Civic honesty around the globe. Alain Cohn et al. Science Jun 20 2019:eaau8712. DOI: 10.1126/science.aau8712
Abstract: Civic honesty is essential to social capital and economic development, but is often in conflict with material self-interest. We examine the trade-off between honesty and self-interest using field experiments in 355 cities spanning 40 countries around the globe. We turned in over 17,000 lost wallets with varying amounts of money at public and private institutions, and measured whether recipients contacted the owner to return the wallets. In virtually all countries citizens were more likely to return wallets that contained more money. Both non-experts and professional economists were unable to predict this result. Additional data suggest our main findings can be explained by a combination of altruistic concerns and an aversion to viewing oneself as a thief, which increase with the material benefits of dishonesty.
Friday, June 21, 2019
Thursday, June 20, 2019
The role of character, hunting ability, and reciprocity in Hadza campmate selection: It seems that social selection for character traits was not a powerful driving force in the evolution of human cooperation
Partner choice in human evolution: The role of character, hunting ability, and reciprocity in Hadza campmate selection. Kristopher M. Smith, Coren L. Apicella. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, for our propensity to cooperate. But evidence for this claim comes largely from Western populations. Here, we investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e. campmate) in Hadza hunter-gatherers of northern Tanzania. Ninety-two Hadza participants from 12 camps ranked their current campmates on character traits (i.e. hard work, generosity, and honesty), hunting ability in men, and their preference for them as future campmates. We found positive but weak associations between rankings on character traits and being a preferred campmate. However, there was suggestive evidence that being perceived as a better hunter was a more important criterion than any character traits for being a preferred campmate in men. And we found little evidence to suggest that partner preferences were reciprocated among campmates. Finally, we found little evidence to suggest that being a preferred campmate is associated with greater reproductive success, which suggests there is little benefit to being a valued partner. Together, these findings suggest that social selection for character traits was not a powerful driving force in the evolution of human cooperation.
https://osf.io/8sxmw/x
Abstract: The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, for our propensity to cooperate. But evidence for this claim comes largely from Western populations. Here, we investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e. campmate) in Hadza hunter-gatherers of northern Tanzania. Ninety-two Hadza participants from 12 camps ranked their current campmates on character traits (i.e. hard work, generosity, and honesty), hunting ability in men, and their preference for them as future campmates. We found positive but weak associations between rankings on character traits and being a preferred campmate. However, there was suggestive evidence that being perceived as a better hunter was a more important criterion than any character traits for being a preferred campmate in men. And we found little evidence to suggest that partner preferences were reciprocated among campmates. Finally, we found little evidence to suggest that being a preferred campmate is associated with greater reproductive success, which suggests there is little benefit to being a valued partner. Together, these findings suggest that social selection for character traits was not a powerful driving force in the evolution of human cooperation.
https://osf.io/8sxmw/x
Foodie Calls, Or When Women Date Men for a Free Meal (Rather Than a Relationship): 23–33% of women surveyed had engaged in a foodie call; related to the the dark triad traits
Foodie Calls: When Women Date Men for a Free Meal (Rather Than a Relationship). Brian Collisson, Jennifer L. Howell, Trista Harig. Social Psychological and Personality Science, June 20, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619856308
Abstract: A foodie call occurs when a person, despite a lack of romantic attraction to a suitor, chooses to go on a date to receive a free meal. The present study examines predictors of a deceptive form of the foodie call in the context of male–female dates: when a woman purposefully misrepresents her romantic interest in a man to dine at his expense. In two studies, we surveyed women regarding their foodie call behavior, dark triad personality traits, traditional gender role beliefs, and online dating history. We found 23–33% of women surveyed had engaged in a foodie call. In Study 1, dark triad and traditional gender role beliefs significantly predicted previous foodie call behavior and its perceived acceptability. Study 2 employed fuller measures and suggested again that dark triad traits predicted foodie calls and their perceived acceptability.
Keywords: dating, food, dark triad, Machiavellianism, gender roles
Abstract: A foodie call occurs when a person, despite a lack of romantic attraction to a suitor, chooses to go on a date to receive a free meal. The present study examines predictors of a deceptive form of the foodie call in the context of male–female dates: when a woman purposefully misrepresents her romantic interest in a man to dine at his expense. In two studies, we surveyed women regarding their foodie call behavior, dark triad personality traits, traditional gender role beliefs, and online dating history. We found 23–33% of women surveyed had engaged in a foodie call. In Study 1, dark triad and traditional gender role beliefs significantly predicted previous foodie call behavior and its perceived acceptability. Study 2 employed fuller measures and suggested again that dark triad traits predicted foodie calls and their perceived acceptability.
Keywords: dating, food, dark triad, Machiavellianism, gender roles
The vast majority of our participants were honest, even when under time-pressure, our data question that people´s automatic response is to cheat and aligns with the idea that people have a strong preference for honest behavior
Verschuere, Bruno, Ine van der Cruyssen, Jonathan D'hondt, and Ewout Meijer. 2019. “Does Honesty Require Time? Two Preregistered Replications of Experiment 2 of Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-meyer (2012).” OSF Preprints. June 20. doi:10.31219/osf.io/qbk6z
Abstract: Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) found across two studies (each N = 72) that time-pressure increased cheating. These findings suggest that dishonesty comes naturally, while honesty requires overcoming the initial tendency to cheat. In a replication attempt of their Experiment 2, time-pressure did not increase cheating (N = 428, rpb = 0.05, BF01 = 16.67). The use of mass testing was, however, a deviation from the original procedure. In a second replication, with small groups of participants, time pressure also did not increase cheating (N = 319, rpb = 0.03, BF01 = 10.14). These findings indicate that the original study may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating. Given that the vast majority of our participants were honest, even when under time-pressure, our data question that people´s automatic response is to cheat and aligns with the idea that people have a strong preference for honest behavior.
Abstract: Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) found across two studies (each N = 72) that time-pressure increased cheating. These findings suggest that dishonesty comes naturally, while honesty requires overcoming the initial tendency to cheat. In a replication attempt of their Experiment 2, time-pressure did not increase cheating (N = 428, rpb = 0.05, BF01 = 16.67). The use of mass testing was, however, a deviation from the original procedure. In a second replication, with small groups of participants, time pressure also did not increase cheating (N = 319, rpb = 0.03, BF01 = 10.14). These findings indicate that the original study may have overestimated the true effect of time pressure on cheating. Given that the vast majority of our participants were honest, even when under time-pressure, our data question that people´s automatic response is to cheat and aligns with the idea that people have a strong preference for honest behavior.
6-18 year old Tsimané children: Few gender differences were found in mobility or spatial ability, although males pointed more accurately to challenging (high sinuosity) routes; girls were more harm avoidant & took more direct routes
Spatial cognition, navigation, and mobility among children in a forager-horticulturalist population, the Tsimané of Bolivia. Helen Elizabeth Davis, Elizabeth Cashdan. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: In many societies, males range farther than females, and this greater environmental experience may foster better spatial ability. Females are also reported to be more harm-avoidant, which may reduce spatial exploration. We evaluated these relationships among 6-18 year old Tsimané children, who live in a forager-horticulturalist society where both girls and boys have few constraints on spatial exploration compared to children in Western societies. Mobility was assessed through GPS tracking and interview, spatial ability through pointing accuracy, perspective-taking and mental rotation, and harm avoidance through interview. Few gender differences were found in mobility or spatial ability, although males pointed more accurately to challenging (high sinuosity) routes. Tsimané girls were more harm avoidant beginning in adolescence, and harm-avoidant adolescents took more direct routes. Greater regional travel and winding daily tracks were predictive of better navigation, but mental rotation scores was more strongly correlated with schooling.
