Seli, Paul, Ph.D. 2019. “Intellectual Humility and Perceptions of Political Opponents.” PsyArXiv. October 22. psyarxiv.com/h8fy9
Abstract: The epistemic virtue of intellectual humility (IH) refers to the recognition that personal beliefs might be wrong. In four initial studies, we examined the role of IH in predicting how people perceive their sociopolitical opponents, and the role of IH in people’s willingness to befriend their sociopolitical opponents. We found that people lower in IH are more likely to derogate and less likely to befriend their opponents. In two additional studies, we experimentally explored a possible method with which to make people less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. After informing participants about the results of our existing studies showing that people who hold opposing positions do not differ in IH, participants were less likely to derogate opponents and somewhat more willing to befriend them. We discuss the implications of these results for sincere, open discussion, and for reducing social extremism and polarization.
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General Discussion
In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigated a possible way in which people who are low in IH might be overconfident in their beliefs and particularly unwilling to seriously engage with opponents’ views. For five of the six sociopolitical issues examined, we found that participants lower in IH tended to derogate the intellectual capabilities and moral character of sociopolitical opponents more than participants higher in IH. By believing that opponents are unintelligent and unethical, it may become easier to dismiss others’ views and to believe in the superiority of one’s own views. Studies 2a and 2b examined whether participants lower in IH are less willing to befriend people with opposing views. For both highly-contentious, polarized issues, and less-contentious, polarized issues, those lower in IH were indeed less willing than those higher in IH to befriend people who hold opposing positions. Then, in Studies 3a and 3b, we introduced an experimental manipulation to explore a possible way to render participants less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend opponents. We informed participants that there are actually no differences in IH between people who hold opposing positions on the issues, and we tested whether this information influenced their perceptions of their opponents. For both issues examined, informing participants that opponents do not actually differ on IH made participants derogate opponents less. Moreover, for the standardized testing issue, but not for the concealed carry issue, informing participants that those who hold opposing positions do not differ on IH made them more willing to befriend those with opposing views. The results from these two final studies provide experimental evidence for a simple and effective means of reducing the tendency for people to derogate others who hold different sociopolitical views.
There has been a recent surge of research on IH, much of which has been devoted to IH scale development and validation (e.g., Haggard et al., 2018; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al., 2017). By most psychological accounts, IH is fundamentally a cognitive intrapersonal construct reflecting people’s private assessments of their beliefs and attitudes (Leary et al., 2017). There are, however, important interpersonal consequences of differences in IH. Other research has found that those higher in IH tend to be more forgiving (Lavelock et al., 2014), generous (Exline & Hill, 2012), and empathic (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). Our research expands upon these findings by identifying an interpersonal consequence of differences in IH, namely that those low in IH tend to both derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend people with opposing sociopolitical views.
Our finding that IH predicts the degree to which people derogate sociopolitical opponents and express an unwillingness to befriend them may have significant implications for social extremism and political polarization. Derogating opponents and being unwilling to befriend them might create cliques of people, with the same views, who collectively seek out and share information that reinforces their shared views (i.e., “echo chambers”). With contemporary social media, there is no shortage of opportunities for people to create and find their desired echo chambers. In fact, echo chambers comprised of people discussing sociopolitical issues and events have been identified on Twitter (Barberá, et al., 2015; Williams, McMurray, Kurz, & Lambert, 2015), Facebook (Del Vicario, et al., 2016), and various blogs (Suhay, Blackwell, Roche, & Bruggeman, 2015). Critically, the results of our final two studies suggest that informing people about actual psychological research on IH has the potential to make them less likely to derogate opponents and more willing to befriend them. This kind of simple intervention might help to minimize social extremism and political polarization—especially for low-IH individuals.
Disagreements over sociopolitical issues can be useful and fruitful. Such disagreements offer the potential for understanding the perspectives of others, generating creative solutions to significant problems, and growing intellectually. However, the extent to which disagreements are useful depends on the willingness of opposing sides to try to understand opposing positions (de Wied, Branje, & Meeus, 2007; Stone, Patton, & Heen, 2010). Promoting IH as an epistemic virtue worth cultivating and informing the public about research on IH has the potential to reduce social extremism, polarization, and the frequency of unresolvable disagreements over time.
Tuesday, October 22, 2019
On average, men have higher humor production ability than women; the effect is small to moderate; the difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences
Sex differences in humor production ability: A meta-analysis. Gil Greengross, Paul J. Silvi, Emily C.Nusbaum. Journal of Research in Personality, October 22 2019, 103886. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103886
Highlights
• On average, men have higher humor production ability than women.
• Effect is small to moderate.
• Humor was rated by independent judges assessing the humor produced by both sexes.
• Difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences.
Abstract: We offer the first systematic quantitative meta-analysis on sex differences in humor production ability. We included studies where participants created humor output that was assessed for funniness by independent raters. Our meta-analysis includes 36 effect sizes from 28 studies published between 1976 and 2018 (N = 5057, 67% women). Twenty of the 36 effect sizes, accounting for 61% of the participants, were not previously published. Results based on random-effects model revealed that men's humor output was rated as funnier than women's, with a combined effect size d = 0.321. Results were robust across various moderators and study characteristics, and multiple tests indicated that publication bias is unlikely. Both evolutionary and cultural explanations were considered and discussed.
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4.3. Conclusion
The research presented here focused on one specific aspect of humor that is largely under-investigated in humor research, humor production ability. Despite finding men to have higher humor creation abilities than women on verbal humor, this difference should not be seen as representative of other types of humor, including non-verbal humor production ability. In fact, for most aspects of humor, men and women seem to exhibit many similarities, with relatively few differences (Martin, 2014). In regard to humor 41production abilities, the topic of sex differences is often reduced to blunt assertions such as that “Women are not funny” (e.g.,Hitchens, 2007). We hope that our meta-analysis will help advance a more nuanced discussion on the topic based on a systematic evaluation of the available scientific data. Examination of such data suggest that regardless of the underlying source of variability, men exhibit higher humor ability than women on the kinds of verbal tasks included in our sample of studies. It is important to remember that though robust, these differences are small to medium in size, and are based on averages. They do not reflect individual abilities, as both men and women vary largely in their abilities to produce humor. We tried to illuminate possible sources for the differences in HPA, what they might mean, theoretical implications, considerations for future research, and limitations. Humor is an important experience for most people, one that is largely unique to humans. We hope that our results will further foster the study of humor, advance theories pertaining to understanding and explaining sex differences in humor and other cognitive abilities, as well as foster research on humor ability.
Highlights
• On average, men have higher humor production ability than women.
• Effect is small to moderate.
• Humor was rated by independent judges assessing the humor produced by both sexes.
• Difference may reflect both evolutionary and environmental influences.
Abstract: We offer the first systematic quantitative meta-analysis on sex differences in humor production ability. We included studies where participants created humor output that was assessed for funniness by independent raters. Our meta-analysis includes 36 effect sizes from 28 studies published between 1976 and 2018 (N = 5057, 67% women). Twenty of the 36 effect sizes, accounting for 61% of the participants, were not previously published. Results based on random-effects model revealed that men's humor output was rated as funnier than women's, with a combined effect size d = 0.321. Results were robust across various moderators and study characteristics, and multiple tests indicated that publication bias is unlikely. Both evolutionary and cultural explanations were considered and discussed.
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4.3. Conclusion
The research presented here focused on one specific aspect of humor that is largely under-investigated in humor research, humor production ability. Despite finding men to have higher humor creation abilities than women on verbal humor, this difference should not be seen as representative of other types of humor, including non-verbal humor production ability. In fact, for most aspects of humor, men and women seem to exhibit many similarities, with relatively few differences (Martin, 2014). In regard to humor 41production abilities, the topic of sex differences is often reduced to blunt assertions such as that “Women are not funny” (e.g.,Hitchens, 2007). We hope that our meta-analysis will help advance a more nuanced discussion on the topic based on a systematic evaluation of the available scientific data. Examination of such data suggest that regardless of the underlying source of variability, men exhibit higher humor ability than women on the kinds of verbal tasks included in our sample of studies. It is important to remember that though robust, these differences are small to medium in size, and are based on averages. They do not reflect individual abilities, as both men and women vary largely in their abilities to produce humor. We tried to illuminate possible sources for the differences in HPA, what they might mean, theoretical implications, considerations for future research, and limitations. Humor is an important experience for most people, one that is largely unique to humans. We hope that our results will further foster the study of humor, advance theories pertaining to understanding and explaining sex differences in humor and other cognitive abilities, as well as foster research on humor ability.
Fruit flies: Sexual conflict is common and sometimes results in sexual aggression; found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success
Genetic variation in sexual aggression and the factors that determine forced copulation success. Carling M. Baxter, Janice L. Yan, Reuven Dukas. Animal Behaviour, October 22 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2019.09.015
Highlights
• Sexual conflict is common in nature and sometimes results in sexual aggression.
• We found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success.
• We compared behaviour of males from low and high forced copulation success genotypes.
• High-success males were more persistent in pursuit and mounting of teneral females.
• Low- and high-success males differed in their response to female rejection.
Abstract: Sexual conflict is common in nature and sometimes results in sexual aggression. An extreme case is forced copulation, where one individual forcibly mates with another individual who resists the mating. To understand what makes some males sexually aggressive, we established an experimental system that allowed us to quantify the characteristics that contribute to males' forced copulation success. In fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster), sexually mature females can choose to accept or reject courting males; however, males can forcibly copulate with newly eclosed, sexually immature, teneral females. We tested males from 59 genotypes and found significant genetic variation in forced copulation success, with a broad-sense heritability of 0.16. We then chose three genotypes with the lowest and three genotypes with the highest forced copulation success rates and compared the behaviour of males from these two groups. Males from genotypes with high forced copulation success were more persistent in their pursuit of teneral females and mounted them more frequently than did males from the low-success genotypes. Males of the two categories, however, were similar in their attractiveness to both teneral and sexually mature females. Our results suggest that males vary in their pursuit strategies. Some males respond to female rejection signals by giving up and searching for receptive females, while other males persist in pursuit and coercion in spite of female objection. Our work highlights the practicality of using forced copulation in fruit flies as a model for further research on the mechanisms affecting variation in sexual coercion and forced copulation success and their evolutionary consequences.
Keywords aggressioncoercionDrosophila melanogasterforced copulationfruit flygenetic variationheritabilitysexual conflict
Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer; authors find that familiarity does not serve as a cue for depth
Mischenko, Elizaveta, Ippei Negishi, Elena Gorbunova, and Tadamasa Sawada. 2019. “Examining the Role of Familiarity in the Perception of Depth.” PsyArXiv. October 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/wxn4s
Downloadable as a pre-print: https://psyarxiv.com/wxn4s/
Abstract: Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer. The distance can be computed by comparing the size of the retinal image of the object to the memorized size of the object. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such “familiarity” information. However, prior experiments looking for an effect of familiarity had not been designed to minimize, or eliminate potential influences of: (i) higher cognitive factors on the observers' responses, or (ii) the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli. We tested the familiarity effect in two psychophysical experiments that were conducted both in Russia and in Japan. Forty Russian students and forty Japanese students participated in these experiments. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins in Russia and in Japan. The participants' depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of “familiarity” on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant's country. We expected a substantial effect of familiarity based on our meta-analysis of the "familiarity" effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect on depth perception was virtually zero. Our experiments clearly show that familiarity, studied for the first time without any obvious confounds, does not serve as a cue for depth.
