production of vocalisations during sleep.
Although in the last few decades we have experienced a remarkable increase in knowledge about cognitive processes and behavioural manifestations during sleep, the literature regarding sleep talking remains dated and fragmentary. We first provide an overview of historical and recent findings regarding sleep talking, and we then discuss the phenomenon in the context of mental activity during sleep. It is shown that verbal utterances, reflecting the ongoing dream content, may represent the unique possibility to access the dreamlike mental experience directly. Furthermore, we discuss such phenomena within a cognitive theoretical framework, considering both the atypical activation of psycholinguistic circuits during sleep and the implications of verbal ‘replay’ of recent learning in memory consolidation.
Despite current knowledge on such a common experience being far from complete, an in-depth analysis of sleep talking episodes could offer interesting opportunities to address fundamental questions on dreaming or information processing during sleep. Further systematic polysomnographic and neuroimaging investigations are expected to shed new light on the manifestation of the phenomenon and related aspects.
Reexamining the Effect of Gustatory Disgust on Moral Judgment: A Multi-lab Direct Replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011). Not Replicable
Ghelfi, Eric, Cody D. Christopherson, Heather L. Urry, Richie L. Lenne, Nicole Legate, Mary A. Fischer, Fieke M. A. Wagemans, et al. 2018. “Reexamining the Effect of Gustatory Disgust on Moral Judgment: A Multi-lab Direct Replication of Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz (2011).” PsyArXiv. December 6. doi:10.31234/osf.io/349pk
Abstract: Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz’s (2011) influential experiment demonstrated that gustatory disgust triggers feelings of moral disgust. This is a report of a large-scale multi-site direct replication of this study, conducted by participants in the Collaborative Replications and Education Project (CREP). Participants in each sample were randomly assigned to one of three beverage conditions: bitter/disgusting, control, or sweet. After consuming the assigned beverage, participants made a series of judgments indicating the moral wrongness of the behavior depicted in each of six vignettes. In the original study, drinking the bitter beverage led to higher ratings of moral wrongness than drinking the control and sweet beverages. The original authors found that a beverage contrast (bitter versus both control and sweet) was significant among conservative participants and not among liberal participants. In this report, random effects meta-analyses across all participants (N = 1,137 in k = 11 studies), conservative participants (N = 162, k = 3), and liberal participants (N = 648, k = 7) revealed standardized effect sizes that were smaller than reported in the original study. Most were in the opposite of the predicted direction and had 95% confidence intervals containing zero; all were smaller than the effect size the original authors had 33% power to detect. In sum, the overall pattern does not provide strong support for the theory that physical disgust via taste perception contributes to moral disgust. We also discuss limitations including low reliability of the moral judgment measure and low numbers of conservative participants across samples.
Abstract: Eskine, Kacinik, and Prinz’s (2011) influential experiment demonstrated that gustatory disgust triggers feelings of moral disgust. This is a report of a large-scale multi-site direct replication of this study, conducted by participants in the Collaborative Replications and Education Project (CREP). Participants in each sample were randomly assigned to one of three beverage conditions: bitter/disgusting, control, or sweet. After consuming the assigned beverage, participants made a series of judgments indicating the moral wrongness of the behavior depicted in each of six vignettes. In the original study, drinking the bitter beverage led to higher ratings of moral wrongness than drinking the control and sweet beverages. The original authors found that a beverage contrast (bitter versus both control and sweet) was significant among conservative participants and not among liberal participants. In this report, random effects meta-analyses across all participants (N = 1,137 in k = 11 studies), conservative participants (N = 162, k = 3), and liberal participants (N = 648, k = 7) revealed standardized effect sizes that were smaller than reported in the original study. Most were in the opposite of the predicted direction and had 95% confidence intervals containing zero; all were smaller than the effect size the original authors had 33% power to detect. In sum, the overall pattern does not provide strong support for the theory that physical disgust via taste perception contributes to moral disgust. We also discuss limitations including low reliability of the moral judgment measure and low numbers of conservative participants across samples.
Wednesday, December 5, 2018
Sex differences in own and other body perception: Other body images, particularly of the opposite sex, may be of greater salience for men, whereas images of own bodies may be more salient for women
Sex differences in own and other body perception. Sarah M. Burke et al. Human Brain Mapping, https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.24388
Abstract: Own body perception, and differentiating and comparing one's body to another person's body, are common cognitive functions that have relevance for self‐identity and social interactions. In several psychiatric conditions, including anorexia nervosa, body dysmorphic disorder, gender dysphoria, and autism spectrum disorder, self and own body perception, as well as aspects of social communication are disturbed. Despite most of these conditions having skewed prevalence sex ratios, little is known about whether the neural basis of own body perception differs between the sexes. We addressed this question by investigating brain activation using functional magnetic resonance imaging during a Body Perception task in 15 male and 15 female healthy participants. Participants viewed their own body, bodies of same‐sex, or opposite‐sex other people, and rated the degree that they appeared like themselves. We found that men and women did not differ in the pattern of brain activation during own body perception compared to a scrambled control image. However, when viewing images of other bodies of same‐sex or opposite‐sex, men showed significantly stronger activations in attention‐related and reward‐related brain regions, whereas women engaged stronger activations in striatal, medial‐prefrontal, and insular cortices, when viewing the own body compared to other images of the opposite sex. It is possible that other body images, particularly of the opposite sex, may be of greater salience for men, whereas images of own bodies may be more salient for women. These observations provide tentative neurobiological correlates to why women may be more vulnerable than men to conditions involving own body perception.
Abstract: Own body perception, and differentiating and comparing one's body to another person's body, are common cognitive functions that have relevance for self‐identity and social interactions. In several psychiatric conditions, including anorexia nervosa, body dysmorphic disorder, gender dysphoria, and autism spectrum disorder, self and own body perception, as well as aspects of social communication are disturbed. Despite most of these conditions having skewed prevalence sex ratios, little is known about whether the neural basis of own body perception differs between the sexes. We addressed this question by investigating brain activation using functional magnetic resonance imaging during a Body Perception task in 15 male and 15 female healthy participants. Participants viewed their own body, bodies of same‐sex, or opposite‐sex other people, and rated the degree that they appeared like themselves. We found that men and women did not differ in the pattern of brain activation during own body perception compared to a scrambled control image. However, when viewing images of other bodies of same‐sex or opposite‐sex, men showed significantly stronger activations in attention‐related and reward‐related brain regions, whereas women engaged stronger activations in striatal, medial‐prefrontal, and insular cortices, when viewing the own body compared to other images of the opposite sex. It is possible that other body images, particularly of the opposite sex, may be of greater salience for men, whereas images of own bodies may be more salient for women. These observations provide tentative neurobiological correlates to why women may be more vulnerable than men to conditions involving own body perception.
