An examination of the potential lingering effects of smartphone use on cognition. Peter Frost et al. Applied Cognitive Psychology, March 18 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/acp.3546
Summary
Smartphones might offer an extension of our own cognitive abilities, potentially preventing practice of certain forms of cognition. Our first study established that heavier usage of smartphones was negatively correlated with social problem solving and delayed gratification, as well as positively correlated with some aspects of critical thinking. Studies 2 and 3 involved experiments where participants were assigned to either a lower or higher smartphone usage group. In both experiments, higher usage of smartphones led only to a diminished ability to interpret and analyze the deeper meaning of information. However, Study 3 showed that, after a 4‐week interval, the difference in the ability to interpret and analyze meaning between lower and higher phone usage groups was no longer evident. The findings of this study suggest that, even in the rare cases where smartphones might alter cognition, this effect is likely transitory.
1 INTRODUCTION
In his book, “The Shallows,” Carr (2010) suggests the following when it comes to how technology might be changing our cognition:
Over the past few years I've had the uncomfortable sense that someone, or something, has been tinkering with my brain, remapping the neural circuitry, reprogramming the memory. My mind isn't going—so far as I can tell—but it's changing. I'm not thinking the way I used to think. (Carr, 2010, p. 5)
Other popular media and books portray smartphones, social media, and other technology as diminishing cognitive capacities, like attention and concentration (Bauerlein, 2011).
Smartphone technology, in particular, is taking on an increasingly larger role in our daily mental activities. Pew Research data show that 77% of all U.S. adults had a smartphone in 2018, up from 35% in 2011 (Pew Research Center, 2018). The Pew Center also indicated that, in 2018, 94% of people from age 18 to 29 owned a smartphone. While access to smartphone technology has grown, so too has the body of literature investigating the concurrent and immediate residual inhibitory effects of these devices on certain forms of cognition, particularly attention (Strayer, Cooper, Turrill, Coleman, & Hopman, 2015; Strayer & Drews, 2007). Our study, however, focuses more on the potential for longer term effects these devices might exert on higher order cognition, including the ability to think critically, problem solve, reason, and engage in executive control. Some researchers acknowledge that consideration of the intersection between cognition and technology is an understudied area in psychology (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Wilmer, Sherman, & Chein, 2017).
If we consider the neuroplasticity of the brain—its ability to physically alter neural connectivity on the basis of changes in the environment and experience—could smartphone technology, which provides immediate and 24/7 access to the internet, be altering our cognitive abilities? Underlying this debate is the neuropsychological phenomenon of “use‐it‐or‐lose it,” demonstrated by neuroimaging and physiological studies that show new experiences strengthen synaptic connections in areas of the brain frequently used while weakening connections that are rarely used (Carr, 2010). Reliance on mobile phone technology as a form of “extended cognition” (Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015; Clayton, Leshner, & Almond, 2015) or “ibrain” (Small & Vorgan, 2008) might be leading to changes occurring in the brain that alter our ability to engage in various cognitive processes. Might easy access to information take away from practice of more deliberative thoughts and critical thinking skills? Moreover, might the constant notifications and cues provided by mobile phones be interrupting our ability to engage in higher cognition and/or delay gratification for longer term goals?
Some studies, such as that by Barr et al. (2015), have examined whether there may be a correlation between analytical thinking and smartphone technology. Barr and colleagues found that people who relied more heavily on smartphones and information sources performed worse on analytic‐thinking tasks. In a separate review article, Pennycook et al. (2015) acknowledged that this preliminary research suggests that smartphones may serve as a “second brain” that allows people to offload thinking.
Some studies show that smartphones might influence other forms of higher order cognitive functions, such as executive function and ability to delay gratification. The ability to resist temptation in favor of long‐term goals has important implications for individual, societal, and economic success (Casey et al., 2011). Delay of gratification is also negatively correlated with the control abilities in children and adults (Casey et al., 2011; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
Wilmer and Chein (2016) showed that higher scores on a self‐report measure of mobile technology engagement was correlated with a weaker tendency to delay gratification, as measured by a delay discounting task. Their self‐report questionnaire measured (a) daily usage of social media apps, (b) frequency of posting public status updates, and (c) phone‐checking behavior. Wilmer and Chein found a negative correlation between mobile device engagement and delay of gratification. They also found that this relationship might be specifically mediated by individual differences in impulse control and not reward sensitivity. The correlational nature of this study limited inferences about causation, but did show an interesting association between mobile device usage and habits associated with delay of gratification.
There is also evidence that the use of smartphones is correlated with some subjective reports associated with attention. Marty‐Dugas, Ralph, Oakman, and Smilek (2018) found that the results of a self‐report that assessed attention lapses, attention‐related errors, and mind wandering was positively related to results of a self‐report that assessed extent of smartphone use. These researchers found the correlation was particularly strong for participants who used smartphones without a specific purpose in mind (for what they referred to as “absent‐minded” usage). Even the mere presence of smartphones can interrupt attention and task performance (Thornton, Faires, Robbins, & Rollins, 2014). These studies show a relationship between concurrent smartphone use and attention. What about lingering effects on attention?
There is research showing that the multitasking aspect of smartphone technology habits, particularly for purposes of using social media, might relate to longer term effects on control of attention and concentration. Ophir, Clifford, and Wagner (2009) had participants engage in a number classification task (even or odd?) or letter classification task (vowel or consonant?). They then occasionally switched tasks. They calculated a “switch cost” as the difference in mean response time between trials preceded by a trial of the other type (switch trials) minus trials preceded by a trail of the same type (nonswitch trials). The switch cost for heavy social media multitaskers was 167 ms greater than that of low social media multitaskers. Heavy social media multimedia users performed worse on a test of task switching, perhaps—they speculated—because of reduced ability to filter out interference from irrelevant representations.
Relevant to smartphone usage for social networking purposes, studies show a positive association between heavier usage of social networking sites and diminished cognitive control or lack of judgment (Alloway & Alloway, 2012; Cao, Masood, Luqman, & Ali, 2018; Chen & Kim, 2013). Chen and Kim (2013) found that, if heavier users of social networking sites went to them for entertainment or pleasure, those desires overrode privacy concerns, such as unauthorized secondary use and improper access. Heavier usage was also associated with greater problematic social networking behaviors. Chen and Kim identified problematic social networking use based on Young's (1998) 20‐item version of problematic Internet use, and items were adjusted to be more relevant to the context of social networking. For example, respondents were asked if they found themselves staying on social networking sites longer than they intended, and if they feared that life without social networking sites would be empty and joyless. They suggest that problematic use might be a compulsivity control issue that cannot be overridden by recognition of potential long‐term exposure to harm. Again, though, a causal link was not established in this particular study. It is unclear whether heavy usage of social networking attracts people with less cognitive control or if social networking may be contributing to a lack of cognitive control. Some of these studies also emphasize the most extreme cases of heavy technology usage.
Some studies also find a negative association between the use of mobile phone technology and working memory (Abramson et al., 2009). Abramson et al. (2009) administered a questionnaire about mobile phone usage. They administered cognitive tests and found that the more frequently calls were made per week, the poorer was working memory accuracy and reaction time for a simple learning task was shorter.
Some studies have also explored whether the frequent interruptions from smartphones influences social reasoning and learning. Reed, Hirsh‐Pasek, and Golinkoff (2017) conducted an experiment where they found that phone interruptions that occurred when a mother was attempting to teach their 2‐year‐old novel words lead to poorer language acquisition. Though these studies show a concurrent effect of smartphone interruptions on social reasoning and learning, few studies have explored lingering effects of smartphone use on social cognition. Other studies show evidence that reliance on smartphone use for social interactions might correlate with poorer social skills and reasoning (e.g., Jin & Park, 2012). Our series of studies, particularly Studies 2 and 3, included controlled experiments to explore causative aspects pertaining to lingering effects of smartphone use.
It should be noted that whereas some studies have explored potential associations between smartphone usage and cognition, some studies have also explored whether exposure to the electromagnetic radiation emitted by smartphone technology alters cognition and brain physiology. Recent research shows that exposure to electromagnetic fields from smartphones does not alter event‐related potentials, like N100, P200, N200, P300 latencies and N2‐P300 amplitudes (Mohan, Khaliq, Panwar, & Vaney, 2016), nor do these fields alter measures of attention and short‐term memory (Cinel, Boldini, Fox, & Russo, 2008). Therefore, it is not likely that electromagnetic fields will confound an examination of how smartphone activities (for social media, phone calls, internet browsing, etc.) might influence cognition.
Our first study explored whether smartphone usage correlated with various measures of higher order cognition, including the Delayed Gratification Inventory, Cornell Critical Thinking Test, Level Z (for college‐age participants), and Modified Means End Problem Solving. The Modified Means End was used to assess social problem solving because we suspected that higher rates of mobile phone technology and social media might lead to a lack of practice with social problem solving. Although a study by Ekinci (2014) found that problematic internet use was positively correlated with the perception of avoidant and impulsive problem solving styles, no one to our knowledge has examined the relationship between use of smartphones and direct (rather than perceptions of) problem solving.
Once we identified relationships between mobile device usage and various forms of cognition, we then used an experimental manipulation in Study 2 to determine if there were any causal links. Only the cognitive tests and scales found to be related to cognition in Study 1 were investigated in Study 2. Study 3 was intended to replicate the findings in Study 2, as well as include a longer interval of time associated with manipulation of smartphone usage.
Given previous research (e.g., Wilmer & Chein, 2016) and our suspicion that more frequent smartphone usage would lead to less reliance on higher cognition, we hypothesized that in Study 1, the use of smartphones should be negatively correlated with particular executive control abilities, particularly delay gratification and critical thinking. Further, we hypothesized in Studies 2 and 3 that higher rates of smartphone usage might cause diminished abilities associated with certain forms of higher cognition.
Our study adds to the literature on mobile phone technology and cognition by (a) examining some cognitive variables not previously associated with research on mobile technology usage, such as social problem solving and more aspects of critical thinking, (b) using tracking apps rather than self‐reports to more accurately and objectively measure usage rates, and (c) introducing experimental control in Studies 2 and 3.
We chose to use tracking apps rather than rely exclusively on self‐reports since studies have shown that people generally misjudge time durations, especially rapid, yet pervasive, checking behaviors (Grondin, 2010; Rachman, 2002). Andrews, Ellis, Shaw, and Piwek (2015) were the first to use a tracking software they developed to find out how much time was actually spent using mobile phones. Comparing self‐reported usage of mobile phones versus tracking app reports over 2 weeks, they found that their participants did not always self‐report some aspects of their mobile phone usage accurately. For example, they found that young adults far underestimated the average daily number of phone uses.
Thursday, April 11, 2019
The evolutionary context of personality development: Ontogenetic and Deferred Adaptations
The evolutionary context of personality development. Marco del Giudice. In Handbook of Personality Development, Chapter 2. New York: Guilford, 2019. January 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316120672_The_evolutionary_context_of_personality_development
Ontogenetic and Deferred Adaptations
Looking at developmental stages through the lens of biological function suggests a useful distinction between two kinds of adaptations that are often observed in early life. Ontogenetic adaptations are designed to serve their fitnessenhancing function at a specific time in development, and often disappear as soon as they are no longer needed. Examples include the placenta (a fetal organ that provides nourishment and other vital functions during the fetal stage and is discarded immediately after birth) and infantile reflexes, such as the suckling reflex. Deferred adaptations are traits that appear in childhood but function—at least in part—to prepare children for adult behavior (Bjorklund & Ellis, 2014). Play is a paramount example of a deferred adaptation; in humans and other mammals, playing trains youngsters to deal with unexpected events and, at the same time, paves the way to the acquisition of specialized adult skills (e.g., foraging, fighting, parenting) (Geary, 2010; Spinka, Newberry, & Bekoff, 2001). The concept of an ontogenetic adaptation is particularly useful to understand the limits of early experiences in shaping adult personality. Some behavioral traits expressed in childhood serve important functions in the context of family life but may cease to be useful as the child turns into an independent adult. These traits may either disappear or get repurposed in a different form in the service of new developmental goals. For example, attachment styles in infancy are largely determined by the parents’ caregiving styles and show negligible genetic effects. In middle childhood, attachment styles start to become differentiated by sex, possibly under the influence of adrenal androgens; adults’ attachment styles to romantic partners are only weakly correlated with those of infancy, and reflect a sizable contribution of genetic factors (Barbaro, Boutwell, Barnes, & Shackelford, 2017; Del Giudice, 2009, 2015a). At an even deeper level, the existence of parent–offspring conflict implies that the parents’ behavior is not completely in the best interest of their children.
For this reason, children should not passively accept the influence of parents; instead, they should show a certain amount of developmental “resistance” to parental shaping. While it is difficult to directly test this hypothesis, parent– offspring conflict may well contribute to explain why family experiences have only small and inconsistent effects on the development of adult personality.
Ontogenetic and Deferred Adaptations
Looking at developmental stages through the lens of biological function suggests a useful distinction between two kinds of adaptations that are often observed in early life. Ontogenetic adaptations are designed to serve their fitnessenhancing function at a specific time in development, and often disappear as soon as they are no longer needed. Examples include the placenta (a fetal organ that provides nourishment and other vital functions during the fetal stage and is discarded immediately after birth) and infantile reflexes, such as the suckling reflex. Deferred adaptations are traits that appear in childhood but function—at least in part—to prepare children for adult behavior (Bjorklund & Ellis, 2014). Play is a paramount example of a deferred adaptation; in humans and other mammals, playing trains youngsters to deal with unexpected events and, at the same time, paves the way to the acquisition of specialized adult skills (e.g., foraging, fighting, parenting) (Geary, 2010; Spinka, Newberry, & Bekoff, 2001). The concept of an ontogenetic adaptation is particularly useful to understand the limits of early experiences in shaping adult personality. Some behavioral traits expressed in childhood serve important functions in the context of family life but may cease to be useful as the child turns into an independent adult. These traits may either disappear or get repurposed in a different form in the service of new developmental goals. For example, attachment styles in infancy are largely determined by the parents’ caregiving styles and show negligible genetic effects. In middle childhood, attachment styles start to become differentiated by sex, possibly under the influence of adrenal androgens; adults’ attachment styles to romantic partners are only weakly correlated with those of infancy, and reflect a sizable contribution of genetic factors (Barbaro, Boutwell, Barnes, & Shackelford, 2017; Del Giudice, 2009, 2015a). At an even deeper level, the existence of parent–offspring conflict implies that the parents’ behavior is not completely in the best interest of their children.
For this reason, children should not passively accept the influence of parents; instead, they should show a certain amount of developmental “resistance” to parental shaping. While it is difficult to directly test this hypothesis, parent– offspring conflict may well contribute to explain why family experiences have only small and inconsistent effects on the development of adult personality.
Rolf Degen summarizing: The emergence of the ability to build elevated sleeping nests allowed great apes to adopt a more comfortable & human-like sleep posture than the one monkeys take up
Nesting, sleeping, and nighttime behaviors in wild and captive great apes. James R. Anderson, Mabel Y. L. Ang, Louise C. Lock, Iris Weiche. Primates, Apr 10 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10329-019-00723-2
Abstract: The past few decades have seen a burgeoning of scientific studies on great apes’ use of nests for sleeping in the wild, as well as their nesting behavior and sleep in captivity. We review recent advances in knowledge of these topics, with the aim of promoting information exchange between people working in the field and with captive great apes. We trace developments in research into nest-building techniques in adults and immatures, factors that influence selection of general sleeping sites and specific locations, social aspects of sleep, postures, and nighttime activities. We argue that exchanges of information deriving from studies of captive and wild apes are valuable for obtaining a better understanding of sleep-related adaptations in our nearest evolutionary neighbors, and conclude by making some recommendations regarding sleeping arrangements in captivity from a welfare perspective.
