Is the InterNet killing the movies industry? Do we see progress in
economics but at the same time is cultural expression decaying? Actually, it seems we are doing well:
Growth of US origin features, 2000-2016, as shows by queries to the IMDb. Fig 3.1 [1]
Check also Record Number of Films Produced [2].
Data from UNESCO database shows what the production of quality film was in previous years (I take documentaries as a measure of quality films) [3]. Number of documentary feature films in the UK at the same time the InterNet explodes and cheap cameras make their appearance:
2005 2
2007 9
2008 62
2009 58
2010 55
2011 56
2012 73
2013 44
2014 85
2015 79
To compare, these are the fictional feature films in the UK, according to the same DB:
2005 162
2007 112
2008 215
2009 248
2010 285
2011 239
2012 249
2013 197
2014 253
2015 213
Is greater production worse? Or better? A way to measure quality of all movies, regardless of genre, is Rotten Tomatoes [4]. These are the movies scoring 84+, 1998-2016 (Fig 3.4 [1]):
References
[1] Joel Waldfogel's Digital Reinassance. Princeton: Princeton Univ Press, 2018.
[2] UNESCO, Mar 31 2016, http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/record-number-films-produced
[3] UNESCO data, accessed Jan 2018: data.uis.unesco.org
[4] www.rottentomatoes.com/top
Sunday, January 27, 2019
The Rise of Pseudomedicine for Dementia and Brain Health
The Rise of Pseudomedicine for Dementia and Brain Health. Joanna Hellmuth, Gil D. Rabinovici, Bruce L. Miller. JAMA, January 25 2019, doi:10.1001/jama.2018.21560
The US population is aging, and with it is an increasing prevalence of Alzheimer disease, which lacks effective approaches for prevention or a cure.1 Many individuals are concerned about developing cognitive changes and dementia. With increasing amounts of readily accessible information, people independently seek and find material about brain health interventions, although not all sources contain quality medical information.
This landscape of limited treatments for dementia, concern about Alzheimer disease, and wide access to information have brought a troubling increase in “pseudomedicine.” Pseudomedicine refers to supplements and medical interventions that exist within the law and are often promoted as scientifically supported treatments, but lack credible efficacy data. Practitioners of pseudomedicine often appeal to health concerns, promote individual testimony as established fact, advocate for unproven therapies, and achieve financial gains.
With neurodegenerative disease, the most common example of pseudomedicine is the promotion of dietary supplements to improve cognition and brain health. This $3.2-billion industry promoting brain health benefits from high-penetration consumer advertising through print media, radio, television, and the internet.2 No known dietary supplement prevents cognitive decline or dementia, yet supplements advertised as such are widely available and appear to gain legitimacy when sold by major US retailers. Consumers are often unaware that dietary supplements do not undergo US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) testing for safety or review for efficacy. Indeed, supplements may cause harm, as has been shown with vitamin E, which may increase risk of hemorrhagic stroke, and, in high doses, increase risk of death.3,4 The Alzheimer’s Association highlights these concerns, noting that many of these supplements are promoted by testimony rather than science.5 These brain health supplements can also be costly, and discussion of them in clinical settings can subvert valuable time needed for clinicians and patients to review other interventions.
Patients and caregivers encounter sophisticated techniques that supply false “scientific” backing for brain health interventions. For example, referring to scientific integrity, Feynman coined the term “cargo cult science” to describe endeavors that follow “…the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they’re missing something essential….”6 Cargo cult science is apparent in material promoting some brain health supplements; “evidence” is presented in a scientific-appearing format that lacks actual substance and rigor. Feynman suggested 1 feature of scientific integrity is “bending over backwards to show how [the study] may be wrong…,” which is a feature that is often lacking when interventions are promoted for financial gain.6
A similarly concerning category of pseudomedicine involves interventions promoted by licensed medical professionals that target unsubstantiated etiologies of neurodegenerative disease (eg, metal toxicity; mold exposure; infectious causes, such as Lyme disease). Some of these practitioners may stand to gain financially by promoting interventions that are not covered by insurance, such as intravenous nutrition, personalized detoxification, chelation therapy, antibiotics, or stem cell therapy. These interventions lack a known mechanism for treating dementia and are costly, unregulated, and potentially harmful.