Psychological hibernation in Antarctica
Psychological hibernation in Antarctica. Gro M Sandal, Fons Van De Vijver, Nathan Smith. Frontiers in Psychology, 2018 Nov 19. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02235
Abstract: Human activity in Antarctica has increased sharply in recent years. In particular during the winter months, people are exposed to long periods of isolation and confinement and an extreme physical environment that poses risks to health, well-being and performance. The aim of the present study was to gain a better understanding of processes contributing to psychological resilience in this context. Specifically, the study examined how the use of coping strategies changed over time, and the extent to which changes coincided with alterations in mood and sleep. Two crews (N=27) spending approximately 10 months at the Concordia station completed the Utrecht Coping List, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and a structured sleep diary at regular intervals (x 9). The results showed that several variables reached a minimum value during the midwinter period, which corresponded to the third quarter of the expedition. The effect was particularly noticeable for coping strategies (i.e., active problem solving, palliative reactions, avoidance, and comforting cognitions). The pattern of results could indicate that participants during Antarctic over-wintering enter a state of psychological hibernation as a stress coping mechanism.
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Discussion
Abstract: Human activity in Antarctica has increased sharply in recent years. In particular during the winter months, people are exposed to long periods of isolation and confinement and an extreme physical environment that poses risks to health, well-being and performance. The aim of the present study was to gain a better understanding of processes contributing to psychological resilience in this context. Specifically, the study examined how the use of coping strategies changed over time, and the extent to which changes coincided with alterations in mood and sleep. Two crews (N=27) spending approximately 10 months at the Concordia station completed the Utrecht Coping List, the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and a structured sleep diary at regular intervals (x 9). The results showed that several variables reached a minimum value during the midwinter period, which corresponded to the third quarter of the expedition. The effect was particularly noticeable for coping strategies (i.e., active problem solving, palliative reactions, avoidance, and comforting cognitions). The pattern of results could indicate that participants during Antarctic over-wintering enter a state of psychological hibernation as a stress coping mechanism.
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Discussion
The findings from this study suggest that coping
strategies, sleep quality, and PA were influenced by the environmental
conditions to a smaller or larger degree during midwinter. Quadratic
time-based models demonstrated the greatest effect sizes, suggesting
that when the conditions are harshest, resources are more depleted and
participants were less involved in any form of coping and reported less
PA. Also subjective sleep quality showed a negative trend over time, a
result consistent with other research (Bhargava et al., 2000; Pattyn et al., 2018)
although at the end of the stay the average score did increase
slightly. While chronic hypoxia might lead to deterioration in sleep
quality in high altitude (Collet et al., 2015), the effect of hypoxia on adaptation among residents on Concordia has been shown to persist over time (Porcelli et al., 2018).
Thus, we argue that hypoxia cannot explain seasonal variations in sleep
quality observed in this study. The reduction in sleep quality and PA
is consistent with the “midwinter syndrome” observed by other
researchers (Bhargava et al., 2000; Palinkas and Suedfeld, 2008).
It is noticeable that reports of NA remained low over time and did not
show the expected change during midwinter. One possible explanation is
that participants were reluctant to report distress.
Perhaps the most striking result from this study was the
reduction in all of observed coping strategies during the midwinter
period. This pattern contradicts the idea that emotional strategies and
avoidance take over from more active strategies in situations involving
chronic stressors. Our findings may reflect that participants became
more indifferent or emotionally flat during the winter months. This
interpretation is consistent with early research which noted the
occurrence of a mild psychological fugue state known as the Antarctic
stare, around the third quarter of the stay (Barabasz et al., 1983).
The phenomenon state is characterized by an altered state of
consciousness or pronounced absentmindedness, “drifting,” wandering off
attention, and deterioration in situational awareness. We believe that
this reaction is not unique to people overwintering in Antarctica. For
example, during a 520 days confinement study (MARS500) crew members
reported reduced need for stimulation around the third quarter (Sandal and Bye, 2015).
Interactions between crew members declined, and one crew member showed
indications of dissociation. The state of seeking reduced stimulation,
and emotional flatness bears resemblance to what could be called
“psychological hibernation.” A state of psychological hibernation may be
beneficial for coping with the harshness of prolonged exposure to
stress in extreme environments. The ability to “switch off” mentally has
been associated with positive outcomes in the work stress literature (Sonnentag and Bayer, 2005).
However, psychological detachment has also been described as a symptom
of burnout after prolonged exposure to stress at work (Maslach and Leiter, 2016).
Whilst psychological hibernation could be an adaptive response to the
extreme conditions, especially if it disappears when conditions become
less extreme (as evidenced by the increase in coping strategy use
reported in the present study), understanding the nature of this
phenomenon should be an avenue for future research. Further research is
also needed to determine the extent to which this state might be
associated with decrement in cognitive function and the ability to react
to acute, safety-critical situations. So far studies on cognitive
performance investigations on Antarctica have been controversial. While
no detectable cognitive deterioration was found in a study of a crew
overwintering on Concordia (Barkaszi et al., 2016), other researchers have shown that residence in Antarctica had a detrimental effect on cognition (Reed et al., 2001).
In social risk, the costs, benefits, & uncertainty of an action depend on the behavior of another individual; humans & chimpanzees overvalue the costs of a socially risky decision when compared with that of purely economic risk
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) Are More Averse to Social Than Nonsocial Risk. Sarah E. Calcutt et al. Psychological Science, https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797618811877
Abstract: Social risk is a domain of risk in which the costs, benefits, and uncertainty of an action depend on the behavior of another individual. Humans overvalue the costs of a socially risky decision when compared with that of purely economic risk. Here, we played a trust game with 8 female captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to determine whether this bias exists in one of our closest living relatives. A correlation between an individual’s social- and nonsocial-risk attitudes indicated stable individual variation, yet the chimpanzees were more averse to social than nonsocial risk. This indicates differences between social and economic decision making and emotional factors in social risk taking. In another experiment using the same paradigm, subjects played with several partners with whom they had varying relationships. Preexisting relationships did not impact the subjects’ choices. Instead, the apes used a tit-for-tat strategy and were influenced by the outcome of early interactions with a partner.