Keywords: Chimpanzee Bonobo Gorilla Orangutan Nest building Sleep posture Sleep quality Environmental enrichment Welfare
Abstract: The past few decades have seen a burgeoning of scientific studies on great apes’ use of nests for sleeping in the wild, as well as their nesting behavior and sleep in captivity. We review recent advances in knowledge of these topics, with the aim of promoting information exchange between people working in the field and with captive great apes. We trace developments in research into nest-building techniques in adults and immatures, factors that influence selection of general sleeping sites and specific locations, social aspects of sleep, postures, and nighttime activities. We argue that exchanges of information deriving from studies of captive and wild apes are valuable for obtaining a better understanding of sleep-related adaptations in our nearest evolutionary neighbors, and conclude by making some recommendations regarding sleeping arrangements in captivity from a welfare perspective.
Keywords: Chimpanzee Bonobo Gorilla Orangutan Nest building Sleep posture Sleep quality Environmental enrichment Welfare
Wednesday, April 10, 2019
Why is age so important in human mating? Evolved age preferences and their influences on multiple mating behaviors
Conroy-Beam, D., & Buss, D. M. (2019). Why is age so important in human mating? Evolved age preferences and their influences on multiple mating behaviors. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, 13(2), 127-157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000127
Abstract: Evolutionary theorizing suggests that chronological age, because it is so strongly linked with key reproductive qualities like fertility, should be an exceptionally consequential variable in mate selection. We review voluminous evidence for mate preferences for age and the substantial and varied behavioral sequelae of those preferences. These include (a) in actual marriage decisions, men choose younger wives, and women choose older husbands, on average in all of the dozens of cultures studied; (b) in personal advertisements, men and women seek partners consistent with their expressed age preferences; (c) chronological age determines number of “hits” received in online dating services; (d) the age of potential bride influences the amount of money spent on premarriage customs; (e) men’s mate retention effort, including commitment manipulation, resource provisioning, and intrasexual threats, is significantly predicted by the wife’s age; and (f) chronological age is an important sex-linked cause of divorce. The far-reaching ramifications of age also extend to (g) tactics of intrasexual competition, (h) predictors of mate value discrepancies, (i) victims of sex crimes, and (j) prostitution patterns. Finally, chronological age predicts (k) probability of remarriage, and (l) the age gap between grooms and brides upon remarriage. We synthesize evidence from diverse methods, across different cultures, and over time spans of centuries. Massive converging evidence provides a powerful, yet complex, understanding of the evolutionary importance of age in multiple mating outcomes over the human life span.
Popular version: What We Know About Age Gaps in Dating, Love, and Marriage. Theresa E DiDonato. Psychology Today, Apr 10, 2019. https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/meet-catch-and-keep/201904/what-we-know-about-age-gaps-in-dating-love-and-marriage
Abstract: Evolutionary theorizing suggests that chronological age, because it is so strongly linked with key reproductive qualities like fertility, should be an exceptionally consequential variable in mate selection. We review voluminous evidence for mate preferences for age and the substantial and varied behavioral sequelae of those preferences. These include (a) in actual marriage decisions, men choose younger wives, and women choose older husbands, on average in all of the dozens of cultures studied; (b) in personal advertisements, men and women seek partners consistent with their expressed age preferences; (c) chronological age determines number of “hits” received in online dating services; (d) the age of potential bride influences the amount of money spent on premarriage customs; (e) men’s mate retention effort, including commitment manipulation, resource provisioning, and intrasexual threats, is significantly predicted by the wife’s age; and (f) chronological age is an important sex-linked cause of divorce. The far-reaching ramifications of age also extend to (g) tactics of intrasexual competition, (h) predictors of mate value discrepancies, (i) victims of sex crimes, and (j) prostitution patterns. Finally, chronological age predicts (k) probability of remarriage, and (l) the age gap between grooms and brides upon remarriage. We synthesize evidence from diverse methods, across different cultures, and over time spans of centuries. Massive converging evidence provides a powerful, yet complex, understanding of the evolutionary importance of age in multiple mating outcomes over the human life span.
Popular version: What We Know About Age Gaps in Dating, Love, and Marriage. Theresa E DiDonato. Psychology Today, Apr 10, 2019. https://www.psychologytoday.com/ca/blog/meet-catch-and-keep/201904/what-we-know-about-age-gaps-in-dating-love-and-marriage
Those with posttraumatic stress disorder frequently experience unwanted memories of their traumas, even when making explicit efforts to avoid them, while healthy individuals can suppress those memories
Behavioral and neural correlates of memory suppression in PTSD. Danielle R. Sullivan et al. Journal of Psychiatric Research, Volume 112, May 2019, Pages 30-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2019.02.015
Highlights
• Trauma exposure is associated with behavioral difficulties in memory suppression.
• Right middle frontal gyrus activity is reduced during memory suppression after trauma exposure.
• Trait suppression is negatively correlated with reduced right middle frontal gyrus activity.
Abstract: Previous work has shown that healthy individuals can actively suppress emotional memories through recruitment of the lateral prefrontal cortex. By contrast, individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) frequently experience unwanted memories of their traumatic experiences, even when making explicit efforts to avoid them. However, little is known regarding the behavioral and neural effects of memory suppression among individuals with PTSD. We examined memory suppression associated with PTSD using the Think-No-Think paradigm in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. We studied three groups: PTSD (n = 16), trauma exposure without PTSD (n = 19), and controls (i.e., no trauma exposure or PTSD; n = 13). There was a main effect of memory suppression such that participants remembered fewer face-picture pairs during the suppress condition than the remember condition. However, trauma-exposed participants (regardless of PTSD status) were less likely to successfully suppress memory than non-trauma-exposed controls. Neuroimaging data revealed that trauma-exposed individuals showed reduced activation in the right middle frontal gyrus during memory suppression. These results suggest that trauma exposure is associated with neural and behavioral disruptions in memory suppression and point to the possibility that difficulty in active suppression of memories may be just one of several likely factors contributing to the development of PTSD.
Highlights
• Trauma exposure is associated with behavioral difficulties in memory suppression.
• Right middle frontal gyrus activity is reduced during memory suppression after trauma exposure.
• Trait suppression is negatively correlated with reduced right middle frontal gyrus activity.
Abstract: Previous work has shown that healthy individuals can actively suppress emotional memories through recruitment of the lateral prefrontal cortex. By contrast, individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) frequently experience unwanted memories of their traumatic experiences, even when making explicit efforts to avoid them. However, little is known regarding the behavioral and neural effects of memory suppression among individuals with PTSD. We examined memory suppression associated with PTSD using the Think-No-Think paradigm in an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study. We studied three groups: PTSD (n = 16), trauma exposure without PTSD (n = 19), and controls (i.e., no trauma exposure or PTSD; n = 13). There was a main effect of memory suppression such that participants remembered fewer face-picture pairs during the suppress condition than the remember condition. However, trauma-exposed participants (regardless of PTSD status) were less likely to successfully suppress memory than non-trauma-exposed controls. Neuroimaging data revealed that trauma-exposed individuals showed reduced activation in the right middle frontal gyrus during memory suppression. These results suggest that trauma exposure is associated with neural and behavioral disruptions in memory suppression and point to the possibility that difficulty in active suppression of memories may be just one of several likely factors contributing to the development of PTSD.
We see evidence of an evolutionary design supportive of attachment as well as reproductive exigencies of procreative well-being; there is an ethological case to be made for considering pornography use as a public health risk
Procreative well-being and pornography – analyzing the script. Public health implications revealed through an ethological lens. Mark H. Butler.Marriage & Family Review, Apr 9 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/01494929.2019.1588187
Abstract: An ethological model of human procreative well-being is proposed and the goodness-of-fit of pornography’s script to that model is considered. Deducing an evolutionary template for procreative well-being from an ethological analysis links attachment dynamics to procreative success. Alongside parent–child attachment, pair-bond attachment in the procreative couple looms large as an element of optimal procreative relationship structure and quality. Key elements of pair-bond attachment are documented. Turning next to an empirical examination of the sexual behavioral system in humans, we see evidence of an evolutionary design supportive of attachment as well as reproductive exigencies of procreative well-being. Sexual system mechanisms promoting both reproduction and attachment are evident in the evolutionary design. We next employ script theory to identify key elements of the sexual script promulgated by pornography. Joining these two analyses, we compare the evolutionary, attachment-based template for procreative success in juxtaposition to pornography’s sexual script to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of pornography use to attachment success and, by extension, procreative well-being. We conclude that there is an ethological case to be made for considering pornography use as a public health risk. Implications of the model of procreative well-being for the practice of couple therapy are given mention.
Keywords: attachment, ethology, family, marriage, pornography, procreative well-being, sexual behavioral system, sociobiology
Abstract: An ethological model of human procreative well-being is proposed and the goodness-of-fit of pornography’s script to that model is considered. Deducing an evolutionary template for procreative well-being from an ethological analysis links attachment dynamics to procreative success. Alongside parent–child attachment, pair-bond attachment in the procreative couple looms large as an element of optimal procreative relationship structure and quality. Key elements of pair-bond attachment are documented. Turning next to an empirical examination of the sexual behavioral system in humans, we see evidence of an evolutionary design supportive of attachment as well as reproductive exigencies of procreative well-being. Sexual system mechanisms promoting both reproduction and attachment are evident in the evolutionary design. We next employ script theory to identify key elements of the sexual script promulgated by pornography. Joining these two analyses, we compare the evolutionary, attachment-based template for procreative success in juxtaposition to pornography’s sexual script to evaluate the goodness-of-fit of pornography use to attachment success and, by extension, procreative well-being. We conclude that there is an ethological case to be made for considering pornography use as a public health risk. Implications of the model of procreative well-being for the practice of couple therapy are given mention.
Keywords: attachment, ethology, family, marriage, pornography, procreative well-being, sexual behavioral system, sociobiology
Long-term benefit of Microbiota Transfer Therapy on autism symptoms and gut/fecal microbiota
Long-term benefit of Microbiota Transfer Therapy on autism symptoms and gut microbiota. Dae-Wook Kang, James B. Adams, Devon M. Coleman, Elena L. Pollard, Juan Maldonado, Sharon McDonough-Means, J. Gregory Caporaso & Rosa Krajmalnik-Brown. Scientific Reports, volume 9, Article number: 5821 (2019). Apr 9. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-019-42183-0
Abstract: Many studies have reported abnormal gut microbiota in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), suggesting a link between gut microbiome and autism-like behaviors. Modifying the gut microbiome is a potential route to improve gastrointestinal (GI) and behavioral symptoms in children with ASD, and fecal microbiota transplant could transform the dysbiotic gut microbiome toward a healthy one by delivering a large number of commensal microbes from a healthy donor. We previously performed an open-label trial of Microbiota Transfer Therapy (MTT) that combined antibiotics, a bowel cleanse, a stomach-acid suppressant, and fecal microbiota transplant, and observed significant improvements in GI symptoms, autism-related symptoms, and gut microbiota. Here, we report on a follow-up with the same 18 participants two years after treatment was completed. Notably, most improvements in GI symptoms were maintained, and autism-related symptoms improved even more after the end of treatment. Important changes in gut microbiota at the end of treatment remained at follow-up, including significant increases in bacterial diversity and relative abundances of Bifidobacteria and Prevotella. Our observations demonstrate the long-term safety and efficacy of MTT as a potential therapy to treat children with ASD who have GI problems, and warrant a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial in the future.
Abstract: Many studies have reported abnormal gut microbiota in individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), suggesting a link between gut microbiome and autism-like behaviors. Modifying the gut microbiome is a potential route to improve gastrointestinal (GI) and behavioral symptoms in children with ASD, and fecal microbiota transplant could transform the dysbiotic gut microbiome toward a healthy one by delivering a large number of commensal microbes from a healthy donor. We previously performed an open-label trial of Microbiota Transfer Therapy (MTT) that combined antibiotics, a bowel cleanse, a stomach-acid suppressant, and fecal microbiota transplant, and observed significant improvements in GI symptoms, autism-related symptoms, and gut microbiota. Here, we report on a follow-up with the same 18 participants two years after treatment was completed. Notably, most improvements in GI symptoms were maintained, and autism-related symptoms improved even more after the end of treatment. Important changes in gut microbiota at the end of treatment remained at follow-up, including significant increases in bacterial diversity and relative abundances of Bifidobacteria and Prevotella. Our observations demonstrate the long-term safety and efficacy of MTT as a potential therapy to treat children with ASD who have GI problems, and warrant a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial in the future.
From 2018: Concern for Group Reputation Increases Prosociality in Young Children
From 2018: Concern for Group Reputation Increases Prosociality in Young Children. Jan M. Engelmann, Esther Herrmann, Michael Tomasello. Psychol Sci. 2018 Feb;29(2):181-190. doi: 10.1177/0956797617733830
Abstract: The motivation to build and maintain a positive personal reputation promotes prosocial behavior. But individuals also identify with their groups, and so it is possible that the desire to maintain or enhance group reputation may have similar effects. Here, we show that 5-year-old children actively invest in the reputation of their group by acting more generously when their group’s reputation is at stake. Children shared significantly more resources with fictitious other children not only when their individual donations were public rather than private but also when their group’s donations (effacing individual donations) were public rather than private. These results provide the first experimental evidence that concern for group reputation can lead to higher levels of prosociality.
Keywords: cooperation, reputation, group reputation, open data
Check also Botto, Sara Valencia, & Rochat, Philippe. (2018). Sensitivity to the evaluation of others emerges by 24 months. Developmental Psychology, 54(9), 1723-1734. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/children-reproduced-outcomes-that-were.html
Abstract: The motivation to build and maintain a positive personal reputation promotes prosocial behavior. But individuals also identify with their groups, and so it is possible that the desire to maintain or enhance group reputation may have similar effects. Here, we show that 5-year-old children actively invest in the reputation of their group by acting more generously when their group’s reputation is at stake. Children shared significantly more resources with fictitious other children not only when their individual donations were public rather than private but also when their group’s donations (effacing individual donations) were public rather than private. These results provide the first experimental evidence that concern for group reputation can lead to higher levels of prosociality.
Keywords: cooperation, reputation, group reputation, open data
Check also Botto, Sara Valencia, & Rochat, Philippe. (2018). Sensitivity to the evaluation of others emerges by 24 months. Developmental Psychology, 54(9), 1723-1734. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/08/children-reproduced-outcomes-that-were.html
Angry people are more likely to engage in debates with those of similar & opposing views, & seek out information confirming their views more frequently; anxious individuals tend to seek out information contradicting their opinions
Anger, Fear, and Echo Chambers: The Emotional Basis for Online Behavior. Dag Wollebæk et al. Social Media + Society, April 9, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119829859
Abstract: Emotions, such as anger and fear, have been shown to influence people’s political behavior. However, few studies link emotions specifically to how people debate political issues and seek political information online. In this article, we examine how anger and fear are related to politics-oriented digital behavior, attempting to bridge the gap between the thus far disconnected literature on political psychology and the digital media. Based on survey data, we show that anger and fear are connected to distinct behaviors online. Angry people are more likely to engage in debates with people having both similar and opposing views. They also seek out information confirming their views more frequently. Anxious individuals, by contrast, tend to seek out information contradicting their opinions. These findings reiterate predictions made in the extant literature concerning the role of emotions in politics. Thus, we argue that anger reinforces echo chamber dynamics and trench warfare dynamics in the digital public sphere, while fear counteracts these dynamics.
Keywords: emotions, echo chambers, trench warfare dynamics, anger, anxiety, online political behavior
Abstract: Emotions, such as anger and fear, have been shown to influence people’s political behavior. However, few studies link emotions specifically to how people debate political issues and seek political information online. In this article, we examine how anger and fear are related to politics-oriented digital behavior, attempting to bridge the gap between the thus far disconnected literature on political psychology and the digital media. Based on survey data, we show that anger and fear are connected to distinct behaviors online. Angry people are more likely to engage in debates with people having both similar and opposing views. They also seek out information confirming their views more frequently. Anxious individuals, by contrast, tend to seek out information contradicting their opinions. These findings reiterate predictions made in the extant literature concerning the role of emotions in politics. Thus, we argue that anger reinforces echo chamber dynamics and trench warfare dynamics in the digital public sphere, while fear counteracts these dynamics.
