Wealth Generation as a Form of Expertise: An Examination from 2002-2016 of Elite Education, Cognitive Ability, and the Gender Gap Among Billionaires. Jonathan Wai & Tomoe Kanaya. Journal of Expertise 2019, Vol 2(1). https://www.journalofexpertise.org/articles/volume2_issue1/JoE_2019_2_1_Wai_Kanaya.html
Abstract: The study of expertise has focused on areas such as chess, music, and sports. Here, we argue that wealth generation can also be considered a form of expertise. This study examines 14,246 global Forbes billionaires across 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability, looking at the world (and U.S. specifically) as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. The results reveal that the elite education and cognitive ability level of billionaires has remained relatively stable over time, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Yet, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. These results suggest that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified their ability to generate wealth in more recent years. This paper broadens the definition of expertise to include wealth generation—the idea that the development of wealth expertise may have skills that transcend field—and suggests deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of success for this area of expertise. A multidisciplinary perspective can help test the strength and generality of expertise theories, more comprehensive models ofe xpertise should account for abilities and education, and the investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Keywords: wealth expertise, elite education, wealth inequality, historical examination, talent
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Introduction
Expertise development has traditionally been studied in domains such as sports, music, and games like chess (e.g., Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). However, there has been a recent push for more comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., for a review, see Hambrick, Macnamara, Campitelli, Ullen, & Mosing, 2016) and a broader multidisciplinary approach to studying expertise (Gobet, 2016). Indeed, expertise research has started to move into domains such business, law, politics, and even journalism (e.g., Volden, Wiseman, & Wai, 2016; Wai, 2013; Wai & Perina, 2018; Wai & Rindermann, 2017), though there has been less research to date focused on wealth accumulation (e.g., Wai & Lincoln, 2016) and the idea that this might also be a form of expertise.
A cottage industry exists around wealth creation (e.g., multiple organizations track the characteristics and habits of the wealthy), in large part because the idea that making money is a skill or form of expertise is attractive. For example, money managers often will demonstrate their “talent” at growing wealth to attract future clients by pointing to their rate of returns in the past. But throughout history, there has been much contention over whether wealth generation is really a form of expertise where talent has a role to play, and how much of becoming rich is simply due to “luck” or things like nepotism (Galbraith, 1994; Pluchino, Biondo, & Rapisarda, 2018). Many models of expertise suggest that general cognitive ability likely plays a role in expertise development (for a review, see Subotnik, Olszewski-Kubilius, & Worrell, 2011). Though certainly not the only important predictor, this perspective would align with the idea that cognitive talent differences may, at least in part, be important in explaining wealth inequality. Additionally, Ericsson’s deliberate practice model focuses on the idea that practice largely can account for individual differences in domain performance (Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson et al., 1993). In contrast to this, Macnamara, Hambrick, and Oswald (2014) showed that deliberate practice accounted for less than 1% of the performance variance in occupations. The review by Hambrick et al. (2016) strongly suggests that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of individual differences in performance across expertise domains studied. Another way to approach the estimation of the role of talent and practice in success is to examine the role of general cognitive ability first, and then consider that as an important source of variance to account for (e.g., Lubinski, 2004) prior to assessing the impact of other factors, such as practice or even luck, which are also important.
Broadening definitions and domains of expertise research to incorporate wealth generation and maintenance, therefore, may be important to test the generality of theoretical models of expertise and expert performance. Though wealth generation is on a continuum, an extreme level of this type of expertise, at least at present, is attaining billionaire status. Due to the many pathways of attaining billionaire status, it may seem that wealth generation is too broad to be considered as a form of expertise. There are, after all, so many different paths to attain billionaire status, with the paths themselves through particular industries that are arguably quantitatively and qualitatively different. The study of expertise has traditionally focused on carefully examining one particular domain as the venue for research (e.g., chess, running).
However, anotherway of studying expertise is to start with an outcome such as extreme wealth and then consider the domains through which such extreme wealth was generated such as different industries (e.g., real estate, technology). In fact, the study of comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., Hambrick et al., 2016) examines expertise development across multiple domains purposefully to shed light on what elements do or do not generalize across domains. Thus, looking at a large sample of billionaires across time and across industry or domain might shed light in a new way on different ways wealth expertise manifests itself.
Another way of thinking about wealth generation as a form of expertise is to consider that the skills and interests in wealth generation likely can and do transcend a specific domain or field. For example, a strong interest and desire to make money would lead an astute entrepreneur or investor to choose an industry based on wealth generation potential as a primary factor. The industry chosen would be selected not on interest in developing expertise within that industry, but rather because it is a good match to the individual’s particular skill sets, interests, connections, and know-how at the time. This would maximize the leveraging of that domain to increase the likelihood of wealth generation. For example, generating an idea, recognizing and seizing an opportunity, a willingness to take extreme risks, convincing others to invest in the idea, and sticking with the idea through lows and highs (or failing and generating a new idea) until eventual fruition are all general skills that likely transcend field in developing wealth expertise. Thus, the educational selectivity and cognitive ability required for a certain pathway to wealth expertise may be important to consider. That is, understanding the role that certain elite schools may play in different domains of wealth expertise can shed light on the role of educational filtering mechanisms and corresponding cognitive ability that different domains of wealth expertise may require.
The study of occupational leaders or elites (e.g., Hacker, 1961; Khan, 2012) has attracted much public discussion and academic interest across multiple disciplines, especially in the U.S. due to a focus on income inequalityand what factors might explain why a tiny fraction of the population holds an enormous fraction of wealth (Piketty & Saez, 2003; Solow, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011). The path to becoming a billionaire is often linked to many personal and contextual factors such as family wealth and connections, attending highly selective schools and accessing networks, cognitive ability, and luck (Wai, 2013, 2014; Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Prior research examined the education and ability levels of Fortune 500 CEOs across the last two decades (Wai & Rindermann, 2015), and uncovered that such levels remained relatively stable across time. This suggests that the occupational filtering or selection structure for Fortune 500 CEOs has been unchanged for at least the last two decades. It remains to be explored whether this holds in other domains. Murray (2003) investigated human accomplishment across the full span of history, from 800 B. C. to 1950, so studying samples after 1950 is important for contemporary understanding, but at the same time the historical trends in the last 50 years are likely but a blip in comparison to accomplishment going back in time.
Scholars that span disciplines have commented on the role that technology may have played in amplifying the impact of highly talented individuals. For example, the economist Krueger (2012, p. 5) noted things have “favored people with the analytical skills to get the most out of technology.” The economist Mankiw (2013, p. 23) stated “changes in technology have allowed a small number of highly educated and exceptionally talented individuals to command superstar incomes in ways that were not possible a generation ago.” Indeed, prior research uncovered that, in more recent years, the billionaires around the world who accumulated their wealth from the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to have very high levels of elite education and corresponding cognitive ability (Wai, 2013, 2014). This also appeared true for 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Psychologists Aguinis and O’Boyle (2013) argued that changes in work have handsomely rewarded a handful of star performers who contribute the vast majority of value in innovation.
Given these comments, it is surprising that it has not been as widely considered that one partial explanation for increases in wealth and other forms of inequality, especially within the U.S., could be that academically gifted or intellectually talented and exceptionally productive individuals may be choosing to pursue opportunities with increasing frequency that lead to the accumulation of wealth. In essence, they may be choosing to develop expertise in attaining wealth. Industries that rely on technology or the ability to use money to make money may have become very rewarding for people with exceptional analytical skills. These ongoing discussions highlight that it is unclear whether elite education and ability selectivity for billionaires or for individual sectors have changed or remained the same over time and should be investigated.
An historical analysis of the education and cognitive abilitylevel of billionaires within these sectors could informthe idea that highly educated and cognitively advancedpeople may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments.Therefore, in this paper, we examine the role of general cognitive ability among billionaires across a number of years through the proxy of elite education. Further, in order to assess the idea that highly educated and cognitively advanced people may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments, we conduct an historical analysis of the education and cognitive level of billionaires within these sectors. More broadly, to examine the extent to which expertise in wealth generation is driven by expertise in specific domains, we examine billionaires across the many different industries or sectors in which they made their money. Broadly,we test the generality of expertise models by moving into a relatively unexplored domain of expertise, that of wealth generation.
Present Study
The present study draws from the Forbesglobal billionaires database from across a recent span of 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires looking at the world overall and U.S. as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. Additionally, we examined whether elite educated and talented people have been entering the technology and finance and investment sectors at higher rates over time. To examine the role that domain pathways matter in expertise development in wealth generation we examine elite education and ability as a function of industry or domain in which the billionaires obtained their wealth. Wealth expertise is on a wide continuum, and examining those who have made it to the top is important in its own right, just as is examining extraordinary performers in other types of domains. There are many paths to develop this type of expertise. What are those paths? What role does education and ability play?