Keywords: trust, chimpanzee, risk, relationships, tit-for-tat
Abstract: Social risk is a domain of risk in which the costs, benefits, and uncertainty of an action depend on the behavior of another individual. Humans overvalue the costs of a socially risky decision when compared with that of purely economic risk. Here, we played a trust game with 8 female captive chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to determine whether this bias exists in one of our closest living relatives. A correlation between an individual’s social- and nonsocial-risk attitudes indicated stable individual variation, yet the chimpanzees were more averse to social than nonsocial risk. This indicates differences between social and economic decision making and emotional factors in social risk taking. In another experiment using the same paradigm, subjects played with several partners with whom they had varying relationships. Preexisting relationships did not impact the subjects’ choices. Instead, the apes used a tit-for-tat strategy and were influenced by the outcome of early interactions with a partner.
Keywords: trust, chimpanzee, risk, relationships, tit-for-tat
Tuesday, December 4, 2018
Why Smart People Are Vulnerable to Putting Tribe Before Truth
Why Smart People Are Vulnerable to Putting Tribe Before Truth. Dan M Kahan. Scientific American, Dec 03 2018. https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-smart-people-are-vulnerable-to-putting-tribe-before-truth/
Excerpts (full text and links in the link above):
What intellectual capacities—or if one prefers, cognitive virtues—should the citizens of a modern democratic society possess? For decades, one dominant answer has been the knowledge and reasoning abilities associated with science literacy. Scientific evidence is indispensable for effective policymaking. And for a self-governing society to reap the benefits of policy-relevant science, its citizens must be able to recognize the best available evidence and its implications for collective action.
This account definitely isn’t wrong. But the emerging science of science communication, which uses scientific methods to understand how people come to know what’s known by science, suggests that it is incomplete.
Indeed, it’s dangerously incomplete. Unless accompanied by another science-reasoning trait, the capacities associated with science literacy can actually impede public recognition of the best available evidence and deepen pernicious forms of cultural polarization.
The supplemental trait needed to make science literacy supportive rather than corrosive of enlightened self-government is science curiosity.
Simply put, as ordinary members of the public acquire more scientific knowledge and become more adept at scientific reasoning, they don’t converge on the best evidence relating to controversial policy-relevant facts. Instead they become even more culturally polarized.
This is one of the most robust findings associated with the science of science communication. It is a relationship observed, for example, in public perceptions of myriad societal risk sources—not just climate change but also nuclear power, gun control and fracking, among others.
In addition, this same pattern—the greater the proficiency, the more acute the polarization—characterizes multiple forms of reasoning essential to science comprehension: polarization increases in tandem not only with science literacy but also with numeracy (an ability to reason well with quantitative information) and with actively open-minded thinking—a tendency to revise one’s beliefs in light of new evidence.
The same goes for cognitive reflection. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures how much people rely on two forms of information processing: “fast,” preconscious, emotion-driven forms of reasoning, often called “System 1”; or a conscious, deliberate, analytical, “slow” form, designated “System 2.”
There’s no doubt that scientific reasoning demands a high degree of proficiency in System 2 information processing. But as ordinary members of the public become more adept at this style of reasoning, they don’t think more like scientists. Instead, they become more reliable indicators of what people who share their group commitments think about culturally contested risks and related facts.
This relationship is readily apparent in public opinion survey studies (Figure 1). It has also been documented experimentally. Experiments catch these thinking capacities “in the act”: proficient reasoners are revealed to be using their analytical skills to ferret out evidence that supports their group’s position, while rationalizing dismissal of such evidence when it undermines their side’s beliefs.
Figure 1. Increasing polarization associated with various reasoning capacities and issues. Credit: Dan M. Kahan
What explains this effect? As counterintuitive as it sounds, it is perfectly rational to use one’s reason this way in a science communication environment polluted by tribalism.
What an ordinary member of the public thinks about climate change, for example, has no impact on the climate. Nor does anything that she does as a consumer or a voter; her individual impact is too small to make a difference. Accordingly, when she is acting in one of these capacities, any mistake she makes about the best available scientific evidence will have zero impact on her or anyone she cares about.
But given what positions on climate change have now come to signify about one’s group allegiances, adopting the “wrong” position in interactions with her peers could rupture bonds on which she depends heavily for emotional and material well-being. Under these pathological conditions, she will predictably use her reasoning not to discern the truth but to form and persist in beliefs characteristic of her group, a tendency known as “identity-protective cognition.”
One doesn’t have to be a Nobel prizewinner to figure out which position one’s tribe espouses. But if someone does enjoy special proficiency in comprehending and interpreting empirical evidence, it is perfectly predictable that she’ll use that skill to forge even stronger links between what she believes and who she is, culturally speaking.
Now consider curiosity.
Conceptually, curiosity has properties directly opposed to those of identity-protective cognition. Whereas the latter evinces a hardened resistance to exploring evidence that could challenge one’s existing views, the former consists of a hunger for the unexpected, driven by the anticipated pleasure of surprise. In that state, the defensive sentries of existing opinion have necessarily been made to stand down. One could reasonably expect, then, that those disposed toward science curiosity would be more open-minded and as a result less polarized along cultural lines.
This is exactly what we see when we test this conjecture empirically. In general population surveys, diverse citizens who score high on the Science Curiosity Scale (SCS) are less divided than are their low-scoring peers.
Indeed, rather than becoming more polarized as their science literacy increases, those who score highest on SCS tend to converge on what the evidence signifies about climate change, private gun ownership, nuclear power and the other risk sources.
Experimental data suggest why. Afforded a choice, low-curiosity individuals opt for familiar evidence consistent with what they already believe; high-curiosity citizens, in contrast, prefer to explore novel findings, even if that information implies that their group’s position is wrong (Figure 2). Consuming a richer diet of information, high-curiosity citizens predictably form less one-sided and hence less polarized views.