Recently, detailed protocols to reverse cognitive changes have been promoted, but these protocols merely repackage known dementia interventions (eg, cognitive training, exercise, a heart-healthy diet) and add supplements and other lifestyle changes. Such protocols are promoted by medical professionals with legitimate credentials, offer a unique holistic and personal approach, and are said to be based on rigorous data published in reputable journals. However, when examining the primary data, the troubling and familiar patterns of testimony and cargo cult science emerge. The primary scientific articles superficially appear valid, yet lack essential features, such as sufficient participant characterization, uniform interventions, or treatment randomization with control or placebo groups, and may fail to include sufficient study limitations. Some of these poor-quality studies may be published in predatory open access journals.7
An argument can be made that even though pseudomedicine may be ethically questionable, these interventions are relatively benign and offer hope for patients facing an incurable disease. However, these interventions are not ethically, medically, or financially benign for patients or their families. While appealing to a sense of hope can be a motivating factor for clinical trials or complementary or alternative practices, the difference is in how these circumstances are framed. Complementary or alternative practices are often adjunct treatments and might not result in direct financial gain by the practitioner recommending the therapy. Further, in clinical trials, there are structured conversations between researchers and participants (such as during the informed consent process) that include research coordinators explaining that any studied interventions are experimental, may result in no gain, and can cause harm. In contrast, pseudomedicine may involve unethical gain for practitioners and manufactured illusion of benefit for patients.
What Can Be Done?
Health care professionals have the responsibility to learn about common pseudomedicine interventions. If a patient or family member inquiries about such an intervention, clinicians can take several steps:
Understand that motivations to pursue such interventions often come from a desire to obtain the best medical care, and convey that understanding to the patients.
Provide honest scientific interpretation of any supporting evidence, along with the associated risks and costs. This approach creates a productive dialogue, rather than dismissing any inquiries outright.
Appropriately label pseudomedicine interventions as such.
Differentiate testimony from data, and assess whether studies display scientific integrity by “bending over backward” to address any limitations.
Suggest an exploration of the financial interests behind the intervention (eg, the sale of supplements, out-of-pocket payments to a clinician or organization, book sales). Note that the gain may not only be financial, but also temporary fame that can accompany spearheading a new protocol.6
Provide education on the US Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act that limits FDA testing and regulation of supplements.
Point out that any effective interventions for common diseases would already be widely used.
Express a willingness to continue to partner with patients in their medical care even if opinions and interpretations about pseudomedicine differ.
Conclusions: It is disheartening that patients with dementia and their family members are targeted by practitioners and companies motivated by self-interest. Physicians have an ethical mandate to protect patients who may be vulnerable to promotion by these entities. More needs to be done on a national level to limit the claims of benefit for interventions that lack proven efficacy. Clinicians must distinguish testimony and cargo cult science from quality medical research and explain when interventions may appear to represent pseudomedicine. While unethical forces promote the existence of pseudomedicine, an educated community of physicians and patients is the starting point to counteract these practices.
The US population is aging, and with it is an increasing prevalence of Alzheimer disease, which lacks effective approaches for prevention or a cure.1 Many individuals are concerned about developing cognitive changes and dementia. With increasing amounts of readily accessible information, people independently seek and find material about brain health interventions, although not all sources contain quality medical information.
This landscape of limited treatments for dementia, concern about Alzheimer disease, and wide access to information have brought a troubling increase in “pseudomedicine.” Pseudomedicine refers to supplements and medical interventions that exist within the law and are often promoted as scientifically supported treatments, but lack credible efficacy data. Practitioners of pseudomedicine often appeal to health concerns, promote individual testimony as established fact, advocate for unproven therapies, and achieve financial gains.