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Discussion
Conceptualizing and Thinking about Wealth Generation as a Form of Expertise
This investigation leveraged billionaire status as a way to empirically conceptualize wealth generation as a form of expertise and to examine how specific occupations required elite education and cognitive abilities to achieve wealth expertise. There was great variation in the industries in which the billionaires earned their wealth, with general intelligence and elite education having much less of a premium in real estate, food and beverage, and fashion and retail and much more of a premium in technology and finance and investments. Overall, elite education and cognitive ability still mattered, just to different degrees for each subdomain. In particular, within the U.S., billionaires making their money in the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to be much more elite educated and cognitively able, perhaps choosing to develop expertise in a technology and/or finance andinvestment sector as a stepping stone towards the broader development of wealth expertise. This aligns with an analysis by industry within a group of 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016).The development of wealth expertise may have underlying skills that in fact also transcend any particular field. First, seeking to use one’s cognitive ability towards certain occupations with potential for wealth expertise requires a value placed on generating and accumulating wealth (this would be in sharp contrast to academics who are also often cognitively advanced, but value academic and intellectual freedom over wealth). Generating an idea that can result in wealth generation likely requires utilizing one’s individual profile of abilities, personality, and other traits but also leveraging one’s cultural resources, context, and connections in historical place and time. Some examples include, but are not limited to, the ability to recognize an opportunityacross many areas in which one might develop highly specific occupational expertise, the ability to persuade or pitch one’s ideas to funders and potential donors, and the ability to tolerate extreme risks. Additionally, based on the data across industriespresented in this paper, having a high cognitive ability, attending an elite school, and leveraging those resources towards turning an idea into a successful money generating enterprise are also important components. Industriousness or being willing to work long hours or put in 10,000 or more hours of practice, even in the face of a certain number of failures, is also likely important in developing wealth expertise as it is for other forms of expertise, as is luck. Broadly, high cognitive ability, attending a highly selective institution, and choosing to pursue wealth through the technology or finance and investments sectors appears to be more important in recent years for the development of wealth expertise.
Findings Across Time: 2002-2016
Prior work demonstrated a significant link between education/intellectual capacity and net worth, even within this highly select sample with restricted variability (Wai, 2013, 2014b), however, that was only for more recent years. A full analysis across a recent span of 15years suggests that broadly, the link between education/cognitive ability and net worth is not strong. This matches with findings on 30-millioniares, which indicated that after controlling for many confounders, the link between education/cognitive abilityand net worth became quite small (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). However, this does not mean that education/cognitive ability is not important for attaining great wealth because people in the top 1% of ability are likelyoverrepresented among billionaires. For example, given top 1% cognitive ability people should be represented at the base rate of 1%, this means globally top 1% people are overrepresented among billionaires by a factor of about 32 to 38, and within the U.S. top 1% people are overrepresented by a factor of about 41 to 47 (see Figure 1, total trends across time). This means that within this highly select sample, other factors may play a larger role in differentiating the person with only 1 billion from multiple billions. Future research might focus on investigating these differentiating factors that contribute to or take away from the development of wealth expertise even within this highly select sample across time.
The Gender Gap
Across the period 2002-2016,sex differences did drop in the initial 3 to 5 years but have been relatively stable in the last decade at about 9 to 1. Overall, sex differences are larger in the world than in the U.S. Broadly this suggests that for whatever reason, more men tend to endup as billionaires and that increasing the number of women billionaires may take some time. Given that among 30-millionaires the male-female ratio was 9.27 to 1 (Wai & Lincoln, 2016), and because newer billionaires may often come from multi-millionaires who increase their wealth, sex differences may shift slowly. These findings should be taken into account when considering ways to increase the numbers of women among billionaires and in the boardroom, among other sectors.
Are Elite Educated and Talented People Increasingly Choosing to Pursue Occupational Expertise That Leads to Wealth?
For the world, most of the elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards the technology sector, and secondarily the finance and investments sector. For the U.S., a similar percentage of elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards both the finance and investments and technology sectors and this percentage has grown over time. Since 2012, the elite education of the finance and investments sector has slightly increased, whereas the technology sector has appeared to level off. The overall pattern in the U.S. may indicate that elite educated people are increasingly choosing to pursue occupational expertise that leads to wealth, namely finance and investments and technology, in recent years. This trend further suggests that some of the increase in income or wealth inequality within the U.S. may be that cognitively advanced people are entering these highly lucrative occupations. Billionaire Mark Cuban, for example has declared that “the world’s first trillionaires are going to come from somebody who masters AI [artificial intelligence] and all its derivatives and applies it in ways we never thought of” (Clifford, 2017). It also means that if you want to develop expertise as a billionaire, and especially if you want to enter the technology, investments, or finance sectors, an elite education and corresponding cognitive ability needed for admission may be important in your path (see Rivera, 2015,for sociological mechanisms through which elite students get elite jobs in these industries). Tracking the role of education and ability in each of these sectors, especially technology, finance, and investments, will be of interest to uncoverthe role that education and ability plays in making enormous sums of money in the future.
Limitations and Future Directions
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Wai, 2014; Wai & Perina, 2018), attendance at American higher education institutions with average SAT (math + verbal) scores (or the ACT equivalent) of 1400 or higher according to U.S. News & World Report (America’s Best Colleges, 2013) as well attendance at a top college or university worldwide according to QS World University Rankings (2012) were used as an approximation for ability level. Because individual test scores were not publicly available, attending these institutions were reasonable approximations for individuals within the top 1% of ability (e.g., Frey & Detterman, 2004; Koenig et al. 2008; Wai, 2014). At an international level, admission to the very top schools was considered representative of at least a good portion of the top cognitive potential within each country. While this method cannot separate education from cognitive ability, it may give an underestimate in some cases as extremely cognitively advanced people may not have attended a highly ranked school for multiple reasons (e.g., financial limitations). It may give an overestimation in some cases due to individuals who gained entry with significantly sub-average test scores (e.g., legacy admissions; Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Golden, 2006; Sander, 2004). Specifically for billionaires, the fluctuations of the percentages of elite education and ability, through the proxy of typical test scores, may be influenced more from the wealth of parents and other corresponding advantages granted such as access to elite institutions and other networks, rather than individual ability. It
is reasonable, however, that both of these Type I and Type II errors counterbalance one another, while they may lower the reliability of the method.One limitation of the billionaires sample over 2002-2016 is that although there was some change, many of the people at the top of the list have remained on this list across time. Therefore, the shift in composition in education over time is largely driven by the nature of who loses and who gains wealth in a way that moves them across this billionaire cut point. As the samples have increased in recent years globally, it washarder to find background educational information on new people in different countries due to a lack of systematic public profiles (hence the high NR/NC percentage for the most recent years). This appeared to be less of a problem within the U.S. Future research might be directed at determining the qualities not only of those who join, but those who leave, the billionaire ranks over time. And because a degree from an elite institution likely opens doors and provides opportunities that would not otherwise be available, future research might investigate the extent to which high ability students who attend state institutions or less selective institutions may fare in attaining billionaire or wealth expertise status.
Another important limitation of using billionaire status as an indicator of wealth expertise is that there may not necessarily be a set of unifying factors underlying this extreme wealth indicator. We fully recognize this as a possibility, but believe it is worthy to explore the role of abilities and educational selectivity across multiple paths within the billionaire sample to examine whether there are commonalities. Additionally, there are likely elements in wealth generation that do transcend field, such as generating an idea, recognizing an opportunity, or convincing others to invest in that idea, among others.
Conclusions
Across a recent span of the last 15 years, the elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires has remained relatively stable, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Additionally, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. This suggests that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human capital or talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified an individual’s ability to generate wealth.These findings add to the expertise literature by broadening the definition of expertise to include wealth generation and historically exploring the role of elite education and cognitive ability in this area of expertise, in part through the industries or pathways through which such expertise is developed. Even across time (from 2002-2016), elite education and cognitive ability appear to be an important factor in developing wealth expertise, suggesting that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of performance and that expertise in wealth generation is likely influenced by many interlocking factors, especially elite education and ability, in addition to factors such as luck. Of course, the importance of elite education and ability within billionaires varies, and billionaires as a whole also differ in the importance of elite education and ability in relation to other areas of expertise. For example, House members tend to have a lower level, whereas the most powerful men and women tend to have a higher level of elite education and ability. This suggests a multidisciplinary perspective is important to test thestrength and generality of expertise theories, that more comprehensive models of expertise should account for abilities and education, and that investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Sunday, April 7, 2019
Decision making under risk for others vs. the self: Decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self; but the little is very little
Decision Making for Others Involving Risk: A Review and Meta-Analysis. Evan Polman, Kaiyang Wu. Journal of Economic Psychology, Apr 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.03.007
Highlights
• We meta-analyzed research on decision making under risk for others vs. the self.
• We found decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self.
• We identify moderators, test their validity, and quantify their effects.
• We suggest researchers focus on when (not whether) decisions for others are riskier.
• We highlight what is unique about decision making for others vs. the self.
Abstract: Are choices for others riskier than choices people make for themselves? This question has been asked by economists, psychologists, and other researchers in the social sciences – which has generated a diversity of research accounts and results. For example, a number of studies have found strong instances of a risky shift in choices for others, while other studies have found no such effect or have found that choices for others instead generate a cautious shift. In a meta-analysis of 128 effects from 71 published and unpublished papers (totaling 14,443 observations), we found a significant though small effect size (d = 0.105) in favor of a risky shift when people choose for others. Moreover, we found considerable variance between studies (Q = 1106.25), suggesting that the net effect is susceptible to moderating factors or study characteristics, which we identify and discuss as well (viz. choice recipient, decision frame, decision reciprocity, theoretical perspective, study design). Thus, we document not only whether decisions for others are riskier, but when (and when such decisions are less risky). We further discuss what is distinctly unique about decision making for others – how such choices are not just different in degree from personal choices but different in kind.
Highlights
• We meta-analyzed research on decision making under risk for others vs. the self.
• We found decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self.
• We identify moderators, test their validity, and quantify their effects.
• We suggest researchers focus on when (not whether) decisions for others are riskier.
• We highlight what is unique about decision making for others vs. the self.
Abstract: Are choices for others riskier than choices people make for themselves? This question has been asked by economists, psychologists, and other researchers in the social sciences – which has generated a diversity of research accounts and results. For example, a number of studies have found strong instances of a risky shift in choices for others, while other studies have found no such effect or have found that choices for others instead generate a cautious shift. In a meta-analysis of 128 effects from 71 published and unpublished papers (totaling 14,443 observations), we found a significant though small effect size (d = 0.105) in favor of a risky shift when people choose for others. Moreover, we found considerable variance between studies (Q = 1106.25), suggesting that the net effect is susceptible to moderating factors or study characteristics, which we identify and discuss as well (viz. choice recipient, decision frame, decision reciprocity, theoretical perspective, study design). Thus, we document not only whether decisions for others are riskier, but when (and when such decisions are less risky). We further discuss what is distinctly unique about decision making for others – how such choices are not just different in degree from personal choices but different in kind.