Figure 2. Selection of position-threatening news story. N= 750, nationally representative sample. Dotted lines denote 0.95 confidence intervals. Credit: Dan M. Kahan
This empirical research paints a more complex picture of the cognitively virtuous democratic citizen. To be sure, she knows a good deal about scientific discoveries and methods. But of equal importance, she experiences wonder and awe—the emotional signatures of curiosity—at the insights that science affords into the hidden processes of nature.
The findings on science curiosity also have implications for the practice of science communication. Merely imparting information is unlikely to be effective—and could even backfire—in a society that has failed to inculcate curiosity in its citizens and that doesn’t engage curiosity when communicating policy-relevant science.
What, then, should educators, science journalists, and other science communication professionals do to enlist the benefits of science curiosity?
The near-term answer to this question is straightforward: join forces with empirical researchers to study science curiosity and the advancement of their craft.
The value of such collaborations was a major theme of the National Academy of Sciences’ recent expert-consensus report Communicating Science Effectively. Indeed, connected lab-field initiatives of the kind envisioned by the NAS Report are already in place. The Science Curiosity Scale is itself the product of a collaborative project between social science researchers affiliated with the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School (CCP) and the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania (APPC), on the one hand, and science film producers at Tangled Bank Studios, on the other.
Results from that initiative, in turn, inform a collaboration between APPC social scientists and science communicators at the public television station KQED. Funded by the National Science Foundation and the Templeton Foundation, that partnership is performing field studies aimed at making science films and related forms of communication engaging to science-curious members of culturally diverse groups—including the groups that are bitterly divided on climate change and other issues.
For now, there are no proven protocols for using science curiosity to help extinguish the group rivalries that generate public disagreement over policy-relevant science, particularly among the most science literate members of such groups.
But if the science of science communication is not yet in a position to tell science communicators exactly what to do to harness the unifying effects of curiosity, it unmistakably does tell them how to figure that out: by use of the empirical methods of science itself.
---
Check also:
The key mechanism that generates scientific polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own:
Tappin, Ben M., and Ryan McKay. 2018. “Moral Polarization and Out-party Hate in the US Political Context.” PsyArXiv. November 2. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/moral-polarization-and-out-party-hate.html
Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization. Barbara Mellers, PhilipTetlock, Hal R. Arkes. Cognition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/forecasting-tournaments-epistemic.html
Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Gregory J. Martin & Steven W. Webster. Political Science Research and Methods, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/voters-appear-to-be-sorting-on-non.html
Liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues; the divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely:
Peltzman, Sam, Polarizing Currents within Purple America (August 20, 2018). SSRN: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/liberals-and-conservatives-have-mainly.html
Does Having a Political Discussion Help or Hurt Intergroup Perceptions? Drawing Guidance From Social Identity Theory and the Contact Hypothesis. Robert M. Bond, Hillary C. Shulman, Michael Gilbert. Bond Vol 12 (2018), https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/having-political-discussion-with-out.html
All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:
Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Excerpts (full text and links in the link above):
What intellectual capacities—or if one prefers, cognitive virtues—should the citizens of a modern democratic society possess? For decades, one dominant answer has been the knowledge and reasoning abilities associated with science literacy. Scientific evidence is indispensable for effective policymaking. And for a self-governing society to reap the benefits of policy-relevant science, its citizens must be able to recognize the best available evidence and its implications for collective action.
This account definitely isn’t wrong. But the emerging science of science communication, which uses scientific methods to understand how people come to know what’s known by science, suggests that it is incomplete.
Indeed, it’s dangerously incomplete. Unless accompanied by another science-reasoning trait, the capacities associated with science literacy can actually impede public recognition of the best available evidence and deepen pernicious forms of cultural polarization.
The supplemental trait needed to make science literacy supportive rather than corrosive of enlightened self-government is science curiosity.
Simply put, as ordinary members of the public acquire more scientific knowledge and become more adept at scientific reasoning, they don’t converge on the best evidence relating to controversial policy-relevant facts. Instead they become even more culturally polarized.
This is one of the most robust findings associated with the science of science communication. It is a relationship observed, for example, in public perceptions of myriad societal risk sources—not just climate change but also nuclear power, gun control and fracking, among others.
In addition, this same pattern—the greater the proficiency, the more acute the polarization—characterizes multiple forms of reasoning essential to science comprehension: polarization increases in tandem not only with science literacy but also with numeracy (an ability to reason well with quantitative information) and with actively open-minded thinking—a tendency to revise one’s beliefs in light of new evidence.
The same goes for cognitive reflection. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) measures how much people rely on two forms of information processing: “fast,” preconscious, emotion-driven forms of reasoning, often called “System 1”; or a conscious, deliberate, analytical, “slow” form, designated “System 2.”
There’s no doubt that scientific reasoning demands a high degree of proficiency in System 2 information processing. But as ordinary members of the public become more adept at this style of reasoning, they don’t think more like scientists. Instead, they become more reliable indicators of what people who share their group commitments think about culturally contested risks and related facts.
This relationship is readily apparent in public opinion survey studies (Figure 1). It has also been documented experimentally. Experiments catch these thinking capacities “in the act”: proficient reasoners are revealed to be using their analytical skills to ferret out evidence that supports their group’s position, while rationalizing dismissal of such evidence when it undermines their side’s beliefs.
Figure 1. Increasing polarization associated with various reasoning capacities and issues. Credit: Dan M. Kahan
What explains this effect? As counterintuitive as it sounds, it is perfectly rational to use one’s reason this way in a science communication environment polluted by tribalism.
What an ordinary member of the public thinks about climate change, for example, has no impact on the climate. Nor does anything that she does as a consumer or a voter; her individual impact is too small to make a difference. Accordingly, when she is acting in one of these capacities, any mistake she makes about the best available scientific evidence will have zero impact on her or anyone she cares about.
But given what positions on climate change have now come to signify about one’s group allegiances, adopting the “wrong” position in interactions with her peers could rupture bonds on which she depends heavily for emotional and material well-being. Under these pathological conditions, she will predictably use her reasoning not to discern the truth but to form and persist in beliefs characteristic of her group, a tendency known as “identity-protective cognition.”
One doesn’t have to be a Nobel prizewinner to figure out which position one’s tribe espouses. But if someone does enjoy special proficiency in comprehending and interpreting empirical evidence, it is perfectly predictable that she’ll use that skill to forge even stronger links between what she believes and who she is, culturally speaking.
Now consider curiosity.
