Effects of emotions on sexual behavior in men with and without hypersexuality. Michael H. Miner, Janna Dickenson & Eli Coleman. Sexual Addiction & Compulsivity, https://doi.org/10.1080/10720162.2018.1564408
Abstract: The association between positive and negative affect and sexual behavior in 39 MSM with and without hypersexuality (HS) was explored using ecological momentary assessment. Participants reported their current positive and negative affect three times per day and their sexual behavior each morning and evening. The relationship between affect and sexual behavior differed between men with or without HS. In those with HS, the timing of and interactions between experienced affect differentially predicted types of sexual behavior, indicating differing mechanisms driving partnered sexual behavior and masturbation. These findings lend support to conceptualizing HS behavior as a coping strategy for affective arousal.
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Hypersexual behavior is characterized by intense, distressing, and recurrentsexual urges and fantasies that significantly interfere with a person’s dailyfunctioning (e.g., with personal, interpersonal, and occupational responsi-bilities). Hypersexual behavior is widely disputed with regard to conceptualization, etiology, and nomenclature, and has been dubbed such terms as “sexual addiction” (Carnes, 1983),“compulsive sexual behavior” (Coleman, 1991), “paraphilia related disorder” (Kafka & Prentky, 1997),“hypersexual disorder” (Kafka, 2010), and “out of control sexual behavior” (Braun-Harvey & Vigorito, 2015). Despite such disagreement, one of the hallmarksof all conceptualizations of hypersexuality (Carnes,1983,1991; Coleman, 1991, 2003; Kafka, 1997, 2010) is distress resulting from obsessive, compulsive, impulsive, and/or out of control sexual behavior (Black, Kehrberg, Flumerfelt, & Schlosser, 1997; Coleman et al., 2010; Dickenson, Gleason, Coleman, & Miner, 2018). Moreover, several theoretical models of hyper-sexual behavior indicate that engaging in sexual behavior functions as astrategy to cope with, escape from, or avoid unwanted emotions (Kafka, 2010; Reid & Kafka, 2014). Yet, to date, our understanding of how day-to-day changes in negative and positive affect are related to day-to-day changes in sexual behavior among men who exhibit hypersexual behavior remains limited.
Negative affect (e.g., sadness, fear) and mood (e.g., depressed, anxious) typically impede sexual interest and arousal (Bancroft et al., 2003a, 2003b), although some men have shown increases in sexual interest and arousalafter experiencing negative affect. Moreover, the link between negativeaffect and sexual behavior appears to vary across individuals. For example, men who have sex with men (MSM) show increased sexual risk behavior following anxious affective states, but only if they have low trait anxiety (Mustanski, 2007). Thus, negative affect can either augment or impede sexual interest, arousal, and behavior depending on additional traits of the individual. Perhaps the degree to which negative affect motivates sexual behavior is also different for men who vary in their tendency to exhibit hypersexual behavior.
Research has consistently demonstrated that men with hypersexual behav-ior exhibit emotion regulation difficulties. Many men with hypersexualbehavior exhibit high negative emotionality (Miner et al.,2016); negative emotional states related to their sexual behavior, such as shame, guilt, and hostility toward themselves (Reid, 2010); are more vulnerable to general lifestressors (Laier & Brand,2017); and have greater deficits in their ability to regulate emotions (Leppink, Chamberlain, Redden, & Grant, 2016; Rizor, Callands, Desrosiers, & Kershaw, 2017). Various theoretical models indicatethat hypersexual behavior serves to reduce unwanted emotions (Bancroft & Vukadinovic, 2004; Coleman, 1991). Such behavior initially provides relief, but this relief is temporary and ultimately leads to guilt and shame about engaging in problematic sexual behavior, thus, reentering the cycle.
Yet, the notion that the cycle of hypersexual behavior begins with negative emotionality has proven inconsistent. On one hand, research examining reports of reasons for engaging in sexual behavior has corroborated thehypothesized link between negative emotionality and sexual behavior. Some research has indicated that sexual behavior may be related to difficulties with negative affect regulation among hypersexual men, and hypersexualmen self-report that negative affect motivates sexual behavior (Parsonset al., 2008). Individuals who compulsively view pornography exhibited higher general stress levels, reported viewing sexual imagery for the purposes of sensation seeking or emotional avoidance, and showed an increasein positive affect immediately after viewing sexual imagery (Laier & Brand, 2017). Moreover, hypersexual MSM have reported that they engage in sexual behavior to cope with negative affect and gain a sense of affirmation and validation that they could not obtain from non-sexual social relationships, whereas MSM without hypersexual behavior did not (Parsonset al., 2008)
Other research has not substantiated the link between negative affect andsexual activity. Grov, Golub, Mustanski, and Parsons (2010) found that among MSM, daily negative affect was associated with decreased likelihood of partnered sexual activity that same day. Contrary to expectations and the above mentioned studies, men with and without HS did not differ in thedegree to which negative affect was associated with partnered sexual activity. Such inconsistent findings indicate that the role of affective regulation in pre-dicting sexual behavior is not clear and may involve the interaction of positive and negative affective changes.
Such contradictory results may be explained by differences in method-ology. Studies varied in their assessment of state versus trait levels of affect,the valence of the affective state (positive versus negative), assessment oftemporal versus concurrent effects (i.e., does affect lead to sexual behavior?), and assessment of whether the relationship between affective states(or traits) and sexual behavior differ between men with and without HS.To date, no study has examined whether the ways in which negative orpositive affect leads to a greater or lower likelihood of engaging in sexualbehavior differs among men with and without HS.
The current study aims to address this gap by examining the day-to-dayrelation between positive and negative affect and various types of sexualbehavior (viewing sexual imagery, engaging in masturbation and engagingin partnered sexual activity) using a sample of MSM with and without hypersexuality. By using Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA: Dunton,Liao, Intille, Spruijt-Metz, & Pentz,2011; Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford,2008), we examined temporal ordering of affect and sexual behavior. Thisstudy extends existing research by focusing on positive affect, as well asnegative affect, and by assessing masturbation and partnered sexual activity. Given prior research and proposed theoretical conceptualizations thathypersexual behavior serves as a coping strategy, we expected that negativeaffect will be associated with greater likelihood of engaging in all threetypes of sexual behavior among hypersexual men. Further, we expected thatpositive affect, but not negative affect, will be associated with greater likeli-hood of engaging in all three types of sexual behavior among MSM without hypersexuality.
Sunday, February 17, 2019
Social discounting: A higher weight on future generations changes both climate and fiscal policy; absent fiscal policy adjustments, the social cost of carbon is not the optimal tax
Be careful what you calibrate for: Social discounting in general equilibrium. Lint Barrage. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 160, April 2018, Pages 33-49. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.02.012
Highlights
• Social discounting is assessed in a general equilibrium climate-economy model.
• A higher weight on future generations changes both climate and fiscal policy.
• Optimal policy includes an effective capital income subsidy.
• Optimal policy includes labor-consumption wedge that is decreasing over time.
• Absent fiscal policy adjustments, the social cost of carbon is not the optimal tax.
Abstract: Concerns about intergenerational equity have led to an influential practice of setting social utility discount rates based on ethical considerations rather than to match household behavior, particularly in climate change economics (e.g., Stern, 2006). This paper formalizes the broader policy implications of this approach in general equilibrium by characterizing jointly optimal environmental and fiscal policies in a climate-economy model with differential planner-household discounting. First, I show that decentralizing the optimal allocation requires not only high carbon prices but also fundamental changes to tax policy: If the government discounts the future less than households, implementing the optimal allocation requires an effective capital income subsidy (a negative intertemporal wedge), and, in a setting with distortionary taxation, an effective labor-consumption tax wedge that is decreasing over time. Second, if the government cannot subsidize capital income, the constrained-optimal carbon tax may be up to 50% below the present value of marginal damages (the social cost of carbon) due to the general equilibrium effects of climate policy on household savings. Third, given the choice to optimize either carbon, capital, or labor income taxes, the socially discounting planner's welfare ranking is ambiguous over a standard range of parameters. Overall, in general equilibrium, a policy-maker's choice to adopt differential social discounting may thus overturn conventional recommendations for both environmental and fiscal policy.
Highlights
• Social discounting is assessed in a general equilibrium climate-economy model.
• A higher weight on future generations changes both climate and fiscal policy.
• Optimal policy includes an effective capital income subsidy.
• Optimal policy includes labor-consumption wedge that is decreasing over time.
• Absent fiscal policy adjustments, the social cost of carbon is not the optimal tax.
Abstract: Concerns about intergenerational equity have led to an influential practice of setting social utility discount rates based on ethical considerations rather than to match household behavior, particularly in climate change economics (e.g., Stern, 2006). This paper formalizes the broader policy implications of this approach in general equilibrium by characterizing jointly optimal environmental and fiscal policies in a climate-economy model with differential planner-household discounting. First, I show that decentralizing the optimal allocation requires not only high carbon prices but also fundamental changes to tax policy: If the government discounts the future less than households, implementing the optimal allocation requires an effective capital income subsidy (a negative intertemporal wedge), and, in a setting with distortionary taxation, an effective labor-consumption tax wedge that is decreasing over time. Second, if the government cannot subsidize capital income, the constrained-optimal carbon tax may be up to 50% below the present value of marginal damages (the social cost of carbon) due to the general equilibrium effects of climate policy on household savings. Third, given the choice to optimize either carbon, capital, or labor income taxes, the socially discounting planner's welfare ranking is ambiguous over a standard range of parameters. Overall, in general equilibrium, a policy-maker's choice to adopt differential social discounting may thus overturn conventional recommendations for both environmental and fiscal policy.
More frequent usage of Twitter positively affects the acquisition of current affairs knowledge; opposite is found for Facebook, particularly for citizens with less political interest
Social network sites and acquiring current affairs knowledge: The impact of Twitter and Facebook usage on learning about the news. Mark Boukes. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Feb 06 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2019.1572568
Abstract: This study investigates how the use of Twitter and Facebook affects citizens’ knowledge acquisition, and whether this effect is conditional upon people’s political interest. Using a panel survey design with repeated measures of knowledge acquisition, this study is able to disentangle causality and to demonstrate that more frequent usage of Twitter positively affects the acquisition of current affairs knowledge. The opposite is found for Facebook: More frequent Facebook usage causes a decline in knowledge acquisition. This negative effect of Facebook usage occurred particularly for citizens with less political interest, thereby, amplifying the existing knowledge gap between politically interested and uninterested citizens.
KEYWORDS: Social network sites, learning effects, current affairs knowledge, Facebook, Twitter, social media, knowledge gap
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To date, no research has been able to convincingly unveil a causal relationship between the usage of specific social networks sites and the acquisition of current affairs knowledge. This is partly due to the reliance on cross-sectional datasets. Survey research cannot determine the directionality of causal relationships: Associations between SNS usage and knowledge may identify a selection mechanism (i.e., knowledge causing SNS use) rather than a media effect. Using a panel survey design (three-waves; n = 3,240) with a repeated measure of (new) current affairs knowledge, the current study has a unique ability to analyze whether the two social networks most often used for news consumption (respectively Facebook and Twitter, [...]) affect the current affairs information that citizens acquire.
Abstract: This study investigates how the use of Twitter and Facebook affects citizens’ knowledge acquisition, and whether this effect is conditional upon people’s political interest. Using a panel survey design with repeated measures of knowledge acquisition, this study is able to disentangle causality and to demonstrate that more frequent usage of Twitter positively affects the acquisition of current affairs knowledge. The opposite is found for Facebook: More frequent Facebook usage causes a decline in knowledge acquisition. This negative effect of Facebook usage occurred particularly for citizens with less political interest, thereby, amplifying the existing knowledge gap between politically interested and uninterested citizens.
KEYWORDS: Social network sites, learning effects, current affairs knowledge, Facebook, Twitter, social media, knowledge gap
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To date, no research has been able to convincingly unveil a causal relationship between the usage of specific social networks sites and the acquisition of current affairs knowledge. This is partly due to the reliance on cross-sectional datasets. Survey research cannot determine the directionality of causal relationships: Associations between SNS usage and knowledge may identify a selection mechanism (i.e., knowledge causing SNS use) rather than a media effect. Using a panel survey design (three-waves; n = 3,240) with a repeated measure of (new) current affairs knowledge, the current study has a unique ability to analyze whether the two social networks most often used for news consumption (respectively Facebook and Twitter, [...]) affect the current affairs information that citizens acquire.
Judged originals (inaccurately) labeled as revisions to be superior to revisions (inaccurately) labeled as originals, or when revisions were trivial, incidental, non-existent, & even objectively worse than the original
Garcia-Rada, Ximena and John, Leslie K. and O'Brien, Ed and Norton, Michael I., The Revision Bias (February 4, 2019). Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 19-087. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3329340
Abstract: Things change. Things also get changed—often. Why? The obvious reason is that revising things makes them better. In the current research, we document a less obvious reason: Revising things makes people think they are better, absent objective improvement. We refer to this phenomenon as the revision bias. Nine studies document this effect and provide insight into its psychological underpinnings. In Study 1, MBA students perceived their revised resumes to be of higher quality the more they differed from their original versions, but this perception was not justified: observers judged originals (inaccurately) labeled as revisions to be superior to revisions (inaccurately) labeled as originals. Study 2 pinpoints the direction of the effect: revisions are appealing, as opposed to originals being unappealing. Moreover, the revision bias holds in a variety of settings in which the revision is devoid of objective improvement: when revisions are trivial (Study 3A), incidental (Study 3B), non-existent (Study 3C), and even objectively worse than the original (Study 3D). Study 4 directly tests the self-fulfilling nature of the revision bias, testing whether mere revision framing leads people to become less critical of the experience—in this study, less sensitive to possible bugs while playing an otherwise identical “revised” video game—and whether this mediates the effect of revision framing on positive evaluations. Studies 5A and 5B offer further support by testing whether the revision bias is accentuated when people engage in a holistic processing style, whether measured as an individual difference (Study 5A) or experimentally induced (Study 5B).
Keywords: change, heuristics and biases, framing, sequences, judgment
Abstract: Things change. Things also get changed—often. Why? The obvious reason is that revising things makes them better. In the current research, we document a less obvious reason: Revising things makes people think they are better, absent objective improvement. We refer to this phenomenon as the revision bias. Nine studies document this effect and provide insight into its psychological underpinnings. In Study 1, MBA students perceived their revised resumes to be of higher quality the more they differed from their original versions, but this perception was not justified: observers judged originals (inaccurately) labeled as revisions to be superior to revisions (inaccurately) labeled as originals. Study 2 pinpoints the direction of the effect: revisions are appealing, as opposed to originals being unappealing. Moreover, the revision bias holds in a variety of settings in which the revision is devoid of objective improvement: when revisions are trivial (Study 3A), incidental (Study 3B), non-existent (Study 3C), and even objectively worse than the original (Study 3D). Study 4 directly tests the self-fulfilling nature of the revision bias, testing whether mere revision framing leads people to become less critical of the experience—in this study, less sensitive to possible bugs while playing an otherwise identical “revised” video game—and whether this mediates the effect of revision framing on positive evaluations. Studies 5A and 5B offer further support by testing whether the revision bias is accentuated when people engage in a holistic processing style, whether measured as an individual difference (Study 5A) or experimentally induced (Study 5B).
Keywords: change, heuristics and biases, framing, sequences, judgment
Saturday, February 16, 2019
Even though theories of dynamic equilibrium include phenomena of ruptures, homeostasis & tension, these are understood as momentary alterations of a condition that must be restored to maintain integrity
Affective semiosis and affective logic. Luca Tateo. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 48, January 2018, Pages 1-11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.08.002
Abstract: Psychology values consistency, reduction of uncertainty, causality and continuity as normative aspects of mental life. Even though theories of dynamic equilibrium include phenomena of ruptures, homeostasis and tension as part of the psychological functioning, these are understood as momentary alterations of a condition that must be restored in order to maintain the integrity of the system. Yet in everyday life one can observe phenomena in which human beings constantly move ahead the conditions of living and the limits of what is somehow acceptable. Tension, ambivalence and uncertainty are part of existence and the most part of us can perfectly live with it, if not actively looking for it.
Traditional logic underneath psychology cannot account for this meaning-making process. We then need to think about a specific form of affective logic that can enable us to understand extreme phenomena not as pathologies but as special forms of meaning-making. I will outline an affective semiosis process based on an affective logic, drawing from the ideas of Peirce's semiotics, Meinong's theory of objectives, Wittegenstein's concept of “seeing-as”, Herbst's co-genetic logic and Simmel's complementarity between binding and unbinding.
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According to Peirce, in his famous distinction between “seminars” and “laboratories” philosophers, the “true scientiļ¬c Eros” (Peirce, CP 1.620)1 is not pursued by those who “love only the truth already in their possession and, thus, conceive their task as steadfast and uncompromising defense of their property” (Colapietro, 1988, p. xvii), rather by the “painstaking and cooperative inquirer” (Colapietro, 1988, p. xvii), who thinks that discover is an everending quest.
Reference
Colapietro,V.M. (1988). Peirce's approach to the self: A semiotic perspective on human subjectivity. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Abstract: Psychology values consistency, reduction of uncertainty, causality and continuity as normative aspects of mental life. Even though theories of dynamic equilibrium include phenomena of ruptures, homeostasis and tension as part of the psychological functioning, these are understood as momentary alterations of a condition that must be restored in order to maintain the integrity of the system. Yet in everyday life one can observe phenomena in which human beings constantly move ahead the conditions of living and the limits of what is somehow acceptable. Tension, ambivalence and uncertainty are part of existence and the most part of us can perfectly live with it, if not actively looking for it.
