Female macaques compete for ‘power’ and ‘commitment’ in their male partners. Christine B. Haunhorst et al. Evolution and Human Behavior, November 18 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2019.11.001
Abstract: The formation of male-female social bonds and the resulting competition among females for male partners is a core element of human societies. While female competition for a male partner outside the mating context is well studied in humans, evidence from non-human primates is scarce, and its evolutionary roots remain to be explored. We studied two multi male – multi female groups of wild Assamese macaques (Macaca assamensis), a species where females gain benefits from selectively affiliating with particular males. Using a behavioral data set collected over several years, we tested whether females competed over access to male social partners, whether success in competition was driven by female dominance rank, and which male traits were most attractive for females. We found assortative bonding by dominance rank between females and males, which together with females initiating and maintaining contact suggests direct female competition over males. Two male traits independently predicted male attractiveness to females: (1) current dominance rank, a measure of “power” or a male's ability to provide access to resources, and (2) prior male affiliation with immatures, a measure of a male's potential paternal proclivity or “commitment” to infant care. Both traits have been consistently identified as drivers of female partner choice in humans. Our study adds to the evidence that female competition for valuable male partners is not unique to humans, suggesting deep evolutionary origins of women's mate choice tendencies for ‘power’ and ‘commitment’.
From the author's 2016 PhD Thesis (Evolutionary origin of the human pair-bond –the adaptive significance of male-female relationships in wild Assamese macaques (Macaca assamensis), Thailand), https://ediss.uni-goettingen.de/bitstream/handle/11858/00-1735-0000-0023-3EBC-9/Dissertation_HaunhorstCB.pdf
ASSAMESE MACAQUES AS MODEL ORGANISM FOR THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN PAIR-BONDS
In the following, I will combine hypotheses on the evolution of the human pair-bond and concealed ovulation to create a scenario how permanent pair-bonds may evolve or have evolved in Assamese macaques or humans, respectively. I will start with the assumption that in humans concealed ovulation evolved (or rather reliable sexual signals got lost) before the pair-bond evolved (Strassmann, 1981), like in Assamese macaques for reasons not debated here (but see Fürtbauer 2011for an elaborated theory). I will develop a theory how pair-bonds may evolve directly from multimale-multifemale groups with promiscuous mating system. Traits already featured by Assamese macaques (as introduced previously; Figure D3) will serve as baseline, and changes in ecological conditions as catalysts for evolutionary progression.
In Assamese macaques, the current social organization, social structure, and mating system (multimale-multifemale groups, promiscuous, social bonds between all sexes) may serve both sexes best in terms of maximizing reproductive output. The existence of dry and rainy season and the resulting seasonality in food availability favors seasonal breeding in females to time birth and lactation to highest food availability (van Schaik and van Noordwijk, 1985; Heesen et al., 2013). Given the hypothetical scenario that (for example due to climate change) seasonality may be less pronounced and food availability more or less spread evenly across the entire year, females may lose their strictly seasonal ovulation patterns (Fairbanks and McGuire, 1984). Though macaques may be less flexible to shift seasonal ovulation patterns than other primate species (Silk et al., 1981), Assamese macaques already feature prolonged sexual receptivity across four months during mating season (Fürtbauer et al., 2011a). Additionally, females may conceive later, and at the same time more often, when changed conditions favor reproduction. For instance, in 2013 infants were born between February and August, indicating a prolonged mating season, and though unexpected, the female with latest parturition gave birth again only 10 months later (personal observation; Ostner and Schülke, unpubl. data). Aseasonal food availability may also result in less clumped food patches and females ́ need to disperse further for foraging, leading to lowered male herding potential (Lukas and Clutton-Brock, 2013).
[Figure D3: Model for the evolution of pair-bonds in Assamese macaques. The current status of social structure and mating system in Assamese macaques at the top line, with its positive (+) or negative (-) influence on other traits, leading to pair-bonds. Details about necessary changes to lead to permanent pair-bonds can be found in the text.]
Female Assamese macaques would still feature concealed ovulation, resulting in lowered male-male competition for mating (Andelman, 1987; Marlowe and Berbesque, 2012), followed by a decreasing dominance skew in mate guarding ability of males. In turn, operational sex ratio may become more male-biased, because females spread receptive phases throughout the year leading to only a few fertile females at the same time, while the number of males would be constant. Male biased operational sex-ratio is supposed to be a prerequisite for the formation of stable pair-bonds (Quinlan and Quinlan, 2007). In human societies that are classified as monogamous, or serial monogamous, operational sex ratio is usually rather male-biased, while for polygynous populations the opposite holds true (Coxworth et al., 2015). On the other hand, a male biased operational sex-ratio leads again to enhanced male mating competition (Kvarnemo and Ahnesjö, 1996). The intensity of male competition should favor males successfully defending an existent bond, rather than searching for a new mate (Parker, 1974; Quinlan and Quinlan, 2007), particularly when concealed ovulation complicates finding mates at the time of ovulation. Males may then increase their chances for paternity by extending mate guarding for longer periods in which a female may be fertile (Palombit, 1999), leading to an enhanced certainty of paternity. In Assamese macaques, association patterns in the mating season already predict male paternity success with that female across all male dominance ranks (Ostner et al., 2013). At the current state dominant males still have priority of access to fertile females. If male monopolization potential is further lowered, all males may adopt strategies of prolonged associations over longer times to increase paternity success. Males should defend ratherlong-term mating relationships when facing costs by abandoning that relationship to search for another mate (Quinlan and Quinlan, 2007; Kokko and Jennions, 2008). Time may not be the restrictive condition, given that group-living is still enforced, because it holds benefits in terms of lowered predation risk and intergroup competition (Isbell, 1994; Sterck et al., 1997). However, if most females in a group are already taken by another male finding a new mate may be more complicated, resulting in unavoidable fighting risk. Additionally, in almost even operational sex ratios, female choice of partners may further lower male access to mates. Hence, in this scenario male access to multiple fertile females would be very low and abandoning an existent relationship may result in the female being fertilized by another male, while the former partner may not find a new mate.Aseasonal breeding may be followed by the females ́ needs to rely on increased male provisioning to overcome food scarcity in times of highenergy demands (i.e. birth and lactation) (Marlowe, 2003). In Assamese macaques, males do not provision females actively, but males may invest, or at least they do provide tolerance, into the female gaining more energy. This would lead to female partner choice based on traits other than dominance rank, but rather the male's willingness to provide paternal care (Strassmann, 1981; Geary, 2000). Given that males (if only accessing one fertile female) can only increase reproductive success, if the mother is in the physical condition to produce viable offspring, males should provide increased investment for the female during gestation and lactation. During lactation, the male may contribute the most to enhance his reproductive success by providing paternal care for the offspring he most likely sired (Clutton-Brock, 1988). Paternity confusion would then be lower than in a strictly promiscuous mating system, as males may havebetter knowledge of the female's mating history. This would be followed by an increase in male infanticide because most males can be certain of not being the sire of most of the infants. Hence, the male's investment in offspring protection would be mandatory to fend off potentially infanticidal males. Reappearing risk of infanticide may again lead to even tighter bonding between male and female during the highest risk of infanticide (van Schaik and Dunbar, 1990). Male care for female and offspring may also result in shortened interbirth intervals in females (cf. van Schaik and Dunbar 1990). When females reach fertility faster because of male help, the male may increase his own reproductive success further by staying with the same female, finally resulting in a permanent pair-bond.In humans now, strong male bonds may enable large societies consisting of multiple family groups (Chapais, 2013). In Assamese macaques, social bonds between adultmales are stable over several years (Kalbitz et al., 2016)and predictive of male-male coalitions (Schülke et al., 2010). Strong male bonds may increase successful defense of territories and hence overall female reproductive output through higher access to food resources (Boesch and Boesch-Achermann, 2000; Aureliet al., 2006). Additionally, for males within-group competition is lowered (Ostner and Schülke, 2014), and successful protection against incoming infanticidal males enhanced (van Schaik, 1996).
Predictability of the outcome of future interactions with the partner is important for the formation of permanent pair-bonds (Weinrich, 1977). In non-human primates emotional bookkeeping may allow long-term reciprocation between two individuals and create an environment of trust with for both individuals predictable interactions without advanced cognitive abilities (Schino and Aureli, 2010b, 2010c). The already established opposite-sex social bond in Assamese macaques may function as mediator to permanent pair-bonding, by means of predictability of future interactions with the partner. Male care, in terms of agonistic support and feeding tolerance, for females (and offspring) already exists in this species, although permanent pair-bonds are not presently existent. Male bonding is very pronounced in Assamese macaques, which would simplify the transition to rather male-bonded societies. So far, ecological conditions may favor the established social as well as mating system in Assamese macaques, but the traits required to switch social structure and mating system towards a permanently pair-bonded one are already existent.
Humans are the only species that build societies of multiple males and females living together, but with reproductive units that are entirely or primarily monogamous (Chapais, 2013). Considering that humans may also be the most successful extant species on earth, it is surprising that not more species adopted this system –in case that there is a connection. The permanent pair-bond, generated or followed by paternal care and male provisioning, builds the baseline for the development of large brains with increased cognitive abilities (Kaplan et al., 2000). Concealed ovulation in turn may have played a major role in the evolution of pair-bonds (Strassmann, 1981). The loss of this very distinctive and costly (Nunn, 1999)sexual signal in females may therefore have enforced pair-bonding in humans under certain ecologicalconditions. Both, synchrony in breeding and concealed ovulation lower male monopolization potential. Aseasonal breeding species with reliable indicators for ovulation fail to lower male mating competition and monopolization potential, making pair-bonding unattractive for males that can still enhance reproductive success by accessing several receptive females at a time. Seasonal breeding with concealed ovulation favors prolonged mate guarding activity by males only for the breeding season. Exclusively in aseasonal breeding species with concealed ovulation females would be able to prolong mate guarding, binding a particular male as potential sire to herself and resulting in paternal care, as suggested for humans (Hawkes, 2004).
Tuesday, November 19, 2019
Monday, November 18, 2019
Men's sociosexuality: No clear relationships between steroid hormones & self-reported sexual desire or sociosexual orientation; greater desire for casual sex only with relatively low average cortisol
Stern, Julia, Konstantina Karastoyanova, Michal Kandrik, Jaimie S. Torrance, Amanda Hahn, Iris J. Holzleitner, Lisa M. DeBruine, et al. 2019. “Are Sexual Desire and Sociosexual Orientation Related to Men’s Salivary Steroid Hormones?.” PsyArXiv. November 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/42t6e
Abstract: Although it is widely assumed that men’s sexual desire and interest in casual sex (i.e., sociosexual orientation) are linked to steroid hormone levels, evidence for such associations is mixed. Consequently, we tested for both longitudinal and cross-sectional relationships between salivary testosterone, cortisol, reported sexual desire and sociosexuality in a sample of 61 young adult men, each of whom was tested weekly on up to five occasions. Longitudinal analyses showed no clear relationships between steroid hormones and self-reported sexual desire or sociosexual orientation. Cross-sectional analyses showed no significant associations between average hormone levels and self-reported sexual desire. However, some aspects of sociosexuality, most notably desire for casual sex, were related to men’s average hormone levels. Men with higher average testosterone reported greater desire for casual sex, but only if they also had relatively low average cortisol. These results support a Dual Hormone account of men’s sociosexuality, in which the combined effects of testosterone and cortisol predict the extent of men’s interest in casual sex.
Abstract: Although it is widely assumed that men’s sexual desire and interest in casual sex (i.e., sociosexual orientation) are linked to steroid hormone levels, evidence for such associations is mixed. Consequently, we tested for both longitudinal and cross-sectional relationships between salivary testosterone, cortisol, reported sexual desire and sociosexuality in a sample of 61 young adult men, each of whom was tested weekly on up to five occasions. Longitudinal analyses showed no clear relationships between steroid hormones and self-reported sexual desire or sociosexual orientation. Cross-sectional analyses showed no significant associations between average hormone levels and self-reported sexual desire. However, some aspects of sociosexuality, most notably desire for casual sex, were related to men’s average hormone levels. Men with higher average testosterone reported greater desire for casual sex, but only if they also had relatively low average cortisol. These results support a Dual Hormone account of men’s sociosexuality, in which the combined effects of testosterone and cortisol predict the extent of men’s interest in casual sex.
Discussion
Our analyses showed no clear effects of within-subject changes in men’s
testosterone, cortisol, or their interaction on any aspects of sociosexuality or
sexual desire. There was a weak negative effect of current cortisol on
sociosexual desire, but this was not robust to correction for multiple tests
(uncorrected p-value = .044). Thus, we did not replicate Raisanen et al’s
(2018) recent finding that within-subject changes in men’s solitary, but not
dyadic, sexual desire track changes in their testosterone and cortisol.
However, our null results for sociosexuality and within-subject changes in
men’s testosterone are consistent with similar null results reported by Gettler
et al. (2019). While our results support the recent proposal that changes in
endogenous steroid hormones contribute little (if at all) to within-subject
changes in men’s sociosexuality (Gettler et al., 2019), they do not support the
claim that endogenous steroid hormones contribute to the regulation of men’s
sexual desire (Raisanen et al., 2018).
Our analyses of responses on the SDI-2 also showed no significant crosssectional
associations between aspects of men’s sexual desire and average
steroid hormones. Thus, we did not replicate previous findings in which men
with higher average testosterone reported greater solitary sexual desire (Das
& Sawin, 2016; van Anders & Dunn, 2009). However, the null results for
cross-sectional associations between aspects of men’s sexual desire and
steroid hormones are consistent with similar null results that have been
reported in other studies (van Anders et al., 2007; van Anders, 2012).
Collectively, these results suggest that associations between average steroid
hormone levels and sexual desire in men are not robust.
Some previous studies have reported that men with higher average
testosterone levels score higher on sociosexual desire (Edelstein et al., 2011;
Puts et al., 2015), but lower on sociosexual behavior (Puts et al., 2015).
These results have been interpreted as evidence for a feedback loop in which
rising testosterone levels increase sociosexual desire, but that engaging in
sexual behavior causes men’s testosterone levels to fall (Puts et al., 2015).
Neither our longitudinal nor cross-sectional analyses of men’s sociosexuality
support this proposal. However, our null results for sociosexuality and men’s
average testosterone levels are consistent with similar null results reported in
other studies (Kordsmeyer et al., 2018; van Anders et al., 2007).
Intriguingly, we found that average testosterone was positively related to
sociosexual attitudes, sociosexual desires, and global sociosexual orientation
(i.e., total scores on the SOI-R) among men with relatively low cortisol.
Although we did not predict this result, we note here that the interactions
between average testosterone and average cortisol for sociosexual attitudes
and global sociosexual orientation would be significant even if Bonferroni
corrected for multiple comparisons. Some previous research suggests that the
combination of high testosterone and low cortisol is associated with status
related behaviors (see Mehta & Prasad, 2015, for a review of this Dual Hormone Hypothesis).
If this is the case, our results present preliminary
evidence that attitudes to uncommitted sexual relationships might be similarly
related to high testosterone and low cortisol. Further research would be
necessary to shed further light on this possibility. Previous studies
investigating possible associations between steroid hormones and men’s
sociosexuality may not have detected these relationships because they did
not consider the interaction between average testosterone and average
cortisol (Kordsmeyer et al., 2018; van Anders et al., 2007).
Strengths of the current study include the longitudinal analyses and
consideration of testosterone, cortisol, and their interactions. However, there
are limitations that could be addressed in future work. For example,
replicating the cross-sectional findings for sociosexuality in a larger sample
may clarify whether our results are robust or false positives.
In conclusion, we did not replicate previous results linking aspects of men’s
sexual desire to their steroid hormones. However, we did find evidence that
aspects of men’s sociosexual orientation, most notably their attitude to casual
sex, was predicted by the interaction between average testosterone and
average cortisol. Men with higher average testosterone levels reported more
positive attitudes to casual sex, but only if they also had relatively low average
cortisol. While such a pattern of results is arguably consistent with the Dual
Hormone Hypothesis of men’s competitive behaviors, further work is needed
to establish whether this pattern of results is robust.
Our analyses showed no clear effects of within-subject changes in men’s
testosterone, cortisol, or their interaction on any aspects of sociosexuality or
sexual desire. There was a weak negative effect of current cortisol on
sociosexual desire, but this was not robust to correction for multiple tests
(uncorrected p-value = .044). Thus, we did not replicate Raisanen et al’s
(2018) recent finding that within-subject changes in men’s solitary, but not
dyadic, sexual desire track changes in their testosterone and cortisol.
