More or Less Money? An Experimental Study on Receiving Money. Sigve Tjøtta. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, MAr 26 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.03.007
Highlights
• I run experiments where participants have to choose between receiving more or less money.
• A considerable minority chose to receive less money
• This result holds in different experimental environments
• This result may compromise interpretation of many experiments.
1 Introduction
A surprising result from one experiment is the point of departure for this paper. The participants were asked to choose between receiving more money or less. The experiment followed standard procedures. I used a randomized payment scheme in which only a subset of the participants were paid. It was a double-blinded design in which neither the participants nor the experimenters could identify the choices made by specific participants. To my surprise, a substantial minority, 28.6% of 91 participants, decided to receive less money. Deciding to receive less money in itself is not a surprise as this is common in many standard experiments such as dictator, ultimatum, and public goods games. Choosing less money in these situations may reflect the decision maker’s strategic behavior or concern toward the other subjects. In the dictator game, choosing less money may reflect concern for the recipient. The strength of the dictator game is that it separates the decision maker’s concern for the recipient from strategic considerations toward the recipient. The more or less money choice goes one step further from the dictator game as it removes explicitconsideration of others participants.If participants in experiments prefer receiving less money than more, the interpretation of economic experiments may be compromised. The result can be explained in at least three ways, and all may affect the interpretations of other experiments. First, subjects’ choice to receive less money, may reflectan experimenter demand effect (Hoffman et al. 1994, Zizzo (2010), and Chlaß and Moffat 2017). Second, subjects may have social preferences toward the experimenter, perceiving they are playing a dictator game with the experimenter. Choosing less money leaves more money for the experimenter. This explanation, however, may also be problematic for the interpretation of experiment results whenever subjects fail to maximize their joint payoff. For
4example, rejecting an offer in an ultimatum game or less trust in a trust game results in the subjects passing on money to the experimenter. Choosing non-cooperation in a public good game increases the payoff for oneself, but it also leaving money to the experimenter. Third, the interpretation of economic experiments is often restricted to a reference group of subjects who play against each other (Fehr and Schmidt 1999:821–822,Bolton and Ockenfels 2000:171).In the more or less money choice the reference groupis reduced to the decision maker only. Therefore, choosing less money may suggest that subjects care about how they perceive themselves. If this self-esteem restricts the subjects’ behavior in more or less money decision, it may also influence their behavior in other experiments. For example, dictators giving to an anonymous recipient is often interpreted, as the dictator preferringequality inthepayoff or following a norm for equityand social-esteem (Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, Dreber et al.2013, and Hauge 2016).1However, among those that chose to receive less money in my experiment, a clear majority, 88,5 % of the 26 particpants, choose an even split in the corresponding dictator game. Hence, giving in a dictator game can be explained by self-esteem, not social preference or social-esteem, as usually is done.2As I used a randomized payment another selfish explanation is that subjectsdo magical thinking, they believe that claiming less money instead of more increases their probability of winning(Arad 2014). 1For an interpretation of dictator giving as a social preference for inequality see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk and Fischbacher (2006),and Cappelen et al.(2007). This interpretation is an ongoing discussion in the literature (List 2007, Levitt and List 2007, List 2009, Berg and Gigerenzer 2010, Binmore and Shaked 2010, Fehr and Schmidt 2010, Eckel and Gintis 2010, Wilson 2010, Smith and Wilson 2014, and Kimbrough and Ostroknutov 2015).2As the more or less money choice resembles the dictator game, the result that participants prefer getting less money for more are in line with experimental findings that dictator’s giving depend on context (Dana et.al. (2006), List (2007), and Bardsley (2008)).
5If the experimenter demand effect, social preference toward the experimenter, self-esteem, or magical thinkingare that strong in the more or less money experiment, they may also be strong in other experiments. Therefore, the interpretation of manyexperiments may be compromised. Whether these explanations actually carry over to other experiments is an empirical question. Such investigations are beyond the scope of this paper. The aimof this paper is to investigate whether the result that some participants choose to receive less money instead of more holds in other experimental situationsandwhether it translates tothe general population. I createdexperimental situations thatwouldmake accepting more money seem more appropriate for the subjects. Table 1 presents the overall results and features of the decision situations:(1) The experience of participating in experiments (reported in experiments3 and 4). (2) Strengthening the participants’ entitlement to the money (Experiment 5). (3) According to the social heuristic hypothesis, deliberations before the actual choice of more or less money should tilt the decision in the direction of accepting more money (Rand et al. 2014) (experiments6 and 7).The participants were also asked to explain their choice of more or less money in an open-ended question(experiments 6 and 7). Theseopen-ended experiments were performed inthe Norwegian Citizen Panel, a web-based survey of randomized sample of the Norwegian population aged 18 to 76 years. Finally,I elicitednorms in the situations of receiving more or less money using the elicitation procedures developed by Krupka and Weber (2013)(experiments 8 and 9). The overall result is that a considerable minority of the participants in the experiments chose to receive less money instead of more;see Table 1. In Experiment5 -the only one where the participant could choose to receive incrementallyless money-themajority, 64.5% of 200
6participants,decidedto receive less money. In the norm elicitation experiments, aminority stated that choosingto receive all the moneyis inappropriate. I used a randomized payment scheme in all experiments;in each experiment, a percentage of the participants were randomly drawn to receive money. The prices and frequencies of winning are shown in Table 1. For a subject choosing less money instead of more, the expected forgoing of money ranges from, low 0.43 kroner in Experiment 7, to high, 50 kroner in Experiment 5. These numbers correspond to expected hourly payment of 26 and 3000 kroner, respectively.3Clearly, using randomized payment schemes and very low probabilities of being paid in some of the experiments may raise the question whether the result holds for experiments in which all are paid. Manyexperiments, however, use random payment schemes in which either some subjects are paid, or subjects make multiple decisions and only a fraction of them are paid (Azrieli et al., 2018, Charness et al., 2016). It is also some empirical evidence that higher, less likely nominal payment may be more salient than lower, more certain payment (Charness et al., 2016, p. 142). Furthermore, comparing a randomized payment scheme with a standard payment scheme, there seems to be no difference in the pattern of givingin a standard dictator game and behavior in the ultimatum game (Charness et al., 2016 and Clot et al.2018). However, in experiments where the moral dimension may be more salient, as it may be in the more or less money experiment reported here, with a randomized payment schemethe benefit of signaling social esteem or self-esteemis chosen by certainty while the monetary cost of signaling is paid only in a fraction of the times (Charness etal. 2016: 148). This asymmetry between cost and 3The estimated hourly wage is based on that subjects used on average one minute.
7benefit may cause difference in results between experiments with randomized payment schemes and experiments in which all are paid.4Table 1: Overall results for experiments. EXP.N TypeDescription Payment lotteryfrequency Less money1 91ClassroomMore or Less andDictator, within-subjects design500 kroner4/9128.6%2 151Classroom More or Less and Dictator,between-subjects design500 kroner4/15136.0%3, 4181ClassroomExperiencedvs. Inexperiencedsubjects.More or Less and Dictator,between-subjects design500 kroner4/18130.4%5200Lab, 20 sessionsStrengthen Entitlements.More or Less and Dictator,between-subjects design500 kroner1/1064.5%61,019Web-basedaExplaining, ex post their choices in an open-ended question 1800 kroner1/101922.6%71,861Web-basedaDeliberation, Inexperience vs. Experienced, explaining choices ex post and ex ante 1800 kroner1/186129.2%8120Lab, 4 sessionsNorm elicitation500 kroner12/120 19.0%b940ClassroomNorm elicitation 500 kroner10/157 38.0%bNotes: The payment in all the experiments is conditional on winning in a lottery; the column withthePayment Lottery shows the prices in Norwegian kroner and frequency of winning. a)The Norwegian Citizen Panel, a web-based survey of a cross-section of the Norwegian population aged 18 to 76 years old. See Ivarsflaten et al.(2015). b) Percentage that states that it is ―very socially inappropriate‖ or ―socially inappropriate‖ to keep all the money for themselves. The point of departure forthis paper wasratherunusual as it started with asurprising result.In hindsight, perhapsI should not have been surprised becausein someuniversally experienced 4I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this mechanism. Note that in Experiment 5, in which the expected cost of signaling is highest (50 kroner), as many as 64.5 % chose to receive less money.
8situationsoutside the lab, people selectless instead of more money. For example, customers return to a shop if they discover that the cashier forgot to charge them for anitem. People routinely take found wallets to the lost and found, and they do likewise in field experiments (Stoop 2014). Similar results are reported in the experimental literature. In a meta-study of 72 studies with more than 32,000 subjects across 43 countries using the lying set-up introduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), the subjects forewent, on average, about three-quarters of the gains from lying (Abeler et al.2016:2). Many participants reported non-maximizing payoff numbers more often than their truthful likelihood (Abeler et al.2016:8). The ―No Die‖ treatment in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013), resembled the more or less choice the most: The participants were asked to pick a number between 1 and 6 with the same incentivized payoff as in the roll die treatment. Among the participants (n=34), 15% chose to receive less money instead of more.Arad (2014) reports that a considerable number of participants in pickingbetween lotteries that differ only in theirprizes, selected lotteries with prizes less than the maximum prize.She explains her results with magical thinking. By choosing the lottery with the lowest price participants believe this would increase their chancesof winning. Magical thinking may be an explanation for choosing less money for more as I usedrandomized payment scheme in all experiments. Among those 454 participants that picked less money in experiments 6 and 7, 10.6% explained their choice as magical thinking. The results presented in this paper may be driven by norms common to Norwegians but less common elsewhere. In general, behavior in experiment has been shown to vary across societies (Henrich et al.2010, Herrmann et al.2008), and itmay also do so in the ―more or less
9money‖ experiment. However behavior in standard experiments in Norwegian samples doesnotdeviate radically from behavior in similar experiments from samples in Western countries. Reigstad et al. (2017) comparedpro-social behavior in different games conducted in Norway and the US and found that pro-social behavior is very similar in the two countries, both across individuals and over time. Cappelen et al. (2015) compared Norwegian students’ behavior in dictator game and found that their behavior was not substantially different from thatreported in the meta-study by Engel (2011). Inexperiments 1-5, I also conducted standard dictator games, and the behavior of the dictator does not deviate radically from the results previously reported in the literature.
Wednesday, March 27, 2019
Sexual Problems in Long-Term Heterosexual Relationships: The most common and problematic sexual problems endorsed by both sexes were frequency of sex, sexual initiation, & showing interest
Sutherland SE, Rehman US, Fallis EE. A Descriptive Analysis of Sexual Problems in Long-Term Heterosexual Relationships. J Sex Med 2019;XX:XXX–XXX. Mar 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2019.02.015
Abstract
Background: Although much research has described individual sexual dysfunctions, few studies to date have examined the types of problems that couples consider most significant in their sexual relationships.
Aim: To clarify the types of relational sexual problems that are most common and most severe in the sexual lives of individuals in long-term romantic relationships.
Methods: A community sample of 117 mixed-sex couples completed this in-lab study. Members of each couple separately completed a demographics questionnaire and a measure of their relational sexual problems, the Sexual Problems Questionnaire (SPQ). Descriptive analyses (eg, examination of means, frequency counts) were conducted to determine the most common and severe sexual problems reported by participants. t-Tests were performed to examine gender differences in mean severity ratings for each SPQ item. Qualitative data were examined by conducting a frequency count on the SPQ items that participants reported to be most important in their sexual relationships. Results of all frequency counts were divided by the total sample size and are reported as percentages.
Main Outcome Measures: Participants reported on the severity of their sexual problems using the 25-item SPQ.
Results: Quantitative analyses revealed that the most common and problematic sexual problems endorsed by both sexes were frequency of sex, sexual initiation, and showing interest. A frequency count of participants’ qualitative reports also revealed that frequency of sex (women = 36%; men = 39%), sexual initiation (women = 33%; men = 32%), and showing interest (women and men = 25%) were the most important sexual issues for most individuals.
Clinical Implication: The most pressing relational sexual problems for couples in long-term romantic relationships are consistent between sexes and pertain to the domain of sexual desire.
Strength & Limitations: The current study used an expanded measure of sexual problems, which allowed participants to report on a broad range of issues in their sexual relationships. The direction of such relational sexual problems (eg, desiring more or less sexual frequency) was not explored.
Conclusion: The key problems in sexual relationships center on the theme of sexual desire, and men and women consider these issues to be problematic to a similar extent.
Abstract
Background: Although much research has described individual sexual dysfunctions, few studies to date have examined the types of problems that couples consider most significant in their sexual relationships.
Aim: To clarify the types of relational sexual problems that are most common and most severe in the sexual lives of individuals in long-term romantic relationships.
Methods: A community sample of 117 mixed-sex couples completed this in-lab study. Members of each couple separately completed a demographics questionnaire and a measure of their relational sexual problems, the Sexual Problems Questionnaire (SPQ). Descriptive analyses (eg, examination of means, frequency counts) were conducted to determine the most common and severe sexual problems reported by participants. t-Tests were performed to examine gender differences in mean severity ratings for each SPQ item. Qualitative data were examined by conducting a frequency count on the SPQ items that participants reported to be most important in their sexual relationships. Results of all frequency counts were divided by the total sample size and are reported as percentages.
Main Outcome Measures: Participants reported on the severity of their sexual problems using the 25-item SPQ.
Results: Quantitative analyses revealed that the most common and problematic sexual problems endorsed by both sexes were frequency of sex, sexual initiation, and showing interest. A frequency count of participants’ qualitative reports also revealed that frequency of sex (women = 36%; men = 39%), sexual initiation (women = 33%; men = 32%), and showing interest (women and men = 25%) were the most important sexual issues for most individuals.
Clinical Implication: The most pressing relational sexual problems for couples in long-term romantic relationships are consistent between sexes and pertain to the domain of sexual desire.
Strength & Limitations: The current study used an expanded measure of sexual problems, which allowed participants to report on a broad range of issues in their sexual relationships. The direction of such relational sexual problems (eg, desiring more or less sexual frequency) was not explored.
Conclusion: The key problems in sexual relationships center on the theme of sexual desire, and men and women consider these issues to be problematic to a similar extent.
Tuesday, March 26, 2019
Prisons privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations; rather, has been a consequence of the administrative & legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners
Why Do States Privatize their Prisons? The Unintended Consequences of Inmate Litigation. Anna Gunderson, Job market paper 2019. Feb 2019. www.annagunderson.com/uploads/1/5/3/2/15320172/gunderson2019.pdf
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government.
Appendix: http://www.annagunderson.com/uploads/1/5/3/2/15320172/gunderson2019appendix.pdf
The United States has witnessed privatization of a variety of government functions over the last three decades. Media and politicians often attribute the decision to privatize to ideological commitments to small government and fiscal pressure. These claims are particularly notable in the context of prison privatization, where states and the federal government have employed private companies to operate and manage private correctional facilities. I argue state prison privatization is not a function of simple ideological or economic considerations. Rather, prison privatization has been a (potentially unintended) consequence of the administrative and legal costs associated with litigation brought by prisoners. I assemble an original database of prison privatization in the US and demonstrate that the privatization of prisons is best predicted by the legal pressure on state corrections systems, rather than the ideological orientation of a state government.