Traditional logic underneath psychology cannot account for this meaning-making process. We then need to think about a specific form of affective logic that can enable us to understand extreme phenomena not as pathologies but as special forms of meaning-making. I will outline an affective semiosis process based on an affective logic, drawing from the ideas of Peirce's semiotics, Meinong's theory of objectives, Wittegenstein's concept of “seeing-as”, Herbst's co-genetic logic and Simmel's complementarity between binding and unbinding.
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According to Peirce, in his famous distinction between “seminars” and “laboratories” philosophers, the “true scientiļ¬c Eros” (Peirce, CP 1.620)1 is not pursued by those who “love only the truth already in their possession and, thus, conceive their task as steadfast and uncompromising defense of their property” (Colapietro, 1988, p. xvii), rather by the “painstaking and cooperative inquirer” (Colapietro, 1988, p. xvii), who thinks that discover is an everending quest.
Reference
Colapietro,V.M. (1988). Peirce's approach to the self: A semiotic perspective on human subjectivity. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
From 2018. The quiet virtues of sadness: A selective theoretical and interpretative appreciation of its potential contribution to wellbeing
The quiet virtues of sadness: A selective theoretical and interpretative appreciation of its potential contribution to wellbeing. Tim Lomas. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 49, April 2018, Pages 18-26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.01.002
Abstract: Critical emotion theorists have raised concerns that “normal” human emotions like sadness are increasingly being pathologised as disorders. Counter efforts have consequently been made to normalise such emotions, such as by highlighting their ubiquity and appropriacy. This paper goes slightly further by suggesting that sadness may not merely be normal, but could have inherent value, and might even be an integral component of a flourishing life. It offers a selective theoretical and interpretative review of literature on the potential “virtues” of sadness. Three overarching themes are identified, each comprising four subthemes: (a) sadness as a mode of protection (including as a warning, as prompting disengagement, as a mode of conservation, and as enhancing accuracy); (b) sadness as an expression of care (including as a manifestation of love, of longing, of compassion, and eliciting care); and (c) sadness as a vehicle for flourishing (including as a moral sensibility, as engendering psychological development, as an aesthetic sensibility, and as integral to fulfilment). It is thus hoped that the paper can contribute to a more “positive” cultural discourse around sadness, suggesting that, for many people, experiences of sadness may serve an important function in their lives.
Abstract: Critical emotion theorists have raised concerns that “normal” human emotions like sadness are increasingly being pathologised as disorders. Counter efforts have consequently been made to normalise such emotions, such as by highlighting their ubiquity and appropriacy. This paper goes slightly further by suggesting that sadness may not merely be normal, but could have inherent value, and might even be an integral component of a flourishing life. It offers a selective theoretical and interpretative review of literature on the potential “virtues” of sadness. Three overarching themes are identified, each comprising four subthemes: (a) sadness as a mode of protection (including as a warning, as prompting disengagement, as a mode of conservation, and as enhancing accuracy); (b) sadness as an expression of care (including as a manifestation of love, of longing, of compassion, and eliciting care); and (c) sadness as a vehicle for flourishing (including as a moral sensibility, as engendering psychological development, as an aesthetic sensibility, and as integral to fulfilment). It is thus hoped that the paper can contribute to a more “positive” cultural discourse around sadness, suggesting that, for many people, experiences of sadness may serve an important function in their lives.
Prevalent practice in the literature of using correlated common and specific factors as independent predictors in classical ANOVA models is both statistically unsound and conceptually distorted
The misleading Dodo Bird verdict. How much of the outcome variance is explained by common and specific factors? Giulio de Felice et al. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 54, August 2019, Pages 50-55. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2019.01.006
Abstract: The literature on psychotherapy research makes use of the so-called "Dodo Bird Verdict" to show that therapeutic change owes more to common factors than to specific techniques. According to the bulk of the empirical literature, common factors explain 30–70% of therapy outcome variance, while specific factors account for between 5% and 15%. This formulation is based on the assumption that common and specific factors are independent of each other. The present study uses a systematic review of the literature to empirically demonstrate that common and specific factors of change are actually correlated. In other words, the prevalent practice in the literature of using correlated common and specific factors as independent predictors in classical ANOVA models is both statistically unsound and conceptually distorted. We offer several alternative proposals for a sensible re-evaluation of the Dodo Bird verdict.
Abstract: The literature on psychotherapy research makes use of the so-called "Dodo Bird Verdict" to show that therapeutic change owes more to common factors than to specific techniques. According to the bulk of the empirical literature, common factors explain 30–70% of therapy outcome variance, while specific factors account for between 5% and 15%. This formulation is based on the assumption that common and specific factors are independent of each other. The present study uses a systematic review of the literature to empirically demonstrate that common and specific factors of change are actually correlated. In other words, the prevalent practice in the literature of using correlated common and specific factors as independent predictors in classical ANOVA models is both statistically unsound and conceptually distorted. We offer several alternative proposals for a sensible re-evaluation of the Dodo Bird verdict.
Examining the effect of combat excitement & diminished civilian solidarity on life satisfaction for American veterans
Examining the effect of combat excitement & diminished civilian solidarity on life satisfaction for American veterans. Gary Senecal et al. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 52, January 2019, Pages 12-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.09.001
Abstract: The data accounting for the difficulties many OIF and OEF veterans experience upon reintegration into civilian society have been thoroughly documented over the last fifteen years. Among these difficulties, some veterans experience antisocial, self-injurious, and violent tendencies upon returning to civilian life. In this research project, 220 veterans were completed self-report surveys pertaining to their transition from military life to a civilian career. Some of the participants' responses revealed that there was a significant emotional and motivational dimension to the formation of otherwise aggressive and self-destructive tendencies activated upon leaving their military careers and culture. The term combat excitement was coined to articulate participants’ anticipation of enemy contact while deployed. This study demonstrates that high levels of combat excitement correlated with lower life satisfaction and lower civilian solidarity for participants in their civilian lives after leaving an active duty setting. Furthermore, civilians solidarity had a strong positive correlation with life satisfaction for participants. Ultimately, this study looks at how significant strong civilian relationships are vital to the health and life satisfaction of veterans as they leave active duty, as well as how combat excitement can weaken the tendency of veterans to have strong civilian relationships after service.
Abstract: The data accounting for the difficulties many OIF and OEF veterans experience upon reintegration into civilian society have been thoroughly documented over the last fifteen years. Among these difficulties, some veterans experience antisocial, self-injurious, and violent tendencies upon returning to civilian life. In this research project, 220 veterans were completed self-report surveys pertaining to their transition from military life to a civilian career. Some of the participants' responses revealed that there was a significant emotional and motivational dimension to the formation of otherwise aggressive and self-destructive tendencies activated upon leaving their military careers and culture. The term combat excitement was coined to articulate participants’ anticipation of enemy contact while deployed. This study demonstrates that high levels of combat excitement correlated with lower life satisfaction and lower civilian solidarity for participants in their civilian lives after leaving an active duty setting. Furthermore, civilians solidarity had a strong positive correlation with life satisfaction for participants. Ultimately, this study looks at how significant strong civilian relationships are vital to the health and life satisfaction of veterans as they leave active duty, as well as how combat excitement can weaken the tendency of veterans to have strong civilian relationships after service.
Social contents in dreams: Dreams were found to contain more social interactions than corresponding waking life; prosocial social simulations were not specifically aimed at familiar persons
Social contents in dreams: An empirical test of the Social Simulation Theory. Jarno Tuominen et al. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 69, March 2019, Pages 133-145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.01.017
Highlights
• Hypotheses from the Social Simulation Theory of dreaming were tested.
• A novel content analysis method, the Social Content Scale, was developed.
• Dreams were found to contain more social interactions than corresponding waking life.
• Prosocial social simulations were not specifically aimed at familiar persons.
• REM and NREM reports did not differ in prosocial or aggressive interactions.
Abstract: Social Simulation Theory (SST) considers the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social events. The Sociality Bias and the Strengthening hypotheses of SST were tested. Social Content Scale (SCS) was developed to quantify social events. Additionally, we attempted to replicate a previous finding (McNamara et al., 2005, Psychological Science) of REM dreams as predisposed to aggressive, and NREM dreams to prosocial interactions.
Further, we investigated the frequency and quality of interactions in late vs early REM and NREM dreams. Data consisted of wake, REM and NREM home dream reports (N = 232, 116, 116, respectively) from 15 students. Dreams overrepresented social events compared to wake reports, supporting the Sociality Bias hypothesis. However, the Strengthening Hypothesis was not supported. We weren’t able to replicate the McNamara et al. finding, and no time of night effect was found. While SST gained partial support, further research on social contents in dreams is required.
Highlights
• Hypotheses from the Social Simulation Theory of dreaming were tested.
• A novel content analysis method, the Social Content Scale, was developed.
• Dreams were found to contain more social interactions than corresponding waking life.
• Prosocial social simulations were not specifically aimed at familiar persons.
• REM and NREM reports did not differ in prosocial or aggressive interactions.
Abstract: Social Simulation Theory (SST) considers the function of dreaming to be the simulation of social events. The Sociality Bias and the Strengthening hypotheses of SST were tested. Social Content Scale (SCS) was developed to quantify social events. Additionally, we attempted to replicate a previous finding (McNamara et al., 2005, Psychological Science) of REM dreams as predisposed to aggressive, and NREM dreams to prosocial interactions.
Further, we investigated the frequency and quality of interactions in late vs early REM and NREM dreams. Data consisted of wake, REM and NREM home dream reports (N = 232, 116, 116, respectively) from 15 students. Dreams overrepresented social events compared to wake reports, supporting the Sociality Bias hypothesis. However, the Strengthening Hypothesis was not supported. We weren’t able to replicate the McNamara et al. finding, and no time of night effect was found. While SST gained partial support, further research on social contents in dreams is required.
High Socioeconomic Status Predicts Substance Use and Alcohol Consumption in U.S. Undergraduates; Asians & married students were the least likely to use alcohol & drugs
High Socioeconomic Status Predicts Substance Use and Alcohol Consumption in U.S. Undergraduates. Chris C. Martin. Substance Use & Misuse, Feb 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10826084.2018.1559193
Abstract: Background: In health sociology, the prevailing consensus is that socioeconomic status (SES) lowers illness risk. This model neglects the fact that unhealthful consumption patterns may covary with affluence. The current study examines consumption of drugs and alcohol among affluent U.S. college students.
Objectives: The article tests the hypothesis that undergraduate students from high-SES households have higher rates and levels of drug and alcohol consumption than their peers.
Methods: The study used self-report data from 18,611 18- to 24-year-old undergraduates across 23 public and private U.S. institutions from the Healthy Minds 2016 dataset. Results: I found that high-SES undergraduates were more likely than peers to use marijuana, choose varied drugs, consume alcohol frequently, and use alcohol and substances to cope with stress. The first three results were robust after controlling for gender, race, residence type, and relationship status. Marital status and race were stronger predictors than SES. Asians and married students were the least likely to use alcohol and drugs.
Conclusions/Importance: Findings supported the main hypotheses, and the effects were robust to controls. Consumption of illicit drugs and alcohol may be one hitherto neglected reason for downward mobility among economically privileged college students.
Keywords: Higher education, social class, substance use, alcohol, young adulthood, Asian Americans
Abstract: Background: In health sociology, the prevailing consensus is that socioeconomic status (SES) lowers illness risk. This model neglects the fact that unhealthful consumption patterns may covary with affluence. The current study examines consumption of drugs and alcohol among affluent U.S. college students.
Objectives: The article tests the hypothesis that undergraduate students from high-SES households have higher rates and levels of drug and alcohol consumption than their peers.
Methods: The study used self-report data from 18,611 18- to 24-year-old undergraduates across 23 public and private U.S. institutions from the Healthy Minds 2016 dataset. Results: I found that high-SES undergraduates were more likely than peers to use marijuana, choose varied drugs, consume alcohol frequently, and use alcohol and substances to cope with stress. The first three results were robust after controlling for gender, race, residence type, and relationship status. Marital status and race were stronger predictors than SES. Asians and married students were the least likely to use alcohol and drugs.
Conclusions/Importance: Findings supported the main hypotheses, and the effects were robust to controls. Consumption of illicit drugs and alcohol may be one hitherto neglected reason for downward mobility among economically privileged college students.
Keywords: Higher education, social class, substance use, alcohol, young adulthood, Asian Americans
Friday, February 15, 2019
Telomere Length And Health Outcomes: Of 50 possible outcomes studied, only important for gastric cancer and, probably, diabetes and Alzheimer's disease
Telomere Length And Health Outcomes: An umbrella review of systematic reviews and meta-analyses of observational studies. Lee Smith et al. Ageing Research Reviews, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arr.2019.02.003
Highlights
• Shorter telomere length are associated with higher risk of non-communicable disease.
• Until now no attempt has been made to capture the breadth of outcomes associated with telomere length.
• This review indicates that shorter telomere length has a highly suggestive association with incidence of only specific cancer types, and has suggestive evidence with diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease risks.
• Telomere length has a weak association with heightened risks in a range of other important health outcomes (n = 20), whereas it has no role with others, including 27 outcomes out of 50.
Abstract: The aim of the present study was to map and grade evidence for the relationships between telomere length with a diverse range of health outcomes, using an umbrella review of systematic reviews with meta-analyses. We searched for meta-analyses of observational studies reporting on the association of telomere length with any health outcome (clinical disease outcomes and intermediate traits). For each association, random-effects summary effect size, 95% confidence interval (CI), and 95% prediction interval were calculated. To evaluate the credibility of the identified evidence, we assessed also heterogeneity, evidence for small-study effect and evidence for excess significance bias. Twenty-one relevant meta-analyses were identified reporting on 50 different outcomes and including a total of 326 observational studies. The level of evidence was high only for the association of short telomeres with higher risk of gastric cancer in the general population (relative risk, RR = 1.95, 95%CI: 1.68-2.26), and moderate for the association of shorter telomeres with diabetes or with Alzheimer’s disease, even if limited to meta-analyses of case-control studies. There was weak evidence for twenty outcomes and not significant association for 27 health outcomes. The present umbrella review demonstrates that shorter telomere length may have an important role in incidence gastric cancer and, probably, diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease. At the same time, conversely to general assumptions, it does not find strong evidence supporting the notion that shorter telomere length plays an important role in many health outcomes that have been studied thus far.
Keywords: Telomere lengthumbrella reviewobservational studies
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Some of the outcomes studied:
Disease-free survival in chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Esophageal cancer
Head and neck cancer
Overall survival in glioma
Overall survival in lung cancer
Prostate cancer
Skin cancer - basal cell carcinoma
Skin cancer - melanoma
Depression
Stroke
Myocardial Infarction
type II diabetes mellitus
coronary heart disease
All-cause mortality in breast cancer
Bladder cancer
Breast cancer
Cancer recurrence
in breast cancer
Cancerspecific mortality in breast cancer
Colorectal cancer
Disease-free survival in colorectal cancer
Hepatocellular carcinoma
Lung cancer
Lymphoma - Hodgkin's lymphoma
Ovarian cancer
Overall survival in bladder cancer
Overall survival in chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Overall survival in colorectal cancer
Overall survival in esophageal cancer
Overall survival in ovarian cancer
Progressionfree survival in lung cancer
Renal cell carcinoma
AF (incident)
Highlights
• Shorter telomere length are associated with higher risk of non-communicable disease.
• Until now no attempt has been made to capture the breadth of outcomes associated with telomere length.
• This review indicates that shorter telomere length has a highly suggestive association with incidence of only specific cancer types, and has suggestive evidence with diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease risks.
• Telomere length has a weak association with heightened risks in a range of other important health outcomes (n = 20), whereas it has no role with others, including 27 outcomes out of 50.
Abstract: The aim of the present study was to map and grade evidence for the relationships between telomere length with a diverse range of health outcomes, using an umbrella review of systematic reviews with meta-analyses. We searched for meta-analyses of observational studies reporting on the association of telomere length with any health outcome (clinical disease outcomes and intermediate traits). For each association, random-effects summary effect size, 95% confidence interval (CI), and 95% prediction interval were calculated. To evaluate the credibility of the identified evidence, we assessed also heterogeneity, evidence for small-study effect and evidence for excess significance bias. Twenty-one relevant meta-analyses were identified reporting on 50 different outcomes and including a total of 326 observational studies. The level of evidence was high only for the association of short telomeres with higher risk of gastric cancer in the general population (relative risk, RR = 1.95, 95%CI: 1.68-2.26), and moderate for the association of shorter telomeres with diabetes or with Alzheimer’s disease, even if limited to meta-analyses of case-control studies. There was weak evidence for twenty outcomes and not significant association for 27 health outcomes. The present umbrella review demonstrates that shorter telomere length may have an important role in incidence gastric cancer and, probably, diabetes and Alzheimer’s disease. At the same time, conversely to general assumptions, it does not find strong evidence supporting the notion that shorter telomere length plays an important role in many health outcomes that have been studied thus far.