Conceptually, curiosity has properties directly opposed to those of identity-protective cognition. Whereas the latter evinces a hardened resistance to exploring evidence that could challenge one’s existing views, the former consists of a hunger for the unexpected, driven by the anticipated pleasure of surprise. In that state, the defensive sentries of existing opinion have necessarily been made to stand down. One could reasonably expect, then, that those disposed toward science curiosity would be more open-minded and as a result less polarized along cultural lines.
This is exactly what we see when we test this conjecture empirically. In general population surveys, diverse citizens who score high on the Science Curiosity Scale (SCS) are less divided than are their low-scoring peers.
Indeed, rather than becoming more polarized as their science literacy increases, those who score highest on SCS tend to converge on what the evidence signifies about climate change, private gun ownership, nuclear power and the other risk sources.
Experimental data suggest why. Afforded a choice, low-curiosity individuals opt for familiar evidence consistent with what they already believe; high-curiosity citizens, in contrast, prefer to explore novel findings, even if that information implies that their group’s position is wrong (Figure 2). Consuming a richer diet of information, high-curiosity citizens predictably form less one-sided and hence less polarized views.
Figure 2. Selection of position-threatening news story. N= 750, nationally representative sample. Dotted lines denote 0.95 confidence intervals. Credit: Dan M. Kahan
This empirical research paints a more complex picture of the cognitively virtuous democratic citizen. To be sure, she knows a good deal about scientific discoveries and methods. But of equal importance, she experiences wonder and awe—the emotional signatures of curiosity—at the insights that science affords into the hidden processes of nature.
The findings on science curiosity also have implications for the practice of science communication. Merely imparting information is unlikely to be effective—and could even backfire—in a society that has failed to inculcate curiosity in its citizens and that doesn’t engage curiosity when communicating policy-relevant science.
What, then, should educators, science journalists, and other science communication professionals do to enlist the benefits of science curiosity?
The near-term answer to this question is straightforward: join forces with empirical researchers to study science curiosity and the advancement of their craft.
The value of such collaborations was a major theme of the National Academy of Sciences’ recent expert-consensus report Communicating Science Effectively. Indeed, connected lab-field initiatives of the kind envisioned by the NAS Report are already in place. The Science Curiosity Scale is itself the product of a collaborative project between social science researchers affiliated with the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School (CCP) and the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania (APPC), on the one hand, and science film producers at Tangled Bank Studios, on the other.
Results from that initiative, in turn, inform a collaboration between APPC social scientists and science communicators at the public television station KQED. Funded by the National Science Foundation and the Templeton Foundation, that partnership is performing field studies aimed at making science films and related forms of communication engaging to science-curious members of culturally diverse groups—including the groups that are bitterly divided on climate change and other issues.
For now, there are no proven protocols for using science curiosity to help extinguish the group rivalries that generate public disagreement over policy-relevant science, particularly among the most science literate members of such groups.
But if the science of science communication is not yet in a position to tell science communicators exactly what to do to harness the unifying effects of curiosity, it unmistakably does tell them how to figure that out: by use of the empirical methods of science itself.
---
Check also:
The key mechanism that generates scientific polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own:
Scientific polarization. Cailin O’Connor, James Owen Weatherall. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. October 2018, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 855–875. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/12/the-key-mechanism-that-generates.htmlPolarized Mass or Polarized Few? Assessing the Parallel Rise of Survey Nonresponse and Measures of Polarization. Amnon Cavari and Guy Freedman. The Journal of Politics, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/polarized-mass-or-polarized-few.html
Tappin, Ben M., and Ryan McKay. 2018. “Moral Polarization and Out-party Hate in the US Political Context.” PsyArXiv. November 2. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/moral-polarization-and-out-party-hate.html
Forecasting tournaments, epistemic humility and attitude depolarization. Barbara Mellers, PhilipTetlock, Hal R. Arkes. Cognition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/forecasting-tournaments-epistemic.html
Does residential sorting explain geographic polarization? Gregory J. Martin & Steven W. Webster. Political Science Research and Methods, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/voters-appear-to-be-sorting-on-non.html
Liberals and conservatives have mainly moved further apart on a wide variety of policy issues; the divergence is substantial quantitatively and in its plausible political impact: intra party moderation has become increasingly unlikely:
Peltzman, Sam, Polarizing Currents within Purple America (August 20, 2018). SSRN: https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/liberals-and-conservatives-have-mainly.html
Does Having a Political Discussion Help or Hurt Intergroup Perceptions? Drawing Guidance From Social Identity Theory and the Contact Hypothesis. Robert M. Bond, Hillary C. Shulman, Michael Gilbert. Bond Vol 12 (2018), https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/having-political-discussion-with-out.html
All the interactions took the form of subjects rating stories offering ‘ammunition’ for their own side of the controversial issue as possessing greater intrinsic news importance:
Perceptions of newsworthiness are contaminated by a political usefulness bias. Harold Pashler, Gail Heriot. Royal Society Open Science, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/all-interactions-took-form-of-subjects.htmlWhen do we care about political neutrality? The hypocritical nature of reaction to political bias. Omer Yair, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. PLOS, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/when-do-we-care-about-political.html
Democrats & Republicans were both more likely to believe news about the value-upholding behavior of their in-group or the value-undermining behavior of their out-group; Republicans were more likely to believe & want to share apolitical fake news:
Pereira, Andrea, and Jay Van Bavel. 2018. “Identity Concerns Drive Belief in Fake News.” PsyArXiv. September 11. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/09/democrats-republicans-were-both-more.htmlIn self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
Summary: A simple test taken by millions of people reveals that virtually everybody has implicit biases that they are unaware of and that may clash with their explicit beliefs. From policing to scientific publishing, all activities that deal with people are at risk of making wrong decisions due to bias. Raising awareness is the first step towards improving the outcomes.People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.htmlKahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.
Keywords: politically motivated reasoning, curiosity, science communication, risk perception
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Are Sex Differences in Preferences for Physical Attractiveness and Good Earning Capacity in Potential Mates Smaller in Countries with Greater Gender Equality? This was not replicable.