Keywords: emotions, echo chambers, trench warfare dynamics, anger, anxiety, online political behavior
Genetic selection/concentration is not an explanation for neighbourhood gradients in obesity & mental health problems; a modest genetic selection/concentration was evident for teen pregnancy and poor educational outcomes
Genetics and the geography of health, behaviour and attainment. Daniel W. Belsky, Avshalom Caspi, Louise Arseneault, David L. Corcoran, Benjamin W. Domingue, Kathleen Mullan Harris, Renate M. Houts, Jonathan S. Mill, Terrie E. Moffitt, Joseph Prinz, Karen Sugden, Jasmin Wertz, Benjamin Williams & Candice L. Odgers. Nature Human Behaviour (2019), April 8 2019, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0562-1
Abstract: Young people’s life chances can be predicted by characteristics of their neighbourhood1. Children growing up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods exhibit worse physical and mental health and suffer poorer educational and economic outcomes than children growing up in advantaged neighbourhoods. Increasing recognition that aspects of social inequalities tend, in fact, to be geographical inequalities2,3,4,5 is stimulating research and focusing policy interest on the role of place in shaping health, behaviour and social outcomes. Where neighbourhood effects are causal, neighbourhood-level interventions can be effective. Where neighbourhood effects reflect selection of families with different characteristics into different neighbourhoods, interventions should instead target families or individuals directly. To test how selection may affect different neighbourhood-linked problems, we linked neighbourhood data with genetic, health and social outcome data for >7,000 European-descent UK and US young people in the E-Risk and Add Health studies. We tested selection/concentration of genetic risks for obesity, schizophrenia, teen pregnancy and poor educational outcomes in high-risk neighbourhoods, including genetic analysis of neighbourhood mobility. Findings argue against genetic selection/concentration as an explanation for neighbourhood gradients in obesity and mental health problems. By contrast, modest genetic selection/concentration was evident for teen pregnancy and poor educational outcomes, suggesting that neighbourhood effects for these outcomes should be interpreted with care.
Abstract: Young people’s life chances can be predicted by characteristics of their neighbourhood1. Children growing up in disadvantaged neighbourhoods exhibit worse physical and mental health and suffer poorer educational and economic outcomes than children growing up in advantaged neighbourhoods. Increasing recognition that aspects of social inequalities tend, in fact, to be geographical inequalities2,3,4,5 is stimulating research and focusing policy interest on the role of place in shaping health, behaviour and social outcomes. Where neighbourhood effects are causal, neighbourhood-level interventions can be effective. Where neighbourhood effects reflect selection of families with different characteristics into different neighbourhoods, interventions should instead target families or individuals directly. To test how selection may affect different neighbourhood-linked problems, we linked neighbourhood data with genetic, health and social outcome data for >7,000 European-descent UK and US young people in the E-Risk and Add Health studies. We tested selection/concentration of genetic risks for obesity, schizophrenia, teen pregnancy and poor educational outcomes in high-risk neighbourhoods, including genetic analysis of neighbourhood mobility. Findings argue against genetic selection/concentration as an explanation for neighbourhood gradients in obesity and mental health problems. By contrast, modest genetic selection/concentration was evident for teen pregnancy and poor educational outcomes, suggesting that neighbourhood effects for these outcomes should be interpreted with care.
Tuesday, April 9, 2019
We construct more precise and robust measures of GDP per capita using nighttime lights; we find that GDP per capita measures are less precise for middle and low income countries
Illuminating Economic Growth. Yingyao Hu, Jiaxiong Yao. IMF Working Paper No. 19/77. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/04/09/Illuminating-Economic-Growth-46670
Summary: This paper seeks to illuminate the uncertainty in official GDP per capita measures using auxiliary data. Using satellite-recorded nighttime lights as an additional measurement of true GDP per capita, we provide a statistical framework, in which the error in official GDP per capita may depend on the country’s statistical capacity and the relationship between nighttime lights and true GDP per capita can be nonlinear and vary with geographic location. This paper uses recently developed results for measurement error models to identify and estimate the nonlinear relationship between nighttime lights and true GDP per capita and the nonparametric distribution of errors in official GDP per capita data. We then construct more precise and robust measures of GDP per capita using nighttime lights, official national accounts data, statistical capacity, and geographic locations. We find that GDP per capita measures are less precise for middle and low income countries and nighttime lights can play a bigger role in improving such measures.
Summary: This paper seeks to illuminate the uncertainty in official GDP per capita measures using auxiliary data. Using satellite-recorded nighttime lights as an additional measurement of true GDP per capita, we provide a statistical framework, in which the error in official GDP per capita may depend on the country’s statistical capacity and the relationship between nighttime lights and true GDP per capita can be nonlinear and vary with geographic location. This paper uses recently developed results for measurement error models to identify and estimate the nonlinear relationship between nighttime lights and true GDP per capita and the nonparametric distribution of errors in official GDP per capita data. We then construct more precise and robust measures of GDP per capita using nighttime lights, official national accounts data, statistical capacity, and geographic locations. We find that GDP per capita measures are less precise for middle and low income countries and nighttime lights can play a bigger role in improving such measures.
Space ‘colonization’ will take place and will likely be fully automated; space mining will be the primary goal of space colonies; automation may lead to a technological singularity
Why space colonization will be fully automated. Riccardo Campa, Konrad Szocik, Martin Braddock. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, April 8 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2019.03.021
Highlights
• Humans cannot survive for long periods of time in outer space.
• Space ‘colonization’ will take place and will likely be fully automated.
• Space mining will be the primary goal of space colonies.
• Automation may lead to a technological singularity.
• Space automation could limit the negative effects of an hostile Superintelligence.
Abstract: In this article we explore a possible scenario of space colonization and its consequences for planet Earth. We argue that in the short term space colonization will take place, but not in the form often presented in scientific and science fiction literature. Space colonies will be fully automated. There are three main reasons to believe that this is the most plausible scenario: 1) space mining is very profitable; 2) humans cannot survive for long periods of time in outer space limiting the prospects for human space colonization (HSC), and 3) automation is already a leading trend on Earth. Crewed missions will have an ancillary function, while machines or human/machine avatars will ‘inhabit’ other celestial bodies, in order to pursue economic enterprises and progress scientific discovery. We also propose some considerations on the speculative hypothesis, elaborated by a few leading futurists, that the development of machine-based learning Artificial Intelligence would lead to the so-called Singularity. In relation to this scenario, we argue that fully automated space colonization (FASC) could be a solution to prevent unwanted side effects of the Singularity, such as competition for resources between humankind and a hostile Artificial Intelligence.
Highlights
• Humans cannot survive for long periods of time in outer space.
• Space ‘colonization’ will take place and will likely be fully automated.
• Space mining will be the primary goal of space colonies.
• Automation may lead to a technological singularity.
• Space automation could limit the negative effects of an hostile Superintelligence.
Abstract: In this article we explore a possible scenario of space colonization and its consequences for planet Earth. We argue that in the short term space colonization will take place, but not in the form often presented in scientific and science fiction literature. Space colonies will be fully automated. There are three main reasons to believe that this is the most plausible scenario: 1) space mining is very profitable; 2) humans cannot survive for long periods of time in outer space limiting the prospects for human space colonization (HSC), and 3) automation is already a leading trend on Earth. Crewed missions will have an ancillary function, while machines or human/machine avatars will ‘inhabit’ other celestial bodies, in order to pursue economic enterprises and progress scientific discovery. We also propose some considerations on the speculative hypothesis, elaborated by a few leading futurists, that the development of machine-based learning Artificial Intelligence would lead to the so-called Singularity. In relation to this scenario, we argue that fully automated space colonization (FASC) could be a solution to prevent unwanted side effects of the Singularity, such as competition for resources between humankind and a hostile Artificial Intelligence.
Male‐mediated prenatal loss can provide greater reproductive benefits to males than infanticide; compared to infanticide, male‐mediated prenatal loss may be more prevalent and of greater role in mammalian species than thought
Male‐mediated prenatal loss: Functions and mechanisms. Matthew N. Zipple et al. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, April 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1002/evan.21776
ABSTRACT: Sexually selected infanticide has been the subject of intense empirical and theoretical study for decades; a related phenomenon, male‐mediated prenatal loss, has received much less attention in evolutionary studies. Male‐mediated prenatal loss occurs when inseminated or pregnant females terminate reproductive effort following exposure to a nonsire male, either through implantation failure or pregnancy termination. Male‐mediated prenatal loss encompasses two sub‐phenomena: sexually selected feticide and the Bruce effect. In this review, we provide a framework that explains the relationship between feticide and the Bruce effect and describes what is known about the proximate and ultimate mechanisms involved in each. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that male‐mediated prenatal loss can provide greater reproductive benefits to males than infanticide. We therefore suggest that, compared to infanticide, male‐mediated prenatal loss may be more prevalent in mammalian species and may have played a greater role in their social evolution than has previously been documented.
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Bruce Effect in Wikipedia:
ABSTRACT: Sexually selected infanticide has been the subject of intense empirical and theoretical study for decades; a related phenomenon, male‐mediated prenatal loss, has received much less attention in evolutionary studies. Male‐mediated prenatal loss occurs when inseminated or pregnant females terminate reproductive effort following exposure to a nonsire male, either through implantation failure or pregnancy termination. Male‐mediated prenatal loss encompasses two sub‐phenomena: sexually selected feticide and the Bruce effect. In this review, we provide a framework that explains the relationship between feticide and the Bruce effect and describes what is known about the proximate and ultimate mechanisms involved in each. Using a simple model, we demonstrate that male‐mediated prenatal loss can provide greater reproductive benefits to males than infanticide. We therefore suggest that, compared to infanticide, male‐mediated prenatal loss may be more prevalent in mammalian species and may have played a greater role in their social evolution than has previously been documented.
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Bruce Effect in Wikipedia:
Evolutionary benefits
Males
When given the opportunity, male mice tend to direct their urine in the female’s direction.[23] This allows males to improve their fitness success by “sabotaging” the pregnancy of a male competitor,[3] and more quickly returning the female to estrus.[24] The Bruce effect can also aid in maintaining social status, with dominant males leaving more urinal scent markings,[25] and so blocking the pregnancies initiated by subordinate males.Females
Females can control their likelihood of terminating pregnancy by pursuing or avoiding novel male contact during their most susceptible periods.[26] In this way, females can exert a post-copulatory mate choice, reserving their reproductive resources for the highest-quality male. Certainly, females are more likely to seek proximity to dominant males.[26] In many rodent species, males kill unrelated young; pregnancy block may avoid the wasted investment of gestating offspring likely to be killed at birth.[5][27] The Bruce effect is most common in polygynous rodent species, for which the risk of infanticide is highest.[28]The mu-opioid system can influence higher-level cognitive function via modulation of valuation & motivation, influencing decision making & cognitive control by increasing the subjective value of reward & reducing aversive arousal
The role of the opioid system in decision making and cognitive control: A review. Henk van Steenbergen, Marie Eikemo, Siri Leknes. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, April 8 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13415-019-00710-6
Abstract: The opioid system regulates affective processing, including pain, pleasure, and reward. Restricting the role of this system to hedonic modulation may be an underestimation, however. Opioid receptors are distributed widely in the human brain, including the more “cognitive” regions in the frontal and parietal lobes. Nonhuman animal research points to opioid modulation of cognitive and decision-making processes. We review emerging evidence on whether acute opioid drug modulation in healthy humans can influence cognitive function, such as how we choose between actions of different values and how we control our behavior in the face of distracting information. Specifically, we review studies employing opioid agonists or antagonists together with experimental paradigms of reward-based decision making, impulsivity, executive functioning, attention, inhibition, and effort. Although this field is still in its infancy, the emerging picture suggests that the mu-opioid system can influence higher-level cognitive function via modulation of valuation, motivation, and control circuits dense in mu-opioid receptors, including orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia, amygdalae, anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex. The framework that we put forward proposes that opioids influence decision making and cognitive control by increasing the subjective value of reward and reducing aversive arousal. We highlight potential mechanisms that might underlie the effects of mu-opioid signaling on decision making and cognitive control and provide directions for future research.
Keywords: Opioid system Cognitive control Decision making Executive function Value-based choice Reward Drugs Mu-opioid receptors Affect Mood Morphine Hedonic states
Abstract: The opioid system regulates affective processing, including pain, pleasure, and reward. Restricting the role of this system to hedonic modulation may be an underestimation, however. Opioid receptors are distributed widely in the human brain, including the more “cognitive” regions in the frontal and parietal lobes. Nonhuman animal research points to opioid modulation of cognitive and decision-making processes. We review emerging evidence on whether acute opioid drug modulation in healthy humans can influence cognitive function, such as how we choose between actions of different values and how we control our behavior in the face of distracting information. Specifically, we review studies employing opioid agonists or antagonists together with experimental paradigms of reward-based decision making, impulsivity, executive functioning, attention, inhibition, and effort. Although this field is still in its infancy, the emerging picture suggests that the mu-opioid system can influence higher-level cognitive function via modulation of valuation, motivation, and control circuits dense in mu-opioid receptors, including orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia, amygdalae, anterior cingulate cortex, and prefrontal cortex. The framework that we put forward proposes that opioids influence decision making and cognitive control by increasing the subjective value of reward and reducing aversive arousal. We highlight potential mechanisms that might underlie the effects of mu-opioid signaling on decision making and cognitive control and provide directions for future research.
Keywords: Opioid system Cognitive control Decision making Executive function Value-based choice Reward Drugs Mu-opioid receptors Affect Mood Morphine Hedonic states
We see our past good deeds as more revealing of our present self than our past bad deeds, & we make inferences about our present personality from positive past behaviors, but not from negative ones; it is different with the others
Andreas Steimer, André Mata, and Cláudia Simão (2019). Ascribing Meaning to the Past: Self–Other Differences in Weighing Good and Bad Deeds. Social Cognition: Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 174-196. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2019.37.2.174
Abstract: In three studies, this research found evidence for self-serving tendencies and a self–other asymmetry in the way people ascribe meaning to past behavior: Participants saw their past good deeds as more revealing of their present self than their past bad deeds (Studies 1–2), and they made inferences about their present personality from positive past behaviors, but not from negative ones (Study 3). In contrast, participants perceived the past behavior of others as diagnostic of their present personality (Study 2), and they made inferences about others' present traits from that behavior (Study 3), regardless of whether it was positive or negative. In support of a motivational account, we also found evidence for moderated mediation of our effect (Study 2), such that the valence effect on ascribing meaning to the past was mediated by desirability only when self-relevance was high (i.e., for the self), not when it was low (i.e., for others). Implications of this self–other asymmetry are discussed.
KEYWORDS: meaning, autobiographic memory, person memory, motivated reasoning, self–other differences, belief updating, true self
Abstract: In three studies, this research found evidence for self-serving tendencies and a self–other asymmetry in the way people ascribe meaning to past behavior: Participants saw their past good deeds as more revealing of their present self than their past bad deeds (Studies 1–2), and they made inferences about their present personality from positive past behaviors, but not from negative ones (Study 3). In contrast, participants perceived the past behavior of others as diagnostic of their present personality (Study 2), and they made inferences about others' present traits from that behavior (Study 3), regardless of whether it was positive or negative. In support of a motivational account, we also found evidence for moderated mediation of our effect (Study 2), such that the valence effect on ascribing meaning to the past was mediated by desirability only when self-relevance was high (i.e., for the self), not when it was low (i.e., for others). Implications of this self–other asymmetry are discussed.
KEYWORDS: meaning, autobiographic memory, person memory, motivated reasoning, self–other differences, belief updating, true self
Testing the potential of 50 kHz rat calls as a species-specific rat attractant for pest control
Testing the potential of 50 kHz rat calls as a species-specific rat attractant. Nicola B. Davidson, Jane L. Hurst. PLOS, April 8, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0211601
Abstract: The control of mammalian pests relies heavily on the use of pesticides that are often avoided and are not species-specific. These problems are particularly acute for pesticides used to control rats (Rattus spp.). The efficacy and targeting of control could be improved by attracting animals to control measures using species-specific cues. One cue that has the potential to attract rats is the 50 kHz calls they emit in positive social situations. Here we test the potential of these rat calls as a species-specific attractant by examining the response of laboratory rats (Rattus norvegicus; n = 48) and non-target bank voles (Myodes glareolus; n = 16) to 50 kHz calls from either sex in a compartmentalised laboratory arena. Sounds of rat movement and white noise acted as control treatments, with each sound tested against a silent control in the opposite side of the arena. When sound cues were played above an empty bait box, rats were attracted to spend time close to 50 kHz rat calls, climbing on top of boxes, regardless of the sex of subject or caller. When either 50 kHz rat calls or rat movement sounds were played inside an empty bait box, rats of both sexes spent 3–4 fold more time inside boxes and visited more frequently. Rats were not attracted by intermittent white noise. Bank voles were neither attracted to, nor avoided, 50 kHz rat calls played inside empty bait boxes. Our findings show that 50 kHz rat calls are an effective attractant for rats of both sexes under laboratory conditions, while not attracting non-target bank voles. These calls are strong candidates for providing a species-specific lure that may be attractive even in the absence of food bait, but further trials will be needed to assess their efficacy under field conditions.