Saturday, April 6, 2019
Confirm that shifting discretionary spending from material goods (clothes) to experiences (concerts) will bring greater happiness, satisfaction, & gratitude, and lower levels of purchase related regret
Barton, Belinda and Zlatevska, Natalina and van Laer, Tom, In Pursuit of Happiness: A Meta-Analysis on the Experiential Advantage (February 22, 2019). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3347446
Abstract: Is it possible to buy happiness? Prior research suggests that shifting discretionary spending from material goods such as clothes to experiences such as concerts will bring greater happiness, satisfaction, and gratitude, and lower levels of purchase related regret. Other research, however, provides evidence for the benefits of purchasing and consuming material goods rather than experiences. We identify 175 effect sizes from 30 primary papers representing 33,237 consumer transactions that compare experiences and material goods in the context of happiness, satisfaction, gratitude, and regret for inclusion in our meta-analysis. Our results show that there is an unequivocal advantage to consuming experiences rather than material goods, but valence of the purchase, median value of the purchase, and the social nature of the consumption episode moderate this effect. In addition, results show that the experimental design used when testing hypotheses also moderates the effect. In contrast to existing literature we find no significant effect of whether the purchase is an experiential product, a gift, or whether the purchase is a real or hypothetical purchase scenario. Our findings help synthesize current literature and provide support for researchers looking to explore and extend knowledge on the experiential advantage.
Keywords: experiences, experiential advantage, happiness, satisfaction, meta-analysis
JEL Classification: M31
Abstract: Is it possible to buy happiness? Prior research suggests that shifting discretionary spending from material goods such as clothes to experiences such as concerts will bring greater happiness, satisfaction, and gratitude, and lower levels of purchase related regret. Other research, however, provides evidence for the benefits of purchasing and consuming material goods rather than experiences. We identify 175 effect sizes from 30 primary papers representing 33,237 consumer transactions that compare experiences and material goods in the context of happiness, satisfaction, gratitude, and regret for inclusion in our meta-analysis. Our results show that there is an unequivocal advantage to consuming experiences rather than material goods, but valence of the purchase, median value of the purchase, and the social nature of the consumption episode moderate this effect. In addition, results show that the experimental design used when testing hypotheses also moderates the effect. In contrast to existing literature we find no significant effect of whether the purchase is an experiential product, a gift, or whether the purchase is a real or hypothetical purchase scenario. Our findings help synthesize current literature and provide support for researchers looking to explore and extend knowledge on the experiential advantage.
Keywords: experiences, experiential advantage, happiness, satisfaction, meta-analysis
JEL Classification: M31
From 2018: Ordinary people think free will is a lack of constraint on choice; internal constraints limit one’s mental ability to choose; scientific/religious constraints can both reduce perceptions of free will
Ordinary people think free will is a lack of constraint, not the presence of a soul. Andrew J. Vonasch, Roy F. Baumeister, Alfred R. Mele. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 60, April 2018, Pages 133-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2018.03.002
• Free will means lack of constraint on choice.
• Internal constraints limit one’s mental ability to choose.
• External constraints impose situational or social limits on choice.
• Scientific and religious constraints can both reduce perceptions of free will.
Abstract: Four experiments supported the hypothesis that ordinary people understand free will as meaning unconstrained choice, not having a soul. People consistently rated free will as being high unless reduced by internal constraints (i.e., things that impaired people’s mental abilities to make choices) or external constraints (i.e., situations that hampered people’s abilities to choose and act as they desired). Scientific paradigms that have been argued to disprove free will were seen as reducing, but usually not eliminating free will, and the reductions were because of constrained conscious choice. We replicated findings that a minority of people think lacking a soul reduces free will. These reductions in perceived free will were fully explained by reductions in people’s perceived abilities to make conscious decisions. Thus, some people do think you need a soul to have free will—but it is because they think you need a soul to make conscious decisions.
• Free will means lack of constraint on choice.
• Internal constraints limit one’s mental ability to choose.
• External constraints impose situational or social limits on choice.
• Scientific and religious constraints can both reduce perceptions of free will.
Abstract: Four experiments supported the hypothesis that ordinary people understand free will as meaning unconstrained choice, not having a soul. People consistently rated free will as being high unless reduced by internal constraints (i.e., things that impaired people’s mental abilities to make choices) or external constraints (i.e., situations that hampered people’s abilities to choose and act as they desired). Scientific paradigms that have been argued to disprove free will were seen as reducing, but usually not eliminating free will, and the reductions were because of constrained conscious choice. We replicated findings that a minority of people think lacking a soul reduces free will. These reductions in perceived free will were fully explained by reductions in people’s perceived abilities to make conscious decisions. Thus, some people do think you need a soul to have free will—but it is because they think you need a soul to make conscious decisions.
A Bigger Lie: Soothing Us With Small Lies, Always With the Best of Intentions
The Way Our Culture Portrays Love Is A Lie: Your relationship will have to struggle and suffer in order to thrive. Benjamin Sledge. Heartsupport, Feb 20 2019. https://blog.heartsupport.com/the-way-our-culture-portrays-love-is-absurd-85e49ad24397
He says:
I don't believe the story about the dad in the bathroom and in any case (in some place in each country those things happen), after a time the dad will surprise the son with some side frienship with some attractive co-worker, or the market cashier, or whomever. Or he was having the affair at the same time that he took care of his wife... It is sanctimonously idealistic, almost what a priest would say to the faithful to teach them how to be honest, caring parents, spouses and citizens.
My dad, as far as I could see, was as in this example. But I wouldn't be surprised if some day a halft-brother or sister pops up somewhere. The readers of such tales, and maybe the author, would be in shock and deeply disappointed, but that is the price for not paying attention to our limited knowledge of human nature.
He says:
A young man once recounted his mother’s battle with cancer [...].
Doctors discovered an aggressive form of breast cancer that required immediate treatment. The chemo and radiation therapy quickly left his mom incapacitated. She lost her hair and appetite while her personal appearance became a skeleton of her former self. What stood out to the young man was when his father would stoop to kiss his bride and exclaim, “Girl! You sexy!” He knew his mother didn’t believe such statements, but it impressed him how his father continued to reaffirm his undying devotion [...].
Most evenings, the young man would hear his mother retching, as his bedroom wall backed up to the family bathroom. The vomiting sessions were violent and loud, often waking him. After months of enduring these interruptions, he stormed into the bathroom one evening, where he found his dad rubbing mom’s back. What surprised him were the two pallets of blankets and pillows laid on the bathroom floor. Every evening, his father had been sleeping in the bathroom next to his wife while she wasted away. Ashamed, he closed the door without protest.
His mom recovered, but he never forgot the lesson his father taught him. Love isn’t sexy most times. But if done right, real love is unconditional and sacrificial.
I don't believe the story about the dad in the bathroom and in any case (in some place in each country those things happen), after a time the dad will surprise the son with some side frienship with some attractive co-worker, or the market cashier, or whomever. Or he was having the affair at the same time that he took care of his wife... It is sanctimonously idealistic, almost what a priest would say to the faithful to teach them how to be honest, caring parents, spouses and citizens.
My dad, as far as I could see, was as in this example. But I wouldn't be surprised if some day a halft-brother or sister pops up somewhere. The readers of such tales, and maybe the author, would be in shock and deeply disappointed, but that is the price for not paying attention to our limited knowledge of human nature.
Happy Believers and Sad Skeptics? Affective Influences on Gullibility (vulnerability to misleading information, tendency to uncritically accept interpersonal messages, detection of deception)
Happy Believers and Sad Skeptics? Affective Influences on Gullibility. Joseph P. Forgas. Current Directions in Psychological Science, April 5, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721419834543
Abstract: How does affect influence gullibility? After a brief consideration of the nature of gullibility, I describe a series of experiments that explored the prediction that in situations in which close attention to stimulus information is required, negative mood can reduce gullibility and positive mood can increase gullibility. The experiments examined mood effects on truth judgments, vulnerability to misleading information, the tendency to uncritically accept interpersonal messages, the detection of deception, and the tendency to see meaning in random or meaningless information. In all of these domains, positive mood promoted gullibility and negative mood reduced it. The practical and theoretical significance of these convergent findings are discussed, and the practical implications of affectively induced gullibility in real-life domains are considered.
Abstract: How does affect influence gullibility? After a brief consideration of the nature of gullibility, I describe a series of experiments that explored the prediction that in situations in which close attention to stimulus information is required, negative mood can reduce gullibility and positive mood can increase gullibility. The experiments examined mood effects on truth judgments, vulnerability to misleading information, the tendency to uncritically accept interpersonal messages, the detection of deception, and the tendency to see meaning in random or meaningless information. In all of these domains, positive mood promoted gullibility and negative mood reduced it. The practical and theoretical significance of these convergent findings are discussed, and the practical implications of affectively induced gullibility in real-life domains are considered.
People Can Accurately (But Not Adaptively) Judge Strangers’ Antigay Prejudice from Faces
People Can Accurately (But Not Adaptively) Judge Strangers’ Antigay Prejudice from Faces. Ravin Alaei, Nicholas O. Rule. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, Apr 5 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10919-019-00305-2
Abstract: The ecological theory of social perception suggests that people’s first impressions should be especially accurate for judgments relevant to their goals. Here, we tested whether people could accurately judge others’ levels of antigay prejudice and whether gay men’s accuracy would exceed straight men’s accuracy in making these judgments. We found that people judged men’s (but not women’s) levels of antigay prejudice accurately from photos of their faces and that impressions of facial power supported their judgments. Gay men and straight men did not significantly differ in their sensitivity to antigay prejudice, however. People may therefore judge others’ levels of prejudice accurately regardless of their personal stake in its consequences.