However, our null results for sociosexuality and within-subject changes in
men’s testosterone are consistent with similar null results reported by Gettler
et al. (2019). While our results support the recent proposal that changes in
endogenous steroid hormones contribute little (if at all) to within-subject
changes in men’s sociosexuality (Gettler et al., 2019), they do not support the
claim that endogenous steroid hormones contribute to the regulation of men’s
sexual desire (Raisanen et al., 2018).
Our analyses of responses on the SDI-2 also showed no significant crosssectional
associations between aspects of men’s sexual desire and average
steroid hormones. Thus, we did not replicate previous findings in which men
with higher average testosterone reported greater solitary sexual desire (Das
& Sawin, 2016; van Anders & Dunn, 2009). However, the null results for
cross-sectional associations between aspects of men’s sexual desire and
steroid hormones are consistent with similar null results that have been
reported in other studies (van Anders et al., 2007; van Anders, 2012).
Collectively, these results suggest that associations between average steroid
hormone levels and sexual desire in men are not robust.
Some previous studies have reported that men with higher average
testosterone levels score higher on sociosexual desire (Edelstein et al., 2011;
Puts et al., 2015), but lower on sociosexual behavior (Puts et al., 2015).
These results have been interpreted as evidence for a feedback loop in which
rising testosterone levels increase sociosexual desire, but that engaging in
sexual behavior causes men’s testosterone levels to fall (Puts et al., 2015).
Neither our longitudinal nor cross-sectional analyses of men’s sociosexuality
support this proposal. However, our null results for sociosexuality and men’s
average testosterone levels are consistent with similar null results reported in
other studies (Kordsmeyer et al., 2018; van Anders et al., 2007).
Intriguingly, we found that average testosterone was positively related to
sociosexual attitudes, sociosexual desires, and global sociosexual orientation
(i.e., total scores on the SOI-R) among men with relatively low cortisol.
Although we did not predict this result, we note here that the interactions
between average testosterone and average cortisol for sociosexual attitudes
and global sociosexual orientation would be significant even if Bonferroni
corrected for multiple comparisons. Some previous research suggests that the
combination of high testosterone and low cortisol is associated with status
related behaviors (see Mehta & Prasad, 2015, for a review of this Dual Hormone Hypothesis).
If this is the case, our results present preliminary
evidence that attitudes to uncommitted sexual relationships might be similarly
related to high testosterone and low cortisol. Further research would be
necessary to shed further light on this possibility. Previous studies
investigating possible associations between steroid hormones and men’s
sociosexuality may not have detected these relationships because they did
not consider the interaction between average testosterone and average
cortisol (Kordsmeyer et al., 2018; van Anders et al., 2007).
Strengths of the current study include the longitudinal analyses and
consideration of testosterone, cortisol, and their interactions. However, there
are limitations that could be addressed in future work. For example,
replicating the cross-sectional findings for sociosexuality in a larger sample
may clarify whether our results are robust or false positives.
In conclusion, we did not replicate previous results linking aspects of men’s
sexual desire to their steroid hormones. However, we did find evidence that
aspects of men’s sociosexual orientation, most notably their attitude to casual
sex, was predicted by the interaction between average testosterone and
average cortisol. Men with higher average testosterone levels reported more
positive attitudes to casual sex, but only if they also had relatively low average
cortisol. While such a pattern of results is arguably consistent with the Dual
Hormone Hypothesis of men’s competitive behaviors, further work is needed
to establish whether this pattern of results is robust.
Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies: Optimal CBDC trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments
Designing Central Bank Digital Currencies. Itai Agur; Anil Ari; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia. IMF Working Paper No. 19/252, November 18, 2019. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2019/11/18/Designing-Central-Bank-Digital-Currencies-48739?cid=em-COM-123-39746
Summary: We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.
Summary: We study the optimal design of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) in an environment where agents sort into cash, CBDC and bank deposits according to their preferences over anonymity and security; and where network effects make the convenience of payment instruments dependent on the number of their users. CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.
Before they begin to speak, infants have already forged a link between language & core cognitive capacities; humans establish reference, convey information declaratively & pass down communicative devices via cultural transmission
Becoming human: human infants link language and cognition, but what about the other great apes? Miriam A. Novack and Sandra Waxman. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, November 18 2019. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2018.0408
Abstract: Human language has no parallel elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It is unique not only for its structural complexity but also for its inextricable interface with core cognitive capacities such as object representation, object categorization and abstract rule learning. Here, we (i) review recent evidence documenting how (and how early) language interacts with these core cognitive capacities in the mind of the human infant, and (ii) consider whether this link exists in non-human great apes—our closest genealogical cousins. Research with human infants demonstrates that well before they begin to speak, infants have already forged a link between language and core cognitive capacities. Evident by just three months of age, this language–cognition link unfolds in a rich developmental cascade, with each advance providing the foundation for subsequent, more precise and more powerful links. This link supports our species' capacity to represent and convey abstract concepts and to communicate beyond the immediate here and now. By contrast, although the communication systems of great apes are sophisticated in their own right, there is no conclusive evidence that apes establish reference, convey information declaratively or pass down communicative devices via cultural transmission. Thus, the evidence currently available reinforces the uniqueness of human language and the power of its interface to cognition.
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3 Beyond humans: gestural communication among non-human great apes
Our goal in this last section is to look beyond human infants andconsider the communicative abilities of the other great apes.
Like humans, apes use a range of communicative signals—including vocalizations, facial expressions and gestures—toconvey information and to influence the behaviour of others[75]. There has been substantial research on primate vocaliza-tions, much of it focusing specifically on vocalizationsproduced in the context of evolutionarily urgent survival func-tions such as responding to predators and communicatingsources of food [76,77]. Certainly, these vocalizations areimpressive and some have argued that they reflect a varietyof sophisticated cognitive and social functions [78–81]. But others have argued that ape gestures—more than their vocalizations—provide the most compelling comparisons tohuman language [82–85]. Therefore, we focus primarily onape gesture and its communicative status in comparison tohuman language and human gesture.
(a) The gestural repertoires of apes
Gestures are part of the communicative repertoires of allspecies of great apes [75]. Typically emerging at around ninemonths of age [86,87], these gestures are produced deliberatelyand voluntarily in social interactions [88–90]. Ape gestureshave been defined as‘discrete, mechanically ineffective phys-ical movements of the body observed during periods ofcommunication’[88, p. 749] and include tactile gestures (invol-ving bodily contact with another individual, e.g. hittinganother), auditory gestures (incorporating non-vocal sounds,e.g. stomping) and visible gestures (those can be seen from adistance, e.g. arm raising) [75,88,90]. Note that within the apeand human literatures, the definition of what constitutes a gesture often differs; definitions of human gesture tend to focusprimarily on silent, empty-handed movements that make nophysical contact with objects or other people (see [91] for a dis-cussion of differences in definition and coding). Nevertheless,important cross-species comparisons can be made.
Most researchers agree that apes’gestures share two key features with those of humans’gestures: flexibility and inten-tionality [13,88,90,92–94]. Regarding flexibility, apes producea variety of gesture types (e.g. arm raise; poke; object shake)flexibly across different situations (e.g. affiliation, grooming,resting, social play). They can use a single gesture typeacross multiple contexts, as well as multiple gesture typeswithin a single context [7]. Regarding intentionality, apes’ges-tures are often responsive to the attentional states of theirwould-be communicative partners: for instance, when theintended partner is looking elsewhere, chimps tend to initiateby making physical contact (touching the other) and auditorygestures (banging on the ground) [88,95].
(b) How do ape gestures differ from human gestures?
Like humans, the gestures of apes reveal an intention tocommunicate and insight into the attentional states of theirconspecifics. But apes’gestures also differ considerablyfrom those of humans. Most striking are species differencesin the presence versus absence of (i) pointing and the estab-lishment of reference, (ii) gesturing for declarative purposes,(iii) communicating without contextual support, and (iv) evi-dence for learning processes and developmental cascades.
Together, these differences raise intriguing questions aboutwhether the communicative systems of apes link to their core cognitive capacities, as is the case for humans.First, apes in the wild do not use pointing gestures to com-municate with conspecifics [96–100]. In one comparative study,researchers used the same criteria to characterize spontaneousreferential gestures produced by 1- to 2-year-old human children and chimpanzees in natural settings. Among children,nearly 25% of the gestures produced were classified as potentially referential (e.g. directed to an external location or third party). Among chimpanzees, fewer than 0.1% of their gestures met this criterion [91]. Human-reared or human-captive apes can be taught to use pointing gestures; however, these points typically occur only in communication with humans and only in contexts where the goal is to convey imperative information, typically a request for food [101–106].
Second, beyond the case of pointing, ape gestures appear tobe reserved exclusively for imperative purposes. They gestureto regulate face-to-face interactions in the here-and-now suchas play, grooming, fighting or tandem travel [98]. For example,most gestures between apes are produced in dyadic contexts,aimed to get the attention of a would-be social partner [107].
There is little to no evidence that apes gesture declaratively to direct another’s attention simply for the sake of sharing interest in it or commenting on it. By contrast, human infants frequently gesture for declarative purposes, sharing their intentions with their carers [48,98,102].
Third, ape gestures are considerably more dependent on thecontextual support of the present than are those of human chil-dren. Although both children and captive apes can use gesture to refer to non-present entities (i.e. they can point to an empty plate that used to contain food), these gestures are still dependent on referencing present objects (i.e. the now-empty plate)[104–106]. In wild ape populations, spontaneous gestures typically require the use of a present object. For example, to request‘play’, an ape may hit a conspecific; to request ‘being carried’ a juvenile may place their hand on their mother’sback.
Humans, too, can use contextual support to express ideas via gesture (e.g. pointing to an object that we want). Yet, in addition,we also ubiquitously gesture in the absence of any referent object, (e.g. using one’s hands to describe the shape of a missing puzzle piece; demonstrating how to cut with scissors, even when none are present). There is no clear evidence of this typeof iconic gesture production in apes [108].
Fourth, there is little evidence that ape gestural repertoiresare readily learned through imitation or through cultural trans-mission [88,93,98,109–111]. Instead, the ape gestural repertoireconsists primarily of species-typical behaviours [88–90]. Somehave interpreted the scant variability in gestural repertoire sacross groups of apes as evidence that ape gestures areinnate, acquired primarily through genetic transmission[88,93]. Others have claimed that certain types of ape gesturesare adaptations of full-fledged actions to create a more restricted gestural form that will elicit a target behaviour, a process known as ontogenetic ritualization [111]. For example, to request a climb on its mother’s back, infants first push down her rear end to gain access to climb. But over time, this behaviour is streamlined: to elicit the response, the infant need only touch the mother’s back [112]. Certainly, this process involves learning, but the learning occurs only in that particular interaction in that dyad concerning that action.
Finally, there are dramatic differences in the developmental course of gesture systems among apes and humans. The most striking difference is that in humans, early gestures are integrated spontaneously into a rapidly burgeoning linguistic system; this system is at once more comprehensive in its communicative and symbolic reach and more precise in itsexpression than the systems observed among apes. Humaninfants initially rely heavily on gestures but this reliance decreases steadily [52,56]. As their linguistic capacities advance, infants move systematically from producing gestures alone toproducing gesture + language (and then language + language) combinations. By contrast, apes’ reliance on gesture for communication does not seem to change, even among apes trained by humans to acquire new symbolic signals [113].
Certainly, there are cases in which apes, raises by humans,learn complex symbol systems including spoken words,pictograms or sign language [114–119] (see [120] for a comprehensive review and discussion of the many controversies surrounding this topic). In such cases, learning to use discrete symbols is achieved only with considerable repetition or reward-based paradigms. Evidence like this offers insightinto the capabilities of the ape mind, given a set of symbols.
Nevertheless, we are cautious in drawing strong conclusions from these examples, as they are rare and have been observed only as a result of human intervention.The fact that apes are capable of learning new symbols ystems speaks to their impressive intelligence, and to the obvious evolutionary links between the ape brain and the human brain. Additionally, there is evidence that some language-trained apes can successfully group novel exemplars into lexical categories, raising the intriguing possibility that learning human-like abstract symbols may support object categorization in non-human apes [121]. However, it typically takes apes manytrials of learning with rewards to acquire basic use of these symbols. Note that this differs from how human infants spontaneously acquire language, as well as how they can easily adapt novel symbols as category markers or object labels, given only a single session of seeing these symbols embedded in a communicative interaction [21,23]. One perhaps important counter-example bears mention: two infant bonobos, Kanzi and Makula, may have spontaneously learned symbols on which their mother had previously been trained [118,119]).
Even for an ape that has mastered productive use of a signal system with their human trainers, there are sharp boundary conditions on their use. Language-trained apes use acquired symbol systems almost exclusively for imperative purposes in interactions with humans [122,123]. Furthermore,in stark contrast to humans, there seems to be an upper limit toapes’combinatorial abilities. Even language-trained apes overwhelmingly produce symbols in isolation; the virtual absence of combinations that exceed two symbols reveals a compelling difference between children and apes [124].
Taken together, the existing evidence reveals that althoughapes in the wild show impressive usage of communicativegestures, produced intentionally and with flexibility, these ges-ture systems differ dramatically from human communication (for a more nuanced discussion, see [88]). They do not makeuse of pointing gestures, gesture for imperative purposes only, typically require present context to gesture, do not pass down their gestures through cultural transmission, and do not undergo significant developmental shifts in gesture use.
Finally, despite the fact that some apes have, with great training, learned a limited set of human-like symbol systems, their learning processes are distinct from human language learning and their use of these symbols is largely limited.
Abstract: Human language has no parallel elsewhere in the animal kingdom. It is unique not only for its structural complexity but also for its inextricable interface with core cognitive capacities such as object representation, object categorization and abstract rule learning. Here, we (i) review recent evidence documenting how (and how early) language interacts with these core cognitive capacities in the mind of the human infant, and (ii) consider whether this link exists in non-human great apes—our closest genealogical cousins. Research with human infants demonstrates that well before they begin to speak, infants have already forged a link between language and core cognitive capacities. Evident by just three months of age, this language–cognition link unfolds in a rich developmental cascade, with each advance providing the foundation for subsequent, more precise and more powerful links. This link supports our species' capacity to represent and convey abstract concepts and to communicate beyond the immediate here and now. By contrast, although the communication systems of great apes are sophisticated in their own right, there is no conclusive evidence that apes establish reference, convey information declaratively or pass down communicative devices via cultural transmission. Thus, the evidence currently available reinforces the uniqueness of human language and the power of its interface to cognition.
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3 Beyond humans: gestural communication among non-human great apes
Our goal in this last section is to look beyond human infants andconsider the communicative abilities of the other great apes.
Like humans, apes use a range of communicative signals—including vocalizations, facial expressions and gestures—toconvey information and to influence the behaviour of others[75]. There has been substantial research on primate vocaliza-tions, much of it focusing specifically on vocalizationsproduced in the context of evolutionarily urgent survival func-tions such as responding to predators and communicatingsources of food [76,77]. Certainly, these vocalizations areimpressive and some have argued that they reflect a varietyof sophisticated cognitive and social functions [78–81]. But others have argued that ape gestures—more than their vocalizations—provide the most compelling comparisons tohuman language [82–85]. Therefore, we focus primarily onape gesture and its communicative status in comparison tohuman language and human gesture.
(a) The gestural repertoires of apes
Gestures are part of the communicative repertoires of allspecies of great apes [75]. Typically emerging at around ninemonths of age [86,87], these gestures are produced deliberatelyand voluntarily in social interactions [88–90]. Ape gestureshave been defined as‘discrete, mechanically ineffective phys-ical movements of the body observed during periods ofcommunication’[88, p. 749] and include tactile gestures (invol-ving bodily contact with another individual, e.g. hittinganother), auditory gestures (incorporating non-vocal sounds,e.g. stomping) and visible gestures (those can be seen from adistance, e.g. arm raising) [75,88,90]. Note that within the apeand human literatures, the definition of what constitutes a gesture often differs; definitions of human gesture tend to focusprimarily on silent, empty-handed movements that make nophysical contact with objects or other people (see [91] for a dis-cussion of differences in definition and coding). Nevertheless,important cross-species comparisons can be made.