Abstract: The control of mammalian pests relies heavily on the use of pesticides that are often avoided and are not species-specific. These problems are particularly acute for pesticides used to control rats (Rattus spp.). The efficacy and targeting of control could be improved by attracting animals to control measures using species-specific cues. One cue that has the potential to attract rats is the 50 kHz calls they emit in positive social situations. Here we test the potential of these rat calls as a species-specific attractant by examining the response of laboratory rats (Rattus norvegicus; n = 48) and non-target bank voles (Myodes glareolus; n = 16) to 50 kHz calls from either sex in a compartmentalised laboratory arena. Sounds of rat movement and white noise acted as control treatments, with each sound tested against a silent control in the opposite side of the arena. When sound cues were played above an empty bait box, rats were attracted to spend time close to 50 kHz rat calls, climbing on top of boxes, regardless of the sex of subject or caller. When either 50 kHz rat calls or rat movement sounds were played inside an empty bait box, rats of both sexes spent 3–4 fold more time inside boxes and visited more frequently. Rats were not attracted by intermittent white noise. Bank voles were neither attracted to, nor avoided, 50 kHz rat calls played inside empty bait boxes. Our findings show that 50 kHz rat calls are an effective attractant for rats of both sexes under laboratory conditions, while not attracting non-target bank voles. These calls are strong candidates for providing a species-specific lure that may be attractive even in the absence of food bait, but further trials will be needed to assess their efficacy under field conditions.
Monday, April 8, 2019
Partisans who blatantly dehumanize members of the opposing party prefer greater social distance from opponents (reduced interpersonal tolerance); also associated with perceptions of greater moral distance
Partisan Dehumanization in American Politics. Erin C. Cassese. Political Behavior, Apr 8 2019, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-019-09545-w
Abstract: Despite evidence that dehumanizing language and metaphors are found in political discourse, extant research has largely overlooked whether voters dehumanize their political opponents. Research on dehumanization has tended to focus on racial and ethnic divisions in societies, rather than political divisions. Understanding dehumanization in political contexts is important because the social psychology literature links dehumanization to a variety of negative outcomes, including moral disengagement, aggression, and even violence. In this manuscript, I discuss evidence of partisan dehumanization during the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign and demonstrate how a focus on dehumanization can expose new relationships between moral psychology and partisan identity. Using data from two surveys conducted in October of 2016, I show that partisans dehumanize their political opponents in both subtle and blatant ways. When I investigate the correlates of dehumanization, I find that partisans who blatantly dehumanize members of the opposing party prefer greater social distance from their political opponents, which is indicative of reduced interpersonal tolerance. I also find that blatant dehumanization is associated with perceptions of greater moral distance between the parties, which is indicative of moral disengagement. These results suggest that dehumanization can improve our understanding of negative partisanship and political polarization.
Keywords: Dehumanization Partisanship Social identity Political polarization Moral disengagement
Abstract: Despite evidence that dehumanizing language and metaphors are found in political discourse, extant research has largely overlooked whether voters dehumanize their political opponents. Research on dehumanization has tended to focus on racial and ethnic divisions in societies, rather than political divisions. Understanding dehumanization in political contexts is important because the social psychology literature links dehumanization to a variety of negative outcomes, including moral disengagement, aggression, and even violence. In this manuscript, I discuss evidence of partisan dehumanization during the 2016 U.S. Presidential campaign and demonstrate how a focus on dehumanization can expose new relationships between moral psychology and partisan identity. Using data from two surveys conducted in October of 2016, I show that partisans dehumanize their political opponents in both subtle and blatant ways. When I investigate the correlates of dehumanization, I find that partisans who blatantly dehumanize members of the opposing party prefer greater social distance from their political opponents, which is indicative of reduced interpersonal tolerance. I also find that blatant dehumanization is associated with perceptions of greater moral distance between the parties, which is indicative of moral disengagement. These results suggest that dehumanization can improve our understanding of negative partisanship and political polarization.
Keywords: Dehumanization Partisanship Social identity Political polarization Moral disengagement
The genetic variants associated with income are related to better mental health than those linked to educational attainment; & team was able to predict 2.5% of income differences using genetic data alone
Genetic analysis identifies molecular systems and biological pathways associated with household income. W. David Hill, Neil M. Davies, Stuart J. Ritchie, Nathan G. Skene, Julien Bryois, Steven Bell, Emanuele Di Angelantonio, David J. Roberts, Shen Xueyi, Gail Davies, David C.M. Liewald, David J. Porteous, Caroline Hayward, Adam S. Butterworth, Andrew M. McIntosh, Catharine R. Gale, Ian J. Deary. bioRxiv, Mar 2012. https://doi.org/10.1101/573691
Abstract: Socio-economic position (SEP) is a multi-dimensional construct reflecting (and influencing) multiple socio-cultural, physical, and environmental factors. Previous genome-wide association studies (GWAS) using household income as a marker of SEP have shown that common genetic variants account for 11% of its variation. Here, in a sample of 286,301 participants from UK Biobank, we identified 30 independent genome-wide significant loci, 29 novel, that are associated with household income. Using a recently-developed method to meta-analyze data that leverages power from genetically-correlated traits, we identified an additional 120 income-associated loci. These loci showed clear evidence of functional enrichment, with transcriptional differences identified across multiple cortical tissues, in addition to links with GABAergic and serotonergic neurotransmission. We identified neurogenesis and the components of the synapse as candidate biological systems that are linked with income. By combining our GWAS on income with data from eQTL studies and chromatin interactions, 24 genes were prioritized for follow up, 18 of which were previously associated with cognitive ability. Using Mendelian Randomization, we identified cognitive ability as one of the causal, partly-heritable phenotypes that bridges the gap between molecular genetic inheritance and phenotypic consequence in terms of income differences. Significant differences between genetic correlations indicated that, the genetic variants associated with income are related to better mental health than those linked to educational attainment (another commonly-used marker of SEP). Finally, we were able to predict 2.5% of income differences using genetic data alone in an independent sample. These results are important for understanding the observed socioeconomic inequalities in Great Britain today.
Abstract: Socio-economic position (SEP) is a multi-dimensional construct reflecting (and influencing) multiple socio-cultural, physical, and environmental factors. Previous genome-wide association studies (GWAS) using household income as a marker of SEP have shown that common genetic variants account for 11% of its variation. Here, in a sample of 286,301 participants from UK Biobank, we identified 30 independent genome-wide significant loci, 29 novel, that are associated with household income. Using a recently-developed method to meta-analyze data that leverages power from genetically-correlated traits, we identified an additional 120 income-associated loci. These loci showed clear evidence of functional enrichment, with transcriptional differences identified across multiple cortical tissues, in addition to links with GABAergic and serotonergic neurotransmission. We identified neurogenesis and the components of the synapse as candidate biological systems that are linked with income. By combining our GWAS on income with data from eQTL studies and chromatin interactions, 24 genes were prioritized for follow up, 18 of which were previously associated with cognitive ability. Using Mendelian Randomization, we identified cognitive ability as one of the causal, partly-heritable phenotypes that bridges the gap between molecular genetic inheritance and phenotypic consequence in terms of income differences. Significant differences between genetic correlations indicated that, the genetic variants associated with income are related to better mental health than those linked to educational attainment (another commonly-used marker of SEP). Finally, we were able to predict 2.5% of income differences using genetic data alone in an independent sample. These results are important for understanding the observed socioeconomic inequalities in Great Britain today.
Changes in life satisfaction are associated with changes in consumption, not in income; increased conspicuous consumption seems strongly associated with improved well-being than is increased nonconspicuous consumption
Consumption Changes, Not Income Changes, Predict Changes in Subjective Well-Being. Gordon D. A. Brown, John Gathergood. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 8, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619835215
Abstract: Does happiness depend on what one earns or what one spends? Income is typically found to have small beneficial effects on well-being. However, economic theory suggests that well-being is conferred not by income but by consumption (i.e., spending on goods and services), and a person’s level of consumption may differ greatly from their level of income due to saving behavior and taxation. Moreover, research within consumer psychology has established relationships between people’s spending in specific categories and their well-being. Here we show for the first time using panel data that changes in life satisfaction are associated with changes in consumption, not changes in income. We also find some evidence that increased conspicuous consumption is more strongly associated with improved well-being than is increased nonconspicuous consumption.
Keywords: income, consumption, conspicuous consumption, well-being, life satisfaction
Abstract: Does happiness depend on what one earns or what one spends? Income is typically found to have small beneficial effects on well-being. However, economic theory suggests that well-being is conferred not by income but by consumption (i.e., spending on goods and services), and a person’s level of consumption may differ greatly from their level of income due to saving behavior and taxation. Moreover, research within consumer psychology has established relationships between people’s spending in specific categories and their well-being. Here we show for the first time using panel data that changes in life satisfaction are associated with changes in consumption, not changes in income. We also find some evidence that increased conspicuous consumption is more strongly associated with improved well-being than is increased nonconspicuous consumption.
Keywords: income, consumption, conspicuous consumption, well-being, life satisfaction
From 2018: Wisdom, Foolishness, and Toxicity in Human Development
Wisdom, Foolishness, and Toxicity in Human Development. Robert J. Sternberg. Research in Human Development, Volume 15, 2018 - Issue 3-4, Aug 29 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/15427609.2018.1491216
Abstract: Socialization of young people today especially emphasizes cognitive and academic-skills development. Although these skills are important, society is making a serious mistake in underestimating the importance of wisdom-based skills. As a result, we are raising a generation of individuals who may be smart but may also be foolish, or even worse, toxic to themselves and others. This article newly contributes a discussion of toxicity. The author discusses what schools can do to place more emphasis on education for wisdom.
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Civilization as we have known it is facing challenges that few people would have expected it to face as the world enters the middle of the 21st century. [...] The world has gotten better in many ways over the years (Pinker, 2012), but in other ways it has gotten much worse. The potential for destruction is unequaled in the history of our civilization because of the presence of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy the world and leaders who just might use them. Here is the irony behind what is going on in the world: The average IQ around the world increased by 30 points during the 20th century—two full Standard Deviations (Flynn, 1987, 2016)—the difference between borderline intellectual challenge average performance, and between average performance and IQ-derived estimates of intellectual giftedness. That is an absolutely incredible rise in IQ. Moreover, the rise has continued in the United States of the 21st century, so this difference underestimates the growth of traditional cognitive abilities in the United States. The increase in IQs has manifested itself in important and in some cases, obvious ways—staggering advances in advanced technologies and the ability to use those technologies, highly sophisticated scientific and engineering research, and some among the upper intellectual “class” figuring out how to exploit their high IQs to make gobs of money, whether on Wall Street, Silicon Valley, or elsewhere, in a way that never before was possible in the history of civilization. The rise the world has experienced in IQs cannot be due solely or even largely to genetic changes: The period of time was simply too short for such a high level of mutation to have occurred. And the increase in IQs cannot be caused merely by selective mating, because selective mating (better choosing intellectual matches) would increase the Standard Deviation (or variation) of IQs in the next generation, but probably not the Mean (because people with low IQs, like people with high IQs, also would choose matches to their IQs). If the increases in IQs result from students being better socialized in their homes and better educated in schools, then something perhaps is missing from that socialization and education. What might be missing?
WISDOM
One thing that is missing is the transmission of wisdom, or the utilization of one’s cognitive skills and knowledge toward the achievement of a common good; by balancing one’s own, others’, and larger (such as communal) interests, over the long- as well as the short–terms, through the infusion of positive ethical values (Sternberg, 1998; Sternberg & Jordan, 1995). Positive ethical values to some extent may be culturally defined; but certain ethical values, such as honesty, integrity, justice, compassion, and sincerity, seem to be cross-cultural and even to transcend cultures (Sternberg, 1998). Of course, the definition given here is only one definition of wisdom. Another related but distinct definition is that of wisdom as addressing difficult problems regarding the meaning and conduct of life. On this view, wisdom is the perfect integration of knowledge with character and mind with virtue. Wisdom thus represents truly outstanding knowledge and judgment as well as advice (see Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). Other definitions exist as well (see Grossmann, in press; Sternberg & Glueck, in press; Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). I would argue, however, that the most distinguishing characteristic of wise people is that they bring out the best in other people. On this view, wisdom is judged not only on the basis of a person’s performance, but also on the positive effect of one’s performance on others in jointly helping to achieve a common good. Various and diverse measures have been proposed to assess wisdom (see Kunzmann, in press; Webster, in press). These measures give some reading on a person’s wisdom in a variety of different kinds of tasks and situations. According to a “balance” theory I have proposed of wisdom and its relation to intelligence (Sternberg, 2003), intelligence is a necessary but not sufficient component of wisdom. One cannot truly be wise if one is not fairly intelligent, because intelligence, even in the narrow sense of IQ, involves the analytical skills needed for various kinds of convergent problem solving. One simply cannot be wise without being analytically skilled: One needs to be able to distinguish good ideas from bad ideas, and useful ideas from useless or even destructive ideas. As a result, one would expect that wisdom and intelligence would be positively related. And indeed, people’s implicit theories of intelligence and wisdom suggest that the two characteristics do indeed positively covary (Sternberg, 1985b). But might it be possible that, as the analytical aspect of intelligence (IQ) increased, wisdom actually simultaneously could decrease? The answer, I believe, is yes. I suggest that wisdom has decreased, on average, largely as a result of a perverse reward system in schooling and society (Sternberg, in press). To the extent that wisdom and intelligence would positively covary, it would be because when society develops analytical intellectual skills, it simultaneously develops as well wisdomrelated skills. But what if it doesn’t? What if it does the opposite, developing IQ-based intellectual skills at the expense of wisdom-related ones? In past times, character education was built into schooling, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The early McGuffey readers (McGuffey, reprinted 1982) emphasized character education and the development of virtues as much as they emphasized development of reading and other verbal skills. Although character education has not typically been an explicit part of the school experience, it generally has been an implicit part, at least in the past. But character education and wisdom development are disappearing, if they are not already gone, in an age of standardized testing (Kamenetz, 2015; Kohn, 2000; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). If standardized tests do not measure character, what difference does character or wisdom make to school administrators who are seeking high test scores almost any way they can get them? Schools, administrators, teachers, and students are evaluated for things other than wisdom, and those other things take precedence (Nichols & Berliner, 2007). These other things take the form primarily of performances of students on a variety of standardized tests of achievement. These other things may be important to IQ and intelligence more generally (Sternberg, 1985a), but they may effectively kick wisdom-related skills out of the curriculum. We may be left with students who, even if smart, are foolish.
FOOLISHNESS
The absence of wisdom may be labeled “foolishness” (Sternberg, 2002). What happens when smart people become foolish, even notably foolish (Sternberg, 2002, 2004, in press)? Such people would show certain characteristics, ones that seem to be increasingly prevalent among the more influential and powerful people in our societies:
1. Unrealistic optimism with respect to their ideas: They believe that if an idea is theirs, certainly, because they are so smart, it must be good.
2. Egocentrism: They come to believe that it’s all about them. In the extreme, they become narcissistic, concerned primarily or only with themselves and their own enhancement.
3. False omniscience: They believe they know everything, or everything they need to know. They fail to know what they do not know or to understand what is not knowable, at least at a given time in a given place.
4. False omnipotence: They believe they are all powerful—that they can do whatever they want.
5. False invulnerability: They believe that because they are so clever and so powerful they can get away with anything.
6. Ethical disengagement: They come to believe that ethics are important for other people but that they are above ethical consideration.
