Is Locker Room Talk Really Just Talk? An Analysis of Normative Sexual Talk and Behavior: Women were more likely than men to rate nonconsensual language as more normal

Is Locker Room Talk Really Just Talk? An Analysis of Normative Sexual Talk and Behavior. Stephanie Simeone & Elizabeth L. Jeglic.Deviant Behavior, Apr 1 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/01639625.2019.1597319

ABSTRACT: Current sexual violence prevention initiatives have focused on addressing and changing societal norms that are supportive of sexual assault. One area of focus has been the way in which people describe women and sexual acts as it has been suggested that people perceive sex differently. The present study investigated what people consider normative sexual language and behavior and what people consider language and behavior indicative of sexual assault. Participants were given a questionnaire to gather their opinions about sexually assaultive language, their feelings about sex talk, and their experiences with sexual assault. Results indicated that women were more likely than men to rate nonconsensual language as more normal, and that normative ratings of assault language was not related to perpetration of sexual assault. These findings will be discussed as they pertain to sexual violence prevention initiatives.

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During the United States (U.S.) presidential election campaign in the fall of 2016, an audiotapedprivate conversation with then presidential candidate Donald J. Trump emerged in which he stated“You know I’m automatically attracted to beautiful–I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Justkiss. I don’t even wait. And then when you’re a star they let you do it. You can do anything...Grab them by the pussy. You can do anything.”These comments ignited a fierce debate, with some individuals, including the presidential candidate himself, referring to his language as harmless“locker room banter,”while others stated that this language was indicative of sexual assault. From a legal perspective, the behaviors described in the candidate’s statement (kissing and grabbing the genital area of a woman without consent) are behaviors that would be considered illegal and if acted upon would result in charges of sexual assault (Cal. Penal Code §261;N.Y. Penal Law §130.05;Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 22.011). However many argued that this type of talk is normative and harmless and that it is common for men to speak like this when in the company of other men. Indeed, shortly after the recording was released, political conservative Ann Coulter commented that Trump’s statements were“not intended to be taken seriously,”and that his message was merely that“women like to sleep with celebrities”(Coulter2016). Similarly, Fox News personality SeanH annity publicly defended Trump, saying that the incident was merely “words” and not“actions. ”Whether this type of language is normal is an empirical question. What we do know is that sexual norms continue to evolve. For example, compared to previous decades, people now have a higher number of sexual partners and have more socially liberal views of sexual behavior (Twenge, Sherman, and Wells2015). However, research suggests that women are largely uncomfortable talking about sex (Montemurro, Bartasavich, and Wintermute2015), while men often engage in conversations about sex among other male peers (Knight et al.2012). In talking about sex, men often discuss their partners and the type of sexual behaviors they engage in (Knight et al.2012). Discussion about sex serves as a platform to demonstrate one’s masculinity(Pascoe2007). If they talk about sex at all, women have discussions about sex in private withclose friends or family members. For women, the focus of sex talk is less about sharing their experiences, but instead on gaining support and validation (Montemurro, Bartasavich, and Wintermute2015).Changes in behavior are generally accompanied by changes in the way people perceive and discuss sex acts. While society has become more sexually lenient in general, there has been an increased awareness of sexual assault and harassment. During a performance at the 2016 Oscars, musical artist Lady Gaga was joined on stage by survivors of sexual assault as she sang a song written about college sexual assault. Indeed, many universities now provide mandatory sexual assault prevention programs in an effort to bring awareness to this issue and limit the incidence of future sexual assaults (Vladutiu, Martin, and Macy2011). Further, many sexual violence prevention programs now target language that is supportive of sexual violence or that denigrates women, as itis believed that this type of discourse fosters a culture that enables sexual violence to occur (DeGueet al.2014).Sexual assault is a pervasive occurrence in our culture.One in five (18.3%) women report experiencing rape, and 13% of women report that they have experienced sexual coercion (Center for Disease Control and Prevention2012). The negative long-term consequences of sexual assault are well documented and include depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress, substance abuse, and suicidality (Kubany et al.1995;Resick1993), thus understanding the causes of sexual violence is imperative to inform prevention and intervention efforts. Attitudes and behaviors that are tolerant or supportive of male violence toward women influence responses to victimization,making it less likely that women will report incidences of sexual violence (Flood and Pease2009). According to the Social Norms Theory, people tend to act in accordance with how they perceive their peers think or behave (Fabiano et al.2003). In the context of sexual assault, men may endorse sexually aggressive behaviors and attitudes because they believe that other men also support these beliefs; however, evidence suggests that men tend to overestimate the sexual aggression of other men (Loh et al.2005). A study investigating social norms of coercive sexual behavior found that students were more likely to report acceptance of rape myths and report that they would engage in behaviors that would constitute rape after learning that their peers supported rape myths (Bohner, Siebler, and Schmelcher2006). Generally, men more frequently endorse rape myths (Burt1980;SuarezandGadalla2010), while women are less accepting(Caron and Carter1997). However, research suggests that although men illustrate higher levelsof rape myth acceptance, women also subscribe to rape myths (Allen et al.1995)–although it isunclear how women’s acceptance translates into sexual assault perpetration. 

Attitudes toward women 

Sexist attitudes toward women are often found in association with sexual aggression (Burt1980). Feminist theories outline how sexual assault is a byproduct of men’s power and control over women(McPhail2016). In a cross-cultural study of tribal societies, Sanday (1981) found that societies with higher incidences of rape were characterized by interpersonal violence and male dominance over women, while societies with lower incidences of rape were related to respect for women, minimal interpersonal violence, and“sexual equality.”In this way,“sexual assault is not simply an individual incident but a wide-ranging constellation of behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, and talk that work to produce and reproduce gendered dominance in everyday interaction”(Pascoe and Hollander2016: 69).Although stereotypical images of sexual assault focus on blatant forms of coercive sex, sexual assault may be more nuanced. It appears that for the general public, the line between sexual assault and normal sexual behavior might be blurred, which has led to an increased acceptance of assaul tive behavior and language. Indeed, in one study of situational factors related to victimization, Koss (1985) found that 26 out of 62 “highly sexually victimized women” (e.g., the incident met the legal definition of rape) did not acknowledge that they had experienced a sexual assault. Specifically,women who were assaulted by people they had previously been intimate with or by someone they knew were less likely to categorize the assault as rape. Given the wide variety of behavior that constitutes sexual assault (e.g., lack of consent due to substance intoxication; forcible rape) and the social environment surrounding casual sex, people may not necessarily categorize their experience asassaultive.The current study aims to extend the literature on the relationship between perception of normative and sexually assaultive behavior and language and the perpetration and experience of sexual assault. Although previous research has suggested a relationship between attitudes and behavior, many rely on college samples (Tharp et al.2013). Because research suggests that attitudes supporting sexual assault predict sexual aggression, it is hypothesized that an increased endorsement of sexual assault behaviors and language will be related to higher levels of sexual assault perpetration.It is also hypothesized that men are more likely to endorse behaviors and talk indicative of sexual assault.

