Reactions to Homosexual, Transgender, and Heterosexual Public Displays of Affection. Ashley E. Buck et al. Journal of Positive Sexuality, Vol. 5, No. 2, October 2019.
http://journalofpositivesexuality.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Reactions-to-Homosexual-Transgender-Heterosexual-Public-Displays-of-Affection-Buck-Lange-Sackett-Edlund.pdf
Abstract: At least two factors may influence reactions to public displays of affection (PDA): personal level of comfort with PDA and attitudes toward sexual minorities. In three studies, we measured participants’ reactions to videotaped heterosexual, homosexual, and transgender PDA. A measure was created to evaluate comfort with PDA. Across all studies, we found that comfort with PDA predicted participant reactions toward PDA. We also found that participants were generally comfortable with viewing all PDA scenarios, but participants were most comfortable viewing heterosexual PDA and least comfortable viewing transgender PDA. Finally, we found that multiple measures of homophobic attitudes predicted reactions to PDA featuring sexual minorities.
Introduction
Support of the legal rights of homosexual couples has been on the rise in North American countries, particularly in Canada and the United States (Doan, Loehr, & Miller, 2015; Morrison, Trinder, & Morrison, 2018). In Canada, gay and lesbian couples cannot be denied the right to adopt a child due to their sexual orientation (Morrison et al., 2018). Partner rights and benefits, such as same-sex marriage, have become legal in the United States, and the majority of U.S. citizens are in favor of gay marriage (60% as of 2015; Doan et al., 2015).
Despite widespread support for the legal rights of homosexual couples, it has been found that many heterosexual individuals do not approve of homosexuals’ “informal rights” (Doan et al., 2015). Engaging in a public display of affection (PDA) is an act that can be categorized under one’s informal rights, meaning acceptance of PDA is an aspect of society that is not controlled through legal means, but rather through social interactions (although it is worth noting that in some countries legal regulations determine the norms surrounding PDA). Homosexual couples are at a higher risk of experiencing prejudice, negative public perception, or fear for one’s personal safety when engaging in PDA compared to heterosexual couples (Doan et al., 2015; Vaquera & Kao, 2005). The present study is an examination of how attitudes toward PDA and attitudes toward individuals of differing sexual orientations influence reactions to viewing PDA.
PDA, using physical affection, such as kissing or hugging, are methods employed in a public space to confirm and maintain relationships (e.g., Doan et al., 2015; Kent & El-Alayli, 2011). Physical affection has been defined as, “any touch intended to arouse feelings of love in the giver and/or the recipient” (Kent & El-Alavli, 2011, p. 150). Seven types of physical affection have been identified, including: “backrubs and massages, caressing and stroking, cuddling and holding, holding hands, hugging, kissing on the lips, and kissing on the face (not lips)” (Kent & El-Alavli, 2011, p. 150). Public displays of affection are considered to be important traits of a satisfying relationship, which is why it is important to consider how homosexual and transgender PDA is perceived by and affected by others (Mohr, Selterman, & Fassinger, 2013).
Public spaces are defined by the rules people follow in the space. If the normal routine of the space is to display affection, people will more readily accept PDA from any gender in that area (Hubbard, 2001). Although societies are not monolithic, a general culture can drastically change what is considered publicly acceptable. People feel more comfortable expressing PDA in countries where friendships and displays of thanks are expressed through PDA, such as in the United Kingdom, while other countries have more conservative attitudes (Anderson, Adams, & Rivers, 2010; Soysal, 2010).
Kisses are common in the public sphere within the United States, which is regarded to be in the middle range of acceptability of public displays of affection (Fox, 1999). Within the United States, attitudes toward the acceptability of PDA vary greatly. Many individuals in the United States condone heterosexual couples holding hands or kissing but discourage making out or sexually touching. In contrast, there are some people who believe all public displays of affection are inappropriate. Anecdotes often emerge demonstrating how small public displays of affection can garner negative reactions. For example, in 2007, a female middle school student in Illinois was given two days of detention for hugging a female friend (Gray, 2007).
Heterosexual couples often engage in small public acts of love in everyday life, but it is less common to see homosexual couples showcase affection through PDA (Hubbard, 2001; Mohr et al., 2013). Homosexual couples have reported that they wish to engage in displays of affection more often, but the couples feel judged when displaying their affection (Lemar & Kite, 1998). In gay couples specifically, relationships that include showing affection are reported to be significantly more satisfying and likely to last compared to gay couples in relationships who do not showcase their affection (Lemar & Kite, 1998).
A prevalent misbelief in the United States is that negative views of homosexuality are tied to age, with the younger generations holding more accepting views than older groups. Olson and DeSouza (2017) found that religiosity and identifying as a political conservative remain the strongest influence on feelings toward sexual minorities, as opposed to age. Many religions condemn same-sex pairings, which influences the attitudes of a religion’s followers (Hubbard, 2001). In highly religious countries, attitudes toward same-sex pairings are negative, and laws are often enacted that force homosexuals to hide their relationships from the authorities or face persecution and legal consequences (Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 2013).
For example, Islam is the federal religion of Malaysia, and homosexuality is outlawed there as a result of the laws of the religion. Homosexuality is considered to be both sinful and punishable by 20 years of imprisonment and caning (Ng, Yee, Subramaniam, Loh & Moreira, 2015). In March 2019, the country of Brunei enacted a penal code based on Shariah law, which includes death by stoning for sex between men and 40 lashes for lesbian sex (Magra, 2019). This act has been met with heavy resistance from other countries and human rights groups.
Previous studies have attempted to determine how perceptions of homosexual PDA are influenced by the viewer’s attitudes toward homosexuality (Kiebel, McFadden, & Herbstrith, 2017; O’Handley, Blair & Hoskin, 2017). Kiebel et al. (2017) asked 45 female and 39 male college students in the United States to view images of gay men kissing, lesbians kissing, or heterosexual couples kissing. Test participants in this study reported little to no prejudice towards homosexuality. However, they found that individuals experienced negative valence and disgust when viewing images of gay men kissing. Images of two females kissing were rated less severely but still elicited feelings of disgust. These subjects found the images of heterosexual couples kissing to be pleasant. O’Handley et al., (2017) examined physiological reactions, implicit (AMP) ratings, and the explicit valence and disgustingness ratings of 465 heterosexual men ages 18 to 45 to images of same-sex or mixed-sex couples kissing or engaged in PDA. They found higher measures of distress (e.g., higher implicit and explicit ratings) when participants viewed men kissing than when they viewed imagery regarded to be universally disgusting (O’Handley et al., 2017). However, these studies found that individuals did not report harboring homosexual attitudes. These studies did not elucidate if these reactions indicated implicit homophobia.
At least two possible factors may guide how people react to PDA of various sexual orientations: (a) people’s general attitudes and feelings toward PDA; and (b) people’s attitudes toward homosexuality and transsexuality (when the couple engaged in PDA is either gay, lesbian, or transgender).
Previous studies have consistently found that men are more explicitly sexually prejudiced than women (Kiebel et al., 2017; Monto & Supinski, 2014). Viewing gay erotica is associated with negative affect, anger-hostility, and feelings of fear in men who have self-reported being sexually prejudiced (Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, & Zeichner, 2001; Parrott, Zeichner, Hoover 2006). Multiple studies have found that even when participants are considered to be non-sexually prejudiced, baseline anger-hostility increases after viewing homosexual erotic videos (Bernat et al., 2001; Hudepohl, Parrott, & Zeichner, 2010). In a study by Bishop (2015), men who viewed romantic and homoerotic images experienced increased negative emotional states. This does not mean that heterosexual women do not harbor prejudice toward homosexuality; women have also been found to experience heightened anger toward viewing same-sex relationships in videos if they self-report being high in gender traditionalism (Parrott & Gallagher, 2008). Men tend to be more discriminatory toward gay men than lesbians, while women are more discriminatory toward lesbians (Kiebel et al., 2017).
Increases in support for the rights of the homosexual community have resulted in homosexual couples expressing PDA (including on television and other forms of media) more openly than they might have in the past (O’Handley et al., 2017). However, sexuality and gender have significant effects on how public displays of affection are received by others (Anderson et al., 2010; Kent & El-Alayli, 2011). Individuals who harbor implicit and explicit feelings of homophobia now encounter more acts of PDA from homosexual couples, which might explain an increasing trend of violence toward homosexual people (O’Handley et al., 2017). As such, it seems logical that a potential influence on one’s attitudes toward PDA is one’s attitude toward gays and lesbians more generally (when the couple engaged in PDA is either gay or lesbian).
Research surrounding attitudes toward sexual minorities has focused more on issues surrounding gay and lesbian individuals than on people who identify as transgender. With higher visibility in the media and public debates on the rights of transgender individuals, conversations have recently been brought to the mainstream related to the inequality and risk of violence transgender people face in society (Mao, Haupert & Smith, 2018). Generally speaking, transgender is an umbrella term to describe individuals who have a disconnect between their biological sex and their gender identity (Meier & Labuski, 2013).
Transgender individuals face stronger negativity and prejudiced attitudes than other sexual minorities (i.e., gay, lesbian, and bisexual people; Norton & Herek, 2018). Negative attitudes toward transgender people have been found to be a function of religious fundamentalism, political conservatism, and authoritarianism in the United States, which is consistent with attitudes toward gay and lesbian people (Norton & Herek, 2018). To date, no studies have appeared to explored attitudes toward PDA involving transgender individuals.
Sunday, October 6, 2019
Women’s Orgasm & Sexual Satisfaction in Committed Sex and Casual Sex: Higher sociosexuality was associated with higher orgasmic function in casual sex, lower sexual satisfaction in committed sex
Women’s Orgasm and Sexual Satisfaction in Committed Sex and Casual Sex: Relationship Between Sociosexuality and Sexual Outcomes in Different Sexual Contexts. Val Wongsomboon, Mary H. Burleson & Gregory D. Webster. The Journal of Sex Research, Oct 4 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2019.1672036
Abstract: Previous studies have found that women report more orgasm and sexual satisfaction from sex in committed relationships than from casual sex. We examined whether sociosexual orientation was associated with these differences, and explored the links between sociosexuality and sexual outcomes in these two sexual relationship contexts. Sexually active women (n = 1,084) completed an online survey measuring sociosexual orientation, orgasmic function, and sexual satisfaction. Participants reported sexual outcomes (orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction) with respect to their sexual activity over the past 12 months in a casual context (if applicable), and separately in a committed context (if applicable). Among women who had both casual and committed sex in the past year, orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction differed between these two relationship contexts only for more sexually restricted women (lower sociosexuality). In the full sample, higher sociosexuality was associated with higher orgasmic function in casual sex and with lower sexual satisfaction in committed sex. These findings underscore the importance of examining interactions between individual differences and contextual factors when studying women’s sexual outcomes.
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Despite considerable study of female sexuality, some aspects of female orgasm and sexual satisfaction remain a mystery. Manywomenwithorwithoutsexualdysfunctionhavetrouble reaching orgasm. Their inability to orgasm, however, cannot be explained by health-related or physiological factors alone (Çayan et al., 2004; Colson, Lemaire, Pinton, Hamidi, & Klein, 2006; Dawood, Kirk, Bailey, Andrews, & Martin, 2005; Meston, Hull, Levin, & Sipski, 2004). In fact, research shows that women’s sexual function and satisfaction are associated with individual differences and interpersonal factors, as well as the relationship contexts in which sex occurs. Specifically, women tend to experience more orgasms or greater sexual satisfaction in committed sex (i.e., sex in committed relationships) versus casual sex (i.e., sex outside committed relationships; Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012; Birnie-Porter & Hunt, 2015). In this study, we refer to this discrepancy in women’s sexual outcomes as the committed-versus-casual sex gap. To better understand this gap, we investigated potential differences in women’s sexual function and satisfaction between these two sexual contexts. We propose that sociosexuality—an individual differencein willingness to have uncommitted sex—is associated with context-dependent sexual outcomes, and by extension, the committed-versus-casual-sex gap in those outcomes.1 Bydefinition, women with higher sociosexuality are more inclined toward casual sexual relations and evaluate casual sex as more positive. Whether they experience a smaller context-dependent gap or greater sexual function and satisfaction in casual sex are open questions.
Despite considerable study of female sexuality, some aspects of female orgasm and sexual satisfaction remain a mystery. Manywomenwithorwithoutsexualdysfunctionhavetrouble reaching orgasm. Their inability to orgasm, however, cannot be explained by health-related or physiological factors alone (Çayan et al., 2004; Colson, Lemaire, Pinton, Hamidi, & Klein, 2006; Dawood, Kirk, Bailey, Andrews, & Martin, 2005; Meston, Hull, Levin, & Sipski, 2004). In fact, research shows that women’s sexual function and satisfaction are associated with individual differences and interpersonal factors, as well as the relationship contexts in which sex occurs. Specifically, women tend to experience more orgasms or greater sexual satisfaction in committed sex (i.e., sex in committed relationships) versus casual sex (i.e., sex outside committed relationships; Armstrong, England, & Fogarty, 2012; Birnie-Porter & Hunt, 2015). In this study, we refer to this discrepancy in women’s sexual outcomes as the committed-versus-casual sex gap. To better understand this gap, we investigated potential differences in women’s sexual function and satisfaction between these two sexual contexts. We propose that sociosexuality—an individual differencein willingness to have uncommitted sex—is associated with context-dependent sexual outcomes, and by extension, the committed-versus-casual-sex gap in those outcomes.1 Bydefinition, women with higher sociosexuality are more inclined toward casual sexual relations and evaluate casual sex as more positive. Whether they experience a smaller context-dependent gap or greater sexual function and satisfaction in casual sex are open questions.
The current study had three aims. The first was to further explore women’s orgasm and sexual satisfaction in committed and casual sexual relationship contexts. The second was to examine whether sociosexual orientation was associated with any committed-versus-casual-sex gap in orgasmic function or sexual satisfaction. The third was to investigate context-related differences in how sociosexuality relates to orgasm and sexual satisfaction.