When so many religious and national political leaders, up to the top, show these characteristics, what kind of hope can we realistically hold out for young people? We need to hope that parents and teachers will hold up foolish leaders as negative role models, but do they? For a variety of reasons, they may not hold up foolish leaders as negative role models. Instead, the parents and teachers may actually admire the foolish leaders. Why? Because the fundamental principle of interpersonal attraction is that we are attracted to people similar to ourselves (Sternberg, 1998), and there are very few wise people out there. People may elect fools, but those fools are “their fools.” Another way to look at this phenomenon is in terms of Haidt’s (2013) of the “righteous mind.” We divide ourselves into tribes, and even if someone is a fool, he is “our fool” versus “their fool.” Foolishness is not the worst possible outcome of failing to develop wisdom. The worst possible outcome is not the absence of wisdom (foolishness), but rather its opposite, toxicity.
TOXICITY
Around the world, including in the Americas, governments are increasingly led by toxic leaders who bring out the worst in people. These leaders typically are elected on the basis of their charisma and populistic false claims to benefit people who perceive themselves as having been victimized by whatever the current system is. They sometimes are referred to as “pseudotransformational” leaders (Bass, 1998). Lipman-Blumen (2006) has written of the allure of toxic leaders—leaders who bring down their organizations or countries and bring down their followers with them (see also Kellerman, 2004). These leaders are the opposite of being wise. Their values are different from those of wise people. Although wise people have prosocial and constructive values (Staudinger, Doerner, & Mickler, 2005), toxic people have antisocial and destructive values. I would suggest that toxic people, and especially toxic leaders, tend to be arrogant—they look down on others; ill tempered—they are constantly autocratic in their relations with others—they want their way and are not much interested in other people’s views; self-absorbed or narcissistic—what they do is for their own benefit and/or glorification; dividers—they tend to seek control by pitting individuals or groups against each other; angry— they constantly seem to be highly critical of other people but rarely or never are they critical of themselves; unethical—they violate ethical precepts with abandon because they do not care about them. Often they are people who exhibit the dark triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Toxicity may be related in some respects to populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), which often involves pitting the supposed “real” or “pure” people against a supposedly corrupted elite. We can see the outlines of such thinking not only among many political leaders today, but also among many of their followers.
[...]
Table 3. Six Procedures for Teaching for Wisdom (After Sternberg, 2001).
1 Encourage students to read classic works of literature, history, and philosophy to learn and reflect on the wisdom of past generations.
2 Engage students in class discussions, projects, and essays that encourage them to discuss the lessons they have learned from classic works and to think about how they can be applied to their own lives and the lives of others. Especially emphasize dialogical and dialectical thinking.
3 Encourage students to study not only knowledge and received “truth,” but also ethical values, as developed during their reflective thinking.
4 Place increased emphasis on critical, creative, practical, and wise thinking in the service of good ends.
5 Encourage students to think about how almost any topic they study might be used for better or for worse ends, and about how important those ends are.
6 Remember that a teacher is always a role model! To role-model wisdom, adopt a Socratic approach to teaching, inviting students to play a more active role in constructing learning—from their own point of view and from that of others.
7 Remind students to seek a common good rather than a good only for people whom they perceive to be like themselves or to be members of their own “tribe.”
Abstract: Socialization of young people today especially emphasizes cognitive and academic-skills development. Although these skills are important, society is making a serious mistake in underestimating the importance of wisdom-based skills. As a result, we are raising a generation of individuals who may be smart but may also be foolish, or even worse, toxic to themselves and others. This article newly contributes a discussion of toxicity. The author discusses what schools can do to place more emphasis on education for wisdom.
---
Civilization as we have known it is facing challenges that few people would have expected it to face as the world enters the middle of the 21st century. [...] The world has gotten better in many ways over the years (Pinker, 2012), but in other ways it has gotten much worse. The potential for destruction is unequaled in the history of our civilization because of the presence of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy the world and leaders who just might use them. Here is the irony behind what is going on in the world: The average IQ around the world increased by 30 points during the 20th century—two full Standard Deviations (Flynn, 1987, 2016)—the difference between borderline intellectual challenge average performance, and between average performance and IQ-derived estimates of intellectual giftedness. That is an absolutely incredible rise in IQ. Moreover, the rise has continued in the United States of the 21st century, so this difference underestimates the growth of traditional cognitive abilities in the United States. The increase in IQs has manifested itself in important and in some cases, obvious ways—staggering advances in advanced technologies and the ability to use those technologies, highly sophisticated scientific and engineering research, and some among the upper intellectual “class” figuring out how to exploit their high IQs to make gobs of money, whether on Wall Street, Silicon Valley, or elsewhere, in a way that never before was possible in the history of civilization. The rise the world has experienced in IQs cannot be due solely or even largely to genetic changes: The period of time was simply too short for such a high level of mutation to have occurred. And the increase in IQs cannot be caused merely by selective mating, because selective mating (better choosing intellectual matches) would increase the Standard Deviation (or variation) of IQs in the next generation, but probably not the Mean (because people with low IQs, like people with high IQs, also would choose matches to their IQs). If the increases in IQs result from students being better socialized in their homes and better educated in schools, then something perhaps is missing from that socialization and education. What might be missing?
WISDOM
One thing that is missing is the transmission of wisdom, or the utilization of one’s cognitive skills and knowledge toward the achievement of a common good; by balancing one’s own, others’, and larger (such as communal) interests, over the long- as well as the short–terms, through the infusion of positive ethical values (Sternberg, 1998; Sternberg & Jordan, 1995). Positive ethical values to some extent may be culturally defined; but certain ethical values, such as honesty, integrity, justice, compassion, and sincerity, seem to be cross-cultural and even to transcend cultures (Sternberg, 1998). Of course, the definition given here is only one definition of wisdom. Another related but distinct definition is that of wisdom as addressing difficult problems regarding the meaning and conduct of life. On this view, wisdom is the perfect integration of knowledge with character and mind with virtue. Wisdom thus represents truly outstanding knowledge and judgment as well as advice (see Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). Other definitions exist as well (see Grossmann, in press; Sternberg & Glueck, in press; Sternberg & Jordan, 2005). I would argue, however, that the most distinguishing characteristic of wise people is that they bring out the best in other people. On this view, wisdom is judged not only on the basis of a person’s performance, but also on the positive effect of one’s performance on others in jointly helping to achieve a common good. Various and diverse measures have been proposed to assess wisdom (see Kunzmann, in press; Webster, in press). These measures give some reading on a person’s wisdom in a variety of different kinds of tasks and situations. According to a “balance” theory I have proposed of wisdom and its relation to intelligence (Sternberg, 2003), intelligence is a necessary but not sufficient component of wisdom. One cannot truly be wise if one is not fairly intelligent, because intelligence, even in the narrow sense of IQ, involves the analytical skills needed for various kinds of convergent problem solving. One simply cannot be wise without being analytically skilled: One needs to be able to distinguish good ideas from bad ideas, and useful ideas from useless or even destructive ideas. As a result, one would expect that wisdom and intelligence would be positively related. And indeed, people’s implicit theories of intelligence and wisdom suggest that the two characteristics do indeed positively covary (Sternberg, 1985b). But might it be possible that, as the analytical aspect of intelligence (IQ) increased, wisdom actually simultaneously could decrease? The answer, I believe, is yes. I suggest that wisdom has decreased, on average, largely as a result of a perverse reward system in schooling and society (Sternberg, in press). To the extent that wisdom and intelligence would positively covary, it would be because when society develops analytical intellectual skills, it simultaneously develops as well wisdomrelated skills. But what if it doesn’t? What if it does the opposite, developing IQ-based intellectual skills at the expense of wisdom-related ones? In past times, character education was built into schooling, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The early McGuffey readers (McGuffey, reprinted 1982) emphasized character education and the development of virtues as much as they emphasized development of reading and other verbal skills. Although character education has not typically been an explicit part of the school experience, it generally has been an implicit part, at least in the past. But character education and wisdom development are disappearing, if they are not already gone, in an age of standardized testing (Kamenetz, 2015; Kohn, 2000; Nichols & Berliner, 2007). If standardized tests do not measure character, what difference does character or wisdom make to school administrators who are seeking high test scores almost any way they can get them? Schools, administrators, teachers, and students are evaluated for things other than wisdom, and those other things take precedence (Nichols & Berliner, 2007). These other things take the form primarily of performances of students on a variety of standardized tests of achievement. These other things may be important to IQ and intelligence more generally (Sternberg, 1985a), but they may effectively kick wisdom-related skills out of the curriculum. We may be left with students who, even if smart, are foolish.
FOOLISHNESS
The absence of wisdom may be labeled “foolishness” (Sternberg, 2002). What happens when smart people become foolish, even notably foolish (Sternberg, 2002, 2004, in press)? Such people would show certain characteristics, ones that seem to be increasingly prevalent among the more influential and powerful people in our societies:
1. Unrealistic optimism with respect to their ideas: They believe that if an idea is theirs, certainly, because they are so smart, it must be good.
2. Egocentrism: They come to believe that it’s all about them. In the extreme, they become narcissistic, concerned primarily or only with themselves and their own enhancement.
3. False omniscience: They believe they know everything, or everything they need to know. They fail to know what they do not know or to understand what is not knowable, at least at a given time in a given place.
4. False omnipotence: They believe they are all powerful—that they can do whatever they want.
5. False invulnerability: They believe that because they are so clever and so powerful they can get away with anything.
6. Ethical disengagement: They come to believe that ethics are important for other people but that they are above ethical consideration.
When so many religious and national political leaders, up to the top, show these characteristics, what kind of hope can we realistically hold out for young people? We need to hope that parents and teachers will hold up foolish leaders as negative role models, but do they? For a variety of reasons, they may not hold up foolish leaders as negative role models. Instead, the parents and teachers may actually admire the foolish leaders. Why? Because the fundamental principle of interpersonal attraction is that we are attracted to people similar to ourselves (Sternberg, 1998), and there are very few wise people out there. People may elect fools, but those fools are “their fools.” Another way to look at this phenomenon is in terms of Haidt’s (2013) of the “righteous mind.” We divide ourselves into tribes, and even if someone is a fool, he is “our fool” versus “their fool.” Foolishness is not the worst possible outcome of failing to develop wisdom. The worst possible outcome is not the absence of wisdom (foolishness), but rather its opposite, toxicity.
TOXICITY
Around the world, including in the Americas, governments are increasingly led by toxic leaders who bring out the worst in people. These leaders typically are elected on the basis of their charisma and populistic false claims to benefit people who perceive themselves as having been victimized by whatever the current system is. They sometimes are referred to as “pseudotransformational” leaders (Bass, 1998). Lipman-Blumen (2006) has written of the allure of toxic leaders—leaders who bring down their organizations or countries and bring down their followers with them (see also Kellerman, 2004). These leaders are the opposite of being wise. Their values are different from those of wise people. Although wise people have prosocial and constructive values (Staudinger, Doerner, & Mickler, 2005), toxic people have antisocial and destructive values. I would suggest that toxic people, and especially toxic leaders, tend to be arrogant—they look down on others; ill tempered—they are constantly autocratic in their relations with others—they want their way and are not much interested in other people’s views; self-absorbed or narcissistic—what they do is for their own benefit and/or glorification; dividers—they tend to seek control by pitting individuals or groups against each other; angry— they constantly seem to be highly critical of other people but rarely or never are they critical of themselves; unethical—they violate ethical precepts with abandon because they do not care about them. Often they are people who exhibit the dark triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Toxicity may be related in some respects to populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), which often involves pitting the supposed “real” or “pure” people against a supposedly corrupted elite. We can see the outlines of such thinking not only among many political leaders today, but also among many of their followers.
[...]
Table 3. Six Procedures for Teaching for Wisdom (After Sternberg, 2001).
1 Encourage students to read classic works of literature, history, and philosophy to learn and reflect on the wisdom of past generations.
2 Engage students in class discussions, projects, and essays that encourage them to discuss the lessons they have learned from classic works and to think about how they can be applied to their own lives and the lives of others. Especially emphasize dialogical and dialectical thinking.
3 Encourage students to study not only knowledge and received “truth,” but also ethical values, as developed during their reflective thinking.
4 Place increased emphasis on critical, creative, practical, and wise thinking in the service of good ends.
5 Encourage students to think about how almost any topic they study might be used for better or for worse ends, and about how important those ends are.
6 Remember that a teacher is always a role model! To role-model wisdom, adopt a Socratic approach to teaching, inviting students to play a more active role in constructing learning—from their own point of view and from that of others.
7 Remind students to seek a common good rather than a good only for people whom they perceive to be like themselves or to be members of their own “tribe.”
Having something to look forward to is a keystone of well-being; anticipation of a future reward can be more gratifying than the experience of reward itself; hippocampal-midbrain circuit enhances the pleasure of anticipation
Hippocampal-midbrain circuit enhances the pleasure of anticipation in the prefrontal cortex. Kiyohito Iigaya, Tobias U. Hauser, Zeb Kurth-Nelson, John P. O’Doherty, Peter Dayan, Raymond J. Dolan. Mar 26 2019. https://doi.org/10.1101/588699
Abstract: Having something to look forward to is a keystone of well-being. Anticipation of a future reward, like an upcoming vacation, can be more gratifying than the experience of reward itself. Theories of anticipation have described how it causes behaviors ranging from beneficial information-seeking to harmful addiction. Here, we investigated how the brain generates and enhances anticipatory pleasure, by analyzing brain activity of human participants who received information predictive of future pleasant outcomes in a decision-making task. Using a computational model of anticipation, we show that three regions orchestrate anticipatory pleasure. We show ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) tracks the value of anticipation; dopaminergic midbrain responds to information that enhances anticipation, while the sustained activity in hippocampus provides for functional coupling between these regions. This coordinating role for hippocampus is consistent with its known role in the vivid imagination of future outcomes. Our findings throw new light on the neural underpinnings of how anticipation influences decision-making, while also unifying a range of phenomena associated with risk and time-delay preference.
Abstract: Having something to look forward to is a keystone of well-being. Anticipation of a future reward, like an upcoming vacation, can be more gratifying than the experience of reward itself. Theories of anticipation have described how it causes behaviors ranging from beneficial information-seeking to harmful addiction. Here, we investigated how the brain generates and enhances anticipatory pleasure, by analyzing brain activity of human participants who received information predictive of future pleasant outcomes in a decision-making task. Using a computational model of anticipation, we show that three regions orchestrate anticipatory pleasure. We show ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) tracks the value of anticipation; dopaminergic midbrain responds to information that enhances anticipation, while the sustained activity in hippocampus provides for functional coupling between these regions. This coordinating role for hippocampus is consistent with its known role in the vivid imagination of future outcomes. Our findings throw new light on the neural underpinnings of how anticipation influences decision-making, while also unifying a range of phenomena associated with risk and time-delay preference.
Sunday, April 7, 2019
The Downsides of Minimum Wage Increases
The Downsides of Minimum Wage Increases. Jonathan Meer. The Library of Economics and Liberty, Apr 6 2019. https://www.econlib.org/hidden-costs-of-the-minimum-wage/
Excerpts (full text and links in the post above):
The House of Representatives recently took up the Raise the Wage Act, which would more than double the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour over the next five years. [...]
When debate focuses on the total number of jobs lost or gained, it hides this potentially nasty distribution of the benefits: a recent college graduate with a barista job may get a few more dollars an hour, but the high school dropout finds it harder to get and keep a job. Those who have the least to offer employers, might need more training, or are the biggest risks to hire will face the toughest challenges.
Some opponents of higher minimum wages skip over the fact that some people absolutely would benefit. Those who get and keep these higher-paying jobs might be winners, seeing an increase in their take-home pay.
But those gains have offsetting losses that could either reduce that gain or even reverse it.
My research (http://people.tamu.edu/%7Ejmeer/CKM_Minimum_Wage_Fringe_Benefits_180517.pdf) shows that when the minimum wage is raised, employers offset increased labor costs by reducing benefits like the generosity of health insurance. Other benefits, like free parking or flexibility in scheduling, are more difficult to measure but are also likely to be cut back. Employers will likely expect more work effort when they are forced to pay more, changing the nature of jobs. And in the longer run, economists have found that employers shift towards automation [...] and expecting customers to do more things themselves[...]– reducing job growth in ways that aren’t always obvious. This damage takes time to be seen, which is one reason minimum wage hikes, like rent control, often seem appealing.