Discussion 
The present study examined the relationship between perception of normative and sexually assaul-tive language and behavior. Overall, three major findings emerged. First, people are more likely torate consensual statements as normative than nonconsensual statements. Second,the findings suggestthat compared to men, women were more likely to rate both consensual and nonconsensual sexualstatements as more normal. Lastly, normative perception of sexual assault language was not relatedto engagement in sexual assault behavior.Most participants reported positive emotions when listening to stories of friends’consensualsexual experiences and reported negative emotions when listening to stories of nonconsensual sexualexperiences. Previous research has found that men’s attitudes toward rape are related to their peer’sattitudes (Bohner, Siebler, and Schmelcher2006), yet the fact that participants reported negativefeelings toward nonconsensual situations suggests that they disapprove of their friend’s behavior.This is consistent with findings that suggest that men underestimate the level of discomfort of othermen in regard to sexist behavior (Kilmartin et al.1999). In social contexts, men may not truthfullyspeak their minds for fear of ridicule from their peers. Although the current study only assessedemotions related to different types of sexual language and behavior, future research should explorehow men address the topic of sexual assault within social contexts.While the overall sample found the consensual statements as more normative than the non-consensual statements, contrary to our hypothesis, women were more likely than men to rate bothtypes of statements as more normative. These findings are also not in line with previous research,which has indicated that men are more likely to have attitudes that promote sexual assault (Suarezand Gadalla2010). Sex talk is generally viewed as masculine and therefore unbefitting discourse forwomen (Nylund2007). Traditional gender roles suggest differences in the way that women and mentalk about sex (Montemurro, Bartasavich, and Wintermute2015). However, the fact that women donot necessarily engage in sex talk in public does not mean that they do not hold certain viewsregarding sex. Given the change of sexual norms promoting casual sexual relationships, women maybe unsure whether certain talk or behavior constitutes assault. Similarly, women may be more likelyto identify sexual assault language as normal because they have difficulty identifying certain situa-tions as sexual assaults (Koss1985). On the other hand, it is possible that women have becomedesensitized to the crude nature of sexual assault language and now associate “normal” with “typical.” Future research may inquire whether women consider certain statements and situationsas sexual assault.Given that all of the statements were from a male's perspective, women were speculating as towhether or not each statement was normal within the context of men's conversations. Theoretically, if “locker room” banter is solely in the presence of other men, then women would not be privy towhat actually occurs during these conversations. Men, on the other hand, may make judgments based off of their own experience as to whether these types of statements are normal in conversation.However, in contrast to the hypothesis, neither the perception of consensual language nor non-consensual language were related to sexual assault behavior. This is contrary to previous literature which has suggested a relationship between normative beliefs and rape proclivity (Strain, Hockett,and Saucier2015). The lack of relationship in the current study may have been due to the lowincidence of sexual assault behavior reported. Alternatively, perhaps sexual assault behavior occursindependently of perceptions of normative behavior. Studies have found that variables such asimpulsivity, anger, and anxiety play a role in the perpetration of sexual aggression (Lyn andBurton2005; Mouilso, Calhoun, and Rosenbloom2013). Future research should consider personalityvariables that may influence perceptions and behaviors.Although the data was collected during a polarizing political election, political affiliation did not playa significant role in perception of normative language and behavior. Because previous research suggeststhat political conservatism is related to negative attitudes toward sex offenders more generally (Pickett,Mancini, and Mears2013;RosselliandJeglic2017), one may postulate that conservative individuals maybe more likely to find nonconsensual language and behaviors as non-normative. However, the currentstudy did not find such differences. Though not the main focus of the current study, future researchshould examine the role of political affiliation on perceptions and behavior related to sexual assault. 

Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations. First, this study relied on self-report. This could lead to under-reportingof the perpetration of sexual assault behavior, and to ratings of sexual assault language. Secondly,some of the participants were recruited via snowballsampling, which could also lead to underreporting.Although participants were assured that their responses were confidential and their names were notassociated with their responses, it is possible that participants did not want to be completely honest withtheiranswersforfearoftheirpeerslearningtheirresponses. Given the voluntary participation of thesample recruited via reddit, it is possible that participants may have held more extreme opinions. However,previous research has used reddit to recruittheir sample (Kaylor, Jeglic, and Collins2016)andstudieshavefound that results from in-person tests were no different than the results from participants recruitedonline. In fact, online recruitment provided a more ethnically diverse sample thanthatofacollegesample(Casler, Bickel, and Hackett2013). The average age of the sample was relatively young (M=26.5years),soit is possible that the perceptions and behaviors reported are not indicative of society more generally.However, as this is the peak time for sexual assault victimization (i.e., ages 12–34 are at the highest risk;Greenfield1997), it is important to understand the thoughts and behaviors of this age group. Future research should try to recruit a wider range of age to see if these results are replicated with older adults. 

Conclusion
Despite these limitations, the current study indicates that people are more likely to think that consensual statements are more normal than nonconsensual statements. Specifically, females are more likely than males to rate statements and behaviors of sexual assault as normative. That most men did not perceive nonconsensual statements as normal suggests that“locker room”talk may not be as prevalent as recent events make it seem. The current study adds to the understanding of social norms as they pertain tos exual language and behavior. As intervention programs continue to focus on changing social norms that perpetuate sexual violence, the current findings suggest that many so-called normative beliefs may not beas widely held as people perceive. However, the fact that a small portion of people did believenonconsensual language was normal suggests that there is still a need for education about sexual assaultand consensual sexual behavior.