Appendix: http://www.annagunderson.com/uploads/1/5/3/2/15320172/gunderson2019appendix.pdf
Automation always reduces the labor share in value added and may reduce labor demand even as it raises productivity; this is counterbalanced by the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage
Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor. Daron Acemoglu, Pascual Restrepo. NBER Working Paper No. 25684, Mar 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25684
Abstract: We present a framework for understanding the effects of automation and other types of technological changes on labor demand, and use it to interpret changes in US employment over the recent past. At the center of our framework is the allocation of tasks to capital and labor—the task content of production. Automation, which enables capital to replace labor in tasks it was previously engaged in, shifts the task content of production against labor because of a displacement effect. As a result, automation always reduces the labor share in value added and may reduce labor demand even as it raises productivity. The effects of automation are counterbalanced by the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage. The introduction of new tasks changes the task content of production in favor of labor because of a reinstatement effect, and always raises the labor share and labor demand. We show how the role of changes in the task content of production—due to automation and new tasks—can be inferred from industry-level data. Our empirical decomposition suggests that the slower growth of employment over the last three decades is accounted for by an acceleration in the displacement effect, especially in manufacturing, a weaker reinstatement effect, and slower growth of productivity than in previous decades.
Abstract: We present a framework for understanding the effects of automation and other types of technological changes on labor demand, and use it to interpret changes in US employment over the recent past. At the center of our framework is the allocation of tasks to capital and labor—the task content of production. Automation, which enables capital to replace labor in tasks it was previously engaged in, shifts the task content of production against labor because of a displacement effect. As a result, automation always reduces the labor share in value added and may reduce labor demand even as it raises productivity. The effects of automation are counterbalanced by the creation of new tasks in which labor has a comparative advantage. The introduction of new tasks changes the task content of production in favor of labor because of a reinstatement effect, and always raises the labor share and labor demand. We show how the role of changes in the task content of production—due to automation and new tasks—can be inferred from industry-level data. Our empirical decomposition suggests that the slower growth of employment over the last three decades is accounted for by an acceleration in the displacement effect, especially in manufacturing, a weaker reinstatement effect, and slower growth of productivity than in previous decades.
Experimentally-Induced Inflammation Predicts Present Focus: Levels of proinflammatory cytokines may play a mechanistic role in the desire for immediately available rewards
Experimentally-Induced Inflammation Predicts Present Focus. Jeffrey Gassen et al. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, February 19 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40750-019-00110-7
Abstract
Objective: Here, we provide an experimental test of the relationship between levels of proinflammatory cytokines and present-focused decision-making.
Methods: We examined whether increases in salivary levels of proinflammatory cytokines (interleukin-1β and interleukin-6) engendered by visually priming immunologically-relevant threats (pathogen threat, physical harm) and opportunities (mating) predicted temporal discounting, a key component of present-focused decision-making.
Results: As hypothesized, results revealed that each experimental manipulation led to a significant rise in both salivary interleukin-1β and interleukin-6. Moreover, post-manipulation levels of each cytokine independently predicted temporal discounting across conditions. These results were not moderated by pre-manipulation levels of either cytokine, nor were they found using the difference between pre- and post-manipulation levels of cytokines as a predictor.
Conclusions: Together, these results suggest that levels of proinflammatory cytokines may play a mechanistic role in the desire for immediately available rewards.
Keywords: Inflammation Life history theory Temporal focus Cytokines Impulsivity
Abstract
Objective: Here, we provide an experimental test of the relationship between levels of proinflammatory cytokines and present-focused decision-making.
Methods: We examined whether increases in salivary levels of proinflammatory cytokines (interleukin-1β and interleukin-6) engendered by visually priming immunologically-relevant threats (pathogen threat, physical harm) and opportunities (mating) predicted temporal discounting, a key component of present-focused decision-making.
Results: As hypothesized, results revealed that each experimental manipulation led to a significant rise in both salivary interleukin-1β and interleukin-6. Moreover, post-manipulation levels of each cytokine independently predicted temporal discounting across conditions. These results were not moderated by pre-manipulation levels of either cytokine, nor were they found using the difference between pre- and post-manipulation levels of cytokines as a predictor.
Conclusions: Together, these results suggest that levels of proinflammatory cytokines may play a mechanistic role in the desire for immediately available rewards.
Keywords: Inflammation Life history theory Temporal focus Cytokines Impulsivity
The results of the study note the ‘queen bee syndrome’, in which powerful women at the top levels of management are not supportive of female managers attempting to climb the ladder
Effects of supervisor gender on promotability of female managers. Hyondong Kim, Tong Hyouk Kang. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, March 20 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/1744-7941.12224
Abstract: In order to more fully understand the importance of same‐gender competition in female supervisor–subordinate working relationships, this study examined the effects of supervisor gender on promotion probabilities for Korean female managers with or without managerial qualifications (e.g. mentoring participation and job ranks). Using a balanced panel sample of 568 Korean female managers in each of four waves (in total, 2272 female managers over 7 years), we conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis to estimate the promotability of female managers. Our findings showed that mentoring participation negatively affects promotion probability for female managers when they have female supervisors (vs male supervisors). Competitive interdependence can be exacerbated between female managers and female supervisors, especially when they are qualified to compete for the same resources and opportunities, which are limited for female managers and supervisors.
Abstract: In order to more fully understand the importance of same‐gender competition in female supervisor–subordinate working relationships, this study examined the effects of supervisor gender on promotion probabilities for Korean female managers with or without managerial qualifications (e.g. mentoring participation and job ranks). Using a balanced panel sample of 568 Korean female managers in each of four waves (in total, 2272 female managers over 7 years), we conducted a multinomial logistic regression analysis to estimate the promotability of female managers. Our findings showed that mentoring participation negatively affects promotion probability for female managers when they have female supervisors (vs male supervisors). Competitive interdependence can be exacerbated between female managers and female supervisors, especially when they are qualified to compete for the same resources and opportunities, which are limited for female managers and supervisors.
Conservatives & Republicans are less likely to report severe forms of sexual harassment & assault, which may explain differences in beliefs on these issues; to be determined if due to reporting biases or differential vulnerabilities
Political Differences in American Reports of Sexual Harassment and Assault. Rupa Jose, James H. Fowler, Anita Raj. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, March 22, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260519835003
Abstract: Political ideology has been linked to beliefs regarding sexual harassment and assault (SH&A). Using data from the January 2018 Stop Street Sexual Harassment online poll (N = 2,009), this study examined associations of political identity and political ideology with self-reported experiences of being the victim of SH&A. SH&A experiences were coded into four mutually exclusive groups: none, non-physically aggressive harassment, physically aggressive harassment, or sexual assault. Sex-stratified logistic regression models assessed associations of interest, adjusting for participant demographics. Among women, more conservative political ideology was negatively associated with reports of sexual assault, odds ratio (OR) = 0.85, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.74, 0.98]. Among males, more conservative political ideology was negatively associated with reports of physically aggressive sexual harassment (OR = 0.85, 95% CI = [0.73, 0.98]), and greater Republican affiliation was negatively associated with reports of sexual assault (OR = 0.82, 95% CI = [0.68, 0.99]). Conservative and Republican women and men are thus less likely to report more severe forms of SH&A, which may explain differences in beliefs on these issues. Research is needed to determine if political differences are due to reporting biases or differential vulnerabilities.
Keywords: political party, political orientation, gender, sexual harassment, sexual violence
Abstract: Political ideology has been linked to beliefs regarding sexual harassment and assault (SH&A). Using data from the January 2018 Stop Street Sexual Harassment online poll (N = 2,009), this study examined associations of political identity and political ideology with self-reported experiences of being the victim of SH&A. SH&A experiences were coded into four mutually exclusive groups: none, non-physically aggressive harassment, physically aggressive harassment, or sexual assault. Sex-stratified logistic regression models assessed associations of interest, adjusting for participant demographics. Among women, more conservative political ideology was negatively associated with reports of sexual assault, odds ratio (OR) = 0.85, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.74, 0.98]. Among males, more conservative political ideology was negatively associated with reports of physically aggressive sexual harassment (OR = 0.85, 95% CI = [0.73, 0.98]), and greater Republican affiliation was negatively associated with reports of sexual assault (OR = 0.82, 95% CI = [0.68, 0.99]). Conservative and Republican women and men are thus less likely to report more severe forms of SH&A, which may explain differences in beliefs on these issues. Research is needed to determine if political differences are due to reporting biases or differential vulnerabilities.
Keywords: political party, political orientation, gender, sexual harassment, sexual violence
Enjoy it again: Repeat experiences are less repetitive than people think
O'Brien, E. (2019). Enjoy it again: Repeat experiences are less repetitive than people think. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 116(4), 519-540. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000147
Abstract: What would it be like to revisit a museum, restaurant, or city you just visited? To rewatch a movie you just watched? To replay a game you just played? People often have opportunities to repeat hedonic activities. Seven studies (total N = 3,356) suggest that such opportunities may be undervalued: Many repeat experiences are not as dull as they appear. Studies 1–3 documented the basic effect. All participants first completed a real-world activity once in full (Study 1, museum exhibit; Study 2, movie; Study 3, video game). Then, some predicted their reactions to repeating it whereas others actually repeated it. Predictors underestimated Experiencers’ enjoyment, even when experienced enjoyment indeed declined. Studies 4 and 5 compared mechanisms: neglecting the pleasurable byproduct of continued exposure to the same content (e.g., fluency) versus neglecting the new content that manifests by virtue of continued exposure (e.g., discovery), both of which might dilute uniform dullness. We found stronger support for the latter: The misprediction was moderated by stimulus complexity (Studies 4 and 5) and mediated by the amount of novelty discovered within the stimulus (Study 5), holding exposure constant. Doing something once may engender an inflated sense that one has now seen “it,” leaving people naïve to the missed nuances remaining to enjoy. Studies 6 and 7 highlighted consequences: Participants incurred costs to avoid repeats so to maximize enjoyment, in specific contexts for which repetition would have been as enjoyable (Study 6) or more enjoyable (Study 7) as the provided novel alternative. These findings warrant a new look at traditional assumptions about hedonic adaptation and novelty preferences. Repetition too could add an unforeseen spice to life.
Abstract: What would it be like to revisit a museum, restaurant, or city you just visited? To rewatch a movie you just watched? To replay a game you just played? People often have opportunities to repeat hedonic activities. Seven studies (total N = 3,356) suggest that such opportunities may be undervalued: Many repeat experiences are not as dull as they appear. Studies 1–3 documented the basic effect. All participants first completed a real-world activity once in full (Study 1, museum exhibit; Study 2, movie; Study 3, video game). Then, some predicted their reactions to repeating it whereas others actually repeated it. Predictors underestimated Experiencers’ enjoyment, even when experienced enjoyment indeed declined. Studies 4 and 5 compared mechanisms: neglecting the pleasurable byproduct of continued exposure to the same content (e.g., fluency) versus neglecting the new content that manifests by virtue of continued exposure (e.g., discovery), both of which might dilute uniform dullness. We found stronger support for the latter: The misprediction was moderated by stimulus complexity (Studies 4 and 5) and mediated by the amount of novelty discovered within the stimulus (Study 5), holding exposure constant. Doing something once may engender an inflated sense that one has now seen “it,” leaving people naïve to the missed nuances remaining to enjoy. Studies 6 and 7 highlighted consequences: Participants incurred costs to avoid repeats so to maximize enjoyment, in specific contexts for which repetition would have been as enjoyable (Study 6) or more enjoyable (Study 7) as the provided novel alternative. These findings warrant a new look at traditional assumptions about hedonic adaptation and novelty preferences. Repetition too could add an unforeseen spice to life.
The Sad State of Happiness in the United States and the Role of Digital Media: Changes in leasure may be a big cause
The Sad State of Happiness in the United States and the Role of Digital Media. Jean M. Twenge. World Happiness Report 2019, Mar 20 2019. http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2019/the-sad-state-of-happiness-in-the-united-states-and-the-role-of-digital-media/
Excerpts. Full text and lots of graphics in the link above.
The years since 2010 have not been good ones for happiness and well-being among Americans. Even as the United States economy improved after the end of the Great Recession in 2009, happiness among adults did not rebound to the higher levels of the 1990s, continuing a slow decline ongoing since at least 2000 in the General Social Survey (Twenge et al., 2016; also see Figure 5.1). Happiness was measured with the question, “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” with the response choices coded 1, 2, or 3.
[...]
Happiness and life satisfaction among United States adolescents, which increased between 1991 and 2011, suddenly declined after 2012 (Twenge et al., 2018a; see Figure 5.2). Thus, by 2016-17, both adults and adolescents were reporting significantly less happiness than they had in the 2000s.
[...]
In addition, numerous indicators of low psychological well-being such as depression, suicidal ideation, and self-harm increased sharply among adolescents since 2010, particularly among girls and young women (Mercado et al., 2017; Mojtabai et al., 2016; Plemmons et al., 2018; Twenge et al., 2018b, 2019a). Depression and self-harm also increased over this time period among children and adolescents in the UK (Morgan et al., 2017; NHS, 2018; Patalay & Gage, 2019). Thus, those in iGen (born after 1995) are markedly lower in psychological well-being than Millennials (born 1980-1994) were at the same age (Twenge, 2017).
This decline in happiness and mental health seems paradoxical. By most accounts, Americans should be happier now than ever. The violent crime rate is low, as is the unemployment rate. Income per capita has steadily grown over the last few decades. This is the Easterlin paradox: As the standard of living improves, so should happiness – but it has not.
Several credible explanations have been posited to explain the decline in happiness among adult Americans, including declines in social capital and social support (Sachs, 2017) and increases in obesity and substance abuse (Sachs, 2018). In this article, I suggest another, complementary explanation: that Americans are less happy due to fundamental shifts in how they spend their leisure time. I focus primarily on adolescents, since more thorough analyses on trends in time use have been performed for this age group. However, future analyses may find that similar trends also appear among adults.
The data on time use among United States adolescents comes primarily from the Monitoring the Future survey of 13- to 18-year-olds (conducted since 1976 for 12th graders and since 1991 for 8th and 10th graders), and the American Freshman Survey of entering university students (conducted since 1966, with time use data since 1987). Both collect large, nationally representative samples every year (for more details, see iGen, Twenge, 2017).
The rise of digital media and the fall of everything else
Over the last decade, the amount of time adolescents spend on screen activities (especially digital media such as gaming, social media, texting, and time online) has steadily increased, accelerating after 2012 after the majority of Americans owned smartphones (Twenge et al., 2019b). By 2017, the average 12th grader (17-18 years old) spent more than 6 hours a day of leisure time on just three digital media activities (internet, social media, and texting; see Figure 5.3). By 2018, 95% of United States adolescents had access to a smartphone, and 45% said they were online “almost constantly” (Anderson & Jiang, 2018).
During the same time period that digital media use increased, adolescents began to spend less time interacting with each other in person, including getting together with friends, socializing, and going to parties. In 2016, iGen college-bound high school seniors spent an hour less a day on face-to-face interaction than GenX adolescents did in the late 1980s (Twenge et al., 2019). Thus, the way adolescents socialize has fundamentally shifted, moving toward online activities and away from face-to-face social interaction.