Downloadable as a pre-print: https://psyarxiv.com/wxn4s/
Abstract: Bishop Berkeley suggested that the distance of an object can be estimated if the object’s size is familiar to the observer. The distance can be computed by comparing the size of the retinal image of the object to the memorized size of the object. It has been suggested that humans can perceive the distance of the object by using such “familiarity” information. However, prior experiments looking for an effect of familiarity had not been designed to minimize, or eliminate potential influences of: (i) higher cognitive factors on the observers' responses, or (ii) the influences of low-level image features in the visual stimuli. We tested the familiarity effect in two psychophysical experiments that were conducted both in Russia and in Japan. Forty Russian students and forty Japanese students participated in these experiments. The visual stimuli used were images of three coins in Russia and in Japan. The participants' depth perception was measured with a multiple-choice task testing the perceived depth-order of the coins. Our expectation was that any effect of “familiarity” on depth perception would only be observed with the coins of the participant's country. We expected a substantial effect of familiarity based on our meta-analysis of the "familiarity" effects observed in prior experiments. But, our results in both experiments showed that the familiarity effect on depth perception was virtually zero. Our experiments clearly show that familiarity, studied for the first time without any obvious confounds, does not serve as a cue for depth.
Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives
Are neo-liberals more intuitive? Undetected libertarians confound the relation between analytic cognitive style and economic conservatism. Onurcan Yilmaz, S. Adil Saribay, Ravi Iyer. Current Psychology, February 14 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-019-0130-x
Abstract: Previous studies consistently showed that analytic cognitive style (ACS) is negatively correlated with social conservatism, but there are mixed findings concerning its relation with economic conservatism. Most tests have relied on a unidimensional (liberal-conservative) operationalization of political orientation. Libertarians tend not only to identify themselves as conservative on this scale but also to score higher on ACS than liberals and conservatives. The presence of libertarians might be the reason for the above-mentioned mixed findings. We investigated the relation between social and economic conservatism and ACS (operationalized using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT) in a large, web-based sample. There was a negative correlation between CRT and social conservatism both when libertarians were included and excluded. However, the correlation between CRT and economic conservatism was significantly reduced in magnitude and became non-significant when libertarians were excluded. The results support the argument that the undetected presence of libertarians may confound the ACS-economic conservatism relation.
Keywords: Analytic cognitive style Libertarians Liberals Conservatives Cognitive reflection test
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Discussion
We argued that if a study includes a non-negligible proportion of libertarians and measures political orientation on the single-item self-placement scale, then it might produce misleading results regarding the relationship between cognitive style and economic conservatism. Specifically, such a procedure may produce misleading results because the libertarians tend to score relatively higher on both variables (i.e., ACS and economic conservatism) and they also tend to self-place toward the conservative end of the political spectrum (see Iyer et al. 2012; Talhelm et al. 2015). In other words, the existence of different proportions of libertarians might produce mixed findings across those samples. The current effort is a demonstration of the importance of considering political affiliation (e.g., libertarian) beyond self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum and, specifically, of the utility of repeating analyses including and excluding libertarians.
The results suggested that the negative (but small) correlation between ACS and social conservatism holds whether libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) are included or excluded. This is consistent with the previous literature showing that there is a negative correlation between social conservatism and ACS (Deppe et al. 2015; Saribay and Yilmaz 2017; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b, 2018). This finding also supports the social orientation hypothesis suggesting that social political orientation is a better predictor of cognitive style differences than economic political orientation (Talhelm et al. 2015). However, our finding also suggests that this relation is weak.
On the other hand, the relation between ACS and economic conservatism differs depending on the inclusion versus exclusion of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups). The positive correlation between CRT and economic conservatism in the whole dataset lost its significance and was reduced to virtually zero when the non-liberal and non-conservative participants were excluded. The results remained constant when we only excluded libertarian participants (instead of all nonliberals and non-conservatives including BDon’t know/not political,^ and BOther^). Thus, the current findings suggest that the presence of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) confounds the relation between ACS and economic conservatism. They clarify why previous findings regarding this relation were mixed. As noted earlier, some previous findings suggested a non-significant relation (Deppe et al. 2015; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b), some others showed a negative relation (Sterling et al. 2016), and some others even showed a positive relation (e.g., one of four studies of Deppe et al. 2015). Jost et al. (2017) meta-analyzed these findings and showed a negative—albeit weak—correlation between ACS and economic conservatism (unweighted average r = −.08). Our contention that different proportions of libertarians might determine the direction and size of the correlation regarding ACS-economic conservatism relation is compatible with these findings since the Study 2 of Deppe et al. (2015), where the correlation between ACS and economic conservatism is positive, was arguably the most-representative sample of American population (see Baron 2015). Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives, however, there were no such differences between self-reported liberals and conservatives.
Abstract: Previous studies consistently showed that analytic cognitive style (ACS) is negatively correlated with social conservatism, but there are mixed findings concerning its relation with economic conservatism. Most tests have relied on a unidimensional (liberal-conservative) operationalization of political orientation. Libertarians tend not only to identify themselves as conservative on this scale but also to score higher on ACS than liberals and conservatives. The presence of libertarians might be the reason for the above-mentioned mixed findings. We investigated the relation between social and economic conservatism and ACS (operationalized using the Cognitive Reflection Test; CRT) in a large, web-based sample. There was a negative correlation between CRT and social conservatism both when libertarians were included and excluded. However, the correlation between CRT and economic conservatism was significantly reduced in magnitude and became non-significant when libertarians were excluded. The results support the argument that the undetected presence of libertarians may confound the ACS-economic conservatism relation.
Keywords: Analytic cognitive style Libertarians Liberals Conservatives Cognitive reflection test
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Discussion
We argued that if a study includes a non-negligible proportion of libertarians and measures political orientation on the single-item self-placement scale, then it might produce misleading results regarding the relationship between cognitive style and economic conservatism. Specifically, such a procedure may produce misleading results because the libertarians tend to score relatively higher on both variables (i.e., ACS and economic conservatism) and they also tend to self-place toward the conservative end of the political spectrum (see Iyer et al. 2012; Talhelm et al. 2015). In other words, the existence of different proportions of libertarians might produce mixed findings across those samples. The current effort is a demonstration of the importance of considering political affiliation (e.g., libertarian) beyond self-placement on the liberal-conservative continuum and, specifically, of the utility of repeating analyses including and excluding libertarians.
The results suggested that the negative (but small) correlation between ACS and social conservatism holds whether libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) are included or excluded. This is consistent with the previous literature showing that there is a negative correlation between social conservatism and ACS (Deppe et al. 2015; Saribay and Yilmaz 2017; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b, 2018). This finding also supports the social orientation hypothesis suggesting that social political orientation is a better predictor of cognitive style differences than economic political orientation (Talhelm et al. 2015). However, our finding also suggests that this relation is weak.
On the other hand, the relation between ACS and economic conservatism differs depending on the inclusion versus exclusion of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups). The positive correlation between CRT and economic conservatism in the whole dataset lost its significance and was reduced to virtually zero when the non-liberal and non-conservative participants were excluded. The results remained constant when we only excluded libertarian participants (instead of all nonliberals and non-conservatives including BDon’t know/not political,^ and BOther^). Thus, the current findings suggest that the presence of libertarians (and other non-mainstream groups) confounds the relation between ACS and economic conservatism. They clarify why previous findings regarding this relation were mixed. As noted earlier, some previous findings suggested a non-significant relation (Deppe et al. 2015; Pennycook et al. 2012; Yilmaz and Saribay 2016, 2017b), some others showed a negative relation (Sterling et al. 2016), and some others even showed a positive relation (e.g., one of four studies of Deppe et al. 2015). Jost et al. (2017) meta-analyzed these findings and showed a negative—albeit weak—correlation between ACS and economic conservatism (unweighted average r = −.08). Our contention that different proportions of libertarians might determine the direction and size of the correlation regarding ACS-economic conservatism relation is compatible with these findings since the Study 2 of Deppe et al. (2015), where the correlation between ACS and economic conservatism is positive, was arguably the most-representative sample of American population (see Baron 2015). Our results also replicated Iyer et al. (2012) previous finding that libertarians think more analytically than both liberals and conservatives, however, there were no such differences between self-reported liberals and conservatives.
Historically heterogeneous populations have lower levels of outgroup prejudice; some evidence that diversity in the current population was related to increased prejudice
Population Diversity and Ancestral Diversity As Distinct Contributors to Outgroup Prejudice. Ilan Shrira. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, October 21, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219880190
Abstract: Previous research has shown conflicting findings on how population diversity influences outgroup prejudice. In some cases, prejudice is greater when minority groups make up a larger portion of the population, whereas in other cases, prejudice is lower as diversity increases. This article examined how the diversity of a culture’s ancestry—or its historical heterogeneity—would be related to outgroup attitudes. Historically heterogeneous populations descend from ancestors who have migrated from many parts of the world over the past 500 years and, as a result, have a longer legacy of contact with diverse groups of people. The results of two cross-cultural studies found that greater heterogeneity predicted lower levels of outgroup prejudice, and some evidence that diversity in the current population was related to increased prejudice. The findings suggest that intergroup attitudes have deeply entrenched roots that cannot be fully understood by looking at current indicators.
Keywords prejudice, culture, attitudes, ancestry, values
Abstract: Previous research has shown conflicting findings on how population diversity influences outgroup prejudice. In some cases, prejudice is greater when minority groups make up a larger portion of the population, whereas in other cases, prejudice is lower as diversity increases. This article examined how the diversity of a culture’s ancestry—or its historical heterogeneity—would be related to outgroup attitudes. Historically heterogeneous populations descend from ancestors who have migrated from many parts of the world over the past 500 years and, as a result, have a longer legacy of contact with diverse groups of people. The results of two cross-cultural studies found that greater heterogeneity predicted lower levels of outgroup prejudice, and some evidence that diversity in the current population was related to increased prejudice. The findings suggest that intergroup attitudes have deeply entrenched roots that cannot be fully understood by looking at current indicators.
Keywords prejudice, culture, attitudes, ancestry, values
Socially transmitted placebo effects: Subjective experiences of pain were directly modulated by providers’ expectations of treatment success; the belief manipulation also affected patients’ perceptions of providers’ empathy
Socially transmitted placebo effects. Pin-Hao A. Chen, Jin Hyun Cheong, Eshin Jolly, Hirsh Elhence, Tor D. Wager & Luke J. Chang. Nature Human Behaviour, October 21 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0749-5
Abstract: Medical treatments typically occur in the context of a social interaction between healthcare providers and patients. Although decades of research have demonstrated that patients’ expectations can dramatically affect treatment outcomes, less is known about the influence of providers’ expectations. Here we systematically manipulated providers’ expectations in a simulated clinical interaction involving administration of thermal pain and found that patients’ subjective experiences of pain were directly modulated by providers’ expectations of treatment success, as reflected in the patients’ subjective ratings, skin conductance responses and facial expression behaviours. The belief manipulation also affected patients’ perceptions of providers’ empathy during the pain procedure and manifested as subtle changes in providers’ facial expression behaviours during the clinical interaction. Importantly, these findings were replicated in two more independent samples. Together, our results provide evidence of a socially transmitted placebo effect, highlighting how healthcare providers’ behaviour and cognitive mindsets can affect clinical interactions.
Abstract: Medical treatments typically occur in the context of a social interaction between healthcare providers and patients. Although decades of research have demonstrated that patients’ expectations can dramatically affect treatment outcomes, less is known about the influence of providers’ expectations. Here we systematically manipulated providers’ expectations in a simulated clinical interaction involving administration of thermal pain and found that patients’ subjective experiences of pain were directly modulated by providers’ expectations of treatment success, as reflected in the patients’ subjective ratings, skin conductance responses and facial expression behaviours. The belief manipulation also affected patients’ perceptions of providers’ empathy during the pain procedure and manifested as subtle changes in providers’ facial expression behaviours during the clinical interaction. Importantly, these findings were replicated in two more independent samples. Together, our results provide evidence of a socially transmitted placebo effect, highlighting how healthcare providers’ behaviour and cognitive mindsets can affect clinical interactions.