Abstract: In many societies, males range farther than females, and this greater environmental experience may foster better spatial ability. Females are also reported to be more harm-avoidant, which may reduce spatial exploration. We evaluated these relationships among 6-18 year old Tsimané children, who live in a forager-horticulturalist society where both girls and boys have few constraints on spatial exploration compared to children in Western societies. Mobility was assessed through GPS tracking and interview, spatial ability through pointing accuracy, perspective-taking and mental rotation, and harm avoidance through interview. Few gender differences were found in mobility or spatial ability, although males pointed more accurately to challenging (high sinuosity) routes. Tsimané girls were more harm avoidant beginning in adolescence, and harm-avoidant adolescents took more direct routes. Greater regional travel and winding daily tracks were predictive of better navigation, but mental rotation scores was more strongly correlated with schooling.
Heterosexual men: In dynamic stimuli depicting two non-preferred targets engaged in sexual intercourse, greater homonegativity predicted less sustained attention toward targets in the receptive role, but not in the insertive role
The impact of homonegativity on gynephilic men's visual attention toward non-preferred sexual targets. Dan Tassone, Samantha J. Dawson, Meredith L. Chivers. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 149, 15 October 2019, Pages 261-272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.05.062
Abstract: Consistent with men's gender-specific patterns of sexual arousal, men tend to look longer at their preferred gender when viewing mixed-sex sexual stimuli. But gynephilic men do attend to males featured in sexual stimuli, and individual differences in negative affect may explain some variability in their sustained attention toward male targets. We explored the influence of homonegativity and affective reactions on visual attention toward sexual stimuli and subsequent feelings of sexual attraction. We sampled gynephilic men in two eye-tracking studies (Study 1: n = 49, Study 2: n = 38) that included measures of universalizing homonegativity, minoritizing homonegativity, and disgust to predict sustained visual attention and reported sexual attraction toward non-preferred targets in still-image and dynamic-video sexual stimuli. Greater feelings of universalizing homonegativity predicted less sustained attention toward solo non-preferred sexual targets. In dynamic stimuli depicting two non-preferred targets engaged in sexual intercourse, greater universalizing homonegativity predicted less sustained attention toward targets in the receptive role, but not in the insertive role. Greater feelings of universalizing homonegativity also predicted lower reported feelings of sexual attraction toward non-preferred targets. Results suggest that gynephilic men's attention and sexual attraction toward male sexual targets is influenced by homonegative attitudes and the target's sexual role.
Abstract: Consistent with men's gender-specific patterns of sexual arousal, men tend to look longer at their preferred gender when viewing mixed-sex sexual stimuli. But gynephilic men do attend to males featured in sexual stimuli, and individual differences in negative affect may explain some variability in their sustained attention toward male targets. We explored the influence of homonegativity and affective reactions on visual attention toward sexual stimuli and subsequent feelings of sexual attraction. We sampled gynephilic men in two eye-tracking studies (Study 1: n = 49, Study 2: n = 38) that included measures of universalizing homonegativity, minoritizing homonegativity, and disgust to predict sustained visual attention and reported sexual attraction toward non-preferred targets in still-image and dynamic-video sexual stimuli. Greater feelings of universalizing homonegativity predicted less sustained attention toward solo non-preferred sexual targets. In dynamic stimuli depicting two non-preferred targets engaged in sexual intercourse, greater universalizing homonegativity predicted less sustained attention toward targets in the receptive role, but not in the insertive role. Greater feelings of universalizing homonegativity also predicted lower reported feelings of sexual attraction toward non-preferred targets. Results suggest that gynephilic men's attention and sexual attraction toward male sexual targets is influenced by homonegative attitudes and the target's sexual role.
Does your partner's personality affect your health? Those high in conscientiousness are good for your quality of life; no other partner effects of the Big Five were found
Does your partner's personality affect your health? Actor and partner effects of the Big Five personality traits. Lynn Williams et al. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 149, 15 October 2019, Pages 231-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.06.004
Abstract: The Big Five personality traits are powerful predictors of health and longevity. However, few studies have addressed partner effects of personality on health, whereby the personalities of people close to us affect our health. The current study examined the partner effects of Big Five traits on health behaviours, mood, and quality of life in romantic couples. Here, 182 romantic couples (N = 364 participants; Mage = 35.7 years) completed self-report measures of the Big Five (TIPI), health behaviours (GPHB), mood (DASS-21) and quality of life (WHOQOL-BREF). Data were analysed using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model and showed significant partner effects of conscientiousness on quality of life. No other partner effects of the Big Five were found. These findings suggest that there are specific, focussed associations between health and a romantic partner's personality.
Abstract: The Big Five personality traits are powerful predictors of health and longevity. However, few studies have addressed partner effects of personality on health, whereby the personalities of people close to us affect our health. The current study examined the partner effects of Big Five traits on health behaviours, mood, and quality of life in romantic couples. Here, 182 romantic couples (N = 364 participants; Mage = 35.7 years) completed self-report measures of the Big Five (TIPI), health behaviours (GPHB), mood (DASS-21) and quality of life (WHOQOL-BREF). Data were analysed using the Actor-Partner Interdependence Model and showed significant partner effects of conscientiousness on quality of life. No other partner effects of the Big Five were found. These findings suggest that there are specific, focussed associations between health and a romantic partner's personality.
Wednesday, June 19, 2019
The predictive effects of fear of being single on physical attractiveness and less selective partner selection strategies
The predictive effects of fear of being single on physical attractiveness and less selective partner selection strategies. Stephanie S. Spielmann et al. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, June 19, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407519856701
Abstract: Fear of being single (FOBS) tends to predict settling for less when seeking a romantic partner. The present research sought to examine whether this is due, at least in part, to lower physical attractiveness among those who fear being single. In a photo-rating study (Study 1, N = 122) and a speed-dating study (Study 2, N = 171), participants completed the FOBS Scale, rated perceptions of their own physical attractiveness, and were then rated on physical attractiveness by a team of raters. In Studies 1 and 2, FOBS was not significantly associated with judge-rated physical attractiveness as a bivariate association or in hierarchical regressions accounting for anxious and avoidant attachments, gender, and smiling. There were mixed findings in both studies regarding the association between FOBS and self-rated physical attractiveness in bivariate versus multivariate analyses. However, the tendency of those with stronger FOBS to be less selective during speed dating was not explained by either their judge-rated or their self-rated physical attractiveness.
Keywords: Fear of being single, physical attractiveness, selectivity, speed dating
Abstract: Fear of being single (FOBS) tends to predict settling for less when seeking a romantic partner. The present research sought to examine whether this is due, at least in part, to lower physical attractiveness among those who fear being single. In a photo-rating study (Study 1, N = 122) and a speed-dating study (Study 2, N = 171), participants completed the FOBS Scale, rated perceptions of their own physical attractiveness, and were then rated on physical attractiveness by a team of raters. In Studies 1 and 2, FOBS was not significantly associated with judge-rated physical attractiveness as a bivariate association or in hierarchical regressions accounting for anxious and avoidant attachments, gender, and smiling. There were mixed findings in both studies regarding the association between FOBS and self-rated physical attractiveness in bivariate versus multivariate analyses. However, the tendency of those with stronger FOBS to be less selective during speed dating was not explained by either their judge-rated or their self-rated physical attractiveness.