Other activities that typically do not involve screens have also declined: Adolescents spent less time attending religious services (Twenge et al., 2015), less time reading books and magazines (Twenge et al., 2019b), and (perhaps most crucially) less time sleeping (Twenge et al., 2017). These declines are not due to time spent on homework, which has declined or stayed the same, or time spent on extracurricular activities, which has stayed about the same (Twenge & Park, 2019). The only activity adolescents have spent significantly more time on during the last decade is digital media. As Figure 5.4 demonstrates, the amount of time adolescents spend online increased at the same time that sleep and in-person social interaction declined, in tandem with a decline in general happiness.
[...]
Several studies have found that adolescents and young adults who spend more time on digital media are lower in well-being (e.g., Booker et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2016; Twenge & Campbell, 2018). For example, girls spending 5 or more hours a day on social media are three times more likely to be depressed than non-users (Kelly et al., 2019), and heavy internet users (vs. light users) are twice as likely to be unhappy (Twenge et al., 2018). Sleeping, face-to-face social interaction, and attending religious services – less frequent activities among iGen teens compared to previous generations – are instead linked to more happiness. Overall, activities related to smartphones and digital media are linked to less happiness, and those not involving technology are linked to more happiness. (See Figure 5.5; note that when iGen adolescents listen to music, they usually do so using their phones with earbuds).
Figure 5.5: Correlation between activities and general happiness, 8th and 10th graders, Monitoring the Future, 2013-2016 (controlled for race, gender, SES, and grade level)
[...]
In short, adolescents who spend more time on electronic devices are less happy, and adolescents who spend more time on most other activities are happier. This creates the possibility that iGen adolescents are less happy because their increased time on digital media has displaced time that previous generations spent on non-screen activities linked to happiness. In other words, digital media may have an indirect effect on happiness as it displaces time that could be otherwise spent on more beneficial activities.
Digital media activities may also have a direct impact on well-being. This may occur via upward social comparison, in which people feel that their lives are inferior compared to the glamorous “highlight reels” of others’ social media pages; these feelings are linked to depression (Steers et al., 2014). Cyberbullying, another direct effect of digital media, is also a significant risk factor for depression (Daine et al., 2013; John et al., 2018). When used during face-to-face social interaction, smartphone use appears to interfere with the enjoyment usually derived from such activities; for example, friends randomly assigned to have their phones available while having dinner at a restaurant enjoyed the activity less than those who did not have their phones available (Dwyer et al., 2018), and strangers in a waiting room who had their phones available were significantly less likely to talk to or smile at other people (Kushlev et al., 2019). Thus, higher use of digital media may be linked to lower well-being via direct means or by displacing time that might have been spent on activities more beneficial for well-being.
Correlation and causation
The analyses presented thus far are correlational, so they cannot prove that digital media time causes unhappiness. Third variables may be operating, though most studies control for factors such as gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status. Reverse causation is also possible: Perhaps unhappy people spend more time on digital media rather than digital media causing unhappiness. However, several longitudinal studies following the same individuals over time have found that digital media use predicts lower well-being later (e.g., Allen & Vella, 2018; Booker et al., 2018; Kim, 2017; Kross et al., 2013; Schmiedeberg & Schroder, 2017; Shakya & Christakis, 2017). In addition, two random-assignment experiments found that people who limit or cease social media use improve their well-being. Tromholt (2017) randomly assigned more than 1,000 adults to either continue their normal use of Facebook or give it up for a week; those who gave it up reported more happiness and less depression at the end of the week. Similarly, Hunt et al. (2018) asked college students to limit their social media use to 10 minutes a day per platform and no more than 30 minutes a day total, compared to a control group that continued their normal use. Those who limited their use were less lonely and less depressed over the course of several weeks.
Both the longitudinal and experimental studies suggest that at least some of the causation runs from digital media use to well-being. In addition, the increases in teen depression after smartphones became common after 2011 cannot be explained by low well-being causing digital media use (if so, one would be forced to argue that a rise in teen depression caused greater ownership of smartphones, an argument that defies logic). [...]
In addition, the indirect effects of digital media in displacing time spent on face-to-face social interaction and sleep are not as subject to reverse causation arguments. Deprivation of social interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hartgerink et al., 2015; Lieberman, 2014) and lack of sleep (Zhai et al., 2015) are clear risk factors for unhappiness and low well-being. [...]
Conclusion
Thus, the large amount of time adolescents spend interacting with electronic devices may have direct links to unhappiness and/or may have displaced time once spent on more beneficial activities, leading to declines in happiness. It is not as certain if adults have also begun to spend less time interacting face-to-face and less time sleeping. However, given that adults in recent years spent just as much time with digital media as adolescents do (Common Sense Media, 2016), it seems likely that their time use has shifted as well. Future research should explore this possibility.
[...]
Excerpts. Full text and lots of graphics in the link above.
The years since 2010 have not been good ones for happiness and well-being among Americans. Even as the United States economy improved after the end of the Great Recession in 2009, happiness among adults did not rebound to the higher levels of the 1990s, continuing a slow decline ongoing since at least 2000 in the General Social Survey (Twenge et al., 2016; also see Figure 5.1). Happiness was measured with the question, “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” with the response choices coded 1, 2, or 3.
[...]
Happiness and life satisfaction among United States adolescents, which increased between 1991 and 2011, suddenly declined after 2012 (Twenge et al., 2018a; see Figure 5.2). Thus, by 2016-17, both adults and adolescents were reporting significantly less happiness than they had in the 2000s.
[...]
In addition, numerous indicators of low psychological well-being such as depression, suicidal ideation, and self-harm increased sharply among adolescents since 2010, particularly among girls and young women (Mercado et al., 2017; Mojtabai et al., 2016; Plemmons et al., 2018; Twenge et al., 2018b, 2019a). Depression and self-harm also increased over this time period among children and adolescents in the UK (Morgan et al., 2017; NHS, 2018; Patalay & Gage, 2019). Thus, those in iGen (born after 1995) are markedly lower in psychological well-being than Millennials (born 1980-1994) were at the same age (Twenge, 2017).
This decline in happiness and mental health seems paradoxical. By most accounts, Americans should be happier now than ever. The violent crime rate is low, as is the unemployment rate. Income per capita has steadily grown over the last few decades. This is the Easterlin paradox: As the standard of living improves, so should happiness – but it has not.
Several credible explanations have been posited to explain the decline in happiness among adult Americans, including declines in social capital and social support (Sachs, 2017) and increases in obesity and substance abuse (Sachs, 2018). In this article, I suggest another, complementary explanation: that Americans are less happy due to fundamental shifts in how they spend their leisure time. I focus primarily on adolescents, since more thorough analyses on trends in time use have been performed for this age group. However, future analyses may find that similar trends also appear among adults.
The data on time use among United States adolescents comes primarily from the Monitoring the Future survey of 13- to 18-year-olds (conducted since 1976 for 12th graders and since 1991 for 8th and 10th graders), and the American Freshman Survey of entering university students (conducted since 1966, with time use data since 1987). Both collect large, nationally representative samples every year (for more details, see iGen, Twenge, 2017).
The rise of digital media and the fall of everything else
Over the last decade, the amount of time adolescents spend on screen activities (especially digital media such as gaming, social media, texting, and time online) has steadily increased, accelerating after 2012 after the majority of Americans owned smartphones (Twenge et al., 2019b). By 2017, the average 12th grader (17-18 years old) spent more than 6 hours a day of leisure time on just three digital media activities (internet, social media, and texting; see Figure 5.3). By 2018, 95% of United States adolescents had access to a smartphone, and 45% said they were online “almost constantly” (Anderson & Jiang, 2018).
During the same time period that digital media use increased, adolescents began to spend less time interacting with each other in person, including getting together with friends, socializing, and going to parties. In 2016, iGen college-bound high school seniors spent an hour less a day on face-to-face interaction than GenX adolescents did in the late 1980s (Twenge et al., 2019). Thus, the way adolescents socialize has fundamentally shifted, moving toward online activities and away from face-to-face social interaction.
Other activities that typically do not involve screens have also declined: Adolescents spent less time attending religious services (Twenge et al., 2015), less time reading books and magazines (Twenge et al., 2019b), and (perhaps most crucially) less time sleeping (Twenge et al., 2017). These declines are not due to time spent on homework, which has declined or stayed the same, or time spent on extracurricular activities, which has stayed about the same (Twenge & Park, 2019). The only activity adolescents have spent significantly more time on during the last decade is digital media. As Figure 5.4 demonstrates, the amount of time adolescents spend online increased at the same time that sleep and in-person social interaction declined, in tandem with a decline in general happiness.
[...]
Several studies have found that adolescents and young adults who spend more time on digital media are lower in well-being (e.g., Booker et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2016; Twenge & Campbell, 2018). For example, girls spending 5 or more hours a day on social media are three times more likely to be depressed than non-users (Kelly et al., 2019), and heavy internet users (vs. light users) are twice as likely to be unhappy (Twenge et al., 2018). Sleeping, face-to-face social interaction, and attending religious services – less frequent activities among iGen teens compared to previous generations – are instead linked to more happiness. Overall, activities related to smartphones and digital media are linked to less happiness, and those not involving technology are linked to more happiness. (See Figure 5.5; note that when iGen adolescents listen to music, they usually do so using their phones with earbuds).
Figure 5.5: Correlation between activities and general happiness, 8th and 10th graders, Monitoring the Future, 2013-2016 (controlled for race, gender, SES, and grade level)
[...]
In short, adolescents who spend more time on electronic devices are less happy, and adolescents who spend more time on most other activities are happier. This creates the possibility that iGen adolescents are less happy because their increased time on digital media has displaced time that previous generations spent on non-screen activities linked to happiness. In other words, digital media may have an indirect effect on happiness as it displaces time that could be otherwise spent on more beneficial activities.
Digital media activities may also have a direct impact on well-being. This may occur via upward social comparison, in which people feel that their lives are inferior compared to the glamorous “highlight reels” of others’ social media pages; these feelings are linked to depression (Steers et al., 2014). Cyberbullying, another direct effect of digital media, is also a significant risk factor for depression (Daine et al., 2013; John et al., 2018). When used during face-to-face social interaction, smartphone use appears to interfere with the enjoyment usually derived from such activities; for example, friends randomly assigned to have their phones available while having dinner at a restaurant enjoyed the activity less than those who did not have their phones available (Dwyer et al., 2018), and strangers in a waiting room who had their phones available were significantly less likely to talk to or smile at other people (Kushlev et al., 2019). Thus, higher use of digital media may be linked to lower well-being via direct means or by displacing time that might have been spent on activities more beneficial for well-being.
Correlation and causation
The analyses presented thus far are correlational, so they cannot prove that digital media time causes unhappiness. Third variables may be operating, though most studies control for factors such as gender, race, age, and socioeconomic status. Reverse causation is also possible: Perhaps unhappy people spend more time on digital media rather than digital media causing unhappiness. However, several longitudinal studies following the same individuals over time have found that digital media use predicts lower well-being later (e.g., Allen & Vella, 2018; Booker et al., 2018; Kim, 2017; Kross et al., 2013; Schmiedeberg & Schroder, 2017; Shakya & Christakis, 2017). In addition, two random-assignment experiments found that people who limit or cease social media use improve their well-being. Tromholt (2017) randomly assigned more than 1,000 adults to either continue their normal use of Facebook or give it up for a week; those who gave it up reported more happiness and less depression at the end of the week. Similarly, Hunt et al. (2018) asked college students to limit their social media use to 10 minutes a day per platform and no more than 30 minutes a day total, compared to a control group that continued their normal use. Those who limited their use were less lonely and less depressed over the course of several weeks.
Both the longitudinal and experimental studies suggest that at least some of the causation runs from digital media use to well-being. In addition, the increases in teen depression after smartphones became common after 2011 cannot be explained by low well-being causing digital media use (if so, one would be forced to argue that a rise in teen depression caused greater ownership of smartphones, an argument that defies logic). [...]
In addition, the indirect effects of digital media in displacing time spent on face-to-face social interaction and sleep are not as subject to reverse causation arguments. Deprivation of social interaction (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Hartgerink et al., 2015; Lieberman, 2014) and lack of sleep (Zhai et al., 2015) are clear risk factors for unhappiness and low well-being. [...]
Conclusion
Thus, the large amount of time adolescents spend interacting with electronic devices may have direct links to unhappiness and/or may have displaced time once spent on more beneficial activities, leading to declines in happiness. It is not as certain if adults have also begun to spend less time interacting face-to-face and less time sleeping. However, given that adults in recent years spent just as much time with digital media as adolescents do (Common Sense Media, 2016), it seems likely that their time use has shifted as well. Future research should explore this possibility.
[...]
Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits
Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits. Ola Andersson et al. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, March 18 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12353
Abstract: Decision makers often face incentives to increase risk‐taking on behalf of others through bonus contracts and relative performance contracts. We conduct an experimental study of risk‐taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample and find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns.