Keywords: Telomere lengthumbrella reviewobservational studies
---
Some of the outcomes studied:
Disease-free survival in chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Esophageal cancer
Head and neck cancer
Overall survival in glioma
Overall survival in lung cancer
Prostate cancer
Skin cancer - basal cell carcinoma
Skin cancer - melanoma
Depression
Stroke
Myocardial Infarction
type II diabetes mellitus
coronary heart disease
All-cause mortality in breast cancer
Bladder cancer
Breast cancer
Cancer recurrence
in breast cancer
Cancerspecific mortality in breast cancer
Colorectal cancer
Disease-free survival in colorectal cancer
Hepatocellular carcinoma
Lung cancer
Lymphoma - Hodgkin's lymphoma
Ovarian cancer
Overall survival in bladder cancer
Overall survival in chronic lymphocytic leukemia
Overall survival in colorectal cancer
Overall survival in esophageal cancer
Overall survival in ovarian cancer
Progressionfree survival in lung cancer
Renal cell carcinoma
AF (incident)
Holding a green self-image & life satisfaction: Pro-environmental norms are experienced by greens as a standard of reference in the process of green status competition & by non-greens as a source of social pressure
Pro-environmental norms and subjective well-being: Panel evidence from the UK. Binder, Martin; Blankenberg, Ann-Kathrin; Welsch, Heinz; Oldenburg Discussion Papers in Economics V-417-19, 2019. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/190962
Abstract: Tying in with a small number of studies on green norms, identity and subjective well-being, this paper studies the relationship between holding a green self-image and life satisfaction in the UK. Focusing on (sub-national) regions as the unit of reference, we investigate if and how the individual-level greenness-satisfaction relationship varies with measures of the prevalence and distribution (disparity) of greenness at the regional level, taking these measures as indicators of a green social norm. Two key findings emerge from our analysis. First, life satisfaction is negatively related to the regional-level mean (prevalence) and positively related to the regional-level diversity of greenness, while being unrelated to the degree of polarization of greenness. Taking the prevalence as a direct and diversity as an inverse measure of the validity of a greenness norm, these results are consistent with the idea that the norm is experienced (by greens) as a standard of reference in the process of green status competition or (by non-greens) as a source of social pressure. Second, the well-being benefits from holding a greener self-image are unrelated to the prevalence and diversity of greenness, but positively related to the polarization of greenness for those either very green or not green at all. This is consistent with the idea that green self-image yields well-being benefits through identity, that is, by identifying with the own group and differentiating oneself from other groups - a possibility that relies on sufficiently large differentiation/polarization of groups. We discuss differences between these results and previous findings based on measures of nation-wide prevalence and disparity of greenness.
Abstract: Tying in with a small number of studies on green norms, identity and subjective well-being, this paper studies the relationship between holding a green self-image and life satisfaction in the UK. Focusing on (sub-national) regions as the unit of reference, we investigate if and how the individual-level greenness-satisfaction relationship varies with measures of the prevalence and distribution (disparity) of greenness at the regional level, taking these measures as indicators of a green social norm. Two key findings emerge from our analysis. First, life satisfaction is negatively related to the regional-level mean (prevalence) and positively related to the regional-level diversity of greenness, while being unrelated to the degree of polarization of greenness. Taking the prevalence as a direct and diversity as an inverse measure of the validity of a greenness norm, these results are consistent with the idea that the norm is experienced (by greens) as a standard of reference in the process of green status competition or (by non-greens) as a source of social pressure. Second, the well-being benefits from holding a greener self-image are unrelated to the prevalence and diversity of greenness, but positively related to the polarization of greenness for those either very green or not green at all. This is consistent with the idea that green self-image yields well-being benefits through identity, that is, by identifying with the own group and differentiating oneself from other groups - a possibility that relies on sufficiently large differentiation/polarization of groups. We discuss differences between these results and previous findings based on measures of nation-wide prevalence and disparity of greenness.
Females preferred fungus‐infected males over other males; maybe these males invested their energetic resources to increase their attractiveness at the risk of survival, in a terminal investment fashion
Female choice for sick males over healthy males: Consequences for offspring. Alicia Reyes‐Ramirez et al. Ethology, Feb 15 2019, https://doi.org/10.1111/eth.12854
Abstract: Sexual selection theory indicates that ornament expression in males is in close relation to their condition. This “honesty” relationship serves as the basis for female choice: Females would mate with healthy males over sick males after assessing male ornament signal expression and derive benefits for their progeny. Here, we investigated female mate choice for infected and non‐infected males, male survival after infection (to corroborate the negative effect of infection), and fitness consequences of female preferences using Tenebrio molitor beetles. Male infection was produced having two types of challenges as follows: males infected with entomopathogenic fungi and males infected with nylon implants. Similar to previous studies, we corroborated that females preferred fungus‐infected males over positive control, negative control, and nylon‐challenged males. Survival was the lowest for fungus‐treated males followed by nylon‐treated and control males. Females mated with fungus‐treated males laid fewer and smaller eggs, and the laid eggs had less lipid content with a reduced eclosion success compared to females mated with non‐challenged males. Our interpretation is that fungus‐treated males invested their energetic resources to increase their attractiveness at the risk of survival, in a terminal investment fashion. Females, however, would have corrected their choice by investing less in their offspring.
Abstract: Sexual selection theory indicates that ornament expression in males is in close relation to their condition. This “honesty” relationship serves as the basis for female choice: Females would mate with healthy males over sick males after assessing male ornament signal expression and derive benefits for their progeny. Here, we investigated female mate choice for infected and non‐infected males, male survival after infection (to corroborate the negative effect of infection), and fitness consequences of female preferences using Tenebrio molitor beetles. Male infection was produced having two types of challenges as follows: males infected with entomopathogenic fungi and males infected with nylon implants. Similar to previous studies, we corroborated that females preferred fungus‐infected males over positive control, negative control, and nylon‐challenged males. Survival was the lowest for fungus‐treated males followed by nylon‐treated and control males. Females mated with fungus‐treated males laid fewer and smaller eggs, and the laid eggs had less lipid content with a reduced eclosion success compared to females mated with non‐challenged males. Our interpretation is that fungus‐treated males invested their energetic resources to increase their attractiveness at the risk of survival, in a terminal investment fashion. Females, however, would have corrected their choice by investing less in their offspring.
Humor reduces the perceived veracity of proximal statements; diminishes the perceived veracity of negative disclosures; adding humor to negative disclosures boosts perceptions of warmth and competence
The impression management benefits of humorous self-disclosures: How humor influences perceptions of veracity. T. Bradford Bitterly et al. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 151, March 2019, Pages 73-89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.01.005
Highlights
• Humor reduces the perceived veracity of proximal statements.
• Humor diminishes the perceived veracity of negative disclosures.
• Adding humor to negative disclosures boosts perceptions of warmth and competence.
• Humor is a powerful impression management tool.
Abstract: Across five studies, we identify humor as a powerful impression management tool that influences perceptions of veracity. In many domains, such as negotiations and interviews, individuals face a challenge with respect to disclosing negative information and managing impressions. For example, an interviewer may ask an applicant to name their greatest weakness. In these settings, disclosures that reveal negative information (e.g., “I am not good at math.”) can harm perceptions of warmth and competence. We demonstrate that pairing a humorous statement with a disclosure (e.g., “I am not good at math. Geometry is where I draw the line.”) changes perceptions of the veracity of the disclosure; disclosures are less likely to be judged as true when they are accompanied by a humorous statement than when they are not. We introduce the Speaker's Inferred Motive (SIM) Model and consider the possibility that (a) speakers pursue different motives, such as a transmission-of-ideas motive (to convey information) or an entertainment motive (to amuse an audience), (b) audience members infer the speaker’s motive, and (c) these inferences influence perceptions of the veracity of proximal disclosures. As a result, by using humor, a speaker may signal a shift in motive and diminish perceptions of the veracity of both the humorous statement and proximal claims. Taken together, when a target discloses negative information, including information that is highly relevant to the conversational partner, the use of humor can boost perceptions of warmth and competence. We discuss implications of our findings with respect to communication, interpersonal perception, and impression management.
Highlights
• Humor reduces the perceived veracity of proximal statements.
• Humor diminishes the perceived veracity of negative disclosures.
• Adding humor to negative disclosures boosts perceptions of warmth and competence.
• Humor is a powerful impression management tool.
Abstract: Across five studies, we identify humor as a powerful impression management tool that influences perceptions of veracity. In many domains, such as negotiations and interviews, individuals face a challenge with respect to disclosing negative information and managing impressions. For example, an interviewer may ask an applicant to name their greatest weakness. In these settings, disclosures that reveal negative information (e.g., “I am not good at math.”) can harm perceptions of warmth and competence. We demonstrate that pairing a humorous statement with a disclosure (e.g., “I am not good at math. Geometry is where I draw the line.”) changes perceptions of the veracity of the disclosure; disclosures are less likely to be judged as true when they are accompanied by a humorous statement than when they are not. We introduce the Speaker's Inferred Motive (SIM) Model and consider the possibility that (a) speakers pursue different motives, such as a transmission-of-ideas motive (to convey information) or an entertainment motive (to amuse an audience), (b) audience members infer the speaker’s motive, and (c) these inferences influence perceptions of the veracity of proximal disclosures. As a result, by using humor, a speaker may signal a shift in motive and diminish perceptions of the veracity of both the humorous statement and proximal claims. Taken together, when a target discloses negative information, including information that is highly relevant to the conversational partner, the use of humor can boost perceptions of warmth and competence. We discuss implications of our findings with respect to communication, interpersonal perception, and impression management.
We propose a novel tripartite taxonomy of Schadenfreude: Aggression, rivalry, and justice; the process of dehumanization may lie at the core of Schadenfreude
Schadenfreude deconstructed and reconstructed: A tripartite motivational model. Shensheng Wang, Scott O. Lilienfeld, Philippe Rochat. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 52, January 2019, Pages 1-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.09.002
Highlights
• Research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology sheds light on Schadenfreude.
• We propose a novel tripartite taxonomy of Schadenfreude: Aggression, rivalry, and justice.
• The process of dehumanization may lie at the core of Schadenfreude.
Abstract: Schadenfreude is the distinctive pleasure people derive from others' misfortune. Research over the past three decades points to the multifaceted nature of Schadenfreude rooted in humans’ concerns for social justice, self-evaluation, and social identity. Less is known, however, regarding how the differing facets of Schadenfreude are interrelated and take shape in response to these concerns. To address these questions, we review extant theories in social psychology and draw upon evidence from developmental, personality, and clinical research literature to propose a novel, tripartite, taxonomy of Schadenfreude embedded in a motivational model. Our model posits that Schadenfreude comprises three separable but interrelated subforms (aggression, rivalry, and justice), which display different developmental trajectories and personality correlates. This model further posits that dehumanization plays a central role in both eliciting Schadenfreude and integrating its various facets. In closing, we point to fruitful directions for future research motivated by this novel account of Schadenfreude.
Highlights
• Research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology sheds light on Schadenfreude.
• We propose a novel tripartite taxonomy of Schadenfreude: Aggression, rivalry, and justice.
• The process of dehumanization may lie at the core of Schadenfreude.
Abstract: Schadenfreude is the distinctive pleasure people derive from others' misfortune. Research over the past three decades points to the multifaceted nature of Schadenfreude rooted in humans’ concerns for social justice, self-evaluation, and social identity. Less is known, however, regarding how the differing facets of Schadenfreude are interrelated and take shape in response to these concerns. To address these questions, we review extant theories in social psychology and draw upon evidence from developmental, personality, and clinical research literature to propose a novel, tripartite, taxonomy of Schadenfreude embedded in a motivational model. Our model posits that Schadenfreude comprises three separable but interrelated subforms (aggression, rivalry, and justice), which display different developmental trajectories and personality correlates. This model further posits that dehumanization plays a central role in both eliciting Schadenfreude and integrating its various facets. In closing, we point to fruitful directions for future research motivated by this novel account of Schadenfreude.
It challenges the use of cognitive-behavioural psychological models underpinning many of the dominant & popular accounts of emotion in the neurosciences; gives importance to the cultural-historical school
Emotions, social activity and neuroscience: The cultural-historical formation of emotion. Ian Burkitt. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 54, August 2019, Pages 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.11.001
Abstract: This article challenges the use of cognitive-behavioural psychological models underpinning many of the dominant and popular accounts of emotion in the neurosciences. Acknowledging that neurobiology is important for any understanding of emotion, an alternative model of neuropsychology is sought in the work of theorists of the cultural-historical school, particularly A. N. Leontyev and A. R. Luria. The importance of their work in stressing the key role of intentional social activity, culture, and language in the formation of human neuropsychological functions is developed into a theory of emotions that can provide an alternative for emotion studies. In this theory, activity, culture, history, and individual ontogeny play the defining role in structuring the neurobiological systems that underlie emotions, as opposed to the evolution of behaviours that are hard-wired into the brain and function as automatic responses. Instead, it is understood that there is a continuum between evolution and human social and cultural development.
Abstract: This article challenges the use of cognitive-behavioural psychological models underpinning many of the dominant and popular accounts of emotion in the neurosciences. Acknowledging that neurobiology is important for any understanding of emotion, an alternative model of neuropsychology is sought in the work of theorists of the cultural-historical school, particularly A. N. Leontyev and A. R. Luria. The importance of their work in stressing the key role of intentional social activity, culture, and language in the formation of human neuropsychological functions is developed into a theory of emotions that can provide an alternative for emotion studies. In this theory, activity, culture, history, and individual ontogeny play the defining role in structuring the neurobiological systems that underlie emotions, as opposed to the evolution of behaviours that are hard-wired into the brain and function as automatic responses. Instead, it is understood that there is a continuum between evolution and human social and cultural development.
Thursday, February 14, 2019
On the relative preponderance of empathic sorrow and its relation to commonsense morality
On the relative preponderance of empathic sorrow and its relation to commonsense morality. Edward B. Royzman, Rahul Kumar. New Ideas in Psychology, Volume 19, Issue 2, August 2001, Pages 131-144. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0732-118X(00)00020-9
Abstract: Empathy is a nominally neutral term: in principle, the affective tone of empathic concern may be either negative (insofar as the relevant experience is that of apprehending and sharing in another's aversive state) or positive (i.e., apprehending and sharing in another's joy). Yet, we propose (Section 1) that, contrary to this standard conception of empathy as a potentially bivalent, generalized disposition towards emotional perspective-taking, in actuality, negative empathic responses, as a rule, (a) are more common, (b) are more differentiated, and (c) span a broader range of human relationships than their positive counterparts. Furthermore, we suggest that, barring certain types of privileged relationships, a failure to be empathetically aroused by another's good fortune is subject to far less severe (if any) social disapproval than the failure to share in another's aversive state. In Section 2, we posit that the negativity bias evident in the nature of our empathic concern may well be at the base of the negative–positive asymmetry found in the structure of commonsense morality, particularly as it expresses itself in the view that the furtherance of another's good has a greater moral claim on us in its negative form (e.g., the relief of suffering) than in its positive form (the promotion of “enjoyment”). We conclude by asking whether this moral (and the underlying empathic) asymmetry warrants our normative concern and we suggest that there are at least two reasons to think otherwise.
Abstract: Empathy is a nominally neutral term: in principle, the affective tone of empathic concern may be either negative (insofar as the relevant experience is that of apprehending and sharing in another's aversive state) or positive (i.e., apprehending and sharing in another's joy). Yet, we propose (Section 1) that, contrary to this standard conception of empathy as a potentially bivalent, generalized disposition towards emotional perspective-taking, in actuality, negative empathic responses, as a rule, (a) are more common, (b) are more differentiated, and (c) span a broader range of human relationships than their positive counterparts. Furthermore, we suggest that, barring certain types of privileged relationships, a failure to be empathetically aroused by another's good fortune is subject to far less severe (if any) social disapproval than the failure to share in another's aversive state. In Section 2, we posit that the negativity bias evident in the nature of our empathic concern may well be at the base of the negative–positive asymmetry found in the structure of commonsense morality, particularly as it expresses itself in the view that the furtherance of another's good has a greater moral claim on us in its negative form (e.g., the relief of suffering) than in its positive form (the promotion of “enjoyment”). We conclude by asking whether this moral (and the underlying empathic) asymmetry warrants our normative concern and we suggest that there are at least two reasons to think otherwise.
Large teams develop and small teams disrupt science and technology: Study of more than 65 million papers, patents and software products that span the period 1954–2014
Large teams develop and small teams disrupt science and technology. Lingfei Wu, Dashun Wang & James A. Evans. Nature (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-0941-9
Abstract: One of the most universal trends in science and technology today is the growth of large teams in all areas, as solitary researchers and small teams diminish in prevalence1,2,3. Increases in team size have been attributed to the specialization of scientific activities3, improvements in communication technology4,5, or the complexity of modern problems that require interdisciplinary solutions6,7,8. This shift in team size raises the question of whether and how the character of the science and technology produced by large teams differs from that of small teams. Here we analyse more than 65 million papers, patents and software products that span the period 1954–2014, and demonstrate that across this period smaller teams have tended to disrupt science and technology with new ideas and opportunities, whereas larger teams have tended to develop existing ones. Work from larger teams builds on more-recent and popular developments, and attention to their work comes immediately. By contrast, contributions by smaller teams search more deeply into the past, are viewed as disruptive to science and technology and succeed further into the future—if at all. Observed differences between small and large teams are magnified for higher-impact work, with small teams known for disruptive work and large teams for developing work. Differences in topic and research design account for a small part of the relationship between team size and disruption; most of the effect occurs at the level of the individual, as people move between smaller and larger teams. These results demonstrate that both small and large teams are essential to a flourishing ecology of science and technology, and suggest that, to achieve this, science policies should aim to support a diversity of team sizes.