Most researchers agree that apes’gestures share two key features with those of humans’gestures: flexibility and inten-tionality [13,88,90,92–94]. Regarding flexibility, apes producea variety of gesture types (e.g. arm raise; poke; object shake)flexibly across different situations (e.g. affiliation, grooming,resting, social play). They can use a single gesture typeacross multiple contexts, as well as multiple gesture typeswithin a single context [7]. Regarding intentionality, apes’ges-tures are often responsive to the attentional states of theirwould-be communicative partners: for instance, when theintended partner is looking elsewhere, chimps tend to initiateby making physical contact (touching the other) and auditorygestures (banging on the ground) [88,95].
(b) How do ape gestures differ from human gestures?
Like humans, the gestures of apes reveal an intention tocommunicate and insight into the attentional states of theirconspecifics. But apes’gestures also differ considerablyfrom those of humans. Most striking are species differencesin the presence versus absence of (i) pointing and the estab-lishment of reference, (ii) gesturing for declarative purposes,(iii) communicating without contextual support, and (iv) evi-dence for learning processes and developmental cascades.
Together, these differences raise intriguing questions aboutwhether the communicative systems of apes link to their core cognitive capacities, as is the case for humans.First, apes in the wild do not use pointing gestures to com-municate with conspecifics [96–100]. In one comparative study,researchers used the same criteria to characterize spontaneousreferential gestures produced by 1- to 2-year-old human children and chimpanzees in natural settings. Among children,nearly 25% of the gestures produced were classified as potentially referential (e.g. directed to an external location or third party). Among chimpanzees, fewer than 0.1% of their gestures met this criterion [91]. Human-reared or human-captive apes can be taught to use pointing gestures; however, these points typically occur only in communication with humans and only in contexts where the goal is to convey imperative information, typically a request for food [101–106].
Second, beyond the case of pointing, ape gestures appear tobe reserved exclusively for imperative purposes. They gestureto regulate face-to-face interactions in the here-and-now suchas play, grooming, fighting or tandem travel [98]. For example,most gestures between apes are produced in dyadic contexts,aimed to get the attention of a would-be social partner [107].
There is little to no evidence that apes gesture declaratively to direct another’s attention simply for the sake of sharing interest in it or commenting on it. By contrast, human infants frequently gesture for declarative purposes, sharing their intentions with their carers [48,98,102].
Third, ape gestures are considerably more dependent on thecontextual support of the present than are those of human chil-dren. Although both children and captive apes can use gesture to refer to non-present entities (i.e. they can point to an empty plate that used to contain food), these gestures are still dependent on referencing present objects (i.e. the now-empty plate)[104–106]. In wild ape populations, spontaneous gestures typically require the use of a present object. For example, to request‘play’, an ape may hit a conspecific; to request ‘being carried’ a juvenile may place their hand on their mother’sback.
Humans, too, can use contextual support to express ideas via gesture (e.g. pointing to an object that we want). Yet, in addition,we also ubiquitously gesture in the absence of any referent object, (e.g. using one’s hands to describe the shape of a missing puzzle piece; demonstrating how to cut with scissors, even when none are present). There is no clear evidence of this typeof iconic gesture production in apes [108].
Fourth, there is little evidence that ape gestural repertoiresare readily learned through imitation or through cultural trans-mission [88,93,98,109–111]. Instead, the ape gestural repertoireconsists primarily of species-typical behaviours [88–90]. Somehave interpreted the scant variability in gestural repertoire sacross groups of apes as evidence that ape gestures areinnate, acquired primarily through genetic transmission[88,93]. Others have claimed that certain types of ape gesturesare adaptations of full-fledged actions to create a more restricted gestural form that will elicit a target behaviour, a process known as ontogenetic ritualization [111]. For example, to request a climb on its mother’s back, infants first push down her rear end to gain access to climb. But over time, this behaviour is streamlined: to elicit the response, the infant need only touch the mother’s back [112]. Certainly, this process involves learning, but the learning occurs only in that particular interaction in that dyad concerning that action.
Finally, there are dramatic differences in the developmental course of gesture systems among apes and humans. The most striking difference is that in humans, early gestures are integrated spontaneously into a rapidly burgeoning linguistic system; this system is at once more comprehensive in its communicative and symbolic reach and more precise in itsexpression than the systems observed among apes. Humaninfants initially rely heavily on gestures but this reliance decreases steadily [52,56]. As their linguistic capacities advance, infants move systematically from producing gestures alone toproducing gesture + language (and then language + language) combinations. By contrast, apes’ reliance on gesture for communication does not seem to change, even among apes trained by humans to acquire new symbolic signals [113].
Certainly, there are cases in which apes, raises by humans,learn complex symbol systems including spoken words,pictograms or sign language [114–119] (see [120] for a comprehensive review and discussion of the many controversies surrounding this topic). In such cases, learning to use discrete symbols is achieved only with considerable repetition or reward-based paradigms. Evidence like this offers insightinto the capabilities of the ape mind, given a set of symbols.
Nevertheless, we are cautious in drawing strong conclusions from these examples, as they are rare and have been observed only as a result of human intervention.The fact that apes are capable of learning new symbols ystems speaks to their impressive intelligence, and to the obvious evolutionary links between the ape brain and the human brain. Additionally, there is evidence that some language-trained apes can successfully group novel exemplars into lexical categories, raising the intriguing possibility that learning human-like abstract symbols may support object categorization in non-human apes [121]. However, it typically takes apes manytrials of learning with rewards to acquire basic use of these symbols. Note that this differs from how human infants spontaneously acquire language, as well as how they can easily adapt novel symbols as category markers or object labels, given only a single session of seeing these symbols embedded in a communicative interaction [21,23]. One perhaps important counter-example bears mention: two infant bonobos, Kanzi and Makula, may have spontaneously learned symbols on which their mother had previously been trained [118,119]).
Even for an ape that has mastered productive use of a signal system with their human trainers, there are sharp boundary conditions on their use. Language-trained apes use acquired symbol systems almost exclusively for imperative purposes in interactions with humans [122,123]. Furthermore,in stark contrast to humans, there seems to be an upper limit toapes’combinatorial abilities. Even language-trained apes overwhelmingly produce symbols in isolation; the virtual absence of combinations that exceed two symbols reveals a compelling difference between children and apes [124].
Taken together, the existing evidence reveals that althoughapes in the wild show impressive usage of communicativegestures, produced intentionally and with flexibility, these ges-ture systems differ dramatically from human communication (for a more nuanced discussion, see [88]). They do not makeuse of pointing gestures, gesture for imperative purposes only, typically require present context to gesture, do not pass down their gestures through cultural transmission, and do not undergo significant developmental shifts in gesture use.
Finally, despite the fact that some apes have, with great training, learned a limited set of human-like symbol systems, their learning processes are distinct from human language learning and their use of these symbols is largely limited.
Winning at all costs: An exploration of bottom‐line mentality, Machiavellianism, and organisational citizenship behaviour
Winning at all costs: An exploration of bottom‐line mentality, Machiavellianism, and organisational citizenship behaviour. Gabi Eissa, Rebecca Wyland, Scott W. Lester, Ritu Gupta. Human Resource Management Journal, May 23 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/1748-8583.12241
Abstract: This study seeks to advance the bottom‐line mentality literature by exploring an antecedent and outcome of employee bottom‐line mentality. We build and test a moderated‐mediation model by arguing that the personality trait of Machiavellianism promotes an employee's adoption of a bottom‐line mentality. Moreover, drawing on trait activation theory, we argue that this relationship is fully activated when the employee perceives that the organisation endorses a bottom‐line mentality. To expand our theoretical model, we also suggest that employee bottom‐line mentality inhibits organisational citizenship behaviour directed towards co‐workers. Lastly, we investigate whether an employee's perception of an organisation's bottom‐line mentality conditionally moderates the indirect effect of Machiavellianism on organisational citizenship behaviour directed towards co‐workers through the mediated mechanism of employee bottom‐line mentality. Our theoretical model is tested across two distinct studies. Study 1, a field study conducted within a variety of organisations, provides evidence for our initial predictions (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Study 2, a multisource field study conducted in multiple industries, replicates and extends the findings from Study 1 by providing evidence for the entire moderated‐mediation model. We find support for our hypothesised model across both studies. Implications for theory and practice are discussed, and suggestions for future research are identified.
4 | DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current investigation was to build and test a model of both antecedents and consequences of employee BLM. In Study 1, we examined the interaction effect of Machiavellianism and employee perception of an organisation's BLM onto employee BLM. Using trait activation theory, the findings from Study 1 found that Machiavellianism was positively related to employee BLM, and the employee perception of an organisation's BLM
amplified this relationship, suggesting that both Machiavellianism and employee perception of an organisation's BLM are highly associated with employee BLM. Moreover, Study 2 replicated the findings from Study 1 and further examined how employee BLM is likely to be associated with low levels of OCBI, suggesting that employee perception of the organisation's BLM may serve as a conditional moderator of the Machiavellianism–employee BLM–OCBI relationship. As expected, our moderated‐mediation model (Figure 1) was supported by the findings across two distinct studies, providing insights as to why and when employee BLM is promoted and a potential consequence that ensues.
This research provides a theoretical foundation that will facilitate future examinations of the construct of BLM. Although previous research suggests that developing a BLM may be detrimental to organisations and its members (Greenbaum et al., 2012), our research represents a departure from the current BLM research (e.g., Bonner et al., 2017; Mawritz et al., 2017) to help identify reasons that prompt employees to fully express this mentality. Our goal was to identify a personality trait that is associated with self‐interest; because self‐interest is typically associated with developing a BLM (Eissa, Wyland, & Gupta, 2018; Greenbaum et al., 2012). Machiavellianism is a personality trait often associated with cynicism and a focus on the self (Dahling et al., 2009). Therefore, in this research, we argue that employee BLM may occur when employees possess the dark personality trait of Machiavellianism, though not all employees are equally likely to have this dark predisposition activated in the same way.
To examine a boundary condition of the Machiavellianism and employee BLM relationship, we drew on trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000) and arguments from prior research (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to build a theoretical model that accounts for levels of employee perceptions of an organisation's BLM. This investigation adds to prior research employing trait activation theory (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2017) suggesting that environmental cues may activate or even enhance a personality tendency within employees. In other words, the Machiavellianism personality trait may be fully prompted when employees perceive that the environment of their organisation aligns with their own self‐interested, controlling, manipulative, and distrustful nature. As such, we argued that employees with high levels of Machiavellianism are more likely to pay attention to information within their environment that endorses their own self‐goals. Overall, our findings offer a credible contribution to theory by suggesting Machiavellianism as a key component influencing the expression of employee BLM. Furthermore, our study is among the first to advance the literature by exploring a boundary condition that influences the impact of Machiavellianism on employee BLM, namely perceptions of
organisation's BLM.
Consistent with prior research that calls for an examination of consequences of employee BLM (Greenbaum et al.,
2012), this current investigation explored the notion that employee BLM may inhibit employee engagement in positive behaviours such as OCBIs. We relied on prior BLM research (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2012; Sims & Brinkmann, 2002, 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Wolfe, 1988) to argue that employee BLM can encourage a narrowly focused, unidimensional, game‐like mentality among employees. Those who have this mentality are more likely to become driven to see others lose and less likely to engage in behaviours that may help others succeed. The current investigation is important because BLM is common and likely to affect how employees approach interpersonal work relationships as well as their willingness to be cooperative with others, which are key determinants of long‐term organisational success and survival (Piccolo et al., 2012). This way, the current research contributes to the literature by offering empirical support for the link between employee BLM and OCBI—a relationship that is frequently discussed in the literature but has received little empirical attention despite its strong theoretical presumption. Altogether, the theoretical underpinnings of the current investigation enabled us to contribute to the BLM literature by presenting a moderated‐mediation model that explains why and when employee BLM is likely to occur and subsequently reduce cooperation among employees at work.
4.1 | Managerial implications
Although many organisations are in business to achieve success, an exclusive, the‐ends‐justify‐the‐means focus on bottom‐line outcomes can lead to negative consequences. The popular press features numerous reports of the problems that can arise when employees adopt a BLM. Earlier in this paper, we used the Enron scandal as an illustration. Another example is the use of subprime mortgage lending in an effort to circumvent capital requirements (Stiglitz, 2010). Clearly, when bottom‐line outcomes (e.g., profit) are valued over everything else, it may encourage employees to act in their own self‐interest, even if it involves engagement in unethical behaviours (Greenbaum et al., 2012) or refraining from positive ones that hinder their own goal attainment. Although delivering results is key to success, employers must comprehend that a narrow, unidimensional focus on achieving results (i.e., BLM) is not ideal and that, to be effective, organisations must create a workplace environment that not only focuses on achieving bottom‐line outcomes, but also fosters positive and moral behaviours. When employees avoid opportunities to collaborate and help each other out, the implication is that the likelihood of teamwork and synergy is greatly diminished. Hence, the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation is likely to be compromised. Therefore, organisations need to be aware of the adverse influence of employee BLM on collaboration and teamwork. This awareness will allow organisations to create a workplace environment that values a variety of important organisational outcomes so that the chances of overall company success are amplified.
Another implication of the current findings is that the personality trait of Machiavellianism is related to the likelihood of falling prey to a BLM, especially when working in an environment that is perceived to value and prioritise achieving the bottom line over everything else. We found that Machs are more likely to adopt a BLM and less likely to engage in OCBI. Employers and human resource managers who are involved in the hiring process could pay attention to personality traits such as Machiavellianism and try to avoid hiring those who tend to have a cynical outlook and a heightened focus on self‐interest. The current findings suggest that Machs would likely embrace an environment of unhealthy competition in the presence of a perceived BLM in an organisation. As discussed, Machs' efforts to succeed or get ahead would likely come at the expense of the long‐term health of the organisation.
4.2 | Limitations and future research
Although the current research makes multiple noteworthy contributions to the literature, it is not without limitations. First, cross‐sectional data were collected in both of our studies, which may limit definitive conclusions regarding the causality among the proposed relationships. However, we have utilised two distinct samples and relied on well-documented theories to provide evidence for the direction of our variables. Nonetheless, future research could replicate our model by using various research methods including collecting longitudinal data or conducting experimental designs to provide further support for our model. Second, we examined OCBs directed at organisational members, namely co‐workers, as a form of positive and moral behaviour that could be limited by employee BLM. We focused on OCB directed towards organisational members because previous BLM research suggests that BLM impacts interpersonal relationships (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2012; Wolfe, 1988). Although this made theoretical sense, it would be interesting if future studies examined citizenship behaviours directed towards the organisation as a whole (i.e., OCBOs) to see if any differences exist based on the target of these behaviours. For example, whereas some OCBs are driven by a desire to make the organisation better, other forms of OCBs are less altruistic and more calculative in nature (e.g., OCBs that are completed as a means of impression management; e.g., Bolino, 1999). Thus, it is plausible that employee BLM might increase some types of OCBOs because these employees are trying to impress their employer by giving back to the organisation. However, it is also plausible that employees who possess a BLM might ignore OCBOs because they are so focused on their own bottom‐line outcomes that they essentially ignore all types of OCBs. Either way, a more complete understanding of the relationships between different types of OCBs and employee BLM would be informative.
Our research supported Machiavellianism as an antecedent of individual adoption of BLM. Yet, this is but one antecedent. Future research should examine other potential antecedents of employee BLM. For example, the presence of incentive pay may also help predict BLM. When incentive pay exists, one would expect that a singular focus on monetary rewards, particularly among those motivated by pay, should increase the likelihood of a BLM. Furthermore, whether incentives are determined at the individual, group, or organisational level should impact whether a BLM develops. Specifically, we would expect a BLM to be more prevalent when individual incentives are used. Group and organisational level incentives frequently require some type of collaboration, which is at odds with the notion of having to defeat your colleagues in order to win. In sum, future research would benefit from exploring additional antecedents of BLM to help answer the question of why employees adopt such mentality.
Additionally, the concept of perception of organisation's BLM may be within the same nomological network as other constructs. For example, (un)ethical climate or transactional psychological contracts (e.g., Zagenczyk et al., 2014) may reveal similar relationships to the constructs presented in our proposed model. Therefore, future research could further explore the relationships between perceived organisation's BLM and other similar constructs to gain a better understanding of the theoretical and empirical distinctions that may exist. Finally, future researchers could move the literature forward by exploring additional moderators that might mitigate (or exacerbate) the dysfunctional relationship between Machiavellianism, employee BLM, and reductions in OCBI. For example, we argued that Machs “will do whatever it takes” to achieve success. As such, it can also be theorised that individuals high in Machiavellianism may at times perform seemingly altruistic behaviours for the sole reason of creating the impression that the recipient needed the help and is incapable of performing the job. This would suggest a positive relationship between BLM and OCBI. Our results indicate a rather low (but significant) relationship. This could be interpreted as an indication of the existence of moderators. Although this is beyond the scope of the current article, it is one potentially fruitful area for future research. One promising moderator might be ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two‐way communication, reinforcement, and decision‐making” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005, p. 120).