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I.Introduction
Risk taking on behalf of others is common in many economic and financial decisions. Examples include fund managers investing their clients’ money and executives acting on behalf of shareholders. To motivate decision makers, the authority to take decisions on behalf of others is often coupledwith powerfulincentives. A basic problem with this practice is that it is typically hard to construct compensation schemes that perfectly align the incentives of decision makers with the interests of stakeholders. Indeed, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, actors in the financial sector have beenroutinely accused of taking increasedrisk on behalf of investors. The introduction of advanced financial products has expanded opportunities to hedge risks, creating further incentives for increased risk-taking. During a public hearing in the US Senate involving the CEO of a leading investment bank, it emerged from internal e-mails that the bank had taken bets against its own clients’ investmentsto hedge their profits. [***I do not agree with this mention here, it seems the authors support the view that these bets were wrong or immoral***.] Moreover, Andrew Haldane, director of the Bank of England, argues that the banking sector’s problems arerooted in the fact that the private risks of financial decision makers are not alignedwith social risks, and that the latter areof a much greatermagnitude (Haldane 2011).In addition, Rajan (2006) suggests that new developments in the finance industry—such as added layers of financial management and new complex financial products—have exacerbated the problem. The argumentsmadein the previous paragraph suggestthat increased risk takingis undesirablefrom a societal point of view. However, theoretically one may argue that increased risk takingis desirable. It is well knownin the finance literature that incentive schemes may be used to increase risk takingbeyond what is motivated by the decision makers risk preferences (Shavell 1979). The argument made is usually that the owners of capital are well diversified and thereby interested in maximizing dividends payout (risk neutrality). The decision makers, on the other hand, are not well diversified and if risk aversethey may take sub-optimal decisions if the reimbursement scheme does not compensate for the difference in risk exposure and risk preferences. Such compensation may come from incentive schemes thatinduce a positive risk shift (e.g., by introducing competition or bonus schemes as in this paper).An alternative motivation is that owners of capital are risk averse, and aware of it, but would like their decisions to reflect dividend maximization. In particular, from a normative stance they agree that risk-neutral decisions are optimal, but when facing actual decisions, they cannot refrain frommaking decisions that depart from this principle. It may then be preferred to delegate to a decision maker whois, for example,less emotionally attached. Inboth cases, the increased risk takingis then optimal from the capital owner’s and society’s perspective and should be encouraged. In this paper, we do not directly address whether increased risk taking on behalf of others is welfare enhancing or not, wesimplycompare the level of risk taken for others under different incentive schemes. As a point of comparison, we estimate risk taking on behalf of others in a situation without distortive(orcorrective) incentives. Hence, when we refer to increased risk taking, we mean risk taking above thelevel decision makers takeon behalf of others in such a neutral situation. Since we find that the level of risk taking on behalf of others without distorting incentives is indistinguishable to the level of risk that individuals take when making decisions on their ownbehalf, it is natural to view departures from this level as detrimental to the principal. However, it should be stressedthat in line with the discussion above, we cannot rule out the existence of emotional and cognitive constraints that impede decision makers to act in accordance withtheir owninterest. That is, a higher level of risk taking could be desirable although decision makers do not choose this for themselves. From previous literature, we know that competitive incentives increase risk taking for individuals working in the finance industry (Kirchler et al. 2018) and students (Dijk et al. 2016). Outstanding questions are whether such behaviour is present in the general population and whether it extends to situations where the decision has consequences for other people. The aim of this paper isto study such incentive schemes, with hedging opportunities or misaligned incentive contract, in a controlled environment using a large sample of people fromall walks of life. In particular, we let decision makers takedecisions on behalf of two other individuals under bonus and competitive incentives, which may distort risk takingas well as open up for hedging opportunities depending on the dividend correlation. A potential counterbalancing force to increasedrisk takingmay bethat decision makers feel responsible to broader groups or have altruistic preferences, i.e., they intrinsically care about the outcome they generate on behalf of others(Andreoni and Miller 2002). Indeed, if such a concern is sufficiently strong, it may operate as a natural moderator of extrinsic incentives to take on more risk. Determining the strength of these forces is an empirical question, made especially difficultbecause it is likely that behavioral responses to misaligned incentives differ between individuals. Understanding this heterogeneity is important because sometimes we can choose upon whom to bestow the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of others, and we can select people according to their characteristics. To study this, we employ several measures of personality traits, both survey-based and behavioural measures. Our focus here is on risk-taking behaviour when there are monetary conflicts of interest between the decision maker and investors (henceforth called receivers). In our experiment, decision makers take risky decisions on behalf of two receivers, whose payoffs may be negatively or positively correlated. When the payoffs of the receivers are perfectly negatively
correlated, the decision makers can exploit the correlation to increase their ownpayoff without increasing their ownrisk exposure. On the contrary, when payoffs are perfectly positively correlated, such risk-free gains are not possible. We allow decision makers to take decisions under both regimes. For decision makers, we incorporate two types of incentive structures common in the financial sector. First, we consider a bonus-like incentive scheme where the decision maker’s compensation is proportional to the total payoffs of the two receivers. Within our experimental setup, we show theoretically that such bonus schemescreate material incentives for increased risk-taking if the receivers’ returns are negatively correlated. Second, we study winner-take-all competition between decision makers who are matchedin pairs. The decision maker who generates the higher total payoff on behalf of her receivers earns aperformance fee as a percentage of the total payoff to the receivers, while the otherdecision makerearns nothing. Competitive incentives are commonplace in financial marketsand create option-like convex compensationschemes(Chevalier and Ellison 1997).We show theoretically that such compensation schemes create material incentives for increased risk taking, independent of the correlation structure of the receivers’ returns. The intuitionis that increasing the risk exposure increases the chance of outperforming peers, and this mechanism trumps any concerns for individual risk-taking by the decision maker. We believe the research reported here is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of such incentives on risk-taking on behalf of others on a large scale using a random sample of the general population. Our experimental study yields two main findings. First, ordinary people respond to powerful incentives to take risks. In particular, in line with our hypotheses, we find that bonus schemes trigger increased risk-taking on behalf of others only when receivers’ returns are negatively correlated. Hence, a bonus scheme with well-aligned risk profiles between decision makers and receivers does not distort risk-taking in our setting. Competition, on the other
hand, triggers increased risk-taking irrespective of the correlation structure of receivers’ returns. For the receivers, competition between the decision makers thereby always leads to higher risk exposure. Overall, we find that individual incentives dominate oversocial concerns in the settings studied here. However, we also findconsiderable heterogeneity in how people respond to such financial incentives. We have access to a large and heterogeneous sample along with a wealth of measures from earlier surveys and experiments. This unique data enables us to identify and investigate who chooses to expose others to risk. We find that measures of personality related topro-social orientation are associatedwithrisk-taking on behalf of others. Indeed, individuals with more pro-social orientations expose receivers to significantly lessrisk. It has been popular to decry decision makers in the financial industry as “financial psychopaths” (see, e.g., DeCovny, 2012).We are not in a position to judge whether this is an accurate description, but our observations, based on a fairly representative sample of the general populationcoupled with individual personality measures, allow us to conclude that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly depends on “financial psychopaths” to flourish. Ordinary people tend to do it when the incentives of decision makers and receivers are not aligned. The general lesson is that policymakersshould become more circumspect in designing incentives and institutionsbecause they impact the risks that are takenon behalf of others. Scientific evidence on the characteristics of individuals working in the financial sector is scant. Concerning risk preferences, Haigh and List (2005) find that professional traders exhibit behaviour consistent with myopic loss aversion to a greater extent than students. In a small sample (n= 21) of traders, Durand et al. (2008) find that average Big 5 scores among traders are not significantly different from the population averages. Along similar lines, using
a small sample of day traders,Loet al.(2005) were unable to relate trader performance to personality traits. Oberlechner (2004) investigates which personal characteristics are perceived as important for being successful as a foreign exchange trader. However, the characteristics emphasized are not directly comparable with the Big 5 inventorythat we use to measure personality traits. The closest match to agreeableness and extraversion (which we find to be important in Table 3) is probably social skills. Interestingly, social skills were considered the least important of the 23 delineated skills.Sjöberg and Engelberg (2009) compare financial economics students with a sample from the Swedish population. They find that compared to the overall population financial economics students are less altruistic (as measured by interest in peace and the environment) and less risk averse.
Abstract: Decision makers often face incentives to increase risk‐taking on behalf of others through bonus contracts and relative performance contracts. We conduct an experimental study of risk‐taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample and find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but is diminished by social concerns.
---
I.Introduction
Risk taking on behalf of others is common in many economic and financial decisions. Examples include fund managers investing their clients’ money and executives acting on behalf of shareholders. To motivate decision makers, the authority to take decisions on behalf of others is often coupledwith powerfulincentives. A basic problem with this practice is that it is typically hard to construct compensation schemes that perfectly align the incentives of decision makers with the interests of stakeholders. Indeed, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, actors in the financial sector have beenroutinely accused of taking increasedrisk on behalf of investors. The introduction of advanced financial products has expanded opportunities to hedge risks, creating further incentives for increased risk-taking. During a public hearing in the US Senate involving the CEO of a leading investment bank, it emerged from internal e-mails that the bank had taken bets against its own clients’ investmentsto hedge their profits. [***I do not agree with this mention here, it seems the authors support the view that these bets were wrong or immoral***.] Moreover, Andrew Haldane, director of the Bank of England, argues that the banking sector’s problems arerooted in the fact that the private risks of financial decision makers are not alignedwith social risks, and that the latter areof a much greatermagnitude (Haldane 2011).In addition, Rajan (2006) suggests that new developments in the finance industry—such as added layers of financial management and new complex financial products—have exacerbated the problem. The argumentsmadein the previous paragraph suggestthat increased risk takingis undesirablefrom a societal point of view. However, theoretically one may argue that increased risk takingis desirable. It is well knownin the finance literature that incentive schemes may be used to increase risk takingbeyond what is motivated by the decision makers risk preferences (Shavell 1979). The argument made is usually that the owners of capital are well diversified and thereby interested in maximizing dividends payout (risk neutrality). The decision makers, on the other hand, are not well diversified and if risk aversethey may take sub-optimal decisions if the reimbursement scheme does not compensate for the difference in risk exposure and risk preferences. Such compensation may come from incentive schemes thatinduce a positive risk shift (e.g., by introducing competition or bonus schemes as in this paper).An alternative motivation is that owners of capital are risk averse, and aware of it, but would like their decisions to reflect dividend maximization. In particular, from a normative stance they agree that risk-neutral decisions are optimal, but when facing actual decisions, they cannot refrain frommaking decisions that depart from this principle. It may then be preferred to delegate to a decision maker whois, for example,less emotionally attached. Inboth cases, the increased risk takingis then optimal from the capital owner’s and society’s perspective and should be encouraged. In this paper, we do not directly address whether increased risk taking on behalf of others is welfare enhancing or not, wesimplycompare the level of risk taken for others under different incentive schemes. As a point of comparison, we estimate risk taking on behalf of others in a situation without distortive(orcorrective) incentives. Hence, when we refer to increased risk taking, we mean risk taking above thelevel decision makers takeon behalf of others in such a neutral situation. Since we find that the level of risk taking on behalf of others without distorting incentives is indistinguishable to the level of risk that individuals take when making decisions on their ownbehalf, it is natural to view departures from this level as detrimental to the principal. However, it should be stressedthat in line with the discussion above, we cannot rule out the existence of emotional and cognitive constraints that impede decision makers to act in accordance withtheir owninterest. That is, a higher level of risk taking could be desirable although decision makers do not choose this for themselves. From previous literature, we know that competitive incentives increase risk taking for individuals working in the finance industry (Kirchler et al. 2018) and students (Dijk et al. 2016). Outstanding questions are whether such behaviour is present in the general population and whether it extends to situations where the decision has consequences for other people. The aim of this paper isto study such incentive schemes, with hedging opportunities or misaligned incentive contract, in a controlled environment using a large sample of people fromall walks of life. In particular, we let decision makers takedecisions on behalf of two other individuals under bonus and competitive incentives, which may distort risk takingas well as open up for hedging opportunities depending on the dividend correlation. A potential counterbalancing force to increasedrisk takingmay bethat decision makers feel responsible to broader groups or have altruistic preferences, i.e., they intrinsically care about the outcome they generate on behalf of others(Andreoni and Miller 2002). Indeed, if such a concern is sufficiently strong, it may operate as a natural moderator of extrinsic incentives to take on more risk. Determining the strength of these forces is an empirical question, made especially difficultbecause it is likely that behavioral responses to misaligned incentives differ between individuals. Understanding this heterogeneity is important because sometimes we can choose upon whom to bestow the responsibility of making decisions on behalf of others, and we can select people according to their characteristics. To study this, we employ several measures of personality traits, both survey-based and behavioural measures. Our focus here is on risk-taking behaviour when there are monetary conflicts of interest between the decision maker and investors (henceforth called receivers). In our experiment, decision makers take risky decisions on behalf of two receivers, whose payoffs may be negatively or positively correlated. When the payoffs of the receivers are perfectly negatively
correlated, the decision makers can exploit the correlation to increase their ownpayoff without increasing their ownrisk exposure. On the contrary, when payoffs are perfectly positively correlated, such risk-free gains are not possible. We allow decision makers to take decisions under both regimes. For decision makers, we incorporate two types of incentive structures common in the financial sector. First, we consider a bonus-like incentive scheme where the decision maker’s compensation is proportional to the total payoffs of the two receivers. Within our experimental setup, we show theoretically that such bonus schemescreate material incentives for increased risk-taking if the receivers’ returns are negatively correlated. Second, we study winner-take-all competition between decision makers who are matchedin pairs. The decision maker who generates the higher total payoff on behalf of her receivers earns aperformance fee as a percentage of the total payoff to the receivers, while the otherdecision makerearns nothing. Competitive incentives are commonplace in financial marketsand create option-like convex compensationschemes(Chevalier and Ellison 1997).We show theoretically that such compensation schemes create material incentives for increased risk taking, independent of the correlation structure of the receivers’ returns. The intuitionis that increasing the risk exposure increases the chance of outperforming peers, and this mechanism trumps any concerns for individual risk-taking by the decision maker. We believe the research reported here is the first to experimentally investigate the effects of such incentives on risk-taking on behalf of others on a large scale using a random sample of the general population. Our experimental study yields two main findings. First, ordinary people respond to powerful incentives to take risks. In particular, in line with our hypotheses, we find that bonus schemes trigger increased risk-taking on behalf of others only when receivers’ returns are negatively correlated. Hence, a bonus scheme with well-aligned risk profiles between decision makers and receivers does not distort risk-taking in our setting. Competition, on the other
hand, triggers increased risk-taking irrespective of the correlation structure of receivers’ returns. For the receivers, competition between the decision makers thereby always leads to higher risk exposure. Overall, we find that individual incentives dominate oversocial concerns in the settings studied here. However, we also findconsiderable heterogeneity in how people respond to such financial incentives. We have access to a large and heterogeneous sample along with a wealth of measures from earlier surveys and experiments. This unique data enables us to identify and investigate who chooses to expose others to risk. We find that measures of personality related topro-social orientation are associatedwithrisk-taking on behalf of others. Indeed, individuals with more pro-social orientations expose receivers to significantly lessrisk. It has been popular to decry decision makers in the financial industry as “financial psychopaths” (see, e.g., DeCovny, 2012).We are not in a position to judge whether this is an accurate description, but our observations, based on a fairly representative sample of the general populationcoupled with individual personality measures, allow us to conclude that lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly depends on “financial psychopaths” to flourish. Ordinary people tend to do it when the incentives of decision makers and receivers are not aligned. The general lesson is that policymakersshould become more circumspect in designing incentives and institutionsbecause they impact the risks that are takenon behalf of others. Scientific evidence on the characteristics of individuals working in the financial sector is scant. Concerning risk preferences, Haigh and List (2005) find that professional traders exhibit behaviour consistent with myopic loss aversion to a greater extent than students. In a small sample (n= 21) of traders, Durand et al. (2008) find that average Big 5 scores among traders are not significantly different from the population averages. Along similar lines, using
a small sample of day traders,Loet al.(2005) were unable to relate trader performance to personality traits. Oberlechner (2004) investigates which personal characteristics are perceived as important for being successful as a foreign exchange trader. However, the characteristics emphasized are not directly comparable with the Big 5 inventorythat we use to measure personality traits. The closest match to agreeableness and extraversion (which we find to be important in Table 3) is probably social skills. Interestingly, social skills were considered the least important of the 23 delineated skills.Sjöberg and Engelberg (2009) compare financial economics students with a sample from the Swedish population. They find that compared to the overall population financial economics students are less altruistic (as measured by interest in peace and the environment) and less risk averse.
Sexual Selection, Agonistic Signaling: Presence of beard increased the speed & accuracy with which participants recognized displays of anger but not happiness; & increased the rated prosociality of happy faces
Sexual Selection, Agonistic Signaling, and the Effect of Beards on Recognition of Men’s Anger Displays. Belinda M. Craig, Nicole L. Nelson, Barnaby J. W. Dixson. Psychological Science, March 25, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619834876
Abstract: The beard is arguably one of the most obvious signals of masculinity in humans. Almost 150 years ago, Darwin suggested that beards evolved to communicate formidability to other males, but no studies have investigated whether beards enhance recognition of threatening expressions, such as anger. We found that the presence of a beard increased the speed and accuracy with which participants recognized displays of anger but not happiness (Experiment 1, N = 219). This effect was not due to negative evaluations shared by beardedness and anger or to negative stereotypes associated with beardedness, as beards did not facilitate recognition of another negative expression, sadness (Experiment 2, N = 90), and beards increased the rated prosociality of happy faces in addition to the rated masculinity and aggressiveness of angry faces (Experiment 3, N = 445). A computer-based emotion classifier reproduced the influence of beards on emotion recognition (Experiment 4). The results suggest that beards may alter perceived facial structure, facilitating rapid judgments of anger in ways that conform to evolutionary theory.