With neurodegenerative disease, the most common example of pseudomedicine is the promotion of dietary supplements to improve cognition and brain health. This $3.2-billion industry promoting brain health benefits from high-penetration consumer advertising through print media, radio, television, and the internet.2 No known dietary supplement prevents cognitive decline or dementia, yet supplements advertised as such are widely available and appear to gain legitimacy when sold by major US retailers. Consumers are often unaware that dietary supplements do not undergo US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) testing for safety or review for efficacy. Indeed, supplements may cause harm, as has been shown with vitamin E, which may increase risk of hemorrhagic stroke, and, in high doses, increase risk of death.3,4 The Alzheimer’s Association highlights these concerns, noting that many of these supplements are promoted by testimony rather than science.5 These brain health supplements can also be costly, and discussion of them in clinical settings can subvert valuable time needed for clinicians and patients to review other interventions.
Patients and caregivers encounter sophisticated techniques that supply false “scientific” backing for brain health interventions. For example, referring to scientific integrity, Feynman coined the term “cargo cult science” to describe endeavors that follow “…the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they’re missing something essential….”6 Cargo cult science is apparent in material promoting some brain health supplements; “evidence” is presented in a scientific-appearing format that lacks actual substance and rigor. Feynman suggested 1 feature of scientific integrity is “bending over backwards to show how [the study] may be wrong…,” which is a feature that is often lacking when interventions are promoted for financial gain.6
A similarly concerning category of pseudomedicine involves interventions promoted by licensed medical professionals that target unsubstantiated etiologies of neurodegenerative disease (eg, metal toxicity; mold exposure; infectious causes, such as Lyme disease). Some of these practitioners may stand to gain financially by promoting interventions that are not covered by insurance, such as intravenous nutrition, personalized detoxification, chelation therapy, antibiotics, or stem cell therapy. These interventions lack a known mechanism for treating dementia and are costly, unregulated, and potentially harmful.
Recently, detailed protocols to reverse cognitive changes have been promoted, but these protocols merely repackage known dementia interventions (eg, cognitive training, exercise, a heart-healthy diet) and add supplements and other lifestyle changes. Such protocols are promoted by medical professionals with legitimate credentials, offer a unique holistic and personal approach, and are said to be based on rigorous data published in reputable journals. However, when examining the primary data, the troubling and familiar patterns of testimony and cargo cult science emerge. The primary scientific articles superficially appear valid, yet lack essential features, such as sufficient participant characterization, uniform interventions, or treatment randomization with control or placebo groups, and may fail to include sufficient study limitations. Some of these poor-quality studies may be published in predatory open access journals.7
An argument can be made that even though pseudomedicine may be ethically questionable, these interventions are relatively benign and offer hope for patients facing an incurable disease. However, these interventions are not ethically, medically, or financially benign for patients or their families. While appealing to a sense of hope can be a motivating factor for clinical trials or complementary or alternative practices, the difference is in how these circumstances are framed. Complementary or alternative practices are often adjunct treatments and might not result in direct financial gain by the practitioner recommending the therapy. Further, in clinical trials, there are structured conversations between researchers and participants (such as during the informed consent process) that include research coordinators explaining that any studied interventions are experimental, may result in no gain, and can cause harm. In contrast, pseudomedicine may involve unethical gain for practitioners and manufactured illusion of benefit for patients.
What Can Be Done?
Health care professionals have the responsibility to learn about common pseudomedicine interventions. If a patient or family member inquiries about such an intervention, clinicians can take several steps:
Understand that motivations to pursue such interventions often come from a desire to obtain the best medical care, and convey that understanding to the patients.
Provide honest scientific interpretation of any supporting evidence, along with the associated risks and costs. This approach creates a productive dialogue, rather than dismissing any inquiries outright.
Appropriately label pseudomedicine interventions as such.
Differentiate testimony from data, and assess whether studies display scientific integrity by “bending over backward” to address any limitations.
Suggest an exploration of the financial interests behind the intervention (eg, the sale of supplements, out-of-pocket payments to a clinician or organization, book sales). Note that the gain may not only be financial, but also temporary fame that can accompany spearheading a new protocol.6
Provide education on the US Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act that limits FDA testing and regulation of supplements.
Point out that any effective interventions for common diseases would already be widely used.