As noted by Piccolo et al. (2012), “ethical leadership may be effective in preventing a nearly exclusive focus on bottom‐line outcomes” (p. 295). Thus, ethical leadership likely weakens the proposed relationships presented in our model. Future research would benefit from exploring this assertion and additional moderators that may explain antecedents and consequences of BLM as presented in Figure 1. In conclusion, we encourage future research to build on these first steps by taking a more comprehensive look at the antecedents, moderators, and consequences of employee BLM as this field of research moves forward.
Abstract: This study seeks to advance the bottom‐line mentality literature by exploring an antecedent and outcome of employee bottom‐line mentality. We build and test a moderated‐mediation model by arguing that the personality trait of Machiavellianism promotes an employee's adoption of a bottom‐line mentality. Moreover, drawing on trait activation theory, we argue that this relationship is fully activated when the employee perceives that the organisation endorses a bottom‐line mentality. To expand our theoretical model, we also suggest that employee bottom‐line mentality inhibits organisational citizenship behaviour directed towards co‐workers. Lastly, we investigate whether an employee's perception of an organisation's bottom‐line mentality conditionally moderates the indirect effect of Machiavellianism on organisational citizenship behaviour directed towards co‐workers through the mediated mechanism of employee bottom‐line mentality. Our theoretical model is tested across two distinct studies. Study 1, a field study conducted within a variety of organisations, provides evidence for our initial predictions (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Study 2, a multisource field study conducted in multiple industries, replicates and extends the findings from Study 1 by providing evidence for the entire moderated‐mediation model. We find support for our hypothesised model across both studies. Implications for theory and practice are discussed, and suggestions for future research are identified.
4 | DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current investigation was to build and test a model of both antecedents and consequences of employee BLM. In Study 1, we examined the interaction effect of Machiavellianism and employee perception of an organisation's BLM onto employee BLM. Using trait activation theory, the findings from Study 1 found that Machiavellianism was positively related to employee BLM, and the employee perception of an organisation's BLM
amplified this relationship, suggesting that both Machiavellianism and employee perception of an organisation's BLM are highly associated with employee BLM. Moreover, Study 2 replicated the findings from Study 1 and further examined how employee BLM is likely to be associated with low levels of OCBI, suggesting that employee perception of the organisation's BLM may serve as a conditional moderator of the Machiavellianism–employee BLM–OCBI relationship. As expected, our moderated‐mediation model (Figure 1) was supported by the findings across two distinct studies, providing insights as to why and when employee BLM is promoted and a potential consequence that ensues.
This research provides a theoretical foundation that will facilitate future examinations of the construct of BLM. Although previous research suggests that developing a BLM may be detrimental to organisations and its members (Greenbaum et al., 2012), our research represents a departure from the current BLM research (e.g., Bonner et al., 2017; Mawritz et al., 2017) to help identify reasons that prompt employees to fully express this mentality. Our goal was to identify a personality trait that is associated with self‐interest; because self‐interest is typically associated with developing a BLM (Eissa, Wyland, & Gupta, 2018; Greenbaum et al., 2012). Machiavellianism is a personality trait often associated with cynicism and a focus on the self (Dahling et al., 2009). Therefore, in this research, we argue that employee BLM may occur when employees possess the dark personality trait of Machiavellianism, though not all employees are equally likely to have this dark predisposition activated in the same way.
To examine a boundary condition of the Machiavellianism and employee BLM relationship, we drew on trait activation theory (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000) and arguments from prior research (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to build a theoretical model that accounts for levels of employee perceptions of an organisation's BLM. This investigation adds to prior research employing trait activation theory (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2017) suggesting that environmental cues may activate or even enhance a personality tendency within employees. In other words, the Machiavellianism personality trait may be fully prompted when employees perceive that the environment of their organisation aligns with their own self‐interested, controlling, manipulative, and distrustful nature. As such, we argued that employees with high levels of Machiavellianism are more likely to pay attention to information within their environment that endorses their own self‐goals. Overall, our findings offer a credible contribution to theory by suggesting Machiavellianism as a key component influencing the expression of employee BLM. Furthermore, our study is among the first to advance the literature by exploring a boundary condition that influences the impact of Machiavellianism on employee BLM, namely perceptions of
organisation's BLM.
Consistent with prior research that calls for an examination of consequences of employee BLM (Greenbaum et al.,
2012), this current investigation explored the notion that employee BLM may inhibit employee engagement in positive behaviours such as OCBIs. We relied on prior BLM research (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2012; Sims & Brinkmann, 2002, 2003; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Wolfe, 1988) to argue that employee BLM can encourage a narrowly focused, unidimensional, game‐like mentality among employees. Those who have this mentality are more likely to become driven to see others lose and less likely to engage in behaviours that may help others succeed. The current investigation is important because BLM is common and likely to affect how employees approach interpersonal work relationships as well as their willingness to be cooperative with others, which are key determinants of long‐term organisational success and survival (Piccolo et al., 2012). This way, the current research contributes to the literature by offering empirical support for the link between employee BLM and OCBI—a relationship that is frequently discussed in the literature but has received little empirical attention despite its strong theoretical presumption. Altogether, the theoretical underpinnings of the current investigation enabled us to contribute to the BLM literature by presenting a moderated‐mediation model that explains why and when employee BLM is likely to occur and subsequently reduce cooperation among employees at work.
4.1 | Managerial implications
Although many organisations are in business to achieve success, an exclusive, the‐ends‐justify‐the‐means focus on bottom‐line outcomes can lead to negative consequences. The popular press features numerous reports of the problems that can arise when employees adopt a BLM. Earlier in this paper, we used the Enron scandal as an illustration. Another example is the use of subprime mortgage lending in an effort to circumvent capital requirements (Stiglitz, 2010). Clearly, when bottom‐line outcomes (e.g., profit) are valued over everything else, it may encourage employees to act in their own self‐interest, even if it involves engagement in unethical behaviours (Greenbaum et al., 2012) or refraining from positive ones that hinder their own goal attainment. Although delivering results is key to success, employers must comprehend that a narrow, unidimensional focus on achieving results (i.e., BLM) is not ideal and that, to be effective, organisations must create a workplace environment that not only focuses on achieving bottom‐line outcomes, but also fosters positive and moral behaviours. When employees avoid opportunities to collaborate and help each other out, the implication is that the likelihood of teamwork and synergy is greatly diminished. Hence, the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation is likely to be compromised. Therefore, organisations need to be aware of the adverse influence of employee BLM on collaboration and teamwork. This awareness will allow organisations to create a workplace environment that values a variety of important organisational outcomes so that the chances of overall company success are amplified.
Another implication of the current findings is that the personality trait of Machiavellianism is related to the likelihood of falling prey to a BLM, especially when working in an environment that is perceived to value and prioritise achieving the bottom line over everything else. We found that Machs are more likely to adopt a BLM and less likely to engage in OCBI. Employers and human resource managers who are involved in the hiring process could pay attention to personality traits such as Machiavellianism and try to avoid hiring those who tend to have a cynical outlook and a heightened focus on self‐interest. The current findings suggest that Machs would likely embrace an environment of unhealthy competition in the presence of a perceived BLM in an organisation. As discussed, Machs' efforts to succeed or get ahead would likely come at the expense of the long‐term health of the organisation.
4.2 | Limitations and future research
Although the current research makes multiple noteworthy contributions to the literature, it is not without limitations. First, cross‐sectional data were collected in both of our studies, which may limit definitive conclusions regarding the causality among the proposed relationships. However, we have utilised two distinct samples and relied on well-documented theories to provide evidence for the direction of our variables. Nonetheless, future research could replicate our model by using various research methods including collecting longitudinal data or conducting experimental designs to provide further support for our model. Second, we examined OCBs directed at organisational members, namely co‐workers, as a form of positive and moral behaviour that could be limited by employee BLM. We focused on OCB directed towards organisational members because previous BLM research suggests that BLM impacts interpersonal relationships (e.g., Greenbaum et al., 2012; Wolfe, 1988). Although this made theoretical sense, it would be interesting if future studies examined citizenship behaviours directed towards the organisation as a whole (i.e., OCBOs) to see if any differences exist based on the target of these behaviours. For example, whereas some OCBs are driven by a desire to make the organisation better, other forms of OCBs are less altruistic and more calculative in nature (e.g., OCBs that are completed as a means of impression management; e.g., Bolino, 1999). Thus, it is plausible that employee BLM might increase some types of OCBOs because these employees are trying to impress their employer by giving back to the organisation. However, it is also plausible that employees who possess a BLM might ignore OCBOs because they are so focused on their own bottom‐line outcomes that they essentially ignore all types of OCBs. Either way, a more complete understanding of the relationships between different types of OCBs and employee BLM would be informative.
Our research supported Machiavellianism as an antecedent of individual adoption of BLM. Yet, this is but one antecedent. Future research should examine other potential antecedents of employee BLM. For example, the presence of incentive pay may also help predict BLM. When incentive pay exists, one would expect that a singular focus on monetary rewards, particularly among those motivated by pay, should increase the likelihood of a BLM. Furthermore, whether incentives are determined at the individual, group, or organisational level should impact whether a BLM develops. Specifically, we would expect a BLM to be more prevalent when individual incentives are used. Group and organisational level incentives frequently require some type of collaboration, which is at odds with the notion of having to defeat your colleagues in order to win. In sum, future research would benefit from exploring additional antecedents of BLM to help answer the question of why employees adopt such mentality.
Additionally, the concept of perception of organisation's BLM may be within the same nomological network as other constructs. For example, (un)ethical climate or transactional psychological contracts (e.g., Zagenczyk et al., 2014) may reveal similar relationships to the constructs presented in our proposed model. Therefore, future research could further explore the relationships between perceived organisation's BLM and other similar constructs to gain a better understanding of the theoretical and empirical distinctions that may exist. Finally, future researchers could move the literature forward by exploring additional moderators that might mitigate (or exacerbate) the dysfunctional relationship between Machiavellianism, employee BLM, and reductions in OCBI. For example, we argued that Machs “will do whatever it takes” to achieve success. As such, it can also be theorised that individuals high in Machiavellianism may at times perform seemingly altruistic behaviours for the sole reason of creating the impression that the recipient needed the help and is incapable of performing the job. This would suggest a positive relationship between BLM and OCBI. Our results indicate a rather low (but significant) relationship. This could be interpreted as an indication of the existence of moderators. Although this is beyond the scope of the current article, it is one potentially fruitful area for future research. One promising moderator might be ethical leadership. Ethical leadership is “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two‐way communication, reinforcement, and decision‐making” (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005, p. 120).
As noted by Piccolo et al. (2012), “ethical leadership may be effective in preventing a nearly exclusive focus on bottom‐line outcomes” (p. 295). Thus, ethical leadership likely weakens the proposed relationships presented in our model. Future research would benefit from exploring this assertion and additional moderators that may explain antecedents and consequences of BLM as presented in Figure 1. In conclusion, we encourage future research to build on these first steps by taking a more comprehensive look at the antecedents, moderators, and consequences of employee BLM as this field of research moves forward.
Efficiency of using Tinder to meet potential long-term committed relationship partners or acquire one-night stands
Hook, Line and Sinker: Do Tinder Matches and Meet Ups Lead to One-Night Stands? Trond Viggo Grøntvedt, Mons Bendixen, Ernst O. Botnen, Leif Edward Ottesen Kennair. Evolutionary Psychological Science, November 18 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-019-00222-z
Abstract: Several recent papers have established a link between personality and Tinder use, particularly with regards to sociosexuality and motivations for use. Following up our recent publication on dating apps and the studies linking Tinder and sociosexuality, we provide a more detailed investigation of the efficiency of using Tinder to acquire one-night stands or meet potential long-term committed relationship partners. Using self-reported data from 269 students (62% women), we find that a very large number of matches are required for a relative small number of meet ups, and result in a very limited number of hook-ups or potential romantic partner meetings. Merely 20% of the Tinder users in the sample have had one-night stands following Tinder use, and the majority of these only had one extra partner. The primary individual difference predictor of achieving casual sex using Tinder is unrestricted sociosexual attitudes, and this also predicts fewer potential romantic partner meetings.
Keywords: Sociosexuality Tinder Casual sex Committed relationships
Discussion
Tinder is an app that promises to ease the search and acquisition of new romantic mates, both long-term, and short-term.Further, in the media moralistic worries that Tinder is causing a spread of social disease have been aired (Rhode Island Government 2015). The current study investigates to what degree Tinder use actually results in more sexual partnersand romantic opportunities based on number of matches andmeet ups.
Contrary to expectations, number of one-night stands out-side Tinder use showed only a weak positive association withnumber of one-night stands following Tinder. When control-ling for length of use and age, there was no effect of one-nightstands outside of Tinder use on one-night stands followingTinder. In the final model, controlling for sociosexuality,matches and meet ups, the effect was actually negative.Botnen et al. (2018) and Sevi (2019a) suggested that datingapps such as Tinder are merely a new arena for evolved short-term sexual behavior, rather than a facilitator of new sexual behaviors. Given the current results, we suggest that Tinder indeed seems to provide new sexual opportunities, but mostlyfor a very small minority. Of the 54 participants who reported one-night stands following Tinder use, only 7 individuals reported no one-night stands outside of Tinder use. However,the general claim still holds for the majority of Tinder users.For those who are most successful outside of Tinder, Tinder adds few extra short-term sexual encounters. A small numberof individuals who are unsuccessful in more traditional datingarenas may turn to Tinder in order to have short-term sexualrelations. Based on the ratio of matches to meetings to sexualencounters, Tinder may not be described as a sex app thatlargely increases the number of one-night stands and hook-ups, at least not in our sample. Despite this, Tinder, as a newarena for mating effort, may still be considered highly efficientfrom an evolutionary perspective. There are almost no costsinvolved apart from the time spent, and one may indicateinterest in a multitude of partners by swiping right in a veryshort time. Most meetings do not lead to one-night stands.There is a potential mismatch between cues used to decideto swipe right and the short-term attractiveness perceived ina face-to-face meeting. Information provided by the short bi-ography, picture, and age are highly relevant; however, otherevolutionary relevant cues for assessing casual sex attractive-ness are only available in a physical meeting. Further, andreflecting the above, individuals who are efficient in tradition-al mating arenas, may therefore acquire more partners through displaying the kind of personality (Schmitt and Shackelford 2008), confidence, physical bodily (Provost et al.2008), and facial features (Li and Kenrick2006;Littleetal.2002)andmaybe even voice cues (Puts2005) that are attractive in short-term matings face-to-face rather than via non-organic, electronic Tinder profiles.
There is an effect of meet ups on one-night stands, but notof matches over and above the effect of meet ups. In addition,both age and sociosexual attitudes consistently predicted number of one-night stands following Tinder. One might argue thatswiping right and hence indicating interest in a potential partner on an app is less time consuming and that one avoids the more distressing rejections than when actively engaging withpeople in real life. However, those who succeed in traditional hook up arenas, in physical interactions, where both partiesare in the mood and with some degree of intoxication, willperhaps not succeed more by adding Tinder. Swiping and searching on Tinder may have limited effect, and as such may not be considered cost efficient. A large number of matches are required in order to achieve a sexual encounter.
This challenges the suggestion that Tinder is a sex app that iscontributing to a general increase in the amount of casual sexand social diseases in society and number of sexual partners for users directly (Rhode Island Governmen t2015).Tinder is neither a very efficient way of meeting a long-termcommitted romantic partner. Women, more than men, meet morepeople with an interest for potential long-term committed rela-tionships. Parallel to other recent findings of sociosexuality andTinder use (Hallam et al. 2018; Sevietal.2018), the statistica leffect of sex on number of meet ups with the interest for a long-term committed romantic relationship was partly accounted forby the attitudes component of the sociosexual orientation inven-tory. A careful interpretation of the effect of the attitudes com-ponent of SOI needs to consider the sex-differentiated nature ofsociosexuality (Kennair et al.2016). The findings support that individual differences in sociosexuality attitudes and sex differ-ences overlap, with women being less short-term oriented ingeneral and also report greater interest in long-term rather thanshort-term encounters. There was also an overlap in what factorsinfluence meeting someone for either a long-term committedromantic relationship or one-night stands. Most likely, this isdue to most people being interested to some degree in bothshort-term as well as long-term relationships (Gangestad and Simpson2000). This resonates with the motives reported by Botnen et al. (2018).T
here was a positive association between one-night stands and meetings with an interest in a long-term committed romantic relationship. Possible explanations of this finding arethat users of Tinder have multiple, non-mutually exclusivereasons for app use, and that some relationships develop from what were initially one-night stands. Unrestricted sociosexual attitudes increased number of one-night stands; however, the effect of SOI-attitudes was negative for committed relationships. These findings were robust. There was a tendency thatthe desire component of sociosexuality also increased one-night stands, but this effect was accounted for by number ofmeet ups and short-term mate value.