Keywords: Accuracy Antigay prejudice Person perception Power
Abstract: The ecological theory of social perception suggests that people’s first impressions should be especially accurate for judgments relevant to their goals. Here, we tested whether people could accurately judge others’ levels of antigay prejudice and whether gay men’s accuracy would exceed straight men’s accuracy in making these judgments. We found that people judged men’s (but not women’s) levels of antigay prejudice accurately from photos of their faces and that impressions of facial power supported their judgments. Gay men and straight men did not significantly differ in their sensitivity to antigay prejudice, however. People may therefore judge others’ levels of prejudice accurately regardless of their personal stake in its consequences.
Keywords: Accuracy Antigay prejudice Person perception Power
Friday, April 5, 2019
People with the greatest proclivity for a behavior choose to interact the most, leading to further feedback/amplification, overstimating peer consumption of legal & illegal drugs, yielding high consumption
The Friendship Paradox and Systematic Biases in Perceptions and Social Norms. Matthew O. Jackson. Journal of Political Economy, Mar 18, 2019. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/701031
Abstract: The “friendship paradox” (first noted by Feld in 1991) refers to the fact that, on average, people have strictly fewer friends than their friends have. I show that this oversampling of more popular people can lead people to perceive more engagement than exists in the overall population. This feeds back to amplify engagement in behaviors that involve complementarities. Also, people with the greatest proclivity for a behavior choose to interact the most, leading to further feedback and amplification. These results are consistent with studies finding overestimation of peer consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs and with resulting high levels of drug and alcohol consumption.
Abstract: The “friendship paradox” (first noted by Feld in 1991) refers to the fact that, on average, people have strictly fewer friends than their friends have. I show that this oversampling of more popular people can lead people to perceive more engagement than exists in the overall population. This feeds back to amplify engagement in behaviors that involve complementarities. Also, people with the greatest proclivity for a behavior choose to interact the most, leading to further feedback and amplification. These results are consistent with studies finding overestimation of peer consumption of alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs and with resulting high levels of drug and alcohol consumption.
Moral Grandstanding in Public Discourse: Status-seeking Motives as a Potential Explanatory Mechanism in Predicting Conflict in Daily Life
Grubbs, Joshua, Brandon Warmke, Justin Tosi, and Alicia S. James. 2019. “Moral Grandstanding in Public Discourse: Status-seeking Motives as a Potential Explanatory Mechanism in Predicting Conflict.” PsyArXiv. April 5. doi:10.31234/osf.io/gnaj5
Abstract: Public discourse is often caustic and conflict-filled. This trend seems to be particularly evident when the content of such discourse is around moral issues (broadly defined) and when the discourse occurs on social media. Several explanatory mechanisms for such conflict have been explored in recent psychological and social-science literatures. The present work sought to examine a potentially novel explanatory mechanism defined in philosophical literature: Moral Grandstanding. According to philosophical accounts, Moral Grandstanding is the use of moral talk to seek social status. For the present work, we conducted five studies, using two undergraduate samples (Study 1, N = 361; Study 2, N = 356); an sample matched to U.S. norms for age, gender, race, income, Census region (Study 3, N = 1,063); a YouGov sample matched to U.S. demographic norms (Study 4, N = 2,000); and a brief, one-month longitudinal study of Mechanical Turk workers in the U.S. (Study 5 , Baseline N = 499, follow-up n = 296). Across studies, we found initial support for the validity of Moral Grandstanding as a construct. Specifically, moral grandstanding was associated with status-seeking personality traits, as well as greater political and moral conflict in daily life.
Abstract: Public discourse is often caustic and conflict-filled. This trend seems to be particularly evident when the content of such discourse is around moral issues (broadly defined) and when the discourse occurs on social media. Several explanatory mechanisms for such conflict have been explored in recent psychological and social-science literatures. The present work sought to examine a potentially novel explanatory mechanism defined in philosophical literature: Moral Grandstanding. According to philosophical accounts, Moral Grandstanding is the use of moral talk to seek social status. For the present work, we conducted five studies, using two undergraduate samples (Study 1, N = 361; Study 2, N = 356); an sample matched to U.S. norms for age, gender, race, income, Census region (Study 3, N = 1,063); a YouGov sample matched to U.S. demographic norms (Study 4, N = 2,000); and a brief, one-month longitudinal study of Mechanical Turk workers in the U.S. (Study 5 , Baseline N = 499, follow-up n = 296). Across studies, we found initial support for the validity of Moral Grandstanding as a construct. Specifically, moral grandstanding was associated with status-seeking personality traits, as well as greater political and moral conflict in daily life.
Scary sexual situations were reported by 23.9% of adult women, 10.3% of adult men, 12.5% of adolescent women, and 3.8% of adolescent men
Feeling Scared During Sex: Findings From a U.S. Probability Sample of Women and Men Ages 14 to 60. Debby Herbenick et al. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, Apr 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/0092623X.2018.1549634
Abstract: Using data from a U.S. probability survey of individuals aged 14 to 60, we aimed (1) to assess the proportion of respondents who ever reported scary sexual situations and (2) to examine descriptions of sexual experiences reported as scary. Data were cross-sectional and collected via the GfK KnowledgePanel®. Scary sexual situations were reported by 23.9% of adult women, 10.3% of adult men, 12.5% of adolescent women, and 3.8% of adolescent men who had ever engaged in oral, vaginal, or anal sex. Themes included sexual assault/rape, incest, being held down, anal sex, choking, threats, multiple people, novelty/learning, among others.
Abstract: Using data from a U.S. probability survey of individuals aged 14 to 60, we aimed (1) to assess the proportion of respondents who ever reported scary sexual situations and (2) to examine descriptions of sexual experiences reported as scary. Data were cross-sectional and collected via the GfK KnowledgePanel®. Scary sexual situations were reported by 23.9% of adult women, 10.3% of adult men, 12.5% of adolescent women, and 3.8% of adolescent men who had ever engaged in oral, vaginal, or anal sex. Themes included sexual assault/rape, incest, being held down, anal sex, choking, threats, multiple people, novelty/learning, among others.
Death among primates: a critical review of non‐human primate interactions towards their dead and dying
Death among primates: a critical review of non‐human primate interactions towards their dead and dying. André Gonçalves, Susana Carvalho. Biological Reviews, April 4 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/brv.12512
ABSTRACT: For the past two centuries, non‐human primates have been reported to inspect, protect, retrieve, carry or drag the dead bodies of their conspecifics and, for nearly the same amount of time, sparse scientific attention has been paid to such behaviours. Given that there exists a considerable gap in the fossil and archaeological record concerning how early hominins might have interacted with their dead, extant primates may provide valuable insight into how and in which contexts thanatological behaviours would have occurred. First, we outline a comprehensive history of comparative thanatology in non‐human primates, from the earliest accounts to the present, uncovering the interpretations of previous researchers and their contributions to the field of primate thanatology. Many of the typical behavioural patterns towards the dead seen in the past are consistent with those observed today. Second, we review recent evidence of thanatological responses and organise it into distinct terminologies: direct interactions (physical contact with the corpse) and secondary interactions (guarding the corpse, vigils and visitations). Third, we provide a critical evaluation regarding the form and function of the behavioural and emotional aspects of these responses towards infants and adults, also comparing them with non‐conspecifics. We suggest that thanatological interactions: promote a faster re‐categorisation from living to dead, decrease costly vigilant/caregiving behaviours, are crucial to the management of grieving responses, update position in the group's hierarchy, and accelerate the formation of new social bonds. Fourth, we propose an integrated model of Life‐Death Awareness, whereupon neural circuitry dedicated towards detecting life, i.e. the agency system (animate agency, intentional agency, mentalistic agency) works with a corresponding system that interacts with it on a decision‐making level (animate/inanimate distinction, living/dead discrimination, death awareness). Theoretically, both systems are governed by specific cognitive mechanisms (perceptual categories, associative concepts and high‐order reasoning, respectively). Fifth, we present an evolutionary timeline from rudimentary thanatological responses likely occurring in earlier non‐human primates during the Eocene to the more elaborate mortuary practices attributed to genus Homo throughout the Pleistocene. Finally, we discuss the importance of detailed reports on primate thanatology and propose several empirical avenues to shed further light on this topic. This review expands and builds upon previous attempts to evaluate the body of knowledge on this subject, providing an integrative perspective and bringing together different fields of research to detail the evolutionary, sensory/cognitive, developmental and historical/archaeological aspects of primate thanatology. Considering all these findings and given their cognitive abilities, we argue that non‐human primates are capable of an implicit awareness of death.
---
III. PRIMATE THANATOLOGY:CONTEMPORARY REPORTS
(1) Dead infants
Females of several primate species have been observedpersistently to carry their deceased infants (sometimesfor prolonged periods of 10 days or more), regardlessof the circumstances that caused the fatality (Fig. 2). Otherrecorded behaviours include grooming, swatting flies awayfrom the corpse and sometimes even consuming part of it.Primatologists have described their expressions as ‘puzzled’,‘confused’ or ‘dazed’, which raises the question as to whetherthey have some, if any, understanding of death.These behaviours are striking because they seemmaladaptive. Whilst live infants are energetically costlyto the mothers who carry them, ultimately they increasereproductive fitness – something a dead immature offspringcannot do. Holding a lifeless corpse hinders locomotion,negatively impacting foraging and predator avoidance. Somewill solve these difficulties by adopting a tripedal gait, carryingthe corpse ventrally, using the neck and shoulder to wedgeit, drag it along the ground, or even carry it dorsally usingthe tail as an extra limb. While some hypotheses have beenproposed to explain post-mortem carrying (Table 1), it isstill a matter of debate which one offers the most powerfulexplanation. Because some are mutually non-exclusive it islikely that many factors, depending on context, contribute tothese behaviours (see Watson & Matsuzawa, 2018).