Abstract: One of the most universal trends in science and technology today is the growth of large teams in all areas, as solitary researchers and small teams diminish in prevalence1,2,3. Increases in team size have been attributed to the specialization of scientific activities3, improvements in communication technology4,5, or the complexity of modern problems that require interdisciplinary solutions6,7,8. This shift in team size raises the question of whether and how the character of the science and technology produced by large teams differs from that of small teams. Here we analyse more than 65 million papers, patents and software products that span the period 1954–2014, and demonstrate that across this period smaller teams have tended to disrupt science and technology with new ideas and opportunities, whereas larger teams have tended to develop existing ones. Work from larger teams builds on more-recent and popular developments, and attention to their work comes immediately. By contrast, contributions by smaller teams search more deeply into the past, are viewed as disruptive to science and technology and succeed further into the future—if at all. Observed differences between small and large teams are magnified for higher-impact work, with small teams known for disruptive work and large teams for developing work. Differences in topic and research design account for a small part of the relationship between team size and disruption; most of the effect occurs at the level of the individual, as people move between smaller and larger teams. These results demonstrate that both small and large teams are essential to a flourishing ecology of science and technology, and suggest that, to achieve this, science policies should aim to support a diversity of team sizes.
Refugees in Denmark between 1986-1998: Evidence for steeper returns to experience in big cities; an individual’s lifetime wage path depends strongly on placement in the country’s capital, Copenhagen
Fabian Eckert & Conor Walsh & Mads Hejlesen, 2018. "The Return to Big City Experience: Evidence from Danish Refugees," 2018 Meeting Papers 1214, Society for Economic Dynamics. https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed018/1214.html
Abstract: Using a random settlement policy for refugees in Denmark between 1986-1998, we provide evidence for steeper returns to experience in big cities. Exploiting exogenous variation in initial placement, we show that the slope of an individual’s lifetime wage path depends strongly on placement in the country’s capital, Copenhagen. Conditional on observables, settled refugees initially earn similar hourly wages across regions, but those placed in Copenhagen see their wages grow 0.63% faster than others with each year of experience they accumulate. We further show that this premium is driven by greater acquisition of experience at high-wage establishments, and differential sorting across occupations. Finally, to account for dynamic selection within the city, we develop and estimate a structural model of earnings dynamics.
Abstract: Using a random settlement policy for refugees in Denmark between 1986-1998, we provide evidence for steeper returns to experience in big cities. Exploiting exogenous variation in initial placement, we show that the slope of an individual’s lifetime wage path depends strongly on placement in the country’s capital, Copenhagen. Conditional on observables, settled refugees initially earn similar hourly wages across regions, but those placed in Copenhagen see their wages grow 0.63% faster than others with each year of experience they accumulate. We further show that this premium is driven by greater acquisition of experience at high-wage establishments, and differential sorting across occupations. Finally, to account for dynamic selection within the city, we develop and estimate a structural model of earnings dynamics.
When Evolution Works Against the Future: Disgust's Contributions to the Acceptance of New Food Technologies
When Evolution Works Against the Future: Disgust's Contributions to the Acceptance of New Food Technologies. Aisha Egolf, Christina Hartmann, Michael Siegrist. Risk Analysis, Feb 13 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13279
Abstract: New food technologies have a high potential to transform the current resource‐consuming food system to a more efficient and sustainable one, but public acceptance of new food technologies is rather low. Such an avoidance might be maintained by a deeply preserved risk avoidance system called disgust. In an online survey, participants (N = 313) received information about a variety of new food technology applications (i.e., genetically modified meat/fish, edible nanotechnology coating film, nanotechnology food box, artificial meat/milk, and a synthetic food additive). Every new food technology application was rated according to the respondent's willingness to eat (WTE) it (i.e., acceptance), risk, benefit, and disgust perceptions. Furthermore, food disgust sensitivity was measured using the Food Disgust Scale. Overall, the WTE both gene‐technology applications and meat coated with an edible nanotechnology film were low and disgust responses toward all three applications were high. In full mediation models, food disgust sensitivity predicted the disgust response toward each new food technology application, which in turn influenced WTE them. Effects of disgust responses on the WTE a synthetic food additive were highest for and lowest for the edible nanotechnology coating film compared to the other technologies. Results indicate that direct disgust responses influence acceptance and risk and benefit perceptions of new food technologies. Beyond the discussion of this study, implications for future research and strategies to increase acceptance of new food technologies are discussed.
Abstract: New food technologies have a high potential to transform the current resource‐consuming food system to a more efficient and sustainable one, but public acceptance of new food technologies is rather low. Such an avoidance might be maintained by a deeply preserved risk avoidance system called disgust. In an online survey, participants (N = 313) received information about a variety of new food technology applications (i.e., genetically modified meat/fish, edible nanotechnology coating film, nanotechnology food box, artificial meat/milk, and a synthetic food additive). Every new food technology application was rated according to the respondent's willingness to eat (WTE) it (i.e., acceptance), risk, benefit, and disgust perceptions. Furthermore, food disgust sensitivity was measured using the Food Disgust Scale. Overall, the WTE both gene‐technology applications and meat coated with an edible nanotechnology film were low and disgust responses toward all three applications were high. In full mediation models, food disgust sensitivity predicted the disgust response toward each new food technology application, which in turn influenced WTE them. Effects of disgust responses on the WTE a synthetic food additive were highest for and lowest for the edible nanotechnology coating film compared to the other technologies. Results indicate that direct disgust responses influence acceptance and risk and benefit perceptions of new food technologies. Beyond the discussion of this study, implications for future research and strategies to increase acceptance of new food technologies are discussed.
Asexual women were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure or fun than their sexual counterparts, & asexual men were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure than sexual men
Sexual Fantasy and Masturbation Among Asexual Individuals: An In-Depth Exploration. Morag A. Yule, Lori A. Brotto, Boris B. Gorzalka. Archives of Sexual Behavior, January 2017, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 311–328. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10508-016-0870-8
Abstract: Human asexuality is generally defined as a lack of sexual attraction. We used online questionnaires to investigate reasons for masturbation, and explored and compared the contents of sexual fantasies of asexual individuals (identified using the Asexual Identification Scale) with those of sexual individuals. A total of 351 asexual participants (292 women, 59 men) and 388 sexual participants (221 women, 167 men) participated. Asexual women were significantly less likely to masturbate than sexual women, sexual men, and asexual men. Asexual women were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure or fun than their sexual counterparts, and asexual men were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure than sexual men. Both asexual women and men were significantly more likely than sexual women and men to report that they had never had a sexual fantasy. Of those who have had a sexual fantasy, asexual women and men were significantly more likely to endorse the response “my fantasies do not involve other people” compared to sexual participants, and consistently scored each sexual fantasy on a questionnaire as being less sexually exciting than did sexual participants. When using an open-ended format, asexual participants were more likely to report having fantasies about sexual activities that did not involve themselves, and were less likely to fantasize about topics such as group sex, public sex, and having an affair. Interestingly, there was a large amount of overlap between sexual fantasies of asexual and sexual participants. Notably, both asexual and sexual participants (both men and women) were equally likely to fantasize about topics such as fetishes and BDSM.
h/t: Usman Muhammad
Abstract: Human asexuality is generally defined as a lack of sexual attraction. We used online questionnaires to investigate reasons for masturbation, and explored and compared the contents of sexual fantasies of asexual individuals (identified using the Asexual Identification Scale) with those of sexual individuals. A total of 351 asexual participants (292 women, 59 men) and 388 sexual participants (221 women, 167 men) participated. Asexual women were significantly less likely to masturbate than sexual women, sexual men, and asexual men. Asexual women were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure or fun than their sexual counterparts, and asexual men were less likely to report masturbating for sexual pleasure than sexual men. Both asexual women and men were significantly more likely than sexual women and men to report that they had never had a sexual fantasy. Of those who have had a sexual fantasy, asexual women and men were significantly more likely to endorse the response “my fantasies do not involve other people” compared to sexual participants, and consistently scored each sexual fantasy on a questionnaire as being less sexually exciting than did sexual participants. When using an open-ended format, asexual participants were more likely to report having fantasies about sexual activities that did not involve themselves, and were less likely to fantasize about topics such as group sex, public sex, and having an affair. Interestingly, there was a large amount of overlap between sexual fantasies of asexual and sexual participants. Notably, both asexual and sexual participants (both men and women) were equally likely to fantasize about topics such as fetishes and BDSM.
h/t: Usman Muhammad
People use algorithmic advice more than human advice; appreciate algorithmic advice despite blindness to algorithm’s process; that appreciation holds even as people underweight advice more generally
Algorithm appreciation: People prefer algorithmic to human judgment. Jennifer M.Logg, Julia A. Minson, Don A. Moore. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 151, March 2019, Pages 90-103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.005
Highlights
• We challenge prevailing idea that people prefer human to algorithmic judgment.
• In head-to-head comparisons, people use algorithmic advice more than human advice.
• We compare usage of advice using the continuous weighting of advice (WOA) measure.
• People appreciate algorithmic advice despite blindness to algorithm’s process.
• Algorithm appreciation holds even as people underweight advice more generally.
Abstract: Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.
Highlights
• We challenge prevailing idea that people prefer human to algorithmic judgment.
• In head-to-head comparisons, people use algorithmic advice more than human advice.
• We compare usage of advice using the continuous weighting of advice (WOA) measure.
• People appreciate algorithmic advice despite blindness to algorithm’s process.
• Algorithm appreciation holds even as people underweight advice more generally.
Abstract: Even though computational algorithms often outperform human judgment, received wisdom suggests that people may be skeptical of relying on them (Dawes, 1979). Counter to this notion, results from six experiments show that lay people adhere more to advice when they think it comes from an algorithm than from a person. People showed this effect, what we call algorithm appreciation, when making numeric estimates about a visual stimulus (Experiment 1A) and forecasts about the popularity of songs and romantic attraction (Experiments 1B and 1C). Yet, researchers predicted the opposite result (Experiment 1D). Algorithm appreciation persisted when advice appeared jointly or separately (Experiment 2). However, algorithm appreciation waned when: people chose between an algorithm’s estimate and their own (versus an external advisor’s; Experiment 3) and they had expertise in forecasting (Experiment 4). Paradoxically, experienced professionals, who make forecasts on a regular basis, relied less on algorithmic advice than lay people did, which hurt their accuracy. These results shed light on the important question of when people rely on algorithmic advice over advice from people and have implications for the use of “big data” and algorithmic advice it generates.
Extramarital guys classified in four classes: Loyal, confiding, deceptive, & unfaithful; individuals differed significantly in ways that are consistent with the investment model and attachment theory
Rodriguez, L., DiBello, A., Ćverup, C., & Lin, H. (2018). A Latent Class Analysis Approach to Extradyadic Involvement. Journal of Relationships Research, 9, E7. doi:10.1017/jrr.2018.6
Abstract: Extradyadic involvement — emotional, romantic, or sexual involvement with another person outside of one's romantic relationship — may have serious personal and relational consequences. The current research examines extradyadic involvement in two samples of individuals in relationships and identifies subgroups of people based on their engagement in different types of extradyadic behaviour. To assess involvement in such behaviour, we created a new behavioural inventory intended to broaden the conceptualisation of types of extradyadic behaviours. Subgroups of individuals who engage in these behaviours were extracted using latent class analysis. Study 1 assessed undergraduate students in relationships (N = 339), and results revealed four classes of individuals: loyal, confiding, deceptive, and unfaithful. Follow-up tests demonstrated that these classes of individuals differed significantly in ways that are consistent with the investment model and attachment theory. Study 2 (N = 202) replicated the four-class solution, as well as the group differences in relationship functioning and attachment orientations. Results suggest theoretically consistent typologies of extradyadic behaviour that may be useful in differentiating deceptive behaviour in close relationships in a more precise way.
---
In contrast, a series of eight studies by DeWall and colleagues (2011) found no association between attachment anxiety and inļ¬delity.Inļ¬delitywasoperationalised in a variety of ways (e.g., attitudes toward inļ¬delity, engagement in overt or physical extradyadic behaviours, interest in meeting alternative partners, a validated selfreport wherein participants rated how emotionally and physically intimate they had been with an alternative partner). This ļ¬nal method of operationalising inļ¬delity most closely resembles the way the current study wished to deļ¬ne levels of extradyadic behaviour, but in DeWall et al. (2011), the ratings were summed to create a composite inļ¬delity index after items showed high reliability. Considering the desire of anxiously attached individuals to feel close and connected to important others (e.g., DeWall et al., 2011), measuring a range of emotional extradyadic behaviours, and not just interest in or physical attraction to alternatives, may be more important for linking anxious attachment to inļ¬delity. This may be why a robust set of studies supporting associations between avoidant attachment and inļ¬delity (described below) did not ļ¬nd signiļ¬cant associations between anxious attachment and inļ¬delity.
Research on attachment avoidance paints a clearerpicture, likely driven by avoidant individuals’ fear of intimacy and desire for more independence (Brennan et al., 1998). Avoidant individuals showed greater interest in alternatives and a greater propensity for inļ¬delity — associations that were mediated by lower levels of relationship commitment (DeWall et al., 2011). Additional work has found associations between attachment avoidance and inļ¬delity (Fish et al., 2012) and that avoidant individuals reported the highest number of extradyadic partners compared with both anxious and secure individuals (Allen & Baucom, 2004). Thus, greater attachment avoidance may be associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in behaviours of sexual inļ¬delity, such as kissing, heavy petting and sexual intercourse, particularly in more casual situations (Feeney, Noller, & Patty, 1993; Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998). Moreover, attachment avoidance might also be associated with the greater use of deceptive extradyadic behaviours, as avoidantly attached individualstendtodislikeconļ¬ict(Domingue&Mollen, 2009). Using deception may be a way to avoid potential conļ¬ict situations with partners and maintain emotional and general independence. In contrast, Russell et al.’s (2013) longitudinal studies on newlywed couples found no association between one’s own attachment avoidance and inļ¬delity; however, in one of the two studies, a partner effect of attachment avoidance on inļ¬delity emerged, where one was less likely to cheat if his or her partner was higher in avoidance. These studies, which ran for three to four years, asked both spouses to report on their own perpetrated inļ¬delity or discovery of their partner’s inļ¬delity at each time point, with the deļ¬nition of inļ¬delity being left open to each participant.
Abstract: Extradyadic involvement — emotional, romantic, or sexual involvement with another person outside of one's romantic relationship — may have serious personal and relational consequences. The current research examines extradyadic involvement in two samples of individuals in relationships and identifies subgroups of people based on their engagement in different types of extradyadic behaviour. To assess involvement in such behaviour, we created a new behavioural inventory intended to broaden the conceptualisation of types of extradyadic behaviours. Subgroups of individuals who engage in these behaviours were extracted using latent class analysis. Study 1 assessed undergraduate students in relationships (N = 339), and results revealed four classes of individuals: loyal, confiding, deceptive, and unfaithful. Follow-up tests demonstrated that these classes of individuals differed significantly in ways that are consistent with the investment model and attachment theory. Study 2 (N = 202) replicated the four-class solution, as well as the group differences in relationship functioning and attachment orientations. Results suggest theoretically consistent typologies of extradyadic behaviour that may be useful in differentiating deceptive behaviour in close relationships in a more precise way.
---
In contrast, a series of eight studies by DeWall and colleagues (2011) found no association between attachment anxiety and inļ¬delity.Inļ¬delitywasoperationalised in a variety of ways (e.g., attitudes toward inļ¬delity, engagement in overt or physical extradyadic behaviours, interest in meeting alternative partners, a validated selfreport wherein participants rated how emotionally and physically intimate they had been with an alternative partner). This ļ¬nal method of operationalising inļ¬delity most closely resembles the way the current study wished to deļ¬ne levels of extradyadic behaviour, but in DeWall et al. (2011), the ratings were summed to create a composite inļ¬delity index after items showed high reliability. Considering the desire of anxiously attached individuals to feel close and connected to important others (e.g., DeWall et al., 2011), measuring a range of emotional extradyadic behaviours, and not just interest in or physical attraction to alternatives, may be more important for linking anxious attachment to inļ¬delity. This may be why a robust set of studies supporting associations between avoidant attachment and inļ¬delity (described below) did not ļ¬nd signiļ¬cant associations between anxious attachment and inļ¬delity.
Research on attachment avoidance paints a clearerpicture, likely driven by avoidant individuals’ fear of intimacy and desire for more independence (Brennan et al., 1998). Avoidant individuals showed greater interest in alternatives and a greater propensity for inļ¬delity — associations that were mediated by lower levels of relationship commitment (DeWall et al., 2011). Additional work has found associations between attachment avoidance and inļ¬delity (Fish et al., 2012) and that avoidant individuals reported the highest number of extradyadic partners compared with both anxious and secure individuals (Allen & Baucom, 2004). Thus, greater attachment avoidance may be associated with a higher likelihood of engaging in behaviours of sexual inļ¬delity, such as kissing, heavy petting and sexual intercourse, particularly in more casual situations (Feeney, Noller, & Patty, 1993; Fraley, Davis, & Shaver, 1998). Moreover, attachment avoidance might also be associated with the greater use of deceptive extradyadic behaviours, as avoidantly attached individualstendtodislikeconļ¬ict(Domingue&Mollen, 2009). Using deception may be a way to avoid potential conļ¬ict situations with partners and maintain emotional and general independence. In contrast, Russell et al.’s (2013) longitudinal studies on newlywed couples found no association between one’s own attachment avoidance and inļ¬delity; however, in one of the two studies, a partner effect of attachment avoidance on inļ¬delity emerged, where one was less likely to cheat if his or her partner was higher in avoidance. These studies, which ran for three to four years, asked both spouses to report on their own perpetrated inļ¬delity or discovery of their partner’s inļ¬delity at each time point, with the deļ¬nition of inļ¬delity being left open to each participant.