Short-term mate value (physical attractiveness) predictsnumber of one-night stands following Tinder. Nevertheless,the directionality is unresolved. Possibly, the effect is bidirec-tional: higher mate value may have increased the number ofone-night stands, and more hook-ups may have resulted inhigher self-perceived mate value
---
Check also Rosenfeld M. (2018) Are Tinder and Dating Apps Changing Dating and Mating in the USA? In: Van Hook J., McHale S., King V. (eds) Families and Technology. National Symposium on Family Issues, vol 9, pp 103-117. Springer, September 21 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/are-tinder-dating-apps-changing-dating.html
And The Association Between Mating Performance, Marital Status, and the Length of Singlehood: Evidence From Greece and China. Menelaos Apostolou, Yan Wang. Evolutionary Psychology, November 13, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/a-considerable-proportion-of-people-in.html
And Do Women Really Desire Casual Sex? Analysis of a Popular Adult Online Dating/Liaison Site, by Michelle Escasa-Dorne and William Jankowiak. In Focality and Extension in Kinship. Essays in memory of Harold W Scheffler. Warren Shapiro (Ed.). Jun 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/do-women-really-desire-casual-sex.html
Abstract: Several recent papers have established a link between personality and Tinder use, particularly with regards to sociosexuality and motivations for use. Following up our recent publication on dating apps and the studies linking Tinder and sociosexuality, we provide a more detailed investigation of the efficiency of using Tinder to acquire one-night stands or meet potential long-term committed relationship partners. Using self-reported data from 269 students (62% women), we find that a very large number of matches are required for a relative small number of meet ups, and result in a very limited number of hook-ups or potential romantic partner meetings. Merely 20% of the Tinder users in the sample have had one-night stands following Tinder use, and the majority of these only had one extra partner. The primary individual difference predictor of achieving casual sex using Tinder is unrestricted sociosexual attitudes, and this also predicts fewer potential romantic partner meetings.
Keywords: Sociosexuality Tinder Casual sex Committed relationships
Discussion
Tinder is an app that promises to ease the search and acquisition of new romantic mates, both long-term, and short-term.Further, in the media moralistic worries that Tinder is causing a spread of social disease have been aired (Rhode Island Government 2015). The current study investigates to what degree Tinder use actually results in more sexual partnersand romantic opportunities based on number of matches andmeet ups.
Contrary to expectations, number of one-night stands out-side Tinder use showed only a weak positive association withnumber of one-night stands following Tinder. When control-ling for length of use and age, there was no effect of one-nightstands outside of Tinder use on one-night stands followingTinder. In the final model, controlling for sociosexuality,matches and meet ups, the effect was actually negative.Botnen et al. (2018) and Sevi (2019a) suggested that datingapps such as Tinder are merely a new arena for evolved short-term sexual behavior, rather than a facilitator of new sexual behaviors. Given the current results, we suggest that Tinder indeed seems to provide new sexual opportunities, but mostlyfor a very small minority. Of the 54 participants who reported one-night stands following Tinder use, only 7 individuals reported no one-night stands outside of Tinder use. However,the general claim still holds for the majority of Tinder users.For those who are most successful outside of Tinder, Tinder adds few extra short-term sexual encounters. A small numberof individuals who are unsuccessful in more traditional datingarenas may turn to Tinder in order to have short-term sexualrelations. Based on the ratio of matches to meetings to sexualencounters, Tinder may not be described as a sex app thatlargely increases the number of one-night stands and hook-ups, at least not in our sample. Despite this, Tinder, as a newarena for mating effort, may still be considered highly efficientfrom an evolutionary perspective. There are almost no costsinvolved apart from the time spent, and one may indicateinterest in a multitude of partners by swiping right in a veryshort time. Most meetings do not lead to one-night stands.There is a potential mismatch between cues used to decideto swipe right and the short-term attractiveness perceived ina face-to-face meeting. Information provided by the short bi-ography, picture, and age are highly relevant; however, otherevolutionary relevant cues for assessing casual sex attractive-ness are only available in a physical meeting. Further, andreflecting the above, individuals who are efficient in tradition-al mating arenas, may therefore acquire more partners through displaying the kind of personality (Schmitt and Shackelford 2008), confidence, physical bodily (Provost et al.2008), and facial features (Li and Kenrick2006;Littleetal.2002)andmaybe even voice cues (Puts2005) that are attractive in short-term matings face-to-face rather than via non-organic, electronic Tinder profiles.
There is an effect of meet ups on one-night stands, but notof matches over and above the effect of meet ups. In addition,both age and sociosexual attitudes consistently predicted number of one-night stands following Tinder. One might argue thatswiping right and hence indicating interest in a potential partner on an app is less time consuming and that one avoids the more distressing rejections than when actively engaging withpeople in real life. However, those who succeed in traditional hook up arenas, in physical interactions, where both partiesare in the mood and with some degree of intoxication, willperhaps not succeed more by adding Tinder. Swiping and searching on Tinder may have limited effect, and as such may not be considered cost efficient. A large number of matches are required in order to achieve a sexual encounter.
This challenges the suggestion that Tinder is a sex app that iscontributing to a general increase in the amount of casual sexand social diseases in society and number of sexual partners for users directly (Rhode Island Governmen t2015).Tinder is neither a very efficient way of meeting a long-termcommitted romantic partner. Women, more than men, meet morepeople with an interest for potential long-term committed rela-tionships. Parallel to other recent findings of sociosexuality andTinder use (Hallam et al. 2018; Sevietal.2018), the statistica leffect of sex on number of meet ups with the interest for a long-term committed romantic relationship was partly accounted forby the attitudes component of the sociosexual orientation inven-tory. A careful interpretation of the effect of the attitudes com-ponent of SOI needs to consider the sex-differentiated nature ofsociosexuality (Kennair et al.2016). The findings support that individual differences in sociosexuality attitudes and sex differ-ences overlap, with women being less short-term oriented ingeneral and also report greater interest in long-term rather thanshort-term encounters. There was also an overlap in what factorsinfluence meeting someone for either a long-term committedromantic relationship or one-night stands. Most likely, this isdue to most people being interested to some degree in bothshort-term as well as long-term relationships (Gangestad and Simpson2000). This resonates with the motives reported by Botnen et al. (2018).T
here was a positive association between one-night stands and meetings with an interest in a long-term committed romantic relationship. Possible explanations of this finding arethat users of Tinder have multiple, non-mutually exclusivereasons for app use, and that some relationships develop from what were initially one-night stands. Unrestricted sociosexual attitudes increased number of one-night stands; however, the effect of SOI-attitudes was negative for committed relationships. These findings were robust. There was a tendency thatthe desire component of sociosexuality also increased one-night stands, but this effect was accounted for by number ofmeet ups and short-term mate value.
Short-term mate value (physical attractiveness) predictsnumber of one-night stands following Tinder. Nevertheless,the directionality is unresolved. Possibly, the effect is bidirec-tional: higher mate value may have increased the number ofone-night stands, and more hook-ups may have resulted inhigher self-perceived mate value
---
Check also Rosenfeld M. (2018) Are Tinder and Dating Apps Changing Dating and Mating in the USA? In: Van Hook J., McHale S., King V. (eds) Families and Technology. National Symposium on Family Issues, vol 9, pp 103-117. Springer, September 21 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/are-tinder-dating-apps-changing-dating.html
And The Association Between Mating Performance, Marital Status, and the Length of Singlehood: Evidence From Greece and China. Menelaos Apostolou, Yan Wang. Evolutionary Psychology, November 13, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/a-considerable-proportion-of-people-in.html
And Do Women Really Desire Casual Sex? Analysis of a Popular Adult Online Dating/Liaison Site, by Michelle Escasa-Dorne and William Jankowiak. In Focality and Extension in Kinship. Essays in memory of Harold W Scheffler. Warren Shapiro (Ed.). Jun 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/do-women-really-desire-casual-sex.html
Sunday, November 17, 2019
Young adult siblings and twins are less alike in cognitive ability in highly educated families than in less educated families
Does sibling and twin similarity in cognitive ability differ by parents’ education? Tina Baier. ZfF – Journal of Family Research, 1-2019, pp. 58-82. https://doi.org/10.3224/zff.v31i1.04
Abstract: Stratification scholars predominantly investigate how differences among children from different families emerge and tend to neglect differences among children from the same family. I study sibling similarity in cognitive ability and examine whether their similarity varies by parents’ education. Although economic approaches and their extensions argue that disadvantaged parents reinforce differences while advantaged parents compensate for differences, I argue that parents may also make equal investments and thus accept differences among their children. I refer to the literature on stratified parenting that demonstrates that parents are engaged differently in child-rearing and their children’s skill formation processes. Because advantaged parents foster children’s talents more individually compared with disadvantaged parents, I propose that sibling similarity is lower in advantaged than in disadvantaged families. Previous studies based on sibling correlations provide conflicting evidence. To account for observable and unobservable differences among siblings, I extend the established sibling correlation approach and study dizygotic and monozygotic twins in addition to siblings. The analyses draw on novel data from a population register-based study of twin families. I find that young adult siblings and twins are less alike in cognitive ability in highly educated families than in less educated families. Hence, my results support the hypothesis concerning equal investments and indicate that stratified parenting has a long-lasting influence on children’s cognitive ability.
Key words: intergenerational transmission; educational inequality; cognitive ability; sibling correlations; twins; Germany
Abstract: Stratification scholars predominantly investigate how differences among children from different families emerge and tend to neglect differences among children from the same family. I study sibling similarity in cognitive ability and examine whether their similarity varies by parents’ education. Although economic approaches and their extensions argue that disadvantaged parents reinforce differences while advantaged parents compensate for differences, I argue that parents may also make equal investments and thus accept differences among their children. I refer to the literature on stratified parenting that demonstrates that parents are engaged differently in child-rearing and their children’s skill formation processes. Because advantaged parents foster children’s talents more individually compared with disadvantaged parents, I propose that sibling similarity is lower in advantaged than in disadvantaged families. Previous studies based on sibling correlations provide conflicting evidence. To account for observable and unobservable differences among siblings, I extend the established sibling correlation approach and study dizygotic and monozygotic twins in addition to siblings. The analyses draw on novel data from a population register-based study of twin families. I find that young adult siblings and twins are less alike in cognitive ability in highly educated families than in less educated families. Hence, my results support the hypothesis concerning equal investments and indicate that stratified parenting has a long-lasting influence on children’s cognitive ability.
Key words: intergenerational transmission; educational inequality; cognitive ability; sibling correlations; twins; Germany
5. Discussion and conclusion
I studied sibling similarity in cognitive ability and asked whether the degree of similarity
varies with parents’ education. In contrast to previous research, I extended the established
sibling correlation approach to DZ and MZ twins. This acknowledges the increasing evidence that genetic variation matters for cognitive ability and allows us to capture shared
family influences more comprehensively, and thus to test rigorously the link between sibling similarity and parents’ education.
To explain a varying degree of similarity, I first referred to economic approaches that
model parents’ investment decisions within the household (Becker/Tomes 1976; Behrman/Pollak/Taubman 1982). Against this backdrop, I tested the hypothesis that sibling
similarity in disadvantaged families is lower for efficiency reasons, whereas highly educated families compensate for, and thus equalize, differences among siblings (Conley
2004, 2008). I then introduced the idea that parents might also invest equally in and accept differences among their children. I drew on the literature on stratified parenting (e.g.,
Cheadle/Amato 2011; Kalil/Ryan/Corey 2012; Lareau 2011; Lareau/Weininger 2003) and
put it in a within-family perspective. Because advantaged parents adopt an active role in
shaping the developmental processes of their children and tend to provide more skillenhancing and specific inputs in line with children’s potentials and needs, I hypothesized
alternatively that siblings from advantaged families are less similar in terms of cognitive
ability compared with siblings from disadvantaged families.
My analyses yielded two findings. First, young adult siblings, DZ twins, and MZ
twins in highly educated families are less alike in terms of cognitive ability compared
with young adult siblings, DZ twins, and MZ twins in less educated families. This contradicts the hypothesis concerning stratified investments rationales, according to which sibling similarity increases with parents’ social background (H1), and supports the hypothesis concerning equal investments and stratified parenting (H2).
Systematic differences in the degree of similarity in cognitive ability are significant in
the sibling sample. This is in line with US findings for literacy skills (Conley/Pfeiffer/
Velez 2007) but differs from the finding for Germany (Grätz 2018). One explanation of
the divergent findings could be that the families I studied have more children (twins and
at least one sibling) than the families in the study by Grätz (2018). Unfortunately, this
study does not provide information about the variance components in absolute terms. The
ICC is a standardized measure that does not change if the variances of shared family and
child-specific influences in absolute terms change at the same time. Thus, there might be
some variation in the relative importance of shared family influences that did not show up
in the ICC. To evaluate to what extent results differ substantially, we would also need information on the family level variation in absolute terms.
For both DZ twins and MZ twins, the results reveal the same pattern. The similarity
decreases according to parents’ education, though it is not statistically significant. Nonetheless, both the results for the variance components in absolute terms and for the ICC
confirm that shared family influences decrease the more educated parents are. Thus, the
more resources parents have, the more important are processes within the family that accentuate differences within the family.
In addition, I found that the mean level of cognitive ability increases with parents’ education, whereas the relative importance of shared family influences decreases. These divergent
trends show that the same shared family influences that make siblings and twins more alike
are also associated with lower levels of cognitive ability. This is a very important aspect, and
more research is needed to understand what kind of influences affect siblings equally and
hamper the realization of cognitive ability in less educated families. In advantaged families,
by contrast, parents often provide additional inputs that foster children’s talents. These influences are more child specific, which leads to higher levels of cognitive ability and promotes
differences in cognitive ability among their children. Given that differences between siblings
and twins from advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds remain even as the children grow
older, my results indicate a long-lasting impact of parenting on cognitive ability.
Second, my results show that the association between parents’ educational background and sibling and twin similarity is not affected by the closeness of the sibling and
twin relationship. I thereby address a major limitation of studies on sibling similarity. In a
similar vein, my results reveal a very similar trend for siblings, DZ twins, and MZ twins,
which shows that there is no “twinning effect” – that is, that twins behave profoundly differently from (full) siblings.
However, it is important to note that I used an indicator that was measured at the
same time as cognitive ability. Since the quality of the sibling and twin relationship might
change over the life course, it is important to back up my results – ideally, with longitudinal data. To the extent that there are no profound changes in the sibling and twin relationship until early adulthood, my results are reliable.
This study is the first to adopt a genetically sensitive approach to sibling similarity in
cognitive ability. The results provide strong indications for parent’s investment decisions
that are not in line with economic theories, rather parents invest equally in their children
but in distinct ways that differ according to parents’ educational background. My findings
challenge the implicit assumption that shared family influences such as parents’ education
influence children in similar fashion. Moreover, if children are raised in advantaged families, shared family influences – those that differ between families – are less important.
Genetically sensitive research can help us to better understand what kinds of parental investment – net of genetic influences – result in within-family stratification, and to formulate informative policy suggestions to enhance the achievements of children from less educated families.
Also: The Social Stratification of Environmental and Genetic Influences on Education: New Evidence Using a Register-Based Twin Sample. Tina Baier, Volker Lang. Sociological Science, February 20, 2019. 10.15195/v6.a6
Also: The Social Stratification of Environmental and Genetic Influences on Education: New Evidence Using a Register-Based Twin Sample. Tina Baier, Volker Lang. Sociological Science, February 20, 2019. 10.15195/v6.a6
The relative importance of genes and shared environmental influences on stratification outcomes has recently received much attention in the literature. We focus on education and the gene-environmental interplay. Specifically, we investigate whether—as proposed by the Scarr-Rowe hypothesis—genetic influences are more important in advantaged families. We argue that the social stratification of family environments affects children’s chances to actualize their genetic potential. We hypothesize that advantaged families provide more child-specific inputs, which enhance genetic expression, whereas the rearing environments of children in disadvantaged families are less adapted to children’s individual abilities, leading to a suppression of genetic potential. We test this relationship in Germany, which represents an interesting case due to its highly selective schooling system characterized by early tracking and the broad coverage of part-time schools. We use novel data from the TwinLife panel, a population-register–based sample of twins and their families. Results of ACE-variance decompositions support the Scarr-Rowe hypothesis: Shared environmental influences on education matter only in disadvantaged families, whereas genetic influences are more important in advantaged families. Our findings support the growing literature on the importance of the gene-environmental interplay and emphasize the role of the family environment as a trigger of differential genetic expression.