Sexual Outcomes in Committed and Casual Sexual Relationship Contexts
As noted above, research suggests that women have higher orgasmic function (e.g., satisfaction with their ability to orgasm), sexual satisfaction, or both, in committed (vs. casual) sexual interactions. For example, women engaged to be married reported greater sexual satisfaction than those in casual-dating and friends-with-benefits relationships (Birnie-Porter & Hunt, 2015). Similarly, using a nationwide probability sample, Waite and Joyner (2001) found that women in exclusive long-term relationships reported more emotional satisfaction and physical pleasure from sex compared to those in more casual relationships. Finally, Armstrong et al. (2012) found that college women were less likely to orgasm in hookups than in romantic relationships. Nevertheless, although women often experience more orgasms, greater sexual enjoyment, or both in relationship sex, casual sex is common (50–80% of women in past studies reported hookups or casual-sex experiences; Armstrong et al., 2012; Armstrong & Reissing, 2015; Correa, Castro, Barrada, & Ruiz-Gómez, 2017; Mark, Garcia, & Fisher, 2015; Paul & Hayes, 2002), and many women engage in casual sex specifically to seek physical pleasure (Armstrong & Reissing, 2015; Garcia & Reiber, 2008; Weaver & Herold, 2000). Moreover, not all women experience a discrepancy in orgasm or sexual enjoyment depending on relationship type (Armstrong et al., 2012). Thus, to further document the committed-versus-casual sex gap and better understand characteristics that are associated with its magnitude, we first contrasted women’s self reports of sexual outcomes in “committed, exclusiveromantic relationships” with those in “uncommitted, non-exclusive sexual relationships.” Based on previous research, we expected to find higher orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction for committed sex than for casual sex across our sample.
Sociosexuality, Orgasm, and Sexual Satisfaction in Different Contexts
Because it stands to reason that women who find casual sex more pleasurable and satisfying would be more inclined to have casual sex, we examined the association between sociosexuality and context-related differences in sexual outcomes. Individuals with lower sociosexuality (more restricted sociosexual orientation) prefer sex with love and commitment, whereas those with higher sociosexuality (more unrestricted sociosexual orientation) both desire and approve of having sex without love or commitment, and thus have more casual sex (Penke & Asendorpf, 2008; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). Furthermore, they are more motivated to seek physical pleasure and novel experiences through sexual activity than more restricted women (Meston & Buss, 2007). We hypothesized that more unrestricted women would report a smaller gap in sexual outcomes between committed and casual sexual relationship contexts.
Relatively little research has been conducted regarding the nature of the association between sociosexuality and orgasm or sexual satisfaction in women. Results from studies in this area have suggested that lower sexual satisfaction (Birnie-Porter & Hunt, 2015; Simpson & Gangestad, 1991; Velten & Margraf, 2017) and fewer orgasms (Ellsworth & Bailey, 2013) are weakly linked with higher sociosexuality. However, none of these studies took sexual relationship context into account; two recruited only participants in exclusive or “romantic” relationships (Ellsworth & Bailey, 2013; Velten & Margraf, 2017), and one did not report relationship status (Simpson & Gangestad, 1991). Because research relating sociosexuality and women’s sexual functioning is surprisingly sparse and does not specifically address sexual relationship contexts, we examined whether and how level of sociosexuality is related to sexual outcomes both within committed and within casual sexual relationship contexts. Given that in general, positive evaluations of sexual activity are associated with more sexual desire, satisfaction, and orgasm among women(e.g., Haavio-Mannila & Kontula, 1997; Morton & Gorzalka, 2013), we predicted that sexual outcomes would be positively related to sociosexuality in casual sexual contexts. However, although there is reason to believe that higher sociosexuality could pose a threat to relationship outcomes in a committed context (Simpson, 1987), there remains insufficient information to justify an a priorihypothesis regarding the association between sociosexuality and sexual outcomes in a committed context. Therefore, we did not have an a priori hypothesis regarding the relationship between sociosexuality and sexual outcomes in committed sex.
Orgasmic Function and Sexual Satisfaction
In the present study, we investigated both orgasmic function (e.g., orgasm frequency) and sexual satisfaction because the relationship between orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction in women remains unclear. Some studies of women found that orgasm frequency was positively related to sexual satisfaction (Frederick, Lever, Gillespie, & Garcia, 2017; Klapilová, Brody, Krejčová, Husárová, & Binter, 2015; Kontula & Miettinen, 2016; Young, Denny, Luquis, & Young, 1998), whereas others showed orgasm was unnecessary for sexual satisfaction or pleasure (Bancroft, Long, & McCabe, 2011; Salisbury & Fisher, 2014; Waterman & Chiauzzi, 1982). Because orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction are positively, but not perfectly, correlated in women, and because some women experience sexual satisfaction without orgasm (or vice versa), we examined both physical and psychological sexual outcomes (i.e., orgasmic function and sexual satisfaction). Further, because we sought a richer understanding of women’s orgasmic experience, we assessed orgasm difficulty, satisfaction with ability to orgasm, and confidence in ability to orgasm, in addition to orgasm frequency.
1 We use the term “sexual outcomes” to refer to sexual satisfaction and orgasmic function, as defined in the Method section.
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Saturday, October 5, 2019
“Sorry, I already have a boyfriend”: Masculine honor beliefs and perceptions of women’s use of deceptive rejection behaviors to avert unwanted romantic advances
“Sorry, I already have a boyfriend”: Masculine honor beliefs and perceptions of women’s use of deceptive rejection behaviors to avert unwanted romantic advances. Evelyn Stratmoen, Emilio D. Rivera, Donald A. Saucier. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, August 7, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407519865615
Abstract: We examined the relationships between masculine honor beliefs (MHB) and women’s endorsement of various rejection-related behaviors, as well as both men’s and women’s perceptions of men’s aggressive responses after being romantically rejected by a woman who uses an avoidant/deceptive rejection technique. In Study 1, women with stronger MHB were more likely to endorse their own use of an avoidant/deceptive rejection technique and expressed fewer expectations of men aggressing against them after their overt rejection. In Study 2, men with stronger MHB perceived a woman’s use of deception to reject a man’s unwanted romantic advance as a greater threat to the rejected man’s honor, while women with stronger MHB expressed greater expectations of retaliatory aggression from the rejected man, regardless of the use of deception. These results suggest women who adhere to masculine honor norms may be in a difficult predicament when faced with rejecting men and may choose to mitigate the honor threat to the rejected man by using avoidance/deception to avert his unwanted romantic advance to avoid potential retaliatory aggression.
Keywords: Aggression, avoidant behaviors, masculine honor beliefs, romantic rejection
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Masculine honor beliefs
Masculine honor ideology—cultural norms based on the American Southern culture of honor—dictates expectations for men’s behavior, specifically regarding construction and maintenance of their social status and reputation (i.e., their honor) (e.g., Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Wyatt-Brown, 1982). Due to the herding lifestyle that was predominant in the American South where families’ livelihoods (i.e., livestock) were easily stolen, men were expected to respond aggressively and even violently to threats to protect their livestock, as well as their property and families (Nisbett, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). These aggressive responses not only protected men and their property from current threats, but also helped them develop intimidating reputations, which then deterred future threats. The possibility of men losing their livelihoods coupled with their need to maintain these reputations evolved into masculine honor ideology, where men must respond aggressively to any threat, provocation, or insult to preserve their formidable reputation (i.e., their sense of honor) (e.g., Brown, 2016; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Nisbett, 1993; Vandello & Bosson, 2013).
Men from honor cultures (e.g., American South) compared to men from nonhonor cultures (e.g., American North) respond more aggressively to insults and threats to their honor (e.g., Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012; Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Cohen, Vandello, & Rantilla, 1998; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; Saucier & McManus, 2014; Vandello & Cohen, 2008). This has been demonstrated in a wide variety of studies, including those examining attitudes toward “honorable” violence (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Saucier, Miller, Martens, O’Dea, & Jones, 2018), school mass shootings (Brown, 2016; Brown, Osterman, & Barnes, 2009), and homicide (Nisbett, Polly, & Lang, 1995). Behavioral experiments further indicate men from honor cultures are more likely to respond aggressively (e.g., emotionally, cognitively, behaviorally, and physiologically) when their honor has been threatened through provocation (e.g., physically bumping a man’s shoulder) and insult (e.g., calling him an “asshole”; Cohen et al., 1996).
Recent research has conceptualized adherence to masculine honor ideology as an individual difference in one’s endorsement of MHB, suggesting men and women from nonhonor cultures may also endorse masculine honor ideology (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; Saucier & McManus, 2014; Saucier et al., 2016). Influenced by previous honor research, Saucier et al. (2016) developed the Masculine Honor Beliefs Scale (MHBS) to measure seven facets (e.g., pride in manhood and provocation) representing MHB. MHB explain regional differences in honor-related responses to provocation (see Saucier, Miller, et al., 2018). Furthermore, the MHBS has been used to examine relationships between adherence to MHB and various attitudes and perceptions of social behaviors, such as perceptions of the world being a “competitive jungle” (Saucier, Webster, et al., 2018), men’s motivations for muscularity (Saucier, O’Dea, & Stratmoen, 2017), perceptions of slurs against men’s masculinity as insulting and deserving of retaliatory aggression (Saucier, Till, Miller, O’Dea, & Andres, 2015), expectations for men to physically confront honor threats (O’Dea, Chalman, Castro Bueno, & Saucier, 2018), and negative perceptions of those who do not (O’Dea, Bueno, & Saucier, 2017). MHB are associated with various political attitudes, including greater endorsement of agentic male candidates for President of the U.S. (Martens, Stratmoen, & Saucier, 2018), negative perceptions of football players who knelt during the National Anthem to protest police violence against racial minorities (Stratmoen, Lawless, & Saucier, 2018), and greater support for restrictive national security policies and endorsement of war (Saucier, Webster, et al., 2018). Furthermore, MHB are associated with negative perceptions of rape survivors and increased support for punishment for rapists (Saucier, Strain, Hockett, & McManus, 2015), as well as with perceptions of romantic rejection as threatening men’s honor and consequently expecting increased aggression by men toward women who reject their romantic advances (Stratmoen, Greer, Martens, & Saucier, 2018).
The Myth of the Stupid Believer: The Negative Religiousness–IQ Nexus is Not on General Intelligence (g) and is Likely a Product of the Relations Between IQ and Autism Spectrum
The Myth of the Stupid Believer: The Negative Religiousness–IQ Nexus is Not on General Intelligence (g) and is Likely a Product of the Relations Between IQ and Autism Spectrum. Edward Dutton et al. Journal of Religion and Health, Oct 5 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-019-00926-3
Abstract
Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. It is in the region of − 0.2, according to meta-analyses. The reasons for this relationship are, however, unknown. It has been suggested that higher intelligence leads to greater attraction to science, or that it helps to override evolved cognitive dispositions such as for religiousness. Either way, such explanations assume that the religion–IQ nexus is on general intelligence (g), rather than some subset of specialized cognitive abilities. In other words, they assume it is a Jensen effect. Two large datasets comparing groups with different levels of religiousness show that their IQ differences are not on g and must, therefore, be attributed to specialized abilities. An analysis of the specialized abilities on which the religious and non-religious groups differ reveals no clear pattern. We cautiously suggest that this may be explicable in terms of autism spectrum disorder traits among people with high IQ scores, because such traits are negatively associated with religiousness.
Keywords: Intelligence Jensen effect Religion IQ Autism spectrum disorder
Introduction
Since the 1920s (e.g. Gilkey 1924; Howells 1928), a substantial number of studies have found a weak but consistent negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. Meta-analyses have shown that this relationship is in the region of − 0.2 in the general population, and around − 0.1 among college students (e.g. Zuckerman et al. 2013; Dutton 2014). Similar negative correlations are also found between religiousness and diverse proxies for IQ, such as educational level and income (Meisenberg et al. 2012). The association is greater at the level of countries, with estimates of national average IQ being correlated with national average levels of religiosity at about − 0.6 (Lynn and Vanhanen 2012). The negative religiousness–IQ nexus is found within most countries, with only a small number of exceptions (Meisenberg et al. 2012). The association can be found both among young and elderly samples (Ritchie et al. 2014). The more pronounced in its religiosity a group is, the lower the average IQ its members tend to possess (Lewis et al. 2011; Nyborg 2009), whereas members of high IQ organizations, such as the Royal Society, tend to be overwhelmingly atheist (Larsen and Witham 1998). The evidence for a negative association between religiousness and IQ is thus robust.
The precise causes of this relationship are less clear. Nyborg (2009) argues that people are attracted to different ways of understanding the world based on their ability to deal with complexity. Science is too complex for those with lower intelligence, who therefore resort to the simpler explanations and life-guiding rules that religions typically provide. Dutton (2014) suggests that the elevated reasoning ability entailed by higher intelligence fosters the ability to see through what he regards as the fallacious arguments for the existence of God, and to therefore conclude that there is no God in the absence of supporting evidence. Kanazawa’s (2012) Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis rests on the assumption that our ancestors were most strongly adapted to the ecology of the Savannah. Accordingly, this is our ‘evolutionarily familiar’ environment, because, having spent so long in it, this ecology selected certain evolved modules useful for dealing with the recurrent problems found in that ecology. One set of modules that this ancestral environment selected for might have been those associated with the generation of social behaviors undergirding religiousness. As humans left the Savannah, they began to encounter evolutionarily novel problems that these modules could not solve, and developed higher intelligence that could successfully solve these novel problems. Thus, intelligence became associated with ‘evolutionarily novel preferences’, such as atheism. There are several conceptual and empirical problems with this hypothesis, highlighted by Dutton and van der Linden (2017). One is that evolution continued, and maybe even accelerated, during the Holocene (Cochran and Harpending 2009; Woodley of Menie et al. 2017) which the Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis assumes is not the case. Dutton and van der Linden (2017) proposed the Intelligence Mismatch Association Model. It suggests that one aspect of intelligence is the ability to rise above our evolved cognitive biases, as this allows us to better solve new cognitive problems by being more open to unusual potential solutions. The difference between the original Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis and the Intelligence Mismatch Association model is that the latter applies to any evolved behavioural or cognitive repertoire, thereby avoiding the alleged subjective distinction between ‘evolutionarily novel’ and ‘evolutionarily familiar’ problem content. Dutton and van der Linden’s argument is simply that humans have certain cognitive biases, intelligence is associated with rising above them in order to solve problems more flexibly, and as religious belief is a cognitive bias, intelligence should be negatively associated with it.