Zhang, Lingshan, Anthony J. Lee, Lisa M. DeBruine, and Benedict C. Jones. 2018. “Are Sex Differences in Preferences for Physical Attractiveness and Good Earning Capacity in Potential Mates Smaller in Countries with Greater Gender Equality?” PsyArXiv. December 4. https://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/mtsx8
Abstract: On average, women show stronger preferences for mates with good earning capacity than men do, while men show stronger preferences for physically attractive mates than women do. Studies reporting that sex differences in mate preferences are smaller in countries with greater gender equality have been interpreted as evidence that these sex differences in mate preferences are caused by the different roles society imposes on men and women. Here we attempted to replicate previously reported links between sex differences in mate preferences and country-level measures of gender inequality in a sample of 3073 participants from 36 countries. Although women preferred mates with good earning capacity more than men did and men preferred physically attractive mates more than women did, we found little evidence that these sex differences were smaller in countries with greater gender equality. Although one analysis suggested that the sex difference in preferences for good earning capacity was smaller in countries with greater gender equality, this effect was not significant when controlling for Galton’s problem or when correcting for multiple comparisons. Collectively, these results provide little support for the social roles account of sex differences in mate preferences.
Abstract: On average, women show stronger preferences for mates with good earning capacity than men do, while men show stronger preferences for physically attractive mates than women do. Studies reporting that sex differences in mate preferences are smaller in countries with greater gender equality have been interpreted as evidence that these sex differences in mate preferences are caused by the different roles society imposes on men and women. Here we attempted to replicate previously reported links between sex differences in mate preferences and country-level measures of gender inequality in a sample of 3073 participants from 36 countries. Although women preferred mates with good earning capacity more than men did and men preferred physically attractive mates more than women did, we found little evidence that these sex differences were smaller in countries with greater gender equality. Although one analysis suggested that the sex difference in preferences for good earning capacity was smaller in countries with greater gender equality, this effect was not significant when controlling for Galton’s problem or when correcting for multiple comparisons. Collectively, these results provide little support for the social roles account of sex differences in mate preferences.
Uncoordinated dances associated with high reproductive success in a crane
Uncoordinated dances associated with high reproductive success in a crane. Kohei F Takeda Mariko Hiraiwa-Hasegawa Nobuyuki Kutsukake. Behavioral Ecology, ary159, https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/ary159
Abstract: Coordinated mutual displays by 2 individuals are believed to play important roles in social and sexual communication. Although previous studies have described mutual displays in birds, few have conducted quantitative analyses. To understand the role of mutual signals, we investigated the reproductive function of pair dances in the red-crowned crane (Grus japonensis). We used an information theory approach to quantify the characteristics of the pair dance and tested the classical “pair bond hypothesis,” which states that the elaborate dance is related to reproductive success. We found that characteristics of the pair dances were related to reproductive success, but the results were not always consistent with the predictions. Dance duration increased as the breeding season approached. However, the past reproductive success of an individual was negatively related to dance coordination (i.e., mutual information) of a pair. These results partially support the pair bond hypothesis, but more importantly, also suggest the need to define the vague concept of a “pair bond” in a biologically reasonable, measurable way.
Abstract: Coordinated mutual displays by 2 individuals are believed to play important roles in social and sexual communication. Although previous studies have described mutual displays in birds, few have conducted quantitative analyses. To understand the role of mutual signals, we investigated the reproductive function of pair dances in the red-crowned crane (Grus japonensis). We used an information theory approach to quantify the characteristics of the pair dance and tested the classical “pair bond hypothesis,” which states that the elaborate dance is related to reproductive success. We found that characteristics of the pair dances were related to reproductive success, but the results were not always consistent with the predictions. Dance duration increased as the breeding season approached. However, the past reproductive success of an individual was negatively related to dance coordination (i.e., mutual information) of a pair. These results partially support the pair bond hypothesis, but more importantly, also suggest the need to define the vague concept of a “pair bond” in a biologically reasonable, measurable way.
Curiosity share common neural mechanisms with extrinsic incentives (i.e. hunger for foods): acceptance (compared to rejection) of curiosity/incentive-driven gambles was accompanied with an enhanced activity in the striatum
Hunger for Knowledge: How the Irresistible Lure of Curiosity is Generated in the Brain. Johnny King L Lau, Hiroki Ozono, Kei Kuratomi, Asuka Komiya, Kou Murayama. bioRxiv, https://doi.org/10.1101/473975
Abstract: Curiosity is often portrayed as a desirable feature of human faculty. For example, a meta-analysis revealed that curiosity predicts academic performance above and beyond intelligence, corroborating findings that curiosity supported long-term consolidation of learning. However, curiosity may come at a cost of strong seductive power that sometimes puts people in a harmful situation. Here, with a set of three behavioural and two neuroimaging experiments including novel stimuli that strongly trigger curiosity (i.e. magic tricks), we examined the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the irresistible lure of curiosity. We consistently demonstrated that across different samples people were indeed willing to gamble to expose themselves to physical risks (i.e. electric shocks) in order to satisfy their curiosity for trivial knowledge that carries no apparent instrumental values. Also, underlying this seductive power of curiosity is its incentive salience properties, which share common neural mechanisms with extrinsic incentives (i.e. hunger for foods). In particular, the two independent fMRI experiments using different kinds of curiosity-stimulating stimuli found replicable results that acceptance (compared to rejection) of curiosity/incentive-driven gambles was accompanied with an enhanced activity in the striatum.
Abstract: Curiosity is often portrayed as a desirable feature of human faculty. For example, a meta-analysis revealed that curiosity predicts academic performance above and beyond intelligence, corroborating findings that curiosity supported long-term consolidation of learning. However, curiosity may come at a cost of strong seductive power that sometimes puts people in a harmful situation. Here, with a set of three behavioural and two neuroimaging experiments including novel stimuli that strongly trigger curiosity (i.e. magic tricks), we examined the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying the irresistible lure of curiosity. We consistently demonstrated that across different samples people were indeed willing to gamble to expose themselves to physical risks (i.e. electric shocks) in order to satisfy their curiosity for trivial knowledge that carries no apparent instrumental values. Also, underlying this seductive power of curiosity is its incentive salience properties, which share common neural mechanisms with extrinsic incentives (i.e. hunger for foods). In particular, the two independent fMRI experiments using different kinds of curiosity-stimulating stimuli found replicable results that acceptance (compared to rejection) of curiosity/incentive-driven gambles was accompanied with an enhanced activity in the striatum.