Express a willingness to continue to partner with patients in their medical care even if opinions and interpretations about pseudomedicine differ.
Conclusions: It is disheartening that patients with dementia and their family members are targeted by practitioners and companies motivated by self-interest. Physicians have an ethical mandate to protect patients who may be vulnerable to promotion by these entities. More needs to be done on a national level to limit the claims of benefit for interventions that lack proven efficacy. Clinicians must distinguish testimony and cargo cult science from quality medical research and explain when interventions may appear to represent pseudomedicine. While unethical forces promote the existence of pseudomedicine, an educated community of physicians and patients is the starting point to counteract these practices.
Saturday, January 26, 2019
Theories of God: Explanatory coherence in religious cognition
Theories of God: Explanatory coherence in religious cognition. Andrew Shtulman, Max Rattner. PLOS, December 26, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0209758
Abstract: Representations of God in art, literature, and discourse range from the highly anthropomorphic to the highly abstract. The present study explored whether people who endorse anthropomorphic God concepts hold different religious beliefs and engage in different religious practices than those who endorse abstract concepts. Adults of various religious affiliations (n = 275) completed a questionnaire that probed their beliefs about God, angels, Satan, Heaven, Hell, cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, human suffering, and human misdeeds, as well as their experiences regarding prayer, worship, and religious development. Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed by how strongly participants anthropomorphized God in a property-attribution task. Overall, the more participants anthropomorphized God, the more concretely they interpreted religious ideas, importing their understanding of human affairs into their understanding of divine affairs. These findings suggest not only that individuals vary greatly in how they interpret the same religious ideas but also that those interpretations cohere along a concrete-to-abstract dimension, anchored on the concrete side by our everyday notions of people.
Abstract: Representations of God in art, literature, and discourse range from the highly anthropomorphic to the highly abstract. The present study explored whether people who endorse anthropomorphic God concepts hold different religious beliefs and engage in different religious practices than those who endorse abstract concepts. Adults of various religious affiliations (n = 275) completed a questionnaire that probed their beliefs about God, angels, Satan, Heaven, Hell, cosmogenesis, anthropogenesis, human suffering, and human misdeeds, as well as their experiences regarding prayer, worship, and religious development. Responses to the questionnaire were analyzed by how strongly participants anthropomorphized God in a property-attribution task. Overall, the more participants anthropomorphized God, the more concretely they interpreted religious ideas, importing their understanding of human affairs into their understanding of divine affairs. These findings suggest not only that individuals vary greatly in how they interpret the same religious ideas but also that those interpretations cohere along a concrete-to-abstract dimension, anchored on the concrete side by our everyday notions of people.
Testosterone doesn't impair mens' cognitive empathy: Evidence from two large-scale randomized controlled trials
Does testosterone impair mens' cognitive empathy? Evidence from two large-scale randomized controlled trials. Amos Nadler, David Zava, Triana Ortiz, Neil Watson, Justin Carre, Colin Camerer, Gideon Nave. bioRxiv 516344, https://doi.org/10.1101/516344
Abstract: The capacity to infer the mental states of others (known as cognitive empathy) is essential for social interactions, and a well-known theory proposes that it is negatively affected by intrauterine testosterone exposure. Furthermore, previous studies reported that testosterone administration impaired cognitive empathy in healthy adults, and that a biomarker of prenatal testosterone exposure (finger digit ratios) moderated the effect. However, empirical support for the relationship has relied on small-sample studies with mixed evidence. We investigate the reliability and generalizability of the relationship in two large-scale double-blind placebo-controlled experiments in young men (N=243 and N=400), using two different testosterone administration protocols. We find no evidence that cognitive empathy is impaired by testosterone administration or associated with digit ratios. With an unprecedented combined sample size, these results counter current theories and previous high-profile reports, and demonstrate that previous investigations of this topic have been statistically underpowered.