Keywords: facial hair, emotion recognition, face processing, intrasexual selection, open data
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Is this perceived intuitively by soldiers? Many more soldiers than civilians wear a beard in countries like the US, where for decades the overwhelming majority of men didn't sport one.
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Excerpts: Agonistic interactions between males during competition over resources, status, and mating opportunities occur across the mammalian class and have shaped the evolution of weaponry and threat displays (Darwin, 1871; Emlen, 2008; Kokko, Jennions, & Brooks, 2006). In humans, these displays are manifest in a variety of bodily and facial dimorphisms, of which beardedness is one of the most visually salient (B. J. Dixson & Vasey, 2012; B. J. W. Dixson, Lee, Sherlock, & Talamas, 2017). Beards provide an accurate indication of male sexual maturity, and bearded faces are rated as more masculine, dominant, and aggressive than clean-shaven faces (B. J. Dixson & Brooks, 2013; Muscarella & Cunningham, 1996; Neave & Shields, 2008). These effects stem from the fact that beards grow around the jaw and mouth, and thus emphasize jaw size and masculine facial structure (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; B. J. W. Dixson, Sulikowski, Gouda-Vossos, Rantala, & Brooks, 2016; Sherlock, Tegg, Sulikowski, & Dixson, 2017). Beardedness has a greater influence on ratings of masculinity and dominance than does craniofacial shape or jaw size (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; Sherlock et al., 2017).The enhancing effects of facial hair on judgments of men’s facial masculinity, dominance, and aggressiveness by framing components of masculine facial shape have been measured using stimuli depicting neutral facial expressions. However, faces carry multiple sources of social information, including emotional facial expres-sions that can convey internal states and intentions. Facial expressions such as displays of anger can be enacted in agonistic interactions to signal interpersonal threat (Blair, 2003; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001; Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; Tay, 2015). It has been hypothesized that beardedness facilitates recognition of threatening displays, including displays of anger, by enhancing masculine facial features related to dominance (particu-larly jaw size; Blanchard, 2009; Goodhart, 1960; Guthrie, 1970), but to date, there have been no behavioral studies detailing whether beards influence recognition of angry expressions.Although the influence of facial hair on recognition of expressions of anger has not been directly tested, previous findings suggest that it is plausible that beards facilitate the recognition of anger. Previous research has demonstrated that people are faster to recognize anger when it is displayed on male faces than when it is displayed on female faces (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007). This influence of masculinity on recognition of anger has been partly attributed to overlap between structural cues of anger and masculinity. It has been suggested that angry facial expressions emphasize masculine facial structures, such as the prom-inence of the jaw (Becker et al., 2007; Hess, Adams, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009). Facial hair grows around the areas involved in express-ing a range of emotions, including anger, and also enhances masculine craniofacial structure and the prominence of the jaw (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; Sherlock et al., 2017). These observations suggest that the pres-ence of a beard may facilitate recognition of angry expressions.To test whether beards amplify displays of anger, we presented participants with photographs of standard-ized expressions of anger and happiness posed by the same men when bearded and clean-shaven. Participants categorized the emotion displayed in each face, and we examined how facial hair affected their speed and accuracy. If participants were faster to recognize anger but not happiness on bearded than on clean-shaven faces, this would indicate that beardedness facilitates recognition of a threatening emotional expression spe-cifically and not emotional expressions more generally. After we found such a specific effect, we explored pos-sible underlying mechanisms in two behavioral experi-ments and a final experiment with a computer-based emotion classifier.
Abstract: The beard is arguably one of the most obvious signals of masculinity in humans. Almost 150 years ago, Darwin suggested that beards evolved to communicate formidability to other males, but no studies have investigated whether beards enhance recognition of threatening expressions, such as anger. We found that the presence of a beard increased the speed and accuracy with which participants recognized displays of anger but not happiness (Experiment 1, N = 219). This effect was not due to negative evaluations shared by beardedness and anger or to negative stereotypes associated with beardedness, as beards did not facilitate recognition of another negative expression, sadness (Experiment 2, N = 90), and beards increased the rated prosociality of happy faces in addition to the rated masculinity and aggressiveness of angry faces (Experiment 3, N = 445). A computer-based emotion classifier reproduced the influence of beards on emotion recognition (Experiment 4). The results suggest that beards may alter perceived facial structure, facilitating rapid judgments of anger in ways that conform to evolutionary theory.
Keywords: facial hair, emotion recognition, face processing, intrasexual selection, open data
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Is this perceived intuitively by soldiers? Many more soldiers than civilians wear a beard in countries like the US, where for decades the overwhelming majority of men didn't sport one.
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Excerpts: Agonistic interactions between males during competition over resources, status, and mating opportunities occur across the mammalian class and have shaped the evolution of weaponry and threat displays (Darwin, 1871; Emlen, 2008; Kokko, Jennions, & Brooks, 2006). In humans, these displays are manifest in a variety of bodily and facial dimorphisms, of which beardedness is one of the most visually salient (B. J. Dixson & Vasey, 2012; B. J. W. Dixson, Lee, Sherlock, & Talamas, 2017). Beards provide an accurate indication of male sexual maturity, and bearded faces are rated as more masculine, dominant, and aggressive than clean-shaven faces (B. J. Dixson & Brooks, 2013; Muscarella & Cunningham, 1996; Neave & Shields, 2008). These effects stem from the fact that beards grow around the jaw and mouth, and thus emphasize jaw size and masculine facial structure (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; B. J. W. Dixson, Sulikowski, Gouda-Vossos, Rantala, & Brooks, 2016; Sherlock, Tegg, Sulikowski, & Dixson, 2017). Beardedness has a greater influence on ratings of masculinity and dominance than does craniofacial shape or jaw size (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; Sherlock et al., 2017).The enhancing effects of facial hair on judgments of men’s facial masculinity, dominance, and aggressiveness by framing components of masculine facial shape have been measured using stimuli depicting neutral facial expressions. However, faces carry multiple sources of social information, including emotional facial expres-sions that can convey internal states and intentions. Facial expressions such as displays of anger can be enacted in agonistic interactions to signal interpersonal threat (Blair, 2003; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001; Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; Tay, 2015). It has been hypothesized that beardedness facilitates recognition of threatening displays, including displays of anger, by enhancing masculine facial features related to dominance (particu-larly jaw size; Blanchard, 2009; Goodhart, 1960; Guthrie, 1970), but to date, there have been no behavioral studies detailing whether beards influence recognition of angry expressions.Although the influence of facial hair on recognition of expressions of anger has not been directly tested, previous findings suggest that it is plausible that beards facilitate the recognition of anger. Previous research has demonstrated that people are faster to recognize anger when it is displayed on male faces than when it is displayed on female faces (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2007). This influence of masculinity on recognition of anger has been partly attributed to overlap between structural cues of anger and masculinity. It has been suggested that angry facial expressions emphasize masculine facial structures, such as the prom-inence of the jaw (Becker et al., 2007; Hess, Adams, Grammer, & Kleck, 2009; Sacco & Hugenberg, 2009). Facial hair grows around the areas involved in express-ing a range of emotions, including anger, and also enhances masculine craniofacial structure and the prominence of the jaw (B. J. W. Dixson et al., 2017; Sherlock et al., 2017). These observations suggest that the pres-ence of a beard may facilitate recognition of angry expressions.To test whether beards amplify displays of anger, we presented participants with photographs of standard-ized expressions of anger and happiness posed by the same men when bearded and clean-shaven. Participants categorized the emotion displayed in each face, and we examined how facial hair affected their speed and accuracy. If participants were faster to recognize anger but not happiness on bearded than on clean-shaven faces, this would indicate that beardedness facilitates recognition of a threatening emotional expression spe-cifically and not emotional expressions more generally. After we found such a specific effect, we explored pos-sible underlying mechanisms in two behavioral experi-ments and a final experiment with a computer-based emotion classifier.
Monday, March 25, 2019
Is the Putative Mirror Neuron System Associated with Empathy? Only weakly... Too much hype, as we already knew
Bekkali, Soukayna, George J. Youssef, Peter H. Donaldson, Natalia Albein-Urios, Christian Hyde, and Peter G. Enticott. 2019. “Is the Putative Mirror Neuron System Associated with Empathy? A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis.” PsyArXiv. March 20. doi:10.31234/osf.io/6bu4p
Abstract: Theoretical perspectives suggest that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is an important neurobiological contributor to empathy, but empirical support is mixed. Here, we adopt a summary model for empathy, consisting of motor, emotional, and cognitive components of empathy. This review provides an overview of existing empirical studies investigating the relationship between putative MNS activity and empathy in healthy populations. 52 studies were identified that investigated the association between the MNS and at least one domain of empathy, representing data from 1044 participants. Our results suggests that emotional and cognitive empathy are moderately correlated with MNS activity, while motor empathy showed no relationship. Results varied across techniques used to acquire MNS activity (TMS, EEG, and fMRI). Overall, results provide some evidence for a relationship between the MNS and empathy. Our findings also highlight methodological variability in study design as an important factor in understanding this relationship. We discuss limitations regarding these methodological variations and important implications for clinical and community translations, as well as suggestions for future research.
Vulgarization: There Is Only Weak Evidence That Mirror Neurons Underlie Human Empathy – New Review And Meta-Analysis. Christian Jarrett. The British Psychological Society Research Digest, March 25, 2019. https://digest.bps.org.uk/2019/03/25/there-is-only-weak-evidence-that-mirror-neurons-underlie-human-empathy-new-review-and-meta-analysis/
Abstract: Theoretical perspectives suggest that the mirror neuron system (MNS) is an important neurobiological contributor to empathy, but empirical support is mixed. Here, we adopt a summary model for empathy, consisting of motor, emotional, and cognitive components of empathy. This review provides an overview of existing empirical studies investigating the relationship between putative MNS activity and empathy in healthy populations. 52 studies were identified that investigated the association between the MNS and at least one domain of empathy, representing data from 1044 participants. Our results suggests that emotional and cognitive empathy are moderately correlated with MNS activity, while motor empathy showed no relationship. Results varied across techniques used to acquire MNS activity (TMS, EEG, and fMRI). Overall, results provide some evidence for a relationship between the MNS and empathy. Our findings also highlight methodological variability in study design as an important factor in understanding this relationship. We discuss limitations regarding these methodological variations and important implications for clinical and community translations, as well as suggestions for future research.
Vulgarization: There Is Only Weak Evidence That Mirror Neurons Underlie Human Empathy – New Review And Meta-Analysis. Christian Jarrett. The British Psychological Society Research Digest, March 25, 2019. https://digest.bps.org.uk/2019/03/25/there-is-only-weak-evidence-that-mirror-neurons-underlie-human-empathy-new-review-and-meta-analysis/
People have a tendency to ‘shoot the messenger,’ deeming innocent bearers of bad news unlikeable; it is unique to the (innocent) messenger, & not mere bystanders; & distinct from merely receiving information that one disagrees with
John, Leslie, Hayley Blunden, and Heidi Liu. "Shooting the Messenger." Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (forthcoming). https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=55611
Abstract: Eleven experiments provide evidence that people have a tendency to ‘shoot the messenger,’ deeming innocent bearers of bad news unlikeable. In a pre-registered lab experiment, participants rated messengers who delivered bad news from a random drawing asrelatively unlikeable (Study 1). A second set of studies points to the specificity of the effect: Study 2A shows that it is unique to the (innocent) messenger, and not mere bystanders. Study 2B shows that it is distinct from merely receiving information that one disagrees with. We suggest that people’s tendency to deem bearers of bad news as unlikeable stems in part from their desire to make sense of chance processes. Consistent with this account, receiving bad news activates the desire to sense-make (Study 3A), and in turn, activating this desire enhances the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news (Study 3B). Next, stemming from the idea that unexpected outcomesheighten the desire to sense-make, Study 4 shows that when bad news is unexpected, messenger dislike is pronounced. Finally, consistent with the notion that people fulfill the desire to sense-make by attributing agency to entities adjacent to chance events, messenger dislike is correlated with the belief that the messenger had malevolent motives (Studies 5A, 5B, & 5C). Studies 6A & 6B go further, manipulating messenger motives independently from news valence to suggest its causal role in our process account: the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news is mitigated when recipients are made aware of the benevolence of the messenger’s motives.
Keywords:judgment,communication, sense-making, attribution, disclosure
Abstract: Eleven experiments provide evidence that people have a tendency to ‘shoot the messenger,’ deeming innocent bearers of bad news unlikeable. In a pre-registered lab experiment, participants rated messengers who delivered bad news from a random drawing asrelatively unlikeable (Study 1). A second set of studies points to the specificity of the effect: Study 2A shows that it is unique to the (innocent) messenger, and not mere bystanders. Study 2B shows that it is distinct from merely receiving information that one disagrees with. We suggest that people’s tendency to deem bearers of bad news as unlikeable stems in part from their desire to make sense of chance processes. Consistent with this account, receiving bad news activates the desire to sense-make (Study 3A), and in turn, activating this desire enhances the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news (Study 3B). Next, stemming from the idea that unexpected outcomesheighten the desire to sense-make, Study 4 shows that when bad news is unexpected, messenger dislike is pronounced. Finally, consistent with the notion that people fulfill the desire to sense-make by attributing agency to entities adjacent to chance events, messenger dislike is correlated with the belief that the messenger had malevolent motives (Studies 5A, 5B, & 5C). Studies 6A & 6B go further, manipulating messenger motives independently from news valence to suggest its causal role in our process account: the tendency to dislike bearers of bad news is mitigated when recipients are made aware of the benevolence of the messenger’s motives.
Keywords:judgment,communication, sense-making, attribution, disclosure
Surprisingly many highly educated individuals are prone to attribute a stage magician's feats to genuine psychic powers, despite knowing of trickery
From 2018: Magic Performances – When Explained in Psychic Terms by University Students. Lise Lesaffre, Gustav Kuhn, Ahmad Abu-Akel, Déborah Rochat and Christine Mohr. Front. Psychol., Nov 6 2018. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02129
Abstract: Paranormal beliefs (PBs), such as the belief in the soul, or in extrasensory perception, are common in the general population. While there is information regarding what these beliefs correlate with (e.g., cognitive biases, personality styles), there is little information regarding the causal direction between these beliefs and their correlates. To investigate the formation of beliefs, we use an experimental design, in which PBs and belief-associated cognitive biases are assessed before and after a central event: a magic performance (see also Mohr et al., 2018). In the current paper, we report a series of studies investigating the “paranormal potential” of magic performances (Study 1, N = 49; Study 2, N = 89; Study 3, N = 123). We investigated (i) which magic performances resulted in paranormal explanations, and (ii) whether PBs and a belief-associated cognitive bias (i.e., repetition avoidance) became enhanced after the performance. Repetition avoidance was assessed using a random number generation task. After the performance, participants rated to what extent the magic performance could be explained in psychic (paranormal), conjuring, or religious terms. We found that conjuring explanations were negatively associated with religious and psychic explanations, whereas religious and psychic explanations were positively associated. Enhanced repetition avoidance correlated with higher PBs ahead of the performance. We also observed a significant increase in psychic explanations and a drop in conjuring explanations when performances involved powerful psychic routines (e.g., the performer contacted the dead). While the experimentally induced enhancement of psychic explanations is promising, future studies should account for potential variables that might explain absent framing and before–after effects (e.g., emotion, attention). Such effects are essential to understand the formation and manipulation of belief.