(a)Mother – infant dynamics
Dead-infant carrying is the most prevalent thanatologicalbehaviour distributed in several primate taxa (Fig. 3). Thisshould not be surprising since: (i) primates follow a typicaltrend observed in many vertebrate species of high infantmortality (Bronikowskiet al., 2011); and (ii) unlike adolescentsand adults who are abandoned at their site of death, deadinfants and juveniles are usually carried by the mother forlonger durations, allowing easier detection. Nevertheless, themother will, invariably, cease to carry the corpse, leavingit unattended for progressively longer periods until finallyabandoning it (Jay, 1962; Nash, 1974; Green, 1975; Altmann,1980; Hosakaet al., 2000; Croninet al., 2011).Many authors have claimed that the mother ceases totreat her infant as a live one during this period – carryingit in awkward positions, by the leg or tail, upside down,using the mouth or dragging the corpse along the ground(van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Green, 1975; Altmann, 1980;Luet al., 2007; Perry & Manson, 2009; Biroet al., 2010;Fashinget al., 2011). Green (1975), who conducted acomprehensive vocal study with wild Japanese macaques(Macaca fuscata), noted that mothers gave out particularvocalisations when their infants died, repeated whilst carryingthe infant or distant from it. Some have proposed thatinfantile colouration may elicitpost-mortemcarrying (Jay,1962; Alley, 1980; Rajpurohit, 1997), but this does notexplain why such behaviour occurs in females from myriad
primate species – some with flamboyant natal coats andothers non-conspicuous.Perry & Manson (2009) describe a case of a capuchinfemale (Cebus capucinus) carrying her stillborn, arguing thatshe behaved in ways which suggested an awareness ofher infant’s death, such as letting the infant be fullysubmerged in water. Although this could represent causalattribution, it may equally be a failure of perspectivetaking. Inexperienced Japanese macaque mothers havebeen observed to inadvertently drown their infants whendiving into the hot springs of Jigokudani Park for food (deWaal, 1996) and similar occurrences have been reportedamong baboons (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Moreover,filial cannibalism duringpost-mortemcarrying has also beenwitnessed, suggesting that corpses may be re-categorisedas food (Altmann, 1980; Hsiang-Jen & Hsiu-Hui, 2008;Dellatore, Waitt & Foitova, 2009; Watsonet al., 2015; Tianet al., 2016; Tokuyamaet al., 2017; De Marco, Cozzolino &Thierry, 2018; Watson & Matsuzawa, 2018).Croninet al.(2011) propose that whilst displayingapproach – withdrawal behaviour towards the infant, themother is actively gathering novel death cues that she couldconceivably recall in equal situations (i.e. death of anotherconspecific). However, if the purpose of such knowledge isto prevent costly behaviours, findings from Sugiyamaet al.(2009) that there is no significant difference in carryingduration between younger and older mothers suggests that,at least in Japanese macaques, no such learning component was found. Moreover, reports on chimpanzees from Bossouillustrate that there may be an individual component. Of thefive infants that died during a flu epidemic, only two werecarried for extended periods (Biro, 2011). Jire transportedboth her dead infants: Jokro in 1992 and again Jimatoin 2003 (Matsuzawa, 1997; Biroet al., 2010). Similarly,in semi-ranging Japanese macaques, the same female wasreported carrying her dead infant for extended periods in2011 and again in 2013 (Watsonet al., 2015), although otherfactors such as cause of death could impact these responses(see Section III.1e).
(b)Group – infant dynamics
The behaviour of group members who were not emotionallyinvolved with the infant is also of interest. Cheney & Seyfarth(2007) note that wild chacma baboons (Papio h. ursinus)donot attempt to handle dead infants and rarely grunt atthem as they would live infants. Similarly, Rajpurohit (1997)mentions that in Hanuman langurs, other members showlittle interest in dead infants – a finding also reported inother species (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Green, 1975;Luet al., 2007; Guoet al., 2016; De Marcoet al., 2018).Conversely, infants and juveniles express more interest inthe corpse (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Ciani, 1984; Croninet al., 2011; Liet al., 2012), some even playing with it (vanLawick-Goodall, 1971; Hosakaet al., 2000; Biro, 2011).Furthermore, juvenile and nulliparous adult females havebeen witnessed carrying dead infants relinquished by theirmothers (Warren & Williamson, 2004; Fashinget al., 2011).The mother occasionally restricts attempts by other groupmembers to access the corpse (Altmann, 1980; Gupta,2000; Liet al., 2012; Tokuyamaet al., 2017) (Fig. 4), withsiblings having broader admittance (van Lawick-Goodall,1971; Kano, 1992; Mulleret al., 1995; Matsuzawa, 1997). It is conceivable that such playful interactions may prepareyounger individuals for death recognition.The matter of stench avoidance is divisive. Byrne (2016)recounts a case in western lowland gorillas where the groupmembers, after initial interest, seemed to avoid and shunthe carrying mother after the body started to smell. BothGreen (1975) and Sugiyamaet al.(2009) report that Japanesemacaque group members actively avoided the mother of adead infant, presumably because of the putrid smell from thecorpse. However, among chimpanzees (Biroet al., 2010) andGelada baboons (Theropithecus gelada) (Fashinget al., 2011),no such avoidance is reported. That most mothers abandonthe infant within a week of death is also informative sinceduring this period the cadaver goes from bloating to activedecay – the stage of decomposition that emanates the moststench.Infant corpses are sometimes central to or incorporatedin the displays of male chimpanzees (Bygott, 1972;Matsuzawa, 1997). Adult males have also been known tocarry dead infants; most notably in semi-ranging Barbarymacaques (Macaca sylvanus) whilst interacting with othermales where the corpse is used for agonistic bufferingpurposes (Merz, 1978). In conjunction with other reports,Merz (1978) notes that handling was much rougher andof shorter duration than with live infants. Rare cases haveinvolved high-ranking individuals unsuccessfully adoptinglive orphans and continuing to carry them after death (Tayloret al., 1978; Notman & Munn, 2003).
(c)Old World – New World dichotomy
To the best of our knowledge, there are 13 publishedcases of dead-infant carrying among New World monkeys,comprising cebids, and atelids (see online Supportinginformation, Appendix S1). The lack of information on thisbehaviour may be partly due to the smaller numberof publications on New World primates. Anderson (2011)argues that their tropical habitats accelerate the decay ofcorpses and consequently their abandonment. Additionally,while Old World monkeys can be either arboreal, terrestrialor both, New World monkeys are almost exclusively arboreal(Fernandez-Duque, Di Fiore & Huck, 2012). Referring toan arboreal Old World species, the red colobus (Piliocolobustephrosceles), Struhsaker (2010) pointed out the difficulty ofcarrying a dead infant while leaping between trees – aclaim supported by other colobine cases (Colobus guereza:Onderdonk, 2000;Colobus vellerosus: Teichroeb & Sicotte,2008) and the observation that species that carry their deadfor long periods, such as snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecusbieti) tend to be more terrestrial (Long & Kirkpatrick, 1994).Observer bias may also be involved; when reviewing theliterature on post-mortem carrying, the best-representedspecies were semi or fully terrestrial and inhabited accessibleareas or were in close proximity to human communities(Rajpurohit, 1997; Sugiyamaet al., 2009; Fashinget al.,2011). The only case of dead-infant carrying recordedamong prosimians comes from ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta)(Nakamichiet al., 1996), the most terrestrial lemur (Schmidt,2011).
(d)Non-carriers
Not all primates engage in corpse carrying althoughthere is evidence that they do show behavioural responsesto dead or dying infants (see Appendix S2). Strepsirrhinesand callitrichines generally do not carry dead infants, despitesome unsuccessful attempts at carrying having been reported.Nakamichi, Koyama & Jolly (1996) observed seven cases ofring-tailed lemur behaviour towards dead/dying infants.One individual carried her dying infant tripedally for 15 m,whilst others in the troop showed affectionate behaviours,gave cohesion calls and displayed ambiguous back-and-forthmovements, switching between following the troop andreturning to the infant, sometimes for hours. Similarly,Santini (2012) observed a dying ring-tailed lemur infantrepeatedly fall, vocalise, and attempt to climb onto theback of its mother, who wavered between staying withthe infant or the group, eventually choosing the latter.Additionally, Littlefield (2010) observed two infanticides insifakas (Propithecus verreauxi) where the females stayed withthe dying infant, occasionally grooming it and, after itsdeath, remaining with the corpse before giving cohesion callsand then following the group. In experimental settings withvarious prosimians, Rosenson (1977) noted that, whilst noneof the mothers attempted to carry their dead infants, all wereobserved to groom them; a galago (Otolemur crassicaudatus)retrieved her infant using her jaws (later and dropping itwhen attempting to groom), and a black lemur (Eulemurmacaco) was seen gripping and lifting her infant. Groomingwas observed in all mothers, most of which were in regularcontact with their infants, likely representing an attemptto elicit a response. While it seems strepsirrhines lack themorphological proficiency for extended periods of carrying,their behaviour suggests they are not indifferent to their deador dying infants, even after they stop showing signs of life(Nakamichi, 2016).