Men's relationship satisfaction, passionate love, & liking were more driven by touch, whereas those of women's were more driven by hearing; higher differential valuing predicted higher passionate love for both
Miron, A., Jiang, L., Weisensel, K., Patterson, M., & Rizo, F. (2018). Testing a Transactional Model of Romantic Sensory Interactions in Male and Female Romantic Intimates. Journal of Relationships Research 2018, 9, e2. doi:10.1017/jrr.2018.2
Abstract: We propose a transactional model of romantic sensory interactions, according to which male and female intimates adapt to the specific context of their romantic relationships by adopting different sensory domains of interactions with their partners. To test this model, we measured romantic couples’ orientations toward using sensory modalities of romantic relating, and the importance of these modalities (N = 137 couples). Although not all hypotheses were supported, the findings suggest that men's relationship satisfaction, passionate love, and liking were driven by a stronger orientation toward touch, whereas women's relationship satisfaction, passionate love, liking, and commitment were predicted by a stronger preference for hearing. Higher differential valuing of touch and bodily sensations predicted higher passionate love for both men and women, suggesting that these sensory modalities have similar functions for both genders — to maintain sexual desire and passionate love for the partner. These findings underscore the importance of romantic couples’ differential sensory orientations in maintaining satisfying relationships.
Abstract: We propose a transactional model of romantic sensory interactions, according to which male and female intimates adapt to the specific context of their romantic relationships by adopting different sensory domains of interactions with their partners. To test this model, we measured romantic couples’ orientations toward using sensory modalities of romantic relating, and the importance of these modalities (N = 137 couples). Although not all hypotheses were supported, the findings suggest that men's relationship satisfaction, passionate love, and liking were driven by a stronger orientation toward touch, whereas women's relationship satisfaction, passionate love, liking, and commitment were predicted by a stronger preference for hearing. Higher differential valuing of touch and bodily sensations predicted higher passionate love for both men and women, suggesting that these sensory modalities have similar functions for both genders — to maintain sexual desire and passionate love for the partner. These findings underscore the importance of romantic couples’ differential sensory orientations in maintaining satisfying relationships.
Wednesday, February 13, 2019
Ratcliffe: Europe "has green taxes that, at best, can be described as foolish as they are having the opposite effect to how they were intended"
INEOS's Sir Jim Ratcliffe’s Open Letter to the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Feb 2019, https://www.ineos.com/news/ineos-group/letter-to-the-european-commission-president-jean-claude-juncker
Dear President Juncker,
“Are you quite mad?” was the reaction of one well known CEO of a European chemicals company when INEOS publicly announced recently its huge €3 billion petrochemicals expansion in Antwerp in January of this year. The first of its kind for a generation.
Nobody but nobody in my business seriously invests in Europe. They haven’t for a generation. Everyone in my business does however invest in the USA, Middle East or China, or indeed, all three. The USA is in the middle of a $200 billion spending spree on 333 new chemical plants. China has spent that sum annually for many years, constructing its own chemical building blocks.
Europe, not so long ago the world leader in chemicals, has seen its market share in the last decade alone collapse from 30% world market share to 15%. This is an industry that employs over 1 million people in high quality jobs in Europe and five times that in indirect jobs. Worldwide, chemicals is an immense industry, considerably bigger than the automotive sector with revenues approaching $4 trillion.
Europe is no longer competitive. It has the worlds most expensive energy and labour laws that are uninviting for employers. Worst of all, it has green taxes that, at best, can be described as foolish as they are having the opposite effect to how they were intended.
Europe going it alone with green taxes prevents renewal as it frightens away investment into the open arms of the USA and China. It also pushes manufacturing to other parts of the world that care less for the environment. To get a sense of the importance of renewal a 70s car will emit 50 times the pollution of a modern day car. Chemical plants are not so different.
The USA is fully in the process of renewal. Immense building programmes are installing the world’s finest chemical technology which has a fraction of the emissions we saw a generation ago. Old units are being shut down. The USA doesn’t have green taxes but it does insist on the very highest environmental standards before it issues permits for new builds.So let’s step back. Europe remains with an industry built one or two generations ago with old environmental standards and has frightened away new investment for a generation with heavy green taxes. America has welcomed new investment but on condition that it has the highest possible environmental standards. It has created investment, new jobs and improved environmental emissions. Europe has done the opposite on all fronts. I know who looks smarter.
I have an intense interest in preserving the environment. I see wildlife being slaughtered in Africa, forests burning all over the world, fish stocks being decimated and I fully believe that we must arrest global warming.
But Europe ‘going it alone’ with green taxes as its main strategy has got it wrong.
As for the question posed to me at the outset, “Are we mad?”, the answer is no. INEOS is uniquely able to import huge quantities of cheap energy and feedstocks from the USA and we have no ‘market risk’ as all the product that we will produce will be consumed by our own INEOS businesses in Europe.
But don’t expect others to follow. They will be welcomed by the USA and China with a warm smile and a good strategy.
Europe, reminds me somewhat of the Charge of the Light Brigade, immortalised in Tennyson’s wonderful poem, full of valour and good intention but the outcome will not be pretty.
Yours Sincerely
Dear President Juncker,
“Are you quite mad?” was the reaction of one well known CEO of a European chemicals company when INEOS publicly announced recently its huge €3 billion petrochemicals expansion in Antwerp in January of this year. The first of its kind for a generation.
Nobody but nobody in my business seriously invests in Europe. They haven’t for a generation. Everyone in my business does however invest in the USA, Middle East or China, or indeed, all three. The USA is in the middle of a $200 billion spending spree on 333 new chemical plants. China has spent that sum annually for many years, constructing its own chemical building blocks.
Europe, not so long ago the world leader in chemicals, has seen its market share in the last decade alone collapse from 30% world market share to 15%. This is an industry that employs over 1 million people in high quality jobs in Europe and five times that in indirect jobs. Worldwide, chemicals is an immense industry, considerably bigger than the automotive sector with revenues approaching $4 trillion.
Europe is no longer competitive. It has the worlds most expensive energy and labour laws that are uninviting for employers. Worst of all, it has green taxes that, at best, can be described as foolish as they are having the opposite effect to how they were intended.
Europe going it alone with green taxes prevents renewal as it frightens away investment into the open arms of the USA and China. It also pushes manufacturing to other parts of the world that care less for the environment. To get a sense of the importance of renewal a 70s car will emit 50 times the pollution of a modern day car. Chemical plants are not so different.
The USA is fully in the process of renewal. Immense building programmes are installing the world’s finest chemical technology which has a fraction of the emissions we saw a generation ago. Old units are being shut down. The USA doesn’t have green taxes but it does insist on the very highest environmental standards before it issues permits for new builds.So let’s step back. Europe remains with an industry built one or two generations ago with old environmental standards and has frightened away new investment for a generation with heavy green taxes. America has welcomed new investment but on condition that it has the highest possible environmental standards. It has created investment, new jobs and improved environmental emissions. Europe has done the opposite on all fronts. I know who looks smarter.
I have an intense interest in preserving the environment. I see wildlife being slaughtered in Africa, forests burning all over the world, fish stocks being decimated and I fully believe that we must arrest global warming.
But Europe ‘going it alone’ with green taxes as its main strategy has got it wrong.
As for the question posed to me at the outset, “Are we mad?”, the answer is no. INEOS is uniquely able to import huge quantities of cheap energy and feedstocks from the USA and we have no ‘market risk’ as all the product that we will produce will be consumed by our own INEOS businesses in Europe.
But don’t expect others to follow. They will be welcomed by the USA and China with a warm smile and a good strategy.
Europe, reminds me somewhat of the Charge of the Light Brigade, immortalised in Tennyson’s wonderful poem, full of valour and good intention but the outcome will not be pretty.
Yours Sincerely
Violent video game engagement is not associated with adolescents' aggressive behaviour: No evidence for a critical tipping point relating violent game engagement to aggressive behaviour
Violent video game engagement is not associated with adolescents' aggressive behaviour: evidence from a registered report. Andrew K. Przybylski and Netta Weinstein. Royal Society Open Science, Volume 6, Issue 2. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.171474
Abstract: In this study, we investigated the extent to which adolescents who spend time playing violent video games exhibit higher levels of aggressive behaviour when compared with those who do not. A large sample of British adolescent participants (n = 1004) aged 14 and 15 years and an equal number of their carers were interviewed. Young people provided reports of their recent gaming experiences. Further, the violent contents of these games were coded using official EU and US ratings, and carers provided evaluations of their adolescents' aggressive behaviours in the past month. Following a preregistered analysis plan, multiple regression analyses tested the hypothesis that recent violent game play is linearly and positively related to carer assessments of aggressive behaviour. Results did not support this prediction, nor did they support the idea that the relationship between these factors follows a nonlinear parabolic function. There was no evidence for a critical tipping point relating violent game engagement to aggressive behaviour. Sensitivity and exploratory analyses indicated these null effects extended across multiple operationalizations of violent game engagement and when the focus was on another behavioural outcome, namely, prosocial behaviour. The discussion presents an interpretation of this pattern of effects in terms of both the ongoing scientific and policy debates around violent video games, and emerging standards for robust evidence-based policy concerning young people's technology use.
Abstract: In this study, we investigated the extent to which adolescents who spend time playing violent video games exhibit higher levels of aggressive behaviour when compared with those who do not. A large sample of British adolescent participants (n = 1004) aged 14 and 15 years and an equal number of their carers were interviewed. Young people provided reports of their recent gaming experiences. Further, the violent contents of these games were coded using official EU and US ratings, and carers provided evaluations of their adolescents' aggressive behaviours in the past month. Following a preregistered analysis plan, multiple regression analyses tested the hypothesis that recent violent game play is linearly and positively related to carer assessments of aggressive behaviour. Results did not support this prediction, nor did they support the idea that the relationship between these factors follows a nonlinear parabolic function. There was no evidence for a critical tipping point relating violent game engagement to aggressive behaviour. Sensitivity and exploratory analyses indicated these null effects extended across multiple operationalizations of violent game engagement and when the focus was on another behavioural outcome, namely, prosocial behaviour. The discussion presents an interpretation of this pattern of effects in terms of both the ongoing scientific and policy debates around violent video games, and emerging standards for robust evidence-based policy concerning young people's technology use.
Do Americans consider polling results an objective source of information? They view polls as more credible when majority opinion matched their opinion
All the Best Polls Agree with Me: Bias in Evaluations of Political Polling. Gabriel J. Madson. D. Sunshine Hillygus. Political Behavior, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-019-09532-1
Abstract: Do Americans consider polling results an objective source of information? Experts tend to evaluate the credibility of polls based on the survey methods used, vendor track record, and data transparency, but it is unclear if the public does the same. In two different experimental studies—one focusing on candidate evaluations in the 2016 U.S. election and one on a policy issue—we find a significant factor in respondent assessments of polling credibility to be the poll results themselves. Respondents viewed polls as more credible when majority opinion matched their opinion. Moreover, we find evidence of attitude polarization after viewing polling results, suggesting motivated reasoning in the evaluations of political polls. These findings indicate that evaluations of polls are biased by motivated reasoning and suggest that such biases could constrain the possible impact of polls on political decision making.
Keywords: Polling Poll evaluation Public opinion Motivated reasoning Cognitive bias
Abstract: Do Americans consider polling results an objective source of information? Experts tend to evaluate the credibility of polls based on the survey methods used, vendor track record, and data transparency, but it is unclear if the public does the same. In two different experimental studies—one focusing on candidate evaluations in the 2016 U.S. election and one on a policy issue—we find a significant factor in respondent assessments of polling credibility to be the poll results themselves. Respondents viewed polls as more credible when majority opinion matched their opinion. Moreover, we find evidence of attitude polarization after viewing polling results, suggesting motivated reasoning in the evaluations of political polls. These findings indicate that evaluations of polls are biased by motivated reasoning and suggest that such biases could constrain the possible impact of polls on political decision making.
Keywords: Polling Poll evaluation Public opinion Motivated reasoning Cognitive bias
Sex Differences in Human Olfaction: A Meta-Analysis
Sex Differences in Human Olfaction: A Meta-Analysis. Piotr Sorokowski, Maciej Karwowski, MichaÅ Misiak, Michalina Konstancja Marczak, Martyna Dziekan, Thomas Hummel and Agnieszka Sorokowska. Front. Psychol., 13 February 2019. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00242
Although the view that women's olfactory abilities outperform men's is taken for granted, some studies involving large samples suggested that male and female olfactory abilities are actually similar. To address this discrepancy, we conducted a meta-analysis of existing studies on olfaction, targeting possible sex differences. The analyzed sample comprised n = 8 848 (5 065 women and 3 783 men) for olfactory threshold (as measured with the Sniffin Sticks Test; SST), n = 8 067 (4 496 women and 3 571 men) for discrimination (SST), n = 13 670 (7 501 women and 6 169 men) for identification (SST), and a total sample of n = 7 154 (3 866 women and 3 288 men) for works using University of Pennsylvania Smell Identification Test (UPSIT). We conducted separate meta-analyses for each aspect of olfaction: identification, discrimination and threshold. The results of our meta-analysis indicate that women generally outperform men in olfactory abilities. What is more, they do so in every aspect of olfaction analyzed in the current study. However, the effect sizes were weak and ranged between g = 0.08 and g = 0.30. We discuss our findings in the context of factors that potentially shape sex differences in olfaction. Nevertheless, although our findings seem to confirm the “common knowledge” on female olfactory superiority, it needs to be emphasized that the effect sizes we observed were notably small.
Although the view that women's olfactory abilities outperform men's is taken for granted, some studies involving large samples suggested that male and female olfactory abilities are actually similar. To address this discrepancy, we conducted a meta-analysis of existing studies on olfaction, targeting possible sex differences. The analyzed sample comprised n = 8 848 (5 065 women and 3 783 men) for olfactory threshold (as measured with the Sniffin Sticks Test; SST), n = 8 067 (4 496 women and 3 571 men) for discrimination (SST), n = 13 670 (7 501 women and 6 169 men) for identification (SST), and a total sample of n = 7 154 (3 866 women and 3 288 men) for works using University of Pennsylvania Smell Identification Test (UPSIT). We conducted separate meta-analyses for each aspect of olfaction: identification, discrimination and threshold. The results of our meta-analysis indicate that women generally outperform men in olfactory abilities. What is more, they do so in every aspect of olfaction analyzed in the current study. However, the effect sizes were weak and ranged between g = 0.08 and g = 0.30. We discuss our findings in the context of factors that potentially shape sex differences in olfaction. Nevertheless, although our findings seem to confirm the “common knowledge” on female olfactory superiority, it needs to be emphasized that the effect sizes we observed were notably small.
Tuesday, February 12, 2019
High occupational level is associated with poor response to the treatment of depression
High occupational level is associated with poor response to the treatment of depression: A replication study. Laura Mandelli et al. European Neuropsychopharmacology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroneuro.2019.01.107
Abstract
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a leading cause of disability and inability to work. There is evidence that occupational factors may precipitate a MDD episode and interfere with the recovery process. In a previous investigation, we found that those employed in high occupational levels had a worse outcome after treatment for depression (Mandelli et al., 2016). The aim of the present study was to further investigate response to treatments for depression according to occupational status on an independent sample of MDD patients.
Six hundred and forty-seven (647) subjects with a stable working occupation were taken from a larger independent sample of MDD patients evaluated for response and resistance to treatment for depression, after at least one adequate treatment trial. Three broad occupational categories were considered: ‘manager’, ‘white-collar’, ‘blue-collar’ and ‘self-employed’.
Managers had the highest rate of non-response and resistance to treatments. White-collar workers also had high non-response and resistance rates. At the opposite, Blue-collar workers had significantly lower rates of non-response and resistance. Self-employed were in between White- and Blue-collar workers and did not significantly differ from the other occupational categories.
The findings of this replication study substantially support our previous observations. MDD patients employed in high-middle occupations may have a less favorable outcome after standard treatments of depression. Working stressful condition and other psychosocial factors at work should be investigated more closely in relation to treatment outcomes in MDD.
Abstract
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a leading cause of disability and inability to work. There is evidence that occupational factors may precipitate a MDD episode and interfere with the recovery process. In a previous investigation, we found that those employed in high occupational levels had a worse outcome after treatment for depression (Mandelli et al., 2016). The aim of the present study was to further investigate response to treatments for depression according to occupational status on an independent sample of MDD patients.
Six hundred and forty-seven (647) subjects with a stable working occupation were taken from a larger independent sample of MDD patients evaluated for response and resistance to treatment for depression, after at least one adequate treatment trial. Three broad occupational categories were considered: ‘manager’, ‘white-collar’, ‘blue-collar’ and ‘self-employed’.