Keywords: Fear of being single, physical attractiveness, selectivity, speed dating
Retracted Papers Die Hard, see the Diederik Stapel case and the Enduring Influence of Flawed Science: Stapel’s papers are still cited in a favorable way within and outside the psychological literature
Moris Fernandez, Luis, and Miguel A. Vadillo. 2019. “Retracted Papers Die Hard: Diederik Stapel and the Enduring Influence of Flawed Science.” PsyArXiv. June 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/cszpy
Abstract: Self-correction is a defining feature of science. However, science’s ability to correct itself is far from optimal as shown, for instance, by the persistent influence of papers that have been retracted due to faulty methods or research misconduct. In this study, we track citations to the retracted work of Diederik Stapel. These citations provide a powerful indicative of the enduring influence of flawed science, as the (admittedly fabricated) data reported in these retracted papers provide no evidence for or against any hypothesis and this case of fraud was widely known due to the extensive media coverage of the scandal. Our data show that Stapel’s papers are still cited in a favorable way within and without the psychological literature. To ameliorate this problem, we propose that papers should be screened during the review process to monitor citations to retracted papers.
Abstract: Self-correction is a defining feature of science. However, science’s ability to correct itself is far from optimal as shown, for instance, by the persistent influence of papers that have been retracted due to faulty methods or research misconduct. In this study, we track citations to the retracted work of Diederik Stapel. These citations provide a powerful indicative of the enduring influence of flawed science, as the (admittedly fabricated) data reported in these retracted papers provide no evidence for or against any hypothesis and this case of fraud was widely known due to the extensive media coverage of the scandal. Our data show that Stapel’s papers are still cited in a favorable way within and without the psychological literature. To ameliorate this problem, we propose that papers should be screened during the review process to monitor citations to retracted papers.
We say we see a lot of news reports about “Politics”, “Science” and “International,” but the categories “Tragedies and Weird news”’ and “Sport” are by far the most visited
The News We Like Are Not the News We Visit: News Categories Popularity in Usage Data. Zied Ben Houidi et al. Vol 13 No 01 (2019): Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference on Web and Social Media, 2019-07-06. https://www.aaai.org/ojs/index.php/ICWSM/article/view/3212
Abstract: Most of our knowledge about online news consumption comes from survey-based news market reports, partial usage data from a single editor, or what people publicly share on social networks. This paper complements these sources by presenting the first holistic study of visits across online news outlets that a population uses to read news. We monitor the entire network traffic generated by Internet users in four locations in Italy. Together these users generated 80 million visits to 5.4 million news articles in about one year and a half. This unique view allows us to evaluate how usage data complements existing data sources. We find for instance that only 16% of news visits in our datasets came from online social networks. In addition, the popularity of news categories when considering all visits is quite different from the one when considering only news discovered on social media, or visits to a single major news outlet. Interestingly, a substantial mismatch emerges between self-reported news-category preferences (as measured by Reuters Institute in the same year and same country) and their actual popularity in terms of visits in our datasets. In particular, unlike self-reported preferences expressed by users in surveys that put “Politics”, “Science” and “International” as the most appreciated categories, “Tragedies and Weird news”’ and “Sport” are by far the most visited. We discuss two possible causes of this mismatch and conjecture that the most plausible reason is the disassociation that may occur between individuals’ cognitive values and their cue-triggered attraction.
Abstract: Most of our knowledge about online news consumption comes from survey-based news market reports, partial usage data from a single editor, or what people publicly share on social networks. This paper complements these sources by presenting the first holistic study of visits across online news outlets that a population uses to read news. We monitor the entire network traffic generated by Internet users in four locations in Italy. Together these users generated 80 million visits to 5.4 million news articles in about one year and a half. This unique view allows us to evaluate how usage data complements existing data sources. We find for instance that only 16% of news visits in our datasets came from online social networks. In addition, the popularity of news categories when considering all visits is quite different from the one when considering only news discovered on social media, or visits to a single major news outlet. Interestingly, a substantial mismatch emerges between self-reported news-category preferences (as measured by Reuters Institute in the same year and same country) and their actual popularity in terms of visits in our datasets. In particular, unlike self-reported preferences expressed by users in surveys that put “Politics”, “Science” and “International” as the most appreciated categories, “Tragedies and Weird news”’ and “Sport” are by far the most visited. We discuss two possible causes of this mismatch and conjecture that the most plausible reason is the disassociation that may occur between individuals’ cognitive values and their cue-triggered attraction.
Rolf Degen summarizing: Ironically, it may not be the much-trumpeted echo chambers, but exposure to cross-cutting views that increases the spread of misinformation on social media
Explaining the Spread of Misinformation on Social Media: Evidence
fromthe 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. Pablo Barbera. Note prepared
for the APSA Comparative Politics Newsletter, Fall 2018.
http://pablobarbera.com/static/barbera-CP-note.pdf
Abstract: Over the past few years, concerns about the negative societal consequences of the spreadof misinformation have become widespread. While false news and propaganda are far from being a new phenomenon, the emergence and popularization of social networking platforms appear to have increased the prevalence of false news stories and the speed at which they become viral. False rumors and news stories that were spread on social media have been mentioned as one of the reasons for the recent rise of populist candidates in the U.S. and Europe and as fuel inciting violence against ethnic minorities in countries such as Sri Lanka and Myanmar (see e.g. Taub and Fisher, 2018). The same new technology tools that allowed the pro-democracy groups during the Arab Spring to coordinate and start a revolution are now seemingly giving a platform to conspiracy theorists and extremist actors seeking to manipulate the political agenda in their own financial or political interest. However, we still know relatively little about the extent to which false news are indeed widespread on social media and the extent to which they have a causal effect on individual attitude change or offline violence. This short note offers an overview of the existing empirical evidence regarding the prevalence of misinformation on social media sites and different individual- and contextual-level factors that may explain its diffusion.
Abstract: Over the past few years, concerns about the negative societal consequences of the spreadof misinformation have become widespread. While false news and propaganda are far from being a new phenomenon, the emergence and popularization of social networking platforms appear to have increased the prevalence of false news stories and the speed at which they become viral. False rumors and news stories that were spread on social media have been mentioned as one of the reasons for the recent rise of populist candidates in the U.S. and Europe and as fuel inciting violence against ethnic minorities in countries such as Sri Lanka and Myanmar (see e.g. Taub and Fisher, 2018). The same new technology tools that allowed the pro-democracy groups during the Arab Spring to coordinate and start a revolution are now seemingly giving a platform to conspiracy theorists and extremist actors seeking to manipulate the political agenda in their own financial or political interest. However, we still know relatively little about the extent to which false news are indeed widespread on social media and the extent to which they have a causal effect on individual attitude change or offline violence. This short note offers an overview of the existing empirical evidence regarding the prevalence of misinformation on social media sites and different individual- and contextual-level factors that may explain its diffusion.
Men looking at women: The contrapposto pose was perceived as more attractive than the standing pose
Waist-to-Hip Ratio as Supernormal Stimuli: Effect of Contrapposto Pose and Viewing Angle. Farid Pazhoohi. Archives of Sexual Behavior, June 18 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-01486-z
Abstract: In women, the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) is an indicator of attractiveness, health, youthfulness, and reproductive potential. In the current study, we hypothesized that viewing angle and body postures influence the attractiveness of these forms based on the view dependency of WHR stimuli (vdWHR). Using eye tracking, we quantified the number of fixations and dwell time on 3D images of a female avatar in two different poses (standing and contrapposto) from eight viewing angles incrementing in 45 degrees of rotation. A total of 68 heterosexual individuals (25 men and 43 women) participated in the study. Results showed that the contrapposto pose was perceived as more attractive than the standing pose and that lower vdWHR sides of the stimuli attracted more first fixation, total fixations, and dwell time. Overall, the results supported that WHR is view-dependent and vdWHRs lower than optimal WHRs are supernormal stimuli that may generate peak shifts in responding. Results are discussed in terms of the attractiveness of women’s movements (gaits and dance) and augmented artistic presentations.