And then there are those who would definitely lose because they can’t find work, and they aren’t likely to be picked at random. The minimum wage is a blunt instrument. It doesn’t distinguish between types of workers and the households they come from. The teenage children of well-off families, earning money to buy video games, are treated the same as single moms struggling to get by. When wages are set at an artificially high rate, why should an employer take a risk on the single mother who needs the occasional shift off to take her kids to the doctor? The kid from a disadvantaged background who needs some direction on how to treat customers appropriately? Or the recently released felon trying to work his way back into the community? Why should employers bother with them when there are plenty of lower-risk people who are willing to work at those artificially high wages?
Recent evidence (https://www.nber.org/papers/w25182) from Seattle’s minimum wage increases show that it’s precisely the most inexperienced workers who struggle the most in the face of high minimum wages. And another line of my own research (http://people.tamu.edu/~jmeer/Clemens_Kahn_Meer_Dropouts_181106.pdf) finds that minimum wage increases cause employers shift towards workers with more credentials.
It will get much worse in the next recession. The economic expansion over the last decade has allowed employers to absorb much of the cost of increased labor market regulations, but a downturn will quickly force them to cut jobs that are marginally productive only in good times. Those at the margins of the workforce will be left further behind. Low-wage jobs aren’t easy, don’t pay well, and are rarely fun. But not being able to find work at all is far worse.
Despite the lowest unemployment rates in decades, only 39% of adults without a high school degree had a full-time job in 2018 – and among young African-Americans dropouts, it’s a shocking 26%. It’s hard to believe that the best way to help them find work and start climbing the job ladder is to put the first rung out of reach [...].
A national minimum wage of $15 per hour ignores the wide variation in labor markets and the cost of living. Even in high-wage New York and California, half of hourly workers outside of metropolitan areas earn less than $15 an hour. Nineteen states, including Texas, have median hourly wages below $15; outside of large cities in Texas, 60 percent of hourly workers earn less than $15. A uniform minimum wage at such an unprecedented level, far beyond historical norms, would cause real damage to inexperienced and low-skill workers – especially in areas in desperate need of more opportunities.
Advocates are absolutely correct that we have to do something to help low-income families. Other policies, like the Earned Income Tax Credit, are better targeted and much more effective. [...]
[...]
Jonathan Meer is a professor of economics at Texas A&M University. His research focuses on charitable giving, the economics of low-wage labor markets, and the economics of education.
Excerpts (full text and links in the post above):
The House of Representatives recently took up the Raise the Wage Act, which would more than double the federal minimum wage to $15 an hour over the next five years. [...]
When debate focuses on the total number of jobs lost or gained, it hides this potentially nasty distribution of the benefits: a recent college graduate with a barista job may get a few more dollars an hour, but the high school dropout finds it harder to get and keep a job. Those who have the least to offer employers, might need more training, or are the biggest risks to hire will face the toughest challenges.
Some opponents of higher minimum wages skip over the fact that some people absolutely would benefit. Those who get and keep these higher-paying jobs might be winners, seeing an increase in their take-home pay.
But those gains have offsetting losses that could either reduce that gain or even reverse it.
My research (http://people.tamu.edu/%7Ejmeer/CKM_Minimum_Wage_Fringe_Benefits_180517.pdf) shows that when the minimum wage is raised, employers offset increased labor costs by reducing benefits like the generosity of health insurance. Other benefits, like free parking or flexibility in scheduling, are more difficult to measure but are also likely to be cut back. Employers will likely expect more work effort when they are forced to pay more, changing the nature of jobs. And in the longer run, economists have found that employers shift towards automation [...] and expecting customers to do more things themselves[...]– reducing job growth in ways that aren’t always obvious. This damage takes time to be seen, which is one reason minimum wage hikes, like rent control, often seem appealing.
And then there are those who would definitely lose because they can’t find work, and they aren’t likely to be picked at random. The minimum wage is a blunt instrument. It doesn’t distinguish between types of workers and the households they come from. The teenage children of well-off families, earning money to buy video games, are treated the same as single moms struggling to get by. When wages are set at an artificially high rate, why should an employer take a risk on the single mother who needs the occasional shift off to take her kids to the doctor? The kid from a disadvantaged background who needs some direction on how to treat customers appropriately? Or the recently released felon trying to work his way back into the community? Why should employers bother with them when there are plenty of lower-risk people who are willing to work at those artificially high wages?
Recent evidence (https://www.nber.org/papers/w25182) from Seattle’s minimum wage increases show that it’s precisely the most inexperienced workers who struggle the most in the face of high minimum wages. And another line of my own research (http://people.tamu.edu/~jmeer/Clemens_Kahn_Meer_Dropouts_181106.pdf) finds that minimum wage increases cause employers shift towards workers with more credentials.
It will get much worse in the next recession. The economic expansion over the last decade has allowed employers to absorb much of the cost of increased labor market regulations, but a downturn will quickly force them to cut jobs that are marginally productive only in good times. Those at the margins of the workforce will be left further behind. Low-wage jobs aren’t easy, don’t pay well, and are rarely fun. But not being able to find work at all is far worse.
Despite the lowest unemployment rates in decades, only 39% of adults without a high school degree had a full-time job in 2018 – and among young African-Americans dropouts, it’s a shocking 26%. It’s hard to believe that the best way to help them find work and start climbing the job ladder is to put the first rung out of reach [...].
A national minimum wage of $15 per hour ignores the wide variation in labor markets and the cost of living. Even in high-wage New York and California, half of hourly workers outside of metropolitan areas earn less than $15 an hour. Nineteen states, including Texas, have median hourly wages below $15; outside of large cities in Texas, 60 percent of hourly workers earn less than $15. A uniform minimum wage at such an unprecedented level, far beyond historical norms, would cause real damage to inexperienced and low-skill workers – especially in areas in desperate need of more opportunities.
Advocates are absolutely correct that we have to do something to help low-income families. Other policies, like the Earned Income Tax Credit, are better targeted and much more effective. [...]
[...]
Jonathan Meer is a professor of economics at Texas A&M University. His research focuses on charitable giving, the economics of low-wage labor markets, and the economics of education.
The Industry Anatomy of the Transatlantic Productivity Growth Slowdown
The Industry Anatomy of the Transatlantic Productivity Growth Slowdown. Robert J. Gordon, Hassan Sayed. NBER Working Paper No. 25703. March 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w25703
By merging KLEMS data sets and aggregating over the ten largest Western European nations (EU-10), we are able to compare and contrast productivity growth up through 2015 starting from 1950 in the U.S. and from 1972 in the EU-10. Data are provided at the aggregate level, as well as for 16 industry groups within the total economy and 11 manufacturing sub-industries. The analysis focuses on outcomes over four time intervals: 1950-72, 1972-95, 1995-2005, and 2005-15. We interpret the EU-10 performance as catching up to the U.S. in stages, with its rapid growth of 1950-72 representing a delayed adoption of the inventions that propelled U.S. productivity growth in the first half of the 20th century, and the next EU-10 stage for 1972-95 as imitating the U.S. outcome for 1950-72. We show that both the pace of aggregate productivity growth during 1972-95 for the EU-10 as well as its industrial composition matched very closely the growth record of the U.S. in the previous 1950-72 time interval.
A striking finding is that for the total economy the “early-to-late” productivity growth slowdown from 1972-95 to 2005-15 in the EU-10 (-1.68 percentage points) was almost identical to the U.S. slowdown from 1950-72 to 2005-15 (-1.67 percentage points). There is a very high EU-U.S. correlation in the magnitude of the early-to-late slowdown across industries. This supports our overall theme that the productivity growth slowdown from the early postwar years to the most recent decade was due to a retardation in technical change that affected the same industries by roughly the same magnitudes on both sides of the Atlantic.
By merging KLEMS data sets and aggregating over the ten largest Western European nations (EU-10), we are able to compare and contrast productivity growth up through 2015 starting from 1950 in the U.S. and from 1972 in the EU-10. Data are provided at the aggregate level, as well as for 16 industry groups within the total economy and 11 manufacturing sub-industries. The analysis focuses on outcomes over four time intervals: 1950-72, 1972-95, 1995-2005, and 2005-15. We interpret the EU-10 performance as catching up to the U.S. in stages, with its rapid growth of 1950-72 representing a delayed adoption of the inventions that propelled U.S. productivity growth in the first half of the 20th century, and the next EU-10 stage for 1972-95 as imitating the U.S. outcome for 1950-72. We show that both the pace of aggregate productivity growth during 1972-95 for the EU-10 as well as its industrial composition matched very closely the growth record of the U.S. in the previous 1950-72 time interval.
A striking finding is that for the total economy the “early-to-late” productivity growth slowdown from 1972-95 to 2005-15 in the EU-10 (-1.68 percentage points) was almost identical to the U.S. slowdown from 1950-72 to 2005-15 (-1.67 percentage points). There is a very high EU-U.S. correlation in the magnitude of the early-to-late slowdown across industries. This supports our overall theme that the productivity growth slowdown from the early postwar years to the most recent decade was due to a retardation in technical change that affected the same industries by roughly the same magnitudes on both sides of the Atlantic.
Empirical evidence that prospectively negative events exhibit a significant amount of shifted (i.e., positive) emotions in the corresponding social network messages, serving as antidote in negative events
Kušen E., Strembeck M., Conti M. (2019) Emotional Valence Shifts and User Behavior on Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. In: Kaya M., Alhajj R. (eds) Influence and Behavior Analysis in Social Networks and Social Media. ASONAM 2018. Lecture Notes in Social Networks. Springer, Cham. December 12 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02592-2_4
Abstract: In this paper, we present a study on 5.6 million messages that have been sent via Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The messages in our data set are related to 24 systematically chosen real-world events. For each of the 5.6 million messages, we first extracted emotion scores based on the eight basic emotions according to Plutchik’s wheel of emotions. Subsequently, we investigated the effects of shifts in the emotional valence on the messaging behavior of social media users. In particular, we found empirical evidence that prospectively negative real-world events exhibit a significant amount of shifted (i.e., positive) emotions in the corresponding messages. To explain this finding, we use the theory of social connection and emotional contagion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that provides empirical evidence for the undoing hypothesis in online social networks (OSNs). The undoing hypothesis assumes that positive emotions serve as an antidote during negative events.
Abstract: In this paper, we present a study on 5.6 million messages that have been sent via Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The messages in our data set are related to 24 systematically chosen real-world events. For each of the 5.6 million messages, we first extracted emotion scores based on the eight basic emotions according to Plutchik’s wheel of emotions. Subsequently, we investigated the effects of shifts in the emotional valence on the messaging behavior of social media users. In particular, we found empirical evidence that prospectively negative real-world events exhibit a significant amount of shifted (i.e., positive) emotions in the corresponding messages. To explain this finding, we use the theory of social connection and emotional contagion. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that provides empirical evidence for the undoing hypothesis in online social networks (OSNs). The undoing hypothesis assumes that positive emotions serve as an antidote during negative events.
Rolf Degen summarizing... They super-rich are different: They found a way to transmute wit into gold.
Wealth Generation as a Form of Expertise: An Examination from 2002-2016 of Elite Education, Cognitive Ability, and the Gender Gap Among Billionaires. Jonathan Wai & Tomoe Kanaya. Journal of Expertise 2019, Vol 2(1). https://www.journalofexpertise.org/articles/volume2_issue1/JoE_2019_2_1_Wai_Kanaya.html
Abstract: The study of expertise has focused on areas such as chess, music, and sports. Here, we argue that wealth generation can also be considered a form of expertise. This study examines 14,246 global Forbes billionaires across 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability, looking at the world (and U.S. specifically) as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. The results reveal that the elite education and cognitive ability level of billionaires has remained relatively stable over time, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Yet, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. These results suggest that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified their ability to generate wealth in more recent years. This paper broadens the definition of expertise to include wealth generation—the idea that the development of wealth expertise may have skills that transcend field—and suggests deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of success for this area of expertise. A multidisciplinary perspective can help test the strength and generality of expertise theories, more comprehensive models ofe xpertise should account for abilities and education, and the investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Keywords: wealth expertise, elite education, wealth inequality, historical examination, talent
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Introduction
Expertise development has traditionally been studied in domains such as sports, music, and games like chess (e.g., Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). However, there has been a recent push for more comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., for a review, see Hambrick, Macnamara, Campitelli, Ullen, & Mosing, 2016) and a broader multidisciplinary approach to studying expertise (Gobet, 2016). Indeed, expertise research has started to move into domains such business, law, politics, and even journalism (e.g., Volden, Wiseman, & Wai, 2016; Wai, 2013; Wai & Perina, 2018; Wai & Rindermann, 2017), though there has been less research to date focused on wealth accumulation (e.g., Wai & Lincoln, 2016) and the idea that this might also be a form of expertise.
A cottage industry exists around wealth creation (e.g., multiple organizations track the characteristics and habits of the wealthy), in large part because the idea that making money is a skill or form of expertise is attractive. For example, money managers often will demonstrate their “talent” at growing wealth to attract future clients by pointing to their rate of returns in the past. But throughout history, there has been much contention over whether wealth generation is really a form of expertise where talent has a role to play, and how much of becoming rich is simply due to “luck” or things like nepotism (Galbraith, 1994; Pluchino, Biondo, & Rapisarda, 2018). Many models of expertise suggest that general cognitive ability likely plays a role in expertise development (for a review, see Subotnik, Olszewski-Kubilius, & Worrell, 2011). Though certainly not the only important predictor, this perspective would align with the idea that cognitive talent differences may, at least in part, be important in explaining wealth inequality. Additionally, Ericsson’s deliberate practice model focuses on the idea that practice largely can account for individual differences in domain performance (Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson et al., 1993). In contrast to this, Macnamara, Hambrick, and Oswald (2014) showed that deliberate practice accounted for less than 1% of the performance variance in occupations. The review by Hambrick et al. (2016) strongly suggests that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of individual differences in performance across expertise domains studied. Another way to approach the estimation of the role of talent and practice in success is to examine the role of general cognitive ability first, and then consider that as an important source of variance to account for (e.g., Lubinski, 2004) prior to assessing the impact of other factors, such as practice or even luck, which are also important.
Broadening definitions and domains of expertise research to incorporate wealth generation and maintenance, therefore, may be important to test the generality of theoretical models of expertise and expert performance. Though wealth generation is on a continuum, an extreme level of this type of expertise, at least at present, is attaining billionaire status. Due to the many pathways of attaining billionaire status, it may seem that wealth generation is too broad to be considered as a form of expertise. There are, after all, so many different paths to attain billionaire status, with the paths themselves through particular industries that are arguably quantitatively and qualitatively different. The study of expertise has traditionally focused on carefully examining one particular domain as the venue for research (e.g., chess, running).
However, anotherway of studying expertise is to start with an outcome such as extreme wealth and then consider the domains through which such extreme wealth was generated such as different industries (e.g., real estate, technology). In fact, the study of comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., Hambrick et al., 2016) examines expertise development across multiple domains purposefully to shed light on what elements do or do not generalize across domains. Thus, looking at a large sample of billionaires across time and across industry or domain might shed light in a new way on different ways wealth expertise manifests itself.
Another way of thinking about wealth generation as a form of expertise is to consider that the skills and interests in wealth generation likely can and do transcend a specific domain or field. For example, a strong interest and desire to make money would lead an astute entrepreneur or investor to choose an industry based on wealth generation potential as a primary factor. The industry chosen would be selected not on interest in developing expertise within that industry, but rather because it is a good match to the individual’s particular skill sets, interests, connections, and know-how at the time. This would maximize the leveraging of that domain to increase the likelihood of wealth generation. For example, generating an idea, recognizing and seizing an opportunity, a willingness to take extreme risks, convincing others to invest in the idea, and sticking with the idea through lows and highs (or failing and generating a new idea) until eventual fruition are all general skills that likely transcend field in developing wealth expertise. Thus, the educational selectivity and cognitive ability required for a certain pathway to wealth expertise may be important to consider. That is, understanding the role that certain elite schools may play in different domains of wealth expertise can shed light on the role of educational filtering mechanisms and corresponding cognitive ability that different domains of wealth expertise may require.