Nationally Representative Sample of Canadians: One-fifth of participants reported prior engagement in an open relationship, and 12% reported open as their ideal relationship type; men voted this three times more than women

Open Relationship Prevalence, Characteristics, and Correlates in a Nationally Representative Sample of Canadian Adults. Nichole Fairbrother, Trevor A. Hart ORCID Icon & Malcolm Fairbrother. The Journal of Sex Research, Apr 1 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2019.1580667

Abstract: Open relationships are those in which individuals agree to participate in sexual and/or emotional and romantic interactions with more than one partner. Accurate estimates of the prevalence of open relationships, based on representative, unbiased samples, are few, and there are none from outside of the United States. We present findings from a nationally representative sample of 2,003 Canadian adults, administered in 2017 via an online questionnaire. Overall, 2.4% of all participants, and 4.0% of those currently in a relationship, reported currently being in an open relationship. One-fifth of participants reported prior engagement in an open relationship, and 12% reported open as their ideal relationship type. Men, compared with women, were more likely to report prior open relationship engagement and to identify open as their ideal relationship type. Younger participants were more likely both to engage in and to prefer open relationships. Relationship satisfaction did not differ significantly between monogamous and open relationships. Having a match between one’s actual relationship type and one’s preferred relationship type was associated with greater relationship satisfaction. Findings suggest that, while currently only a small proportion of the population is in an open relationship, interest in open relationships is higher, particularly among younger adults, and open appears to be a viable and important relationship type.

It is said that children’s sense of fairness emerges at age 8 & is rooted in the aversion to unequal distributions; they add 2 twists: It emerges already at age 3 & only in the context of collaborative activities

Children’s Sense of Fairness as Equal Respect. Jan M. Engelmann, Michael Tomasello. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Apr 2 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2019.03.001

Highlights
If humans could survive and thrive entirely on their own, they would not concern themselves with dimensions such as equality, merit, and deservingness. Fairness is a form of cooperation as it enables individuals with conflicting interests to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the demands of interdependent lifeways.

Consistent with this evolutionary perspective, young children show a concern for fairness first inside, but not outside, of collaborative interactions with others in which they view their partners (but not free riders) as equally deserving participants.

In this context, children’s sense of fairness is not mainly about how material ‘stuff’ is distributed, but about the social meaning of the act of distribution. They thus are okay with an unequal distribution if the procedure was a fair one that gave everyone an equal chance. In general, children are concerned that acts of distribution treat everyone with equal respect.

One influential view holds that children’s sense of fairness emerges at age 8 and is rooted in the development of an aversion to unequal resource distributions. Here, we suggest two amendments to this view. First, we argue and present evidence that children’s sense of fairness emerges already at age 3 in (and only in) the context of collaborative activities. This is because, in our theoretical view, collaboration creates a sense of equal respect among partners. Second, we argue and present evidence that children’s judgments about what is fair are essentially judgments about the social meaning of the distributive act; for example, children accept unequal distributions if the procedure gave everyone an equal chance (so-called distributive justice). Children thus respond to unequal (and other) distributions not based on material concerns, but rather based on interpersonal concerns: they want equal respect.

Red China's Foreign Aid in the 1970: 5 per cent of its national budget into foreign aid, maximum of 6.92pct

According to Julia Lovell's Maoism: A Global History

It is undeniable that China since the late 1950s has deployed hard and soft power in its determination to exert influence over Africa.  In the Mao era this translated into enormous aid budgets.  By 1975, China was throwing 'more than' -- in Zhou Enlai's revealingly hazy formulation -- 5 per cent of its national budget into foreign aid; in fact, two years earlier it had reached 6.92 per cent.  Compare this proportion with the 0.7 percent of national income that the much wealthier UK annually reserves for international aid..It thus seems certain that Mao-era china spent a greater proportion of income on foreign aid -- including in Africa -- than did either the US (around 1.5 per cent of the federal budget in 1977) or the USSR (0.9 per cent of GNP in 1976).

Comparing strategies for decreasing anxiety and increasing subjective well-being: downward social comparison, loving-kindness contemplations, and interconnectedness contemplation

Caring for Others Cares for the Self: An Experimental Test of Brief Downward Social Comparison, Loving-Kindness, and Interconnectedness Contemplations. Douglas A. Gentile, Dawn M. Sweet, Lanmiao He. Journal of Happiness Studies, Mar 21 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10902-019-00100-2

Abstract: Several strategies for decreasing anxiety and increasing subjective well-being have been tested and found to be useful, such as downward social comparison, loving-kindness contemplations, and interconnectedness contemplations. These, however, have not often been directly compared. Emerging adults contemplated one technique for 12 min while walking around a building. Those who wished others well (loving-kindness) had lower anxiety, greater happiness, greater empathy, and higher feelings of caring and connectedness than those in a control condition. The Interconnectedness condition resulted only in beneficial effects on social connection. Although social comparison theory suggests that downward social comparison should improve mood, this study found that it had no beneficial effects relative to the control condition and was significantly worse than the loving-kindness condition. This brief loving-kindness contemplation worked equally well across several measured individual differences, and is a simple intervention that can be used to reduce anxiety, increase happiness, empathy, and feelings of social connection.

Keywords: Happiness Well-being Social comparison Anxiety Intervention

Oral sex is associated with reduced incidence of recurrent miscarriage; maybe it induces maternal tolerance towards paternal antigens of the fetus

Oral sex is associated with reduced incidence of recurrent miscarriage. T. Meuleman et al. Journal of Reproductive Immunology, Mar 27 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jri.2019.03.005

Highlights
•    At population level, women with unexplained recurrent miscarriage had less oral sex
•    Oral sex seems to influence pregnancy outcome in a proportion of the women
•    Oral sex might induce maternal tolerance towards paternal antigens of the fetus

Abstract

A possible way of immunomodulation of the maternal immune system before pregnancy would be exposure to paternal antigens via seminal fluid to oral mucosa. We hypothesized that women with recurrent miscarriage have had less oral sex compared to women with uneventful pregnancy.

In a matched case control study, 97 women with at least three unexplained consecutive miscarriages prior to the 20th week of gestation with the same partner were included. Cases were younger than 36 years at time of the third miscarriage. The control group included 137 matched women with an uneventful pregnancy. The association between oral sex and recurrent miscarriage was assessed with conditional logistic regression, odds ratios (ORs) were estimated. Missing data were imputed using Imputation by Chained Equations.

In the matched analysis, 41 out of 72 women with recurrent miscarriage had have oral sex, whereas 70 out of 96 matched controls answered positive to this question (56.9% vs. 72.9%, OR 0.50 95%CI 0.25-0.97, p = 0.04). After imputation of missing exposure data (51.7%), the association became weaker (OR 0.67, 95%CI 0.36-1.24, p = 0.21).

In conclusion, this study suggests a possible protective role of oral sex in the occurrence of recurrent miscarriage in a proportion of the cases. Future studies in women with recurrent miscarriage explained by immune abnormalities should reveal whether oral exposure to seminal plasma indeed modifies the maternal immune system, resulting in more live births.