However, all these models assume that the negative religion–IQ nexus is predominantly related to general intelligence (g), as they all assume that religious people are less intelligent than atheists. The g factor is likely the construct that best represents the heritable components of intelligence, and hence that which evolution has most strongly acted upon historically in human, and more broadly, primate populations, as indicated by comparative phylogenetic analyses of the evolutionary rates for different cognitive abilities, where there are strong indications that such rates increase in proportion to the loading of these abilities onto a Big-G factor of inter-specific cognitive ability (Fernandes et al. 2014). An IQ test score is typically the sum of several subtests that measure specific cognitive abilities and will therefore include these specific abilities. A proper measure of g should rather ignore the specific abilities, but capture the variance that is common among them. This is achieved by factor analysis, the first unrotated factor of which typically explains 50–60% of the variance among all subtests across a number of individuals. Factor analysis also yields the factor loadings for each subtest, corresponding to the proportion of the common variance between the subtest and g, referred to as its g loading (Jensen 1998). The Jensen effect refers to a situation in which subtest g-loadings positively moderate a given effect size, indicating that g variance is the source of that effect size. Jensen effects manifest as positive correlations between the column vector of the effect sizes associated with each subtest (e.g. the strength of a subtest’s correlation with religiosity) and the column vector of their associated g loadings (Jensen 1998). The present study asks specifically whether the negative religion–IQ nexus is a Jensen effect. Finding that it is not (indeed it is an anti-Jensen effect), it explores possible explanations for the existence of this nexus, leading us to examine the role of autism spectrum traits.
Discussion
We tested the assumption inferred from the theories discussed in the introduction that the relationship between IQ differences between religious groups with different average IQs and their g loadings constitutes a Jensen effect, and may therefore indicate a role for g as a source of positive moderation of the group differences. As it clearly does not, when members of the same ethnic group are compared, evolutionary theories that purport to explain the weak, but robust negative religiousness–IQ nexus become somewhat less convincing. We would have expected, therefore, that a specific pattern of specialized cognitive abilities would have driven the negative religious–IQ nexus. However, contrary to our expectations, the analyses of the subtests differences did not reveal a clear pattern with regard to which specific cognitive abilities may drive the IQ differences between the different groups. In Verhage (1964), the largest differences seemed to occur on vocabulary. In the Steppan (2010) study, the subtest effect sizes showed less variation than in the Verhage study, but the largest effect sizes in the expected direction were found on mental rotation and medical–scientific reasoning. In the Steppan (2010) sample, the presumably more religious group did relatively better on mathematical reasoning.
A possible way of making sense of our findings is through the influence of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). There is a growing body of research on the negative relationship between ASD and religiosity. The evidence indicates, overall, that ASD is negatively associated with religious belief and that empathy is the mediating factor: autism, in part, may actually cause people to be less religious (see the systematic literature review by Dutton et al. 2018). Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) studied discussions by 192 different contributors on an autism website, from which they were able to discern the views on religion held by the contributors. High-functioning autistic (HFA) individuals significantly demonstrated the highest rates of ‘non-belief identities’: Atheism (26%) and Agnosticism (17%). In the neurotypical (NT) group used as non-autistic controls, 17% were atheists and 10% were agnostics. The same authors conducted a survey with a sample of 61 people who self-identified as autistic. They found that those who regarded themselves as atheists scored significantly higher than those who were believers did on the Autism Quotient Scale, an instrument that quantifies the extent of autism. Barnes and Gibson (2013) found that those who had undergone religious experiences had elevated empathy, contrary to those with ASD. Jack et al. (2016) found that ‘moral concern’, which is also conceivably lower in those with ASD, predicted strength of religious belief and was negatively associated with analytic thinking. This implies that low religiousness is predicted by analytic thinking—which those with ASD are particularly adept at. Norenzayan et al. (2012) showed that autism predicted reduced religious belief, based on Canadian and American samples. Importantly, they found that it was the ability to mentalize that mediated the negative relationship between autism and religious belief. Lowicki and Zajenkowski (2016, 2017) and Vonk and Pitzen (2017) note that aspects of ASD—such as low emotional intelligence—are negatively associated with religious belief. Again, these are the aspects of ASD that relate to the ability to develop a sound theory of mind. The only counter-study of which we are aware is Reddish et al. (2016), which did not find any significant difference in religious behaviour or belief between an HFA group and an NT control group. However, this was based on a very small sample of 21 people.
So, all available studies with reasonable sample sizes are consistent with the notion that theory of mind is an important factor in the association between ASD and religious belief. Autistics tend to perceive the world in a mechanistic fashion, as a system. Accordingly, they should not perceive the complexity of the world as the workings of a sentient being, because they are unable to think about or even notice mental states. In this regard, they stand in stark contrast with schizotypal personality. Schizophrenia (a particularly pronounced manifestation of schizotypal personality) is associated with being extremely religious, as well as with belief in the paranormal and in conspiracy theories (see Dutton et al. 2018). This is because schizophrenics are so highly attuned to inferring mental states from external markers that they perceive evidence of mental states even in the world itself; it is as if the world has feelings and meaning; thus, schizophrenics routinely experience the presence of God. There are a variety of models which have attempted to make sense of religious experiences or the feeling that there is a god. Azari et al. (2005) used brain scans to conclude that religious experience is primarily a cognitive phenomenon rather than an emotional one. Religious experience, they concluded, relates to neural processes involved in ‘relational cognitivity’—thinking about relationships. Schjoedt et al. (2009) assessed which areas of the brain were active when participants engaged in informal prayer compared to when wishing to Santa Claus. They found that brain activity during prayer more closely resembled that which occurred while talking to a real person than to an imaginary figure. Religious experience appears to involve the ability to empathize with somebody else. Although it is currently small, the extant brain imaging evidence indicates that religious experience involves brain areas that are associated with mentalizing and relating to other people.
This raises the question of how people with ASD perform in IQ tests. There is no clear direction to these results. A literature review by Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi (2004) reported that some studies have found that those with Asperger’s syndrome—a middle-level ASD—have high-level verbal IQ and but can be deficient on performance IQ. Other studies have revealed that those with pronounced ASD, such as high-functioning autism, show a reversal in this pattern: poor verbal IQ and high mathematical IQ. Consistent with this, Karpinski et al. (2018) have recently presented evidence that highly intelligent people seem to manifest autism traits, in terms of an enhanced tendency to systematize and a diminished ability to empathize (see also Baron-Cohen 2002 and Crespi 2016). Tests of the IQ of HFA persons have found that their scores are high in fluid intelligence, in other words on matrix and similarities reasoning subtests (e.g. Hayashi et al. 2008). Dawson et al. (2007) have shown that HFA persons score strongly on Raven’s (a matrix test) relative to broader IQ test batteries, on average 30 percentile points, and in some cases 70 percentile points higher than they score on the WISC. However, it is not high-functioning autism (HFA) which predicts low religiosity but rather ASD more broadly, and here the IQ profile pattern is much less clear cut. In this regard, a recent study found that possessing genetic risk factors for ASD was associated with logical memory, verbal intelligence and g, meaning it would confer a small advantage in IQ tests even in the absence of greater g (Clarke et al. 2016). So, such an explanation would potentially make sense of the otherwise difficult to explain results which we find. However, more research must be conducted to discover why we did not find any positive moderating effect of g. Our finding that the more religious scored better on Mathematics would seem to be consistent with the results of some studies which have found deficiencies on performance IQ among those with ASD.
It should be cautioned that it is likely that the findings of our analysis only hold for within-population comparisons, where the differences in g might be expected to be relatively small. If we were to make comparisons between populations, such as between Middle Eastern Muslims and European Catholics, it is probable that, in line with Spearman’s hypothesis, the differences would indeed be on g. Moreover, insofar as the groups that are being compared in the present study may not be precisely equal in terms of g, there is room for small group differences in g to attenuate the anti-Jensen effect which we have found. But, naturally, it would be very difficult to find two groups that were precisely equal in terms of g. A second limitation is that our results are not comprehensive. However, there are two substantial datasets and, for this reason, our results are likely to generalize to religious differences in other countries. A third limitation is that the Steppan dataset makes comparisons between regions rather than individuals or groups, which leaves room for anomalies. Finally, it is worth cautioning that our ASD explanation for apparent oddities in our results is paralleled by similar anomalies in terms of the IQ profile of those with normal range IQ who have an ASD ranging all the way up to HFA. This may lead us to question the conceptual validity of ASD, or how accurately we can measure it, something which others have already done (e.g. Lundqvist and Lindner 2017; Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi 2004).
Abstract
Numerous studies have found a negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. It is in the region of − 0.2, according to meta-analyses. The reasons for this relationship are, however, unknown. It has been suggested that higher intelligence leads to greater attraction to science, or that it helps to override evolved cognitive dispositions such as for religiousness. Either way, such explanations assume that the religion–IQ nexus is on general intelligence (g), rather than some subset of specialized cognitive abilities. In other words, they assume it is a Jensen effect. Two large datasets comparing groups with different levels of religiousness show that their IQ differences are not on g and must, therefore, be attributed to specialized abilities. An analysis of the specialized abilities on which the religious and non-religious groups differ reveals no clear pattern. We cautiously suggest that this may be explicable in terms of autism spectrum disorder traits among people with high IQ scores, because such traits are negatively associated with religiousness.
Keywords: Intelligence Jensen effect Religion IQ Autism spectrum disorder
Introduction
Since the 1920s (e.g. Gilkey 1924; Howells 1928), a substantial number of studies have found a weak but consistent negative relationship between religiousness and IQ. Meta-analyses have shown that this relationship is in the region of − 0.2 in the general population, and around − 0.1 among college students (e.g. Zuckerman et al. 2013; Dutton 2014). Similar negative correlations are also found between religiousness and diverse proxies for IQ, such as educational level and income (Meisenberg et al. 2012). The association is greater at the level of countries, with estimates of national average IQ being correlated with national average levels of religiosity at about − 0.6 (Lynn and Vanhanen 2012). The negative religiousness–IQ nexus is found within most countries, with only a small number of exceptions (Meisenberg et al. 2012). The association can be found both among young and elderly samples (Ritchie et al. 2014). The more pronounced in its religiosity a group is, the lower the average IQ its members tend to possess (Lewis et al. 2011; Nyborg 2009), whereas members of high IQ organizations, such as the Royal Society, tend to be overwhelmingly atheist (Larsen and Witham 1998). The evidence for a negative association between religiousness and IQ is thus robust.
The precise causes of this relationship are less clear. Nyborg (2009) argues that people are attracted to different ways of understanding the world based on their ability to deal with complexity. Science is too complex for those with lower intelligence, who therefore resort to the simpler explanations and life-guiding rules that religions typically provide. Dutton (2014) suggests that the elevated reasoning ability entailed by higher intelligence fosters the ability to see through what he regards as the fallacious arguments for the existence of God, and to therefore conclude that there is no God in the absence of supporting evidence. Kanazawa’s (2012) Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis rests on the assumption that our ancestors were most strongly adapted to the ecology of the Savannah. Accordingly, this is our ‘evolutionarily familiar’ environment, because, having spent so long in it, this ecology selected certain evolved modules useful for dealing with the recurrent problems found in that ecology. One set of modules that this ancestral environment selected for might have been those associated with the generation of social behaviors undergirding religiousness. As humans left the Savannah, they began to encounter evolutionarily novel problems that these modules could not solve, and developed higher intelligence that could successfully solve these novel problems. Thus, intelligence became associated with ‘evolutionarily novel preferences’, such as atheism. There are several conceptual and empirical problems with this hypothesis, highlighted by Dutton and van der Linden (2017). One is that evolution continued, and maybe even accelerated, during the Holocene (Cochran and Harpending 2009; Woodley of Menie et al. 2017) which the Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis assumes is not the case. Dutton and van der Linden (2017) proposed the Intelligence Mismatch Association Model. It suggests that one aspect of intelligence is the ability to rise above our evolved cognitive biases, as this allows us to better solve new cognitive problems by being more open to unusual potential solutions. The difference between the original Savanna–IQ Interaction hypothesis and the Intelligence Mismatch Association model is that the latter applies to any evolved behavioural or cognitive repertoire, thereby avoiding the alleged subjective distinction between ‘evolutionarily novel’ and ‘evolutionarily familiar’ problem content. Dutton and van der Linden’s argument is simply that humans have certain cognitive biases, intelligence is associated with rising above them in order to solve problems more flexibly, and as religious belief is a cognitive bias, intelligence should be negatively associated with it.
However, all these models assume that the negative religion–IQ nexus is predominantly related to general intelligence (g), as they all assume that religious people are less intelligent than atheists. The g factor is likely the construct that best represents the heritable components of intelligence, and hence that which evolution has most strongly acted upon historically in human, and more broadly, primate populations, as indicated by comparative phylogenetic analyses of the evolutionary rates for different cognitive abilities, where there are strong indications that such rates increase in proportion to the loading of these abilities onto a Big-G factor of inter-specific cognitive ability (Fernandes et al. 2014). An IQ test score is typically the sum of several subtests that measure specific cognitive abilities and will therefore include these specific abilities. A proper measure of g should rather ignore the specific abilities, but capture the variance that is common among them. This is achieved by factor analysis, the first unrotated factor of which typically explains 50–60% of the variance among all subtests across a number of individuals. Factor analysis also yields the factor loadings for each subtest, corresponding to the proportion of the common variance between the subtest and g, referred to as its g loading (Jensen 1998). The Jensen effect refers to a situation in which subtest g-loadings positively moderate a given effect size, indicating that g variance is the source of that effect size. Jensen effects manifest as positive correlations between the column vector of the effect sizes associated with each subtest (e.g. the strength of a subtest’s correlation with religiosity) and the column vector of their associated g loadings (Jensen 1998). The present study asks specifically whether the negative religion–IQ nexus is a Jensen effect. Finding that it is not (indeed it is an anti-Jensen effect), it explores possible explanations for the existence of this nexus, leading us to examine the role of autism spectrum traits.