Revisiting the Form and Function of Conflict: Neurobiological, Psychological and Cultural Mechanisms for Attack and Defense Within and Between Group
Revisiting the Form and Function of Conflict: Neurobiological, Psychological and Cultural Mechanisms for Attack and Defense Within and Between Groups. Carsten K W De Dreu, Jörg Gross. Behavioral and Brain Sciences · September 2018, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X18002170
Abstract: Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory, and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (i) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy, reveal that (ii) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness, suggest that (iii) attack recruits neuro-endocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning and hostile attributions, and show that (iv) people invest less in attack than defense and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (v) in intergroup conflict out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for pro-sociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts, and reduce its waste.
Abstract: Conflict can profoundly affect individuals and their groups. Oftentimes, conflict involves a clash between one side seeking change and increased gains through victory, and the other side defending the status quo and protecting against loss and defeat. However, theory and empirical research largely neglected these conflicts between attackers and defenders, and the strategic, social, and psychological consequences of attack and defense remain poorly understood. To fill this void, we model (i) the clashing of attack and defense as games of strategy, reveal that (ii) attack benefits from mismatching its target's level of defense, whereas defense benefits from matching the attacker's competitiveness, suggest that (iii) attack recruits neuro-endocrine pathways underlying behavioral activation and overconfidence, whereas defense invokes neural networks for behavioral inhibition, vigilant scanning and hostile attributions, and show that (iv) people invest less in attack than defense and attack often fails. Finally, we propose that (v) in intergroup conflict out-group attack needs institutional arrangements that motivate and coordinate collective action, whereas in-group defense benefits from endogenously emerging in-group identification. We discuss how games of attack and defense may have shaped human capacities for pro-sociality and aggression, and how third parties can regulate such conflicts, and reduce its waste.
The key mechanism that generates scientific polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own
Scientific polarization. Cailin O’Connor, James Owen Weatherall. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. October 2018, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 855–875. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13194-018-0213-9
Abstract: Contemporary societies are often “polarized”, in the sense that sub-groups within these societies hold stably opposing beliefs, even when there is a fact of the matter. Extant models of polarization do not capture the idea that some beliefs are true and others false. Here we present a model, based on the network epistemology framework of Bala and Goyal (Learning from neighbors, Rev. Econ. Stud. 65(3), 784–811 1998), in which polarization emerges even though agents gather evidence about their beliefs, and true belief yields a pay-off advantage. As we discuss, these results are especially relevant to polarization in scientific communities, for these reasons. The key mechanism that generates polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own.
Keywords: Polarization Network Network epistemology Social epistemology Agent based modeling Theory change
Abstract: Contemporary societies are often “polarized”, in the sense that sub-groups within these societies hold stably opposing beliefs, even when there is a fact of the matter. Extant models of polarization do not capture the idea that some beliefs are true and others false. Here we present a model, based on the network epistemology framework of Bala and Goyal (Learning from neighbors, Rev. Econ. Stud. 65(3), 784–811 1998), in which polarization emerges even though agents gather evidence about their beliefs, and true belief yields a pay-off advantage. As we discuss, these results are especially relevant to polarization in scientific communities, for these reasons. The key mechanism that generates polarization involves treating evidence generated by other agents as uncertain when their beliefs are relatively different from one’s own.
Keywords: Polarization Network Network epistemology Social epistemology Agent based modeling Theory change
“All the Gays Are Liberal?” Sexuality and Gender Gaps in Political Perspectives among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Mostly Heterosexual, and Heterosexual College Students in the Southern USA
“All the Gays Are Liberal?” Sexuality and Gender Gaps in Political Perspectives among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Mostly Heterosexual, and Heterosexual College Students in the Southern USA. Meredith G. F. Worthen. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13178-018-0365-6
Abstract: Despite the stereotype that “all the gays are liberal,” sexual identity (sexual orientation) has largely been overlooked in explorations of political attitudes save a handful of studies. The existing research indicates that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people tend to be more liberal than heterosexuals, supporting a “sexuality gap” in liberalism; however, there is significantly less work focused on LGB attitudes toward specific politicized topics, even less research that investigates the role of gender in these relationships, and no existing studies focusing on mostly heterosexuals’ (MH) political attitudes. The current study explores sexuality and gender gaps in political perspectives among college students enrolled at a university in the southern USA (N = 1940). Specifically, sexual identity (lesbian, gay, bisexual, mostly heterosexual, and heterosexual); gender (man/woman); and the intersections among sexual identity and gender are explored as they relate to politicized perspectives (liberal ideology and feminist identity) and support of politicized issues (death penalty and legal abortion). It is hypothesized that liberal social justice perspectives may be particularly common among LGB people as a group and perhaps especially among lesbian and bisexual women due to their multiple oppressed identities. Results confirm sexuality gaps (heterosexual-LGB, MH-LGB, and B-LG) as well as gender gaps among MH and LGB students (MH women-MH men, bisexual women-bisexual men, gay men-lesbian women), though some gaps (B-LG and G-L) are in the opposite direction from expected. In addition, there is evidence of a bisexual woman consciousness that relates to strong liberalism among bisexual college women. Overall, this research seeks to fill the gaps in the literature, expand our knowledge about sexuality and gender gaps in political attitudes, and contribute to new lines of inquiry that focus on MH and LGB people’s perspectives. In doing so, the current study works toward a deeper understanding of ways college students can promote political change and advocate for social justice.
Keywords: Liberal Politics Gender gap Sexuality gap Lesbian Gay Bisexual Mostly heterosexual Heterosexual College students Social justice
Abstract: Despite the stereotype that “all the gays are liberal,” sexual identity (sexual orientation) has largely been overlooked in explorations of political attitudes save a handful of studies. The existing research indicates that lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people tend to be more liberal than heterosexuals, supporting a “sexuality gap” in liberalism; however, there is significantly less work focused on LGB attitudes toward specific politicized topics, even less research that investigates the role of gender in these relationships, and no existing studies focusing on mostly heterosexuals’ (MH) political attitudes. The current study explores sexuality and gender gaps in political perspectives among college students enrolled at a university in the southern USA (N = 1940). Specifically, sexual identity (lesbian, gay, bisexual, mostly heterosexual, and heterosexual); gender (man/woman); and the intersections among sexual identity and gender are explored as they relate to politicized perspectives (liberal ideology and feminist identity) and support of politicized issues (death penalty and legal abortion). It is hypothesized that liberal social justice perspectives may be particularly common among LGB people as a group and perhaps especially among lesbian and bisexual women due to their multiple oppressed identities. Results confirm sexuality gaps (heterosexual-LGB, MH-LGB, and B-LG) as well as gender gaps among MH and LGB students (MH women-MH men, bisexual women-bisexual men, gay men-lesbian women), though some gaps (B-LG and G-L) are in the opposite direction from expected. In addition, there is evidence of a bisexual woman consciousness that relates to strong liberalism among bisexual college women. Overall, this research seeks to fill the gaps in the literature, expand our knowledge about sexuality and gender gaps in political attitudes, and contribute to new lines of inquiry that focus on MH and LGB people’s perspectives. In doing so, the current study works toward a deeper understanding of ways college students can promote political change and advocate for social justice.