Unlike other forms of antisocial behavior, the findings do not reveal a relationship between two different heart rate measures and white-collar offending
Heart Rate Fails to Predict White Collar Crime. Nicole Leeper Piquero et al. American Journal of Criminal Justice, October 17 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12103-019-09503-6
Abstract: This paper joins two strands of research: a focus on the influence of heart rate on antisocial behavior and the correlates of white-collar offending. With respect to the former, resting heart rate has been found to be one of the most replicable of all biological correlates of many different types of antisocial behavior and psychopathology. However, researchers studying the correlates of white-collar offending have only just begun to examine individual characteristics – and as of yet, have not examined the extent to which heart rate is a relevant correlate. Using data from a community sample of over a hundred males, this paper examines whether heart rate is associated with white-collar offending. Unlike other forms of antisocial behavior, the findings do not reveal a relationship between two different heart rate measures and white-collar offending. Directions for future research are noted.
Keywords: Heart rate White-collar offending Biosocial
Abstract: This paper joins two strands of research: a focus on the influence of heart rate on antisocial behavior and the correlates of white-collar offending. With respect to the former, resting heart rate has been found to be one of the most replicable of all biological correlates of many different types of antisocial behavior and psychopathology. However, researchers studying the correlates of white-collar offending have only just begun to examine individual characteristics – and as of yet, have not examined the extent to which heart rate is a relevant correlate. Using data from a community sample of over a hundred males, this paper examines whether heart rate is associated with white-collar offending. Unlike other forms of antisocial behavior, the findings do not reveal a relationship between two different heart rate measures and white-collar offending. Directions for future research are noted.
Keywords: Heart rate White-collar offending Biosocial
The large sex differences in being arrested, pleading guilty, being sentenced, & being incarcerated are consistent with lifetime violent behavior, low self-control, IQ, parental socialization, & social support; that is, the differences seem justified
Self-Reported Male-Female Differences in Criminal Involvement Do Not Account for Criminal Justice Processing Differences. Kevin M. Beaver, John Paul Wright. American Journal of Criminal Justice, December 2019, Volume 44, Issue 6, pp 859–871. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12103-019-09488-2
Abstract: Disparities between males and females in criminal behavior have been widely documented. Despite the extensive amount of research examining sex differences in criminal and analogous behaviors, there is no consensus on whether self-reported misbehavior accounts for the large sex differences found in all phases of the criminal justice system. The current study explores whether, and to what degree, self-reported misconduct accounts for male-female differences. To do so, data drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) were analyzed. Consistent with prior research, the results revealed statistically significant and substantively large male-female differences in being arrested, pleading guilty, being sentenced to probation, and being incarcerated. These disparities were unaffected by self-reports of lifetime violent behavior, lifetime non-violent behavior, low self-control, IQ, parental socialization, and social support.
Keywords: Add health Criminal justice Female Male Sex differences
Abstract: Disparities between males and females in criminal behavior have been widely documented. Despite the extensive amount of research examining sex differences in criminal and analogous behaviors, there is no consensus on whether self-reported misbehavior accounts for the large sex differences found in all phases of the criminal justice system. The current study explores whether, and to what degree, self-reported misconduct accounts for male-female differences. To do so, data drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) were analyzed. Consistent with prior research, the results revealed statistically significant and substantively large male-female differences in being arrested, pleading guilty, being sentenced to probation, and being incarcerated. These disparities were unaffected by self-reports of lifetime violent behavior, lifetime non-violent behavior, low self-control, IQ, parental socialization, and social support.
Keywords: Add health Criminal justice Female Male Sex differences
Discussion
A long line of research has revealed that males are disproportionately engaged in crime
and other acts of aggression and that they are processed through the criminal justice
system at much higher levels than females. Males are significantly more likely to be
arrested, incarcerated, and sentenced to lengthier prison terms than are females (Ellis
et al., 2009). The factors accounting for male-female differences, however, have been
somewhat elusive. The current study attempted to shed some light on the potential
factors that might explain male-female differences in being arrested, pleading guilty,
being sentenced to probation, and being incarcerated. Analysis of data drawn from the
Add Health revealed two key findings.
First, and in line with previous research (Ellis et al., 2009), the analyses revealed
robust male-female differences in the criminal justice processing variables. In comparison to the odds for females, the odds that males would be arrested was 3.74 times
greater, that they would plead guilty was 3.96 times greater, that they would be
sentenced to probation was 3.93 times greater, that they would be incarcerated was
3.91 times greater, and that they would be incarcerated if arrested was 1.45 times
greater. These differences were all statistically significant and quite large.
The second key finding to emerge from the analyses was that the male-female
disparities in criminal justice processing were largely immune to the effects of
covariates—including measures of some of the most consistent and robust predictors
of contact with the criminal justice system, such as involvement in violent and
nonviolent behavior, self-control, IQ, exposure to delinquent peers, and maternal as
well as paternal socialization variables. Although the male-female gap was slightly
attenuated in the multivariate models, the reductions were very small, ranging from 4 to
12%. This is a particularly noteworthy finding and highlights just how robust the male-
female differences were in the data.
While these analyses cannot provide definitive evidence of the processes that lead to
males being disproportionately processed through the criminal justice system, they do
tend to rule out some of the more common explanations. For instance, including
covariates for lifetime violent behavior and lifetime nonviolent behavior and having
the male-female gap remain strong and statistically significant tends to suggest that
male over-involvement in criminal activities is not the driving force behind why males
are disproportionately processed in the criminal justice system. At the same time,
criminogenic traits, such as low self-control and IQ, appear to have little to no
substantive impact on sex disparities in the criminal justice system and neither do
parental socialization measures or social support.
Our findings suggest that factors other than differential involvement create and
sustain sex disparities in justice system processing. Given findings in the extant
literature, it seems likely that legally relevant variables, such as the number of prior
arrests, the seriousness of the current crime, the presence of witnesses, and the desire of
victims to press charges, are the likely factors driving sex differences in processing.
Males, for example, account for the vast majority of homicides, rapes, and armed
robberies—crimes where system discretion is more limited and where penalties, such as
incarceration, are almost certain if convicted.
We would be remis not to contrast the literature on sex disparities in justice processing
with the literature on racial differences in processing. By any measure, sex disparities are
substantially larger and more indelible than are racial disparities. Indeed, in prior analyses
of these data, racial disparities in self-reported justice system processing were accounted
for using a limited number of measures (Beaver et al., 2013). And where several studies
find that legally relevant variables account for all, or almost all, of racial disparities in
processing, just the opposite is true of the literature on sex disparities in processing. Given
our findings, and those reported by others, it would appear that the criminal justice system
is sexist in its application of justice. However, we suggest that the system is rationally
sexist. Men are more physically violent than women, are physically more capable of
inflicting harm on others, and they engage in crimes where personal injury is more likely.
The criminal careers of men are also longer than women’s, they accelerate their offending
more quickly and have an earlier age of onset than women, and they take longer to desist
(Moffitt, 1993; Wright, Tibbetts, & Daigle, 2008). In turn, men represent a greater
comparative social threat to the safety of others and to the communities within which
they live. The large sex disparities found in the literature, and in our analysis of a national
sample, exist in part because they reflect the rational legal and institutional responses to
more fundamental differences between men and women in their use of physical
aggression. If true, women are more likely to be channeled out of the criminal justice
system for reasons not entirely associated with their participation in a criminal event. In
general, women are less physically dangerous than men and pose less a social threat than
men even if they engage in the same criminal event with a male.
The findings revealing significant male-female differences in criminal justice processing
should be viewed cautiously owing to a number of limitations. First, all of the criminal
justice processing variables were based on retrospective self-reported data which leaves
open the possibility of recall bias. It would be interesting and important to replicate these
analyses with data that included official crime measures. Unfortunately, the Add Health
data do not include such measures and so other samples will have to be employed in order
to address this shortcoming. Second, the data were based on a nationally representative data
which translates into relatively few chronic offenders. Again, an important avenue for
future research would be to analyze samples that have a substantially greater number of
violent offenders to determine whether these findings would remain robust to such
differences in the composition of the sample. Last, the Add Health data that are currently
available only followed respondents into their 30s. This necessarily leaves open the
possibility that the findings might change if the age range of respondents reached later
into adulthood. Future research would benefit by addressing these limitations and determining whether the findings presented here would be replicated in other samples.
Saturday, November 16, 2019
Kyoko interjects, “Isn’t life disappointing?” Noriko smiles back at her. “Yes,” she nods. “Nothing but disappointment.”
Pain in Japanese Cinema. Abe Callard. Garden of Forking Paths Blog, November 12, 2019. https://gardenofforkingpaths.home.blog/2019/11/12/pain-in-japanese-cinema/
Excerpts:
A strange moment is buried near the end of Yasujirō Ozu’s Tokyo Story. Two sister-in-laws, Kyoko and Noriko, are chatting and airing their grievances when Kyoko interjects, “Isn’t life disappointing?”
Noriko smiles back at her. “Yes,” she nods. “Nothing but disappointment.”
“Well I should get going,” says Kyoko.
“Goodbye, then,” responds Noriko. They smile at each other and leave.
You might find this an oddly quotidian treatment of existential tragedy – but that oddness is precisely what defines the work of Yasujirō Ozu.
Ozu is the secret maestro of Japanese cinema; hiding from the public eye, his legend as one of the great humanists of the 20th century is kept alive by critics and film school students. One explanation of this is that Ozu’s films are Buddhist at heart. Though mainstream western culture can easily digest the bushido code, with its emphasis on honor and revenge, the mystic passivity of Buddhism is far more alien to us.
The best example of Ozu’s Buddhist ideology is found in his interpretation of pain. Earlier in the same conversation between Noriko and Kyoko, Kyoko is angrily deriding their siblings’ treatment of the elderly grandparents. “I felt sorry for poor mother,” she says. “Even strangers would have been more considerate!”
When I first watched the film, I was on Kyoko’s side. I saw it as a morality play – essentially about how we should treat our parents better. It was unusually subtle for a morality play, but ultimately didactic nonetheless. One YouTube comment on Tokyo Story proves that others feel the same way: “Great movie it makes me want to bee a better son, and to never have children!”
On my second and third viewings, however, I began to understand that the real revelation of this scene is the line that comes next. Noriko responds, “Look, Kyoko, I thought so too when I was your age. But as children get older, they drift away from their parents.”
The film is full of these oblique statements that seem to pardon the childrens’ unkind behavior.
“Children never live up to their parents’ expectations. Let’s just be happy that they’re better than most.”
“They’re certainly better than average. We’re fortunate.”
“I think so, too.”
“We should consider ourselves lucky.”
“Yes, we are very lucky.”
At first glance, I perceived these as truisms, put in the mouths of the characters to conceal their real anger and sadness at their children. But I began to realize that, quite the opposite, they are the central idea of the film.
The Buddha allegedly stated, “Pain in life is inevitable but suffering is not. Pain is what the world does to you, suffering is what you do to yourself.”
Through Ozu’s lens, there are two reactions to pain; acceptance and suffering. The wise person lets pain occur, even feels it, but does not turn it into moral judgment. As Lawrence of Arabia says, “The trick is not minding that it hurts.” The unwise person, conversely, obsesses over pain, places it under headings like “wrong” and “evil”. These moral categorizations themselves create a new form of pain, which the Buddha labels suffering. Suffering is unnecessary and pointless; it is, at its heart, a vain attempt to eradicate the first kind of pain.
It is hard, if not impossible, for me to put myself in this mindset. When I try to weigh its merits, questions arise: If we feel pain, do we not suffer? Isn’t pain bad? Why shouldn’t we morally judge bad people?
Perhaps it is my Western upbringing, or perhaps I’m just wired that way. But even a surface-level understanding of Ozu’s perspective on pain has given me insight into his other works. Late Spring is not about the evils of societal norms, and The Only Son is not about the tragedy of the education system – they are simply presentations of pain, like a chef serving the bitter along with the sweet.
This deeply Eastern philosophy caused Japanese film exporters to view Ozu’s films as unmarketable to a Western audience; Tokyo Story was not known among European and American film critics until the 60s and 70s.
Ozu’s Buddhist portrayal of pain stands in stark contrast to the other looming titan of Japanese cinema, Akira Kurosawa. Kurosawa was often accused by critics of being “too Western”, and although it is perplexing to assign normativity to this, it’s true that Kurosawa’s films basically operate under a Western value system. Having grown up watching John Ford films, he saw the world in terms of cowboys and bandits.
[...]
Ozu, on the other hand, made films that present pain in a commonplace manner. He is known for “pillow shots” – shots of empty alleys, piles of magazines and vases of flowers that are interspersed between the scenes of his films. He is fascinated with objects because they exist regardless of human pain. They represent the eye of the world, looking placidly at us as we come into existence, suffer, and die. They represent peace, tranquility – nothingness. Uncoincidentally, “nothingness” is the single word inscribed on Ozu’s gravestone.
At the end of Tokyo Story, the grandfather returns home to southwest Japan, alone for the first time since the death of his wife. He sits cross-legged on a tatami mat, fanning himself. A neighbor stops by his window, and they chat about life.
“Living alone,” he says, “I think the days will seem very long.”
“Absolutely. You’ll feel lonely,” she says, smiling cheerfully. They bow and she walks away.
He lets out a calm sigh, listening to the put-put of the boats in the harbor.
Excerpts:
A strange moment is buried near the end of Yasujirō Ozu’s Tokyo Story. Two sister-in-laws, Kyoko and Noriko, are chatting and airing their grievances when Kyoko interjects, “Isn’t life disappointing?”
Noriko smiles back at her. “Yes,” she nods. “Nothing but disappointment.”
“Well I should get going,” says Kyoko.
“Goodbye, then,” responds Noriko. They smile at each other and leave.
You might find this an oddly quotidian treatment of existential tragedy – but that oddness is precisely what defines the work of Yasujirō Ozu.
Ozu is the secret maestro of Japanese cinema; hiding from the public eye, his legend as one of the great humanists of the 20th century is kept alive by critics and film school students. One explanation of this is that Ozu’s films are Buddhist at heart. Though mainstream western culture can easily digest the bushido code, with its emphasis on honor and revenge, the mystic passivity of Buddhism is far more alien to us.
The best example of Ozu’s Buddhist ideology is found in his interpretation of pain. Earlier in the same conversation between Noriko and Kyoko, Kyoko is angrily deriding their siblings’ treatment of the elderly grandparents. “I felt sorry for poor mother,” she says. “Even strangers would have been more considerate!”
When I first watched the film, I was on Kyoko’s side. I saw it as a morality play – essentially about how we should treat our parents better. It was unusually subtle for a morality play, but ultimately didactic nonetheless. One YouTube comment on Tokyo Story proves that others feel the same way: “Great movie it makes me want to bee a better son, and to never have children!”
On my second and third viewings, however, I began to understand that the real revelation of this scene is the line that comes next. Noriko responds, “Look, Kyoko, I thought so too when I was your age. But as children get older, they drift away from their parents.”
The film is full of these oblique statements that seem to pardon the childrens’ unkind behavior.
“Children never live up to their parents’ expectations. Let’s just be happy that they’re better than most.”
“They’re certainly better than average. We’re fortunate.”
“I think so, too.”
“We should consider ourselves lucky.”
“Yes, we are very lucky.”
At first glance, I perceived these as truisms, put in the mouths of the characters to conceal their real anger and sadness at their children. But I began to realize that, quite the opposite, they are the central idea of the film.
The Buddha allegedly stated, “Pain in life is inevitable but suffering is not. Pain is what the world does to you, suffering is what you do to yourself.”
Through Ozu’s lens, there are two reactions to pain; acceptance and suffering. The wise person lets pain occur, even feels it, but does not turn it into moral judgment. As Lawrence of Arabia says, “The trick is not minding that it hurts.” The unwise person, conversely, obsesses over pain, places it under headings like “wrong” and “evil”. These moral categorizations themselves create a new form of pain, which the Buddha labels suffering. Suffering is unnecessary and pointless; it is, at its heart, a vain attempt to eradicate the first kind of pain.