Discussion
We tested the assumption inferred from the theories discussed in the introduction that the relationship between IQ differences between religious groups with different average IQs and their g loadings constitutes a Jensen effect, and may therefore indicate a role for g as a source of positive moderation of the group differences. As it clearly does not, when members of the same ethnic group are compared, evolutionary theories that purport to explain the weak, but robust negative religiousness–IQ nexus become somewhat less convincing. We would have expected, therefore, that a specific pattern of specialized cognitive abilities would have driven the negative religious–IQ nexus. However, contrary to our expectations, the analyses of the subtests differences did not reveal a clear pattern with regard to which specific cognitive abilities may drive the IQ differences between the different groups. In Verhage (1964), the largest differences seemed to occur on vocabulary. In the Steppan (2010) study, the subtest effect sizes showed less variation than in the Verhage study, but the largest effect sizes in the expected direction were found on mental rotation and medical–scientific reasoning. In the Steppan (2010) sample, the presumably more religious group did relatively better on mathematical reasoning.
A possible way of making sense of our findings is through the influence of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). There is a growing body of research on the negative relationship between ASD and religiosity. The evidence indicates, overall, that ASD is negatively associated with religious belief and that empathy is the mediating factor: autism, in part, may actually cause people to be less religious (see the systematic literature review by Dutton et al. 2018). Caldwell-Harris et al. (2011) studied discussions by 192 different contributors on an autism website, from which they were able to discern the views on religion held by the contributors. High-functioning autistic (HFA) individuals significantly demonstrated the highest rates of ‘non-belief identities’: Atheism (26%) and Agnosticism (17%). In the neurotypical (NT) group used as non-autistic controls, 17% were atheists and 10% were agnostics. The same authors conducted a survey with a sample of 61 people who self-identified as autistic. They found that those who regarded themselves as atheists scored significantly higher than those who were believers did on the Autism Quotient Scale, an instrument that quantifies the extent of autism. Barnes and Gibson (2013) found that those who had undergone religious experiences had elevated empathy, contrary to those with ASD. Jack et al. (2016) found that ‘moral concern’, which is also conceivably lower in those with ASD, predicted strength of religious belief and was negatively associated with analytic thinking. This implies that low religiousness is predicted by analytic thinking—which those with ASD are particularly adept at. Norenzayan et al. (2012) showed that autism predicted reduced religious belief, based on Canadian and American samples. Importantly, they found that it was the ability to mentalize that mediated the negative relationship between autism and religious belief. Lowicki and Zajenkowski (2016, 2017) and Vonk and Pitzen (2017) note that aspects of ASD—such as low emotional intelligence—are negatively associated with religious belief. Again, these are the aspects of ASD that relate to the ability to develop a sound theory of mind. The only counter-study of which we are aware is Reddish et al. (2016), which did not find any significant difference in religious behaviour or belief between an HFA group and an NT control group. However, this was based on a very small sample of 21 people.
So, all available studies with reasonable sample sizes are consistent with the notion that theory of mind is an important factor in the association between ASD and religious belief. Autistics tend to perceive the world in a mechanistic fashion, as a system. Accordingly, they should not perceive the complexity of the world as the workings of a sentient being, because they are unable to think about or even notice mental states. In this regard, they stand in stark contrast with schizotypal personality. Schizophrenia (a particularly pronounced manifestation of schizotypal personality) is associated with being extremely religious, as well as with belief in the paranormal and in conspiracy theories (see Dutton et al. 2018). This is because schizophrenics are so highly attuned to inferring mental states from external markers that they perceive evidence of mental states even in the world itself; it is as if the world has feelings and meaning; thus, schizophrenics routinely experience the presence of God. There are a variety of models which have attempted to make sense of religious experiences or the feeling that there is a god. Azari et al. (2005) used brain scans to conclude that religious experience is primarily a cognitive phenomenon rather than an emotional one. Religious experience, they concluded, relates to neural processes involved in ‘relational cognitivity’—thinking about relationships. Schjoedt et al. (2009) assessed which areas of the brain were active when participants engaged in informal prayer compared to when wishing to Santa Claus. They found that brain activity during prayer more closely resembled that which occurred while talking to a real person than to an imaginary figure. Religious experience appears to involve the ability to empathize with somebody else. Although it is currently small, the extant brain imaging evidence indicates that religious experience involves brain areas that are associated with mentalizing and relating to other people.
This raises the question of how people with ASD perform in IQ tests. There is no clear direction to these results. A literature review by Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi (2004) reported that some studies have found that those with Asperger’s syndrome—a middle-level ASD—have high-level verbal IQ and but can be deficient on performance IQ. Other studies have revealed that those with pronounced ASD, such as high-functioning autism, show a reversal in this pattern: poor verbal IQ and high mathematical IQ. Consistent with this, Karpinski et al. (2018) have recently presented evidence that highly intelligent people seem to manifest autism traits, in terms of an enhanced tendency to systematize and a diminished ability to empathize (see also Baron-Cohen 2002 and Crespi 2016). Tests of the IQ of HFA persons have found that their scores are high in fluid intelligence, in other words on matrix and similarities reasoning subtests (e.g. Hayashi et al. 2008). Dawson et al. (2007) have shown that HFA persons score strongly on Raven’s (a matrix test) relative to broader IQ test batteries, on average 30 percentile points, and in some cases 70 percentile points higher than they score on the WISC. However, it is not high-functioning autism (HFA) which predicts low religiosity but rather ASD more broadly, and here the IQ profile pattern is much less clear cut. In this regard, a recent study found that possessing genetic risk factors for ASD was associated with logical memory, verbal intelligence and g, meaning it would confer a small advantage in IQ tests even in the absence of greater g (Clarke et al. 2016). So, such an explanation would potentially make sense of the otherwise difficult to explain results which we find. However, more research must be conducted to discover why we did not find any positive moderating effect of g. Our finding that the more religious scored better on Mathematics would seem to be consistent with the results of some studies which have found deficiencies on performance IQ among those with ASD.
It should be cautioned that it is likely that the findings of our analysis only hold for within-population comparisons, where the differences in g might be expected to be relatively small. If we were to make comparisons between populations, such as between Middle Eastern Muslims and European Catholics, it is probable that, in line with Spearman’s hypothesis, the differences would indeed be on g. Moreover, insofar as the groups that are being compared in the present study may not be precisely equal in terms of g, there is room for small group differences in g to attenuate the anti-Jensen effect which we have found. But, naturally, it would be very difficult to find two groups that were precisely equal in terms of g. A second limitation is that our results are not comprehensive. However, there are two substantial datasets and, for this reason, our results are likely to generalize to religious differences in other countries. A third limitation is that the Steppan dataset makes comparisons between regions rather than individuals or groups, which leaves room for anomalies. Finally, it is worth cautioning that our ASD explanation for apparent oddities in our results is paralleled by similar anomalies in terms of the IQ profile of those with normal range IQ who have an ASD ranging all the way up to HFA. This may lead us to question the conceptual validity of ASD, or how accurately we can measure it, something which others have already done (e.g. Lundqvist and Lindner 2017; Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi 2004).
When evaluating faces as potential romantic partners, participants’ preferences focused in attractiveness even when task instructions imply that warmth or status should be of primary importance
From 2018... Facial and self-report questionnaire measures capture different aspects of romantic partner preferences. Jennifer Kay South Palomares and Andrew William Young. British journal of psychology, September 30 2018 https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12347
Abstract: Romantic relationship researchers often use self‐report measures of partner preferences based on verbal questionnaires. These questionnaires show that partner preferences involve an evaluation in terms of underlying factors of vitality–attractiveness, status‐resources, and warmth–trustworthiness. However, when people first encounter a potential partner, they can usually derive a wealth of impressions from their face, and little is known about the relationship between verbal self‐reports and impressions derived from faces. We conducted four studies investigating potential parallels and differences between facial impressions and verbal self‐reports. Study 1 showed that when evaluating highly variable everyday face images in a context that does not require considering them as potential partners, participants can reliably perceive the traits and factors that are related to partner preferences. However, despite being capable of these nuanced evaluations, Study 2 found that when asked to evaluate images of faces as potential romantic partners, participants’ preferences become dominated by attractiveness‐related concerns. Study 3 confirmed this dominance of facial attractiveness using morphed face‐like images. Study 4 showed that attractiveness dominates partner preferences for faces even when task instructions imply that warmth–trustworthiness or status–resources should be of primary importance. In contrast to verbal questionnaire measures of partner preferences, evaluations of faces focus heavily on attractiveness, whereas questionnaire self‐reports tend on average to prioritize warmth–trustworthiness over attractiveness. Evaluations of faces and verbal self‐report measures therefore capture different aspects of partner preferences.
Abstract: Romantic relationship researchers often use self‐report measures of partner preferences based on verbal questionnaires. These questionnaires show that partner preferences involve an evaluation in terms of underlying factors of vitality–attractiveness, status‐resources, and warmth–trustworthiness. However, when people first encounter a potential partner, they can usually derive a wealth of impressions from their face, and little is known about the relationship between verbal self‐reports and impressions derived from faces. We conducted four studies investigating potential parallels and differences between facial impressions and verbal self‐reports. Study 1 showed that when evaluating highly variable everyday face images in a context that does not require considering them as potential partners, participants can reliably perceive the traits and factors that are related to partner preferences. However, despite being capable of these nuanced evaluations, Study 2 found that when asked to evaluate images of faces as potential romantic partners, participants’ preferences become dominated by attractiveness‐related concerns. Study 3 confirmed this dominance of facial attractiveness using morphed face‐like images. Study 4 showed that attractiveness dominates partner preferences for faces even when task instructions imply that warmth–trustworthiness or status–resources should be of primary importance. In contrast to verbal questionnaire measures of partner preferences, evaluations of faces focus heavily on attractiveness, whereas questionnaire self‐reports tend on average to prioritize warmth–trustworthiness over attractiveness. Evaluations of faces and verbal self‐report measures therefore capture different aspects of partner preferences.
The belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s
The Return of the Repressed: The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma. Henry Otgaar et al. Perspectives on Psychological Science, October 4, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691619862306
Abstract: Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.
Keywords: memory wars, repressed memory, repression, false memory, recovered memory, therapy
Abstract: Can purely psychological trauma lead to a complete blockage of autobiographical memories? This long-standing question about the existence of repressed memories has been at the heart of one of the most heated debates in modern psychology. These so-called memory wars originated in the 1990s, and many scholars have assumed that they are over. We demonstrate that this assumption is incorrect and that the controversial issue of repressed memories is alive and well and may even be on the rise. We review converging research and data from legal cases indicating that the topic of repressed memories remains active in clinical, legal, and academic settings. We show that the belief in repressed memories occurs on a nontrivial scale (58%) and appears to have increased among clinical psychologists since the 1990s. We also demonstrate that the scientifically controversial concept of dissociative amnesia, which we argue is a substitute term for memory repression, has gained in popularity. Finally, we review work on the adverse side effects of certain psychotherapeutic techniques, some of which may be linked to the recovery of repressed memories. The memory wars have not vanished. They have continued to endure and contribute to potentially damaging consequences in clinical, legal, and academic contexts.
Keywords: memory wars, repressed memory, repression, false memory, recovered memory, therapy
From 2009... Masturbation in Urban China
From 2009... Masturbation in Urban China. Aniruddha Das, William L. Parish, Edward O. Laumann. Archives of Sexual Behavior, February 2009, Volume 38, Issue 1, pp 108–120. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10508-007-9222-z
Abstract: This study examined the prevalence and sources of masturbatory practice in a nationally representative sample from China completed in the year 2000, with analysis of sources focused on 2,828 urban respondents aged 20–59. In this subpopulation, 13% (95% CI, 10–18) of women and 35% (CI, 26–44) of men reported any masturbation in the preceding year. Prevalence for people in their 20s was higher, and closer to US and European levels, especially for men. Particularly for women, masturbation not only compensated for absent partners but also complemented the high sexual interests of a subset of participants. For both women and men, practicing masturbation appeared to be a two-step process. In the first step, events such as sexual contact in childhood, early puberty, and early sex were related to sexualization and the “gateway event” of adolescent masturbation. In the second step, other factors, such as liberal sexual values and sexual knowledge, further increased the current probability of masturbation. Overall, the results suggest that masturbation is readily adopted even at more modest levels of economic and social development, that masturbation is often more than simply compensatory behavior for regular partnered sex, that masturbatory patterns are heavily influenced by early sexualization, and that a complex model is needed to comprehend masturbatory practice, particularly for women.
Keywords: Masturbation China Sexualization Social influence
---
Perspectives on Masturbation
Much research on the correlates of sexual behavior has advocated multi-causal models subsuming biological and psychosocial factors (Bancroft, 1983, 2002; Hawton, 1987; Kaplan, 1974; Laumann et al., 1994; Lipsith et al., 2003; Riley, 1998; Udry, 1988). A similar broad range of influences has been investigated in studies of masturbation (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002; Laumann et al., 1994).
This broad approach was repeated in the present study and informed the two central questions outlined above.
Relationship to Partnered Sex: Compensatory or Complementary?
At least implicitly, both early (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953) and more recent studies (Lipsithet al.,2003) have viewed sexuality as a result of fixed individual levels of sexual ‘‘drive’’ (Laumann et al., 1994). From this perspective, masturbation appears to be a suboptimal outlet for sexual tension, compensating for the lack of availability of either partnered sex or satisfactory partnered sex (Langstrom & Hanson, 2006). Empirical data suggest thatmasturbationmay not have such a simple inverse relationship to partnered sex (Laumann et al., 1994). Also, in some societies, the relationships may be in flux, an example being the tendency for more recent generations of Western youth to view masturbation not as a second-best solution but as a relatively autonomous sexual act that can coexist with the availability of partnered sex (Dekker & Schmidt, 2002; Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002). If masturbation is compensatory, it can be expected to be more common among those with little access to satisfying partnered sex, e.g., no partnered sex of any kind, stable partner often absent, and unsatisfying sex with a stable partner. If complementary, masturbation would be unrelated to the availability of partnered sex. Moreover, if masturbation has a life of its own, it can be expected to be more common among more highly sexualized individuals, including those with multiple partners in the previous year, those who have more varied sexual practices with their stable partner, and those who report frequent thoughts about sex.