Those of higher scoring on the Cognitive Reflection Test were more discerning in their social media use: They followed more selectively, shared news content from more reliable sources, and tweeted about weightier subjects
Mosleh, Mohsen, Gordon Pennycook, Antonio A. Arechar, and David G. Rand. 2019. “Digital Fingerprints of Cognitive Reflection.” PsyArXiv. October 17. doi:10.31234/osf.io/qaswn
Abstract: Social media is playing an increasingly large role in everyday life. Thus, it is of both scientific and practical interest to understand behavior on social media platforms. Furthermore, social media provides a unique window for social scientists to deepen our understanding of the human mind. Here we investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and behavior on Twitter in a sample of large N = 1,953 users recruited via Prolific Academic. In doing so, we differentiate between two competing accounts of human information processing: an “intuitionist” account whereby reflection plays little role in daily life, and a “reflectionist” account whereby reflection (and, in particular, overriding intuitive responses) does play an important role. We found that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – a widely used measure of reflective thinking – were more discerning in their social media use: They followed more selectively, shared news content from more reliable sources, and tweeted about weightier subjects. Furthermore, a network analysis indicated that the phenomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not limited to politics: we observe “cognitive echo chambers” in which people low on cognitive reflection tend to follow the same set of accounts. Our results help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms, and challenge intuitionist notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.
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Discussion
Together, these results paint a fairly consistent picture. People in our sample who engaged in more cognitive reflection were more discerning in their social media use: They followed more selectively, shared higher quality content from more reliable sources, and tweeted about more weighty subjects. These results have numerous implications. Returning to the debate between those who have claimed a limited role for cognitive reflection in determining everyday behaviors (intuitionists) and those who emphasize the importance of the (perhaps distinctly) human capacity to use reflection to override intuitions (reflectionists), the results are plainly more consistent with the latter perspective. We find that reflective thinking (as measured in our survey study) is associated with a wide range of naturally occurring social media behaviors. Furthermore, each of these associations has important theoretical implications in their own right that we will now enumerate – and together, they paint a consistent picture of reflective thinking as an important positive force in judgment and decision-making outside of the laboratory.
One line of prior work which the current results bear on has to do with media truth discernment. Past work has shown that people who are more analytic and reflective are better at identifying true versus false news headlines, regardless of whether the headlines align with their ideology (e.g., (Pennycook and Rand 2019c)). However, these studies have relied entirely on survey experiments, where participant responses may be driven by experimenter demand effects or expressive responding. Additionally, in these experiments, participants judge a comparatively small set of headlines (pre-selected by the experimenters to be balanced on partisanship and veracity). Thus, these prior results may be idiosyncratic to the specific headlines (or approach for selecting headlines) used in designing the survey. Furthermore, these studies have focused on contrasting true headlines with blatantly false headlines (which may be comparatively rare outside the laboratory, (Grinberg et al. 2019, Guess et al. 2019), rather than articles which are misleading but not entirely false (e.g., hyper-partisan biased reporting of events that actually occurred (Pennycook and Rand 2019b)). Thus, the results may not generalize to the kinds of misinformation more typically encountered online. Finally, these studies have focused on judgments of accuracy, rather than sharing decisions. Thus, whether these previously documented associations extended to actual sharing in the naturally occurring social media environment is an open question – particularly given that the social media context may be more likely to active a political identity (as opposed to accuracy or truth) focus (Brady, Crockett and Van Bavel 2019, Van Bavel and Pereira 2018). Yet, despite these numerous reasons to think that prior findings may not generalize outside the survey context, we do indeed find that participants who perform better on the CRT share news from higher quality news sources. This observation substantially extends prior support for a positive role of reasoning in news media truth discernment.
Our results are also relevant in similar ways for prior work regarding the role of cognitive sophistication in political engagement. Prior evidence using survey experiments suggests that people who are more cognitively sophisticated (e.g., higher CRT, more educated, higher political knowledge) show higher rates of engagement with politics (Pennycook and Rand 2019a, Galston 2001). However, it has also been suggested that this relationship may be the result of social desirability bias, such that more cognitively sophisticated people simply over-report political engagement to please the experimenter (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003, Enamorado and Imai 2018). Our results, however, suggest that more reflective people are indeed actually more engaged with politics on social media. This supports the inference that analytic thinking is associated with increased political engagement.
More broadly, cognitive reflection has been associated with lower gullibility – that is, less acceptance of a large range of epistemically suspect beliefs (such as conspiracy theories, paranormal claims, etc. – see (Pennycook et al. 2015b) for a review), including decreased susceptibility to pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al. 2015a). Again, however, these findings are rooted in survey evidence and not real-world behavior, and could reflect socially desirable responding. Here we find that low CRT is associated with increased following of and tweeting about money-making scams and get-rich-quick schemes. This supports the conclusion that more intuitive people are indeed more gullible.
One of the most intriguing results that we uncovered was the clustering of accounts followed by lower versus higher CRT participants. In particular, there was a cluster of accounts that were predominantly followed by low CRT participants. This observation is particularly interesting in the context of the extremely extensive discussion of partisan echo chambers, in which supporters of the same party are much more likely to interact with co-partisans (Stewart et al. 2019, Barberá et al. 2015, Garimella and Weber 2017). Our network analysis indicates that the phenomenon of echo chambers is not limited to politics: the cognitive echo chambers we observe have potentially profound implications for how information flows through social media. Furthermore, it is likely that cognitive echo chambers are not confined to social media – future work should investigate this phenomenon more broadly.
There are, of course, important limitations of the present work. Most notably, we were only able to consider the Twitter activity of a tiny subset of all users on the platform. Thus, it is important for future work to examine how our results generalize to other sets of users – and in particular, to users who did not opt in to a survey experiment. One potential approach that may be fruitful in this endeavor is training a machine learning classifier to estimate users’ CRT scores based on their social media activity. Relatedly, it will be important to test how the results generalize to other social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn), and to users from non-Western cultures. Future work should also examine how the results obtained here generalize to other measures of cognitive sophistication beyond the CRT.
In sum, here we have shed light on social media behavior using the lens of cognitive science. We have provided evidence that one’s extent of analytic thinking predicts a wide range of social media behaviors. These results meaningfully extend prior survey studies, demonstrating that analytic thinking plays an important role outside the laboratory.
Abstract: Social media is playing an increasingly large role in everyday life. Thus, it is of both scientific and practical interest to understand behavior on social media platforms. Furthermore, social media provides a unique window for social scientists to deepen our understanding of the human mind. Here we investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitive reflection and behavior on Twitter in a sample of large N = 1,953 users recruited via Prolific Academic. In doing so, we differentiate between two competing accounts of human information processing: an “intuitionist” account whereby reflection plays little role in daily life, and a “reflectionist” account whereby reflection (and, in particular, overriding intuitive responses) does play an important role. We found that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – a widely used measure of reflective thinking – were more discerning in their social media use: They followed more selectively, shared news content from more reliable sources, and tweeted about weightier subjects. Furthermore, a network analysis indicated that the phenomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not limited to politics: we observe “cognitive echo chambers” in which people low on cognitive reflection tend to follow the same set of accounts. Our results help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms, and challenge intuitionist notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.
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Discussion
Together, these results paint a fairly consistent picture. People in our sample who engaged in more cognitive reflection were more discerning in their social media use: They followed more selectively, shared higher quality content from more reliable sources, and tweeted about more weighty subjects. These results have numerous implications. Returning to the debate between those who have claimed a limited role for cognitive reflection in determining everyday behaviors (intuitionists) and those who emphasize the importance of the (perhaps distinctly) human capacity to use reflection to override intuitions (reflectionists), the results are plainly more consistent with the latter perspective. We find that reflective thinking (as measured in our survey study) is associated with a wide range of naturally occurring social media behaviors. Furthermore, each of these associations has important theoretical implications in their own right that we will now enumerate – and together, they paint a consistent picture of reflective thinking as an important positive force in judgment and decision-making outside of the laboratory.
One line of prior work which the current results bear on has to do with media truth discernment. Past work has shown that people who are more analytic and reflective are better at identifying true versus false news headlines, regardless of whether the headlines align with their ideology (e.g., (Pennycook and Rand 2019c)). However, these studies have relied entirely on survey experiments, where participant responses may be driven by experimenter demand effects or expressive responding. Additionally, in these experiments, participants judge a comparatively small set of headlines (pre-selected by the experimenters to be balanced on partisanship and veracity). Thus, these prior results may be idiosyncratic to the specific headlines (or approach for selecting headlines) used in designing the survey. Furthermore, these studies have focused on contrasting true headlines with blatantly false headlines (which may be comparatively rare outside the laboratory, (Grinberg et al. 2019, Guess et al. 2019), rather than articles which are misleading but not entirely false (e.g., hyper-partisan biased reporting of events that actually occurred (Pennycook and Rand 2019b)). Thus, the results may not generalize to the kinds of misinformation more typically encountered online. Finally, these studies have focused on judgments of accuracy, rather than sharing decisions. Thus, whether these previously documented associations extended to actual sharing in the naturally occurring social media environment is an open question – particularly given that the social media context may be more likely to active a political identity (as opposed to accuracy or truth) focus (Brady, Crockett and Van Bavel 2019, Van Bavel and Pereira 2018). Yet, despite these numerous reasons to think that prior findings may not generalize outside the survey context, we do indeed find that participants who perform better on the CRT share news from higher quality news sources. This observation substantially extends prior support for a positive role of reasoning in news media truth discernment.
Our results are also relevant in similar ways for prior work regarding the role of cognitive sophistication in political engagement. Prior evidence using survey experiments suggests that people who are more cognitively sophisticated (e.g., higher CRT, more educated, higher political knowledge) show higher rates of engagement with politics (Pennycook and Rand 2019a, Galston 2001). However, it has also been suggested that this relationship may be the result of social desirability bias, such that more cognitively sophisticated people simply over-report political engagement to please the experimenter (Holbrook, Green and Krosnick 2003, Enamorado and Imai 2018). Our results, however, suggest that more reflective people are indeed actually more engaged with politics on social media. This supports the inference that analytic thinking is associated with increased political engagement.
More broadly, cognitive reflection has been associated with lower gullibility – that is, less acceptance of a large range of epistemically suspect beliefs (such as conspiracy theories, paranormal claims, etc. – see (Pennycook et al. 2015b) for a review), including decreased susceptibility to pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook et al. 2015a). Again, however, these findings are rooted in survey evidence and not real-world behavior, and could reflect socially desirable responding. Here we find that low CRT is associated with increased following of and tweeting about money-making scams and get-rich-quick schemes. This supports the conclusion that more intuitive people are indeed more gullible.
One of the most intriguing results that we uncovered was the clustering of accounts followed by lower versus higher CRT participants. In particular, there was a cluster of accounts that were predominantly followed by low CRT participants. This observation is particularly interesting in the context of the extremely extensive discussion of partisan echo chambers, in which supporters of the same party are much more likely to interact with co-partisans (Stewart et al. 2019, Barberá et al. 2015, Garimella and Weber 2017). Our network analysis indicates that the phenomenon of echo chambers is not limited to politics: the cognitive echo chambers we observe have potentially profound implications for how information flows through social media. Furthermore, it is likely that cognitive echo chambers are not confined to social media – future work should investigate this phenomenon more broadly.
There are, of course, important limitations of the present work. Most notably, we were only able to consider the Twitter activity of a tiny subset of all users on the platform. Thus, it is important for future work to examine how our results generalize to other sets of users – and in particular, to users who did not opt in to a survey experiment. One potential approach that may be fruitful in this endeavor is training a machine learning classifier to estimate users’ CRT scores based on their social media activity. Relatedly, it will be important to test how the results generalize to other social media platforms (e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn), and to users from non-Western cultures. Future work should also examine how the results obtained here generalize to other measures of cognitive sophistication beyond the CRT.
In sum, here we have shed light on social media behavior using the lens of cognitive science. We have provided evidence that one’s extent of analytic thinking predicts a wide range of social media behaviors. These results meaningfully extend prior survey studies, demonstrating that analytic thinking plays an important role outside the laboratory.