It is hard, if not impossible, for me to put myself in this mindset. When I try to weigh its merits, questions arise: If we feel pain, do we not suffer? Isn’t pain bad? Why shouldn’t we morally judge bad people?
Perhaps it is my Western upbringing, or perhaps I’m just wired that way. But even a surface-level understanding of Ozu’s perspective on pain has given me insight into his other works. Late Spring is not about the evils of societal norms, and The Only Son is not about the tragedy of the education system – they are simply presentations of pain, like a chef serving the bitter along with the sweet.
This deeply Eastern philosophy caused Japanese film exporters to view Ozu’s films as unmarketable to a Western audience; Tokyo Story was not known among European and American film critics until the 60s and 70s.
Ozu’s Buddhist portrayal of pain stands in stark contrast to the other looming titan of Japanese cinema, Akira Kurosawa. Kurosawa was often accused by critics of being “too Western”, and although it is perplexing to assign normativity to this, it’s true that Kurosawa’s films basically operate under a Western value system. Having grown up watching John Ford films, he saw the world in terms of cowboys and bandits.
[...]
Ozu, on the other hand, made films that present pain in a commonplace manner. He is known for “pillow shots” – shots of empty alleys, piles of magazines and vases of flowers that are interspersed between the scenes of his films. He is fascinated with objects because they exist regardless of human pain. They represent the eye of the world, looking placidly at us as we come into existence, suffer, and die. They represent peace, tranquility – nothingness. Uncoincidentally, “nothingness” is the single word inscribed on Ozu’s gravestone.
At the end of Tokyo Story, the grandfather returns home to southwest Japan, alone for the first time since the death of his wife. He sits cross-legged on a tatami mat, fanning himself. A neighbor stops by his window, and they chat about life.
“Living alone,” he says, “I think the days will seem very long.”
“Absolutely. You’ll feel lonely,” she says, smiling cheerfully. They bow and she walks away.
He lets out a calm sigh, listening to the put-put of the boats in the harbor.
Supposedly, high levels of sexual arousal can promote sexual willingness and approach tendencies toward a priori low attractive mates; these authors did not see such lowering of standards
The Influence of Sexual Arousal on Self-Reported Sexual Willingness and Automatic Approach to Models of Low, Medium, and High Prior Attractiveness. Charmaine Borg,Aleksandra Pawłowska,Robin van Stokkum,Janniko R. Georgiadis &Peter J. de Jong. The Journal of Sex Research, Nov 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2019.1687641
ABSTRACT: Anecdotal evidence suggests that sexual attraction is flexible, and that high levels of sexual arousal can promote sexual willingness and approach tendencies toward a priori low attractive mates. This experimental study tested whether heightened sexual arousal can lower the threshold for sexual willingness and automatic approach tendencies toward potential sex partners of low and medium attractiveness. Heterosexual male (n =54) and female (n =61) participants were randomly assigned to a sexual arousal or control condition. Approach tendencies were indexed using a reaction time task. Sexual willingness was indexed using participant ratings of willingness to kiss and to consider having sex with same- and other-sex models of low, medium, and high attractiveness. Overall, participants showed stronger approach to models of high and medium than of low attractiveness. Sexual arousal weakened this differential responding but did not result in a robust increase of approach toward less attractive other-sex or same-sex models. Sexual willingness toward less attractive models was not affected by sexual arousal. Independent of condition, women reported greater sexual willingness toward same-sex models. The current pattern of findings does not support the notion that sexual arousal promotes automatic approach and sexual willingness to a broader array of sex partners.
Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate possible factors
that may promote the increase in breadth of sexual responding. In
order to examine the influence of sexual abstinence on breadth of
sexual responding, we attempted to manipulate the amount of
sexual activity in a selected group of participants. However, since
a substantial proportion of those participants did not manage to
abstain from sexual activity during the assigned period of time, the
effects of sexual abstinence could not be adequately tested. Thus, in
the current study, we tested whether sexual arousal would promote
automatic (reflexive/impulsive) approach tendencies toward pictures of men and women in provocative poses as well as individuals’ self-reported (reflective) willingness to kiss or have sex with these pictured men and women. In addition, we tested whether
such impact would generalize to less attractive stimuli and/or to
same-sex stimuli, and whether the pattern of automatic approach
tendencies and sexual willingness would differ between men and women.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) Overall,
automatic approach tendencies and sexual willingness were
greater for stimuli of medium and high attractiveness than toward
stimuli of low attractiveness; (ii) This differential pattern of automatic approach as a function of stimulus attractiveness was attenuated by sexual arousal manipulation; (iii) There was no robust
evidence to suggest that sexual arousal increased automatic
approach tendencies to models of low attractiveness or same-sex
models; (iv) Moreover, self-reported willingness to kiss and to
consider having sex with the models was higher for models of
high attractiveness and did not seem to be influenced by the sexual
arousal manipulation; (v) Women reported higher sexual willingness to same-sex models than men, and showed stronger variability in reported willingness to kiss and to consider having
sex as a function of stimulus attractiveness than men.
Sexual Arousal Effects
Consistent with previous research showing increased automatic approach to positively valenced stimuli (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & de Raedt,
2010), participants in the current study generally showed
stronger automatic approach toward relatively attractive stimuli. This differential pattern was slightly attenuated by sexual arousal manipulation. Specifically, approach behavior
toward other-sex stimuli of low and high attractiveness was
more similar among sexually aroused participants than among
control participants, suggesting that induced sexual arousal
increased automatic approach tendencies toward stimuli of
low attractiveness and decreased these approach tendencies
toward stimuli of high attractiveness. This effect is somewhat
consistent with our hypotheses. However, considering its
small effect size (ηp2 = 0.03), as well as lack of a clear-cut
main effect of sexual arousal manipulation, it remains to be
tested whether this represents a robust finding.
Moreover, sexual arousal manipulation did not affect either
of the sexual willingness measures. That is, against our
hypotheses, sexual arousal manipulation did not result in
a general increase in willingness to kiss or to consider having
sex with other- and same-sex stimuli, nor in a specific
increase toward same-sex stimuli or toward stimuli of low and
medium attractiveness. Thus, it seems that under laboratory
conditions, sexual arousal induced by means of erotic videos
was ineffective in amplifying the attractiveness of less physically attractive stimuli or same-sex stimuli to a degree that would increase automatic approach tendencies and selfreported sexual willingness related to the models depicted in
these stimuli. Previous research using self-stimulation at
home (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006), or erotic audio narratives
(Imhoff & Schmidt, 2014) and pornographic film clips
(Skakoon-Sparling et al., 2016) in the lab to increase sexual
arousal, provided evidence that heightened sexual arousal
increased self-reported willingness to engage in uncommon
or risky sexual activities. The current findings indicate that
the impact of sexual arousal does not generally extend to
lowering the threshold for the automatic approach and sexual
willingness toward individuals of low a priori attractiveness.
Despite the fact that there was more potential for an increase
in willingness to have sex with less attractive same-sex stimuli,
especially in men, no such effect was observed. Therefore, the
current findings provide no support for the view that the state
of sexual arousal promotes widening of the array of sexual
stimuli that participants are sexually attracted to by strengthening the motivation to satisfy one’s sexual needs (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Imhoff & Schmidt, 2014; Kringelbach &
Rolls, 2004).
Gender Effects
In line with our predictions, female participants were found to
be more willing to kiss and to consider having sex with
female, rather than male, stimuli of medium attractiveness.
Female participants were equally willing to kiss and to consider having sex with male and female stimuli of low attractiveness. In contrast, male participants were consistently more
willing to kiss female than male stimuli across all attractiveness levels. Thus, in agreement with previous theoretical and empirical works (Baumeister, 2000; Diamond, 2008; SavinWilliams & Ream, 2007), as well as our predictions, female
participants were characterized by a greater breadth of subjective sexual responding than male participants, as indicated by their equal willingness to kiss and to consider having sex
with both male and female models of low and medium attractiveness. In contrast, the breadth of subjective sexual responding of male participants was generally small, in the sense that
men were uniformly more willing to kiss and to consider
having sex with female rather than with male models, regardless of their attractiveness. No generally accepted explanation
exists for the observed sex differences, with researchers proposing that various evolutionary and sociocultural influences may be at play (e.g., Baumeister, 2004; Buss & Schmitt, 1993;
Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). Regarding sociocultural influences, some point to the fact that there is generally a greater social acceptance toward non-heterosexual expression of
female than male sexuality (e.g., Herek, 2002). Thus, perhaps
the observed gender effects reflect the fact that same-sex
sexual behavior among women is viewed as more socially
acceptable than the same behavioral expression among men.
It is also noteworthy that female participants showed no
differential preference for male and female stimuli of low
attractiveness but seemed to prefer female stimuli of medium
attractiveness over male stimuli of the same attractiveness,
while expressing preference for male stimuli of high attractiveness over female stimuli of high attractiveness. A positive sexual response can generally be expected to occur in response
to the preferred (gendered) stimuli. Yet, sexual orientation
can be comprised of multiple dimensions e.g., sexual activity
preference, age, nurturance, etc. (Chivers & Brotto, 2017).
Thus, it could be that the highly attractive stimuli were
appraised differently than those of medium and low attractiveness on one or more of those dimensions, increasing the salience of gendered preference for sexual stimuli. To arrive at
firmer conclusions concerning the nature of response specificity in men and women, more research into sociocultural gender roles, as well as the cognitive and affective systems
governing the processing of sexual stimuli, is needed.
Men and women showed some differences with regard to
their pattern of automatic approach behaviors toward sexual
stimuli of low, medium, and high attractiveness. This differential pattern seemed to be mainly driven by a relatively strong inclination of women to avoid stimuli of low attractiveness. Low value mates, such as those depicted in the stimuli of low attractiveness, can induce feelings of (sexual)
disgust (Tybur et al., 2009), an emotion associated with strong
avoidance tendencies (Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, &
DeScioli, 2013). Women tend to be more prone and sensitive
to disgust experiences than men (Grauvogl et al., 2015; Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994), and thus, the behavioral avoidance
away from the sexual stimuli of low attractiveness observed
among women might have been driven by sex differences in
disgust sensitivity.
ABSTRACT: Anecdotal evidence suggests that sexual attraction is flexible, and that high levels of sexual arousal can promote sexual willingness and approach tendencies toward a priori low attractive mates. This experimental study tested whether heightened sexual arousal can lower the threshold for sexual willingness and automatic approach tendencies toward potential sex partners of low and medium attractiveness. Heterosexual male (n =54) and female (n =61) participants were randomly assigned to a sexual arousal or control condition. Approach tendencies were indexed using a reaction time task. Sexual willingness was indexed using participant ratings of willingness to kiss and to consider having sex with same- and other-sex models of low, medium, and high attractiveness. Overall, participants showed stronger approach to models of high and medium than of low attractiveness. Sexual arousal weakened this differential responding but did not result in a robust increase of approach toward less attractive other-sex or same-sex models. Sexual willingness toward less attractive models was not affected by sexual arousal. Independent of condition, women reported greater sexual willingness toward same-sex models. The current pattern of findings does not support the notion that sexual arousal promotes automatic approach and sexual willingness to a broader array of sex partners.
Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate possible factors
that may promote the increase in breadth of sexual responding. In
order to examine the influence of sexual abstinence on breadth of
sexual responding, we attempted to manipulate the amount of
sexual activity in a selected group of participants. However, since
a substantial proportion of those participants did not manage to
abstain from sexual activity during the assigned period of time, the
effects of sexual abstinence could not be adequately tested. Thus, in
the current study, we tested whether sexual arousal would promote
automatic (reflexive/impulsive) approach tendencies toward pictures of men and women in provocative poses as well as individuals’ self-reported (reflective) willingness to kiss or have sex with these pictured men and women. In addition, we tested whether
such impact would generalize to less attractive stimuli and/or to
same-sex stimuli, and whether the pattern of automatic approach
tendencies and sexual willingness would differ between men and women.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) Overall,
automatic approach tendencies and sexual willingness were
greater for stimuli of medium and high attractiveness than toward
stimuli of low attractiveness; (ii) This differential pattern of automatic approach as a function of stimulus attractiveness was attenuated by sexual arousal manipulation; (iii) There was no robust
evidence to suggest that sexual arousal increased automatic
approach tendencies to models of low attractiveness or same-sex
models; (iv) Moreover, self-reported willingness to kiss and to
consider having sex with the models was higher for models of
high attractiveness and did not seem to be influenced by the sexual
arousal manipulation; (v) Women reported higher sexual willingness to same-sex models than men, and showed stronger variability in reported willingness to kiss and to consider having
sex as a function of stimulus attractiveness than men.
Sexual Arousal Effects
Consistent with previous research showing increased automatic approach to positively valenced stimuli (e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1999; Krieglmeyer, Deutsch, De Houwer, & de Raedt,
2010), participants in the current study generally showed
stronger automatic approach toward relatively attractive stimuli. This differential pattern was slightly attenuated by sexual arousal manipulation. Specifically, approach behavior
toward other-sex stimuli of low and high attractiveness was
more similar among sexually aroused participants than among
control participants, suggesting that induced sexual arousal
increased automatic approach tendencies toward stimuli of
low attractiveness and decreased these approach tendencies
toward stimuli of high attractiveness. This effect is somewhat
consistent with our hypotheses. However, considering its
small effect size (ηp2 = 0.03), as well as lack of a clear-cut
main effect of sexual arousal manipulation, it remains to be
tested whether this represents a robust finding.
Moreover, sexual arousal manipulation did not affect either
of the sexual willingness measures. That is, against our
hypotheses, sexual arousal manipulation did not result in
a general increase in willingness to kiss or to consider having
sex with other- and same-sex stimuli, nor in a specific
increase toward same-sex stimuli or toward stimuli of low and
medium attractiveness. Thus, it seems that under laboratory
conditions, sexual arousal induced by means of erotic videos
was ineffective in amplifying the attractiveness of less physically attractive stimuli or same-sex stimuli to a degree that would increase automatic approach tendencies and selfreported sexual willingness related to the models depicted in
these stimuli. Previous research using self-stimulation at
home (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006), or erotic audio narratives
(Imhoff & Schmidt, 2014) and pornographic film clips
(Skakoon-Sparling et al., 2016) in the lab to increase sexual
arousal, provided evidence that heightened sexual arousal
increased self-reported willingness to engage in uncommon
or risky sexual activities. The current findings indicate that
the impact of sexual arousal does not generally extend to
lowering the threshold for the automatic approach and sexual
willingness toward individuals of low a priori attractiveness.
Despite the fact that there was more potential for an increase
in willingness to have sex with less attractive same-sex stimuli,
especially in men, no such effect was observed. Therefore, the
current findings provide no support for the view that the state
of sexual arousal promotes widening of the array of sexual
stimuli that participants are sexually attracted to by strengthening the motivation to satisfy one’s sexual needs (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Imhoff & Schmidt, 2014; Kringelbach &
Rolls, 2004).
Gender Effects
In line with our predictions, female participants were found to
be more willing to kiss and to consider having sex with
female, rather than male, stimuli of medium attractiveness.
Female participants were equally willing to kiss and to consider having sex with male and female stimuli of low attractiveness. In contrast, male participants were consistently more
willing to kiss female than male stimuli across all attractiveness levels. Thus, in agreement with previous theoretical and empirical works (Baumeister, 2000; Diamond, 2008; SavinWilliams & Ream, 2007), as well as our predictions, female
participants were characterized by a greater breadth of subjective sexual responding than male participants, as indicated by their equal willingness to kiss and to consider having sex
with both male and female models of low and medium attractiveness. In contrast, the breadth of subjective sexual responding of male participants was generally small, in the sense that
men were uniformly more willing to kiss and to consider
having sex with female rather than with male models, regardless of their attractiveness. No generally accepted explanation
exists for the observed sex differences, with researchers proposing that various evolutionary and sociocultural influences may be at play (e.g., Baumeister, 2004; Buss & Schmitt, 1993;
Simpson & Gangestad, 1992). Regarding sociocultural influences, some point to the fact that there is generally a greater social acceptance toward non-heterosexual expression of
female than male sexuality (e.g., Herek, 2002). Thus, perhaps
the observed gender effects reflect the fact that same-sex
sexual behavior among women is viewed as more socially
acceptable than the same behavioral expression among men.