Nonsense Words Elicit Meaningful Drawings

Davis, Charles P., Hannah M. Morrow, and Gary Lupyan. 2019. “What Does a Horgous Look Like? Nonsense Words Elicit Meaningful Drawings.” PsyArXiv. April 2. doi:10.31234/osf.io/uve7d

Abstract: To what extent do people attribute meanings to “nonsense” words? How pervasive is such attribution? We used a set of seemingly meaningless words to elicit drawings of made-up creatures. Separate groups of participants rated the nonsense words and the drawings on several semantic dimensions, and were asked to choose a name for the drawn creatures. Nonsense words elicited a high level of consistency in the produced drawings. Meaning attributions made to nonsense words corresponded with meaning attributions made by separate people to drawings that were inspired by the name. Naïve participants were able to recover the name that inspired the drawing with greater-than-chance accuracy. These results suggest that people make liberal and consistent use of non-arbitrary relationships between forms and meanings.

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1. Introduction
Imagine a group of artists illustrating children’s books about made-up creatures with
names like “horgous” and “keex.” Will different artists create similar drawings for creatures that
have similar names? Will readers who encounter the drawing of a “horgous” expect this creature
to be named “horgous”? We show here that drawings elicited by certain “nonsense” words relate
in a systematic way to the form of these words. This relationship between nonce words and the
meanings they express is bidirectional: Certain word-forms lead people to infuse their drawings
with certain properties. Other people, looking at the drawings, match them back to the original
names at higher than chance levels.
The idea that certain words fit some meanings better than others has its roots in the
ancient world (Plato, 1999) but was all but excised by the ascendance of structural linguistics (de
Saussure, 1959) and its focus on the sharp boundary between the signifier and the signified. The
conventional wisdom has been that with the exception of words that directly imitate sounds, the
relationship between word-forms and meanings is arbitrary: “There is no reason for you to call a
dog ‘dog’ rather than ‘cat’ except for the fact that everyone else is doing it” (Pinker & Bloom,
1990). In the last several decades, iconicity—a resemblance between form and meaning—is
being recognized as one of the basic design features of natural language in both the signed and
spoken modalities (Perniss & Vigliocco, 2014, Dingemanse et al., 2015, Monaghan et al., 2014,
cf. Hockett, 1978). The idea that the auditory modality can convey meanings in an iconic way,
beyond simple imitation of sounds, is at first counterintuitive. For example, Hockett argued that
the relationships between spoken words and meanings is arbitrary because “When a
representation of some four-dimensional hunk of life has to be compressed into the single
dimension of speech, most iconicity is necessarily squeezed out” (Hockett, 1978 p. 274). We now know that speech is a richly multi-dimensional signal, and spoken languages make ample
use of this dimensionality to convey meanings in an iconic way. For example, consonant voicing
(/b/ vs. /p/, /d/ vs. /t/) is used to signal differences in mass: Siwu: tsratsra, ‘a light person walking
quickly’ vs. dzradzra, ‘a heavy person walking quickly’. Vowel quality is used to signal size:
Ewe: lɛgɛɛ : logoo, ‘slim : fat’. Vowel lengthening is used to signal duration and intensity:
Japanese:  piQ : piiQ, ‘tear short : long strip of cloth. And reduplication is used to signal
repetition: Tamil: curuk-nu : curukcuruk-nu, ‘a sharp prick : many sharp pricks’ (Dingemanse et
al., 2015; see also Perniss, Thompson, & Vigliocco, 2010). Although these specific form-to
meaning relationships are not found in all languages, examining statistical relationships between
forms and meanings across languages does reveal some more universal relationships (e.g., Blasi
et al., 2016).
What makes such examples especially interesting is that people appear to be extremely
sensitive to form–meaning relationships even when the specific relationship is not present in
their language. For example, monolingual English 3-year-olds are sensitive to Japanese form–
meaning relationships when learning novel words (Kantartzis, Imai, & Kita, 2011). In English,
there does not appear to be a systematic relationship between object size and vowel pitch. Yet
anyone who has read to a small child knows that there is something exceedingly natural about
saying “elephant” in a lower pitch than “mouse,” or using a higher pitch to refer to the baby
elephant compared to the mommy elephant.1 Similarly, in English, smaller objects do not as a
rule have shorter names than larger objects (indeed, the relative shortness of “whale” compared
to “micro-organism” is used by Hockett to illustrate the principle of arbitrariness; Hockett,
1978). And yet, when asked to select a nonce-word for a small object such as a pin, people not
only prefer shorter words, but justify their choices with statements like “a small item’s name
should be small” and “pins are sharp and simple, as is this word” (Lupyan & Casasanto, 2012).
Hearing adults with no sign language experience can also use iconicity to determine the
approximate meaning of a word (i.e., a word’s telic content—whether it refers to an event with a
finite end point or not) across a number of signed languages, even when the exact meaning of the
sign is not a response option. People are more likely to choose “believe” than “forget” when
presented with a sign for “think” (Strickland et al., 2015), perhaps because telic signs make event
boundaries salient, while atelic signs are characterized by repetition and a lack of such
boundaries.
In an early systematic investigation of what he called “phonetic symbolism,” Sapir
(1929) recruited over 500 participants of varying ages (mostly, but not exclusively, English
speakers) and presented them with dozens of short nonce words and asked to distinguish them on
size. For example, a participant may be told that “mal” and “mil” both mean table; they then had
to decide which would be a better word for a large table. The chosen answer, overwhelmingly
and largely independent of age and language background, was “mal.”2 Sapir concluded that most
people displayed a common “feeling-significance” toward vocalic and consonantal contrasts in
nonsense words and that it made “surprisingly little difference whether the phonetic contrast was
contained in a [phonotactically] ‘possible’ [i.e., attested in the subject’s language] or …
‘impossible’ context” (p. 228). Sapir did not know where these sound-to-meaning mappings
came from, but speculated that they may arise from people implicitly learning that producing
 certain vowels requires larger mouth cavities. This early speculation was greatly amplified by
Ramachandran and Hubbard’s (2001) replication of Sapir’s phonetic symbolism demonstration
(see also Kohler, 1929; Newman, 1931) giving us the well-known “bouba-kiki” effect wherein
people overwhelmingly match “bouba” to a round shape and “kiki” to an angular one (see also
e.g., Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006).
Contemporary investigations of sound symbolism have not settled the question of where
these associations between forms and meanings come from (but see e.g., Imai & Kita, 2014;
Sidhu & Pexman, 2018; Spence, 2011), but they have further demonstrated the varied way in
which iconicity plays a role in language learning and vocal communication. For example, Perry
et al. (2018) showed that more iconic words are learned earlier by children (adjusting for
numerous potential confounds like frequency, concreteness, and communicative need; see also
e.g., Imai, Kita, Nagumo, & Okada, 2008; Maurer et al., 2006; Peña, Mehler, & Nespor, 2011;
for further review, see Imai & Kita, 2014). Such apparent advantages of iconicity go beyond
word-learning. For example, people think that someone named Bob ought to have a round face
while a Mike should have a more angular one (Sidhu & Pexman, 2015). Further, Lupyan and
Casasanto (2015) had people learn to categorize two kinds of “aliens.” One of these contained
aliens that were subtly more round and the other subtly more pointy. When the categories were
labeled with the nonce words “foove” (which people tend to associate with being round and
friendly) and “crelch” (pointy and dangerous), people learned the category distinction itself (not
just the category names) better than when arbitrary or iconically incongruent labels were used.
When tasked with creating novel vocalizations to communicate a range of meanings (e.g., big,
small, high, low, smooth, rough, cook, fire, fruit, and many others), people not only converge on
surprisingly similar vocal forms, but when these vocalizations are played to naïve listeners
(including those from other language backgrounds), they are understood at levels well above
chance (Perlman & Lupyan, 2018).