Vulgarization: Experiencing the impossible https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-32/april-2019/experiencing-impossible
Abstract: Paranormal beliefs (PBs), such as the belief in the soul, or in extrasensory perception, are common in the general population. While there is information regarding what these beliefs correlate with (e.g., cognitive biases, personality styles), there is little information regarding the causal direction between these beliefs and their correlates. To investigate the formation of beliefs, we use an experimental design, in which PBs and belief-associated cognitive biases are assessed before and after a central event: a magic performance (see also Mohr et al., 2018). In the current paper, we report a series of studies investigating the “paranormal potential” of magic performances (Study 1, N = 49; Study 2, N = 89; Study 3, N = 123). We investigated (i) which magic performances resulted in paranormal explanations, and (ii) whether PBs and a belief-associated cognitive bias (i.e., repetition avoidance) became enhanced after the performance. Repetition avoidance was assessed using a random number generation task. After the performance, participants rated to what extent the magic performance could be explained in psychic (paranormal), conjuring, or religious terms. We found that conjuring explanations were negatively associated with religious and psychic explanations, whereas religious and psychic explanations were positively associated. Enhanced repetition avoidance correlated with higher PBs ahead of the performance. We also observed a significant increase in psychic explanations and a drop in conjuring explanations when performances involved powerful psychic routines (e.g., the performer contacted the dead). While the experimentally induced enhancement of psychic explanations is promising, future studies should account for potential variables that might explain absent framing and before–after effects (e.g., emotion, attention). Such effects are essential to understand the formation and manipulation of belief.
Vulgarization: Experiencing the impossible https://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/volume-32/april-2019/experiencing-impossible
54–58% of Google search snippets amplify partisanship, likely because of journalistic practice: It uses terms & quotes from partisan politicians in the introduction (& meta-data) of articles (favored by the summarization algorithm)
Auditing the Partisanship of Google Search Snippets. Desheng Hu et al. To be presented in THE International World Wide Web Conference 2019. https://cbw.sh/static/pdf/hu-www19.pdf
Abstract: The text snippets presented in web search results provide userswith a slice of page content that they can quickly scan to help in-form their click decisions. However, little is known about how thesesnippets are generated or how they relate to a user’s search query. Motivated by the growing body of evidence suggesting that searchengine rankings can influence undecided voters, we conducted an algorithm audit of the political partisanship of Google Search snip-pets relative to the webpages they are extracted from. To accomplish this, we constructed lexicon of partisan cues to measure partisan-ship and construct a set of left- and right-leaning search queries.Then, we collected a large dataset of Search Engine Results Pages (SERPs) by running our partisan queries and their autocompletesuggestions on Google Search. After using our lexicon to score themachine-coded partisanship of snippets and webpages, we found that Google Search’s snippets generally amplify partisanship, and that this effect is robust across different types of webpages, query topics, and partisan (left- and right-leaning) queries.
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• We present the first large-scale analysis of machine-codedpartisanship in Google Search snippets, covering 4,570 political queries and their autocomplete suggestions.
• We audit the behavior of Google Search’s document summarization algorithm, and find that snippets tend to be drawn from text that is near the beginning of webpages. We further observe that the algorithm leverages visible text and textual meta-data (such as alt-text on images) from webpages.
• Overall, we find that 54–58% of snippets amplify partisanship, depending on the fraction of our lexicon that is used for scoring, i.e., the snippets contain stronger partisan cues on average than the corresponding webpage they were synthesized from. This finding remains consistent across SERPs from left- and right-leaning queries and pages with and with-out structured meta-data that may influence Google Search’s document summarization algorithm [28, 29].
• Surprisingly, we find that 19–24% of snippets have inverse partisanship than the corresponding webpage.
• We identify 31 websites where Google Search consistently produces snippets that differ from the underlying webpagesin terms of the machine-coded partisanship, with high statistical significance. These websites include prominent news and social media services.
We believe that it is highly unlikely that Google has intentionallyengineered their document summarization algorithm to amplify partisan cues. Instead, a more likely explanation for our findingsis that journalistic practice encourages the use of partisan terms and quotes from partisan politicians in the introduction (and meta-data) of articles, which are also the types of text favored by the summarization algorithm.
It is unlikely that Google has intentionally engineered their document summarization algorithm to amplify partisan cues. Instead, a more likely explanation for our findings is that journalistic practice encourages the use of partisan terms and quotes from partisan politicians in the introduction (and meta-data) of articles, which are also the types of text favored by the summarization algorithm.
Abstract: The text snippets presented in web search results provide userswith a slice of page content that they can quickly scan to help in-form their click decisions. However, little is known about how thesesnippets are generated or how they relate to a user’s search query. Motivated by the growing body of evidence suggesting that searchengine rankings can influence undecided voters, we conducted an algorithm audit of the political partisanship of Google Search snip-pets relative to the webpages they are extracted from. To accomplish this, we constructed lexicon of partisan cues to measure partisan-ship and construct a set of left- and right-leaning search queries.Then, we collected a large dataset of Search Engine Results Pages (SERPs) by running our partisan queries and their autocompletesuggestions on Google Search. After using our lexicon to score themachine-coded partisanship of snippets and webpages, we found that Google Search’s snippets generally amplify partisanship, and that this effect is robust across different types of webpages, query topics, and partisan (left- and right-leaning) queries.
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• We present the first large-scale analysis of machine-codedpartisanship in Google Search snippets, covering 4,570 political queries and their autocomplete suggestions.
• We audit the behavior of Google Search’s document summarization algorithm, and find that snippets tend to be drawn from text that is near the beginning of webpages. We further observe that the algorithm leverages visible text and textual meta-data (such as alt-text on images) from webpages.
• Overall, we find that 54–58% of snippets amplify partisanship, depending on the fraction of our lexicon that is used for scoring, i.e., the snippets contain stronger partisan cues on average than the corresponding webpage they were synthesized from. This finding remains consistent across SERPs from left- and right-leaning queries and pages with and with-out structured meta-data that may influence Google Search’s document summarization algorithm [28, 29].
• Surprisingly, we find that 19–24% of snippets have inverse partisanship than the corresponding webpage.
• We identify 31 websites where Google Search consistently produces snippets that differ from the underlying webpagesin terms of the machine-coded partisanship, with high statistical significance. These websites include prominent news and social media services.
We believe that it is highly unlikely that Google has intentionallyengineered their document summarization algorithm to amplify partisan cues. Instead, a more likely explanation for our findingsis that journalistic practice encourages the use of partisan terms and quotes from partisan politicians in the introduction (and meta-data) of articles, which are also the types of text favored by the summarization algorithm.
It is unlikely that Google has intentionally engineered their document summarization algorithm to amplify partisan cues. Instead, a more likely explanation for our findings is that journalistic practice encourages the use of partisan terms and quotes from partisan politicians in the introduction (and meta-data) of articles, which are also the types of text favored by the summarization algorithm.
From 2017: Factors involving extramarital affairs among married adults in Bangladesh
From 2017: Factors involving extramarital affairs among married adults in Bangladesh. Yasmin Jaha et al. International Journal of Community Medicine and Public Health, May 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.18203/2394-6040.ijcmph20171506
Abstract: Extramarital affairs have become a common occurrence in modern society. Many studies have pointed to the lack of variety in a relationship as a contributing factor related to divorce and extramarital affairs. This study wants to explore the reasons behind developing the extramarital affair in married adults. The study is based upon the information gathered through scanning newspapers, journals, books, and browsing the Internet and all related papers which were published from 1980 to 2016. However, there is a limited data on the specific topic. After reviewing literatures, we found some common factors that might be responsible for extramarital affairs. Based on that we have made some recommendations for lowering this devastating situation. From this study, we expect that the stakeholders and policy makers can develop some new thoughts and strategies to let down this overwhelming condition.
Keywords: Extramarital affair, Married adults, Bangladesh
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Check also Have Humans Evolved to Be Cheaters? Is it something general? Have other monogamous species did the same? https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/03/have-humans-evolved-to-be-cheaters-is.html
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Excerpts:
After reviewing, we think these factors can be accountable for extramarital relationship for Bangladesh and as well as other developing countries.
Marriage
It is the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law we considered as marriage.57 Formally arranged marriage goes through various experiences, thus requires careful handling of all the situations with patience and good understanding with related people which often become hampered.58 Another thing is people who marry in their early 20s would most likely have achieved some level of stability and social standing by their mid-30s. An interesting phenomenon is the deprivation of teenage relationship experience.59 This perceived feeling makes an individual careless enough to fall into an extramarital affair.58
Sex
Sex is perhaps one of the most important reasons, and it is an amalgamation of love and passion between two people. After a certain period, sex can become monotonous and if there is a lack of desire, passion, and romance in the relationship, then it may drive the person to seek it with someone else. Individuals with less selfcontrol and deeper dissatisfaction of sexual desire have the common reason of intense sexual addiction to opposite sex as a fact of searching for extramarital relationship.58
Married for the wrong reasons
Many people enter marriage for the wrong reasons like pressures from family and society. After a point, many people agree to marriage without even getting to know each other. High priority in searching always the best for himself or herself by an individual is another potential factor of causing extramarital relationship. Regardless of the justification, even after being married, this poor tendency often creates emptiness to fill up which the individuals immediately get attracted to another person meeting their expectation and ultimately their previous relationship ends up.58
Becoming parents
Newcomer parents experience rapid but practical changes in terms of pursuing responsibilities, changes in precedence order, time sharing, etc. The new environment requires tremendous efforts from the mother. Hence, incidences can be found where the male person may have perceived feeling of deprivation with less attention in terms of importance and can be driven to the involvement in extramarital affair in case of less consideration from the women.58
Physical dissatisfaction
It is the most penetrating issue for married persons’ involvement in extramarital affair since fulfillment of sexual satisfaction remains as a key phenomenon to sustain physical relationship. Lack of sexual satisfaction ultimately causes expectation gap and married female were found highly sensitive to this issue in several previous studies. The same things can happen in case of male persons in terms of their desire to fulfill sexual discontent through making a new affair and procuring a more responsive partner.58
Career advancement
Discord regarding the question of career and financial establishment is another pathetic reason but reality. It hampers economic solvency of a married couple and intensifies mismanagement of family finance issues triggering the onset of a continuous wrangling. After the effect of this volatile situation surely does not help the mutual cognitive understanding, as it constantly pressurizes the financial stability of the married couple. Long term impact of this issue creates acute scenario with severe conflict of intrinsic remorse and loyalty.58
Need for excitement
Human instinct is quite immeasurable, diversified, and it is impossible to fathom and predict the nature and depth of any desire. A result of which is the outbreak of an extramarital affair through searching for the opportunity of removing boredom, exhaustion as well as for recreation.58
No common interests
The role of negotiation and respect for each other’s choice has no alternative to sustain peaceful coexistence in pursuing the conjugal life responsibilities. Any failure to recognize this fact and doing accordingly cause distortion the mutual interest and a sharp cut down in the personal time spending which can lead towards development of an extramarital affair after a certain period of time.58
Self-esteem problems
Perceived recognition about self-esteem and cognition about individual’s own behavioral aptitude requires balance to maintain sound level of personal judgment. The apparent deprivation of being less or least loved by own husband or wife is a powerful phenomenon and can be easily driven by the feeling of deprivation of companionship and love from partner. Psychological deprivation is not an abstract phenomenon. Therefore, it is not possible to improve mental condition without positive conscience of the individual to overcome the threat of extramarital affair involvement.60
Social network
The anonymity and easy availability of online dating now result in many more spouses looking for love outside marriage.61 In accordance with a recent survey of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), for the last five (5) years, an astonishing scenario has been observed by the nation’s 81% top divorce attorneys claiming that the easy availability of individual identity and contact in social media is the key promoter behind the rapid increase in divorce rate. Here Facebook remains as the undisputed pioneer with an awful 66% contribution to the online divorce evidence, according to the original source. Like Facebook, there are so many social websites where married persons can express themselves and seek for an extramarital relation.62
Other issues
Other factors instigating individual tendency of searching for compassionate love are as follows: i) opportunity to live together even after being committed in a marriage; ii) midlife crisis as a period of psychological stress occurring in middle age (this shapes individual thought to be triggered by a physical, occupational, or domestic event); iii) concerns related to natural deterioration of physical condition (this can cause significant and sometimes unwanted accidental changes in life).60
Abstract: Extramarital affairs have become a common occurrence in modern society. Many studies have pointed to the lack of variety in a relationship as a contributing factor related to divorce and extramarital affairs. This study wants to explore the reasons behind developing the extramarital affair in married adults. The study is based upon the information gathered through scanning newspapers, journals, books, and browsing the Internet and all related papers which were published from 1980 to 2016. However, there is a limited data on the specific topic. After reviewing literatures, we found some common factors that might be responsible for extramarital affairs. Based on that we have made some recommendations for lowering this devastating situation. From this study, we expect that the stakeholders and policy makers can develop some new thoughts and strategies to let down this overwhelming condition.
Keywords: Extramarital affair, Married adults, Bangladesh
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Check also Have Humans Evolved to Be Cheaters? Is it something general? Have other monogamous species did the same? https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/03/have-humans-evolved-to-be-cheaters-is.html
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Excerpts:
After reviewing, we think these factors can be accountable for extramarital relationship for Bangladesh and as well as other developing countries.