Both sexes prefer individuals who have been faithful in a previous relationship, but men prefer short term relationships with unfaithful individuals more than women; oxytocin increases this sex difference in preference
Oxytocin amplifies sex differences in human mate choice. Lei Xu et al. Psychoneuroendocrinology, October 21 2019, 104483. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psyneuen.2019.104483
• Both sexes prefer individuals who have been faithful in a previous relationship.
• But men prefer short term relationships with unfaithful individuals more than women.
• Oxytocin increases this sex difference in preference for unfaithful individuals.
• And increases women’s preference for long term relationships with faithful men.
Abstract: Infidelity is the major cause of breakups and individuals with a history of infidelity are more likely to repeat it, but may also present a greater opportunity for short-term sexual relationships. Here in a pre-registered, double-blind study involving 160 subjects we report that while both sexes valued faithful individuals most for short-term and long-term relationships, both single men and those in a relationship were more interested in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful individuals than women. Oxytocin administration resulted in men rating the faces of unfaithful women as more attractive and likeable but in women rating those of unfaithful men as less attractive and also finding them less memorable. Oxytocin also increased single men’s interest in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful women whereas it increased single women’s interest in having long-term relationships with faithful men. Thus, oxytocin release during courtship may first act to amplify sex-dependent priorities in attraction and mate choice before subsequently promoting romantic bonds.
• Both sexes prefer individuals who have been faithful in a previous relationship.
• But men prefer short term relationships with unfaithful individuals more than women.
• Oxytocin increases this sex difference in preference for unfaithful individuals.
• And increases women’s preference for long term relationships with faithful men.
Abstract: Infidelity is the major cause of breakups and individuals with a history of infidelity are more likely to repeat it, but may also present a greater opportunity for short-term sexual relationships. Here in a pre-registered, double-blind study involving 160 subjects we report that while both sexes valued faithful individuals most for short-term and long-term relationships, both single men and those in a relationship were more interested in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful individuals than women. Oxytocin administration resulted in men rating the faces of unfaithful women as more attractive and likeable but in women rating those of unfaithful men as less attractive and also finding them less memorable. Oxytocin also increased single men’s interest in having short-term relationships with previously unfaithful women whereas it increased single women’s interest in having long-term relationships with faithful men. Thus, oxytocin release during courtship may first act to amplify sex-dependent priorities in attraction and mate choice before subsequently promoting romantic bonds.
Private Wealth And Happiness: Building wealth will typically add to your happiness, though not by very much
Private Wealth And Happiness: A research synthesis using an online findings-archive. Antje Jantsch and Ruut Veenhoven. In: Gaël Brulé & Christian Suter (eds) Wealth(s) and Subjective Well-Being, pp 17-50. https://rd.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F978-3-030-05535-6
Abstract: There is a lot of research on the relationship between income and happiness, but little research into the relationship between wealth and happiness. Knowledge about the effects of wealth on happiness is required for informed decision making in matters of saving and consumption. In order to answer the questions of how and to what extent wealth relates to happiness, we take stock of the available research findings on this issue, covering 119 research findings observed in 72 studies. We use a new method of research synthesis, in which research findings are described in a comparable format and entered in an online ‘findings archive’, the World Database of Happiness, to which links are made from this text. This technique allows a condensed presentation of research findings, while providing readers access to full details. We found mostly positive relationships between assets and happiness, and negative relationships between debt and happiness. The size of the relationships is small, variations in wealth explain typically less than 1% of the variation in individual happiness. The correlations are slightly reduced when controlled for income and socio-demographic factors. The few longitudinal studies suggest a causal effect of wealth on happiness. We found little differences across methods used and populations studied. Together, the available research findings imply that building wealth will typically add to your happiness, though not by very much.
Keywords: life satisfaction, consumption, saving, assets, debt, wealth, research synthesis
Abstract: There is a lot of research on the relationship between income and happiness, but little research into the relationship between wealth and happiness. Knowledge about the effects of wealth on happiness is required for informed decision making in matters of saving and consumption. In order to answer the questions of how and to what extent wealth relates to happiness, we take stock of the available research findings on this issue, covering 119 research findings observed in 72 studies. We use a new method of research synthesis, in which research findings are described in a comparable format and entered in an online ‘findings archive’, the World Database of Happiness, to which links are made from this text. This technique allows a condensed presentation of research findings, while providing readers access to full details. We found mostly positive relationships between assets and happiness, and negative relationships between debt and happiness. The size of the relationships is small, variations in wealth explain typically less than 1% of the variation in individual happiness. The correlations are slightly reduced when controlled for income and socio-demographic factors. The few longitudinal studies suggest a causal effect of wealth on happiness. We found little differences across methods used and populations studied. Together, the available research findings imply that building wealth will typically add to your happiness, though not by very much.
Keywords: life satisfaction, consumption, saving, assets, debt, wealth, research synthesis
Monday, October 21, 2019
The Impact of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes on Purchases In Four Cities: We do not find impacts of the taxes in the other three cities combined
The Impact of Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Taxes on Purchases: Evidence from Four City-Level Taxes in the U.S. John Cawley, David Frisvold, David Jones. NBER Working Paper No. 26393, October 2019. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26393
Abstract: Since 2017, many U.S. cities have implemented taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) to decrease consumption of sugary beverages and raise revenue. In this paper, we analyze household receipt data to examine the impact of SSB taxes on households’ purchases of taxed and untaxed beverages in the four largest U.S. cities with such taxes: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San Francisco, California; Seattle, Washington; and Oakland, California. We estimate the impact of these taxes by comparing changes in monthly household purchases in the treatment cities to changes in one of two comparison groups: 1) areas adjacent to the treatment cities; or 2) a matched set of households nationally. We find that an increase in the beverage tax rate of 1 cent per ounce decreases household purchases of taxed beverages by 53.0 ounces per month or 12.2 percent. This impact is small in magnitude and consistent with a reduction in individual consumption of 5 calories per day per household member and eventual reduction in weight of 0.5 pounds. When we examine results separately by city, we find that the decline was concentrated in Philadelphia, where the tax decreased purchases by 27.7 percent. We do not find impacts of the taxes in the other three cities combined.
Abstract: Since 2017, many U.S. cities have implemented taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs) to decrease consumption of sugary beverages and raise revenue. In this paper, we analyze household receipt data to examine the impact of SSB taxes on households’ purchases of taxed and untaxed beverages in the four largest U.S. cities with such taxes: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San Francisco, California; Seattle, Washington; and Oakland, California. We estimate the impact of these taxes by comparing changes in monthly household purchases in the treatment cities to changes in one of two comparison groups: 1) areas adjacent to the treatment cities; or 2) a matched set of households nationally. We find that an increase in the beverage tax rate of 1 cent per ounce decreases household purchases of taxed beverages by 53.0 ounces per month or 12.2 percent. This impact is small in magnitude and consistent with a reduction in individual consumption of 5 calories per day per household member and eventual reduction in weight of 0.5 pounds. When we examine results separately by city, we find that the decline was concentrated in Philadelphia, where the tax decreased purchases by 27.7 percent. We do not find impacts of the taxes in the other three cities combined.
Long-lasting effects of relative age at school
Long-lasting effects of relative age at school. Lionel Page et a. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, October 21 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.005
Abstract: We investigate the long-lasting effects on behaviour of relative age at school. We conduct an online incentivised survey with a sample of 1007 adults, who were born at most two months before or after the school entry cut-off date in four Australian states. We find those who were among the oldest in the classroom throughout their school years display higher self-confidence, are more willing to enter in some form of competition and declare taking more risk in a range of domains in their life, compared to those who were among the youngest.
Abstract: We investigate the long-lasting effects on behaviour of relative age at school. We conduct an online incentivised survey with a sample of 1007 adults, who were born at most two months before or after the school entry cut-off date in four Australian states. We find those who were among the oldest in the classroom throughout their school years display higher self-confidence, are more willing to enter in some form of competition and declare taking more risk in a range of domains in their life, compared to those who were among the youngest.
From 2012... Fascist Ecology: The "Green Wing" of the Nazi Party and its Historical Antecedents
From 2012... Fascist Ecology: The "Green Wing" of the Nazi Party and its Historical Antecedents. Peter Staudenmaier. Pomegranate The International Journal of Pagan Studies 13(10). May 2012. DOI: 10.1558/pome.v13.i10.14577
Abstract: We recognize that separating humanity from nature, from the whole of life, leads to humankind's own destruction and to the death of nations. Only through a re-integration of humanity into the whole of nature can our people be made stronger. That is the fundamental point of the biological tasks of our age. Humankind alone is no longer the focus of thought, but rather life as a whole . . . This striving toward connectedness with the totality of life, with nature itself, a nature into which we are born, this is the deepest meaning and the true essence of National Socialist thought." 1 In our zeal to condemn the status quo, radicals often carelessly toss about epithets like "fascist" and "ecofascist," thus contributing to a sort of conceptual inflation that in no way furthers effective social critique. In such a situation, it is easy to overlook the fact that there are still virulent strains of fascism in our political culture which, however marginal, demand our attention. One of the least recognized or understood of these strains is the phenomenon one might call "actually existing ecofascism," that is, the preoccupation of authentically fascist movements with environmentalist concerns. In order to grasp the peculiar intensity and endurance of this affiliation, we would do well to examine more closely its most notorious historical incarnation, the so-called "green wing" of German National Socialism. Despite an extensive documentary record, the subject remains an elusive one, underappreciated by professional historians and environmental activists alike. In English-speaking countries as well as in Germany itself, the very existence of a "green wing" in the Nazi movement, much less its inspiration, goals, and consequences, has yet to be adequately researched and analyzed. Most of the handful of available interpretations succumb to either an alarming intellectual affinity with their subject." 2 or a naive refusal to examine the full extent of the "ideological overlap between nature conservation and National Socialism." 3 This article presents a brief and necessarily schematic overview of the ecological components of Nazism, emphasizing both their central role in Nazi ideology and their practical implementation during the Third Reich. A preliminary survey of nineteenth and twentieth century precursors to classical ecofascism should serve to illuminate the conceptual underpinnings common to all forms of reactionary ecology.
Abstract: We recognize that separating humanity from nature, from the whole of life, leads to humankind's own destruction and to the death of nations. Only through a re-integration of humanity into the whole of nature can our people be made stronger. That is the fundamental point of the biological tasks of our age. Humankind alone is no longer the focus of thought, but rather life as a whole . . . This striving toward connectedness with the totality of life, with nature itself, a nature into which we are born, this is the deepest meaning and the true essence of National Socialist thought." 1 In our zeal to condemn the status quo, radicals often carelessly toss about epithets like "fascist" and "ecofascist," thus contributing to a sort of conceptual inflation that in no way furthers effective social critique. In such a situation, it is easy to overlook the fact that there are still virulent strains of fascism in our political culture which, however marginal, demand our attention. One of the least recognized or understood of these strains is the phenomenon one might call "actually existing ecofascism," that is, the preoccupation of authentically fascist movements with environmentalist concerns. In order to grasp the peculiar intensity and endurance of this affiliation, we would do well to examine more closely its most notorious historical incarnation, the so-called "green wing" of German National Socialism. Despite an extensive documentary record, the subject remains an elusive one, underappreciated by professional historians and environmental activists alike. In English-speaking countries as well as in Germany itself, the very existence of a "green wing" in the Nazi movement, much less its inspiration, goals, and consequences, has yet to be adequately researched and analyzed. Most of the handful of available interpretations succumb to either an alarming intellectual affinity with their subject." 2 or a naive refusal to examine the full extent of the "ideological overlap between nature conservation and National Socialism." 3 This article presents a brief and necessarily schematic overview of the ecological components of Nazism, emphasizing both their central role in Nazi ideology and their practical implementation during the Third Reich. A preliminary survey of nineteenth and twentieth century precursors to classical ecofascism should serve to illuminate the conceptual underpinnings common to all forms of reactionary ecology.