Social Origins
Life Trajectory: As with other sexual behavior, the social origins of masturbation are likely to begin with early sexualizing experiences, whose influences persist into adulthood (Browning & Laumann, 1997, 2003; Laumann, Browning, Rijt, & Gatzeva, 2003). Consistent with recent research in human development (Caspi et al., 2003; Shanahan & Hofer, 2005), ‘‘sexualization’’ is conceived here not as a simple outcome of individual-specific biological traits, but of a complex system of interacting biological and social processes. Kontula and Haavio-Mannila (2002) found that patterns of masturbation set early in the life course became a stable feature of sexual expression in adulthood, indicating perhaps that sexualization tends to become a self-sustaining pattern, an argument consistent, for women, with Kinsey et al.’s (1953) early observations. In the same 2002 study, early initiation into partnered sex (whether conceptualized as an indicator of hormonal levels or of social entrainment in a less inhibited sexual career) was associated with a greater propensity to masturbate in adulthood. Early pubertal development has been found to be correlated with higher levels of sexuality in adulthood (Belsky,Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Moffit, Caspi, Belsky,&Silva,1992),with both differential hormonal levels and different social environments arguably contributing to these patterns (Liao, Missenden, Hallam, & Conway, 2005; Udry, 1988). Though disagreeing on the exact mechanisms involved, studies agree that sexual contact during childhood or adolescence is correlated with an intensification of sexual behaviors in adulthood (Browning & Laumann, 1997, 2003; Laumann et al., 2003). Values/Knowledge: Whether through the direct transmission of ‘‘cultural scenarios’’ of sexual appropriateness (Ellingson, Laumann, Paik, & Mahay,2004) or indirectly by enabling the individual to consume media products carrying globalized or ‘‘modern’’ sexual scripts, higher education arguably increases the propensity to masturbate (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002). The individual’s current sexual values, almost by definition, serve as indicators of internalized cultural scripts or norms defining appropriate sexual behavior, including, potentially, masturbation (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002; Sandfort, Bos, Haavio-Mannila, & Sundet, 1998). Qualitative and small-sample studies in China and Taiwan also indicate the persistence of the belief that excessive ejaculation, and particularly masturbation, causes shenkui, or a loss of virility and energy (So & Cheung, 2005). Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests the recency of ‘‘rediscovery’’ of the clitoris and clitoral orgasms among Western women, an event connected with increased sexual liberalism stemming from the sexual revolution (Angier,2000).Thus, knowledge of the clitoris, apart from indicating greater sexual knowledge, is also arguably a marker of more permissive sexual values.
Controls
Several background characteristics were controlled in the analysis, including region, age, and sexual dysfunctions. Arguably, sociocultural context, as proxied by area of current residence, may affect a person’s understandings and modes of sexuality, whether by embedding him or her in a more sexually permissive peer network or by increasing exposure to globalized or ‘‘Westernized’’ media products. Age can also be important, not only in influencing hormone levels and vitality but also because it indexes differential experiences of cohorts who came of age at different times (Abbott, 2005; Ryder, 1965). Both popular literature and academic studies suggest that masturbation can be a route for women to achieve orgasm and, implicitly, relieve sexual difficulties (e.g., Berman & Berman, 2005; Hite, 1976; Leiblum & Rosen,2000; LoPiccolo & Lobitz,1972; McMullen & Rosen, 1979; Meston, Levin, Sipski, Hull, & Heiman,2004), a mechanism that may potentially apply to men as well.
In addition to these factors, several reflections of low social control were considered, such as drunkenness, smoking, and having had commercial sex over the preceding year. However, these effects failed to reach significance net of the other factors, and were therefore dropped in the final analysis.
Abstract: This study examined the prevalence and sources of masturbatory practice in a nationally representative sample from China completed in the year 2000, with analysis of sources focused on 2,828 urban respondents aged 20–59. In this subpopulation, 13% (95% CI, 10–18) of women and 35% (CI, 26–44) of men reported any masturbation in the preceding year. Prevalence for people in their 20s was higher, and closer to US and European levels, especially for men. Particularly for women, masturbation not only compensated for absent partners but also complemented the high sexual interests of a subset of participants. For both women and men, practicing masturbation appeared to be a two-step process. In the first step, events such as sexual contact in childhood, early puberty, and early sex were related to sexualization and the “gateway event” of adolescent masturbation. In the second step, other factors, such as liberal sexual values and sexual knowledge, further increased the current probability of masturbation. Overall, the results suggest that masturbation is readily adopted even at more modest levels of economic and social development, that masturbation is often more than simply compensatory behavior for regular partnered sex, that masturbatory patterns are heavily influenced by early sexualization, and that a complex model is needed to comprehend masturbatory practice, particularly for women.
Keywords: Masturbation China Sexualization Social influence
---
Perspectives on Masturbation
Much research on the correlates of sexual behavior has advocated multi-causal models subsuming biological and psychosocial factors (Bancroft, 1983, 2002; Hawton, 1987; Kaplan, 1974; Laumann et al., 1994; Lipsith et al., 2003; Riley, 1998; Udry, 1988). A similar broad range of influences has been investigated in studies of masturbation (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002; Laumann et al., 1994).
This broad approach was repeated in the present study and informed the two central questions outlined above.
Relationship to Partnered Sex: Compensatory or Complementary?
At least implicitly, both early (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Martin, & Gebhard, 1953) and more recent studies (Lipsithet al.,2003) have viewed sexuality as a result of fixed individual levels of sexual ‘‘drive’’ (Laumann et al., 1994). From this perspective, masturbation appears to be a suboptimal outlet for sexual tension, compensating for the lack of availability of either partnered sex or satisfactory partnered sex (Langstrom & Hanson, 2006). Empirical data suggest thatmasturbationmay not have such a simple inverse relationship to partnered sex (Laumann et al., 1994). Also, in some societies, the relationships may be in flux, an example being the tendency for more recent generations of Western youth to view masturbation not as a second-best solution but as a relatively autonomous sexual act that can coexist with the availability of partnered sex (Dekker & Schmidt, 2002; Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002). If masturbation is compensatory, it can be expected to be more common among those with little access to satisfying partnered sex, e.g., no partnered sex of any kind, stable partner often absent, and unsatisfying sex with a stable partner. If complementary, masturbation would be unrelated to the availability of partnered sex. Moreover, if masturbation has a life of its own, it can be expected to be more common among more highly sexualized individuals, including those with multiple partners in the previous year, those who have more varied sexual practices with their stable partner, and those who report frequent thoughts about sex.
Social Origins
Life Trajectory: As with other sexual behavior, the social origins of masturbation are likely to begin with early sexualizing experiences, whose influences persist into adulthood (Browning & Laumann, 1997, 2003; Laumann, Browning, Rijt, & Gatzeva, 2003). Consistent with recent research in human development (Caspi et al., 2003; Shanahan & Hofer, 2005), ‘‘sexualization’’ is conceived here not as a simple outcome of individual-specific biological traits, but of a complex system of interacting biological and social processes. Kontula and Haavio-Mannila (2002) found that patterns of masturbation set early in the life course became a stable feature of sexual expression in adulthood, indicating perhaps that sexualization tends to become a self-sustaining pattern, an argument consistent, for women, with Kinsey et al.’s (1953) early observations. In the same 2002 study, early initiation into partnered sex (whether conceptualized as an indicator of hormonal levels or of social entrainment in a less inhibited sexual career) was associated with a greater propensity to masturbate in adulthood. Early pubertal development has been found to be correlated with higher levels of sexuality in adulthood (Belsky,Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Moffit, Caspi, Belsky,&Silva,1992),with both differential hormonal levels and different social environments arguably contributing to these patterns (Liao, Missenden, Hallam, & Conway, 2005; Udry, 1988). Though disagreeing on the exact mechanisms involved, studies agree that sexual contact during childhood or adolescence is correlated with an intensification of sexual behaviors in adulthood (Browning & Laumann, 1997, 2003; Laumann et al., 2003). Values/Knowledge: Whether through the direct transmission of ‘‘cultural scenarios’’ of sexual appropriateness (Ellingson, Laumann, Paik, & Mahay,2004) or indirectly by enabling the individual to consume media products carrying globalized or ‘‘modern’’ sexual scripts, higher education arguably increases the propensity to masturbate (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002). The individual’s current sexual values, almost by definition, serve as indicators of internalized cultural scripts or norms defining appropriate sexual behavior, including, potentially, masturbation (Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 2002; Sandfort, Bos, Haavio-Mannila, & Sundet, 1998). Qualitative and small-sample studies in China and Taiwan also indicate the persistence of the belief that excessive ejaculation, and particularly masturbation, causes shenkui, or a loss of virility and energy (So & Cheung, 2005). Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests the recency of ‘‘rediscovery’’ of the clitoris and clitoral orgasms among Western women, an event connected with increased sexual liberalism stemming from the sexual revolution (Angier,2000).Thus, knowledge of the clitoris, apart from indicating greater sexual knowledge, is also arguably a marker of more permissive sexual values.
Controls
Several background characteristics were controlled in the analysis, including region, age, and sexual dysfunctions. Arguably, sociocultural context, as proxied by area of current residence, may affect a person’s understandings and modes of sexuality, whether by embedding him or her in a more sexually permissive peer network or by increasing exposure to globalized or ‘‘Westernized’’ media products. Age can also be important, not only in influencing hormone levels and vitality but also because it indexes differential experiences of cohorts who came of age at different times (Abbott, 2005; Ryder, 1965). Both popular literature and academic studies suggest that masturbation can be a route for women to achieve orgasm and, implicitly, relieve sexual difficulties (e.g., Berman & Berman, 2005; Hite, 1976; Leiblum & Rosen,2000; LoPiccolo & Lobitz,1972; McMullen & Rosen, 1979; Meston, Levin, Sipski, Hull, & Heiman,2004), a mechanism that may potentially apply to men as well.
In addition to these factors, several reflections of low social control were considered, such as drunkenness, smoking, and having had commercial sex over the preceding year. However, these effects failed to reach significance net of the other factors, and were therefore dropped in the final analysis.
This study examines the extent to which masculine and feminine gender role orientations predict self-reported anomalous experiences, belief, ability and fear
Gender role orientation, thinking style preference and facets of adult paranormality: A mediation analysis. Paul Rogers et al. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 76, November 2019, 102821. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.102821
Highlights
• Stronger femininity directly predicts more intuitive thinking.
• Stronger femininity directly predicts more anomalous experiences and belief.
• Less rational thinking directly predicts more anomalous fear.
• More intuitive thinking mediates several gender role-paranormality relationships.
• Findings are consistent with a gender role account of adult paranormality.
Abstract: This study examines the extent to which masculine and feminine gender role orientations predict self-reported anomalous experiences, belief, ability and fear once relevant correlates including biological sex are controlled for. The extent to which rational versus intuitive thinking style preference mediates these relationships is also examined. Path analysis (n = 332) found heightened femininity directly predicts stronger intuitive preference plus more anomalous experiences, belief and fear with, additionally, intuitive preference mediating several gender role-paranormality relationships. By comparison, heightened masculinity directly predicts both thinking styles plus lower anomalous fear. The latter relationship is also shaped by the nature of mediators with (a) more anomalous experiences and belief associated with more anomalous fear and (b) either heightened rationality else more anomalous ability linked to, conversely, less anomalous fear. The extent to which findings support a gender (or social) role account of adult paranormality, together with methodological limitations and ideas for future research, is discussed.
Keywords: Gender roleParanormalAnomalousIntuitionThinking styleDual process
Highlights
• Stronger femininity directly predicts more intuitive thinking.
• Stronger femininity directly predicts more anomalous experiences and belief.
• Less rational thinking directly predicts more anomalous fear.
• More intuitive thinking mediates several gender role-paranormality relationships.
• Findings are consistent with a gender role account of adult paranormality.
Abstract: This study examines the extent to which masculine and feminine gender role orientations predict self-reported anomalous experiences, belief, ability and fear once relevant correlates including biological sex are controlled for. The extent to which rational versus intuitive thinking style preference mediates these relationships is also examined. Path analysis (n = 332) found heightened femininity directly predicts stronger intuitive preference plus more anomalous experiences, belief and fear with, additionally, intuitive preference mediating several gender role-paranormality relationships. By comparison, heightened masculinity directly predicts both thinking styles plus lower anomalous fear. The latter relationship is also shaped by the nature of mediators with (a) more anomalous experiences and belief associated with more anomalous fear and (b) either heightened rationality else more anomalous ability linked to, conversely, less anomalous fear. The extent to which findings support a gender (or social) role account of adult paranormality, together with methodological limitations and ideas for future research, is discussed.
Keywords: Gender roleParanormalAnomalousIntuitionThinking styleDual process
Non-human females that observed others choosing a male were on average 2.71 times more likely to mate with that male; virgin females were more likely to copy mate choices
Mechanisms of social influence: a meta-analysis of the effects of social information on female mate choice decisions. Blake C. Jones and Emily H. DuVal. Front. Ecol. Evol., 10.3389/fevo.2019.00390
Abstract: Social learning about mate choices is taxonomically widespread, and is a potentially important mechanism of social evolution that may affect the strength of sexual selection in a population. We used a meta-analytic approach to estimate the effect of mate-choice copying on reproductive decisions. We evaluated effect sizes across 103 experiments from 40 studies that experimentally measured female mate-choice copying in non-human animals representing Arachnida, Insecta, Malacostraca, Aves, and Actinoperygii. Our goals were to quantify the magnitude of the effect of this form of social influence, and the extent to which it is modified by observer experience, model age relative to the observer, attractiveness of prospective mates, and testing conditions (laboratory vs. free-living). Across all studies, females that observed others choosing a male were on average 2.71 times more likely to mate with that male, or with a phenotypically similar individual, compared to females with no social information (odds ratio 95% credible interval: 1.60-4.80). After corrected for publication bias, this effect remained significant (corrected odds ratio: 1.92, 95% credible interval 1.13-3.40). We found little evidence for phylogenetic effects in the occurrence of mate-choice copying. Indeed, some studies herein found evidence for mate-choice copying in a broad cross-section of species, while others rejected it in their sister taxa. Social information from observed mate choices of others had a considerably stronger effect on mate-choice in free-living subjects than in captive individuals. Inexperienced (virgin) females were more likely to copy mate choices than were experienced females, but the relative age of the model was unrelated to whether copying occurred. Finally, females were more likely to copy the mate choices of others when social information counteracted the observing female’s personal or genetic mating preference. We note the need for increased taxonomic representation in tests of mate-choice copying, given the robust demonstration of effects in taxa studied to date. Such broader information will provide additional insight to the drivers of the differences identified here in tendency to copy mate choices of others.