From 2015... The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template

From 2015... The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-Based Moral Template. Chelsea Schein, Kurt Gray. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Vol 41, Issue 8, June 19, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591501

Abstract: ­Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is “no.” Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition—in both liberals and conservatives—is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested—and confirmed—through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes—and overlaps with—diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.

Keywords: moral pluralism, values, culture, moral foundations, political psychology

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The existence of moral disagreement across the political spectrum is uncontroversial. One need only open a news-paper to see that liberals and conservatives are divided on many issues, including abortion, capital punishment, gay rights, women’s rights, gun ownership, environmentalism, euthanasia, and the justifiability of war. What is contro-versial is whether this disagreement reflects deep differ-ences in moral cognition. Do liberals and conservatives have fundamentally different moral minds? One popular theory of moral cognition argues that liberals and conser-vatives rely on different sets of moral mechanisms (or foundations; Haidt, 2012).In contrast, we suggest that liberals and conservatives fundamentally have the same moral mind. Rather than dis-tinct and differentially activated mechanisms, we suggest that moral judgment involves a common template grounded in perceived harm (the moral dyad; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). This template is not only consistent with categorization in non-moral domains but also reconciles modern moral pluralism with historic harm-centric accounts, and provides hope for bridging political differ-ences. In this article, we test six predictions of dyadic morality, which can be summarized as follows: Harm is central in moral cognition for both liberals and conservatives. 

Descriptive Diversity 
An important first step in science is collecting and cataloging diversity. Biology began with natural history, in which living organisms were collected from around the world and placed into taxonomies. The most famous biological taxonomy is Linnaean classification—proposed by Carl Linnaeus—which divides organisms into five different kingdoms based on their appearance.The new renaissance of moral psychology also began with collecting and taxonomizing moral diversity based on descriptive appearance, akin to Linnaean classification. Anthropological accounts of morality in rural India were divided into three content areas of autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). One later account inspired by American political disagree-ment—Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)—taxonomizes morality into the five content areas of harm, fairness, author-ity, in-group, and purity (Haidt, 2012).Beyond providing a moral taxonomy, MFT also suggests differences in morality across liberals and conservatives, with only conservatives being concerned with authority, in-group, and purity. The idea of differences between liberals and conservatives is not new, as decades of research reveal that conservatives are more tolerant of inequality, are more religious, and believe more in a just world (for review, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In particular, classic research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) reveals that conservatives are more submissive to authority, more likely to use aggression to protect the in-group, and more conventional in terms of sexuality (Altemeyer, 1988).Given that RWA demonstrates the sensitivity of conserva-tives to authority, in-group, and sexual/religious convention-alism, it is safe for MFT to suggest the same—especially given that MFT questionnaires about authority, in-group, and purity correlate up to r = .70 with the RWA questionnaire (Graham etal., 2011, Table 7, p. 377). Moreover, as RWA fully accounts for liberal-conservative differences revealed by MFT (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014), one may wonder about the novelty of MFT claims. However, MFT does make one bold, unique claim—that these political dif-ferences arise from deep differences in moral cognition. 

Moral Modules
 Inspired by theories of basic emotions, MFT suggests that harm, fairness, in-group, authority, and purity each represent a distinct functional moral mechanism or cognitive module(Haidt, 2012). MFT defines cognitive modules as “little switches in the brains of all animals” that are “triggered” by specific moral “inputs” (Haidt, 2012, p. 123). These modules are suggested to be ultimately distinct from each other, involving fundamentally “distinct cognitive computations” (Young & Saxe, 2011, p. 203), such that violations of one content area (e.g., harm) are processed differently from those of another (e.g., purity).This “distinct cognition” prediction is best explained by the MFT analogy of moral foundations as different “taste receptors” (e.g., purity as “saltiness”), such that each moral concern triggers only one specific receptor, which gives rise to a corresponding distinct moral experience. However, recent evidence casts doubt on claims of distinct cognition, as even harm and purity—often discussed as maximally dis-tinct (Haidt, 2012)—are highly correlated (r = .87; Gray & Keeney, 2015). Moreover, the apparent cognitive differ-ences between these two content areas stem from scenario sampling bias: MFT purity violations are weirder and less severe (e.g., necrophilia) than harm violations (e.g., mur-der), and it is these general differences that give the illusion of distinct cognition (Gray & Keeney, 2015).MFT also posits that moral modules are uniquely linked to specific emotions, such that harm is specially linked to anger and purity to disgust. Recent evidence also casts doubt on this claim, as links between moral content and emotion can be explained with broader affective and conceptual con-siderations (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, in press; Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). Studies that purport to find a unique effect of disgust on purity fail to control for other high arousal emotions, such as anger or fear, or use statistical pro-cedures that ignore substantial shared variance between anger and disgust (Cameron etal., in press).Despite the lack of evidence for cognitive distinctness, the idea of moral “foundations” is intuitively compelling because it aligns with psychological essentialism—provid-ing a deep mental/biological explanation for important polit-ical differences. However, descriptive differences between liberals and conservatives—whether in personality, music preferences, or the moralization of specific issues—need not reflect cognitive differences. Even incredible diversity can be underlain by a common process.