From 2017... 1919–1944: Meat Propaganda, Against (Fiume, Fascism & Nazism) and Pro (US)
From 2017... 1919–1944: Meat Propaganda. Francesco Buscemi. From Body
Fuel to Universal Poison pp 49-61. December 16 2017.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-72086-9_4
Abstract: This chapter principally analyses meat in terms of its relations to ideology. Certainly, a right-wing vegetarianism existed, and is traceable in the Italian Regency of Fiume, Fascism and Nazism, three dictatorships that ruled in today’s Croatia, Italy and Germany respectively, and threatening the entire Europe. These dictatorships were also built on what I term ‘sacred vegetarianism’, a propagandistic meat abstention descending from old Oriental myths. Nonetheless, it must be said that Fascism and Nazism were adverse to the vegetarian associations in their countries, demonstrating that sacred vegetarianism was exclusively a matter of propaganda. Starting from studies that I have already published, the first part of this chapter summarizes what I have already found and interprets the result in cultural terms. What these dictatorships communicated, in fact, became part of the collective imaginary of these nations, and thus may be considered as part of cultural history. The second part of the chapter is, conversely, devoted to the way in which meat was ideologically represented in the US, and to scientific discoveries that encouraged meat consumption. Another issue analyzed is meat in WWII, from the points of view of both the soldiers at the front and the rest of the people at home. The short story is a tale about ideology and about how it splits communities into fighting factions.
Abstract: This chapter principally analyses meat in terms of its relations to ideology. Certainly, a right-wing vegetarianism existed, and is traceable in the Italian Regency of Fiume, Fascism and Nazism, three dictatorships that ruled in today’s Croatia, Italy and Germany respectively, and threatening the entire Europe. These dictatorships were also built on what I term ‘sacred vegetarianism’, a propagandistic meat abstention descending from old Oriental myths. Nonetheless, it must be said that Fascism and Nazism were adverse to the vegetarian associations in their countries, demonstrating that sacred vegetarianism was exclusively a matter of propaganda. Starting from studies that I have already published, the first part of this chapter summarizes what I have already found and interprets the result in cultural terms. What these dictatorships communicated, in fact, became part of the collective imaginary of these nations, and thus may be considered as part of cultural history. The second part of the chapter is, conversely, devoted to the way in which meat was ideologically represented in the US, and to scientific discoveries that encouraged meat consumption. Another issue analyzed is meat in WWII, from the points of view of both the soldiers at the front and the rest of the people at home. The short story is a tale about ideology and about how it splits communities into fighting factions.
The relatively uncensored internet is replacing Kremlin-controlled TV as the public’s main window onto the world; thew image of a resurgent Russia and a decadent, devious West is becoming more difficult for Moscow to maintain
On ‘Island’ in Russian Arctic, Arrival of Fast Internet Shakes Political Calm. Anton Troianovski. The New York Times, Oct. 20, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/20/world/europe/russia-internet-norilsk-youtube-arctic.html
Residents of Norilsk long felt isolated from their country’s turbulence. Then a mining company strung a fiber-optic cable across 600 miles of tundra.
NORILSK, Russia — On a screen, the California sun beams through the palm fronds and the Walk of Fame gleams underfoot. This island of mines and smokestacks in the tundra has high-speed internet now, so Andrei Kurchukov watches videos about America.
Videos by one of his favorite YouTube personalities, Marina Mogilko, feature interviews with fellow Russian expatriates in the United States. “Los Angeles,” she tells her one million followers, is “where Russian dreams come true.”
“I watch her and think, alas,” Mr. Kurchukov said. “So what we’re showing about the rotting West is false.”
Closed to foreigners, unreachable by road and shrouded in darkness for 45 days a year, Norilsk, an Arctic nickel-mining hub of 180,000, is Russia’s most isolated major city. Lacking reliable digital communication with the rest of the country — “the continent,” they call it — residents used to fly home with external hard drives full of downloaded books and movies after their trips out.
Then, two years ago, the city’s mining giant, Norilsk Nickel, strung a fiber-optic cable across 600 miles of tundra and under the vast, icy Yenisey River. Amid fireworks and a concert in the central square, cheaper, faster internet suddenly replaced a slow and shaky satellite link as the city’s main data connection to the rest of the planet.
That turned Norilsk into a petri dish for a slow-motion but radical change pushing ever deeper into Russia’s hinterlands. The relatively uncensored internet is replacing Kremlin-controlled TV as the public’s main window onto the world. And as it does so, the carefully crafted image of a resurgent Russia and a decadent, devious West is becoming more difficult for Moscow’s spin doctors to maintain.
“When the internet was slow, I knew less about this bad stuff happening on the continent,” said Anastasia Oleynikova, a 49-year-old housewife, walking her three dogs on a muddy lakefront track flanked by huge, rusting pipes. Now, “It’s becoming sad and depressing to think: What has our country come to?”
An Instagram account called Norilsk Today that often posts pictures of dirty tap water and uncollected trash along with snide commentary — “At least they tell us on television that our lives are wonderful” — has amassed 54,000 followers, nearly one-third of the city’s population. With the complaints out in the open, the authorities are sometimes forced to respond.
“At the direction of the acting prosecutor,” a typical announcement in the municipal newspaper reads, “an examination has been conducted based on information posted on the social network known as ‘Instagram’ on the network known as ‘the internet.’ ”
After President Vladimir V. Putin took power in 2000, he quickly grabbed control of all of Russia’s main TV channels. Drubbed into obedience, they piped an increasingly strident narrative of a newly assertive leader facing down the West into nearly every household across the country’s 11 time zones. Critical viewpoints remained accessible online, but that mattered little from the Kremlin’s perspective: In 2014, when Mr. Putin annexed Crimea, 90 percent of Russians told independent pollster Levada that television was their primary source of news.
Over the last few years, public opinion researchers have seen a shift. This year, only 72 percent of Russians told Levada that TV was their main source of news, while the share of respondents who relied on social media to keep abreast of current events roughly doubled to 32 percent since 2014.
Even a government-run pollster, FOM, reported that the share of Russians who trust TV news fell to 36 percent in 2019, from 63 percent four years earlier.
The Russian government is spending millions to expand high-speed internet access to far-flung areas. At the same time, it has worked to expand its internet propaganda operation, criminalized insulting the government online, and consulted with China about controlling the web. But all that has not stopped online videos from the opposition leader Aleksei A. Navalny and other Putin critics from racking up tens of millions of views; those aged 18 to 24 are now more likely to turn to YouTube than to television for daily information about current events, Levada found.
The internet boom at first passed Norilsk by. The city, built in inhuman conditions by Gulag prisoners, sits next to some of the world’s largest nickel deposits, 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. Metals leave the city’s sulfur-dioxide-belching smelters by railway for an Arctic Ocean port. Citizens, their livelihoods bound up with the mines, find it hard to leave at all. With no roads connecting the city to the outside world, constructing a land-based internet connection never made economic sense.
Residents adjusted. They created an intracity computer network that, among other things, allowed locals to download pirated movies and TV shows without connecting to the wider web. Going on vacation, several said, meant sitting in a hotel room, updating smartphone apps and taking in the bounties of the online world, even if the beach beckoned. Gamers who managed to get online to play “World of Tanks” — a popular Belarus-made computer game — learned to time their moves to take into account the delay caused by the city’s slow satellite link.
Leonid Pryadko, a miner who enjoys taking pictures in his spare time, used to enlist people leaving Norilsk to bring back downloaded YouTube videos of photography master classes, which he then shared with the city photo club. But he never sought out political content, and he said he would have never used up precious megabytes from his limited internet plan to download it.
Then, on Sept. 22, 2017, Norilsk Nickel finished a yearslong effort to string a bundle of 48 hair’s-width optical fibers over the frozen tundra, 600 miles from the city of Novy Urengoy. Part of the impetus was to modernize the company’s business processes. But a section of the 40 gigabit-per-second link was set aside for the general public, and the era of what residents call “the big internet” began.
“It was a crazy high, crazy pleasure, crazy euphoria,” Nikita Yakush, a programmer, said.
Facebook, YouTube and Instagram boomed. Even two years later, the Siberian telecommunications provider that services the city, Sibirskie Seti, said that Norilsk residents still consumed nearly twice as much web traffic as their other customers.
But as the internet expanded, political content became harder to avoid — “On YouTube, it’s everywhere,” Mr. Pryadko said. Mr. Yakush found out about this summer’s Moscow protests on an Instagram account specializing in cute animal videos. Mr. Pryadko learned about wildfires in Siberia that the Russian government was criticized for not doing enough to contain.
“I’ve started to worry,” he said, “about the political situation in the country, how everything happens with impunity.”
The regional office of Mr. Navalny, the opposition leader, is 900 miles away, in a basement in the Siberian metropolis of Krasnoyarsk. There, the office’s coordinator, Daniil Markelov, sees the fiber-optic line as an opportunity to penetrate a city so tightly monitored by the security services that passengers arriving on domestic flights have to go through passport control.
Working remotely, Mr. Markelov’s team produced a YouTube video this year telling the story of an allegedly wrongful property transfer engineered by the city’s mayor. The video got so much attention in Norilsk that the mayor, Rinat Akhmetchin, felt compelled to go on public television to deny any wrongdoing.
To Mr. Markelov, the power of YouTube is that people do not have to seek out political content — it comes to them, thanks to the platform’s recommendation algorithm.
“In terms of exerting political pressure, the internet coming to faraway cities is pretty amazing,” Mr. Markelov said. “It automatically politicizes people.”
From inside Norilsk, the city’s few activists are using the web to gain nationwide attention, creating a way to pressure the mayor’s office and the city’s main employer and polluter, Norilsk Nickel.
“We know we’re being seen, we’re being heard,” said Ruslan Abdullayev, a Norilsk lawyer who often campaigns against pollution and corruption. He said that the local news media used to ignore his complaints, but now that he can more easily reach a national audience online, “I don’t need them anymore.”
Whether greater access to critical information online actually leads Russians to demand more rights from their government remains to be seen. The chairman of the Norilsk City Council, Aleksandr Pestryakov, a member of Mr. Putin’s United Russia party, argued that better internet access had made people more withdrawn and less interested in taking part in public life.
“The internet allows for energy to be released and that’s it,” Mr. Pestryakov said. “Maybe some person would have been ready to say something against the authorities and go out on the street. But the internet lets him do that and stay on the couch by the television, and everything is great.”
Vitaly Bolnakov, a lawyer and activist, used the web to find out how to marry his same-sex partner. The couple last year flew to Denmark, got their marriage certificate, and posted a detailed how-to on a Russian L.G.B.T. online forum.
Asked about his future plans, Mr. Bolnakov jerked his thumb at the miniature American and Canadian flags mounted on his apartment wall. Watching YouTube, he said, has made him more of a “Russophobe.” He sees how often his fellow Russians’ rights are violated by the state and how little his countrymen stand up for them.
The internet will not change the fact that Mr. Putin controls a sprawling security apparatus capable of putting down any revolt, he says. But at least people now find it easier to make fun of their government.
“The internet can’t change anything cardinally, but morally it puts them down,” Mr. Bolnakov said of the authorities. “They’re being laughed at, you understand?”
Violent video game play can alter how people process social information: Improved subjective fighting ability is a reinforcing feature of violent video games that may make them highly attractive to players
Violent video game play, gender, and trait aggression influence subjective fighting ability, perceptions of men's toughness, and anger facial recognition. Thomas F. Denson et al. Computers in Human Behavior, October 21 2019, 106175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2019.106175
Highlights
• Playing violent video games reduced facial anger recognition.
• Playing violent video games increased subjective fighting ability.
• Playing violent video games reduced perceptions of other men's toughness.
• Together results suggest violent video games enhance a readiness to fight.
• These effects of violent video games may contribute to gaming disorders.