ABSTRACT: For the past two centuries, non‐human primates have been reported to inspect, protect, retrieve, carry or drag the dead bodies of their conspecifics and, for nearly the same amount of time, sparse scientific attention has been paid to such behaviours. Given that there exists a considerable gap in the fossil and archaeological record concerning how early hominins might have interacted with their dead, extant primates may provide valuable insight into how and in which contexts thanatological behaviours would have occurred. First, we outline a comprehensive history of comparative thanatology in non‐human primates, from the earliest accounts to the present, uncovering the interpretations of previous researchers and their contributions to the field of primate thanatology. Many of the typical behavioural patterns towards the dead seen in the past are consistent with those observed today. Second, we review recent evidence of thanatological responses and organise it into distinct terminologies: direct interactions (physical contact with the corpse) and secondary interactions (guarding the corpse, vigils and visitations). Third, we provide a critical evaluation regarding the form and function of the behavioural and emotional aspects of these responses towards infants and adults, also comparing them with non‐conspecifics. We suggest that thanatological interactions: promote a faster re‐categorisation from living to dead, decrease costly vigilant/caregiving behaviours, are crucial to the management of grieving responses, update position in the group's hierarchy, and accelerate the formation of new social bonds. Fourth, we propose an integrated model of Life‐Death Awareness, whereupon neural circuitry dedicated towards detecting life, i.e. the agency system (animate agency, intentional agency, mentalistic agency) works with a corresponding system that interacts with it on a decision‐making level (animate/inanimate distinction, living/dead discrimination, death awareness). Theoretically, both systems are governed by specific cognitive mechanisms (perceptual categories, associative concepts and high‐order reasoning, respectively). Fifth, we present an evolutionary timeline from rudimentary thanatological responses likely occurring in earlier non‐human primates during the Eocene to the more elaborate mortuary practices attributed to genus Homo throughout the Pleistocene. Finally, we discuss the importance of detailed reports on primate thanatology and propose several empirical avenues to shed further light on this topic. This review expands and builds upon previous attempts to evaluate the body of knowledge on this subject, providing an integrative perspective and bringing together different fields of research to detail the evolutionary, sensory/cognitive, developmental and historical/archaeological aspects of primate thanatology. Considering all these findings and given their cognitive abilities, we argue that non‐human primates are capable of an implicit awareness of death.
---
III. PRIMATE THANATOLOGY:CONTEMPORARY REPORTS
(1) Dead infants
Females of several primate species have been observedpersistently to carry their deceased infants (sometimesfor prolonged periods of 10 days or more), regardlessof the circumstances that caused the fatality (Fig. 2). Otherrecorded behaviours include grooming, swatting flies awayfrom the corpse and sometimes even consuming part of it.Primatologists have described their expressions as ‘puzzled’,‘confused’ or ‘dazed’, which raises the question as to whetherthey have some, if any, understanding of death.These behaviours are striking because they seemmaladaptive. Whilst live infants are energetically costlyto the mothers who carry them, ultimately they increasereproductive fitness – something a dead immature offspringcannot do. Holding a lifeless corpse hinders locomotion,negatively impacting foraging and predator avoidance. Somewill solve these difficulties by adopting a tripedal gait, carryingthe corpse ventrally, using the neck and shoulder to wedgeit, drag it along the ground, or even carry it dorsally usingthe tail as an extra limb. While some hypotheses have beenproposed to explain post-mortem carrying (Table 1), it isstill a matter of debate which one offers the most powerfulexplanation. Because some are mutually non-exclusive it islikely that many factors, depending on context, contribute tothese behaviours (see Watson & Matsuzawa, 2018).
(a)Mother – infant dynamics
Dead-infant carrying is the most prevalent thanatologicalbehaviour distributed in several primate taxa (Fig. 3). Thisshould not be surprising since: (i) primates follow a typicaltrend observed in many vertebrate species of high infantmortality (Bronikowskiet al., 2011); and (ii) unlike adolescentsand adults who are abandoned at their site of death, deadinfants and juveniles are usually carried by the mother forlonger durations, allowing easier detection. Nevertheless, themother will, invariably, cease to carry the corpse, leavingit unattended for progressively longer periods until finallyabandoning it (Jay, 1962; Nash, 1974; Green, 1975; Altmann,1980; Hosakaet al., 2000; Croninet al., 2011).Many authors have claimed that the mother ceases totreat her infant as a live one during this period – carryingit in awkward positions, by the leg or tail, upside down,using the mouth or dragging the corpse along the ground(van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Green, 1975; Altmann, 1980;Luet al., 2007; Perry & Manson, 2009; Biroet al., 2010;Fashinget al., 2011). Green (1975), who conducted acomprehensive vocal study with wild Japanese macaques(Macaca fuscata), noted that mothers gave out particularvocalisations when their infants died, repeated whilst carryingthe infant or distant from it. Some have proposed thatinfantile colouration may elicitpost-mortemcarrying (Jay,1962; Alley, 1980; Rajpurohit, 1997), but this does notexplain why such behaviour occurs in females from myriad
primate species – some with flamboyant natal coats andothers non-conspicuous.Perry & Manson (2009) describe a case of a capuchinfemale (Cebus capucinus) carrying her stillborn, arguing thatshe behaved in ways which suggested an awareness ofher infant’s death, such as letting the infant be fullysubmerged in water. Although this could represent causalattribution, it may equally be a failure of perspectivetaking. Inexperienced Japanese macaque mothers havebeen observed to inadvertently drown their infants whendiving into the hot springs of Jigokudani Park for food (deWaal, 1996) and similar occurrences have been reportedamong baboons (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Moreover,filial cannibalism duringpost-mortemcarrying has also beenwitnessed, suggesting that corpses may be re-categorisedas food (Altmann, 1980; Hsiang-Jen & Hsiu-Hui, 2008;Dellatore, Waitt & Foitova, 2009; Watsonet al., 2015; Tianet al., 2016; Tokuyamaet al., 2017; De Marco, Cozzolino &Thierry, 2018; Watson & Matsuzawa, 2018).Croninet al.(2011) propose that whilst displayingapproach – withdrawal behaviour towards the infant, themother is actively gathering novel death cues that she couldconceivably recall in equal situations (i.e. death of anotherconspecific). However, if the purpose of such knowledge isto prevent costly behaviours, findings from Sugiyamaet al.(2009) that there is no significant difference in carryingduration between younger and older mothers suggests that,at least in Japanese macaques, no such learning component was found. Moreover, reports on chimpanzees from Bossouillustrate that there may be an individual component. Of thefive infants that died during a flu epidemic, only two werecarried for extended periods (Biro, 2011). Jire transportedboth her dead infants: Jokro in 1992 and again Jimatoin 2003 (Matsuzawa, 1997; Biroet al., 2010). Similarly,in semi-ranging Japanese macaques, the same female wasreported carrying her dead infant for extended periods in2011 and again in 2013 (Watsonet al., 2015), although otherfactors such as cause of death could impact these responses(see Section III.1e).
(b)Group – infant dynamics
The behaviour of group members who were not emotionallyinvolved with the infant is also of interest. Cheney & Seyfarth(2007) note that wild chacma baboons (Papio h. ursinus)donot attempt to handle dead infants and rarely grunt atthem as they would live infants. Similarly, Rajpurohit (1997)mentions that in Hanuman langurs, other members showlittle interest in dead infants – a finding also reported inother species (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Green, 1975;Luet al., 2007; Guoet al., 2016; De Marcoet al., 2018).Conversely, infants and juveniles express more interest inthe corpse (van Lawick-Goodall, 1968; Ciani, 1984; Croninet al., 2011; Liet al., 2012), some even playing with it (vanLawick-Goodall, 1971; Hosakaet al., 2000; Biro, 2011).Furthermore, juvenile and nulliparous adult females havebeen witnessed carrying dead infants relinquished by theirmothers (Warren & Williamson, 2004; Fashinget al., 2011).The mother occasionally restricts attempts by other groupmembers to access the corpse (Altmann, 1980; Gupta,2000; Liet al., 2012; Tokuyamaet al., 2017) (Fig. 4), withsiblings having broader admittance (van Lawick-Goodall,1971; Kano, 1992; Mulleret al., 1995; Matsuzawa, 1997). It is conceivable that such playful interactions may prepareyounger individuals for death recognition.The matter of stench avoidance is divisive. Byrne (2016)recounts a case in western lowland gorillas where the groupmembers, after initial interest, seemed to avoid and shunthe carrying mother after the body started to smell. BothGreen (1975) and Sugiyamaet al.(2009) report that Japanesemacaque group members actively avoided the mother of adead infant, presumably because of the putrid smell from thecorpse. However, among chimpanzees (Biroet al., 2010) andGelada baboons (Theropithecus gelada) (Fashinget al., 2011),no such avoidance is reported. That most mothers abandonthe infant within a week of death is also informative sinceduring this period the cadaver goes from bloating to activedecay – the stage of decomposition that emanates the moststench.Infant corpses are sometimes central to or incorporatedin the displays of male chimpanzees (Bygott, 1972;Matsuzawa, 1997). Adult males have also been known tocarry dead infants; most notably in semi-ranging Barbarymacaques (Macaca sylvanus) whilst interacting with othermales where the corpse is used for agonistic bufferingpurposes (Merz, 1978). In conjunction with other reports,Merz (1978) notes that handling was much rougher andof shorter duration than with live infants. Rare cases haveinvolved high-ranking individuals unsuccessfully adoptinglive orphans and continuing to carry them after death (Tayloret al., 1978; Notman & Munn, 2003).