Abstract: The capacity to infer the mental states of others (known as cognitive empathy) is essential for social interactions, and a well-known theory proposes that it is negatively affected by intrauterine testosterone exposure. Furthermore, previous studies reported that testosterone administration impaired cognitive empathy in healthy adults, and that a biomarker of prenatal testosterone exposure (finger digit ratios) moderated the effect. However, empirical support for the relationship has relied on small-sample studies with mixed evidence. We investigate the reliability and generalizability of the relationship in two large-scale double-blind placebo-controlled experiments in young men (N=243 and N=400), using two different testosterone administration protocols. We find no evidence that cognitive empathy is impaired by testosterone administration or associated with digit ratios. With an unprecedented combined sample size, these results counter current theories and previous high-profile reports, and demonstrate that previous investigations of this topic have been statistically underpowered.
Penis size over-reporting is more prevalent among experienced college men than in less experienced ones; may be due to a greater sense of masculinity & sexual competence and prowess by experienced men
Social Desirability and Young Men’s Self-Reports of Penis Size. Bruce M. King, Lauren M. Duncan, Kelley M. Clinkenbeard, Morgan B. Rutland & Kelly M. Ryan. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, https://doi.org/10.1080/0092623X.2018.1533905
Abstract: Previous studies demonstrate that many men have insecurities about the size of their penises, often resulting in low sexual self-esteem and sexual problems. In the present study, mean self-reported erect penis length by 130 sexually experienced college men (6.62 inches) was greater than found in previous studies in which researchers took measurements. This suggests that many of the men embellished their responses. Only 26.9% of the sexually experienced men self-reported penis lengths of less than 6 inches, while 30.8% self-reported lengths of 7 inches or more (with 10% self-reporting 8 inches or more). The correlation with Marlowe–Crowne social desirability scores was +.257 (p < .01), indicating that men with a high level of social desirability were more likely than others to self-report having a large penis.
---
The difference between sexually experienced and inexperienced men for self-reported penis size has not previously been reported but suggests that over-reporting is more prevalent among experienced men, thus accounting for the stronger correlation in that group. We speculate that the difference between the two groups is due to a greater sense of masculinity and sexual competence and prowess by experienced men.
Abstract: Previous studies demonstrate that many men have insecurities about the size of their penises, often resulting in low sexual self-esteem and sexual problems. In the present study, mean self-reported erect penis length by 130 sexually experienced college men (6.62 inches) was greater than found in previous studies in which researchers took measurements. This suggests that many of the men embellished their responses. Only 26.9% of the sexually experienced men self-reported penis lengths of less than 6 inches, while 30.8% self-reported lengths of 7 inches or more (with 10% self-reporting 8 inches or more). The correlation with Marlowe–Crowne social desirability scores was +.257 (p < .01), indicating that men with a high level of social desirability were more likely than others to self-report having a large penis.
---
The difference between sexually experienced and inexperienced men for self-reported penis size has not previously been reported but suggests that over-reporting is more prevalent among experienced men, thus accounting for the stronger correlation in that group. We speculate that the difference between the two groups is due to a greater sense of masculinity and sexual competence and prowess by experienced men.
Women high on narcissism were more likely to engage in blatant lying, machiavellianism predicted blatant lying & lying to avoid confrontation; primary & secondary psychopathy predicted self-serving deception
Dark triad traits and women's use of sexual deception. Gayle Brewer, Demi De Griffa, Ezgi Uzun. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 142, 1 May 2019, Pages 42-44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.01.033
Highlights
• Dark Triad traits independently predict women's use of sexual deception.
• Women high on narcissism were more likely to engage in blatant lying.
• Machiavellianism predicted blatant lying and lying to avoid confrontation.
• Primary and secondary psychopathy each predicted the use of self-serving deception.
Abstract: Dark Triad traits are related but distinct personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy) characterised by emotional coldness, exploitation, and a lack of empathy. Previous research investigates Dark Triad traits in relation to sexual behaviour and the use of deception in mating contexts. Few studies have, however, considered the types of sexual deception performed by those high on Dark Triad traits. In the present study, heterosexual women (N = 217) aged 18–59 years completed a series of online questionnaires assessing Dark Triad traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, primary and secondary psychopathy) and sexual deception (blatant lying, self-serving deception, and avoiding confrontation). Multiple regression analyses indicate that Dark Triad traits are associated with each form of sexual deception investigated. Women high on narcissism were more likely to engage in blatant lying whilst Machiavellianism was associated with greater use of blatant lying and lying to avoid confrontation. Primary and secondary psychopathies were each associated with self-serving deception. Future studies should consider Dark Triad traits in relation to the effectiveness of each form of deception employed.