Abstract: In women, the waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) is an indicator of attractiveness, health, youthfulness, and reproductive potential. In the current study, we hypothesized that viewing angle and body postures influence the attractiveness of these forms based on the view dependency of WHR stimuli (vdWHR). Using eye tracking, we quantified the number of fixations and dwell time on 3D images of a female avatar in two different poses (standing and contrapposto) from eight viewing angles incrementing in 45 degrees of rotation. A total of 68 heterosexual individuals (25 men and 43 women) participated in the study. Results showed that the contrapposto pose was perceived as more attractive than the standing pose and that lower vdWHR sides of the stimuli attracted more first fixation, total fixations, and dwell time. Overall, the results supported that WHR is view-dependent and vdWHRs lower than optimal WHRs are supernormal stimuli that may generate peak shifts in responding. Results are discussed in terms of the attractiveness of women’s movements (gaits and dance) and augmented artistic presentations.
Tuesday, June 18, 2019
How Successful Are Efforts to Maintain Monogamy in Intimate Relationships?
Walk the Line: How Successful Are Efforts to Maintain Monogamy in Intimate Relationships? Brenda H. Lee, Lucia F. O’Sullivan. Archives of Sexual Behavior, June 18 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-018-1376-3
Abstract: Monogamy, typically defined as sexual and romantic exclusivity to one partner, is a near-universal expectation in committed intimate relationships in Western societies. Attractive alternative partners are a common threat to monogamous relationships. However, little is known about how individuals strive to protect their relationships from tempting alternatives, particularly those embedded in one’s social network. The current exploratory study was guided by the Investment Model, which states that satisfaction, investments, and perceived alternatives to a relationship predict commitment, which in turn predicts relationship longevity. The study aimed to identify relationship and extradyadic attraction characteristics associated with monogamy maintenance efforts, specifically relationship commitment, as predicted by the Investment Model. The efficacy of monogamy maintenance efforts was assessed via sexual and emotional infidelity measures at a 2-month follow-up. U.S. adults in heterosexual intimate relationships (N = 287; 50.2% male; M age = 34.5 years; M relationship length = 87 months) were recruited online to complete the survey study. Through structural equation modelling, the Investment Model structure was replicated, and relationship commitment predicted use of relationship-enhancing efforts as well as self-monitoring/derogation efforts. Individuals who experienced reciprocated attraction used significantly more avoidance and self-monitoring/derogation efforts than did those who experienced unreciprocated attraction. Ultimately, monogamy maintenance efforts did not significantly predict success in maintaining monogamy at follow-up. These findings have important research, educational, and clinical implications relating to relationship longevity.
Abstract: Monogamy, typically defined as sexual and romantic exclusivity to one partner, is a near-universal expectation in committed intimate relationships in Western societies. Attractive alternative partners are a common threat to monogamous relationships. However, little is known about how individuals strive to protect their relationships from tempting alternatives, particularly those embedded in one’s social network. The current exploratory study was guided by the Investment Model, which states that satisfaction, investments, and perceived alternatives to a relationship predict commitment, which in turn predicts relationship longevity. The study aimed to identify relationship and extradyadic attraction characteristics associated with monogamy maintenance efforts, specifically relationship commitment, as predicted by the Investment Model. The efficacy of monogamy maintenance efforts was assessed via sexual and emotional infidelity measures at a 2-month follow-up. U.S. adults in heterosexual intimate relationships (N = 287; 50.2% male; M age = 34.5 years; M relationship length = 87 months) were recruited online to complete the survey study. Through structural equation modelling, the Investment Model structure was replicated, and relationship commitment predicted use of relationship-enhancing efforts as well as self-monitoring/derogation efforts. Individuals who experienced reciprocated attraction used significantly more avoidance and self-monitoring/derogation efforts than did those who experienced unreciprocated attraction. Ultimately, monogamy maintenance efforts did not significantly predict success in maintaining monogamy at follow-up. These findings have important research, educational, and clinical implications relating to relationship longevity.
Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching?
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jillian Jacob Jordan, David G. Rand. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching? We propose that reputation concerns shape outrage and punishment even in anonymous interactions, because people employ the heuristic that somebody is usually watching. In anonymous experiments, subjects (n = 8440) are more outraged by selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing money)—such that if somebody were watching, punishment would have greater signaling value. Additionally, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Furthermore, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And moderation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, supporting the role of heuristics: less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969063
https://osf.io/7z8b6
---Final version:
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jordan, Jillian J.,Rand, David G. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 15 , 2019 [Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186
Abstract: Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
Keywords: signaling, third-party punishment, morality, trustworthiness, anger
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186.supp
Abstract: Moralistic punishment signals trustworthiness to observers. But why punish when nobody is watching? We propose that reputation concerns shape outrage and punishment even in anonymous interactions, because people employ the heuristic that somebody is usually watching. In anonymous experiments, subjects (n = 8440) are more outraged by selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing money)—such that if somebody were watching, punishment would have greater signaling value. Additionally, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by decreasing reputation concerns. Furthermore, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (n = 6076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. And moderation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy towards selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, supporting the role of heuristics: less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (n = 3422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2969063
https://osf.io/7z8b6
---Final version:
Signaling when no one is watching: A reputation heuristics account of outrage and punishment in one-shot anonymous interactions. Jordan, Jillian J.,Rand, David G. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 15 , 2019 [Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported online in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology on Jul 22 2019 (see record 2019-43753-001). http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186
Abstract: Moralistic punishment can confer reputation benefits by signaling trustworthiness to observers. However, why do people punish even when nobody is watching? We argue that people often rely on the heuristic that reputation is typically at stake, such that reputation concerns can shape moralistic outrage and punishment even in one-shot anonymous interactions. We then support this account using data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. In anonymous experiments, subjects (total n = 8,440) report more outrage in response to others’ selfishness when they cannot signal their trustworthiness through direct prosociality (sharing with a third party)—such that if the interaction were not anonymous, punishment would have greater signaling value. Furthermore, mediation analyses suggest that sharing opportunities reduce outrage by influencing reputation concerns. Additionally, anonymous experiments measuring costly punishment (total n = 6,076) show the same pattern: subjects punish more when sharing is not possible. Moreover, and importantly, moderation analyses provide some evidence that sharing opportunities do not merely reduce outrage and punishment by inducing empathy toward selfishness or hypocrisy aversion among non-sharers. Finally, we support the specific role of heuristics by investigating individual differences in deliberateness. Less deliberative individuals (who typically rely more on heuristics) are more sensitive to sharing opportunities in our anonymous punishment experiments, but, critically, not in punishment experiments where reputation is at stake (total n = 3,422); and not in our anonymous outrage experiments (where condemning is costless). Together, our results suggest that when nobody is watching, reputation cues nonetheless can shape outrage and—among individuals who rely on heuristics—costly punishment.