The study of occupational leaders or elites (e.g., Hacker, 1961; Khan, 2012) has attracted much public discussion and academic interest across multiple disciplines, especially in the U.S. due to a focus on income inequalityand what factors might explain why a tiny fraction of the population holds an enormous fraction of wealth (Piketty & Saez, 2003; Solow, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011). The path to becoming a billionaire is often linked to many personal and contextual factors such as family wealth and connections, attending highly selective schools and accessing networks, cognitive ability, and luck (Wai, 2013, 2014; Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Prior research examined the education and ability levels of Fortune 500 CEOs across the last two decades (Wai & Rindermann, 2015), and uncovered that such levels remained relatively stable across time. This suggests that the occupational filtering or selection structure for Fortune 500 CEOs has been unchanged for at least the last two decades. It remains to be explored whether this holds in other domains. Murray (2003) investigated human accomplishment across the full span of history, from 800 B. C. to 1950, so studying samples after 1950 is important for contemporary understanding, but at the same time the historical trends in the last 50 years are likely but a blip in comparison to accomplishment going back in time.
Scholars that span disciplines have commented on the role that technology may have played in amplifying the impact of highly talented individuals. For example, the economist Krueger (2012, p. 5) noted things have “favored people with the analytical skills to get the most out of technology.” The economist Mankiw (2013, p. 23) stated “changes in technology have allowed a small number of highly educated and exceptionally talented individuals to command superstar incomes in ways that were not possible a generation ago.” Indeed, prior research uncovered that, in more recent years, the billionaires around the world who accumulated their wealth from the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to have very high levels of elite education and corresponding cognitive ability (Wai, 2013, 2014). This also appeared true for 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Psychologists Aguinis and O’Boyle (2013) argued that changes in work have handsomely rewarded a handful of star performers who contribute the vast majority of value in innovation.
Given these comments, it is surprising that it has not been as widely considered that one partial explanation for increases in wealth and other forms of inequality, especially within the U.S., could be that academically gifted or intellectually talented and exceptionally productive individuals may be choosing to pursue opportunities with increasing frequency that lead to the accumulation of wealth. In essence, they may be choosing to develop expertise in attaining wealth. Industries that rely on technology or the ability to use money to make money may have become very rewarding for people with exceptional analytical skills. These ongoing discussions highlight that it is unclear whether elite education and ability selectivity for billionaires or for individual sectors have changed or remained the same over time and should be investigated.
An historical analysis of the education and cognitive abilitylevel of billionaires within these sectors could informthe idea that highly educated and cognitively advancedpeople may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments.Therefore, in this paper, we examine the role of general cognitive ability among billionaires across a number of years through the proxy of elite education. Further, in order to assess the idea that highly educated and cognitively advanced people may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments, we conduct an historical analysis of the education and cognitive level of billionaires within these sectors. More broadly, to examine the extent to which expertise in wealth generation is driven by expertise in specific domains, we examine billionaires across the many different industries or sectors in which they made their money. Broadly,we test the generality of expertise models by moving into a relatively unexplored domain of expertise, that of wealth generation.
Present Study
The present study draws from the Forbesglobal billionaires database from across a recent span of 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires looking at the world overall and U.S. as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. Additionally, we examined whether elite educated and talented people have been entering the technology and finance and investment sectors at higher rates over time. To examine the role that domain pathways matter in expertise development in wealth generation we examine elite education and ability as a function of industry or domain in which the billionaires obtained their wealth. Wealth expertise is on a wide continuum, and examining those who have made it to the top is important in its own right, just as is examining extraordinary performers in other types of domains. There are many paths to develop this type of expertise. What are those paths? What role does education and ability play?
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Discussion
Conceptualizing and Thinking about Wealth Generation as a Form of Expertise
This investigation leveraged billionaire status as a way to empirically conceptualize wealth generation as a form of expertise and to examine how specific occupations required elite education and cognitive abilities to achieve wealth expertise. There was great variation in the industries in which the billionaires earned their wealth, with general intelligence and elite education having much less of a premium in real estate, food and beverage, and fashion and retail and much more of a premium in technology and finance and investments. Overall, elite education and cognitive ability still mattered, just to different degrees for each subdomain. In particular, within the U.S., billionaires making their money in the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to be much more elite educated and cognitively able, perhaps choosing to develop expertise in a technology and/or finance andinvestment sector as a stepping stone towards the broader development of wealth expertise. This aligns with an analysis by industry within a group of 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016).The development of wealth expertise may have underlying skills that in fact also transcend any particular field. First, seeking to use one’s cognitive ability towards certain occupations with potential for wealth expertise requires a value placed on generating and accumulating wealth (this would be in sharp contrast to academics who are also often cognitively advanced, but value academic and intellectual freedom over wealth). Generating an idea that can result in wealth generation likely requires utilizing one’s individual profile of abilities, personality, and other traits but also leveraging one’s cultural resources, context, and connections in historical place and time. Some examples include, but are not limited to, the ability to recognize an opportunityacross many areas in which one might develop highly specific occupational expertise, the ability to persuade or pitch one’s ideas to funders and potential donors, and the ability to tolerate extreme risks. Additionally, based on the data across industriespresented in this paper, having a high cognitive ability, attending an elite school, and leveraging those resources towards turning an idea into a successful money generating enterprise are also important components. Industriousness or being willing to work long hours or put in 10,000 or more hours of practice, even in the face of a certain number of failures, is also likely important in developing wealth expertise as it is for other forms of expertise, as is luck. Broadly, high cognitive ability, attending a highly selective institution, and choosing to pursue wealth through the technology or finance and investments sectors appears to be more important in recent years for the development of wealth expertise.
Findings Across Time: 2002-2016
Prior work demonstrated a significant link between education/intellectual capacity and net worth, even within this highly select sample with restricted variability (Wai, 2013, 2014b), however, that was only for more recent years. A full analysis across a recent span of 15years suggests that broadly, the link between education/cognitive ability and net worth is not strong. This matches with findings on 30-millioniares, which indicated that after controlling for many confounders, the link between education/cognitive abilityand net worth became quite small (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). However, this does not mean that education/cognitive ability is not important for attaining great wealth because people in the top 1% of ability are likelyoverrepresented among billionaires. For example, given top 1% cognitive ability people should be represented at the base rate of 1%, this means globally top 1% people are overrepresented among billionaires by a factor of about 32 to 38, and within the U.S. top 1% people are overrepresented by a factor of about 41 to 47 (see Figure 1, total trends across time). This means that within this highly select sample, other factors may play a larger role in differentiating the person with only 1 billion from multiple billions. Future research might focus on investigating these differentiating factors that contribute to or take away from the development of wealth expertise even within this highly select sample across time.
The Gender Gap
Across the period 2002-2016,sex differences did drop in the initial 3 to 5 years but have been relatively stable in the last decade at about 9 to 1. Overall, sex differences are larger in the world than in the U.S. Broadly this suggests that for whatever reason, more men tend to endup as billionaires and that increasing the number of women billionaires may take some time. Given that among 30-millionaires the male-female ratio was 9.27 to 1 (Wai & Lincoln, 2016), and because newer billionaires may often come from multi-millionaires who increase their wealth, sex differences may shift slowly. These findings should be taken into account when considering ways to increase the numbers of women among billionaires and in the boardroom, among other sectors.
Are Elite Educated and Talented People Increasingly Choosing to Pursue Occupational Expertise That Leads to Wealth?
For the world, most of the elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards the technology sector, and secondarily the finance and investments sector. For the U.S., a similar percentage of elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards both the finance and investments and technology sectors and this percentage has grown over time. Since 2012, the elite education of the finance and investments sector has slightly increased, whereas the technology sector has appeared to level off. The overall pattern in the U.S. may indicate that elite educated people are increasingly choosing to pursue occupational expertise that leads to wealth, namely finance and investments and technology, in recent years. This trend further suggests that some of the increase in income or wealth inequality within the U.S. may be that cognitively advanced people are entering these highly lucrative occupations. Billionaire Mark Cuban, for example has declared that “the world’s first trillionaires are going to come from somebody who masters AI [artificial intelligence] and all its derivatives and applies it in ways we never thought of” (Clifford, 2017). It also means that if you want to develop expertise as a billionaire, and especially if you want to enter the technology, investments, or finance sectors, an elite education and corresponding cognitive ability needed for admission may be important in your path (see Rivera, 2015,for sociological mechanisms through which elite students get elite jobs in these industries). Tracking the role of education and ability in each of these sectors, especially technology, finance, and investments, will be of interest to uncoverthe role that education and ability plays in making enormous sums of money in the future.
Limitations and Future Directions
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Wai, 2014; Wai & Perina, 2018), attendance at American higher education institutions with average SAT (math + verbal) scores (or the ACT equivalent) of 1400 or higher according to U.S. News & World Report (America’s Best Colleges, 2013) as well attendance at a top college or university worldwide according to QS World University Rankings (2012) were used as an approximation for ability level. Because individual test scores were not publicly available, attending these institutions were reasonable approximations for individuals within the top 1% of ability (e.g., Frey & Detterman, 2004; Koenig et al. 2008; Wai, 2014). At an international level, admission to the very top schools was considered representative of at least a good portion of the top cognitive potential within each country. While this method cannot separate education from cognitive ability, it may give an underestimate in some cases as extremely cognitively advanced people may not have attended a highly ranked school for multiple reasons (e.g., financial limitations). It may give an overestimation in some cases due to individuals who gained entry with significantly sub-average test scores (e.g., legacy admissions; Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Golden, 2006; Sander, 2004). Specifically for billionaires, the fluctuations of the percentages of elite education and ability, through the proxy of typical test scores, may be influenced more from the wealth of parents and other corresponding advantages granted such as access to elite institutions and other networks, rather than individual ability. It
is reasonable, however, that both of these Type I and Type II errors counterbalance one another, while they may lower the reliability of the method.One limitation of the billionaires sample over 2002-2016 is that although there was some change, many of the people at the top of the list have remained on this list across time. Therefore, the shift in composition in education over time is largely driven by the nature of who loses and who gains wealth in a way that moves them across this billionaire cut point. As the samples have increased in recent years globally, it washarder to find background educational information on new people in different countries due to a lack of systematic public profiles (hence the high NR/NC percentage for the most recent years). This appeared to be less of a problem within the U.S. Future research might be directed at determining the qualities not only of those who join, but those who leave, the billionaire ranks over time. And because a degree from an elite institution likely opens doors and provides opportunities that would not otherwise be available, future research might investigate the extent to which high ability students who attend state institutions or less selective institutions may fare in attaining billionaire or wealth expertise status.
Another important limitation of using billionaire status as an indicator of wealth expertise is that there may not necessarily be a set of unifying factors underlying this extreme wealth indicator. We fully recognize this as a possibility, but believe it is worthy to explore the role of abilities and educational selectivity across multiple paths within the billionaire sample to examine whether there are commonalities. Additionally, there are likely elements in wealth generation that do transcend field, such as generating an idea, recognizing an opportunity, or convincing others to invest in that idea, among others.
Conclusions
Across a recent span of the last 15 years, the elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires has remained relatively stable, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Additionally, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. This suggests that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human capital or talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified an individual’s ability to generate wealth.These findings add to the expertise literature by broadening the definition of expertise to include wealth generation and historically exploring the role of elite education and cognitive ability in this area of expertise, in part through the industries or pathways through which such expertise is developed. Even across time (from 2002-2016), elite education and cognitive ability appear to be an important factor in developing wealth expertise, suggesting that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of performance and that expertise in wealth generation is likely influenced by many interlocking factors, especially elite education and ability, in addition to factors such as luck. Of course, the importance of elite education and ability within billionaires varies, and billionaires as a whole also differ in the importance of elite education and ability in relation to other areas of expertise. For example, House members tend to have a lower level, whereas the most powerful men and women tend to have a higher level of elite education and ability. This suggests a multidisciplinary perspective is important to test thestrength and generality of expertise theories, that more comprehensive models of expertise should account for abilities and education, and that investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Abstract: The study of expertise has focused on areas such as chess, music, and sports. Here, we argue that wealth generation can also be considered a form of expertise. This study examines 14,246 global Forbes billionaires across 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability, looking at the world (and U.S. specifically) as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. The results reveal that the elite education and cognitive ability level of billionaires has remained relatively stable over time, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Yet, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. These results suggest that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified their ability to generate wealth in more recent years. This paper broadens the definition of expertise to include wealth generation—the idea that the development of wealth expertise may have skills that transcend field—and suggests deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of success for this area of expertise. A multidisciplinary perspective can help test the strength and generality of expertise theories, more comprehensive models ofe xpertise should account for abilities and education, and the investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Keywords: wealth expertise, elite education, wealth inequality, historical examination, talent
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Introduction
Expertise development has traditionally been studied in domains such as sports, music, and games like chess (e.g., Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). However, there has been a recent push for more comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., for a review, see Hambrick, Macnamara, Campitelli, Ullen, & Mosing, 2016) and a broader multidisciplinary approach to studying expertise (Gobet, 2016). Indeed, expertise research has started to move into domains such business, law, politics, and even journalism (e.g., Volden, Wiseman, & Wai, 2016; Wai, 2013; Wai & Perina, 2018; Wai & Rindermann, 2017), though there has been less research to date focused on wealth accumulation (e.g., Wai & Lincoln, 2016) and the idea that this might also be a form of expertise.
A cottage industry exists around wealth creation (e.g., multiple organizations track the characteristics and habits of the wealthy), in large part because the idea that making money is a skill or form of expertise is attractive. For example, money managers often will demonstrate their “talent” at growing wealth to attract future clients by pointing to their rate of returns in the past. But throughout history, there has been much contention over whether wealth generation is really a form of expertise where talent has a role to play, and how much of becoming rich is simply due to “luck” or things like nepotism (Galbraith, 1994; Pluchino, Biondo, & Rapisarda, 2018). Many models of expertise suggest that general cognitive ability likely plays a role in expertise development (for a review, see Subotnik, Olszewski-Kubilius, & Worrell, 2011). Though certainly not the only important predictor, this perspective would align with the idea that cognitive talent differences may, at least in part, be important in explaining wealth inequality. Additionally, Ericsson’s deliberate practice model focuses on the idea that practice largely can account for individual differences in domain performance (Ericsson, 2014; Ericsson et al., 1993). In contrast to this, Macnamara, Hambrick, and Oswald (2014) showed that deliberate practice accounted for less than 1% of the performance variance in occupations. The review by Hambrick et al. (2016) strongly suggests that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of individual differences in performance across expertise domains studied. Another way to approach the estimation of the role of talent and practice in success is to examine the role of general cognitive ability first, and then consider that as an important source of variance to account for (e.g., Lubinski, 2004) prior to assessing the impact of other factors, such as practice or even luck, which are also important.
Broadening definitions and domains of expertise research to incorporate wealth generation and maintenance, therefore, may be important to test the generality of theoretical models of expertise and expert performance. Though wealth generation is on a continuum, an extreme level of this type of expertise, at least at present, is attaining billionaire status. Due to the many pathways of attaining billionaire status, it may seem that wealth generation is too broad to be considered as a form of expertise. There are, after all, so many different paths to attain billionaire status, with the paths themselves through particular industries that are arguably quantitatively and qualitatively different. The study of expertise has traditionally focused on carefully examining one particular domain as the venue for research (e.g., chess, running).
However, anotherway of studying expertise is to start with an outcome such as extreme wealth and then consider the domains through which such extreme wealth was generated such as different industries (e.g., real estate, technology). In fact, the study of comprehensive theoretical models of expertise (e.g., Hambrick et al., 2016) examines expertise development across multiple domains purposefully to shed light on what elements do or do not generalize across domains. Thus, looking at a large sample of billionaires across time and across industry or domain might shed light in a new way on different ways wealth expertise manifests itself.