(c)Old World – New World dichotomy
To the best of our knowledge, there are 13 publishedcases of dead-infant carrying among New World monkeys,comprising cebids, and atelids (see online Supportinginformation, Appendix S1). The lack of information on thisbehaviour may be partly due to the smaller numberof publications on New World primates. Anderson (2011)argues that their tropical habitats accelerate the decay ofcorpses and consequently their abandonment. Additionally,while Old World monkeys can be either arboreal, terrestrialor both, New World monkeys are almost exclusively arboreal(Fernandez-Duque, Di Fiore & Huck, 2012). Referring toan arboreal Old World species, the red colobus (Piliocolobustephrosceles), Struhsaker (2010) pointed out the difficulty ofcarrying a dead infant while leaping between trees – aclaim supported by other colobine cases (Colobus guereza:Onderdonk, 2000;Colobus vellerosus: Teichroeb & Sicotte,2008) and the observation that species that carry their deadfor long periods, such as snub-nosed monkeys (Rhinopithecusbieti) tend to be more terrestrial (Long & Kirkpatrick, 1994).Observer bias may also be involved; when reviewing theliterature on post-mortem carrying, the best-representedspecies were semi or fully terrestrial and inhabited accessibleareas or were in close proximity to human communities(Rajpurohit, 1997; Sugiyamaet al., 2009; Fashinget al.,2011). The only case of dead-infant carrying recordedamong prosimians comes from ring-tailed lemurs (Lemur catta)(Nakamichiet al., 1996), the most terrestrial lemur (Schmidt,2011).
(d)Non-carriers
Not all primates engage in corpse carrying althoughthere is evidence that they do show behavioural responsesto dead or dying infants (see Appendix S2). Strepsirrhinesand callitrichines generally do not carry dead infants, despitesome unsuccessful attempts at carrying having been reported.Nakamichi, Koyama & Jolly (1996) observed seven cases ofring-tailed lemur behaviour towards dead/dying infants.One individual carried her dying infant tripedally for 15 m,whilst others in the troop showed affectionate behaviours,gave cohesion calls and displayed ambiguous back-and-forthmovements, switching between following the troop andreturning to the infant, sometimes for hours. Similarly,Santini (2012) observed a dying ring-tailed lemur infantrepeatedly fall, vocalise, and attempt to climb onto theback of its mother, who wavered between staying withthe infant or the group, eventually choosing the latter.Additionally, Littlefield (2010) observed two infanticides insifakas (Propithecus verreauxi) where the females stayed withthe dying infant, occasionally grooming it and, after itsdeath, remaining with the corpse before giving cohesion callsand then following the group. In experimental settings withvarious prosimians, Rosenson (1977) noted that, whilst noneof the mothers attempted to carry their dead infants, all wereobserved to groom them; a galago (Otolemur crassicaudatus)retrieved her infant using her jaws (later and dropping itwhen attempting to groom), and a black lemur (Eulemurmacaco) was seen gripping and lifting her infant. Groomingwas observed in all mothers, most of which were in regularcontact with their infants, likely representing an attemptto elicit a response. While it seems strepsirrhines lack themorphological proficiency for extended periods of carrying,their behaviour suggests they are not indifferent to their deador dying infants, even after they stop showing signs of life(Nakamichi, 2016).
To defend their views, Rousseauians resort to a variety of tactics to diminish the apparent frequency & intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare (redefine war, censor ethnographic accounts of warfare, misconstrue archaeological evidence)
Pacifying Hunter-Gatherers. Raymond Hames. Human Nature, April 5 2019.https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12110-019-09340-w
Abstract: There is a well-entrenched schism on the frequency (how often), intensity (deaths per 100,000/year), and evolutionary significance of warfare among hunter-gatherers compared with large-scale societies. To simplify, Rousseauians argue that warfare among prehistoric and contemporary hunter-gatherers was nearly absent and, if present, was a late cultural invention. In contrast, so-called Hobbesians argue that violence was relatively common but variable among hunter-gatherers. To defend their views, Rousseauians resort to a variety of tactics to diminish the apparent frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare. These tactics include redefining war, censoring ethnographic accounts of warfare in comparative analyses, misconstruing archaeological evidence, and claiming that outside contact inflates the intensity of warfare among hunter-gatherers. These tactics are subject to critical analysis and are mostly found to be wanting. Furthermore, Hobbesians with empirical data have already established that the frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare is greater compared with large-scale societies even though horticultural societies engage in warfare more intensively than hunter-gatherers. In the end I argue that although war is a primitive trait we may share with chimpanzees and/or our last common ancestor, the ability of hunter-gatherer bands to live peaceably with their neighbors, even though war may occur, is a derived trait that fundamentally distinguishes us socially and politically from chimpanzee societies. It is a point often lost in these debates.
Keywords: Hunter-gatherers War Chimpanzees Peace Comparative research
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In 1997 Lawrence Keeley coined the phrase “pacifying the past” as a critique of scholars who took what one might call a Rousseauian view of conflict in small-scale societies that predated the advent of the state. Along with such notions as living in harmony with the environment (Hames2007) and primordial sexual equality and promiscuity (Ryan andJetha2012 ), Rousseauians believed that war and lethal violence were rare or absent in
small-scale societies and did not become widespread and intense until settled agricultural life when war was “invented” and then elaborated and intensified with the development of the state. Keeley’s direct experience with this perspective stemmed from his research grants being rejected by funding agencies because he sought to investigate what he hypothesized to be defensive fortifications and other forms of archaeological evidence of warfare in non-state societies. Although his War before Civilization (Keeley1997) made a significant impact, those who hold the Rousseauian position have responded, and a major target has revolved around the intensity and frequency of warfare and lethal violence among mobile hunter-gatherers. The terms “Hobbesians” and “Rousseauians” have gained some currency (Gat2015), although alternative contrasts such as Hawks and Doves (Otterbein2004 ) or warfare having a “long chronology” or “short chronology”(Allen and Jones2014 ) make similar distinctions (see Allen2014afor a review of these positions). However, I will use theHobbesian/Rousseauian distinction following the penetrating analysis by Gat (2015) wherein he uses the Australian hunter-gatherer material to clearly expose conceptual and empirical problems for those who would pacify hunter-gatherers. Oddly, Douglas Fry, one of the Rousseauian leaders of this conservative counter, claims that the “pervasive intergroup hostility model”is somehow the main orientation held by many researchers (2006 :10) who investigate hunter-gatherer warfare. Although this allegedly pervasive model includes such things as hunter-gatherer patrilocality and the closed nature of residential bands, the key claim he seeks to refute is that warfare has a deep history and was common among mobile hunter-gatherers. How one demarcates “common” from “rare”is not defined by Fry, even though comparative researchers have created measures of both warfare frequency, or how often it occurs (e.g., Ember and Ember1992a), and warfare intensity, or the probability of an individual being killed by another human through war or homicide (Wrangham et al.2006).
This Rousseauian perspective runs parallel to scholars who cast doubt on the causes,adaptive nature, and intensity of chimpanzee coalitionary violence. A number of researchers, most prominently Power (2005 ), claim chimpanzee violence is not “natural”or adaptive and is largely the consequence of outside factors such as research team presence and disruptions (e.g., feeding stations) or disturbances by farmers or the bush meat trade (Sussman and Marshack2010). Such claims have been empirically discounted through a comparative analysis of 22 chimpanzee communities with and without significant contact (Wilson et al.2014 ). Similarly, as applied to hunter-gatherers, tribal zone theory (Ferguson and Whitehead1991 ) makes a parallel claim: tribal warfare was frequently initiated or intensified as a consequence of colonial invasions.
The goal of this paper is to assess and critique a variety of positions put forward by Rousseauians to diminish the frequency and intensity of warfare among hunter-gatherers. These tactics include the following: misrepresenting evolutionary theory, reclassifying hunter-gatherers; redefining warfare; censoring ethnographic accounts on hunter-gatherer violence; overemphasizing the role of colonial activities in increasing warfare; and questionable use of archaeological evidence and time lines. Finally, and most importantly, I will also argue that although coalitionary violence is a primitive feature of human life that is likely a continuation of the chimpanzee pattern of intergroup relations, the ability to have peaceful relations with neighboring bands is a unique derived trait that fundamentally distinguishes chimps from humans and may have been partially responsible for our rapid cultural evolution.
Abstract: There is a well-entrenched schism on the frequency (how often), intensity (deaths per 100,000/year), and evolutionary significance of warfare among hunter-gatherers compared with large-scale societies. To simplify, Rousseauians argue that warfare among prehistoric and contemporary hunter-gatherers was nearly absent and, if present, was a late cultural invention. In contrast, so-called Hobbesians argue that violence was relatively common but variable among hunter-gatherers. To defend their views, Rousseauians resort to a variety of tactics to diminish the apparent frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare. These tactics include redefining war, censoring ethnographic accounts of warfare in comparative analyses, misconstruing archaeological evidence, and claiming that outside contact inflates the intensity of warfare among hunter-gatherers. These tactics are subject to critical analysis and are mostly found to be wanting. Furthermore, Hobbesians with empirical data have already established that the frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare is greater compared with large-scale societies even though horticultural societies engage in warfare more intensively than hunter-gatherers. In the end I argue that although war is a primitive trait we may share with chimpanzees and/or our last common ancestor, the ability of hunter-gatherer bands to live peaceably with their neighbors, even though war may occur, is a derived trait that fundamentally distinguishes us socially and politically from chimpanzee societies. It is a point often lost in these debates.