Keywords: signaling, third-party punishment, morality, trustworthiness, anger
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000186.supp
Compensating victims of unfairness leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators; even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate
Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation. Indrajeet Patil, Nathan Dhaliwal, Fiery Cushman. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Humans sometimes intervene in moral conflicts between others—so-called “third-party responding”. Sometimes third parties punish perpetrators; other times they provide aid to victims. Across 24 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the different benefits third-parties accrue based on their choice between these two forms of response, as well as third-parties’ understanding of those benefits. We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. Finally, we find that this selective preference for a compensation strategy is limited to fairness violations and does not extend to harm violations. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.
https://psyarxiv.com/c3bsj
https://osf.io/yhbrc
Abstract: Humans sometimes intervene in moral conflicts between others—so-called “third-party responding”. Sometimes third parties punish perpetrators; other times they provide aid to victims. Across 24 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the different benefits third-parties accrue based on their choice between these two forms of response, as well as third-parties’ understanding of those benefits. We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. Finally, we find that this selective preference for a compensation strategy is limited to fairness violations and does not extend to harm violations. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.
https://psyarxiv.com/c3bsj
https://osf.io/yhbrc
Women used more voice messaging, but not more texts, to text relatives, family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more; ment sent voice messaging more to opposite-sex friends
Who is the loudest in the communication jungle? An evolutionary perspective on mobile instant messaging. Dorothea Cosima Adler, Benjamin Philip Lange. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: A world without smartphones and mobile instant messaging (mim) via texting or voice messaging (vm) is unthinkable. While texting has already been investigated (e.g., Sultan, 2014), vm has not. It can be assumed that both channels fulfil different purposes. Taking an evolutionary perspective, sex differences in channel choice, motives, and target groups are assumed. Generally, women should use more mim (especially vm) with only one exception: Men should send more vm to the opposite sex. Two online studies were conducted (Study 1: N=317, 232 f; Study 2: N=307,197 f). Study 1. Women used more mim (d=0.30) and liked texting (d=0.23), and vm more (d=0.22). No sex differences emerged on frequency or length of vm/texts. Study 2. Women used more vm (d=0.26), but not more texts. They texted relatives (d=0.70), family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more (d=0.72) and scored higher on several motives (e.g., intimacy motive in vm, d=0.41). Men sent vm more to opposite-sex friends (d=-0.51; all ps<.05, one-tailed). Our study is the first empirical study that gives insights into sex differences in channel choice of mim from an evolutionary perspective. Further differences (e.g., personality) will be presented at the conference.
Abstract: A world without smartphones and mobile instant messaging (mim) via texting or voice messaging (vm) is unthinkable. While texting has already been investigated (e.g., Sultan, 2014), vm has not. It can be assumed that both channels fulfil different purposes. Taking an evolutionary perspective, sex differences in channel choice, motives, and target groups are assumed. Generally, women should use more mim (especially vm) with only one exception: Men should send more vm to the opposite sex. Two online studies were conducted (Study 1: N=317, 232 f; Study 2: N=307,197 f). Study 1. Women used more mim (d=0.30) and liked texting (d=0.23), and vm more (d=0.22). No sex differences emerged on frequency or length of vm/texts. Study 2. Women used more vm (d=0.26), but not more texts. They texted relatives (d=0.70), family (d=0.34), and same-sex friends more (d=0.72) and scored higher on several motives (e.g., intimacy motive in vm, d=0.41). Men sent vm more to opposite-sex friends (d=-0.51; all ps<.05, one-tailed). Our study is the first empirical study that gives insights into sex differences in channel choice of mim from an evolutionary perspective. Further differences (e.g., personality) will be presented at the conference.
Pathogen disgust sensitivity changes according to the perceived harshness of the environment
Pathogen disgust sensitivity changes according to the perceived harshness of the environment. Carlota Batres, David I Perrett. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Much research has explored behaviours that are linked with disgust sensitivity. Few studies, however, have been devoted to understanding how fixed or variable disgust sensitivity is. We therefore aimed to examine whether disgust sensitivity can change with the environment by repeatedly testing university students whose environment was not changing as well as university student cadets undergoing intensive training at an army camp. We found that an increase in the perceived harshness of the environment was associated with a decrease in pathogen disgust sensitivity. Our results support the idea that disgust sensitivity is malleable depending on the environment. More specifically, we propose that in a harsh environment, where survival may be more difficult, pathogen disgust sensitivity may decrease to allow the consumption of available resources.
Abstract: Much research has explored behaviours that are linked with disgust sensitivity. Few studies, however, have been devoted to understanding how fixed or variable disgust sensitivity is. We therefore aimed to examine whether disgust sensitivity can change with the environment by repeatedly testing university students whose environment was not changing as well as university student cadets undergoing intensive training at an army camp. We found that an increase in the perceived harshness of the environment was associated with a decrease in pathogen disgust sensitivity. Our results support the idea that disgust sensitivity is malleable depending on the environment. More specifically, we propose that in a harsh environment, where survival may be more difficult, pathogen disgust sensitivity may decrease to allow the consumption of available resources.
People prioritize expected growth over expected value
People prioritize expected growth over expected value. Adam Bear, Dorsa Amir, Matthew R. Jordan, Fiery Cushman. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: How should people make decisions? A voluminous literature dating back to Bernoulli suggests that people should maximize expected utility. According to this theory, we should prefer an investment that, at every time step, either grows by 40% or shrinks by 30% to an investment that grows by 10% or shrinks by 5%. But while the former investment offers a higher average return over time, the latter investment is expected to grow over time at a faster rate, as characterized by the geometric mean of its payoffs (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016). Given that this growth rate will largely determine which people or traits survive over evolutionary time, we hypothesized that people’s investment decisions would prioritize this quantity over the more familiar expected value. In a first experiment, we show that people prefer a ‘safe’ investment to its riskier, but higher expected-value, counterpart when this safe investment has a faster growth rate. However, when the riskier investment has a faster growth rate than the safer investment, this pattern reverses: people are more likely to take the risk. These findings provide initial evidence, consistent with evolution, that people may rationally prioritize the long-run growth of a process over simple expected value.
Abstract: How should people make decisions? A voluminous literature dating back to Bernoulli suggests that people should maximize expected utility. According to this theory, we should prefer an investment that, at every time step, either grows by 40% or shrinks by 30% to an investment that grows by 10% or shrinks by 5%. But while the former investment offers a higher average return over time, the latter investment is expected to grow over time at a faster rate, as characterized by the geometric mean of its payoffs (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016). Given that this growth rate will largely determine which people or traits survive over evolutionary time, we hypothesized that people’s investment decisions would prioritize this quantity over the more familiar expected value. In a first experiment, we show that people prefer a ‘safe’ investment to its riskier, but higher expected-value, counterpart when this safe investment has a faster growth rate. However, when the riskier investment has a faster growth rate than the safer investment, this pattern reverses: people are more likely to take the risk. These findings provide initial evidence, consistent with evolution, that people may rationally prioritize the long-run growth of a process over simple expected value.
A functional affordance-management approach to stigma-by-association: Does stigma transfer depend on type of stigma?
A functional affordance-management approach to stigma-by-association: Does stigma transfer depend on type of stigma? Jarrod Bock, Jaimie Arona Krems. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Social psychological descriptions of stigma-by-association suggest that, because we devalue and/or dislike stigmatized people, we will devalue and/or dislike their traditionally non-stigmatized associates. However, functional approaches to stigma imply that people hold qualitatively distinct prejudices—rather than generalized devaluation or dislike—which are underlain by the qualitatively distinct threats that stigmatized people are perceived to afford. For example, whereas we might equally stigmatize them, we may perceive Black men as threats to physical safety and religious fundamentalists as threats to freedoms. We ask: If different stigmas represent different, specific threats, (1) which stigmas are transferred and (2) do all stigmas transfer equally? Across three experiments, participants read one of several vignettes describing an average White male (Brad), Brad and a similar friend (control), or Brad and a stigmatized friend (e.g., African-American male, religious fundamentalist), reporting the extent to which Brad—and/or his friend—evoked various threats and affective reactions. We investigated the prediction that, whereas, (1) the generalized stigma might be transferred to Brad when he has a stigmatized friend, (2) the specific stigmas transferred to Brad—and their affective reactions (e.g., fear, anger)—will vary as a function of the specific threat Brad’s friend is perceived to afford.