Another way of thinking about wealth generation as a form of expertise is to consider that the skills and interests in wealth generation likely can and do transcend a specific domain or field. For example, a strong interest and desire to make money would lead an astute entrepreneur or investor to choose an industry based on wealth generation potential as a primary factor. The industry chosen would be selected not on interest in developing expertise within that industry, but rather because it is a good match to the individual’s particular skill sets, interests, connections, and know-how at the time. This would maximize the leveraging of that domain to increase the likelihood of wealth generation. For example, generating an idea, recognizing and seizing an opportunity, a willingness to take extreme risks, convincing others to invest in the idea, and sticking with the idea through lows and highs (or failing and generating a new idea) until eventual fruition are all general skills that likely transcend field in developing wealth expertise. Thus, the educational selectivity and cognitive ability required for a certain pathway to wealth expertise may be important to consider. That is, understanding the role that certain elite schools may play in different domains of wealth expertise can shed light on the role of educational filtering mechanisms and corresponding cognitive ability that different domains of wealth expertise may require.
The study of occupational leaders or elites (e.g., Hacker, 1961; Khan, 2012) has attracted much public discussion and academic interest across multiple disciplines, especially in the U.S. due to a focus on income inequalityand what factors might explain why a tiny fraction of the population holds an enormous fraction of wealth (Piketty & Saez, 2003; Solow, 2014; Stiglitz, 2011). The path to becoming a billionaire is often linked to many personal and contextual factors such as family wealth and connections, attending highly selective schools and accessing networks, cognitive ability, and luck (Wai, 2013, 2014; Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Prior research examined the education and ability levels of Fortune 500 CEOs across the last two decades (Wai & Rindermann, 2015), and uncovered that such levels remained relatively stable across time. This suggests that the occupational filtering or selection structure for Fortune 500 CEOs has been unchanged for at least the last two decades. It remains to be explored whether this holds in other domains. Murray (2003) investigated human accomplishment across the full span of history, from 800 B. C. to 1950, so studying samples after 1950 is important for contemporary understanding, but at the same time the historical trends in the last 50 years are likely but a blip in comparison to accomplishment going back in time.
Scholars that span disciplines have commented on the role that technology may have played in amplifying the impact of highly talented individuals. For example, the economist Krueger (2012, p. 5) noted things have “favored people with the analytical skills to get the most out of technology.” The economist Mankiw (2013, p. 23) stated “changes in technology have allowed a small number of highly educated and exceptionally talented individuals to command superstar incomes in ways that were not possible a generation ago.” Indeed, prior research uncovered that, in more recent years, the billionaires around the world who accumulated their wealth from the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to have very high levels of elite education and corresponding cognitive ability (Wai, 2013, 2014). This also appeared true for 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). Psychologists Aguinis and O’Boyle (2013) argued that changes in work have handsomely rewarded a handful of star performers who contribute the vast majority of value in innovation.
Given these comments, it is surprising that it has not been as widely considered that one partial explanation for increases in wealth and other forms of inequality, especially within the U.S., could be that academically gifted or intellectually talented and exceptionally productive individuals may be choosing to pursue opportunities with increasing frequency that lead to the accumulation of wealth. In essence, they may be choosing to develop expertise in attaining wealth. Industries that rely on technology or the ability to use money to make money may have become very rewarding for people with exceptional analytical skills. These ongoing discussions highlight that it is unclear whether elite education and ability selectivity for billionaires or for individual sectors have changed or remained the same over time and should be investigated.
An historical analysis of the education and cognitive abilitylevel of billionaires within these sectors could informthe idea that highly educated and cognitively advancedpeople may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments.Therefore, in this paper, we examine the role of general cognitive ability among billionaires across a number of years through the proxy of elite education. Further, in order to assess the idea that highly educated and cognitively advanced people may be increasingly developing expertise in technology, finance, and investments, we conduct an historical analysis of the education and cognitive level of billionaires within these sectors. More broadly, to examine the extent to which expertise in wealth generation is driven by expertise in specific domains, we examine billionaires across the many different industries or sectors in which they made their money. Broadly,we test the generality of expertise models by moving into a relatively unexplored domain of expertise, that of wealth generation.
Present Study
The present study draws from the Forbesglobal billionaires database from across a recent span of 15 years (2002-2016) to examine historical trends of elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires looking at the world overall and U.S. as a function of industry, country, sex, self-made status, and net worth. Additionally, we examined whether elite educated and talented people have been entering the technology and finance and investment sectors at higher rates over time. To examine the role that domain pathways matter in expertise development in wealth generation we examine elite education and ability as a function of industry or domain in which the billionaires obtained their wealth. Wealth expertise is on a wide continuum, and examining those who have made it to the top is important in its own right, just as is examining extraordinary performers in other types of domains. There are many paths to develop this type of expertise. What are those paths? What role does education and ability play?
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Discussion
Conceptualizing and Thinking about Wealth Generation as a Form of Expertise
This investigation leveraged billionaire status as a way to empirically conceptualize wealth generation as a form of expertise and to examine how specific occupations required elite education and cognitive abilities to achieve wealth expertise. There was great variation in the industries in which the billionaires earned their wealth, with general intelligence and elite education having much less of a premium in real estate, food and beverage, and fashion and retail and much more of a premium in technology and finance and investments. Overall, elite education and cognitive ability still mattered, just to different degrees for each subdomain. In particular, within the U.S., billionaires making their money in the technology and finance and investment sectors tended to be much more elite educated and cognitively able, perhaps choosing to develop expertise in a technology and/or finance andinvestment sector as a stepping stone towards the broader development of wealth expertise. This aligns with an analysis by industry within a group of 30-millionaires (Wai & Lincoln, 2016).The development of wealth expertise may have underlying skills that in fact also transcend any particular field. First, seeking to use one’s cognitive ability towards certain occupations with potential for wealth expertise requires a value placed on generating and accumulating wealth (this would be in sharp contrast to academics who are also often cognitively advanced, but value academic and intellectual freedom over wealth). Generating an idea that can result in wealth generation likely requires utilizing one’s individual profile of abilities, personality, and other traits but also leveraging one’s cultural resources, context, and connections in historical place and time. Some examples include, but are not limited to, the ability to recognize an opportunityacross many areas in which one might develop highly specific occupational expertise, the ability to persuade or pitch one’s ideas to funders and potential donors, and the ability to tolerate extreme risks. Additionally, based on the data across industriespresented in this paper, having a high cognitive ability, attending an elite school, and leveraging those resources towards turning an idea into a successful money generating enterprise are also important components. Industriousness or being willing to work long hours or put in 10,000 or more hours of practice, even in the face of a certain number of failures, is also likely important in developing wealth expertise as it is for other forms of expertise, as is luck. Broadly, high cognitive ability, attending a highly selective institution, and choosing to pursue wealth through the technology or finance and investments sectors appears to be more important in recent years for the development of wealth expertise.
Findings Across Time: 2002-2016
Prior work demonstrated a significant link between education/intellectual capacity and net worth, even within this highly select sample with restricted variability (Wai, 2013, 2014b), however, that was only for more recent years. A full analysis across a recent span of 15years suggests that broadly, the link between education/cognitive ability and net worth is not strong. This matches with findings on 30-millioniares, which indicated that after controlling for many confounders, the link between education/cognitive abilityand net worth became quite small (Wai & Lincoln, 2016). However, this does not mean that education/cognitive ability is not important for attaining great wealth because people in the top 1% of ability are likelyoverrepresented among billionaires. For example, given top 1% cognitive ability people should be represented at the base rate of 1%, this means globally top 1% people are overrepresented among billionaires by a factor of about 32 to 38, and within the U.S. top 1% people are overrepresented by a factor of about 41 to 47 (see Figure 1, total trends across time). This means that within this highly select sample, other factors may play a larger role in differentiating the person with only 1 billion from multiple billions. Future research might focus on investigating these differentiating factors that contribute to or take away from the development of wealth expertise even within this highly select sample across time.
The Gender Gap
Across the period 2002-2016,sex differences did drop in the initial 3 to 5 years but have been relatively stable in the last decade at about 9 to 1. Overall, sex differences are larger in the world than in the U.S. Broadly this suggests that for whatever reason, more men tend to endup as billionaires and that increasing the number of women billionaires may take some time. Given that among 30-millionaires the male-female ratio was 9.27 to 1 (Wai & Lincoln, 2016), and because newer billionaires may often come from multi-millionaires who increase their wealth, sex differences may shift slowly. These findings should be taken into account when considering ways to increase the numbers of women among billionaires and in the boardroom, among other sectors.
Are Elite Educated and Talented People Increasingly Choosing to Pursue Occupational Expertise That Leads to Wealth?
For the world, most of the elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards the technology sector, and secondarily the finance and investments sector. For the U.S., a similar percentage of elite educated and cognitively advanced people have tended towards both the finance and investments and technology sectors and this percentage has grown over time. Since 2012, the elite education of the finance and investments sector has slightly increased, whereas the technology sector has appeared to level off. The overall pattern in the U.S. may indicate that elite educated people are increasingly choosing to pursue occupational expertise that leads to wealth, namely finance and investments and technology, in recent years. This trend further suggests that some of the increase in income or wealth inequality within the U.S. may be that cognitively advanced people are entering these highly lucrative occupations. Billionaire Mark Cuban, for example has declared that “the world’s first trillionaires are going to come from somebody who masters AI [artificial intelligence] and all its derivatives and applies it in ways we never thought of” (Clifford, 2017). It also means that if you want to develop expertise as a billionaire, and especially if you want to enter the technology, investments, or finance sectors, an elite education and corresponding cognitive ability needed for admission may be important in your path (see Rivera, 2015,for sociological mechanisms through which elite students get elite jobs in these industries). Tracking the role of education and ability in each of these sectors, especially technology, finance, and investments, will be of interest to uncoverthe role that education and ability plays in making enormous sums of money in the future.
Limitations and Future Directions
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Wai, 2014; Wai & Perina, 2018), attendance at American higher education institutions with average SAT (math + verbal) scores (or the ACT equivalent) of 1400 or higher according to U.S. News & World Report (America’s Best Colleges, 2013) as well attendance at a top college or university worldwide according to QS World University Rankings (2012) were used as an approximation for ability level. Because individual test scores were not publicly available, attending these institutions were reasonable approximations for individuals within the top 1% of ability (e.g., Frey & Detterman, 2004; Koenig et al. 2008; Wai, 2014). At an international level, admission to the very top schools was considered representative of at least a good portion of the top cognitive potential within each country. While this method cannot separate education from cognitive ability, it may give an underestimate in some cases as extremely cognitively advanced people may not have attended a highly ranked school for multiple reasons (e.g., financial limitations). It may give an overestimation in some cases due to individuals who gained entry with significantly sub-average test scores (e.g., legacy admissions; Espenshade & Radford, 2009; Golden, 2006; Sander, 2004). Specifically for billionaires, the fluctuations of the percentages of elite education and ability, through the proxy of typical test scores, may be influenced more from the wealth of parents and other corresponding advantages granted such as access to elite institutions and other networks, rather than individual ability. It
is reasonable, however, that both of these Type I and Type II errors counterbalance one another, while they may lower the reliability of the method.One limitation of the billionaires sample over 2002-2016 is that although there was some change, many of the people at the top of the list have remained on this list across time. Therefore, the shift in composition in education over time is largely driven by the nature of who loses and who gains wealth in a way that moves them across this billionaire cut point. As the samples have increased in recent years globally, it washarder to find background educational information on new people in different countries due to a lack of systematic public profiles (hence the high NR/NC percentage for the most recent years). This appeared to be less of a problem within the U.S. Future research might be directed at determining the qualities not only of those who join, but those who leave, the billionaire ranks over time. And because a degree from an elite institution likely opens doors and provides opportunities that would not otherwise be available, future research might investigate the extent to which high ability students who attend state institutions or less selective institutions may fare in attaining billionaire or wealth expertise status.
Another important limitation of using billionaire status as an indicator of wealth expertise is that there may not necessarily be a set of unifying factors underlying this extreme wealth indicator. We fully recognize this as a possibility, but believe it is worthy to explore the role of abilities and educational selectivity across multiple paths within the billionaire sample to examine whether there are commonalities. Additionally, there are likely elements in wealth generation that do transcend field, such as generating an idea, recognizing an opportunity, or convincing others to invest in that idea, among others.
Conclusions
Across a recent span of the last 15 years, the elite education and cognitive ability of billionaires has remained relatively stable, suggesting the billionaire filtering structure has remained relatively unchanged. Additionally, at least within the U.S., the percentage of elite educated and cognitively talented billionaires entering the technology and especially the finance and investment sectors has increased over time. This suggests that one factor to consider in increasing inequality in the U.S. may be the role of human capital or talent in selecting areas of occupational expertise that have amplified an individual’s ability to generate wealth.These findings add to the expertise literature by broadening the definition of expertise to include wealth generation and historically exploring the role of elite education and cognitive ability in this area of expertise, in part through the industries or pathways through which such expertise is developed. Even across time (from 2002-2016), elite education and cognitive ability appear to be an important factor in developing wealth expertise, suggesting that deliberate practice cannot be the full explanation of performance and that expertise in wealth generation is likely influenced by many interlocking factors, especially elite education and ability, in addition to factors such as luck. Of course, the importance of elite education and ability within billionaires varies, and billionaires as a whole also differ in the importance of elite education and ability in relation to other areas of expertise. For example, House members tend to have a lower level, whereas the most powerful men and women tend to have a higher level of elite education and ability. This suggests a multidisciplinary perspective is important to test thestrength and generality of expertise theories, that more comprehensive models of expertise should account for abilities and education, and that investigation of expertise models should account for historical changes.
Decision making under risk for others vs. the self: Decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self; but the little is very little
Decision Making for Others Involving Risk: A Review and Meta-Analysis. Evan Polman, Kaiyang Wu. Journal of Economic Psychology, Apr 6 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2019.03.007
Highlights
• We meta-analyzed research on decision making under risk for others vs. the self.
• We found decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self.
• We identify moderators, test their validity, and quantify their effects.
• We suggest researchers focus on when (not whether) decisions for others are riskier.
• We highlight what is unique about decision making for others vs. the self.
Abstract: Are choices for others riskier than choices people make for themselves? This question has been asked by economists, psychologists, and other researchers in the social sciences – which has generated a diversity of research accounts and results. For example, a number of studies have found strong instances of a risky shift in choices for others, while other studies have found no such effect or have found that choices for others instead generate a cautious shift. In a meta-analysis of 128 effects from 71 published and unpublished papers (totaling 14,443 observations), we found a significant though small effect size (d = 0.105) in favor of a risky shift when people choose for others. Moreover, we found considerable variance between studies (Q = 1106.25), suggesting that the net effect is susceptible to moderating factors or study characteristics, which we identify and discuss as well (viz. choice recipient, decision frame, decision reciprocity, theoretical perspective, study design). Thus, we document not only whether decisions for others are riskier, but when (and when such decisions are less risky). We further discuss what is distinctly unique about decision making for others – how such choices are not just different in degree from personal choices but different in kind.
Highlights
• We meta-analyzed research on decision making under risk for others vs. the self.
• We found decisions for others are a little more risky than decisions for the self.
• We identify moderators, test their validity, and quantify their effects.
• We suggest researchers focus on when (not whether) decisions for others are riskier.
• We highlight what is unique about decision making for others vs. the self.
Abstract: Are choices for others riskier than choices people make for themselves? This question has been asked by economists, psychologists, and other researchers in the social sciences – which has generated a diversity of research accounts and results. For example, a number of studies have found strong instances of a risky shift in choices for others, while other studies have found no such effect or have found that choices for others instead generate a cautious shift. In a meta-analysis of 128 effects from 71 published and unpublished papers (totaling 14,443 observations), we found a significant though small effect size (d = 0.105) in favor of a risky shift when people choose for others. Moreover, we found considerable variance between studies (Q = 1106.25), suggesting that the net effect is susceptible to moderating factors or study characteristics, which we identify and discuss as well (viz. choice recipient, decision frame, decision reciprocity, theoretical perspective, study design). Thus, we document not only whether decisions for others are riskier, but when (and when such decisions are less risky). We further discuss what is distinctly unique about decision making for others – how such choices are not just different in degree from personal choices but different in kind.
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