Keywords: Liberal Politics Gender gap Sexuality gap Lesbian Gay Bisexual Mostly heterosexual Heterosexual College students Social justice
Lower Waist-to-hip, Waist-to-stature, and Waist-to-bust Ratios Predict Higher Rankings of Plus-size Models
Aung, Toe, and Leah Williams. 2018. “Lower Waist-to-hip, Waist-to-stature, and Waist-to-bust Ratios Predict Higher Rankings of Plus-size Models in a Naturalistic Condition.” OSF Preprints. December 3. doi:10.31219/osf.io/zrxqj
Abstract: Previous research suggests that waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), waist-to-stature ratio (WSR), and waist-to-bust ratio (WBR) serve as cues of health and fertility in women, influencing the viewers’ perception of attractiveness. However, it is unclear to what extent these findings can be applied to the perception of female attractiveness in a naturalistic condition or in women with a higher body mass index. In this study, we tested whether lower WHR, WSR, and WBR increased the perceived attractiveness of plus-size models in a naturalistic condition. The WHR, WSR, and WBR were computed via biometric data (height, bust, waist, and hip measurements) of 49 U.S. plus-size models who have been listed on ranker.com. The photographs of these models have been viewed 2.60 million times and voted 146,000 times. The perception of attractiveness was operationalized as rankings, generated from the relative number of upvotes and downvotes from site visitors. Spearman correlations showed that lower WHR, WSR, and WBR were all positively correlated with higher rankings. In a subsequent ordinal logistic regression, only WSR and WBR remained as significant predictors of rankings. The principal component regression also revealed that the latent body component of WHR, WSR, and WBR predicted rankings of the models.
These findings cannot be accounted by the models’ general popularity or their anthropometric measures being similar to other types of models’ (e.g., fashion, glamor, playboy, and adult film models). Our findings suggest that smaller WHR, WSR, and WBR influence the perception of female attractiveness in a naturalistic condition, even among plus-size models.
Abstract: Previous research suggests that waist-to-hip ratio (WHR), waist-to-stature ratio (WSR), and waist-to-bust ratio (WBR) serve as cues of health and fertility in women, influencing the viewers’ perception of attractiveness. However, it is unclear to what extent these findings can be applied to the perception of female attractiveness in a naturalistic condition or in women with a higher body mass index. In this study, we tested whether lower WHR, WSR, and WBR increased the perceived attractiveness of plus-size models in a naturalistic condition. The WHR, WSR, and WBR were computed via biometric data (height, bust, waist, and hip measurements) of 49 U.S. plus-size models who have been listed on ranker.com. The photographs of these models have been viewed 2.60 million times and voted 146,000 times. The perception of attractiveness was operationalized as rankings, generated from the relative number of upvotes and downvotes from site visitors. Spearman correlations showed that lower WHR, WSR, and WBR were all positively correlated with higher rankings. In a subsequent ordinal logistic regression, only WSR and WBR remained as significant predictors of rankings. The principal component regression also revealed that the latent body component of WHR, WSR, and WBR predicted rankings of the models.
These findings cannot be accounted by the models’ general popularity or their anthropometric measures being similar to other types of models’ (e.g., fashion, glamor, playboy, and adult film models). Our findings suggest that smaller WHR, WSR, and WBR influence the perception of female attractiveness in a naturalistic condition, even among plus-size models.
Monday, December 3, 2018
Social animals show elaborate cognitive skills to deal with others, but there are few reports of animals physically using social agents & their respective responses as means to an end—social tool use; origins of Machiavellian intelligence
Schweinfurth, M. K., DeTroy, S. E., van Leeuwen, E. J. C., Call, J., & Haun, D. B. M. (2018). Spontaneous social tool use in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 132(4), 455-463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000127
Abstract: Although there is good evidence that social animals show elaborate cognitive skills to deal with others, there are few reports of animals physically using social agents and their respective responses as means to an end—social tool use. In this case study, we investigated spontaneous and repeated social tool use behavior in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We presented a group of chimpanzees with an apparatus, in which pushing two buttons would release juice from a distantly located fountain. Consequently, any one individual could only either push the buttons or drink from the fountain but never push and drink simultaneously. In this scenario, an adult male attempted to retrieve three other individuals and push them toward the buttons that, if pressed, released juice from the fountain. With this strategy, the social tool user increased his juice intake 10-fold. Interestingly, the strategy was stable over time, which was possibly enabled by playing with the social tools. With over 100 instances, we provide the biggest data set on social tool use recorded among nonhuman animals so far. The repeated use of other individuals as social tools may represent a complex social skill linked to Machiavellian intelligence.
Abstract: Although there is good evidence that social animals show elaborate cognitive skills to deal with others, there are few reports of animals physically using social agents and their respective responses as means to an end—social tool use. In this case study, we investigated spontaneous and repeated social tool use behavior in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). We presented a group of chimpanzees with an apparatus, in which pushing two buttons would release juice from a distantly located fountain. Consequently, any one individual could only either push the buttons or drink from the fountain but never push and drink simultaneously. In this scenario, an adult male attempted to retrieve three other individuals and push them toward the buttons that, if pressed, released juice from the fountain. With this strategy, the social tool user increased his juice intake 10-fold. Interestingly, the strategy was stable over time, which was possibly enabled by playing with the social tools. With over 100 instances, we provide the biggest data set on social tool use recorded among nonhuman animals so far. The repeated use of other individuals as social tools may represent a complex social skill linked to Machiavellian intelligence.
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