Abstract: Social psychological descriptions of stigma-by-association suggest that, because we devalue and/or dislike stigmatized people, we will devalue and/or dislike their traditionally non-stigmatized associates. However, functional approaches to stigma imply that people hold qualitatively distinct prejudices—rather than generalized devaluation or dislike—which are underlain by the qualitatively distinct threats that stigmatized people are perceived to afford. For example, whereas we might equally stigmatize them, we may perceive Black men as threats to physical safety and religious fundamentalists as threats to freedoms. We ask: If different stigmas represent different, specific threats, (1) which stigmas are transferred and (2) do all stigmas transfer equally? Across three experiments, participants read one of several vignettes describing an average White male (Brad), Brad and a similar friend (control), or Brad and a stigmatized friend (e.g., African-American male, religious fundamentalist), reporting the extent to which Brad—and/or his friend—evoked various threats and affective reactions. We investigated the prediction that, whereas, (1) the generalized stigma might be transferred to Brad when he has a stigmatized friend, (2) the specific stigmas transferred to Brad—and their affective reactions (e.g., fear, anger)—will vary as a function of the specific threat Brad’s friend is perceived to afford.
Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users; those significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating
The Dark Side of Tinder: The Dark Triad of Personality as Correlates of Tinder Use. Barış Sevi. Journal of Individual Differences, June 17, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000297
Abstract: Tinder is the leading online dating application. This study (N = 271) explored the Dark Triad personality traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and sociosexuality as correlates of Tinder use. The results revealed that Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users. Also, Tinder users with higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating; however, there was no significant relation with Tinder use and motivation for long-term mating. This finding supports the idea that Tinder can be a new venue for people high on the Dark Triad to pursue their short-term mating strategies.
Keywords: tinder, dark triad, sociosexuality, sexual strategies, online dating
Abstract: Tinder is the leading online dating application. This study (N = 271) explored the Dark Triad personality traits (i.e., Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) and sociosexuality as correlates of Tinder use. The results revealed that Tinder users had higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality, compared to non-users. Also, Tinder users with higher scores on the Dark Triad traits and sociosexuality significantly showed greater motivation to use Tinder for short-term mating; however, there was no significant relation with Tinder use and motivation for long-term mating. This finding supports the idea that Tinder can be a new venue for people high on the Dark Triad to pursue their short-term mating strategies.
Keywords: tinder, dark triad, sociosexuality, sexual strategies, online dating
Monday, June 17, 2019
Political differences in free will are largely explicable through differing desires to blame, rather than reflecting some genuine disagreement about the metaphysics of human freedom
Everett, Jim A. C., Cory J. Clark, Peter Meindl, Jamie B. Luguri, Brian D. Earp, Peter Ditto, Jesse Graham, et al. 2019. “Political Differences in Free Will Are Driven by Differences in Moralization.” PsyArXiv. June 17. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ms8p
Abstract: In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign responsibility. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behaviour (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations of our hypothesis, we show that when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); that when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and that specific perceptions of wrongness mediate the relationship between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). Together, our results suggest political differences in free will are largely explicable through motivated reasoning and differing desires to blame, rather than reflecting some genuine disagreement about the metaphysical nature of human freedom. Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
---
Liberals and conservatives characteristically view the relationship between the
individual and society in different terms. Whereas liberal (i.e. left-wing) ideology has often
focused on the role of social institutions and other external forces in shaping individual
behavior, conservative (i.e. right wing) thinking tends to emphasize the importance of
personal responsibility (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Jost, Nosek, &
Gosling, 2008; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002; Skitka & Tetlock,
1992, 1993). According to the conservative view, individuals should take responsibility for
the course of their own lives and refrain from expecting others to solve their problems. In
addition to being explicitly championed by prominent conservative leaders (Cameron, 2010;
Reagan, 1968; Thatcher, 1981), a focus on personal responsibility seems to pervade the
thinking of everyday conservatives as well (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). Research has shown
that conservatives are more likely than liberals to make dispositional attributions of
responsibility in a number of key areas, including poverty (Zucker & Weiner, 1993),
unemployment (Feather, 1985), obesity (Crandall, 1994), and even intelligence (Skitka et al.,
2002).
In addition to judging that others are more responsible for their actions, recent
research by Carey and Paulhus (2013) has suggested that conservatives also believe that
others have more free will. Political conservatism is not merely associated with thinking that
others are more responsible for their specific actions, but also with thinking that they have
more autonomous control over their behavior in general. Across three studies, Carey and
Paulhus (2013) found that belief in free will was associated with traditional conservative
attitudes as well as with an increased importance attached to the three ‘conservative’ moral
foundations (loyalty, authority, sanctity). Why might this be so?
We suggest that the relationship between political orientation and free will belief
might be parsimoniously explained by motivated social cognition. This hypothesis is derived
from two areas of research. First, recent research has demonstrated that free will beliefs are
motivated by desires to punish others (Clark et al., 2014) and to justify holding them morally
responsible (Clark, Baumeister, & Ditto, 2017), which recently has been replicated and
confirmed in meta-analyses (Clark, Winegard, & Shariff, 2019). Second, political
conservatives have a tendency to moralize a wider scope of actions than their liberal
counterparts (Graham et al., 2013; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011).
Combining these two areas of research, we suggest that conservatives report greater belief in
free will and attribute more free will to people than do liberals because conservatives
recognize a wider spectrum of transgressions for which moral responsibility must be assigned
and moral blame attributed.
Motivated Beliefs in Free Will
What do we mean by “free will?” In this paper, we draw on an understanding of free
will that has both been articulated by philosophers and seems to track the intuitions of laypeople.
In line with previous empirical work in this area, we use the term “free will” to refer
to an autonomous choice of action that a person performs in the absence of substantial
internal and external constraints (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011),
where this ability to choose renders one morally responsible for their actions (Nichols, 2007;
Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Free will, in other words, can be understood as responsibility -
making autonomy. Note that the concept of free will distinct from the concept of attributions
in social psychology (e.g. Skitka et al., 2002; Zucker & Weiner, 1993), and this can broadly
be related to the philosophical distinction between reasons and causes. Attributions are
reasons, and help answer the question of what the reason is for why a person performed a
given action. In social psychology, work on attribution has focused on two main kinds of
reasons: dispositional attributions (the person did it because of the kind of person they are);
and situational attributions (the person did it because of the situation they were placed in). In
contrast, the concept of free will relates to causes, which can partially include reasons but
also ultimate level causal factors (e.g. it was determined by genes). To illustrate: it is
perfectly plausible to say that someone stole something because they are a selfish person (a
dispositional attribution), but that because their selfishness was genetically determined (an
attribution of free will), they did not have free and thus were not personally responsible.
Assuming this definition of free will of responsibility-making autonomy, what would
it mean for belief in free will to be “motivated,” as we suggested? Motivated social cognition
refers to the well-documented tendency for desired conclusions to organize judgment
processes in a top-down fashion that favors evidence for the conclusions people prefer (Ditto,
Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). When reasoning about the world, people often act more like
intuitive lawyers than intuitive scientists, such that their desired beliefs influence their actual
beliefs (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2012). In moral reasoning, desires to
blame and to hold individuals morally responsible compel people to produce rational
explanations that would justify their moral judgments (Alicke, 2000; Clark, Chen, & Ditto,
2015). Indeed, a growing body of research has demonstrated that the desire to hold
individuals morally accountable for their immoral behaviors can lead to motivated judgments
that such immoral behaviors are intended, under the agent’s control, and freely chosen
(Alicke, 1992, 2000; Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011; Clark et al., 2014; Clark, Bauman,
Kamble, & Knowles, 2017; Clark, Winegard, & Baumeister, 2019; Cushman, Knobe, &
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hamlin & Baron, 2014; Knobe, 2003; Knobe & Fraser, 2008;
Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Phillips & Knobe, 2009).