Keywords: Sexual selection, Cultural inheritance, Social learning, Mate-choice copying, Biological meta-analysis, Mate choice behaviour, Meta-analytic, Drosophila, Poecilia
Abstract: Social learning about mate choices is taxonomically widespread, and is a potentially important mechanism of social evolution that may affect the strength of sexual selection in a population. We used a meta-analytic approach to estimate the effect of mate-choice copying on reproductive decisions. We evaluated effect sizes across 103 experiments from 40 studies that experimentally measured female mate-choice copying in non-human animals representing Arachnida, Insecta, Malacostraca, Aves, and Actinoperygii. Our goals were to quantify the magnitude of the effect of this form of social influence, and the extent to which it is modified by observer experience, model age relative to the observer, attractiveness of prospective mates, and testing conditions (laboratory vs. free-living). Across all studies, females that observed others choosing a male were on average 2.71 times more likely to mate with that male, or with a phenotypically similar individual, compared to females with no social information (odds ratio 95% credible interval: 1.60-4.80). After corrected for publication bias, this effect remained significant (corrected odds ratio: 1.92, 95% credible interval 1.13-3.40). We found little evidence for phylogenetic effects in the occurrence of mate-choice copying. Indeed, some studies herein found evidence for mate-choice copying in a broad cross-section of species, while others rejected it in their sister taxa. Social information from observed mate choices of others had a considerably stronger effect on mate-choice in free-living subjects than in captive individuals. Inexperienced (virgin) females were more likely to copy mate choices than were experienced females, but the relative age of the model was unrelated to whether copying occurred. Finally, females were more likely to copy the mate choices of others when social information counteracted the observing female’s personal or genetic mating preference. We note the need for increased taxonomic representation in tests of mate-choice copying, given the robust demonstration of effects in taxa studied to date. Such broader information will provide additional insight to the drivers of the differences identified here in tendency to copy mate choices of others.
Keywords: Sexual selection, Cultural inheritance, Social learning, Mate-choice copying, Biological meta-analysis, Mate choice behaviour, Meta-analytic, Drosophila, Poecilia
Current alcohol use is associated cross-sectionally with a favorable multisystem physiologic score known to be associated with better long-term health outcomes
Compared to non-drinkers, individuals who drink alcohol have a more favorable multisystem physiologic risk score as measured by allostatic load. Deena Goldwater, Arun Karlamangla, Sharon Stein Merkin, Teresa Seeman . PLOS September 30, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0223168
Abstract
Aims: Alcohol use is associated with both positive and negative effects on individual cardiovascular risk factors, depending upon which risk factor is assessed. The present analysis uses a summative multisystem index of biologic risk, known as allostatic load (AL), to evaluate whether the overall balance of alcohol-associated positive and negative cardiovascular risk factors may be favorable or unfavorable.
Methods: This analysis included 1255 adults from the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) biomarker substudy. Participants, average age 54.5 (±11) years, were divided into 6 alcohol-use categories based on self-reported drinking habits. Current non-drinkers were classified as lifelong abstainers and former light drinkers, former moderate drinkers, or former heavy drinkers. Current alcohol users were classified as light, moderate, or heavy drinkers. A total AL score was calculated using 24 biomarkers grouped into 7 physiologic systems including cardiovascular, inflammation, glucose metabolism, lipid metabolism, sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. Mixed-effects regression models were fit to determine the relationship between alcohol use categories and AL with controls for covariates that may influence the relationship between alcohol use and AL.
Results: 468 (37.6%) individuals were current non-drinkers while 776 (62.4%) were current drinkers. In adjusted mixed-effects regression models, all 3 groups of current drinkers had significantly lower average AL scores than the lifelong abstainer/former light drinker group (light: -0.23, 95% CI -0.40, -0.07, p < 0.01; moderate: -0.20, 95% CI -0.38, -0.02, p < 0.05; heavy: -0.30, 95% CI -0.57, -0.04, p < 0.05), while the average AL scores of former moderate and former heavy drinkers did not differ from the lifelong abstainer/former light drinker group.
Conclusions: Current alcohol use is associated cross-sectionally with a favorable multisystem physiologic score known to be associated with better long-term health outcomes, providing evidence in support of long-term health benefits related to alcohol consumption.
Abstract
Aims: Alcohol use is associated with both positive and negative effects on individual cardiovascular risk factors, depending upon which risk factor is assessed. The present analysis uses a summative multisystem index of biologic risk, known as allostatic load (AL), to evaluate whether the overall balance of alcohol-associated positive and negative cardiovascular risk factors may be favorable or unfavorable.
Methods: This analysis included 1255 adults from the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) biomarker substudy. Participants, average age 54.5 (±11) years, were divided into 6 alcohol-use categories based on self-reported drinking habits. Current non-drinkers were classified as lifelong abstainers and former light drinkers, former moderate drinkers, or former heavy drinkers. Current alcohol users were classified as light, moderate, or heavy drinkers. A total AL score was calculated using 24 biomarkers grouped into 7 physiologic systems including cardiovascular, inflammation, glucose metabolism, lipid metabolism, sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems, and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis. Mixed-effects regression models were fit to determine the relationship between alcohol use categories and AL with controls for covariates that may influence the relationship between alcohol use and AL.
Results: 468 (37.6%) individuals were current non-drinkers while 776 (62.4%) were current drinkers. In adjusted mixed-effects regression models, all 3 groups of current drinkers had significantly lower average AL scores than the lifelong abstainer/former light drinker group (light: -0.23, 95% CI -0.40, -0.07, p < 0.01; moderate: -0.20, 95% CI -0.38, -0.02, p < 0.05; heavy: -0.30, 95% CI -0.57, -0.04, p < 0.05), while the average AL scores of former moderate and former heavy drinkers did not differ from the lifelong abstainer/former light drinker group.
Conclusions: Current alcohol use is associated cross-sectionally with a favorable multisystem physiologic score known to be associated with better long-term health outcomes, providing evidence in support of long-term health benefits related to alcohol consumption.
Domestic cats are spontaneously attracted by a well-known motion illusion, the Rotating Snake (RS) illusion; big cats in zoos seem also interested in motion illusions
Motion Illusions as Environmental Enrichment for Zoo Animals: A Preliminary Investigation on Lions (Panthera leo). Barbara Regaiolli et al. Front. Psychol., 04 October 2019. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02220
Abstract: Investigating perceptual and cognitive abilities of zoo animals might help to improve their husbandry and enrich their daily life with new stimuli. Developing new environmental enrichment programs and devices is hence necessary to promote species-specific behaviors that need to be maintained in controlled environments. As far as we are aware, no study has ever tested the potential benefits of motion illusions as visual enrichment for zoo animals. Starting from a recent study showing that domestic cats are spontaneously attracted by a well-known motion illusion, the Rotating Snake (RS) illusion, we studied whether this illusion could be used as a visual enrichment for big cats. We observed the spontaneous behavior of three lionesses when three different visual stimuli were placed in their environment: the RS illusion and two control stimuli. The study involved two different periods: the baseline and the RS period, in which the visual stimuli were provided to the lionesses. To assess whether the lionesses were specifically attracted by the RS illusion, we collected data on the number of interactions with the stimuli, as well as on the total time spent interacting with them. To investigate the effect of the illusion on the animals’ welfare, individual and social behaviors were studied, and compared between the two periods. The results showed that two lionesses out of three interacted more with the RS stimulus than with the two control stimuli. The fact that the lionesses seemed to be more inclined to interact with the RS stimulus indirectly suggests the intriguing possibility that they were attracted by the illusory motion. Moreover, behavioral changes between the two periods were reported for one of the lionesses, highlighting a reduction in self-directed behaviors and an increase in attentive behaviors, and suggesting positive welfare implications. Thus, behavioral observations made before and during the presentation of the stimuli showed that our visual enrichment actually provided positive effects in lionesses. These results call for the development of future studies on the use of visual illusions in the enrichment programs of zoo animals.
Abstract: Investigating perceptual and cognitive abilities of zoo animals might help to improve their husbandry and enrich their daily life with new stimuli. Developing new environmental enrichment programs and devices is hence necessary to promote species-specific behaviors that need to be maintained in controlled environments. As far as we are aware, no study has ever tested the potential benefits of motion illusions as visual enrichment for zoo animals. Starting from a recent study showing that domestic cats are spontaneously attracted by a well-known motion illusion, the Rotating Snake (RS) illusion, we studied whether this illusion could be used as a visual enrichment for big cats. We observed the spontaneous behavior of three lionesses when three different visual stimuli were placed in their environment: the RS illusion and two control stimuli. The study involved two different periods: the baseline and the RS period, in which the visual stimuli were provided to the lionesses. To assess whether the lionesses were specifically attracted by the RS illusion, we collected data on the number of interactions with the stimuli, as well as on the total time spent interacting with them. To investigate the effect of the illusion on the animals’ welfare, individual and social behaviors were studied, and compared between the two periods. The results showed that two lionesses out of three interacted more with the RS stimulus than with the two control stimuli. The fact that the lionesses seemed to be more inclined to interact with the RS stimulus indirectly suggests the intriguing possibility that they were attracted by the illusory motion. Moreover, behavioral changes between the two periods were reported for one of the lionesses, highlighting a reduction in self-directed behaviors and an increase in attentive behaviors, and suggesting positive welfare implications. Thus, behavioral observations made before and during the presentation of the stimuli showed that our visual enrichment actually provided positive effects in lionesses. These results call for the development of future studies on the use of visual illusions in the enrichment programs of zoo animals.
Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (necessary for normal emotion) allocate more lenient third-party punishment to criminals who commit emotionally-evocative, violent crimes
Soft on crime: Patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage allocate reduced third-party punishment to violent criminals. Erik W. Asp et al. Cortex, Volume 119, October 2019, Pages 33-45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2019.03.024
Abstract: The human impulse to punish those who have unjustly harmed others (i.e., third-party punishment) is critical for stable, cooperative societies. Punishment selection is influenced by both harm outcome and the intent of the moral agent (i.e., the offender's knowledge of wrongdoing and desire that the prohibited consequence occur). We allocate severe punishments to those who commit violent crimes and milder punishments to those who commit non-violent crimes; and we allocate severe punishments to criminals who have malicious intent and milder punishments to criminals who lack malicious intent. Prior research has indicated that aversive, emotional responses of third-party judges may influence punishment allocation, as increased negative emotion correlates with more punitive punishments. Here, we show that patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; a region necessary for the normal generation of emotion), compared to other neurological patients and healthy adult participants, allocate more lenient third-party punishment to criminals who commit emotionally-evocative, violent crimes. By contrast, patients with vmPFC damage did not differ from comparison participants on punishment allocation for non-emotional, non-violent crimes. These results demonstrate the necessity of the vmPFC for the integration of emotion into third-party punishment decisions, and indicate that negative emotion influences third-party punishment allocation particularly for scenarios involving physical harm to another.
Keywords: Moral judgmentPrefrontal cortexHarmThird-party punishmentSocial cognition
Abstract: The human impulse to punish those who have unjustly harmed others (i.e., third-party punishment) is critical for stable, cooperative societies. Punishment selection is influenced by both harm outcome and the intent of the moral agent (i.e., the offender's knowledge of wrongdoing and desire that the prohibited consequence occur). We allocate severe punishments to those who commit violent crimes and milder punishments to those who commit non-violent crimes; and we allocate severe punishments to criminals who have malicious intent and milder punishments to criminals who lack malicious intent. Prior research has indicated that aversive, emotional responses of third-party judges may influence punishment allocation, as increased negative emotion correlates with more punitive punishments. Here, we show that patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; a region necessary for the normal generation of emotion), compared to other neurological patients and healthy adult participants, allocate more lenient third-party punishment to criminals who commit emotionally-evocative, violent crimes. By contrast, patients with vmPFC damage did not differ from comparison participants on punishment allocation for non-emotional, non-violent crimes. These results demonstrate the necessity of the vmPFC for the integration of emotion into third-party punishment decisions, and indicate that negative emotion influences third-party punishment allocation particularly for scenarios involving physical harm to another.
Keywords: Moral judgmentPrefrontal cortexHarmThird-party punishmentSocial cognition
We identified the “walkability” of a city, how easy it is to get things done without a car, as a key factor in determining the upward social mobility of its residents
Oishi, S., Koo, M., & Buttrick, N. R. (2019). The socioecological psychology of upward social mobility. American Psychologist, Oct 2019, 74(7), 751-763. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000422
Abstract: Intergenerational upward economic mobility—the opportunity for children from poorer households to pull themselves up the economic ladder in adulthood—is a hallmark of a just society. In the United States, there are large regional differences in upward social mobility. The present research examined why it is easier to get ahead in some cities and harder in others. We identified the “walkability” of a city, how easy it is to get things done without a car, as a key factor in determining the upward social mobility of its residents. We 1st identified the relationship between walkability and upward mobility using tax data from approximately 10 million Americans born between 1980 and 1982. We found that this relationship is linked to both economic and psychological factors. Using data from the American Community Survey from over 3.66 million Americans, we showed that residents of walkable cities are less reliant on car ownership for employment and wages, significantly reducing 1 barrier to upward mobility. Additionally, in 2 studies, including 1 preregistered study (1,827 Americans; 1,466 Koreans), we found that people living in more walkable neighborhoods felt a greater sense of belonging to their communities, which is associated with actual changes in individual social class.
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Chetty et al. (2014) proposed five factors to explain these regional differences: the area’s racial makeup, the level of income inequality, the quality of the K–12 school system, the strength of social capital (measured by voter turnout, the percentage of people who returned their census forms, and various measures of community participation), and the percentage of children living in homes with single parents. These five factors account for a substantial amount of regional variations in upward mobility.
Chetty et al. (2014) proposed five factors to explain these regional differences: the area’s racial makeup, the level of income inequality, the quality of the K–12 school system, the strength of social capital (measured by voter turnout, the percentage of people who returned their census forms, and various measures of community participation), and the percentage of children living in homes with single parents. These five factors account for a substantial amount of regional variations in upward mobility.
In this article, we identify a new predictor of economic mobility: the way in which cities are organized. We propose that the walkability of one’s area is an important predictor of intergenerational upward mobility. We define walkability as how easily people can live their lives on foot or using public transportation—in highly walkable areas, people can go to work, for example, or to their local grocery store without needing a car. In contrast, in less walkable areas, cars are needed for practically every task. In urban planning, geography, and transportation research, walkability is typically measured by physical characteristics such as intersection density and street connectivity, as well as land use (e.g., mixed residential and commercial use) and dwelling density (see Frank et al., 2006). Walkability is associated with urban vibrancy and recreational opportunities (Forsyth, 2015), and walkable cities tend to have better public transportation than do less walkable cities.