Common Cognition 
If science begins with cataloging diversity, its next step is often developing theories that explain this diversity with a common mechanism. In biology, Linnaeus and his contem-poraries believed that each species was distinct and immu-table, uniquely created by God. However, Darwin discovered that this incredible diversity stemmed from the simple algo-rithm of evolution. Could moral diversity also be underlain by a simple common mechanism? Could liberals and conser-vatives—despite their political disagreements—ultimately have the same moral cognition?Decades of research in cognitive psychology suggest that non-moral categorization decisions (is x a member of y cat-egory?) rely upon the process of template comparison. This template (or prototype) represents the most common, salient or important features across category instances (Murphy, 2004). Categorization decisions are made by comparing potential examples with this template, with closer matches being more robustly categorized as belonging to that cate-gory. For the category of “birds,” the template includes the features of “small,” “flying,” and “seed-eating,” which explains why sparrows are judged as more bird-like than penguins (Rosch, 1978). The same process occurs in social categorization, in which people are compared with cognitive templates called stereotypes (Smith & Zarate, 1990).The principle of parsimony suggests that moral judgments (is x act a member of the category immorality?) should also be made via template comparison. Acts should be compared to a moral template—or prototype—that extracts the most common, salient, and important elements across instances of immorality. Moral psychology suggests many potential can-didates for these elements, such as concerns about intention, causation, and outcome (Alicke, 2000; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Malle, 2006); norm and affect (Nichols, 2002); and mind perception (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). The concept of harm is related to many of these elements, and we suggest it forms the basis of a cognitive moral template. 

Dyadic Morality 
Harm can manifest itself in different ways, but within moral contexts, it typically involves the intentional action of one person causing suffering to a second person—a perpetrator and a victim. More technically, harm involves the perception of two interacting minds, one mind (an agent) intentionally causing suffering to another mind (a patient)—what we call the moral dyad (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; see also Mikhail, 2007).The complementary roles of agent and patient stem from the two-dimensional nature of mind perception (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011) and the general dyadic structure of language (Brown & Fish, 1983) and action (Aristotle, BC350), in which agents act upon patients (Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The psychological power of a harm-based template stems not only from the presence of inten-tional harm in many canonical acts of immorality (e.g., murder, rape, assault, and abuse) but also from the affective potency of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitiv-ity of agency detection (Barrett, 2004), the early develop-ment of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013).It is clear that harm plays a key role in morality, helping to separate counter-normative acts into those that are immoral from those that are violations of mere social con-vention (Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Dyadic morality provides a mechanism for the role of harm. We suggest that a norm violation “x” leads people to automatically ask “is x immoral?”—per-haps to the degree that x induces negative affect (Nichols, 2002)—which then activates the dyadic harm-based tem-plate. The more an act is inherently dyadic (i.e., harmful), the better the template matches, and the more robustly it is judged as immoral, explaining why murder is judged as more immoral than masturbation. Importantly, this process of dyadic comparison is intuitive and need not rely on effortful reason, like moral judgment in general (Haidt, 2001).Although a dyadic template should be reliably present during moral judgments, we acknowledge the influence of other domain-general psychological factors, such as misin-terpreting affective arousal (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) or rote learning (i.e., “the bible says abortion is wrong”). However, a dyadic template suggests that such misinterpretation and rote learning are easier with more harmful actions. Just as it is easier to rote-learn that a jerboa (a little desert kangaroo) is a mammal than a platypus (which non-prototypically lays eggs and has a bill), it should also be easier to rote-learn that abortion is immoral than to rote-learn that dropping the Torah is immoral.Importantly, we are not suggesting that moral cognition consists of only one moral module (i.e., a foundation) of harm. Dyadic morality, with its roots in psychological con-structionism (Cameron etal., in press), denies the very exis-tence of moral modules. This template is not an on-or-off “switch” but is instead a domain-general process that allows for gradations of harm. It is also activated no matter the con-tent of the norm violation—that is, even when an act initially seems harmless (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Because harm represents the essence of immorality, it serves as a con-stant backdrop in moral cognition—one that exerts a power-ful cognitive gravity (Schein & Gray, 2014).The Pluralism of Perceived HarmModular theories such as MFT have long argued against such a common template because of the ostensible existence of harmless wrongs. For example, scenarios of consensual incest carefully constructed to be “objectively harmless” are still rated as immoral by participants (Haidt, 2001). However, we argue against the very idea of “objective” harm. Harm, like morality, is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both harm and morality are rooted in the ambiguous perceptions of other minds. Judgments of immorality require seeing a mind capable of doing evil, and judgments of harm require seeing a mind capable of suffering (i.e., an agent and a patient; Gray & Schein, 2012).The subjective nature of harm means that bizarre “harm-less” scenarios concocted by liberal researchers (e.g., mas-turbating with a dead chicken) may not seem harmless to their more conservative participants. Indeed, many studies document the perception of harm in “harmless” cases of reli-gious blasphemy, anti-patriotism, and aberrant sexuality (DeScioli, Gilbert, & Kurzban, 2012; Kahan, 2007; for a full treatment, see Gray etal., 2014).Consider a case described by anthropologist Richard Shweder (2012): Oriya Hindu Brahmans believe it is extremely immoral for the eldest son to eat chicken immedi-ately after his father’s death. Westerners fail to see this action as wrong—or harmful—viewing it as a mere matter of reli-gious protocol, whereas Hindus consider it the eldest son’s duty to process the father’s “death pollution” through a veg-etarian diet. When the son eats chicken, he “places the father’s spiritual transmigration in deep jeopardy” (Shweder, 2012, p. 96). By understanding the perceived harm in these actions, even Western liberals can understand its perceived immorality.1 Who can deny the immorality of condemning your father to eternal suffering? MFT interprets such perceived harm as mistaken, but dyadic morality sees these perceptions as legitimate. In the language of social anthropology, dyadic morality advocates for not only moral pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of dif-ferent perceptions of morality) but also harm pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of different perceptions of harm). Harm pluralism suggests that different moral content such as purity and loyalty are (less prototypical) varieties of per-ceived harm. In contrast, MFT endorses harm monism, rejecting the legitimacy of harm in anything but direct physi-cal or emotional suffering.Indeed, the very act of separating harm into a specific modular “foundation” denies its perceived existence in moral issues such as treason or sexual impropriety. The harm monism of MFT discounts the harm that conservatives see in matters of religious and sexual propriety (Gray etal., 2014). We suggest that this harm monism stems from the liberal bias in social psychology (Inbar & Lammers, 2012), which also once long denied the legitimacy of moral pluralism. Echoing the cries of moral anthropologists, we suggest that understanding harm requires cultural sensitivity (Shweder, 2012); moral psychol-ogy should prioritize the harm pluralist perceptions of partici-pants over the harm monist theories of researchers. 