But how might belief in free will, specifically, be seen as a form of motivated social
cognition? Across five studies, Clark et al. (2014) used a range of methods – experimental,
correlational, and archival – to test the hypothesis that a key motivation underlying belief in
human free will is the desire to hold others morally responsible for their behavior. For
example, telling students that a fellow classmate had cheated on a recent exam increased
belief in free will on a standard measure of global free will belief; and countries with higher
homicide rates were also found to express higher levels of free will belief. Clark et al (2014)
concluded that free will belief is not an abstract, invariant phenomenon, but is rather driven,
at least in part, by a motivated desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful
behaviors, the strength of which varies across time and situation.
The focus on wrongful behaviors may have a straightforward explanation. Put simply,
across a broad range of psychological phenomena, “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, p. 1), meaning that people tend to notice, and give
greater weight to, negative actions and outcomes than positive ones. For example, research
has repeatedly shown a praise-blame asymmetry in judgments of intentional action: people
are more inclined to say that a behavior with negative side-effects was performed
intentionally than an identical action with positive side-effects (Knobe, 2003; Pettit & Knobe,
2009). Motivated judgments of others’ behavior are most pronounced in – and perhaps even
driven by – cases in which the behavior is seen as harmful (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, &
Davis, 2008). All else being equal, the desire to blame another for bad behavior is more
potent than the desire to praise another for their good behavior (Clark, Shniderman,
Baumeister, Luguri, & Ditto, 2018). As Baumeister et al. (2001) note, while a general
explanation for this effect is hard to come by given its inherent generality across a broad
range of psychological phenomena, it is likely that a tendency to pay greater attention to bad
actions and outcomes than good ones will have been evolutionarily adaptive because survival
often requires more urgent attention to possible bad outcomes (e.g. a predator behind you)
than possible good outcomes (e.g. a berry bush behind you).
Abstract: In fourteen studies, we tested whether political conservatives’ stronger free will beliefs are driven by stronger and broader tendencies to moralize, and thus a greater motivation to assign responsibility. In Study 1 (meta-analysis of five studies, n = 308,499) we show that conservatives have stronger tendencies to moralize than liberals, even for moralization measures containing zero political content (e.g., moral badness ratings of faces and personality traits). In Study 2, show that conservatives report higher free will belief, and this is mediated by the belief that people should be held morally responsible for their bad behaviour (n = 14,707). In Study 3, we show that political conservatism is associated with higher attributions of free will for specific events. Turning to experimental manipulations of our hypothesis, we show that when conservatives and liberals see an action as equally wrong there is no difference in free will attributions (Study 4); that when conservatives see an action as less wrong than liberals, they attribute less free will (Study 5); and that specific perceptions of wrongness mediate the relationship between political ideology and free will attributions (Study 6a and 6b). Finally, we show that political conservatives and liberals even differentially attribute free will for the same action depending on who performed it (Studies 7a-d). Together, our results suggest political differences in free will are largely explicable through motivated reasoning and differing desires to blame, rather than reflecting some genuine disagreement about the metaphysical nature of human freedom. Higher free will beliefs among conservatives may be explained by conservatives’ tendency to moralize, which strengthens motivation to justify blame with stronger belief in free will and personal accountability.
---
Liberals and conservatives characteristically view the relationship between the
individual and society in different terms. Whereas liberal (i.e. left-wing) ideology has often
focused on the role of social institutions and other external forces in shaping individual
behavior, conservative (i.e. right wing) thinking tends to emphasize the importance of
personal responsibility (Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, & Blanchar, 2012; Jost, Nosek, &
Gosling, 2008; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002; Skitka & Tetlock,
1992, 1993). According to the conservative view, individuals should take responsibility for
the course of their own lives and refrain from expecting others to solve their problems. In
addition to being explicitly championed by prominent conservative leaders (Cameron, 2010;
Reagan, 1968; Thatcher, 1981), a focus on personal responsibility seems to pervade the
thinking of everyday conservatives as well (Carey & Paulhus, 2013). Research has shown
that conservatives are more likely than liberals to make dispositional attributions of
responsibility in a number of key areas, including poverty (Zucker & Weiner, 1993),
unemployment (Feather, 1985), obesity (Crandall, 1994), and even intelligence (Skitka et al.,
2002).
In addition to judging that others are more responsible for their actions, recent
research by Carey and Paulhus (2013) has suggested that conservatives also believe that
others have more free will. Political conservatism is not merely associated with thinking that
others are more responsible for their specific actions, but also with thinking that they have
more autonomous control over their behavior in general. Across three studies, Carey and
Paulhus (2013) found that belief in free will was associated with traditional conservative
attitudes as well as with an increased importance attached to the three ‘conservative’ moral
foundations (loyalty, authority, sanctity). Why might this be so?
We suggest that the relationship between political orientation and free will belief
might be parsimoniously explained by motivated social cognition. This hypothesis is derived
from two areas of research. First, recent research has demonstrated that free will beliefs are
motivated by desires to punish others (Clark et al., 2014) and to justify holding them morally
responsible (Clark, Baumeister, & Ditto, 2017), which recently has been replicated and
confirmed in meta-analyses (Clark, Winegard, & Shariff, 2019). Second, political
conservatives have a tendency to moralize a wider scope of actions than their liberal
counterparts (Graham et al., 2013; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011).
Combining these two areas of research, we suggest that conservatives report greater belief in
free will and attribute more free will to people than do liberals because conservatives
recognize a wider spectrum of transgressions for which moral responsibility must be assigned
and moral blame attributed.
Motivated Beliefs in Free Will
What do we mean by “free will?” In this paper, we draw on an understanding of free
will that has both been articulated by philosophers and seems to track the intuitions of laypeople.
In line with previous empirical work in this area, we use the term “free will” to refer
to an autonomous choice of action that a person performs in the absence of substantial
internal and external constraints (Baumeister & Monroe, 2014; Paulhus & Carey, 2011),
where this ability to choose renders one morally responsible for their actions (Nichols, 2007;
Nichols & Knobe, 2007). Free will, in other words, can be understood as responsibility -
making autonomy. Note that the concept of free will distinct from the concept of attributions
in social psychology (e.g. Skitka et al., 2002; Zucker & Weiner, 1993), and this can broadly
be related to the philosophical distinction between reasons and causes. Attributions are
reasons, and help answer the question of what the reason is for why a person performed a
given action. In social psychology, work on attribution has focused on two main kinds of
reasons: dispositional attributions (the person did it because of the kind of person they are);
and situational attributions (the person did it because of the situation they were placed in). In
contrast, the concept of free will relates to causes, which can partially include reasons but
also ultimate level causal factors (e.g. it was determined by genes). To illustrate: it is
perfectly plausible to say that someone stole something because they are a selfish person (a
dispositional attribution), but that because their selfishness was genetically determined (an
attribution of free will), they did not have free and thus were not personally responsible.