Marriage
It is the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex as husband or wife in a consensual and contractual relationship recognized by law we considered as marriage.57 Formally arranged marriage goes through various experiences, thus requires careful handling of all the situations with patience and good understanding with related people which often become hampered.58 Another thing is people who marry in their early 20s would most likely have achieved some level of stability and social standing by their mid-30s. An interesting phenomenon is the deprivation of teenage relationship experience.59 This perceived feeling makes an individual careless enough to fall into an extramarital affair.58
Sex
Sex is perhaps one of the most important reasons, and it is an amalgamation of love and passion between two people. After a certain period, sex can become monotonous and if there is a lack of desire, passion, and romance in the relationship, then it may drive the person to seek it with someone else. Individuals with less selfcontrol and deeper dissatisfaction of sexual desire have the common reason of intense sexual addiction to opposite sex as a fact of searching for extramarital relationship.58
Married for the wrong reasons
Many people enter marriage for the wrong reasons like pressures from family and society. After a point, many people agree to marriage without even getting to know each other. High priority in searching always the best for himself or herself by an individual is another potential factor of causing extramarital relationship. Regardless of the justification, even after being married, this poor tendency often creates emptiness to fill up which the individuals immediately get attracted to another person meeting their expectation and ultimately their previous relationship ends up.58
Becoming parents
Newcomer parents experience rapid but practical changes in terms of pursuing responsibilities, changes in precedence order, time sharing, etc. The new environment requires tremendous efforts from the mother. Hence, incidences can be found where the male person may have perceived feeling of deprivation with less attention in terms of importance and can be driven to the involvement in extramarital affair in case of less consideration from the women.58
Physical dissatisfaction
It is the most penetrating issue for married persons’ involvement in extramarital affair since fulfillment of sexual satisfaction remains as a key phenomenon to sustain physical relationship. Lack of sexual satisfaction ultimately causes expectation gap and married female were found highly sensitive to this issue in several previous studies. The same things can happen in case of male persons in terms of their desire to fulfill sexual discontent through making a new affair and procuring a more responsive partner.58
Career advancement
Discord regarding the question of career and financial establishment is another pathetic reason but reality. It hampers economic solvency of a married couple and intensifies mismanagement of family finance issues triggering the onset of a continuous wrangling. After the effect of this volatile situation surely does not help the mutual cognitive understanding, as it constantly pressurizes the financial stability of the married couple. Long term impact of this issue creates acute scenario with severe conflict of intrinsic remorse and loyalty.58
Need for excitement
Human instinct is quite immeasurable, diversified, and it is impossible to fathom and predict the nature and depth of any desire. A result of which is the outbreak of an extramarital affair through searching for the opportunity of removing boredom, exhaustion as well as for recreation.58
No common interests
The role of negotiation and respect for each other’s choice has no alternative to sustain peaceful coexistence in pursuing the conjugal life responsibilities. Any failure to recognize this fact and doing accordingly cause distortion the mutual interest and a sharp cut down in the personal time spending which can lead towards development of an extramarital affair after a certain period of time.58
Self-esteem problems
Perceived recognition about self-esteem and cognition about individual’s own behavioral aptitude requires balance to maintain sound level of personal judgment. The apparent deprivation of being less or least loved by own husband or wife is a powerful phenomenon and can be easily driven by the feeling of deprivation of companionship and love from partner. Psychological deprivation is not an abstract phenomenon. Therefore, it is not possible to improve mental condition without positive conscience of the individual to overcome the threat of extramarital affair involvement.60
Social network
The anonymity and easy availability of online dating now result in many more spouses looking for love outside marriage.61 In accordance with a recent survey of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), for the last five (5) years, an astonishing scenario has been observed by the nation’s 81% top divorce attorneys claiming that the easy availability of individual identity and contact in social media is the key promoter behind the rapid increase in divorce rate. Here Facebook remains as the undisputed pioneer with an awful 66% contribution to the online divorce evidence, according to the original source. Like Facebook, there are so many social websites where married persons can express themselves and seek for an extramarital relation.62
Other issues
Other factors instigating individual tendency of searching for compassionate love are as follows: i) opportunity to live together even after being committed in a marriage; ii) midlife crisis as a period of psychological stress occurring in middle age (this shapes individual thought to be triggered by a physical, occupational, or domestic event); iii) concerns related to natural deterioration of physical condition (this can cause significant and sometimes unwanted accidental changes in life).60
Benefits of zebra stripes: Behaviour of tabanid flies around zebras and horses
Benefits of zebra stripes: Behaviour of tabanid flies around zebras and horses. Tim Caro et al. PLOS, February 20, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0210831
Abstract: Averting attack by biting flies is increasingly regarded as the evolutionary driver of zebra stripes, although the precise mechanism by which stripes ameliorate attack by ectoparasites is unknown. We examined the behaviour of tabanids (horse flies) in the vicinity of captive plains zebras and uniformly coloured domestic horses living on a horse farm in Britain. Observations showed that fewer tabanids landed on zebras than on horses per unit time, although rates of tabanid circling around or briefly touching zebra and horse pelage did not differ. In an experiment in which horses sequentially wore cloth coats of different colours, those wearing a striped pattern suffered far lower rates of tabanid touching and landing on coats than the same horses wearing black or white, yet there were no differences in attack rates to their naked heads. In separate, detailed video analyses, tabanids approached zebras faster and failed to decelerate before contacting zebras, and proportionately more tabanids simply touched rather than landed on zebra pelage in comparison to horses. Taken together, these findings indicate that, up close, striped surfaces prevented flies from making a controlled landing but did not influence tabanid behaviour at a distance. To counteract flies, zebras swished their tails and ran away from fly nuisance whereas horses showed higher rates of skin twitching. As a consequence of zebras’ striping, very few tabanids successfully landed on zebras and, as a result of zebras’ changeable behaviour, few stayed a long time, or probed for blood.
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Instead, there is an emerging consensus among biologists that the primary function of contrasting black and white stripes on the three species of zebras is to thwart attack from tabanids, and possibly glossinids, stomoxys and other biting muscoids based on laboratory and field experiments with striped materials [3, 9–12] and on comparative evidence [13]. In Africa where zebras live, tabanids carry diseases fatal to zebras including trypanosomiasis, equine infectious anemia, African horse sickness and equine influenza [14] and zebras are particularly susceptible to infection because their thin pelage allows biting flies to probe successfully with their mouthparts [13]. The exact mechanism by which stripes prevent flies from obtaining a blood meal is less well understood, however. Flies may fail to detect a zebra from a distance, or from close up, either as a result of misinterpreting optic flow as they approach [15], by interfering with cues that promote a landing response [9, 16], or even by disrupting the polarization signature of their host [12]. Unfortunately, detailed observations of biting flies in the vicinity of live zebras have so far been unavailable but such information would help elucidate the stage at which stripes exert an effect on host seeking by biting flies.
In this study we compare several measures of behaviour of wild tabanid horse flies around captive zebras and domestic horses living in the same habitat using direct observations and video footage. We also compare the behaviour of tabanids around horses wearing differently coloured cloth coats, report on the duration of time that tabanids spend on equids with different coloured pelage, and compare the behaviour of horses and zebras in response to biting fly annoyance.
Three additional but more speculative points may be made in closing. First, we found that rates at which tabanids circled and touched a single grey horse were lower than for zebras although landing rates did not differ significantly (Table Ba-c in S1 File). This was in contrast to comparisons between zebras and horses of other colours where circling and touching rates did not differ but where zebras enjoyed fewer landings per unit time. More work on grey pelage in relation to fly annoyance is clearly needed because stripes will appear grey from a distance to flies (Text A in S1 File).
Second, we found that there was no difference in rates at which tabanids moved across the surface of striped or uniform coats. Since black and white stripes give off different heat loads during the day [30–32], they could possibly confuse a tabanid if it tried to locate a capillary by thermal sensitivity (although we have no evidence that they do this). If stripes did prevent a tabanid from locating a capillary we might expect greater rates of searching zebra pelage but this was not the case.
Third, extremely high rates of tail flicking were seen in the zebra/wild ass hybrid at Dundry (Text B in S1 File) similar to that observed in African wild asses at the Tierpark Zoo (table 5.3 in [3]) suggesting that tail flicking may in part be a species-specific trait. Striping is also a species specific trait and also under partial genetic control (as witnessed by mother-offspring striping similarities, for example, TC pers obs). Therefore both morphological and behavioural anti-parasite defense strategies appear to be under strong selection in zebras.
Abstract: Averting attack by biting flies is increasingly regarded as the evolutionary driver of zebra stripes, although the precise mechanism by which stripes ameliorate attack by ectoparasites is unknown. We examined the behaviour of tabanids (horse flies) in the vicinity of captive plains zebras and uniformly coloured domestic horses living on a horse farm in Britain. Observations showed that fewer tabanids landed on zebras than on horses per unit time, although rates of tabanid circling around or briefly touching zebra and horse pelage did not differ. In an experiment in which horses sequentially wore cloth coats of different colours, those wearing a striped pattern suffered far lower rates of tabanid touching and landing on coats than the same horses wearing black or white, yet there were no differences in attack rates to their naked heads. In separate, detailed video analyses, tabanids approached zebras faster and failed to decelerate before contacting zebras, and proportionately more tabanids simply touched rather than landed on zebra pelage in comparison to horses. Taken together, these findings indicate that, up close, striped surfaces prevented flies from making a controlled landing but did not influence tabanid behaviour at a distance. To counteract flies, zebras swished their tails and ran away from fly nuisance whereas horses showed higher rates of skin twitching. As a consequence of zebras’ striping, very few tabanids successfully landed on zebras and, as a result of zebras’ changeable behaviour, few stayed a long time, or probed for blood.
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Introduction
The function of zebra stripes has been a source of scientific interest for over 150 years generating many hypotheses including camouflage, confusion of predators, signaling to conspecifics, thermoregulation and avoidance of biting flies [1] but contemporary data show that only one stands up to careful scrutiny [2–4]. Briefly, regarding camouflage, zebra stripes are difficult for lion Panthera leo and spotted hyaena Crocuta crocuta predators to resolve at any great distance making crypsis against mammalian predators an unlikely benefit [5]. Regarding confusion of predators, zebras do not have the sort of striping pattern that aids in confusion [6] and African lions take zebra prey disproportionately more than expected suggesting an absence of confusion effect [7]. Regarding social benefits, rates of grooming and patterns of association are no greater in striped equids than in unstriped equids [3]. Finally, there are no thermoregulatory benefits to striping based on controlled experiments using water drums [4], infrared photography of free-living herbivores [3] and logical argument in regards to flank striping [8].Instead, there is an emerging consensus among biologists that the primary function of contrasting black and white stripes on the three species of zebras is to thwart attack from tabanids, and possibly glossinids, stomoxys and other biting muscoids based on laboratory and field experiments with striped materials [3, 9–12] and on comparative evidence [13]. In Africa where zebras live, tabanids carry diseases fatal to zebras including trypanosomiasis, equine infectious anemia, African horse sickness and equine influenza [14] and zebras are particularly susceptible to infection because their thin pelage allows biting flies to probe successfully with their mouthparts [13]. The exact mechanism by which stripes prevent flies from obtaining a blood meal is less well understood, however. Flies may fail to detect a zebra from a distance, or from close up, either as a result of misinterpreting optic flow as they approach [15], by interfering with cues that promote a landing response [9, 16], or even by disrupting the polarization signature of their host [12]. Unfortunately, detailed observations of biting flies in the vicinity of live zebras have so far been unavailable but such information would help elucidate the stage at which stripes exert an effect on host seeking by biting flies.
In this study we compare several measures of behaviour of wild tabanid horse flies around captive zebras and domestic horses living in the same habitat using direct observations and video footage. We also compare the behaviour of tabanids around horses wearing differently coloured cloth coats, report on the duration of time that tabanids spend on equids with different coloured pelage, and compare the behaviour of horses and zebras in response to biting fly annoyance.
Conclusion
In summary, multiple lines of evidence indicate that stripes prevent effective landing by tabanids once they are in the vicinity of the host but did not prevent them approaching from a distance. In addition, zebras appear to use behavioural means to prevent tabanids spending time on them through constant tail swishing and even running away. As a consequence of both of these morphological and behavioural defenses, very few tabanids are able to probe for a zebra blood meal as evidenced by our data.Three additional but more speculative points may be made in closing. First, we found that rates at which tabanids circled and touched a single grey horse were lower than for zebras although landing rates did not differ significantly (Table Ba-c in S1 File). This was in contrast to comparisons between zebras and horses of other colours where circling and touching rates did not differ but where zebras enjoyed fewer landings per unit time. More work on grey pelage in relation to fly annoyance is clearly needed because stripes will appear grey from a distance to flies (Text A in S1 File).
Second, we found that there was no difference in rates at which tabanids moved across the surface of striped or uniform coats. Since black and white stripes give off different heat loads during the day [30–32], they could possibly confuse a tabanid if it tried to locate a capillary by thermal sensitivity (although we have no evidence that they do this). If stripes did prevent a tabanid from locating a capillary we might expect greater rates of searching zebra pelage but this was not the case.
Third, extremely high rates of tail flicking were seen in the zebra/wild ass hybrid at Dundry (Text B in S1 File) similar to that observed in African wild asses at the Tierpark Zoo (table 5.3 in [3]) suggesting that tail flicking may in part be a species-specific trait. Striping is also a species specific trait and also under partial genetic control (as witnessed by mother-offspring striping similarities, for example, TC pers obs). Therefore both morphological and behavioural anti-parasite defense strategies appear to be under strong selection in zebras.
People are often characterized as poor savers; an attentional asymmetry away from money-saved relative to money-earned, potentially contributes to decreased everyday salience and future wealth
From 2018: Differential temporal salience of earning and saving. Kesong Hu, Eve De Rosa & Adam K. Anderson. Nature Communications, volume 9, Article number: 2843 (2018). https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-018-05201-9/
Abstract: People are often characterized as poor savers. Here we examined whether cues associated with earning and saving have differential salience for attention and action. We first modeled earning and saving after positive and negative variants of monetary reinforcement, i.e., gains versus avoiding loss. Despite their equivalent absolute magnitude in a monetary incentive task, colors predicting saving were judged to appear after those that predicted earning in a temporal-order judgment task. This saving posteriority effect also occurred when savings were framed as earnings that come slightly later. Colors predicting savings, whether they acquired either negative or positive value, persisted in their posteriority. An attentional asymmetry away from money-saved relative to money-earned, potentially contributes to decreased everyday salience and future wealth.
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Introduction
In the parable of the ant and the grasshopper, the ant’s assiduous collection of food, saving for the winter, contrasts with the grasshopper’s pursuits of immediate gratification. Cast more as grasshopper than ant, humans are often characterized as poor savers. This reputation may be well earned, in particular in America. According to a 2016 analysis of the Federal Reserve’s 2013 survey of consumer finances, the median American working-age couple has saved only $5000 for retirement with 43% of working-age families estimated to have no retirement savings at all1. On a long downward trend, the personal savings rate (expressed as a percentage of disposable personal income, DPI), dropped to <3% of DPI at the close of 20172. Contrasting with a near 96% employment rate, we have ant-like work ethic, yet earnings are rarely converted into savings.
Here we assess, in the context of monetary reinforcement, whether earning and saving reflect an asymmetry in value-derived attention3,4,5, asking whether the attentional scales are tipped in one’s favor. The way we attend has important interactions with value, perception, decision making, and ultimately behavior3. To assess their comparative behavioral and attentional salience, we considered two potential conceptual models for the distinction between earning and saving. First, we modeled earning and saving after positive and negative reinforcement, i.e., gains versus avoiding losses. Second, we considered earning and saving as variants of positive reinforcement in which gains accumulate at the same rate, but differ according to a conceptual framing of manifesting immediately or a short time later.
Inspired by language, one meaning of “to save” is to avoid loss. Saving may represent an aversion to losing one’s earnings. The assessment of gains and losses is central to our most basic physiological needs and drives6. There are evident asymmetries in the weight we place on gains and losses, with potential losses having an incommensurate influence when people evaluate identical outcomes7. In field experiments, monetary incentives framed as losses (“avoid losing A by doing B”) increases factory workers’ productivity relative to those as gains (“gain A by doing B”)8. Such loss aversion has received empirical support from a variety of studies9,10,11,12, and when directly experienced, losses outweigh gains13. Loss aversion is related to biases such as the endowment effect14 and the status quo bias15, suggesting that individuals should place greater value on savings they have already earned. But quite to the contrary, poor saving behavior16 suggests loss aversion is likely not at work in limited savings. One must be motivated to accrue savings before being concerned about losing them.