Highlights
• Dark Triad traits independently predict women's use of sexual deception.
• Women high on narcissism were more likely to engage in blatant lying.
• Machiavellianism predicted blatant lying and lying to avoid confrontation.
• Primary and secondary psychopathy each predicted the use of self-serving deception.
Abstract: Dark Triad traits are related but distinct personality traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy) characterised by emotional coldness, exploitation, and a lack of empathy. Previous research investigates Dark Triad traits in relation to sexual behaviour and the use of deception in mating contexts. Few studies have, however, considered the types of sexual deception performed by those high on Dark Triad traits. In the present study, heterosexual women (N = 217) aged 18–59 years completed a series of online questionnaires assessing Dark Triad traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, primary and secondary psychopathy) and sexual deception (blatant lying, self-serving deception, and avoiding confrontation). Multiple regression analyses indicate that Dark Triad traits are associated with each form of sexual deception investigated. Women high on narcissism were more likely to engage in blatant lying whilst Machiavellianism was associated with greater use of blatant lying and lying to avoid confrontation. Primary and secondary psychopathies were each associated with self-serving deception. Future studies should consider Dark Triad traits in relation to the effectiveness of each form of deception employed.
Unlearning implicit racial and gender biases during sleep: A failure to replicate Hu et al. (2015)
Unlearning implicit social biases during sleep: A failure to replicate. Graelyn B. Humiston, Erin J. Wamsley. PLOS January 25, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211416
Abstract: A 2015 article in Science (Hu et al.) proposed a new way to reduce implicit racial and gender biases during sleep. The method built on an existing counter-stereotype training procedure, using targeted memory reactivation to strengthen counter-stereotype memory by playing cues associated with the training during a 90min nap. If effective, this procedure would have potential real-world usefulness in reducing implicit biases and their myriad effects. We replicated this procedure on a sample of n = 31 college students. Contrary to the results reported by Hu et al., we found no effect of cueing on implicit bias, either immediately following the nap or one week later. In fact, bias was non-significantly greater for cued than for uncued stimuli. Our failure to detect an effect of cueing on implicit bias could indicate either that the original report was a false positive, or that the current study is a false negative. However, several factors argue against Type II error in the current study. Critically, this replication was powered at 0.9 for detecting the originally reported cueing effect. Additionally, the 95% confidence interval for the cueing effect in the present study did not overlap with that of the originally reported effect; therefore, our observations are not easily explained as a noisy estimate of the same underlying effect. Ultimately, the outcome of this replication study reduces our confidence that cueing during sleep can reduce implicit bias.
Abstract: A 2015 article in Science (Hu et al.) proposed a new way to reduce implicit racial and gender biases during sleep. The method built on an existing counter-stereotype training procedure, using targeted memory reactivation to strengthen counter-stereotype memory by playing cues associated with the training during a 90min nap. If effective, this procedure would have potential real-world usefulness in reducing implicit biases and their myriad effects. We replicated this procedure on a sample of n = 31 college students. Contrary to the results reported by Hu et al., we found no effect of cueing on implicit bias, either immediately following the nap or one week later. In fact, bias was non-significantly greater for cued than for uncued stimuli. Our failure to detect an effect of cueing on implicit bias could indicate either that the original report was a false positive, or that the current study is a false negative. However, several factors argue against Type II error in the current study. Critically, this replication was powered at 0.9 for detecting the originally reported cueing effect. Additionally, the 95% confidence interval for the cueing effect in the present study did not overlap with that of the originally reported effect; therefore, our observations are not easily explained as a noisy estimate of the same underlying effect. Ultimately, the outcome of this replication study reduces our confidence that cueing during sleep can reduce implicit bias.
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