Assuming this definition of free will of responsibility-making autonomy, what would
it mean for belief in free will to be “motivated,” as we suggested? Motivated social cognition
refers to the well-documented tendency for desired conclusions to organize judgment
processes in a top-down fashion that favors evidence for the conclusions people prefer (Ditto,
Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). When reasoning about the world, people often act more like
intuitive lawyers than intuitive scientists, such that their desired beliefs influence their actual
beliefs (Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Haidt, 2001, 2012). In moral reasoning, desires to
blame and to hold individuals morally responsible compel people to produce rational
explanations that would justify their moral judgments (Alicke, 2000; Clark, Chen, & Ditto,
2015). Indeed, a growing body of research has demonstrated that the desire to hold
individuals morally accountable for their immoral behaviors can lead to motivated judgments
that such immoral behaviors are intended, under the agent’s control, and freely chosen
(Alicke, 1992, 2000; Alicke, Rose, & Bloom, 2011; Clark et al., 2014; Clark, Bauman,
Kamble, & Knowles, 2017; Clark, Winegard, & Baumeister, 2019; Cushman, Knobe, &
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hamlin & Baron, 2014; Knobe, 2003; Knobe & Fraser, 2008;
Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006; Phillips & Knobe, 2009).
But how might belief in free will, specifically, be seen as a form of motivated social
cognition? Across five studies, Clark et al. (2014) used a range of methods – experimental,
correlational, and archival – to test the hypothesis that a key motivation underlying belief in
human free will is the desire to hold others morally responsible for their behavior. For
example, telling students that a fellow classmate had cheated on a recent exam increased
belief in free will on a standard measure of global free will belief; and countries with higher
homicide rates were also found to express higher levels of free will belief. Clark et al (2014)
concluded that free will belief is not an abstract, invariant phenomenon, but is rather driven,
at least in part, by a motivated desire to hold others morally responsible for their wrongful
behaviors, the strength of which varies across time and situation.
The focus on wrongful behaviors may have a straightforward explanation. Put simply,
across a broad range of psychological phenomena, “bad is stronger than good” (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001, p. 1), meaning that people tend to notice, and give
greater weight to, negative actions and outcomes than positive ones. For example, research
has repeatedly shown a praise-blame asymmetry in judgments of intentional action: people
are more inclined to say that a behavior with negative side-effects was performed
intentionally than an identical action with positive side-effects (Knobe, 2003; Pettit & Knobe,
2009). Motivated judgments of others’ behavior are most pronounced in – and perhaps even
driven by – cases in which the behavior is seen as harmful (Alicke, Buckingham, Zell, &
Davis, 2008). All else being equal, the desire to blame another for bad behavior is more
potent than the desire to praise another for their good behavior (Clark, Shniderman,
Baumeister, Luguri, & Ditto, 2018). As Baumeister et al. (2001) note, while a general
explanation for this effect is hard to come by given its inherent generality across a broad
range of psychological phenomena, it is likely that a tendency to pay greater attention to bad
actions and outcomes than good ones will have been evolutionarily adaptive because survival
often requires more urgent attention to possible bad outcomes (e.g. a predator behind you)
than possible good outcomes (e.g. a berry bush behind you).
Sexual risk-taking when sexually aroused
Sexual risk-taking when sexually aroused. Courtney L. Crosby, Cindy M. Meston, David M. Buss. Human Behavior and Evolution Society 31st annual meeting. Boston 2019. http://tiny.cc/aa1w6y
Abstract: Sexual arousal is a motivational state that prioritizes mating opportunities and minimizes perceived risks associated with sex. Due to gender asymmetries in evolved sexual psychology, sexual arousal may differentially motivate men and women. Arousal is predicted to motivate men to achieve copulation, whereas women are predicted to remain highly discriminating about sexual partner choice even while aroused. Previous studies show that men are more likely to endorse engaging in morally questionable behaviors and view contraceptives as less important when sexually aroused. However, these underpowered studies have typically only examined arousal in men. We extended previous research by including women and men in a study of experimentally-induced sexual arousal’s effect on perceived willingness to engage in risky sexual behaviors. Preliminary analyses revealed that 1) there was a significant difference in levels of arousal between experimental and control conditions, but no differences in levels of arousal between sex; and 2) that men were more likely to endorse participation in risky sexual behaviors regardless of condition, but sexual arousal did not mediate perceived willingness to engage in these behaviors. Discussion centers on hypothesis refinement and future directions for research on the relationship between sexual arousal and sexual risk-taking.
Abstract: Sexual arousal is a motivational state that prioritizes mating opportunities and minimizes perceived risks associated with sex. Due to gender asymmetries in evolved sexual psychology, sexual arousal may differentially motivate men and women. Arousal is predicted to motivate men to achieve copulation, whereas women are predicted to remain highly discriminating about sexual partner choice even while aroused. Previous studies show that men are more likely to endorse engaging in morally questionable behaviors and view contraceptives as less important when sexually aroused. However, these underpowered studies have typically only examined arousal in men. We extended previous research by including women and men in a study of experimentally-induced sexual arousal’s effect on perceived willingness to engage in risky sexual behaviors. Preliminary analyses revealed that 1) there was a significant difference in levels of arousal between experimental and control conditions, but no differences in levels of arousal between sex; and 2) that men were more likely to endorse participation in risky sexual behaviors regardless of condition, but sexual arousal did not mediate perceived willingness to engage in these behaviors. Discussion centers on hypothesis refinement and future directions for research on the relationship between sexual arousal and sexual risk-taking.
Sunday, June 16, 2019
From 2018: People who are inclined to experience malicious envy make less positive impressions on others, undermine superior’s successes with aggressive strategies, and, ultimately, reach worse wellbeing
Dispositional envy: A conceptual review. Jens Lange, Lisa Blatz, Jan Crusius. January 2018. DOI: 10.4135/9781526451248.n18. In SAGE Handbook of personality and individual differences.Publisher: Sage. Eds: Virgil Zeigler-Hill, Todd Shackelford.
Abstract: We review research on the determinants of dispositional envy and its consequences on the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal level. We propose to extend earlier conceptualizations of envy by distinguishing two forms that constitute emotional pathways in responding to status threats. According to this perspective, benign envy is a reaction to a loss of prestige leading to behaviors directed at re-gaining status. Therefore, people who are inclined to experience benign envy make more positive impressions on others, improve their performance, and, ultimately, reach better well-being. Thus, we argue that dispositional benign envy may contribute to societal flourishing. In contrast, malicious envy is a reaction to dominant others leading to behaviors directing at harming their status. Therefore, people who are inclined to experience malicious envy make less positive impressions on others, undermine superior’s successes with aggressive strategies, and, ultimately, reach worse wellbeing. Thus, we argue that dispositional malicious envy may contribute to societal conflict. In sum, dispositional envy appears to be an important personality variable contributing to the regulation of status hierarchies.
Abstract: We review research on the determinants of dispositional envy and its consequences on the intrapersonal, interpersonal, and societal level. We propose to extend earlier conceptualizations of envy by distinguishing two forms that constitute emotional pathways in responding to status threats. According to this perspective, benign envy is a reaction to a loss of prestige leading to behaviors directed at re-gaining status. Therefore, people who are inclined to experience benign envy make more positive impressions on others, improve their performance, and, ultimately, reach better well-being. Thus, we argue that dispositional benign envy may contribute to societal flourishing. In contrast, malicious envy is a reaction to dominant others leading to behaviors directing at harming their status. Therefore, people who are inclined to experience malicious envy make less positive impressions on others, undermine superior’s successes with aggressive strategies, and, ultimately, reach worse wellbeing. Thus, we argue that dispositional malicious envy may contribute to societal conflict. In sum, dispositional envy appears to be an important personality variable contributing to the regulation of status hierarchies.
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