Abstract: Violent video game play can alter how people process social information. We examined the extent to which violent video game play influenced anger facial recognition, perceptions of one's own fighting ability, and perceptions of others' toughness. In three experiments (N = 868), participants were randomly assigned to play a violent or non-violent video game in the laboratory for 15 min (Experiments 1 and 2) or online for 5 min (Experiment 3). Participants then completed anger recognition tasks. Participants also indicated when they would back out of a physical confrontation with images of men that morphed from feminine to masculine. They rated these same target images on how tough they were and how much they could bench press. Participants rated themselves on how well they would fare in a fight against the men. Although not perfectly replicated, the general pattern of findings suggest that violent video game play impaired anger recognition, increased players' self-perceived fighting ability and reduced perceptions of the target men's toughness. Several effects were moderated by gender and/or trait aggression. These results provide insight into improved subjective fighting ability as a reinforcing feature of violent video games that may make them highly attractive to players.
Highlights
• Playing violent video games reduced facial anger recognition.
• Playing violent video games increased subjective fighting ability.
• Playing violent video games reduced perceptions of other men's toughness.
• Together results suggest violent video games enhance a readiness to fight.
• These effects of violent video games may contribute to gaming disorders.
Abstract: Violent video game play can alter how people process social information. We examined the extent to which violent video game play influenced anger facial recognition, perceptions of one's own fighting ability, and perceptions of others' toughness. In three experiments (N = 868), participants were randomly assigned to play a violent or non-violent video game in the laboratory for 15 min (Experiments 1 and 2) or online for 5 min (Experiment 3). Participants then completed anger recognition tasks. Participants also indicated when they would back out of a physical confrontation with images of men that morphed from feminine to masculine. They rated these same target images on how tough they were and how much they could bench press. Participants rated themselves on how well they would fare in a fight against the men. Although not perfectly replicated, the general pattern of findings suggest that violent video game play impaired anger recognition, increased players' self-perceived fighting ability and reduced perceptions of the target men's toughness. Several effects were moderated by gender and/or trait aggression. These results provide insight into improved subjective fighting ability as a reinforcing feature of violent video games that may make them highly attractive to players.
Associations between adolescent media use, mental health, and risky sexual behaviors: Both social media and hours spent watching TV had negligible impacts on risky sexual behaviors
Associations between adolescent media use, mental health, and risky sexual behaviors. Renae A. Merrill, Xinya Liang. Children and Youth Services Review, Volume 103, August 2019, Pages 1-9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2019.05.022
Highlights
• Social media consumption and TV may not be practically associated with poorer mental health.
• Both social media and hours spent watching TV had negligible impacts on risky sexual behaviors.
• Adolescents who engaged in risky sexual behaviors reported overall poorer mental health.
Abstract: Guided by the ecological “technosystem,” data was examined from 13,156 adolescents completing the CDC's 2015 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) looking for associations between television, social media, depressive symptoms, suicidality, and sexual risk behaviors. Regression results indicate media use is not an important factor in adolescents' internalizing and externalizing problems. Social media and television are unlikely the contributors to both mental health and risky sexual behaviors. Findings from this research are important for future studies that focus on multi-systemic prevention and intervention efforts aimed at promoting adolescent resiliency, particularly among vulnerable youth who are most susceptible to media influences.
Highlights
• Social media consumption and TV may not be practically associated with poorer mental health.
• Both social media and hours spent watching TV had negligible impacts on risky sexual behaviors.
• Adolescents who engaged in risky sexual behaviors reported overall poorer mental health.
Abstract: Guided by the ecological “technosystem,” data was examined from 13,156 adolescents completing the CDC's 2015 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) looking for associations between television, social media, depressive symptoms, suicidality, and sexual risk behaviors. Regression results indicate media use is not an important factor in adolescents' internalizing and externalizing problems. Social media and television are unlikely the contributors to both mental health and risky sexual behaviors. Findings from this research are important for future studies that focus on multi-systemic prevention and intervention efforts aimed at promoting adolescent resiliency, particularly among vulnerable youth who are most susceptible to media influences.
Sunday, October 20, 2019
Men’s Bodily Attractiveness: Women’s preferences provided only partial support for our hypotheses that women will prefer muscles that most reliably differentiate between potential mates to be larger
Men’s Bodily Attractiveness: Muscles as Fitness Indicators. Patrick K. Durkee et al. Evolutionary Psychology, Volume 17 issue 2, June 5, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919852918
Abstract: Bodily attractiveness is an important component of mate value. Musculature—a crucial component of men’s bodily attractiveness—provides women with probabilistic information regarding a potential mate’s quality. Overall musculature is comprised of several muscle groups, each of which varies in information value; different muscles should be weighted differently by attractiveness-assessment adaptations as a result. In the current study, women and men (N = 1,742) reported size preferences for 14 major muscle groups. Women’s reported preferences provided only partial support for our hypotheses that women will prefer muscles that most reliably differentiate between potential mates to be larger; men tended to prefer larger upper-body muscles. We discuss possible interpretations of these mixed findings. Ultimately, our findings suggest that attractiveness-assessment adaptations are sensitive to the information contained within specific muscle groups and they highlight the potential for additional research on the nuances of bodily attractiveness assessment.
Keywords muscles, attractiveness assessment, evolved preferences, mate value
Abstract: Bodily attractiveness is an important component of mate value. Musculature—a crucial component of men’s bodily attractiveness—provides women with probabilistic information regarding a potential mate’s quality. Overall musculature is comprised of several muscle groups, each of which varies in information value; different muscles should be weighted differently by attractiveness-assessment adaptations as a result. In the current study, women and men (N = 1,742) reported size preferences for 14 major muscle groups. Women’s reported preferences provided only partial support for our hypotheses that women will prefer muscles that most reliably differentiate between potential mates to be larger; men tended to prefer larger upper-body muscles. We discuss possible interpretations of these mixed findings. Ultimately, our findings suggest that attractiveness-assessment adaptations are sensitive to the information contained within specific muscle groups and they highlight the potential for additional research on the nuances of bodily attractiveness assessment.
Keywords muscles, attractiveness assessment, evolved preferences, mate value
On average it takes a 30% increase in GDP to raise happiness by the amount that a year of war causes it to fall
Historical analysis of national subjective wellbeing using millions of digitized books. Thomas T. Hills, Eugenio Proto, Daniel Sgroi & Chanuki Illushka Seresinhe. Nature Human Behaviour, October 14 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0750-z
Abstract: In addition to improving quality of life, higher subjective wellbeing leads to fewer health problems and higher productivity, making subjective wellbeing a focal issue among researchers and governments. However, it is difficult to estimate how happy people were during previous centuries. Here we show that a method based on the quantitative analysis of natural language published over the past 200 years captures reliable patterns in historical subjective wellbeing. Using sentiment analysis on the basis of psychological valence norms, we compute a national valence index for the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Italy, indicating relative happiness in response to national and international wars and in comparison to historical trends in longevity and gross domestic product. We validate our method using Eurobarometer survey data from the 1970s and demonstrate robustness using words with stable historical meanings, diverse corpora (newspapers, magazines and books) and additional word norms. By providing a window on quantitative historical psychology, this approach could inform policy and economic history.
There are several ungated versions, among them one in 2015 (!): https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/9195/historical-analysis-of-national-subjective-wellbeing-using-millions-of-digitized-books
Abstract: In addition to improving quality of life, higher subjective wellbeing leads to fewer health problems and higher productivity, making subjective wellbeing a focal issue among researchers and governments. However, it is difficult to estimate how happy people were during previous centuries. Here we show that a method based on the quantitative analysis of natural language published over the past 200 years captures reliable patterns in historical subjective wellbeing. Using sentiment analysis on the basis of psychological valence norms, we compute a national valence index for the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Italy, indicating relative happiness in response to national and international wars and in comparison to historical trends in longevity and gross domestic product. We validate our method using Eurobarometer survey data from the 1970s and demonstrate robustness using words with stable historical meanings, diverse corpora (newspapers, magazines and books) and additional word norms. By providing a window on quantitative historical psychology, this approach could inform policy and economic history.
There are several ungated versions, among them one in 2015 (!): https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/9195/historical-analysis-of-national-subjective-wellbeing-using-millions-of-digitized-books
Analyses of data from a pilot experiment (n = 54) and a pre-registered experiment (n = 171) provides no evidence that mindfulness meditation increases political tolerance
Petersen, Michael Bang, and Panagiotis Mitkidis. 2019. “A Sober Second Thought? A Pre-registered Experiment on the Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on Political Tolerance.” PsyArXiv. October 20. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ksy37
Abstract: Mindfulness meditation is increasingly promoted as a tool to foster more inclusive and tolerant societies and, accordingly, meditation practice has been adopted in a number of public institutions including schools and legislatures. Here, we provide the first empirical test of the effects of mindfulness meditation on political and societal attitudes by examining whether completion in a 15-minute mindfulness meditation increases tolerance towards disliked groups relative to relevant control conditions. Analyses of data from a pilot experiment (N = 54) and a pre-registered experiment (N = 171) provides no evidence that mindfulness meditation increases political tolerance. Furthermore, exploratory analyses show that individual differences in trait mindfulness is not associated with differences in tolerance. These results suggest that there is reason to pause recommending mindfulness meditation as a way to achieve democratically desirable outcomes or, at least, that short-term meditation is not sufficient to generate these.
Check also ‘I Do Not Exist’: Pathologies of Self Among Western Buddhists. Judith Pickering. Journal of Religion and Health, June 2019, Volume 58, Issue 3, pp 748–769. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/07/i-do-not-exist-pathologies-of-self.html
Mindfulness not related to behavioral & speech markers of emotional positivity (or less negativity), interpersonally better connected (quality or quantity), or prosocial orientation (more affectionate, less gossipy or complaining)Dispositional mindfulness in daily life:
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There is reason to pause recommending mindfulness meditation as a way to achieve democratically desirable outcomes like tolerance for disliked groups
Abstract: Mindfulness meditation is increasingly promoted as a tool to foster more inclusive and tolerant societies and, accordingly, meditation practice has been adopted in a number of public institutions including schools and legislatures. Here, we provide the first empirical test of the effects of mindfulness meditation on political and societal attitudes by examining whether completion in a 15-minute mindfulness meditation increases tolerance towards disliked groups relative to relevant control conditions. Analyses of data from a pilot experiment (N = 54) and a pre-registered experiment (N = 171) provides no evidence that mindfulness meditation increases political tolerance. Furthermore, exploratory analyses show that individual differences in trait mindfulness is not associated with differences in tolerance. These results suggest that there is reason to pause recommending mindfulness meditation as a way to achieve democratically desirable outcomes or, at least, that short-term meditation is not sufficient to generate these.
Check also ‘I Do Not Exist’: Pathologies of Self Among Western Buddhists. Judith Pickering. Journal of Religion and Health, June 2019, Volume 58, Issue 3, pp 748–769. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/07/i-do-not-exist-pathologies-of-self.html
Mindfulness not related to behavioral & speech markers of emotional positivity (or less negativity), interpersonally better connected (quality or quantity), or prosocial orientation (more affectionate, less gossipy or complaining)Dispositional mindfulness in daily life:
Deanna M. Kaplan, L. Raison, Anne Milek, Allison M. Tackman, Thaddeus W. W. Pace, Matthias R. Mehl. PLOS, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/11/mindfulness-not-related-to-behavioral.html
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There is reason to pause recommending mindfulness meditation as a way to achieve democratically desirable outcomes like tolerance for disliked groups
Disgust Proneness and Personal Space in Children
Disgust Proneness and Personal Space in Children. Anne Schienle, Daniela Schwab. Evolutionary Psychology, September 18, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919870990
Abstract: Individuals vary in their personal space (PS) size as reflected by the preferred distance to another person during social interactions. A previous study with adults showed that pathogen-relevant disgust proneness (DP) predicted PS magnitude. The present study investigated whether this association between DP and PS already exists in 8- to 12-year-old children (144 girls, 101 boys). The children answered a disgust questionnaire with the two trait dimensions “core disgust (contact with spoiled food and poor hygiene) and “death-relevant disgust” (imagined contact with dead and dying organisms). PS magnitude was assessed with a paper–pencil measure (drawing a PS bubble; Experiment 1) or with the stop-distance task (preferred distance to an approaching woman or man; Experiment 2). In both experiments, only death-related disgust predicted PS magnitude and only if the approaching person was male. The current study questions the relevance of pathogen-related disgust in children for regulating interpersonal distance.