Keywords: Hunter-gatherers War Chimpanzees Peace Comparative research
---
In 1997 Lawrence Keeley coined the phrase “pacifying the past” as a critique of scholars who took what one might call a Rousseauian view of conflict in small-scale societies that predated the advent of the state. Along with such notions as living in harmony with the environment (Hames2007) and primordial sexual equality and promiscuity (Ryan andJetha2012 ), Rousseauians believed that war and lethal violence were rare or absent in
small-scale societies and did not become widespread and intense until settled agricultural life when war was “invented” and then elaborated and intensified with the development of the state. Keeley’s direct experience with this perspective stemmed from his research grants being rejected by funding agencies because he sought to investigate what he hypothesized to be defensive fortifications and other forms of archaeological evidence of warfare in non-state societies. Although his War before Civilization (Keeley1997) made a significant impact, those who hold the Rousseauian position have responded, and a major target has revolved around the intensity and frequency of warfare and lethal violence among mobile hunter-gatherers. The terms “Hobbesians” and “Rousseauians” have gained some currency (Gat2015), although alternative contrasts such as Hawks and Doves (Otterbein2004 ) or warfare having a “long chronology” or “short chronology”(Allen and Jones2014 ) make similar distinctions (see Allen2014afor a review of these positions). However, I will use theHobbesian/Rousseauian distinction following the penetrating analysis by Gat (2015) wherein he uses the Australian hunter-gatherer material to clearly expose conceptual and empirical problems for those who would pacify hunter-gatherers. Oddly, Douglas Fry, one of the Rousseauian leaders of this conservative counter, claims that the “pervasive intergroup hostility model”is somehow the main orientation held by many researchers (2006 :10) who investigate hunter-gatherer warfare. Although this allegedly pervasive model includes such things as hunter-gatherer patrilocality and the closed nature of residential bands, the key claim he seeks to refute is that warfare has a deep history and was common among mobile hunter-gatherers. How one demarcates “common” from “rare”is not defined by Fry, even though comparative researchers have created measures of both warfare frequency, or how often it occurs (e.g., Ember and Ember1992a), and warfare intensity, or the probability of an individual being killed by another human through war or homicide (Wrangham et al.2006).
This Rousseauian perspective runs parallel to scholars who cast doubt on the causes,adaptive nature, and intensity of chimpanzee coalitionary violence. A number of researchers, most prominently Power (2005 ), claim chimpanzee violence is not “natural”or adaptive and is largely the consequence of outside factors such as research team presence and disruptions (e.g., feeding stations) or disturbances by farmers or the bush meat trade (Sussman and Marshack2010). Such claims have been empirically discounted through a comparative analysis of 22 chimpanzee communities with and without significant contact (Wilson et al.2014 ). Similarly, as applied to hunter-gatherers, tribal zone theory (Ferguson and Whitehead1991 ) makes a parallel claim: tribal warfare was frequently initiated or intensified as a consequence of colonial invasions.
The goal of this paper is to assess and critique a variety of positions put forward by Rousseauians to diminish the frequency and intensity of warfare among hunter-gatherers. These tactics include the following: misrepresenting evolutionary theory, reclassifying hunter-gatherers; redefining warfare; censoring ethnographic accounts on hunter-gatherer violence; overemphasizing the role of colonial activities in increasing warfare; and questionable use of archaeological evidence and time lines. Finally, and most importantly, I will also argue that although coalitionary violence is a primitive feature of human life that is likely a continuation of the chimpanzee pattern of intergroup relations, the ability to have peaceful relations with neighboring bands is a unique derived trait that fundamentally distinguishes chimps from humans and may have been partially responsible for our rapid cultural evolution.
Echo chambers? Data on Poland & Hungary do not support the hypothesis of clusters emerging along partisan lines; there are sharp group divisions on Twitter, but the nodes however are diverse & overlapping in terms of political leaning
Are Echo Chambers Based on Partisanship? Twitter and Political Polarity in Poland and Hungary. Paweł Matuszewski, Gabriella Szabó. Social Media + Society, April 4, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119837671
Abstract: In this study, we investigate how Twitter allows individuals in Hungary and Poland to experience different political views. To comprehend citizens’ exposure to political information, “who’s following who?” graphs of 455,912 users in Hungary (851,557 connections) and 1,803,837 users in Poland (10,124,501 connections) are examined. Our conceptual point of departure is that Twitter follower networks tell us whether individuals prefer to be members of a group that receives one-sided political messages, or whether they tend to form politically heterogeneous clusters that cut across ideological lines. Methodologically, such connections are best studied by means of computer-aided quantitative research complemented by the sociocentric approach of network analysis. Our data date from September 2018. The findings for Poland do not support the hypothesis of clusters emerging along partisan lines. Likewise, the Hungarian case reveals sharp group divisions on Twitter, the nodes however are diverse and overlapping in terms of political leaning. The data suggest that exposure and segregation in follower networks are not necessarily based on partisanship.
Keywords: Twitter, political information-seeking, network analysis, Hungary, Poland, echo chamber
Abstract: In this study, we investigate how Twitter allows individuals in Hungary and Poland to experience different political views. To comprehend citizens’ exposure to political information, “who’s following who?” graphs of 455,912 users in Hungary (851,557 connections) and 1,803,837 users in Poland (10,124,501 connections) are examined. Our conceptual point of departure is that Twitter follower networks tell us whether individuals prefer to be members of a group that receives one-sided political messages, or whether they tend to form politically heterogeneous clusters that cut across ideological lines. Methodologically, such connections are best studied by means of computer-aided quantitative research complemented by the sociocentric approach of network analysis. Our data date from September 2018. The findings for Poland do not support the hypothesis of clusters emerging along partisan lines. Likewise, the Hungarian case reveals sharp group divisions on Twitter, the nodes however are diverse and overlapping in terms of political leaning. The data suggest that exposure and segregation in follower networks are not necessarily based on partisanship.
Keywords: Twitter, political information-seeking, network analysis, Hungary, Poland, echo chamber
Female Sexual Dysfunction seems less prevalent among female adult entertainers than rates commonly quoted for the general population and was more often seen in the women with less satisfying personal sex lives
Dubin JM, Greer AB, Valentine C, et al. Evaluation of Indicators of Female Sexual Dysfunction in Adult Entertainers. J Sex Med 2019;XX:XXX–XXX.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2019.03.002
Abstract
Introduction: Female sexual dysfunction (FSD) incorporates a wide range of sexual issues within the female population; however, it has not been evaluated among female adult entertainers.
Aim: To evaluate the prevalence of FSD in women working in the adult entertainment industry.
Methods: A 53-question online survey was distributed to female adult entertainers via e-mail through collaboration with the Free Speech Coalition, the North American Trade Association of the Adult Industry. Surveys were sent by the Free Speech Coalition to those within the Performer Availability Screening Services database who met the criteria of having biological vaginas and having experience as adult entertainers. The surveys were answered anonymously. Statistical analysis was performed with Stata/IC 15.1.
Main Outcome Measures: The survey acquired baseline characteristics, use of contraceptives, sexual activity, work vs home sexual satisfaction, and orgasm, in addition to evaluation of female sexual function using the Female Sexual Function Index survey, with a total score <26.55 indicative of FSD.
Results: Of the 147 respondents, 96 (65%) met inclusion criteria of adequately completing the survey, having a biological vagina, and working in the adult entertainment industry. The mean age was 34.1 ± 10.3 years (range 20–66). The average Female Sexual Function Index score was 28.7 ± 5.6, and 24.0% (23 of 96) of entertainers had scores indicative of FSD. Overall, women found their personal sex lives more satisfying when compared with their professional sex lives (3.99 ± 1.40 vs 3.08 ± 1.52, P < .01). When comparing women with FSD to those without FSD, women with FSD had less sexual satisfaction at home (2.8 ± 1.7 vs 4.4 ± 1.0, P < .01), fewer overall sexual events (7.0 ± 6.7 FSD vs 12.9 ± 10.0 non-FSD, P < .01), and fewer satisfying sexual events overall (3.3 ± 4.2 vs 10.7 ± 8.7, P < .01).
Clinical Implications: FSD is prevalent among all women, including those within the adult entertainment industry, and must be addressed during patient interactions.
Strength & Limitation: This is the first study to evaluate the novel group of female adult entertainers. Despite this novel population, the study size is rather small and is susceptible to response bias.
Conclusion: FSD appeared to be less prevalent among female adult entertainers than rates commonly quoted for the general population and was more often seen in the women with less satisfying personal sex lives.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2019.03.002
Abstract
Introduction: Female sexual dysfunction (FSD) incorporates a wide range of sexual issues within the female population; however, it has not been evaluated among female adult entertainers.
Aim: To evaluate the prevalence of FSD in women working in the adult entertainment industry.
Methods: A 53-question online survey was distributed to female adult entertainers via e-mail through collaboration with the Free Speech Coalition, the North American Trade Association of the Adult Industry. Surveys were sent by the Free Speech Coalition to those within the Performer Availability Screening Services database who met the criteria of having biological vaginas and having experience as adult entertainers. The surveys were answered anonymously. Statistical analysis was performed with Stata/IC 15.1.
Main Outcome Measures: The survey acquired baseline characteristics, use of contraceptives, sexual activity, work vs home sexual satisfaction, and orgasm, in addition to evaluation of female sexual function using the Female Sexual Function Index survey, with a total score <26.55 indicative of FSD.
Results: Of the 147 respondents, 96 (65%) met inclusion criteria of adequately completing the survey, having a biological vagina, and working in the adult entertainment industry. The mean age was 34.1 ± 10.3 years (range 20–66). The average Female Sexual Function Index score was 28.7 ± 5.6, and 24.0% (23 of 96) of entertainers had scores indicative of FSD. Overall, women found their personal sex lives more satisfying when compared with their professional sex lives (3.99 ± 1.40 vs 3.08 ± 1.52, P < .01). When comparing women with FSD to those without FSD, women with FSD had less sexual satisfaction at home (2.8 ± 1.7 vs 4.4 ± 1.0, P < .01), fewer overall sexual events (7.0 ± 6.7 FSD vs 12.9 ± 10.0 non-FSD, P < .01), and fewer satisfying sexual events overall (3.3 ± 4.2 vs 10.7 ± 8.7, P < .01).
Clinical Implications: FSD is prevalent among all women, including those within the adult entertainment industry, and must be addressed during patient interactions.
Strength & Limitation: This is the first study to evaluate the novel group of female adult entertainers. Despite this novel population, the study size is rather small and is susceptible to response bias.
Conclusion: FSD appeared to be less prevalent among female adult entertainers than rates commonly quoted for the general population and was more often seen in the women with less satisfying personal sex lives.
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