Managers had the highest rate of non-response and resistance to treatments. White-collar workers also had high non-response and resistance rates. At the opposite, Blue-collar workers had significantly lower rates of non-response and resistance. Self-employed were in between White- and Blue-collar workers and did not significantly differ from the other occupational categories.
The findings of this replication study substantially support our previous observations. MDD patients employed in high-middle occupations may have a less favorable outcome after standard treatments of depression. Working stressful condition and other psychosocial factors at work should be investigated more closely in relation to treatment outcomes in MDD.
Consumers tend to consume too rapidly, growing tired of initially well-liked stimuli such as a favorite snack/an enjoyable video game more quickly than they would if they slowed consumption
Galak, Jeffrey; Kruger, Justin; Loewenstein, George (2018): Too Much of a Good Thing: Insensitivity to Rate of Consumption Leads to Unforeseen Satiation. https://kilthub.cmu.edu/articles/Too_Much_of_a_Good_Thing_Insensitivity_to_Rate_of_Consumption_Leads_to_Unforeseen_Satiation/6708902/1
Abstract: Consumers are often able to choose how often to consume the things they enjoy. The research presented here suggests that consumers tend to consume too rapidly, growing tired of initially well-liked stimuli such as a favorite snack (Experiments 1 and 4) or an enjoyable video game (Experiments 2 and 3) more quickly than they would if they slowed consumption. The results also suggest that this because of an underestimation of the extent to which breaks reset adaptation. The results present a paradox: Participants who chose their own rate of consumption enjoyed the stimulus less than participants who had a slower rate of consumption chosen for them.
Abstract: Consumers are often able to choose how often to consume the things they enjoy. The research presented here suggests that consumers tend to consume too rapidly, growing tired of initially well-liked stimuli such as a favorite snack (Experiments 1 and 4) or an enjoyable video game (Experiments 2 and 3) more quickly than they would if they slowed consumption. The results also suggest that this because of an underestimation of the extent to which breaks reset adaptation. The results present a paradox: Participants who chose their own rate of consumption enjoyed the stimulus less than participants who had a slower rate of consumption chosen for them.
Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo: The returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk; & full repudiation is rare, the median haircut is below 50%
Sovereign Bonds since Waterloo. Josefin Meyer, Carmen M. Reinhart, Christoph TrebeschNBER Working Paper No. 25543, February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25543
Abstract: This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 220,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns averaged 7% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of around 4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and with the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median haircut is below 50%.
Abstract: This paper studies external sovereign bonds as an asset class. We compile a new database of 220,000 monthly prices of foreign-currency government bonds traded in London and New York between 1815 (the Battle of Waterloo) and 2016, covering 91 countries. Our main insight is that, as in equity markets, the returns on external sovereign bonds have been sufficiently high to compensate for risk. Real ex-post returns averaged 7% annually across two centuries, including default episodes, major wars, and global crises. This represents an excess return of around 4% above US or UK government bonds, which is comparable to stocks and outperforms corporate bonds. The observed returns are hard to reconcile with canonical theoretical models and with the degree of credit risk in this market, as measured by historical default and recovery rates. Based on our archive of more than 300 sovereign debt restructurings since 1815, we show that full repudiation is rare; the median haircut is below 50%.
Given the inherent complexity & ambiguity of the political realm, ideological uncertainty undermines political efficacy & interest, motivating individuals to disengage from participating in electoral politics
Ideological uncertainty and investment of the self in politics. Joseph A.Vitriola et al. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 82, May 2019, Pages 85-97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.005
Abstract: Ideological orientation may provide some citizens with an efficient heuristic for guiding their political judgment. Accordingly, one might expect that ideological uncertainty would lead individuals to engage more deeply with the political domain in order to acquire a sufficient level of subjective certainty that the ideological orientation they have adopted is the “right” one. Given the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the political realm, however, we propose that ideological uncertainty should instead undermine political efficacy and interest, thereby motivating individuals to disengage and withdrawal from participating in electoral politics. Using both correlational and experimental methods, we conduct four studies on both convenience and representative samples in the context of two electoral contexts to test this hypothesis. Study 1 (N = 343) and Study 2 (N = 1054) demonstrate that ideological uncertainty covaries with reduced levels of political engagement and participation in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, respectively. Study 3 (N = 170) and Study 4 (N = 798) replicate and extend the results of Study 1 and 2 by experimentally manipulating ideological uncertainty using an original and innovative false-feedback paradigm. We demonstrate the causal effect of ideological uncertainty on political engagement (independent of demographic variables, political knowledge, and ideological extremity and conviction), and find that it is particularly pronounced among individuals who reflect on the meaning of their political judgment and behaviors for their political orientation. Implications for political choice and behavior are considered.
Abstract: Ideological orientation may provide some citizens with an efficient heuristic for guiding their political judgment. Accordingly, one might expect that ideological uncertainty would lead individuals to engage more deeply with the political domain in order to acquire a sufficient level of subjective certainty that the ideological orientation they have adopted is the “right” one. Given the inherent complexity and ambiguity of the political realm, however, we propose that ideological uncertainty should instead undermine political efficacy and interest, thereby motivating individuals to disengage and withdrawal from participating in electoral politics. Using both correlational and experimental methods, we conduct four studies on both convenience and representative samples in the context of two electoral contexts to test this hypothesis. Study 1 (N = 343) and Study 2 (N = 1054) demonstrate that ideological uncertainty covaries with reduced levels of political engagement and participation in the 2012 and 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, respectively. Study 3 (N = 170) and Study 4 (N = 798) replicate and extend the results of Study 1 and 2 by experimentally manipulating ideological uncertainty using an original and innovative false-feedback paradigm. We demonstrate the causal effect of ideological uncertainty on political engagement (independent of demographic variables, political knowledge, and ideological extremity and conviction), and find that it is particularly pronounced among individuals who reflect on the meaning of their political judgment and behaviors for their political orientation. Implications for political choice and behavior are considered.
From 2015... Past research suggests moral behavior is highly inconsistent, which leaves little room for a personological approach to morality; authors reveal a surprisingly large degree of moral consistency
From 2015... A foundation beam for studying morality from a personological point of view: Are individual differences in moral behaviors and thoughts consistent? Peter Meindl et al. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 59, December 2015, Pages 81-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2015.09.005
Highlights
• Past research suggests moral behavior is highly inconsistent.
• This leaves little room for a personological approach to morality.
• We tested the consistency of real world morality via two experience sampling studies.
• Results reveal a surprisingly large degree of moral consistency.
• Personality appears to have the potential to profoundly impact moral life.
Abstract: Morality is a topic of burgeoning scientific interest, and the relevance of personological factors to moral behavior has interdisciplinary implications for the social sciences, public policy, and philosophy. However, relatively little research has investigated the role of personological factors in moral life, perhaps because of lingering skepticism about the robustness of moral traits. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether morality is consistent across many occasions of everyday life, implying that personological factors play an important role in moral behavior. A novel method of assessing moral behaviors was developed and employed in two experience sampling studies (4075 total observations). Results showed that moral behavior is consistent in many different ways, suggesting that personological factors substantially impact moral life.
Highlights
• Past research suggests moral behavior is highly inconsistent.
• This leaves little room for a personological approach to morality.
• We tested the consistency of real world morality via two experience sampling studies.
• Results reveal a surprisingly large degree of moral consistency.
• Personality appears to have the potential to profoundly impact moral life.
Abstract: Morality is a topic of burgeoning scientific interest, and the relevance of personological factors to moral behavior has interdisciplinary implications for the social sciences, public policy, and philosophy. However, relatively little research has investigated the role of personological factors in moral life, perhaps because of lingering skepticism about the robustness of moral traits. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether morality is consistent across many occasions of everyday life, implying that personological factors play an important role in moral behavior. A novel method of assessing moral behaviors was developed and employed in two experience sampling studies (4075 total observations). Results showed that moral behavior is consistent in many different ways, suggesting that personological factors substantially impact moral life.
Why would people vote to ban a product they regularly consume? This question is at the crux of the controversies over a variety of ballot initiatives restricting certain agricultural production practices
An Experiment on the Vote-Buy Gap with Application to Cage-Free Eggs. Andrew Paul, Jayson Lusk. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.02.005
Highlights
• The vote-buy gap can be replicated in the lab.
• Many people vote to ban a product they purchase.
• The behavior is not driven by a sample selection effect.
• Information asymmetry may be one driver of the effect.
Abstract: Why would people vote to ban a product they regularly consume? This question is at the crux of the controversies over a variety of ballot initiatives restricting certain agricultural production practices. This research moves the question to a controlled laboratory setting with real food and real money to explore the underlying causes of the so-called vote-buy gap. Respondents first made a shopping choice between snack options, some of which included eggs from caged hens as an ingredient. After selecting a snack, participants then voted on a proposition to ban snack options that utilized eggs from caged hens. We show that the vote-buy gap can be replicated in the lab: in the control condition, approximately 80% of the individuals who chose snacks with caged eggs when shopping subsequently voted to ban snacks with caged eggs. The finding rules out the suggestion that the vote-buy gap is an illusion or statistical artifact, as it can be re-created in an experimental lab setting at an individual level. A number of experimental treatments were conducted to test hypotheses related to the underlying causes of the vote-buy gap. We found qualified support for the hypothesis that the vote-buy gap is a result of information asymmetries, but little evidence that it results from public good or expressive voting phenomena.
Highlights
• The vote-buy gap can be replicated in the lab.
• Many people vote to ban a product they purchase.
• The behavior is not driven by a sample selection effect.
• Information asymmetry may be one driver of the effect.
Abstract: Why would people vote to ban a product they regularly consume? This question is at the crux of the controversies over a variety of ballot initiatives restricting certain agricultural production practices. This research moves the question to a controlled laboratory setting with real food and real money to explore the underlying causes of the so-called vote-buy gap. Respondents first made a shopping choice between snack options, some of which included eggs from caged hens as an ingredient. After selecting a snack, participants then voted on a proposition to ban snack options that utilized eggs from caged hens. We show that the vote-buy gap can be replicated in the lab: in the control condition, approximately 80% of the individuals who chose snacks with caged eggs when shopping subsequently voted to ban snacks with caged eggs. The finding rules out the suggestion that the vote-buy gap is an illusion or statistical artifact, as it can be re-created in an experimental lab setting at an individual level. A number of experimental treatments were conducted to test hypotheses related to the underlying causes of the vote-buy gap. We found qualified support for the hypothesis that the vote-buy gap is a result of information asymmetries, but little evidence that it results from public good or expressive voting phenomena.
Rolf Degen summarizing: 38% of subjects derived pleasure from purportedly grinding live bugs, some demanded even more than they had been granted
Psychopathy subfactors distinctively predispose to dispositional and state-level of sadistic pleasure.. Jill Lobbestael, Martijn van Teffelen, Roy F. Baumeister. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2019.02.003
Highlights
• Sadistic pleasure has devastating interpersonal and societal consequences.
• The current knowledge on non-sexual, subclinical forms of sadistic pleasure is poor.
• Coldheartedness showed the strongest relationship to sadistic pleasure.
• Increased Coldheartedness related to more pleasure and less guilt after bug grinding.
Abstract
Background and objectives: Sadistic pleasure — the enjoyment of harm-infliction to others — can have devastating interpersonal and societal consequences. The current knowledge on non-sexual, subclinical forms of sadistic pleasure is poor. The present study therefore focussed on the personality correlates of sadistic pleasure and investigated the relationship between the different subcomponents of psychopathy and both dispositional and state-level sadistic pleasure.
Method: N = 120 males drawn from a community sample filled out questionnaires to assess their level of psychopathy and dispositional sadism. Then, participants engaged in a bug-grinder procedure in which they were led to believe that they were killing pill bugs. The positive affect they reported after ostensibly killing the bugs served as measures of sadistic pleasure. The bug-grinding task was repeated a second time after installing either a positive victim attitude combined with giving human names to the bugs, or a negative victim attitude combined with labeling the bugs with numbers.
Results: Although the Self-centred Impulsivity component of psychopathy had some relevance to sadism, it was the Coldheartedness subscale that showed the strongest relationship to sadistic pleasure. Specifically, increased Coldheartedness was uniquely related to more positive affect, along with less guilt after bug grinding.
Limitations: Drawbacks of the study include the unique reliance on a male, community sample, and the potential impact of demand characteristics, including a suggestion that the participant put at least some bugs into the grinder.
Conclusions: Our findings underscore the differential predictive value of psychopathy components for sadistic pleasure. Coldheartedness can be considered especially disturbing because of its unique relationship to harm-infliction of the most irreversible nature (i.e. killing), and gaining pleasure out of it.
Highlights
• Sadistic pleasure has devastating interpersonal and societal consequences.
• The current knowledge on non-sexual, subclinical forms of sadistic pleasure is poor.
• Coldheartedness showed the strongest relationship to sadistic pleasure.
• Increased Coldheartedness related to more pleasure and less guilt after bug grinding.
Abstract
Background and objectives: Sadistic pleasure — the enjoyment of harm-infliction to others — can have devastating interpersonal and societal consequences. The current knowledge on non-sexual, subclinical forms of sadistic pleasure is poor. The present study therefore focussed on the personality correlates of sadistic pleasure and investigated the relationship between the different subcomponents of psychopathy and both dispositional and state-level sadistic pleasure.
Method: N = 120 males drawn from a community sample filled out questionnaires to assess their level of psychopathy and dispositional sadism. Then, participants engaged in a bug-grinder procedure in which they were led to believe that they were killing pill bugs. The positive affect they reported after ostensibly killing the bugs served as measures of sadistic pleasure. The bug-grinding task was repeated a second time after installing either a positive victim attitude combined with giving human names to the bugs, or a negative victim attitude combined with labeling the bugs with numbers.
Results: Although the Self-centred Impulsivity component of psychopathy had some relevance to sadism, it was the Coldheartedness subscale that showed the strongest relationship to sadistic pleasure. Specifically, increased Coldheartedness was uniquely related to more positive affect, along with less guilt after bug grinding.
Limitations: Drawbacks of the study include the unique reliance on a male, community sample, and the potential impact of demand characteristics, including a suggestion that the participant put at least some bugs into the grinder.
Conclusions: Our findings underscore the differential predictive value of psychopathy components for sadistic pleasure. Coldheartedness can be considered especially disturbing because of its unique relationship to harm-infliction of the most irreversible nature (i.e. killing), and gaining pleasure out of it.
Monday, February 11, 2019
Universal Basic Income: Would direct much larger shares of transfers to childless, non-elderly, non-disabled households than existing programs, and much more to middle-income rather than poor households
Universal Basic Income in the US and Advanced Countries. Hilary W. Hoynes, Jesse Rothstein. NBER Working Paper No. 25538, February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25538
Abstract: We discuss the potential role of Universal Basic Incomes (UBIs) in advanced countries. A feature of advanced economies that distinguishes them from developing countries is the existence of well developed, if often incomplete, safety nets. We develop a framework for describing transfer programs, flexible enough to encompass most existing programs as well as UBIs, and use this framework to compare various UBIs to the existing constellation of programs in the United States. A UBI would direct much larger shares of transfers to childless, non-elderly, non-disabled households than existing programs, and much more to middle-income rather than poor households. A UBI large enough to increase transfers to low-income families would be enormously expensive. We review the labor supply literature for evidence on the likely impacts of a UBI. We argue that the ongoing UBI pilot studies will do little to resolve the major outstanding questions.
Abstract: We discuss the potential role of Universal Basic Incomes (UBIs) in advanced countries. A feature of advanced economies that distinguishes them from developing countries is the existence of well developed, if often incomplete, safety nets. We develop a framework for describing transfer programs, flexible enough to encompass most existing programs as well as UBIs, and use this framework to compare various UBIs to the existing constellation of programs in the United States. A UBI would direct much larger shares of transfers to childless, non-elderly, non-disabled households than existing programs, and much more to middle-income rather than poor households. A UBI large enough to increase transfers to low-income families would be enormously expensive. We review the labor supply literature for evidence on the likely impacts of a UBI. We argue that the ongoing UBI pilot studies will do little to resolve the major outstanding questions.
Intergenerational Mobility in Africa: Upward mobility is higher & downward mobility is lower in regions that were more developed at independence (higher urbanization & employment in services & manufacturing)
Intergenerational Mobility in Africa. Alberto Alesina, Sebastian Hohmann, Stelios Michalopoulos, Elias Papaioannou. NBER Working Paper No. 25534. February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25534
We examine intergenerational mobility (IM) in educational attainment in Africa since independence, using census data from 26 countries. First, we map and characterize the geography of IM. There is substantial variation both across and within countries with differences in literacy of the old generation being the strongest correlate of IM. Inertia is stronger for rural, as compared to urban, households and present for both boys and girls. Second, we explore the correlates of mobility across more than 2,800 regions. Colonial investments in the transportation network and missionary activity are associated with upward mobility. IM is also higher in regions close to the coast and national capitals as well as in rugged areas without malaria. Upward mobility is higher and downward mobility is lower in regions that were more developed at independence, with higher urbanization and employment in services and manufacturing. Third, we identify the effects of regions on educational mobility by exploiting within-family variation from children whose families moved during primary school age. While sorting is sizable, there are considerable regional exposure effects.