Loss aversion and related biases are thought to reflect the asymmetric weighting of punishment and reward17. Losses are punishing, resulting in an exaggerated avoidance response, biasing both decisions and the amount of attention devoted to them17,18. While the act of avoiding loss is the removal of punishment, and thus is reinforcing19. Motivation to earn versus save may, more directly, be a comparison of positive and negative variants of reinforcement20, comparing earnings with the avoidance of losing one’s earnings. Positive and negative reinforcement refer to increasing the likelihood of a behavior with the addition or subtraction of an outcome, not their positive or negative utility for an individual. Positive and negative reinforcement have been shown to similarly recruit the reward system, suggesting that both have positive utility21. Nevertheless, they may have asymmetric motivational power12. Psychologically, and in our daily experience, individuals believe they are paid for their performance rather than arranging conditions to avoid moneyless periods of time22. Savings, in this context, should motivate individuals to avoid being without money. Earning and saving should then align with different concerns. Moreover, individuals can differently experience pleasure or utility according to their promotion versus prevention orientation23, through either promoting desired versus preventing undesired outcomes.
On the other hand, the meaning of “to save” could be understood in terms of expected utility in the future, hence currently inaccessible. In line with this, efforts to avoid moneyless periods of time highlight the importance of temporal perspectives on one’s earnings. Maintaining an orientation toward saving may result in temporal discounting of today’s earnings in the future24. Discounting of future value is captured by individuals who prefer $5 now compared to $10 three months from now25,26. Participants often make choices of smaller but immediate rewards relative to rewards that are larger but delayed. Such temporal or delay discounting is also considered a marker of impulsive behavior, assessing the degree to which the subjective value of an offering decreases as a function of delay in its delivery27. While the rate of discounting depends on the individual, it is a fundamental to the representation of value, observed in human and nonhuman animals28. Temporal distance of saving for the future may also modulate value representations such that they are more abstract29. This may cognitively distance individuals from the reality of the undesirable outcomes of not saving, i.e., extended moneyless periods of time. Saving in these contexts reflects an orientation toward the future, as well as the limits of imagination on behavior30. Accordingly, while earning may reflect the here and now, savings may reflect earnings as a discounted and abstract future.
Whether earning and saving reflect varieties of reinforcement or differentially reflect temporal discounting, they involve making a choice between options31. Our nervous system is confronted, at each moment, by choices in terms of where to invest or allocate its resources in the currency of attention3,32. By paying attention, an individual is able to impact the salience33 and value34 of sensory events. While unpleasant events typically evoke relatively stronger changes in affect and attention in both perceptual and decision studies9,12,17,18,35,36, gains also play a similar role3,4,37,38,39. Importantly, value not only alters attention, but attention is also central to value, with attention-boosting34 and inattention-reducing value40. Attention can both follow and influence preference41, predicting consumer choice42. Thus, the choice to what we attend is central to value and behavior17,18,43. While multiple studies have characterized value-derived attention3,4,5, much less is known about how different variants of reinforcement and temporal framing regulate attention. Here we examined how earning and saving, according to different models, regulate the paying of attention. If earning and savings represent differential concerns to the individual, then this should be reflected in attentional choice, having an asymmetric regulatory influence on salience and awareness.
Mirroring how value is scaled relative to time44, time is also scaled relative to attention. Attention shapes not only what is perceived but also when45. Attention can warp the judgment of temporal order, with attended events appearing to occur before non-attended events, called “prior entry”46,47. Similarly, individuals attend to more immediate events and outcomes than those in the more distant future29, and this asymmetry in attention may modulate temporal discounting48. We took advantage of how attention can influence judgments of temporal order to examine how individuals perceive events predicting earning and saving. Just as how individuals may put off saving due to decreased salience and relative inattention, monetarily reinforced colors associated with savings may be less attentionally salient and appear to come later. As a model for earnings and savings, we first examined the power of positive (gains) and negative (avoiding losses) monetary reinforcement of color patches and the relationship between action and attentional salience (experiments 1a–c). In a further study (experiment 2), through distinct temporal framings of positive reinforcement, we modeled earning and saving after gains that come immediately versus gains to come later (i.e., saving for future).
Figure 1 illustrates the core tasks and the example colored circle used as stimuli. Participants started with value reinforcement trials, where equiluminant colors (red, blue, or yellow) were 100% reinforced, or received no reinforcement, for fast and accurate color discriminations. One color was associated with “earning,” gaining 30 cents, and another associated with “saving,” avoiding loss of 30 cents. The task was sufficiently easy to enable reinforcement on the majority trials, whereby earning would increase one’s balance and saving would preserve those earnings. Participants received their performance-based earnings at the end of the experiment. Color-reinforcement associations were counterbalanced across participants. The temporal-order judgment (TOJ) task required participants to judge which of the side-by-side colored stimuli appeared first, when presented in varying temporal proximity (8–98 ms). TOJ trials were pseudo-randomly intermixed with value reinforcement trials to ensure that any acquired salience for colors was maintained throughout. Similar to indifference points in temporal discounting to establish value25,26, we estimated the participant’s point of subjective simultaneity (PSS), which indicates the estimated time interval to perceive the two stimuli as arriving simultaneously, i.e., 50%47,49,50,51.
Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Illustration of the display sequences and target stimuli examples. a Monetary reinforcement task. Exp. 1a involved a color discrimination (red, blue, and yellow), while Exp. 1b and 1c involved a gap side (left and right) discrimination. After response, participants were informed about gain or loss, together with the total cash bonus accrued (in white). b Temporal-order judgment task. Following fixation, colored circles were presented either on the left or on the right side of the fixation followed by a second different color circle, which appeared on the opposite side after a variable SOA (8, 18, 38, 68, and 98 ms). Participants were required to indicate which color (Exp 1a) or which side (Exp 1b and 1c) appeared first
Full size image
Despite their equivalent absolute magnitude in a monetary incentive task, we find that saving results in less behavioral salience and decreased payout. In a temporal-order task, saving-associated color cues are also judged to appear after those that predict earning, consistent with the decreased attentional salience of saving. This saving temporal posteriority effect generalizes to when saving is framed as earnings that come slightly later. Across studies, saving-associated cues persisted in their relative inattention whether the cues acquire negative or positive valence. Thus, saving posteriority is not simply explained by acquired affective value. We conclude that decreased attentional salience related to money-saved relative to money-earned is a fundamental information-processing bias. That saving has less moment-to-moment attention attracting potential may contribute to reduced saving behavior. Attentional interventions to enhance the everyday salience of saving may be gainfully employed to improve saving behavior.
Abstract: People are often characterized as poor savers. Here we examined whether cues associated with earning and saving have differential salience for attention and action. We first modeled earning and saving after positive and negative variants of monetary reinforcement, i.e., gains versus avoiding loss. Despite their equivalent absolute magnitude in a monetary incentive task, colors predicting saving were judged to appear after those that predicted earning in a temporal-order judgment task. This saving posteriority effect also occurred when savings were framed as earnings that come slightly later. Colors predicting savings, whether they acquired either negative or positive value, persisted in their posteriority. An attentional asymmetry away from money-saved relative to money-earned, potentially contributes to decreased everyday salience and future wealth.
---
Introduction
In the parable of the ant and the grasshopper, the ant’s assiduous collection of food, saving for the winter, contrasts with the grasshopper’s pursuits of immediate gratification. Cast more as grasshopper than ant, humans are often characterized as poor savers. This reputation may be well earned, in particular in America. According to a 2016 analysis of the Federal Reserve’s 2013 survey of consumer finances, the median American working-age couple has saved only $5000 for retirement with 43% of working-age families estimated to have no retirement savings at all1. On a long downward trend, the personal savings rate (expressed as a percentage of disposable personal income, DPI), dropped to <3% of DPI at the close of 20172. Contrasting with a near 96% employment rate, we have ant-like work ethic, yet earnings are rarely converted into savings.
Here we assess, in the context of monetary reinforcement, whether earning and saving reflect an asymmetry in value-derived attention3,4,5, asking whether the attentional scales are tipped in one’s favor. The way we attend has important interactions with value, perception, decision making, and ultimately behavior3. To assess their comparative behavioral and attentional salience, we considered two potential conceptual models for the distinction between earning and saving. First, we modeled earning and saving after positive and negative reinforcement, i.e., gains versus avoiding losses. Second, we considered earning and saving as variants of positive reinforcement in which gains accumulate at the same rate, but differ according to a conceptual framing of manifesting immediately or a short time later.
Inspired by language, one meaning of “to save” is to avoid loss. Saving may represent an aversion to losing one’s earnings. The assessment of gains and losses is central to our most basic physiological needs and drives6. There are evident asymmetries in the weight we place on gains and losses, with potential losses having an incommensurate influence when people evaluate identical outcomes7. In field experiments, monetary incentives framed as losses (“avoid losing A by doing B”) increases factory workers’ productivity relative to those as gains (“gain A by doing B”)8. Such loss aversion has received empirical support from a variety of studies9,10,11,12, and when directly experienced, losses outweigh gains13. Loss aversion is related to biases such as the endowment effect14 and the status quo bias15, suggesting that individuals should place greater value on savings they have already earned. But quite to the contrary, poor saving behavior16 suggests loss aversion is likely not at work in limited savings. One must be motivated to accrue savings before being concerned about losing them.
Loss aversion and related biases are thought to reflect the asymmetric weighting of punishment and reward17. Losses are punishing, resulting in an exaggerated avoidance response, biasing both decisions and the amount of attention devoted to them17,18. While the act of avoiding loss is the removal of punishment, and thus is reinforcing19. Motivation to earn versus save may, more directly, be a comparison of positive and negative variants of reinforcement20, comparing earnings with the avoidance of losing one’s earnings. Positive and negative reinforcement refer to increasing the likelihood of a behavior with the addition or subtraction of an outcome, not their positive or negative utility for an individual. Positive and negative reinforcement have been shown to similarly recruit the reward system, suggesting that both have positive utility21. Nevertheless, they may have asymmetric motivational power12. Psychologically, and in our daily experience, individuals believe they are paid for their performance rather than arranging conditions to avoid moneyless periods of time22. Savings, in this context, should motivate individuals to avoid being without money. Earning and saving should then align with different concerns. Moreover, individuals can differently experience pleasure or utility according to their promotion versus prevention orientation23, through either promoting desired versus preventing undesired outcomes.
On the other hand, the meaning of “to save” could be understood in terms of expected utility in the future, hence currently inaccessible. In line with this, efforts to avoid moneyless periods of time highlight the importance of temporal perspectives on one’s earnings. Maintaining an orientation toward saving may result in temporal discounting of today’s earnings in the future24. Discounting of future value is captured by individuals who prefer $5 now compared to $10 three months from now25,26. Participants often make choices of smaller but immediate rewards relative to rewards that are larger but delayed. Such temporal or delay discounting is also considered a marker of impulsive behavior, assessing the degree to which the subjective value of an offering decreases as a function of delay in its delivery27. While the rate of discounting depends on the individual, it is a fundamental to the representation of value, observed in human and nonhuman animals28. Temporal distance of saving for the future may also modulate value representations such that they are more abstract29. This may cognitively distance individuals from the reality of the undesirable outcomes of not saving, i.e., extended moneyless periods of time. Saving in these contexts reflects an orientation toward the future, as well as the limits of imagination on behavior30. Accordingly, while earning may reflect the here and now, savings may reflect earnings as a discounted and abstract future.
Whether earning and saving reflect varieties of reinforcement or differentially reflect temporal discounting, they involve making a choice between options31. Our nervous system is confronted, at each moment, by choices in terms of where to invest or allocate its resources in the currency of attention3,32. By paying attention, an individual is able to impact the salience33 and value34 of sensory events. While unpleasant events typically evoke relatively stronger changes in affect and attention in both perceptual and decision studies9,12,17,18,35,36, gains also play a similar role3,4,37,38,39. Importantly, value not only alters attention, but attention is also central to value, with attention-boosting34 and inattention-reducing value40. Attention can both follow and influence preference41, predicting consumer choice42. Thus, the choice to what we attend is central to value and behavior17,18,43. While multiple studies have characterized value-derived attention3,4,5, much less is known about how different variants of reinforcement and temporal framing regulate attention. Here we examined how earning and saving, according to different models, regulate the paying of attention. If earning and savings represent differential concerns to the individual, then this should be reflected in attentional choice, having an asymmetric regulatory influence on salience and awareness.
Mirroring how value is scaled relative to time44, time is also scaled relative to attention. Attention shapes not only what is perceived but also when45. Attention can warp the judgment of temporal order, with attended events appearing to occur before non-attended events, called “prior entry”46,47. Similarly, individuals attend to more immediate events and outcomes than those in the more distant future29, and this asymmetry in attention may modulate temporal discounting48. We took advantage of how attention can influence judgments of temporal order to examine how individuals perceive events predicting earning and saving. Just as how individuals may put off saving due to decreased salience and relative inattention, monetarily reinforced colors associated with savings may be less attentionally salient and appear to come later. As a model for earnings and savings, we first examined the power of positive (gains) and negative (avoiding losses) monetary reinforcement of color patches and the relationship between action and attentional salience (experiments 1a–c). In a further study (experiment 2), through distinct temporal framings of positive reinforcement, we modeled earning and saving after gains that come immediately versus gains to come later (i.e., saving for future).
Figure 1 illustrates the core tasks and the example colored circle used as stimuli. Participants started with value reinforcement trials, where equiluminant colors (red, blue, or yellow) were 100% reinforced, or received no reinforcement, for fast and accurate color discriminations. One color was associated with “earning,” gaining 30 cents, and another associated with “saving,” avoiding loss of 30 cents. The task was sufficiently easy to enable reinforcement on the majority trials, whereby earning would increase one’s balance and saving would preserve those earnings. Participants received their performance-based earnings at the end of the experiment. Color-reinforcement associations were counterbalanced across participants. The temporal-order judgment (TOJ) task required participants to judge which of the side-by-side colored stimuli appeared first, when presented in varying temporal proximity (8–98 ms). TOJ trials were pseudo-randomly intermixed with value reinforcement trials to ensure that any acquired salience for colors was maintained throughout. Similar to indifference points in temporal discounting to establish value25,26, we estimated the participant’s point of subjective simultaneity (PSS), which indicates the estimated time interval to perceive the two stimuli as arriving simultaneously, i.e., 50%47,49,50,51.
Fig. 1
Fig. 1
Illustration of the display sequences and target stimuli examples. a Monetary reinforcement task. Exp. 1a involved a color discrimination (red, blue, and yellow), while Exp. 1b and 1c involved a gap side (left and right) discrimination. After response, participants were informed about gain or loss, together with the total cash bonus accrued (in white). b Temporal-order judgment task. Following fixation, colored circles were presented either on the left or on the right side of the fixation followed by a second different color circle, which appeared on the opposite side after a variable SOA (8, 18, 38, 68, and 98 ms). Participants were required to indicate which color (Exp 1a) or which side (Exp 1b and 1c) appeared first
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Despite their equivalent absolute magnitude in a monetary incentive task, we find that saving results in less behavioral salience and decreased payout. In a temporal-order task, saving-associated color cues are also judged to appear after those that predict earning, consistent with the decreased attentional salience of saving. This saving temporal posteriority effect generalizes to when saving is framed as earnings that come slightly later. Across studies, saving-associated cues persisted in their relative inattention whether the cues acquire negative or positive valence. Thus, saving posteriority is not simply explained by acquired affective value. We conclude that decreased attentional salience related to money-saved relative to money-earned is a fundamental information-processing bias. That saving has less moment-to-moment attention attracting potential may contribute to reduced saving behavior. Attentional interventions to enhance the everyday salience of saving may be gainfully employed to improve saving behavior.
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