The Centrality of Harm for Liberals and Conservatives 
The diversity of harm provides the possibility for a unify-ing moral template in both liberals and conservatives. Rather than distinct moral mechanisms for each kind of moral content, dyadic morality suggests that immoral acts—even those of “authority” or “purity”—will activate a prototype of harm. Of course, some acts are more harmful than others, and dyadic morality predicts that increased harm (i.e., better template matches) will result in more severe judgments of immorality. Consistent with past research on RWA, we acknowledge political differences between liberals and conservative—and the possibility that these differences may translate to some differences in moral judgment. However, we predict that moral differences between liberals and conservatives have been greatly exag-gerated by MFT (a prediction consistent with Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Morgan, & Wisneski, in press).We suggest that liberals and conservatives share the same dyadic template, rather than categorically different moral minds. A harm-based moral template predicts that harm should be cen-tral in moral cognition across both moral diversity (i.e., many different moral acts) and political orientation (i.e., for both lib-erals and conservatives). Because centrality is a relatively broad concept, we operationalize it through six specific hypotheses:Hypothesis 1 (H1: Accessibility): Harm is most cogni-tively accessible across moral diversity and political ori-entation (Study 1).Hypothesis2(H2: Importance): Harm is most impor-tant across moral diversity and political orientation (Studies 2 and 3).Hypothesis3(H3: Organization): Harm organizes judg-ments of immorality across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 4).Hypothesis4(H4: Overlap): Harm overlaps substan-tially with other moral concerns across political orienta-tion (Study 5).Hypothesis5(H5: Translation): Harm is the best lingua franca for translating across moral diversity and political orientation (Study 6).Hypothesis6 (H6: Association): Harm is more implic-itly associated with moral diversity than descriptively similar concerns, across political orientation (Study 7).

Demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on the accumulation of large numbers of small effects

Population Genetics: Why structure matters. Nick Barton, Joachim Hermisson, Magnus Nordborg. eLIFE Sciences, Mar 21 2019. https://elifesciences.org/articles/45380

Abstract: Great care is needed when interpreting claims about the genetic basis of human variation based on data from genome-wide association studies.

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As the name suggests, GWAS scan the genome for variants – typically single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) – that are associated with a particular condition or trait (phenotype). The first GWAS for height found a small number of SNPs that jointly explained only a tiny fraction of the variation. Because this was in contrast with the high heritability seen in twin studies, it was dubbed ‘the missing heritability problem’ (reviewed in Yang et al., 2010). It was suggested that the problem was simply due to a lack of statistical power to detect polymorphisms of small effect. Subsequent studies with larger sample sizes have supported this explanation: more and more loci have been identified although most of the variation remains ‘unmappable’, presumably because sample sizes on the order of a million are still not large enough (Yengo et al., 2018).

One way in which the unmappable component of genetic variation can be included in a statistical measure is via so-called polygenic scores. These scores sum the estimated contributions to the trait across many SNPs, including those whose effects, on their own, are not statistically significant. Polygenic scores thus represent a shift from the goal of identifying major genes to predicting phenotype from genotype. Originally designed for plant and animal breeding purposes, polygenic scores can, in principle, also be used to study the genetic basis of differences between individuals and groups.

This, however, requires accurate and unbiased estimation of the effects of all SNPs included in the score, which is difficult in a structured (non-homogeneous) population when environmental differences cannot be controlled. To see why this is a problem, consider the classic example of chopstick-eating skills (Lander and Schork, 1994). While there surely are genetic variants affecting our ability to handle chopsticks, most of the variation for this trait across the globe is due to environmental differences (cultural background), and a GWAS would mostly identify variants that had nothing to do with chopstick skills, but simply happened to differ in frequency between East Asia and the rest of the world.

Several methods for dealing with this problem have been proposed. When a GWAS is carried out to identify major genes, it is relatively simple to avoid false positives by eliminating associations outside major loci regardless of whether they are due to population structure confounding or an unmappable polygenic background (Vilhjálmsson and Nordborg, 2013). However, if the goal is to make predictions, or to understand differences among populations (such as the latitudinal cline in height), we need accurate and unbiased estimates for all SNPs. Accomplishing this is extremely challenging, and it is also difficult to know whether one has succeeded.

One possibility is to compare the population estimates with estimates taken from sibling data, which should be relatively unbiased by environmental differences. In one of many examples of this, Robinson et al. used data from the GIANT Consortium (Wood et al., 2014) together with sibling data to estimate that genetic variation contributes significantly to height variation across Europe (Robinson et al., 2015). They also argued that selection must have occurred, because the differences were too large to have arisen by chance. Using estimated effect sizes provided by Robinson et al., a more sophisticated analysis by Field et al. found extremely strong evidence for selection for height across Europe (p=10−74; Field et al., 2016). Several other studies reached the same conclusion based on the GIANT data (reviewed in Berg et al., 2019; Sohail et al., 2019).

Berg et al. (who are based at Columbia University, Stanford University, UC Davis and the University of Copenhagen) and Sohail et al. (who are based at Harvard Medical School, the Broad Institute, and other institutes in the US, Finland and Sweden) now re-examine these conclusions using the recently released data from the UK Biobank (Sudlow et al., 2015). Estimating effect sizes from these data allows possible biases due to population structure confounding to be investigated, because the UK Biobank data comes from a (supposedly) more homogenous population than the GIANT data.

Using these new estimates, Berg et al. and Sohail et al. independently found that evidence for selection vanishes – along with evidence for a genetic cline in height across Europe. Instead, they show that the previously published results were due to the cumulative effects of slight biases in the effect-size estimates in the GIANT data. Surprisingly, they also found evidence for confounding in the sibling data used as a control by Robinson et al. and Field et al. This turned out to be due to a technical error in the data distributed by Robinson et al. after they published their paper.

This means we still do not know whether genetics and selection are responsible for the pattern of height differences seen across Europe. That genetics plays a major role in height differences between individuals is not in doubt, and it is also clear that the signal from GWAS is mostly real. The issue is that there is no perfect way to control for complex population structure and environmental heterogeneity. Biases at individual loci may be tiny, but they become highly significant when summed across thousands of loci – as is done in polygenic scores. Standard methods to control for these biases, such as principal component analysis, may work well in simulations but are often insufficient when confronted with real data. Importantly, no natural population is unstructured: indeed, even the data in the UK Biobank seems to contain significant structure (Haworth et al., 2019).

Berg et al. and Sohail et al. demonstrate the potential for population structure to create spurious results, especially when using methods that rely on large numbers of small effects, such as polygenic scores. Caution is clearly needed when interpreting and using the results of such studies. For clinical predictions, risks must be weighed against benefits (Rosenberg et al., 2019). In some cases, such as recommendations for more frequent medical checkups for patients found at higher ‘genetic’ risk of a condition, it may not matter greatly whether predictors are confounded as long as they work. By contrast, the results of behavioral studies of traits such as IQ and educational attainment (Plomin and von Stumm, 2018) must be presented carefully, because while the benefits are far from obvious, the risks of such results being misinterpreted and misused are quite clear. The problem is worsened by the tendency of popular media to ignore caveats and uncertainties of estimates.