We examine intergenerational mobility (IM) in educational attainment in Africa since independence, using census data from 26 countries. First, we map and characterize the geography of IM. There is substantial variation both across and within countries with differences in literacy of the old generation being the strongest correlate of IM. Inertia is stronger for rural, as compared to urban, households and present for both boys and girls. Second, we explore the correlates of mobility across more than 2,800 regions. Colonial investments in the transportation network and missionary activity are associated with upward mobility. IM is also higher in regions close to the coast and national capitals as well as in rugged areas without malaria. Upward mobility is higher and downward mobility is lower in regions that were more developed at independence, with higher urbanization and employment in services and manufacturing. Third, we identify the effects of regions on educational mobility by exploiting within-family variation from children whose families moved during primary school age. While sorting is sizable, there are considerable regional exposure effects.
Genetic predisposition for Alzheimer's Disease correlates with, but is not causally related to older individuals’ wealth holdings
Understanding the Correlation between Alzheimer's Disease Polygenic Risk, Wealth, and the Composition of Wealth Holdings. Su H. Shin, Dean R. Lillard, Jay Bhattacharya.
NBER Working Paper No. 25526. February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25526
Abstract: We investigate how the genetic risk of developing Alzheimer's Disease (AD) relates to saving behavior. Using nationally representative data from the 1992-2014 Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we find that genetic predisposition for AD correlates with, but is not causally related to older individuals’ wealth holdings. People with higher Alzheimer’s Disease polygenic risk score (PGS) hold roughly 9 percent more wealth in CDs (hands-off assets) and around 11 percent, 15 percent, and 7 percent less wealth in stocks, IRAs, and other financial assets (hands-on assets) respectively. We explore three hypotheses that could explain these correlations. We hypothesize that people with high risk of AD choose different portfolios because: (i) they know their polygenic risk of developing Alzheimer’s Disease and related dementia, (ii) they have lower cognitive capacity, and (iii) the genome-wide association studies (GWAS) process that generated the Alzheimer’s Disease PGS failed to fully account for the aging process. Our extended model results do not support the first two hypotheses. Consistent with the third hypothesis, the interaction between age and the Alzheimer’s Disease PGS explains the correlation between genetic traits and asset holdings
NBER Working Paper No. 25526. February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25526
Abstract: We investigate how the genetic risk of developing Alzheimer's Disease (AD) relates to saving behavior. Using nationally representative data from the 1992-2014 Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we find that genetic predisposition for AD correlates with, but is not causally related to older individuals’ wealth holdings. People with higher Alzheimer’s Disease polygenic risk score (PGS) hold roughly 9 percent more wealth in CDs (hands-off assets) and around 11 percent, 15 percent, and 7 percent less wealth in stocks, IRAs, and other financial assets (hands-on assets) respectively. We explore three hypotheses that could explain these correlations. We hypothesize that people with high risk of AD choose different portfolios because: (i) they know their polygenic risk of developing Alzheimer’s Disease and related dementia, (ii) they have lower cognitive capacity, and (iii) the genome-wide association studies (GWAS) process that generated the Alzheimer’s Disease PGS failed to fully account for the aging process. Our extended model results do not support the first two hypotheses. Consistent with the third hypothesis, the interaction between age and the Alzheimer’s Disease PGS explains the correlation between genetic traits and asset holdings
Arbitrary clock conventions – by generating large differences in when the sun sets across locations – help determine the geographic distribution of educational attainment levels; greater effect is among the poor
Poor Sleep: Sunset Time and Human Capital Production. Maulik Jagnani. Jan 15 2019. https://www.dropbox.com/s/5ojttz8d9leco4n/jagnani_jmp.pdf
Abstract: This paper provides evidence that arbitrary clock conventions – by generating large differences in when the sun sets across locations – help determine the geographic distribution of educational attainment levels. I show later sunset reduces children’s sleep: when the sun sets later, children go to bed later; by contrast, wake-up times do not respond to solar cues. Sleep-deprived students decrease study effort, consistent with a model where sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of effort. Overall, school-age children exposed to later sunsets attain fewer years of education and are less likely to complete primary and middle school. Later sunsets are also associated with fewer hours of sleep and lower wages among adults. The non-poor adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later; sunset-induced sleep deficits are most pronounced among the poor, especially in periods when households face severe financial constraints.
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I find that later sunset causes school-age children to begin sleep later, but does not affect wake-up times. An hour (approximately two standard deviation) delay in sunset time reduces children’s sleep by 30 minutes. I also show that later sunset reduces students’ time spent on homework or studying, and time spent on formal and informal work by child laborers,while increasing time spent on indoor leisure for all children. This result is consistent with a model where sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of study effort for students and work effort for child laborers.
The second part of the paper examines the consequent lifetime impacts of later sunset on stock indicators of children’s academic outcomes. I use nationally-representative data from the 2015 India Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) to estimate how children’s education outcomes co-vary with annual average sunset time across eastern and western locations within a district. I find that an hour (approximately two standard deviation) delay in annual average sunset time reduces years of education by 0.8 years, and children in geographic locations with later sunset are less likely to complete primary and middle school.
Abstract: This paper provides evidence that arbitrary clock conventions – by generating large differences in when the sun sets across locations – help determine the geographic distribution of educational attainment levels. I show later sunset reduces children’s sleep: when the sun sets later, children go to bed later; by contrast, wake-up times do not respond to solar cues. Sleep-deprived students decrease study effort, consistent with a model where sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of effort. Overall, school-age children exposed to later sunsets attain fewer years of education and are less likely to complete primary and middle school. Later sunsets are also associated with fewer hours of sleep and lower wages among adults. The non-poor adjust their sleep schedules when the sun sets later; sunset-induced sleep deficits are most pronounced among the poor, especially in periods when households face severe financial constraints.
---
I find that later sunset causes school-age children to begin sleep later, but does not affect wake-up times. An hour (approximately two standard deviation) delay in sunset time reduces children’s sleep by 30 minutes. I also show that later sunset reduces students’ time spent on homework or studying, and time spent on formal and informal work by child laborers,while increasing time spent on indoor leisure for all children. This result is consistent with a model where sleep is productivity-enhancing and increases the marginal returns of study effort for students and work effort for child laborers.
The second part of the paper examines the consequent lifetime impacts of later sunset on stock indicators of children’s academic outcomes. I use nationally-representative data from the 2015 India Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) to estimate how children’s education outcomes co-vary with annual average sunset time across eastern and western locations within a district. I find that an hour (approximately two standard deviation) delay in annual average sunset time reduces years of education by 0.8 years, and children in geographic locations with later sunset are less likely to complete primary and middle school.
Strict ID Laws Don't Stop Voters; ID requirements have no effect on fraud either – actual or perceived; overall, efforts to reform voter ID laws may not have much impact on elections
Strict ID Laws Don't Stop Voters: Evidence from a U.S. Nationwide Panel, 2008-2016. Enrico Cantoni, Vincent Pons. NBER Working Paper No. 25522. February 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25522
Abstract: U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.3-billion-observations panel, we find the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications and cannot be attributed to mobilization against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. ID requirements have no effect on fraud either – actual or perceived. Overall, our results suggest that efforts to reform voter ID laws may not have much impact on elections.
Abstract: U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.3-billion-observations panel, we find the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications and cannot be attributed to mobilization against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. ID requirements have no effect on fraud either – actual or perceived. Overall, our results suggest that efforts to reform voter ID laws may not have much impact on elections.
Psychological Explanations of How Gender Relates to Perceptions and Outcomes at Trial: Verdicts tend to be harsher for male than female defendants
Psychological Explanations of How Gender Relates to Perceptions and Outcomes at Trial. Tyler N. Livingston, Peter O. Rerick, Monica K. Miller. Advances in Psychology and Law pp 137-173. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-11042-0_5
Abstract: Although the American legal system does not statutorily permit differential civil and criminal trial outcomes on the basis of gender, empirical observations of the effects of gender on trial outcomes are ample yet mixed. For several decades, legal actors have attempted to diminish the effects of gender in the courtroom through Supreme Court rulings, presidential policies, legislation, and modification of language in legal documents. Social scientific research suggests that implicit and explicit processes likely affect how the gender of legal actors (e.g., defendants, victims) relates to trial outcomes. This chapter first discusses a variety of laws and policies designed to curtail gender bias generally (e.g., in employment settings) and in the trial process specifically. Next, the chapter synthesizes empirical research that demonstrates the relationship between gender and trial process and outcomes. This synthesis of the psychological research includes specific emphasis on the gender of five primary legal actors: victims, defendants, attorneys, experts, and legal decision-makers. Then, the chapter offers psychological mechanisms that explain why the gender of legal actors (e.g., jurors, witnesses) might relate to trial outcomes. We include overarching theoretical psychological explanations for the observed effects of gender using the symbolic interaction framework and the influence of gender roles and stereotypes. Finally, we identify deficits in the existing research on the relationship between gender and the trial process, suggesting topics for future empirical examination.
Abstract: Although the American legal system does not statutorily permit differential civil and criminal trial outcomes on the basis of gender, empirical observations of the effects of gender on trial outcomes are ample yet mixed. For several decades, legal actors have attempted to diminish the effects of gender in the courtroom through Supreme Court rulings, presidential policies, legislation, and modification of language in legal documents. Social scientific research suggests that implicit and explicit processes likely affect how the gender of legal actors (e.g., defendants, victims) relates to trial outcomes. This chapter first discusses a variety of laws and policies designed to curtail gender bias generally (e.g., in employment settings) and in the trial process specifically. Next, the chapter synthesizes empirical research that demonstrates the relationship between gender and trial process and outcomes. This synthesis of the psychological research includes specific emphasis on the gender of five primary legal actors: victims, defendants, attorneys, experts, and legal decision-makers. Then, the chapter offers psychological mechanisms that explain why the gender of legal actors (e.g., jurors, witnesses) might relate to trial outcomes. We include overarching theoretical psychological explanations for the observed effects of gender using the symbolic interaction framework and the influence of gender roles and stereotypes. Finally, we identify deficits in the existing research on the relationship between gender and the trial process, suggesting topics for future empirical examination.
About 40% of adults experienced poor performance in either starting or keeping an intimate relationship; higher emotional intelligence helped, but little
Mating Performance: Exploring Emotional Intelligence, the Dark Triad, Jealousy and Attachment Effects. Menelaos Apostolou et al. Journal of Relationships Research, Volume 10, 019, e1, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-relationships-research/article/mating-performance-exploring-emotional-intelligence-the-dark-triad-jealousy-and-attachment-effects/F5103416EF564E2CB3C83C91BA5CFA6B
Abstract: A considerable proportion of the population in post-industrial societies experiences substantial difficulties in the domain of mating. The current research attempted to estimate the prevalence rate of poor mating performance and to identify some of its predictors. Two independent studies, which employed a total of 1,358 Greek-speaking men and women, found that about 40% of the participants experienced poor performance in either starting or keeping an intimate relationship, or in both areas. Furthermore, emotional intelligence, Dark Triad traits, jealousy, and attachment style were found to be significant predictors of mating performance. In particular, higher emotional intelligence and narcissism were associated with higher performance in mating, while higher psychopathy, jealousy and an avoidant attachment style were associated with lower mating performance.
Abstract: A considerable proportion of the population in post-industrial societies experiences substantial difficulties in the domain of mating. The current research attempted to estimate the prevalence rate of poor mating performance and to identify some of its predictors. Two independent studies, which employed a total of 1,358 Greek-speaking men and women, found that about 40% of the participants experienced poor performance in either starting or keeping an intimate relationship, or in both areas. Furthermore, emotional intelligence, Dark Triad traits, jealousy, and attachment style were found to be significant predictors of mating performance. In particular, higher emotional intelligence and narcissism were associated with higher performance in mating, while higher psychopathy, jealousy and an avoidant attachment style were associated with lower mating performance.
In old age, people from higher classes commit more crimes (tax & insurance fraud, theft at work, &c) than those of lower ones; not by need, but to maintain/expand the status already achieved
Alter(n) und StraffƤlligkeit: Handbuch fĆ¼r Wissenschaft und Praxis. Franziska Kunz, Thomas Gƶrgen. January 2019, DOI: 10.5771/9783845276687-491
And a different world: The Crimes That Old Persons Commit. Oliver J. Keller, Jr., Clyde B. Vedder. The Gerontologist, Volume 8, Issue 1, Part 1, March 01 1968, Pages 43–50, https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/8.1_Part_1.43
Check also Old Age and Crime. David O Moberg. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol 43, issue 3, 1953. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4086&context=jclc
And a different world: The Crimes That Old Persons Commit. Oliver J. Keller, Jr., Clyde B. Vedder. The Gerontologist, Volume 8, Issue 1, Part 1, March 01 1968, Pages 43–50, https://doi.org/10.1093/geront/8.1_Part_1.43
Check also Old Age and Crime. David O Moberg. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol 43, issue 3, 1953. https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4086&context=jclc
Detecting a Decline in Serial Homicide: The past decade had almost half the cases (13%) that existed at the 1980s peak of serial homicide (27%)
Yaksic, Enzo, Clare Allely, Raneesha De Silva, Melissa Smith-Inglis, Daniel Konikoff, Kori Ryan, Dan Gordon, et al. 2019. “Detecting a Decline in Serial Homicide: Have We Banished the Devil from the Details?.” SocArXiv. February 11. doi:10.31235/osf.io/esyvg
Abstract
Objectives: The likelihood that serial murderers are responsible for most unresolved homicides and missing persons was examined by investigating the accounting of the phenomenon in the context of a declining prevalence.
Methods: A mixed methods approach was used, consisting of a review of a sample of unresolved homicides, a comparative analysis of the frequency of known serial homicide series and unresolved serial homicide series, and semi-structured interviews of experts.
Results: The past decade contained almost half the cases (13%) that existed at the 1980s peak of serial homicide (27%). Only 282 (1.3%) strangled females made up the 22,444 unresolved homicides reviewed. Most expert respondents thought it unreasonable that any meaningful proportion of missing persons cases are victims of serial homicide.
Conclusions: Technology, shifts in offending behavior, proactive law enforcement action, and vigilance of society have transformed serial killing and aids in viewing offenders as people impacted by societal shifts and cultural norms. The absence of narrative details inhibited some aspects of the review. An exhaustive list of known unresolved serial homicide series remained elusive as some missing persons are never reported. Future research should incorporate those intending to murder serially, but whose efforts were stalled by arrest, imprisonment, or death.
Abstract
Objectives: The likelihood that serial murderers are responsible for most unresolved homicides and missing persons was examined by investigating the accounting of the phenomenon in the context of a declining prevalence.
Methods: A mixed methods approach was used, consisting of a review of a sample of unresolved homicides, a comparative analysis of the frequency of known serial homicide series and unresolved serial homicide series, and semi-structured interviews of experts.
Results: The past decade contained almost half the cases (13%) that existed at the 1980s peak of serial homicide (27%). Only 282 (1.3%) strangled females made up the 22,444 unresolved homicides reviewed. Most expert respondents thought it unreasonable that any meaningful proportion of missing persons cases are victims of serial homicide.
Conclusions: Technology, shifts in offending behavior, proactive law enforcement action, and vigilance of society have transformed serial killing and aids in viewing offenders as people impacted by societal shifts and cultural norms. The absence of narrative details inhibited some aspects of the review. An exhaustive list of known unresolved serial homicide series remained elusive as some missing persons are never reported. Future research should incorporate those intending to murder serially, but whose efforts were stalled by arrest, imprisonment, or death.
Sunday, February 10, 2019
Conspiracy Beliefs and Personaliy Traits: Agreeableness, openness to experience, & the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs
A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Psychological Research on Conspiracy Beliefs: Field Characteristics, Measurement Instruments, and Associations With Personality Traits. Andreas Goreis, and Martin Voracek. Front. Psychol., February 11 2019. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00205
Abstract: In the last decade, the number of investigations of the beliefs in conspiracy theories has begun to increase in the fields of social, differential, and experimental psychology. A considerable number of variables have been suggested as predictors of conspiracy beliefs, amongst them personality factors such as low agreeableness (as disagreeableness is associated with suspicion and antagonism) and high openness to experience (due to its positive association to seek out unusual and novel ideas). The association between agreeableness, openness to experience and conspiracy beliefs remains unclear in the literature. The present study reviews the literature of psychological studies investigating conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, the association between Big Five personality factors and conspiracy beliefs is analyzed meta-analytically using random-effects models. Ninety-six studies were identified for the systematic review. A comprehensive account of predictors, consequences, operationalization, questionnaires, and most prominent conspiracy theories is presented. For meta-analysis, 74 effect sizes from 13 studies were extracted. The psychological literature on predictors of conspiracy beliefs can be divided in approaches either with a pathological (e.g., paranoia) or socio-political focus (e.g., perceived powerlessness). Generally, there is a lack of theoretical frameworks in this young area of research. Meta-analysis revealed that agreeableness, openness to experience, and the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs if effect sizes are aggregated. Considerable heterogeneity in designs and operationalization characterizes the field. This article provides an overview of instrumentation, study designs, and current state of knowledge in an effort toward advancement and consensus in the study of conspiracy beliefs.