Keywords personal space, disgust proneness, children
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Abstract: Individuals vary in their personal space (PS) size as reflected by the preferred distance to another person during social interactions. A previous study with adults showed that pathogen-relevant disgust proneness (DP) predicted PS magnitude. The present study investigated whether this association between DP and PS already exists in 8- to 12-year-old children (144 girls, 101 boys). The children answered a disgust questionnaire with the two trait dimensions “core disgust (contact with spoiled food and poor hygiene) and “death-relevant disgust” (imagined contact with dead and dying organisms). PS magnitude was assessed with a paper–pencil measure (drawing a PS bubble; Experiment 1) or with the stop-distance task (preferred distance to an approaching woman or man; Experiment 2). In both experiments, only death-related disgust predicted PS magnitude and only if the approaching person was male. The current study questions the relevance of pathogen-related disgust in children for regulating interpersonal distance.
Keywords personal space, disgust proneness, children
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Over the course of human evolution, physical proximity to others has often been associated with an increased vulnerability to interpersonal violence and infectious disease (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). Even today, most people would not consider it wise to spend too much time in close proximity to people that are displaying overtly aggressive behavior or recognizable symptoms of illness, as the first characteristic implies an increased risk for physical harm, whereas the second a transmission of pathogens. Both types of these threats elicit specific emotions fear and disgust, which in turn facilitate certain behavioral strategies, such as escape and active avoidance/rejection (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005).
These behaviors regulate interpersonal distance or “personal space” (PS). PS is defined as the region immediately surrounding our bodies. It can be conceptualized as an imaginary safety zone that should not be invaded by others (Hayduk, 1978). This zone has a variable magnitude, which is influenced by several characteristics of the approaching person as well of the person who is approached. For instance, biological sex moderates PS size. Women typically choose a greater distance to a male stranger relative to a female they have never met before. From a bio-evolutionary perspective, this response tendency seems to be adaptive because men are more physically aggressive than women and were historically more likely to participate in violent conflicts (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016).
Emotional states are also associated with PS size. We allow a smaller distance when we are happy and when someone is approaching us with a friendly face (Gessaroli, Santelli, di Pellegrino, & Frassinetti, 2013). On the other hand, facial expressions of anger lead to increased arousal and withdrawal even in very young children (4–24 months old; e.g., LoBue, Buss, Taber-Thomas, & Pérez-Edgar, 2017). There is also disgust-based interpersonal distancing. We try to maintain a greater distance to people who provoke feelings of disgust (e.g., because of signs of illness). Blacker and LoBou (2016) showed that children aged 6–7 years chose a greater distance to a confederate who was described as being sick. The best predictor of avoidance was the child’s knowledge about illness transmission and possible outcomes.
Finally, certain personality traits are associated with PS preferences. PS tends to be larger among anxious and introverted individuals (e.g., Pedersen, 1973; Sambo & Iannetti, 2013). Park (2015) conducted the first study on the association between the personality trait disgust proneness (DP) and PS size. He showed that individual differences in pathogen-relevant DP predicted PS magnitude independent of trait anxiety and introversion in a sample of adults. DP is the temporally stable tendency of an individual to experience disgust across different situations (Schienle & Rohrmann, 2011).
Disgust researchers generally agree that DP is a multidimensional construct (e.g., Olatunji et al., 2009; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009; Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). For example, Olatunji et al. (2009) conducted a large cross-cultural study to evaluate the factor structure of DP in eight countries. The authors identified three central dimensions labeled “core disgust” (e.g., “You are about to drink a glass of milk when you smell that it is spoiled”), “contamination disgust” (e.g., “I probably would not go to my favorite restaurant if I found out that the cook had a cold”), and “animal-reminder disgust” (e.g., “It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body”). With partial overlap, Tybur, Lieberman, and Griskevicius (2009) and Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, and DeScioli (2013) described three DP domains with the functions of pathogen avoidance and functional decision-making in the domains of mate choice and morality.
These examples demonstrate that very consistently a disgust factor related to contamination risk could be identified. This factor is part of a disease-avoidance mechanism that motivates specific behaviors (e.g., grooming, cleaning, avoidance, distancing) aiming at reducing the risk of pathogen transmission (e.g., Tybur et al. 2009). A similar disgust dimension has also been identified in children. Schienle and Rohrmann (2011) constructed a DP measure for children. Two interrelated disgust factors were identified: core disgust and “death-related disgust.” The latter factor corresponds to the factor animal-reminder disgust as described by Olatunji et al. (2009) for adults.
The present investigation analyzed whether DP (core disgust; death-related disgust) is associated with PS size in children. Two different PS tasks were employed. In Experiment 1, 110 children were asked to draw a PS bubble around a silhouette representing their own person in order to describe the preferred interpersonal distance to a woman and a man. In the second experiment with 135 children, the stop-distance task (Kennedy, Gläscher, Tyszka, & Adolphs, 2009) was conducted. A female and a male adult slowly approached the children, who were instructed that the confederate would walk toward them until they said stop.
Male Vocal Quality and Its Relation to Females’ Preferences
Male Vocal Quality and Its Relation to Females’ Preferences. Alexandre Suire, Michel Raymond, Melissa Barkat-Defradas. Evolutionary Psychology, September 30, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919874675
Abstract: In both correlational and experimental settings, studies on women’s vocal preferences have reported negative relationships between perceived attractiveness and men’s vocal pitch, emphasizing the idea of an adaptive preference. However, such consensus on vocal attractiveness has been mostly conducted with native English speakers, but a few evidence suggest that it may be culture-dependent. Moreover, other overlooked acoustic components of vocal quality, such as intonation, perceived breathiness and roughness, may influence vocal attractiveness. In this context, the present study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating vocal attractiveness in an underrepresented language (i.e., French) as well as shedding light on its relationship with understudied acoustic components of vocal quality. More specifically, we investigated the relationships between attractiveness ratings as assessed by female raters and male voice pitch, its variation, the formants’ dispersion and position, and the harmonics-to-noise and jitter ratios. Results show that women were significantly more attracted to lower vocal pitch and higher intonation patterns. However, they did not show any directional preferences for all the other acoustic features. We discuss our results in light of the adaptive functions of vocal preferences in a mate choice context.
Keywords attractiveness, fundamental frequency, formants, intonation, breathiness, roughness, mate choice
Check also Human vocal behavior within competitive and courtship contexts and its relation to mating success. Alexandre Suire, Michel Raymond, Melissa Barkat-Defradas. Evolution and Human Behavior, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/07/men-displaying-faster-articulation-rate.html: Men displaying faster articulation rate and louder voices reported significantly more sexual partners
Abstract: In both correlational and experimental settings, studies on women’s vocal preferences have reported negative relationships between perceived attractiveness and men’s vocal pitch, emphasizing the idea of an adaptive preference. However, such consensus on vocal attractiveness has been mostly conducted with native English speakers, but a few evidence suggest that it may be culture-dependent. Moreover, other overlooked acoustic components of vocal quality, such as intonation, perceived breathiness and roughness, may influence vocal attractiveness. In this context, the present study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating vocal attractiveness in an underrepresented language (i.e., French) as well as shedding light on its relationship with understudied acoustic components of vocal quality. More specifically, we investigated the relationships between attractiveness ratings as assessed by female raters and male voice pitch, its variation, the formants’ dispersion and position, and the harmonics-to-noise and jitter ratios. Results show that women were significantly more attracted to lower vocal pitch and higher intonation patterns. However, they did not show any directional preferences for all the other acoustic features. We discuss our results in light of the adaptive functions of vocal preferences in a mate choice context.
Keywords attractiveness, fundamental frequency, formants, intonation, breathiness, roughness, mate choice
Check also Human vocal behavior within competitive and courtship contexts and its relation to mating success. Alexandre Suire, Michel Raymond, Melissa Barkat-Defradas. Evolution and Human Behavior, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/07/men-displaying-faster-articulation-rate.html: Men displaying faster articulation rate and louder voices reported significantly more sexual partners
Politically Motivated Causal Evaluations of Economic Performance: Despite being shown identical data, participants differed in their judgments of the graphs along party lines
Politically Motivated Causal Evaluations of Economic Performance. Zachary A. Caddick Benjamin M. Rottman. Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh. http://www.lrdc.pitt.edu/rottman/pubs/38/2019CaddickRottmanCogSci.pdf
Abstract: The current study seeks to extend research on motivated reasoning by examining how prior beliefs influence the interpretation of objective graphs displaying quantitative information. The day before the 2018 midterm election, conservatives and liberals made judgments about four economic indicators displaying real-world data of the US economy. Half of the participants were placed in an 'alien cover story' condition where prior beliefs were reduced under the guise of evaluating a fictional society. The other half of participants in the 'authentic condition' were aware they were being shown real-world data. Despite being shown identical data, participants in the Authentic condition differed in their judgments of the graphs along party lines. The participants in the Alien condition interpreted the data similarly, regardless of politics. There was no evidence of a „backfire‟ effect, and there was some evidence of belief updating when shown objective data.
Keywords: motivated reasoning; politics; biases; reasoning; decision-making
Introduction
Previous research has shown that individuals often reason differently about information depending on whether it is congruent with their prior beliefs. Individuals tend to more easily accept information that is congruent with prior beliefs and desires and discount information that is incongruent with prior beliefs and desires. This process is known as motivated reasoning. In the current research, we studied the influence of political attitudes on how people interpret time series graphs of the economy. This research is at the intersection of two fields: causal reasoning about time series data, and motivated reasoning.
Motivated Reasoning and Causal Reasoning: Similarities and Differences
The fields of motivated reasoning and causal reasoning have long been intimately connected in certain ways, yet also distant in other ways. The current research aims to advance both of these fields, and to advance research on the intersection of the two.
In one aspect, these two fields have studied similar questions about the role of prior beliefs and desires on the acceptance or rejection of new information. On the causal reasoning side, there has been considerable research into how people incorporate new information with prior causal beliefs (e.g., Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). Furthermore, many of the particular topics that have been studied in the field of motivated reasoning have had to do with causal or at least predictive relations. For example, in a seminal work on motivated reasoning, Kunda (1987) found that people tend to believe that other people who have attributes similar to themselves are less likely to get divorced than people with dissimilar attributes. Note how in this study, the attribute is as a potential cause or predictor of the effect (divorce). Other research on motivated reasoning that is less directly related to causation still often studies acceptance of causalscientific explanations, for example, about global warming (Campbell & Kay, 2014).
On the other hand, there are also important differences between these fields. First, causal learning has traditionally been focused on the rational (Bayesian) updating of beliefs given new information, whereas motivated reasoning has focused on affective reasons for failing to update beliefs. A second difference, more relevant to the current research, is that most research on causal reasoning has focused on the inferential process - how a learner infers a cause-effect relationship from a set of data. In contrast, research on motivated reasoning does not involve inference. Instead, participants are typically presented with a fact or a set of facts, and the question is whether participants accept or reject the facts (e.g., Ranney & Clark, 2016).
One recent study on motivated reasoning has investigated inference from data, similar to causal reasoning research. Kahan, Peters, Dawson, and Slovic (2017) presented participants with quantitative information in 2x2 contingency tables about the number of cities that did or did not ban handguns in public and whether there was an increase or decrease in crime, and participants were asked to infer the relation between gun bans and crime. Despite being presented with quantitative data, participants were more likely to make correct inferences when the data supported their prior attitudes about guns. The current research is in a similar vein–it investigates the role of political attitudes on inferences about economic trends.