Finally, although quantitative genetics has proved highly successful in plant and animal breeding, it should be remembered that this success has been based on large pedigrees, well-controlled environments, and short-term prediction. When these methods have been applied to natural populations, even the most basic predictions fail, in large part due to poorly understood environmental factors (Charmantier et al., 2014). Natural populations are never homogeneous, and it is therefore misleading to imply there is a qualitative difference between ‘within-population’ and ‘between-population’ comparisons – as was recently done in connection with James Watson’s statements about race and IQ (Harmon, 2019). With respect to confounding by population structure, the key qualitative difference is between controlling the environment experimentally, and not doing so. Once we leave an experimental setting, we are effectively skating on thin ice, and whether the ice will hold depends on how far out we skate.

The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe & North America in the early twenty-first century: Associated with declines in face-to-face contact, not with increases in use of electronic media

The decline in adolescent substance use across Europe and North America in the early twenty-first century: A result of the digital revolution? Margaretha De Looze et al. International Journal of Public Health, March 2019, Volume 64, Issue 2, pp 229–240. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00038-018-1182-7

Abstract
Objectives: Increases in electronic media communication (EMC) and decreases in face-to-face peer contact in the evening (FTF) have been thought to explain the recent decline in adolescent substance use (alcohol, tobacco, cannabis). This study addresses this hypothesis, by examining associations between (time trends in) EMC, FTF, and substance use in more than 25 mainly European countries.

Methods: Using 2002–2014 data from the international Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study, we ran multilevel logistic regression analyses to investigate the above associations.

Results: National declines in substance use were associated with declines in FTF, but not with increases in EMC. At the individual level, both EMC and FTF related positively to substance use. For alcohol and cannabis use, the positive association with EMC was stronger in more recent years. Associations between EMC and substance use varied across countries, but this variation could not be explained by the proportion of young people using EMC within countries.

Conclusions: Our research suggests that the decrease in FTF, but not the increase in EMC, plays a role in the recent decrease in adolescent substance use.

Keywords: Adolescence Substance use Tobacco Alcohol Cannabis Electronic media communication Internet Trends over time Europe Time spent with friends

Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts; they scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys; sport practice related with mental rotation performance

Childhood preference for spatial toys. Gender differences and relationships with mental rotation in STEM and non-STEM students. Angelica Moè, Petra Jansen, Stefanie Pietsch. Learning and Individual Differences, Volume 68, December 2018, Pages 108-115. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2018.10.003

Highlights
•    Women in Science preferred spatial toys in childhood more than women in Arts.
•    They scored higher in mental rotation when they had preferred spatial toys.
•    Sport practice related with mental rotation performance.

Abstract: Women tend not to choose STEM degrees, for a number of reasons associated with aptitudes, motivation and experience with certain spatial tasks such as mental rotation. This study considered an unexplored experiential factor: childhood preference for spatial toys and sports. It was predicted that the higher the preference for spatial activities in childhood, the higher the mental rotation performance and intrinsic motivation, and likewise the greater the probability of choosing a STEM degree. One hundred seventy-six Italian and German students attending the first year of either a STEM (n = 90) or a no STEM (n = 86) degree filled in the Mental Rotation Test, a self-report to assess intrinsic motivation, and two questionnaires to assess their actual practice with spatial sports and their childhood preference for either spatial or non-spatial toys and sports. The results showed that women in STEM degrees preferred spatial toys more than women in non-STEM degrees and performed better in mental rotation when preferred spatial toys in childhood. The discussion focuses on the relationship between childhood toy preferences and the choice of a STEM degree.

Girls read more than boys: It also happens with digital devices; cause is much bigger motivation to read

Gender gap in reading digitally? Examining the role of motivation and self-concept. Nele McElvany, Franziska Schwabe. Journal for Educational Research Online, Vol 11, No 1 (2019), http://www.j-e-r-o.com/index.php/jero/article/view/882

Abstract: Reading is a core prerequisite for educational success and participation in society. However, comprehensive empirical research is needed to understand how reading may differ in a digitalized world. The current study addressed the gender gap in reading digitally. It investigated competence scores along with information on (a) reading and (b) digital motivation and self-concept in 588 elementary school students. Results revealed a gender gap in reading digitally, in reading motivation and self-concept, and in motivation and self-concept in respect to working on digital devices. Only reading motivation variables predicted reading digitally, thereby providing important information on the validity of digitally based reading tests. Reading motivation was found to fully mediate the gender effect on reading digitally. Results have important implications for research and practice.

Keywords: Reading; Motivation; Digitalization; Elementary school
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Welfare implications of labor market power: Declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 pct points 1976-2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share

Labor Market Power. David W. Berger, Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Simon Mongey. NBER Working Paper No. 25719. March 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25719

Abstract: What are the welfare implications of labor market power? We provide an answer to this question in two steps: (1) we develop a tractable quantitative, general equilibrium, oligopsony model of the labor market, (2) we estimate key parameters using within-firm-state, across-market differences in wage and employment responses to state corporate tax changes in U.S. Census data. We validate the model against recent evidence on productivity-wage pass-through, and new measurements of the distribution of local market concentration. The model implies welfare losses from labor market power that range from 2.9 to 8.0 percent of lifetime consumption. However, despite large contemporaneous losses, labor market power has not contributed to the declining labor share. Finally, we show that minimum wages can deliver moderate, and limited, welfare gains by reallocating workers from smaller to larger, more productive firms.


Tyler Cowen summarizing (Some implications of monopsony models, Mar 01 2019, https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2019/04/some-implications-of-monopsony-models.html):

More workers ought to be in larger firms, as those firms are afraid to hire more, knowing that bids up wages for everyone. Therefore (ceteris paribus) the large firms in the economy ought to be larger.

Raising the legal minimum wage also reallocates workers into larger firms, and again makes them larger.

Tough stuff if you worry a lot about both monopoly and monopsony at the same time -- choose your poison!

I have adapted those points from a recent paper by David Berger, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey, "Labor Market Power."  On the empirics, they conclude: "Our theory implies that this declining labor market concentration increase labor's share of income by 2.89 percentage points between 1976 and 2014, suggesting that labor market concentration is not the reason for a declining labor share."  So the paper makes no one happy (good!): monopsony is significant, but has been declining in import.