It is also noteworthy that female participants showed no
differential preference for male and female stimuli of low
attractiveness but seemed to prefer female stimuli of medium
attractiveness over male stimuli of the same attractiveness,
while expressing preference for male stimuli of high attractiveness over female stimuli of high attractiveness. A positive sexual response can generally be expected to occur in response
to the preferred (gendered) stimuli. Yet, sexual orientation
can be comprised of multiple dimensions e.g., sexual activity
preference, age, nurturance, etc. (Chivers & Brotto, 2017).
Thus, it could be that the highly attractive stimuli were
appraised differently than those of medium and low attractiveness on one or more of those dimensions, increasing the salience of gendered preference for sexual stimuli. To arrive at
firmer conclusions concerning the nature of response specificity in men and women, more research into sociocultural gender roles, as well as the cognitive and affective systems
governing the processing of sexual stimuli, is needed.
Men and women showed some differences with regard to
their pattern of automatic approach behaviors toward sexual
stimuli of low, medium, and high attractiveness. This differential pattern seemed to be mainly driven by a relatively strong inclination of women to avoid stimuli of low attractiveness. Low value mates, such as those depicted in the stimuli of low attractiveness, can induce feelings of (sexual)
disgust (Tybur et al., 2009), an emotion associated with strong
avoidance tendencies (Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, &
DeScioli, 2013). Women tend to be more prone and sensitive
to disgust experiences than men (Grauvogl et al., 2015; Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994), and thus, the behavioral avoidance
away from the sexual stimuli of low attractiveness observed
among women might have been driven by sex differences in
disgust sensitivity.
Humor could be the feeling of Rapid Anxiety Reduction, with strong correspondencies to False Alarm Theory, Benign Violation Theory, and Cognitive Debugging Theory
Rapid Anxiety Reduction (RAR): A unified theory of humor. Adam Safron. arXiv, Nov 8 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.02364
Abstract: Here I propose a novel theory in which humor is the feeling of Rapid Anxiety Reduction (RAR). According to RAR, humor can be expressed in a simple formula: -d(A)/dt. RAR has strong correspondences with False Alarm Theory, Benign Violation Theory, and Cognitive Debugging Theory, all of which represent either special cases or partial descriptions at alternative levels of analysis. Some evidence for RAR includes physiological similarities between hyperventilation and laughter and the fact that smiles often indicate negative affect in non-human primates (e.g. fear grimaces where teeth are exposed as a kind of inhibited threat display). In accordance with Benign Violation Theory, if humor reliably indicates both a) anxiety induction, b) anxiety reduction, and c) the time-course over which anxiety is reduced, then the intersection of these conditions productively constrains inference spaces over latent mental states with respect to the values and capacities of the persons experiencing humor. In this way, humor is a powerful cypher for understanding persons in both individual and social contexts, with far-reaching implications. Finally, if humor can be expressed in such a simple formula with clear ties to phenomenology, and yet this discovery regarding such an essential part of the human experience has remained undiscovered for this long, then this is an extremely surprising state of affairs worthy of further investigation. Towards this end, I propose an analogy can be found with consciousness studies, where in addition to the "Hard problem" of trying to explain humor, we would do well to consider a "Meta-Problem" of why humor seems so difficult to explain, and why relatively simple explanations may have eluded us for this long. (Please note: RAR was conceived in 2008, and last majorly updated in 2012.)
Abstract: Here I propose a novel theory in which humor is the feeling of Rapid Anxiety Reduction (RAR). According to RAR, humor can be expressed in a simple formula: -d(A)/dt. RAR has strong correspondences with False Alarm Theory, Benign Violation Theory, and Cognitive Debugging Theory, all of which represent either special cases or partial descriptions at alternative levels of analysis. Some evidence for RAR includes physiological similarities between hyperventilation and laughter and the fact that smiles often indicate negative affect in non-human primates (e.g. fear grimaces where teeth are exposed as a kind of inhibited threat display). In accordance with Benign Violation Theory, if humor reliably indicates both a) anxiety induction, b) anxiety reduction, and c) the time-course over which anxiety is reduced, then the intersection of these conditions productively constrains inference spaces over latent mental states with respect to the values and capacities of the persons experiencing humor. In this way, humor is a powerful cypher for understanding persons in both individual and social contexts, with far-reaching implications. Finally, if humor can be expressed in such a simple formula with clear ties to phenomenology, and yet this discovery regarding such an essential part of the human experience has remained undiscovered for this long, then this is an extremely surprising state of affairs worthy of further investigation. Towards this end, I propose an analogy can be found with consciousness studies, where in addition to the "Hard problem" of trying to explain humor, we would do well to consider a "Meta-Problem" of why humor seems so difficult to explain, and why relatively simple explanations may have eluded us for this long. (Please note: RAR was conceived in 2008, and last majorly updated in 2012.)
There seems to be an optimal level of humility, such that those participants who somewhat underestimated their morality with respect to their peers were liked and respected the most
Shared Reality or Shared Illusions? Evaluating Moral Impressions. Maxwell Barranti. PhD Thesis, Psychology Dept, Toronto U, 2019. https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/97321/3/Barranti_Maxwell_201911_PhD_thesis.pdf
Abstract: Moral impressions are some of the most consequential opinions people have about themselves and others. Morality is at the core of identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014), and drives many interpersonal interactions such as cooperation (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005) and affiliation (Bukowski & Sippola, 1998). Yet, little is known about the extent to which these moral impressions are grounded in reality or if they are only held as idiosyncratic impressions. The current investigation evaluated how people see their own and other’s moral character, if these moral impressions are shared, and if a shared understanding of moral character is adaptive. First, I developed and tested a measurement model for assessing self- and other-impressions of morality which removes a global evaluative bias from moral impressions (Studies 1 and 2). Second, I evaluated if self- and other-impressions are grounded in a shared social reality (i.e. self-other agreement and inter-judge consensus) and/or grounded in observable behavior (Study 3). Third, I evaluated if sharing a social reality for moral impressions has interpersonal consequences for the self (Study 4). This work sheds light on the extent to which morality is in the eye of the beholder and the adaptiveness of holding shared moral impressions. Additionally, this work has implications for the assessment of moral character and the adaptiveness of self-knowledge.
1 Importance of moral impressions
1.1 Self-impressions
The beliefs we hold about our own moral character – moral self-impressions – are among the most important beliefs we hold about ourselves (Wojciszke, 2005). Indeed, people’s beliefs about their own morality lie at the heart of their identity (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2017). For example, changing aspects of our moral selves is viewed as fundamentally changing a person, more so than non-moral aspects (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). When people are asked about what traits comprise the ideal person, moral traits are the defining features of an ideal person (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). Even after death, loved ones emphasize the morality of the recently deceased (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). People value a moral self-image (Jordan & Mullen, 2011; Monin & Jordan, 2009) and have a strong desire to see themselves as moral (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Given how much people care about their own morality it stands to reason that holding moral self-perceptions may be a fundamental psychological need (Prentice, Jayawickreme, Hawkins, Hartley, Furr, & Fleeson, 2018). Taken together, this suggests that moral self-perceptions are an important part of people’s lives.
1.2 Other-impressions
It isn’t just our own morality that people care deeply about. People also care deeply about the morality of others (Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2012). This is evidenced by the amount of time and effort people put into seeking and sharing information about the moral character of others. People preferentially seek out morally relevant information more so than non-moral information when forming an impression of others (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Further, and they regularly share information about the moral character of people they know. For example, people regularly gossip about morality (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Peters & Kashima 2015). A conservative estimate is that on any given day there is about a 15% chance to learn about moral acts of others (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). In essence, people exert effort into learning the morality of others.
Part of why people try to understand the other’s morality is because they believe it is useful information for guiding important interpersonal decisions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, people use their impressions about other’s moral character to inform a wide variety of decisions. As such, moral impressions carry consequence. Moral character impressions affect who people like and trust (Goodwin et al., 2014). Friendships and relationships are sought and ended based on moral judgments (Van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). Decisions about whom to trust with valuable resources (e.g. money) are informed by moral character judgments (e.g. money; De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005). People avoid working with people who are uncooperative. For example, people prefer to work with other’s when they have seen them make large contributions to a public good (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). Leaders are elected based on constituent impressions of their morality. For example, voters prefer candidates that appear trustworthy (Chen, Jing, & Lee, 2014). All of this evidence suggests that being seen as a moral person has positive interpersonal consequences.
In essence, people care deeply about their own morality and exert lots of effort to understand the moral character of others. The well documented dominance of moral impressions in our social lives has driven scholars to regard morality as a fundamental dimension of person perception (Brambilla & Leach, 2014, Goodwin et al., 2014; Wojciszke, 2005). And yet, despite the importance of moral impressions in our lives and its fundamental role in person perception, current work has not adequately addressed several fundamental questions about moral character impressions. Are our moral impressions grounded in reality? Is holding realistic moral impressions adaptive? To address these fundamental questions, it is important to understand the process by which accurate moral impressions form and the challenges that stand in the way of forming accurate moral impressions.
4 In lab and daily behaviors
Despite evidence of convergence between self- and other-impressions of morality, there was little evidence that self-impressions were related to moral behaviors. Self-impressions were not associated with in-lab cooperation behavior nor with daily reports from participants about their own behavior. There was some evidence that other-impressions are related to moral behavior. Specifically, other-impressions were related to in-lab cooperation behaviors in the public goods game. However, there was no relationship between other-impressions and daily reports of moral behavior.
If my measures of behaviors are taken as a valid criterion of accuracy, then these results suggest that people are somewhat accurate about the morality of others. But that people are inaccurate about their own morality. This is mostly in line with SOKA model predictions that the evaluative nature of a moral impression prevents selves from holding accurate impressions and the somewhat internal nature of morality makes it difficult for other’s to form an accurate moral impression. And in general these results are in line with some recent work that suggest that impressions are not tethered to acoustical recordings of behaviors for either agreeableness (Beer & Vazire, 2017) or moral impressions (Bollich, 2016).
5 Is sharing reality adaptive?
Using polynomial regression and response surface analysis, I found that those participants that share a social reality did not experience the most social value. Instead, there was an optimal level of humility, such that those participants who somewhat underestimated their morality with respect to their peers were liked and respected the most. There seems to be a balancing act between the benefits of sharing a social reality and being somewhat humble with respect to peers. The result of this balance is that some, but not too much humility was associated with highest levels of social value.
Although the general pattern for moral impression suggested the optimal approach for participants was to be humble with respect to their peers, this was not the case for the domain of fairness. Instead, peer’s impression of fairness was positively related to social value, regardless of how people saw themselves. This suggests that there are no benefits of humility, nor costs to enhancement in the domain of fairness. Though some caution should be used when interpreting domain specific effects, as little systematic domain variance was detected in studies 1 & 2.
Abstract: Moral impressions are some of the most consequential opinions people have about themselves and others. Morality is at the core of identity (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014), and drives many interpersonal interactions such as cooperation (Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005) and affiliation (Bukowski & Sippola, 1998). Yet, little is known about the extent to which these moral impressions are grounded in reality or if they are only held as idiosyncratic impressions. The current investigation evaluated how people see their own and other’s moral character, if these moral impressions are shared, and if a shared understanding of moral character is adaptive. First, I developed and tested a measurement model for assessing self- and other-impressions of morality which removes a global evaluative bias from moral impressions (Studies 1 and 2). Second, I evaluated if self- and other-impressions are grounded in a shared social reality (i.e. self-other agreement and inter-judge consensus) and/or grounded in observable behavior (Study 3). Third, I evaluated if sharing a social reality for moral impressions has interpersonal consequences for the self (Study 4). This work sheds light on the extent to which morality is in the eye of the beholder and the adaptiveness of holding shared moral impressions. Additionally, this work has implications for the assessment of moral character and the adaptiveness of self-knowledge.
1 Importance of moral impressions
1.1 Self-impressions
The beliefs we hold about our own moral character – moral self-impressions – are among the most important beliefs we hold about ourselves (Wojciszke, 2005). Indeed, people’s beliefs about their own morality lie at the heart of their identity (Heiphetz, Strohminger, & Young, 2017). For example, changing aspects of our moral selves is viewed as fundamentally changing a person, more so than non-moral aspects (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014). When people are asked about what traits comprise the ideal person, moral traits are the defining features of an ideal person (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007). Even after death, loved ones emphasize the morality of the recently deceased (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). People value a moral self-image (Jordan & Mullen, 2011; Monin & Jordan, 2009) and have a strong desire to see themselves as moral (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Given how much people care about their own morality it stands to reason that holding moral self-perceptions may be a fundamental psychological need (Prentice, Jayawickreme, Hawkins, Hartley, Furr, & Fleeson, 2018). Taken together, this suggests that moral self-perceptions are an important part of people’s lives.
1.2 Other-impressions
It isn’t just our own morality that people care deeply about. People also care deeply about the morality of others (Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2012). This is evidenced by the amount of time and effort people put into seeking and sharing information about the moral character of others. People preferentially seek out morally relevant information more so than non-moral information when forming an impression of others (Brambilla, Rusconi, Sacchi, & Cherubini, 2011; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Further, and they regularly share information about the moral character of people they know. For example, people regularly gossip about morality (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner, 2012; Peters & Kashima 2015). A conservative estimate is that on any given day there is about a 15% chance to learn about moral acts of others (Hofmann, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014). In essence, people exert effort into learning the morality of others.
Part of why people try to understand the other’s morality is because they believe it is useful information for guiding important interpersonal decisions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, people use their impressions about other’s moral character to inform a wide variety of decisions. As such, moral impressions carry consequence. Moral character impressions affect who people like and trust (Goodwin et al., 2014). Friendships and relationships are sought and ended based on moral judgments (Van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008). Decisions about whom to trust with valuable resources (e.g. money) are informed by moral character judgments (e.g. money; De Bruin & Van Lange, 1999; Delgado, Frank, & Phelps, 2005). People avoid working with people who are uncooperative. For example, people prefer to work with other’s when they have seen them make large contributions to a public good (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). Leaders are elected based on constituent impressions of their morality. For example, voters prefer candidates that appear trustworthy (Chen, Jing, & Lee, 2014). All of this evidence suggests that being seen as a moral person has positive interpersonal consequences.
In essence, people care deeply about their own morality and exert lots of effort to understand the moral character of others. The well documented dominance of moral impressions in our social lives has driven scholars to regard morality as a fundamental dimension of person perception (Brambilla & Leach, 2014, Goodwin et al., 2014; Wojciszke, 2005). And yet, despite the importance of moral impressions in our lives and its fundamental role in person perception, current work has not adequately addressed several fundamental questions about moral character impressions. Are our moral impressions grounded in reality? Is holding realistic moral impressions adaptive? To address these fundamental questions, it is important to understand the process by which accurate moral impressions form and the challenges that stand in the way of forming accurate moral impressions.
4 In lab and daily behaviors
Despite evidence of convergence between self- and other-impressions of morality, there was little evidence that self-impressions were related to moral behaviors. Self-impressions were not associated with in-lab cooperation behavior nor with daily reports from participants about their own behavior. There was some evidence that other-impressions are related to moral behavior. Specifically, other-impressions were related to in-lab cooperation behaviors in the public goods game. However, there was no relationship between other-impressions and daily reports of moral behavior.
If my measures of behaviors are taken as a valid criterion of accuracy, then these results suggest that people are somewhat accurate about the morality of others. But that people are inaccurate about their own morality. This is mostly in line with SOKA model predictions that the evaluative nature of a moral impression prevents selves from holding accurate impressions and the somewhat internal nature of morality makes it difficult for other’s to form an accurate moral impression. And in general these results are in line with some recent work that suggest that impressions are not tethered to acoustical recordings of behaviors for either agreeableness (Beer & Vazire, 2017) or moral impressions (Bollich, 2016).
5 Is sharing reality adaptive?
Using polynomial regression and response surface analysis, I found that those participants that share a social reality did not experience the most social value. Instead, there was an optimal level of humility, such that those participants who somewhat underestimated their morality with respect to their peers were liked and respected the most. There seems to be a balancing act between the benefits of sharing a social reality and being somewhat humble with respect to peers. The result of this balance is that some, but not too much humility was associated with highest levels of social value.
Although the general pattern for moral impression suggested the optimal approach for participants was to be humble with respect to their peers, this was not the case for the domain of fairness. Instead, peer’s impression of fairness was positively related to social value, regardless of how people saw themselves. This suggests that there are no benefits of humility, nor costs to enhancement in the domain of fairness. Though some caution should be used when interpreting domain specific effects, as little systematic domain variance was detected in studies 1 & 2.
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