Persuasive Effects of Presidential Campaign Advertising: Effects are sometimes distinguishable from zero, but are always quite modest
Persuasive Effects of Presidential Campaign Advertising: Results of 53 Real-time Experiments in 2016. Alexander Coppock, Seth J. Hill and Lynn Vavreck. Prepared for presentation at the 2019 meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 23, 2019. https://alexandercoppock.com/papers/CHV_ads.pdf
Abstract: In this letter, we report the results of 53randomizedadvertising experiments conducted over 29 weeks on 34,000 people during the US 2016 Presidential election. Our treatments were drawn in real time from advertisements on air each week. The ads vary on many dimensions: election type (primary or general), tone (attack or promotional), sponsor (candidates or Super PACS), context (timing), and content (topics). We manipulate which ads respondents see, when they see them, whether they see more than one ad, which ad they see first, and whether they see competing, reinforcing, or no additional information. Owing to the large size of our study, the meta-analytic estimates of the average treatment effects on favorability and vote choice are sometimes distinguishable from zero, but are always quite modest, even accounting for variation across advertisements and contexts.
Check also Le Pennec, Caroline, and Vincent Pons. "Vote Choice Formation and the Minimal Effects of TV Debates: Evidence from 61 Elections in 9 OECD Countries." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-031, September 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/tv-debates-small-effect-in-voters.html
And Testing popular news discourse on the “echo chamber” effect: Does political polarisation occur among those relying on social media as their primary politics news source? Nguyen, A. and Vu, H.T. First Monday, 24 (5), 6. Jun 4 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/testing-popular-news-discourse-on-echo.html
And Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies. Shelley Boulianne, Karolina Koc-Michalska, Bruce Bimber. New Media & Society, presented, in review. Sep 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/echo-chambers-usa-overall-we-find-no.html
And Kalla, Joshua and Broockman, David E., The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments (September 25, 2017). Forthcoming, American Political Science Review; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-65. American Political Science Review. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/11/the-best-estimate-of-effects-of.html
TV debates small effect in voters, evidence from 61 elections in 9 OECD countries: Changes in individual vote choices mostly result from changes in beliefs on competing candidates
Le Pennec, Caroline, and Vincent Pons. "Vote Choice Formation and the Minimal Effects of TV Debates: Evidence from 61 Elections in 9 OECD Countries." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 20-031, September 2019. https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/vote-choice-formation-and-the-minimal-effects-of-tv-debates-evidence-from-61-elections-in-9-oecd-countries
Abstract: We use 200,000 observations from repeated survey data in 61 elections and 9 OECD countries since 1952 to study the formation of vote choices and policy preferences in the electoral season and assess how TV debates contribute to this process. We find that the share of voters who state a pre-election vote intention corresponding to their final vote choice increases by 15 percentage points in the two months preceding the election. Changes in individual vote choices mostly result from changes in beliefs on competing candidates, and they generate aggregate shifts in predicted vote shares. Instead, policy preferences remain remarkably stable over time. We use an event study to estimate the impact of TV debates, campaigns’ most salient events, and find that they do not significantly affect either individual vote choice and preference formation nor aggregate vote shares. This suggests that information continuously received by voters exerts more influence on their behavior.
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These results suggest that even if voters sometimes seem relatively uninformed, their vote choices actually aggregate a lot of information, beyond just debates, and that other sources are more impactful. A possible interpretation is that voters discard candidates’ debate statements because they rationally expect them to be more biased than information coming from nonpartisan sources, or that they only pay attention to statements aligned with their existing beliefs. But existing evidence shows that some forms of partisan communication do persuade voters. An alternative interpretation is that the particular medium through which debates are broadcasted is the issue: it is difficult for candidates to change people’s minds, and this does not happen on TV or the radio. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that campaign advertisements diffused through these channels fail to affect individual vote choices (Spenkuch and Toniatti, 2018), differently from more personalized contacts such as phone calls, door-to-door visits, or townhall meetings (e.g., Arceneaux, 2007; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Pons, 2018).
[...]
Our results also have implications for the regulation of campaigns. Since the first presidential TV debate in the U.S., in 1960, there has been a continuous and ongoing effort to diffuse this innovation to countries which have not adopted it yet (see for instance the work done by the Commission on Presidential Debates or the National Democratic Institute), and to improve debates’ format and the fairness with which they treat all competitors, including third-party candidates, where they have become a tradition(e.g., McKinney and Carlin, 2004). Our results suggest that some of this energy may be better spent in studying and reforming campaign regulations to ensure that all campaigns have equal direct access to voters; and in monitoring the most personal and tailored forms of partisan communication, on the field and in social media, toimprovethequality of information available to voters and increase the chance that their final choice corresponds to their actual preferences. This may require granting administrative bodies responsible for organizing and supervising elections more resources, while better controlling those available to candidates.
Check also Testing popular news discourse on the “echo chamber” effect: Does political polarisation occur among those relying on social media as their primary politics news source? Nguyen, A. and Vu, H.T. First Monday, 24 (5), 6. Jun 4 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/testing-popular-news-discourse-on-echo.html
And Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies. Shelley Boulianne, Karolina Koc-Michalska, Bruce Bimber. New Media & Society, presented, in review. Sep 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/echo-chambers-usa-overall-we-find-no.html
Abstract: We use 200,000 observations from repeated survey data in 61 elections and 9 OECD countries since 1952 to study the formation of vote choices and policy preferences in the electoral season and assess how TV debates contribute to this process. We find that the share of voters who state a pre-election vote intention corresponding to their final vote choice increases by 15 percentage points in the two months preceding the election. Changes in individual vote choices mostly result from changes in beliefs on competing candidates, and they generate aggregate shifts in predicted vote shares. Instead, policy preferences remain remarkably stable over time. We use an event study to estimate the impact of TV debates, campaigns’ most salient events, and find that they do not significantly affect either individual vote choice and preference formation nor aggregate vote shares. This suggests that information continuously received by voters exerts more influence on their behavior.
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These results suggest that even if voters sometimes seem relatively uninformed, their vote choices actually aggregate a lot of information, beyond just debates, and that other sources are more impactful. A possible interpretation is that voters discard candidates’ debate statements because they rationally expect them to be more biased than information coming from nonpartisan sources, or that they only pay attention to statements aligned with their existing beliefs. But existing evidence shows that some forms of partisan communication do persuade voters. An alternative interpretation is that the particular medium through which debates are broadcasted is the issue: it is difficult for candidates to change people’s minds, and this does not happen on TV or the radio. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that campaign advertisements diffused through these channels fail to affect individual vote choices (Spenkuch and Toniatti, 2018), differently from more personalized contacts such as phone calls, door-to-door visits, or townhall meetings (e.g., Arceneaux, 2007; Fujiwara and Wantchekon, 2013; Pons, 2018).
[...]
Our results also have implications for the regulation of campaigns. Since the first presidential TV debate in the U.S., in 1960, there has been a continuous and ongoing effort to diffuse this innovation to countries which have not adopted it yet (see for instance the work done by the Commission on Presidential Debates or the National Democratic Institute), and to improve debates’ format and the fairness with which they treat all competitors, including third-party candidates, where they have become a tradition(e.g., McKinney and Carlin, 2004). Our results suggest that some of this energy may be better spent in studying and reforming campaign regulations to ensure that all campaigns have equal direct access to voters; and in monitoring the most personal and tailored forms of partisan communication, on the field and in social media, toimprovethequality of information available to voters and increase the chance that their final choice corresponds to their actual preferences. This may require granting administrative bodies responsible for organizing and supervising elections more resources, while better controlling those available to candidates.
Check also Testing popular news discourse on the “echo chamber” effect: Does political polarisation occur among those relying on social media as their primary politics news source? Nguyen, A. and Vu, H.T. First Monday, 24 (5), 6. Jun 4 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/testing-popular-news-discourse-on-echo.html
And Right-Wing Populism, Social Media and Echo Chambers in Western Democracies. Shelley Boulianne, Karolina Koc-Michalska, Bruce Bimber. New Media & Society, presented, in review. Sep 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/10/echo-chambers-usa-overall-we-find-no.html
Defining pleasant touch stimuli: Using a soft material and stroking at a velocity of 3 cm/s with light force is generally considered as particularly pleasant
Defining pleasant touch stimuli: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Pankaj Taneja et al. Psychological Research, October 19 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-019-01253-8
Abstract: Pleasantness is generally overlooked when investigating tactile functions. Addition of a pleasant stimulus could allow for a more complete characterisation of somatosensory function. The aims of this review were to systematically assess the methodologies used to elicit a pleasant sensation, measured via psychophysical techniques, and to perform a meta-analysis to measure the effect of brush stroking velocity on touch pleasantness. Eighteen studies were included in the systematic review, with five studies included in the meta-analysis. The review found that factors such as texture, velocity, force, and the duration of continuous stroking influence tactile evoked pleasantness. Specifically, using a soft material and stroking at a velocity of 3 cm/s with light force is generally considered as particularly pleasant. The meta-analysis showed that a brush stroking velocity of 30 cm/s was rated as less pleasant than 3 cm/s, on the forearm. The present study collates the factors that are most likely to provide a stimulus to elicit a pleasant sensation. The results should be important for studies requiring a well-defined pleasant stimulus including neurosensory assessment protocols, allowing for a more complete multimodality assessment of somatosensory function.
Saturday, October 19, 2019
From 2013... The Good-in-Bed Effect: College Students’ Tendency to See Themselves as Better Than Others as a Sex Partner
The Good-in-Bed Effect: College Students’ Tendency to See Themselves as Better Than Others as a Sex Partner. James K. Beggan, Jennifer A. Vencill & Sheila Garos. The Journal of Psychology, Interdisciplinary and Applied, Volume 147, 2013 - Issue 5, Pages 415-434, Jul 2013. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.2012.707992
ABSTRACT: Self-enhancement refers to the finding that people tend to see themselves as better than others. The present research tested whether people display self-enhancement with regard to beliefs about their competency as sexual partners (the good-in-bed effect). Participants were asked to list good and bad sexually related behaviors more frequently performed by the self or by others. Study 1 demonstrated that people selectively associate themselves with good and others with bad sexual behaviors. In Study 2, independent raters judged bad behaviors associated with the self as less negative than bad behaviors associated with others. Study 3 replicated the good-in-bed effect and also found that when the salience of the comparison between good and bad traits is increased, men are more likely than women to demonstrate the effect. Implications of the results for relationship satisfaction are considered.
Keywords: gender, self-concept, self-enhancement, sex, sexual self, stereotypes
ABSTRACT: Self-enhancement refers to the finding that people tend to see themselves as better than others. The present research tested whether people display self-enhancement with regard to beliefs about their competency as sexual partners (the good-in-bed effect). Participants were asked to list good and bad sexually related behaviors more frequently performed by the self or by others. Study 1 demonstrated that people selectively associate themselves with good and others with bad sexual behaviors. In Study 2, independent raters judged bad behaviors associated with the self as less negative than bad behaviors associated with others. Study 3 replicated the good-in-bed effect and also found that when the salience of the comparison between good and bad traits is increased, men are more likely than women to demonstrate the effect. Implications of the results for relationship satisfaction are considered.
Keywords: gender, self-concept, self-enhancement, sex, sexual self, stereotypes
Childhood Maltreatment, Gender Nonconformity, and Adolescent Sexual Orientation: A Prospective Birth Cohort Study
Childhood Maltreatment, Gender Nonconformity, and Adolescent Sexual Orientation: A Prospective Birth Cohort Study. Yin Xu Sam Norton Qazi Rahman. Child Development, October 18 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13317
Abstract: This study tested whether associations between childhood maltreatment and adolescent sexual orientation were accounted for by childhood gender nonconforming behavior (GNCB) in a prospective birth cohort (N = 5,007). Childhood parental maltreatment (physical and emotional) and GNCB were assessed on multiple occasions up to age 6 years, and sexual orientation at 15.5 years. Boys with a history of maltreatment were significantly more likely to be nonheterosexual. Using propensity score weighting, maltreatment was associated with a 3.5% (p = .03) increase in the prevalence of nonheterosexuality accounting for confounders not including GNCB, and by 2.9% (p = .06) when also accounting for GNCB. These findings suggest that maltreatment is associated with an increased prevalence of nonheterosexuality in boys but may be explained by confounding factors including GNCB.
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