Limitations and Future Directions
We would like to point out several limitations of the current research. The primary limitation is a function of our analytical approach: Because the current analyses are based on correlational data, there is the possibility that unmeasured third variables account for the link between walkability and upward mobility, and thus we cannot make causal claims. In a similar vein, we cannot conclusively demonstrate chains of causality. In Study 3, for example, though we did not find any evidence for the mediational role of upward social mobility in explaining links between walkability and a sense of belonging, it is possible that both walkability and upward social mobility induce a sense of belonging, and our findings could be driven by this alternative specification. Because we could not manipulate either walkability or a sense of belonging, we could not fully disambiguate these two accounts. In Studies 2-4, there is a possibility of selection bias in that people who like to walk chose to live in walkable cities or neighborhoods and vice versa. Study 1 does not have this problem, because children are unlikely to be able to choose where to live during their childhood. In Study 1, the city in which the participants grew up, although not randomly assigned, is not an endogenous variable, and the selection bias in Study 1 is not a major concern. Nevertheless, it is important to explore whether there is a causal effect of living in a walkable city in the future.
Second, our analyses treat walkability and access to public transportation as interchangeable. Although they are strongly correlated, it is likely that each has its own separate impact on upward mobility. For instance, Lachapelle, Frank, Saelens, Sallis, and Conway (2011) found that even within equally walkable neighborhoods, individuals who used public transportation to commute had more moderateintensity physical activity than did those who drove (see also Saelens, Vernez Moudon, Kang, Hurvitz, & Zhou, 2014). The availability and use of public transportation thus could have an independent effect on an individual’s upward social mobility. As measures of public transit availability become more comprehensive (as of now, there are far more cities with Walk Scores than Public Transit scores available at www.walkscore.com), future work disentangling the two factors will be important for guiding policy recommendations.
Third, Studies 3 and 4 relied on self-reported walkability, whereas other researchers interested in walkability have used more objective measures based on geographic information systems (Todd et al., 2016). As Studies 3 and 4 found, it is related to self-reported frequency of walking. However, because walkability is a multidimensional construct—ranging from purely physical aspects such as intersection density and connectivity to the presence of sidewalks; to proximity to restaurants, banks, and other amenities; to recreational opportunities (Forsyth, 2015)— different aspects of walkability may affect different paths to upward social mobility. In addition to the hardscape (built environment) and accessibility of amenities that is captured in the Walk Score measure used in Studies 1 and 2 and that may have a more direct effect on the link between car ownership and employment, the softscape of a neighborhood, such as its green spaces and lighting, also affect perceptions of an area’s walkability (Hajna, Dasgupta, Halparin, & Ross, 2013) and may have a more direct effect on a sense of belonging. Our current analyses, based as they are on either the hardscape-limited Walk Score or global individual perceptions of walkability, cannot disentangle all these distinct aspects of walkability, and future studies with more focused definitions of walkability, or which manipulate perceptions of walkability even without changing the hardscape, will be useful, especially when it comes to policy recommendations.
Fourth, whereas we found a robust association between walkability and upward social mobility in the city-level analyses of Study 1, we did not observe the direct association in the individual-level analyses of Studies 3 and 4. It may be that walkability is an emergent property most clearly visible at the level of aggregate, not at the level of each individual. This seeming paradox can be illustrated with a reference to epidemiology. Studies clearly indicate, for example, a strong association between air quality and prevalence of lung cancer when examined at the level of a city or county (e.g., Hemminki & Pershagen, 1994), yet when examined at the level of individuals, the association is null or nonsignificant (e.g., Beelen et al., 2008). This is in part because lung cancer is rare. When examined at the level of a city, cancer prevalence could range from 0% to even more than 10%, with gradation in each level. When observed at the level of individuals, however, most of them do not have cancer, and therefore the effect of air quality is hard to discern. Similarly, the rate of lower SES children’s moving up the economic ladder ranges from 5%–13% between cities, and so when examined at the level of individuals, those who moved up the ladder in adulthood are small in number.
Finally, in an effort to test generalizability, we conducted Study 4 in South Korea. Although we assumed that a sense of belonging would be measured more or less equivalently between the United States and Korea, this assumption must be tested rigorously in the future using sophisticated techniques such as item response theory (e.g., Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993).
Societal progress is often measured by whether the life of the current generation has gotten better than that of the previous generations, with intergenerational upward economic mobility as a critical indicator of the fairness of a society. We found that the walkability of a city is an important predictor of upward social mobility and that this might be due in part to the fact that in walkable cities residents can get access to employment without owning a car and due in part to more walking and a greater sense of belonging, which we showed have real-world relationships with individual upward mobility. We found walking effects (but not perceived walkability effects) cross-nationally and cross-culturally, both in the individualistic United States and in the more collectivist Korea, implying that the link between walking, sense of belonging, and upward social mobility may be widespread and robust. It is not easy to add sidewalks or make public roads more walkable by adding more intersections and crossings. Adding additional bus lines or putting in new train lines is also not cheap (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, & Speck, 2000; Speck, 2012). However, these might be wise societal investments if, as our results suggest, they may help rebuild the fading American dream.
Limitations and Future Directions
We would like to point out several limitations of the current research. The primary limitation is a function of our analytical approach: Because the current analyses are based on correlational data, there is the possibility that unmeasured third variables account for the link between walkability and upward mobility, and thus we cannot make causal claims. In a similar vein, we cannot conclusively demonstrate chains of causality. In Study 3, for example, though we did not find any evidence for the mediational role of upward social mobility in explaining links between walkability and a sense of belonging, it is possible that both walkability and upward social mobility induce a sense of belonging, and our findings could be driven by this alternative specification. Because we could not manipulate either walkability or a sense of belonging, we could not fully disambiguate these two accounts. In Studies 2-4, there is a possibility of selection bias in that people who like to walk chose to live in walkable cities or neighborhoods and vice versa. Study 1 does not have this problem, because children are unlikely to be able to choose where to live during their childhood. In Study 1, the city in which the participants grew up, although not randomly assigned, is not an endogenous variable, and the selection bias in Study 1 is not a major concern. Nevertheless, it is important to explore whether there is a causal effect of living in a walkable city in the future.
Second, our analyses treat walkability and access to public transportation as interchangeable. Although they are strongly correlated, it is likely that each has its own separate impact on upward mobility. For instance, Lachapelle, Frank, Saelens, Sallis, and Conway (2011) found that even within equally walkable neighborhoods, individuals who used public transportation to commute had more moderateintensity physical activity than did those who drove (see also Saelens, Vernez Moudon, Kang, Hurvitz, & Zhou, 2014). The availability and use of public transportation thus could have an independent effect on an individual’s upward social mobility. As measures of public transit availability become more comprehensive (as of now, there are far more cities with Walk Scores than Public Transit scores available at www.walkscore.com), future work disentangling the two factors will be important for guiding policy recommendations.
Third, Studies 3 and 4 relied on self-reported walkability, whereas other researchers interested in walkability have used more objective measures based on geographic information systems (Todd et al., 2016). As Studies 3 and 4 found, it is related to self-reported frequency of walking. However, because walkability is a multidimensional construct—ranging from purely physical aspects such as intersection density and connectivity to the presence of sidewalks; to proximity to restaurants, banks, and other amenities; to recreational opportunities (Forsyth, 2015)— different aspects of walkability may affect different paths to upward social mobility. In addition to the hardscape (built environment) and accessibility of amenities that is captured in the Walk Score measure used in Studies 1 and 2 and that may have a more direct effect on the link between car ownership and employment, the softscape of a neighborhood, such as its green spaces and lighting, also affect perceptions of an area’s walkability (Hajna, Dasgupta, Halparin, & Ross, 2013) and may have a more direct effect on a sense of belonging. Our current analyses, based as they are on either the hardscape-limited Walk Score or global individual perceptions of walkability, cannot disentangle all these distinct aspects of walkability, and future studies with more focused definitions of walkability, or which manipulate perceptions of walkability even without changing the hardscape, will be useful, especially when it comes to policy recommendations.
Fourth, whereas we found a robust association between walkability and upward social mobility in the city-level analyses of Study 1, we did not observe the direct association in the individual-level analyses of Studies 3 and 4. It may be that walkability is an emergent property most clearly visible at the level of aggregate, not at the level of each individual. This seeming paradox can be illustrated with a reference to epidemiology. Studies clearly indicate, for example, a strong association between air quality and prevalence of lung cancer when examined at the level of a city or county (e.g., Hemminki & Pershagen, 1994), yet when examined at the level of individuals, the association is null or nonsignificant (e.g., Beelen et al., 2008). This is in part because lung cancer is rare. When examined at the level of a city, cancer prevalence could range from 0% to even more than 10%, with gradation in each level. When observed at the level of individuals, however, most of them do not have cancer, and therefore the effect of air quality is hard to discern. Similarly, the rate of lower SES children’s moving up the economic ladder ranges from 5%–13% between cities, and so when examined at the level of individuals, those who moved up the ladder in adulthood are small in number.
Finally, in an effort to test generalizability, we conducted Study 4 in South Korea. Although we assumed that a sense of belonging would be measured more or less equivalently between the United States and Korea, this assumption must be tested rigorously in the future using sophisticated techniques such as item response theory (e.g., Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993).
Societal progress is often measured by whether the life of the current generation has gotten better than that of the previous generations, with intergenerational upward economic mobility as a critical indicator of the fairness of a society. We found that the walkability of a city is an important predictor of upward social mobility and that this might be due in part to the fact that in walkable cities residents can get access to employment without owning a car and due in part to more walking and a greater sense of belonging, which we showed have real-world relationships with individual upward mobility. We found walking effects (but not perceived walkability effects) cross-nationally and cross-culturally, both in the individualistic United States and in the more collectivist Korea, implying that the link between walking, sense of belonging, and upward social mobility may be widespread and robust. It is not easy to add sidewalks or make public roads more walkable by adding more intersections and crossings. Adding additional bus lines or putting in new train lines is also not cheap (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, & Speck, 2000; Speck, 2012). However, these might be wise societal investments if, as our results suggest, they may help rebuild the fading American dream.
Friday, October 4, 2019
Evolutionary Origins of Morality: The element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys
Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Insights From Non-human Primates. Judith M. Burkart, Rahel K. Brügger and Carel P. van Schaik. Front. Sociol., July 9 2018. https://doi.org/10.3389/fsoc.2018.00017
The aim of this contribution is to explore the origins of moral behavior and its underlying moral preferences and intuitions from an evolutionary perspective. Such a perspective encompasses both the ultimate, adaptive function of morality in our own species, as well as the phylogenetic distribution of morality and its key elements across primates. First, with regard to the ultimate function, we argue that human moral preferences are best construed as adaptations to the affordances of the fundamentally interdependent hunter-gatherer lifestyle of our hominin ancestors. Second, with regard to the phylogenetic origin, we show that even though full-blown human morality is unique to humans, several of its key elements are not. Furthermore, a review of evidence from non-human primates regarding prosocial concern, conformity, and the potential presence of universal, biologically anchored and arbitrary cultural norms shows that these elements of morality are not distributed evenly across primate species. This suggests that they have evolved along separate evolutionary trajectories. In particular, the element of prosocial concern most likely evolved in the context of shared infant care, which can be found in humans and some New World monkeys. Strikingly, many if not all of the elements of morality found in non-human primates are only evident in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but not as third-party reactions by truly uninvolved bystanders. We discuss several potential explanations for the unique presence of a systematic third-party perspective in humans, but focus particularly on mentalizing ability and language. Whereas both play an important role in present day, full-blown human morality, it appears unlikely that they played a causal role for the original emergence of morality. Rather, we suggest that the most plausible scenario to date is that human morality emerged because our hominin ancestors, equipped on the one hand with large and powerful brains inherited from their ape-like ancestor, and on the other hand with strong prosocial concern as a result of cooperative breeding, could evolve into an ever more interdependent social niche.
Introduction
Contemplation of law as a natural social phenomenon quickly reveals that it cannot be reduced to purely rational processes and explicit reasoning. It is fundamentally built on (albeit not identical with) our sense for morality, the propensity to differentiate actions, decisions, and intentions between those that are proper and right and those that are improper or wrong (Long and Sedley, 1987). This evaluation can be the result of deliberation, but also of automatic proximate mechanisms such as intuitions that are expressed by a variety of moral emotions, motivations, and preferences which often have a high-urgency feel (Weaver et al., 2014).
Social scientists have traditionally considered morality as a recent, purely cultural innovation, seemingly necessary to keep our otherwise brutish nature under control (e.g., reviewed in Long and Sedley, 1987; de Waal, 2006; Haidt, 2013). In support of this conjecture, what is considered moral in a given culture or society, or what the corresponding systems of laws prescribe, can indeed be quite variable. However, despite this variability in the content of what counts as moral among cultures, there are also elements that seem universal, both with regard to the proximate mechanisms that regulate moral behavior and the content of moral norms. For instance, Barrett et al. (2016) found that across societies, including small-scale societies, humans take an agent's reason for action into account for moral judgments, but they also found independent variation when looking at specific contents, e.g., harm vs. theft, or in how the content influences the role of intentionality. Furthermore, even if conformist transmission could in principle stabilize a variety of behaviors and norms (Chudek and Henrich, 2011), there appears strong canalization in that some kinds of content (such as for instance not to harm others, or engage in parental investment) are more readily considered moral than others (van Schaik, 2016).
Ubiquitous key elements of human morality discussed in this paper are prosocial concern and conformity, as well as the moral contents of doing good, not harming others, and avoiding inequity and incest (van Schaik, 2016). Importantly, these elements are not only expressed when the individual is personally involved, i.e., in individualistic or dyadic contexts, but also in the absence of personal involvement, i.e., in third-party contexts. For instance, moral behavior not only includes the urge to conform to the rules and norms of one's own community, but also evokes strong feelings that others ought to do so as well. The universal presence of these elements of morality across human societies suggests there is an evolved core to morality, which should therefore be amenable to a functional and comparative evolutionary analysis sensu Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963; Bateson and Laland, 2013).