Abstract: In the last decade, the number of investigations of the beliefs in conspiracy theories has begun to increase in the fields of social, differential, and experimental psychology. A considerable number of variables have been suggested as predictors of conspiracy beliefs, amongst them personality factors such as low agreeableness (as disagreeableness is associated with suspicion and antagonism) and high openness to experience (due to its positive association to seek out unusual and novel ideas). The association between agreeableness, openness to experience and conspiracy beliefs remains unclear in the literature. The present study reviews the literature of psychological studies investigating conspiracy beliefs. Additionally, the association between Big Five personality factors and conspiracy beliefs is analyzed meta-analytically using random-effects models. Ninety-six studies were identified for the systematic review. A comprehensive account of predictors, consequences, operationalization, questionnaires, and most prominent conspiracy theories is presented. For meta-analysis, 74 effect sizes from 13 studies were extracted. The psychological literature on predictors of conspiracy beliefs can be divided in approaches either with a pathological (e.g., paranoia) or socio-political focus (e.g., perceived powerlessness). Generally, there is a lack of theoretical frameworks in this young area of research. Meta-analysis revealed that agreeableness, openness to experience, and the remaining Big Five personality factors were not significantly associated with conspiracy beliefs if effect sizes are aggregated. Considerable heterogeneity in designs and operationalization characterizes the field. This article provides an overview of instrumentation, study designs, and current state of knowledge in an effort toward advancement and consensus in the study of conspiracy beliefs.
British colonial rule correlates positively with democracy levels at independence; changes in the international system during the Cold War eliminated the British advantage
British colonialism and democracy: Divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. Alexander Lee, Jack Paine. Journal of Comparative Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2019.02.001
Highlights
• British colonial rule correlates positively with democracy levels at independence.
• British colonial rule is not strongly associated with democracy levels thirty years after independence.
• Britain tailored decolonization policies to individual colonies’ democratic development.
• Changes in the international system during the Cold War eliminated the British advantage.
Abstract: Did British colonial rule promote post-independence democracy? We provide evidence that the relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, but subsequent democratic convergence has largely eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Existing theories expounding superior British culture or alternative colonial institutions cannot account for divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. To explain the time-varying pattern, we analyze European powers’ varying policy approaches to decolonization as well as changes in the international system. Britain more consistently treated competitive democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial democracy levels. However, nascent democracies that lacked deep-rooted societal transformation faced challenges to democratic consolidation because of Cold War superpower competition. Later shifts in the international system toward promoting democracy further contributed to convergence by destabilizing colonially rooted dictatorships.
Highlights
• British colonial rule correlates positively with democracy levels at independence.
• British colonial rule is not strongly associated with democracy levels thirty years after independence.
• Britain tailored decolonization policies to individual colonies’ democratic development.
• Changes in the international system during the Cold War eliminated the British advantage.
Abstract: Did British colonial rule promote post-independence democracy? We provide evidence that the relationship follows a strong temporal pattern. Former British colonies were considerably more democratic than other countries immediately following independence, but subsequent democratic convergence has largely eliminated these differences in the post-Cold War period. Existing theories expounding superior British culture or alternative colonial institutions cannot account for divergent inheritances and diminishing legacies. To explain the time-varying pattern, we analyze European powers’ varying policy approaches to decolonization as well as changes in the international system. Britain more consistently treated competitive democratic elections as a prerequisite for gaining independence, leading to higher initial democracy levels. However, nascent democracies that lacked deep-rooted societal transformation faced challenges to democratic consolidation because of Cold War superpower competition. Later shifts in the international system toward promoting democracy further contributed to convergence by destabilizing colonially rooted dictatorships.
Everyone should feel entitled to more: This privatized approach taken by the US Gov't and employers exacerbates inequalities among workers
The Real Mommy War Is Against the State. Caitlyn Collins. The New York Times. Feb 10, 2019, Page SR7, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/09/opinion/sunday/the-real-mommy-war-is-against-the-state.html
Stop blaming yourselves. Blame the total lack of social supports.
A lawyer and I stepped into a windowless conference room in her office building in Washington, D.C., and she reflexively closed the door. I had forgotten to restock my tissues and would soon regret that. By then, I had been interviewing American mothers about their work-family conflict for several weeks. I asked women I had just met what their bosses said to them when they announced a pregnancy, what their parental leave was like, if they could ever work remotely when a child was sick.
This time, I didn’t get even 20 minutes into the conversation before the woman I was interviewing dissolved in tears.
She recalled scrambling after her son was born to accomplish two tasks: “knitting back together” from her C-section and assembling a patchwork of enough disability leave, vacation and sick days, and unpaid time off, to rest briefly and care for her infant son before returning to work. In the United States — the only country in the industrialized world without federally mandated paid maternity leave — this do-it-yourself approach is often the only option.
“You could have children, but the general expectation was, if you made that choice, you needed to have a plan for someone else to care for them,” the lawyer in Washington told me.
Since 2011, I’ve interviewed 135 middle-class employed mothers in Sweden, Germany, Italy and the United States to understand their work-family conflict. (I spoke to mothers specifically because in wealthy nations, mothers have historically been the focus of work-family policies and they’re still responsible for most housework and child care. They report greater work-family conflict and they use work-family policies more often than men.) And I had a personal interest: I’d watched my own mother struggle to navigate her work and family obligations — a decade-long juggling act that involved occasionally toting my sister and me to boardroom meetings to nap in sleeping bags when babysitters fell ill or schools closed. Years later, it seemed as though the conflict hadn’t eased for many of my peers.
In the United States, almost every woman I interviewed had reached the same conclusion: It was her — or her and her partner’s — responsibility to figure out child care, cobble together a leave of absence (often unpaid), get on a preschool waiting list, find a babysitter, seek advice from friends and acquaintances, and engineer any number of other highly improvised coping techniques. In the lawyer’s case, this meant, among other things, joining a less-prestigious firm that demanded fewer hours and finding the right hands-free breast pump to multitask in her cubicle. The common thread in every conversation was that the parents had to solve their problem themselves, no matter how piecemeal the solutions.
That all makes perfect (if outrageous) sense: The United States has the least generous benefits, the lowest public commitment to caregiving, one of the highest wage gaps between employed men and women, and among the highest maternal and child poverty rates of any Western industrialized nation.
In the course of my interviews, I discovered that American working mothers generally blame themselves for how hard their lives are. They take personal responsibility for problems that European mothers recognize as having external causes. The lesson here isn’t for overwhelmed American parents to look longingly across the Atlantic; it’s to emulate the Swedes, Germans and Italians by harboring the reasonable expectation that the state will help.
All the American mothers I interviewed said they felt enormous guilt and tension between their work and family commitments. So did the Italians. But Italian women tended to blame the government for their problems: “Social benefits? Zero. Less than zero. Nobody helps me,” laughed one woman I met, a single mother working at a hospital in Rome. “Does the government help me? No,” she said, “but they should think about helping you a little bit.”
In Sweden, working mothers I spoke with wanted full gender equality and expected to seamlessly combine paid work and child rearing. Mothers there also anticipated that the government would support them in these endeavors — and that’s exactly what the Swedish state, its work-family policy, and the country’s cultural ideals about work and motherhood do. When Swedish mothers feel stressed, they tend to blame the country’s lofty expectations of what parenting should be. German mothers ascribed their work-family juggling act, with its emphasis on traditional home life, to outdated cultural ideals.
American women who worked for companies that provided flexible schedules and paid maternity leave described themselves as “being very lucky” or “feeling privileged.” This privatized approach taken by the United States government and employers exacerbates inequalities among workers. Some elite employers elect to offer helpful work-family policies, meaning only certain workers — typically highly educated, salaried employees — receive these supports. The employees most in need of support, however — vulnerable hourly-wage workers — are the ones least likely to enjoy any work-family benefits. The highest-income earners in the United States are 3.5 times as likely to have access to paid family leave as those at the bottom of the pay scale.
After three months of interviews with mothers in Sweden, I was heartened to discover that the country in many ways lives up to its image as the place where women come closest to having successful careers and fulfilling family lives. But consider the national policy focus responsible for that lifestyle: Sweden prizes gender equality, universal child care and a “dual earner-carer” model that features women and men sharing breadwinning and child-rearing roles.
Women in Stockholm seemed confused or laughed out loud when I used the term “working mother.” “I don’t think that expression exists in Swedish,” an urban planner and mother of two told me. “It’s not like there’s a ‘nonworking mother,’” she said. “I mean, what else would she do?”
But we can’t simply import social policies and hope they’ll have the same effect in a different context. For instance, American parents tend to marvel at Germany’s comparatively luxurious-sounding three-year parental leave, which was available to new parents for decades. So I was taken aback when many working mothers in Germany told me they despised the policy because of the cultural stigma it heaped on their shoulders to not return to work until they absolutely had to. A teacher who went back to work before the end of the allowable parental leave described people telling her: “You cannot do this. You are selfish, you’re a career whore.”
“Balance” is a term that came up relentlessly in my conversations with women in the United States. But framing work-family conflict as a problem of imbalance is merely an individualized way to justify a nation of mothers engulfed in stress. It fails to recognize how institutions contribute to this anxiety.
The stress that American parents feel is an urgent political issue, so the solution must be political as well. We have a social responsibility to solve work-family conflict. Let’s start with paid parental leave and high-quality, affordable child care as national priorities.
Women — again, on this side of the Atlantic — routinely assume it’s their duty to stitch together time off after childbirth. Those fortunate to qualify for parental-leave benefits — even two months at full pay, or six weeks at partial pay — feel real gratitude for such slim provisions. And in a country where most women (too often the poor and racial-ethnic minorities) receive no paid leave at all, that gratitude makes sense. But being able to work and raise the next generation of taxpayers and employees should never be deemed a matter of mere “luck.”
Everyone should feel entitled to more.
Caitlyn Collins is an assistant professor of sociology at Washington University in St. Louis and the author of “Making Motherhood Work: How Women Manage Careers and Caregiving,” from which this essay is adapted.
Check also The Perpetual Panic of American Parenthood. Pamela Druckerman. TNYT, Oct 13 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/opinion/the-perpetual-panic-of-american-parenthood.html:
"make America great, by making it a bit more like the rest of the world"
Stop blaming yourselves. Blame the total lack of social supports.
A lawyer and I stepped into a windowless conference room in her office building in Washington, D.C., and she reflexively closed the door. I had forgotten to restock my tissues and would soon regret that. By then, I had been interviewing American mothers about their work-family conflict for several weeks. I asked women I had just met what their bosses said to them when they announced a pregnancy, what their parental leave was like, if they could ever work remotely when a child was sick.
This time, I didn’t get even 20 minutes into the conversation before the woman I was interviewing dissolved in tears.
She recalled scrambling after her son was born to accomplish two tasks: “knitting back together” from her C-section and assembling a patchwork of enough disability leave, vacation and sick days, and unpaid time off, to rest briefly and care for her infant son before returning to work. In the United States — the only country in the industrialized world without federally mandated paid maternity leave — this do-it-yourself approach is often the only option.
“You could have children, but the general expectation was, if you made that choice, you needed to have a plan for someone else to care for them,” the lawyer in Washington told me.
Since 2011, I’ve interviewed 135 middle-class employed mothers in Sweden, Germany, Italy and the United States to understand their work-family conflict. (I spoke to mothers specifically because in wealthy nations, mothers have historically been the focus of work-family policies and they’re still responsible for most housework and child care. They report greater work-family conflict and they use work-family policies more often than men.) And I had a personal interest: I’d watched my own mother struggle to navigate her work and family obligations — a decade-long juggling act that involved occasionally toting my sister and me to boardroom meetings to nap in sleeping bags when babysitters fell ill or schools closed. Years later, it seemed as though the conflict hadn’t eased for many of my peers.
In the United States, almost every woman I interviewed had reached the same conclusion: It was her — or her and her partner’s — responsibility to figure out child care, cobble together a leave of absence (often unpaid), get on a preschool waiting list, find a babysitter, seek advice from friends and acquaintances, and engineer any number of other highly improvised coping techniques. In the lawyer’s case, this meant, among other things, joining a less-prestigious firm that demanded fewer hours and finding the right hands-free breast pump to multitask in her cubicle. The common thread in every conversation was that the parents had to solve their problem themselves, no matter how piecemeal the solutions.
That all makes perfect (if outrageous) sense: The United States has the least generous benefits, the lowest public commitment to caregiving, one of the highest wage gaps between employed men and women, and among the highest maternal and child poverty rates of any Western industrialized nation.
In the course of my interviews, I discovered that American working mothers generally blame themselves for how hard their lives are. They take personal responsibility for problems that European mothers recognize as having external causes. The lesson here isn’t for overwhelmed American parents to look longingly across the Atlantic; it’s to emulate the Swedes, Germans and Italians by harboring the reasonable expectation that the state will help.
All the American mothers I interviewed said they felt enormous guilt and tension between their work and family commitments. So did the Italians. But Italian women tended to blame the government for their problems: “Social benefits? Zero. Less than zero. Nobody helps me,” laughed one woman I met, a single mother working at a hospital in Rome. “Does the government help me? No,” she said, “but they should think about helping you a little bit.”
In Sweden, working mothers I spoke with wanted full gender equality and expected to seamlessly combine paid work and child rearing. Mothers there also anticipated that the government would support them in these endeavors — and that’s exactly what the Swedish state, its work-family policy, and the country’s cultural ideals about work and motherhood do. When Swedish mothers feel stressed, they tend to blame the country’s lofty expectations of what parenting should be. German mothers ascribed their work-family juggling act, with its emphasis on traditional home life, to outdated cultural ideals.
American women who worked for companies that provided flexible schedules and paid maternity leave described themselves as “being very lucky” or “feeling privileged.” This privatized approach taken by the United States government and employers exacerbates inequalities among workers. Some elite employers elect to offer helpful work-family policies, meaning only certain workers — typically highly educated, salaried employees — receive these supports. The employees most in need of support, however — vulnerable hourly-wage workers — are the ones least likely to enjoy any work-family benefits. The highest-income earners in the United States are 3.5 times as likely to have access to paid family leave as those at the bottom of the pay scale.
After three months of interviews with mothers in Sweden, I was heartened to discover that the country in many ways lives up to its image as the place where women come closest to having successful careers and fulfilling family lives. But consider the national policy focus responsible for that lifestyle: Sweden prizes gender equality, universal child care and a “dual earner-carer” model that features women and men sharing breadwinning and child-rearing roles.
Women in Stockholm seemed confused or laughed out loud when I used the term “working mother.” “I don’t think that expression exists in Swedish,” an urban planner and mother of two told me. “It’s not like there’s a ‘nonworking mother,’” she said. “I mean, what else would she do?”
But we can’t simply import social policies and hope they’ll have the same effect in a different context. For instance, American parents tend to marvel at Germany’s comparatively luxurious-sounding three-year parental leave, which was available to new parents for decades. So I was taken aback when many working mothers in Germany told me they despised the policy because of the cultural stigma it heaped on their shoulders to not return to work until they absolutely had to. A teacher who went back to work before the end of the allowable parental leave described people telling her: “You cannot do this. You are selfish, you’re a career whore.”
“Balance” is a term that came up relentlessly in my conversations with women in the United States. But framing work-family conflict as a problem of imbalance is merely an individualized way to justify a nation of mothers engulfed in stress. It fails to recognize how institutions contribute to this anxiety.
The stress that American parents feel is an urgent political issue, so the solution must be political as well. We have a social responsibility to solve work-family conflict. Let’s start with paid parental leave and high-quality, affordable child care as national priorities.
Women — again, on this side of the Atlantic — routinely assume it’s their duty to stitch together time off after childbirth. Those fortunate to qualify for parental-leave benefits — even two months at full pay, or six weeks at partial pay — feel real gratitude for such slim provisions. And in a country where most women (too often the poor and racial-ethnic minorities) receive no paid leave at all, that gratitude makes sense. But being able to work and raise the next generation of taxpayers and employees should never be deemed a matter of mere “luck.”
Everyone should feel entitled to more.
Caitlyn Collins is an assistant professor of sociology at Washington University in St. Louis and the author of “Making Motherhood Work: How Women Manage Careers and Caregiving,” from which this essay is adapted.
Check also The Perpetual Panic of American Parenthood. Pamela Druckerman. TNYT, Oct 13 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/opinion/the-perpetual-panic-of-american-parenthood.html:
"make America great, by making it a bit more like the rest of the world"
Why do people love to share their running routes on social media? When people sense their own mate value to be low, or when there is a mating motive, they want to ensure workout posts are noticed
If you work it, flaunt it: Conspicuous displays of exercise efforts increase mate value. Jolien Vandenbroele, Anneleen Van Kerckhove, Maggie Geuens. Journal of Business Research, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.01.030
Abstract: Why do people love to share their running routes on social media? From an evolutionary perspective, the conspicuous display of exercise efforts provides an indicator of health. These displays benefit the sender, given that health establishes a human mate preference. Hence, potential mates attribute higher mate value to individuals posting about workouts because of greater inferred healthiness. In line with this theorizing, activating a mating motive increases online sharing intentions for workouts (vs. activities that require less energy) when people sense their own mate value to be low. Moreover, a mating motive increases senders' desire to ensure workout posts are noticed by attractive potential partners. Along with some boundary conditions of the costly signal, this article details the implications of these findings for theory, public policy, and online community marketers.
Abstract: Why do people love to share their running routes on social media? From an evolutionary perspective, the conspicuous display of exercise efforts provides an indicator of health. These displays benefit the sender, given that health establishes a human mate preference. Hence, potential mates attribute higher mate value to individuals posting about workouts because of greater inferred healthiness. In line with this theorizing, activating a mating motive increases online sharing intentions for workouts (vs. activities that require less energy) when people sense their own mate value to be low. Moreover, a mating motive increases senders' desire to ensure workout posts are noticed by attractive potential partners. Along with some boundary conditions of the costly signal, this article details the implications of these findings for theory, public policy, and online community marketers.
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