Such an evolutionary analysis claims that whenever universal, proximate mechanisms have evolved, they must have done so to fulfill a specific adaptive function. In the first section of this contribution we will argue that the adaptive function of our evolved morality was to enable the highly interdependent life-style of Pleistocene hunter-gathers.
An evolutionary analysis of human morality also includes the examination of its phylogenetic origin, to which we will turn in the second section. Whereas full-blown human morality, which includes explicit moral reasoning and evaluation, may well be unique to humans, some of its elements or building blocks are not, and we can use data from non-human primates to trace the evolutionary history of each of them separately. An obvious first, and very popular, step is to look at the great apes, and in particular the chimpanzees and bonobos (e.g., de Waal, 2006), to investigate the possible presence of a specific building block in our closest relatives. However, a broader and more informative comparative approach consists in mapping the presence or absence of each of these building blocks or traits in a broader set of species, to then test which factor best predicts this pattern of distribution (MacLean, 2016). If the specific case of humans fits such an identified pattern, this allows us to identify the evolutionary context of the emergence of this trait. This approach thus ideally allows not only to identify that a trait is or is not unique to humans, but also why it is present in a given set of species, including humans.
Beauty is an emergent property: The Neural Selection and the Emergence of ‘beauty Canons’ as Signaling Codes in Co-evolving Species
Formenti, Alessandro. 2019. “The Neural Selection and the Emergence of ‘beauty Canons’ as Signaling Codes in Co-evolving Species.” PsyArXiv. September 29. doi:10.31234/osf.io/bdj3p
Abstract
Widespread opinion wants beauty to be pleasant and aimless, this assumption biased Darwin's explanation of sexual selection. Conversely, Wallace hypothesized that showy and symmetric sexual traits correlate with vigor and health and he placed ‘aesthetic’ preferences within the natural selection. The controversy has continued until today.
To understand the role of beauty canons in communication, the focus was on the flower-pollinator cooperative system as a model, were flower evolution embodies the natural history of pollinators' preferences.
Optimum for a signal requires energy efficiency, high signal-to-noise ratio, and intelligibility. It involves pollinator perception mechanisms that, in turn, induce co-evolutionary feedback on signal traits. In fact, the flowers physical and hedonic properties correlate with the basic perceptual, motivational, emotional, and learning mechanisms of pollinators.
It is proposed that pollinator behavior, unmasking a preference, reveals the ability to evaluate an expected benefit. Features such as a relative simplicity, redundancy, and regularity of stimuli facilitate perception and memorization and are essential elements for communication between co-evolving species. They improve signaling to satisfy the need for easy and fast recognition. With these properties, a stimulus is adaptive and rewarding per se and may be an ideal conditioned stimulus in associative learning.
Among the most conspicuous signals, pollinators learn to recognize and choose those associated with nectar, thus favoring the evolution of flowers that are not only ‘beautiful’ but also ‘honest’ in reporting a reward. Beauty is an emergent property, and studying communication and perception we may understand the origin of some beauty canons.
Abstract
Widespread opinion wants beauty to be pleasant and aimless, this assumption biased Darwin's explanation of sexual selection. Conversely, Wallace hypothesized that showy and symmetric sexual traits correlate with vigor and health and he placed ‘aesthetic’ preferences within the natural selection. The controversy has continued until today.
To understand the role of beauty canons in communication, the focus was on the flower-pollinator cooperative system as a model, were flower evolution embodies the natural history of pollinators' preferences.
Optimum for a signal requires energy efficiency, high signal-to-noise ratio, and intelligibility. It involves pollinator perception mechanisms that, in turn, induce co-evolutionary feedback on signal traits. In fact, the flowers physical and hedonic properties correlate with the basic perceptual, motivational, emotional, and learning mechanisms of pollinators.
It is proposed that pollinator behavior, unmasking a preference, reveals the ability to evaluate an expected benefit. Features such as a relative simplicity, redundancy, and regularity of stimuli facilitate perception and memorization and are essential elements for communication between co-evolving species. They improve signaling to satisfy the need for easy and fast recognition. With these properties, a stimulus is adaptive and rewarding per se and may be an ideal conditioned stimulus in associative learning.
Among the most conspicuous signals, pollinators learn to recognize and choose those associated with nectar, thus favoring the evolution of flowers that are not only ‘beautiful’ but also ‘honest’ in reporting a reward. Beauty is an emergent property, and studying communication and perception we may understand the origin of some beauty canons.
Some healthy males do not mate when they have access to a sexually receptive female; these non-copulating individuals have been reported in murine, cricetid and ungulates; in humans this is denominated asexuality
Motivational Drive in Non-copulating and Socially Monogamous Mammals. Wendy Portillo and Raúl G. Paredes. Front. Behav. Neurosci., Oct 4 2019. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2019.00238
Abstract: Motivational drives guide behaviors in animals of different species, including humans. Some of these motivations, like looking for food and water, are crucial for the survival of the individual and hence for the preservation of the species. But there is at least another motivation that is also important for the survival of the species but not for the survival of the individual. Undoubtedly, sexual motivation is important for individuals to find a mate and reproduce, thus ensuring the survival of the species. In species with sexual reproduction, when males find a female in the appropriate hormonal conditions, they will display sexual behavior. However, some healthy males do not mate when they have access to a sexually receptive female, even though they are repeatedly tested. These non-copulating (NC) individuals have been reported in murine, cricetid and ungulates. In humans this sexual orientation is denominated asexuality. Asexual individuals are physically and emotionally healthy men and women without desire for sexual intercourse. Different species have developed a variety of strategies to find a mate and reproduce. Most species of mammals are polygamous; they mate with one or several partners at the same time, as occur in rats, or they can reproduce with different conspecifics throughout their life span. There are also monogamous species that only mate with one partner. One of the most studied socially monogamous species is the Prairie vole. In this species mating or cohabitation for long periods induces the formation of a long-lasting pair bond. Both males and females share the nest, show a preference for their sexual partner, display aggression to other males and females and display parental behavior towards their pups. This broad spectrum of reproductive strategies demonstrates the biological variability of sexual motivation and points out the importance of understanding the neurobiological basis of sexual motivational drives in different species.
Introduction
Mammals display several reproductive strategies that can be influenced by population density, group size, distribution, home range size, abundance of food and resources. In mammals, the most common mating strategy is polygamy with the polygyny (one male more than one female) and polyandry (one female, more than one male, rare or inexistent in no human species) as subtypes. In polygamy, there is no sexual exclusivity and reproductive success is maximized through multiple mating partners (Kleiman, 1977). Social monogamy is a reproductive strategy in species in which resources are evenly distributed but sparse, females can disperse and have large home ranges, and males are not able to defend the access to more than one female. Also, a low density of females and food can favor monogamy. Monogamy is also present when successful rearing of offspring requires paternal and maternal care. Males help carry the litter, provide food for them and the mother when this resource is energetically costly to obtain, and the litter size is larger (Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1978). Socially monogamous males and females after mating establish a pair bond that can last more than one reproductive cycle. However, in monogamous species some males and females do not form this pair bond and only mate opportunistically.
Interestingly, there are males and females in polygamous and socially monogamous species that do not mate even if they have the opportunity. In humans, around 1% of healthy men and women are not interested in engaging in sexual activity and are denominated as asexual. However, asexual individuals are interested in other motivational aspects of sexuality such as romantic relationships (Bogaert, 2004; Prause and Graham, 2007; Brotto and Yule, 2017; Jones et al., 2017). The biological bases of asexuality in humans are not well understood due to their complexity and ethical issues. However, the physiological bases of asexuality have been studied in murine, cricetid and ungulates, where some males do not mate even if they are tested with several sexually receptive females. In this manuscript, we will briefly outline different motivational strategies associated with reproduction in mammals and then we will describe in more detail the possible neurobiological factors associated with non-copulating (NC) males and the socially monogamous prairie vole.
In most mammals, sexual behavior consists of stereotyped movements usually organized in predictable patterns that are similar between individuals, but which vary between species. The specific patterns displayed by males and females reflect the motivational or consummatory aspects of sexual behavior. The comparative analysis between species showing different mating strategies including monogamy, polygamy and the case of asexuality could help us understand the biological variability of sexual motivational drives in mammals.
Abstract: Motivational drives guide behaviors in animals of different species, including humans. Some of these motivations, like looking for food and water, are crucial for the survival of the individual and hence for the preservation of the species. But there is at least another motivation that is also important for the survival of the species but not for the survival of the individual. Undoubtedly, sexual motivation is important for individuals to find a mate and reproduce, thus ensuring the survival of the species. In species with sexual reproduction, when males find a female in the appropriate hormonal conditions, they will display sexual behavior. However, some healthy males do not mate when they have access to a sexually receptive female, even though they are repeatedly tested. These non-copulating (NC) individuals have been reported in murine, cricetid and ungulates. In humans this sexual orientation is denominated asexuality. Asexual individuals are physically and emotionally healthy men and women without desire for sexual intercourse. Different species have developed a variety of strategies to find a mate and reproduce. Most species of mammals are polygamous; they mate with one or several partners at the same time, as occur in rats, or they can reproduce with different conspecifics throughout their life span. There are also monogamous species that only mate with one partner. One of the most studied socially monogamous species is the Prairie vole. In this species mating or cohabitation for long periods induces the formation of a long-lasting pair bond. Both males and females share the nest, show a preference for their sexual partner, display aggression to other males and females and display parental behavior towards their pups. This broad spectrum of reproductive strategies demonstrates the biological variability of sexual motivation and points out the importance of understanding the neurobiological basis of sexual motivational drives in different species.
Introduction
Mammals display several reproductive strategies that can be influenced by population density, group size, distribution, home range size, abundance of food and resources. In mammals, the most common mating strategy is polygamy with the polygyny (one male more than one female) and polyandry (one female, more than one male, rare or inexistent in no human species) as subtypes. In polygamy, there is no sexual exclusivity and reproductive success is maximized through multiple mating partners (Kleiman, 1977). Social monogamy is a reproductive strategy in species in which resources are evenly distributed but sparse, females can disperse and have large home ranges, and males are not able to defend the access to more than one female. Also, a low density of females and food can favor monogamy. Monogamy is also present when successful rearing of offspring requires paternal and maternal care. Males help carry the litter, provide food for them and the mother when this resource is energetically costly to obtain, and the litter size is larger (Clutton-Brock and Harvey, 1978). Socially monogamous males and females after mating establish a pair bond that can last more than one reproductive cycle. However, in monogamous species some males and females do not form this pair bond and only mate opportunistically.
Interestingly, there are males and females in polygamous and socially monogamous species that do not mate even if they have the opportunity. In humans, around 1% of healthy men and women are not interested in engaging in sexual activity and are denominated as asexual. However, asexual individuals are interested in other motivational aspects of sexuality such as romantic relationships (Bogaert, 2004; Prause and Graham, 2007; Brotto and Yule, 2017; Jones et al., 2017). The biological bases of asexuality in humans are not well understood due to their complexity and ethical issues. However, the physiological bases of asexuality have been studied in murine, cricetid and ungulates, where some males do not mate even if they are tested with several sexually receptive females. In this manuscript, we will briefly outline different motivational strategies associated with reproduction in mammals and then we will describe in more detail the possible neurobiological factors associated with non-copulating (NC) males and the socially monogamous prairie vole.
In most mammals, sexual behavior consists of stereotyped movements usually organized in predictable patterns that are similar between individuals, but which vary between species. The specific patterns displayed by males and females reflect the motivational or consummatory aspects of sexual behavior. The comparative analysis between species showing different mating strategies including monogamy, polygamy and the case of asexuality could help us understand the biological variability of sexual motivational drives in mammals.
People Represent Mental States in Terms of Rationality, Social Impact, and Valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model
Thornton, Mark A., and Diana Tamir. 2019. “People Represent Mental States in Terms of Rationality, Social Impact, and Valence: Validating the 3d Mind Model.” PsyArXiv. June 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/akhpq
Abstract: Humans can experience a wide variety of different thoughts and feelings in the course of everyday life. To successfully navigate the social world, people need to perceive, understand, and predict others’ mental states. Previous research suggests that people use three dimensions to represent mental states: rationality, social impact, and valence. This 3d Mind Model allows people to efficiently “see” the state of another person’s mind by considering whether that state is rational or emotional, more or less socially impactful, and positive or negative. In the current investigation, we validate this model using neural, behavioral, and linguistic evidence. First, we examine the robustness of the 3d Mind Model by conducting a mega-analysis of four fMRI studies in which participants considered others’ mental states. We find evidence that rationality, social impact, and valence each contribute to explaining the neural representation of mental states. Second, we test whether the 3d Mind Model offers the optimal combination of dimensions for describing neural representations of mental state. Results reveal that the 3d Mind Model achieve the best performance among a large set of candidate dimensions. Indeed, it offers a highly explanatory account of mental state representation, explaining over 80% of reliable neural variance. Finally, we demonstrate that all three dimensions of the model likewise capture convergent behavioral and linguistic measures of mental state representation. Together, these findings provide strong support for the 3d Mind Model, indicating that is it is a robust and generalizable account of how people think about mental states.
Abstract: Humans can experience a wide variety of different thoughts and feelings in the course of everyday life. To successfully navigate the social world, people need to perceive, understand, and predict others’ mental states. Previous research suggests that people use three dimensions to represent mental states: rationality, social impact, and valence. This 3d Mind Model allows people to efficiently “see” the state of another person’s mind by considering whether that state is rational or emotional, more or less socially impactful, and positive or negative. In the current investigation, we validate this model using neural, behavioral, and linguistic evidence. First, we examine the robustness of the 3d Mind Model by conducting a mega-analysis of four fMRI studies in which participants considered others’ mental states. We find evidence that rationality, social impact, and valence each contribute to explaining the neural representation of mental states. Second, we test whether the 3d Mind Model offers the optimal combination of dimensions for describing neural representations of mental state. Results reveal that the 3d Mind Model achieve the best performance among a large set of candidate dimensions. Indeed, it offers a highly explanatory account of mental state representation, explaining over 80% of reliable neural variance. Finally, we demonstrate that all three dimensions of the model likewise capture convergent behavioral and linguistic measures of mental state representation. Together, these findings provide strong support for the 3d Mind Model, indicating that is it is a robust and generalizable account of how people think about mental states.
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